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“From Disharmony to Harmony” A Typology of Great Power Concerts

Carsten Rauch and Iris Wurm

Paper prepared for presentation

at the ISA`s 54th

Annual Convention at San Francisco, CA, USA April 3-6, 2013

Content 1. Where we come from – “A 21st Century Concert of Powers”: The Project ..................................... 2

2.Why the need for security governance? Structural Developments and Actual Conflicts ................ 3

Power Shift and Power Transition as Structural Challenges to Global Peace ................................. 4

Concrete and latent Great Power Conflicts ..................................................................................... 7

The Solution: Great Power Multilateralism through a Concert of Powers ..................................... 9

3.Towards a Concert Typology .......................................................................................................... 10

A Disharmonic Choir – IR Theory and the Concert of Europe ....................................................... 11

What is a “concert”? Minimum requirements .............................................................................. 14

Some optional concert dimensions ............................................................................................... 15

Concert of Europe vs. 21st Century Concert .................................................................................. 19

4.Provisional Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 21

Literature ........................................................................................................................................... 22

Carsten Rauch Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Baseler Straße 27-31 60329 Frankfurt rauch@hsfk.de

Iris Wurm Goethe University Frankfurt

Grüneburgplatz 1 60323 Frankfurt

wurm@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

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1. Where we come from – “A 21st Century Concert of Powers”: The Project

This paper is an offspring from the international research project “A 21st Century Concert of

Powers”, funded by Compagnia di San Paolo, the VolkswagenStiftung and the Riksbankens

Jubileumsfond and conducted by 20-plus researchers of seven different countries.

The project searches for ways to establish a multilateral system for global security

governance to cope with the challenges of the 21st century and to define the place of the

European Union therein.

The European Union, in its evolution and its present being, has been embedded grew and

deepened in a system of transatlantic hegemony. This hegemony started with World War II

and defended pride of place, even in the bipolar rivalry throughout the Cold War. It further

evolved in a system characterized by a short “unipolar moment” in the 1990s and a following

hybrid with unipolar and multipolar elements. Living in the age of globalization and power

change, we face a seminal transition from the transatlantic-dominated, state-centred,

geostrategic, and geoeconomic era to a future international system that will be multipolar

and in which emerging nation states like China and India will play a much more significant

role. Nevertheless, this more complex world is also highly interdependent in all policy fields,

not the least in the field of security. It is therefore in need for governance structures which

are able to prevent major war and minimize international and transnational violence. For

that purpose, a security management system is required in which all major powers

participate in a cooperative fashion.

The project uses a particular episode of European history, the 19th century „Concert of

Europe“ as a template for managing and shaping the upcoming power transition as well as

great power relations in general in a peaceful manner. We do, however, recognize the need

to amend and further develop this template in order to apply it in a promising way. It has to

include procedural and normative arrangements able to incorporate great powers with

different normative systems and competing justice claims into a joint project of war

prevention and world governance. The project aims to devise such a system adapted to the

challenges of the present world, and to define a strategy for the European Union to initiate

and foster its construction in cooperation with the other great powers.

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2. Why the need for security governance? Structural Developments and Actual Conflicts

While the number and type of actors has multiplied in the process of globalization, great

powers retain their dominant role in international security. Great powers are still

responsible for most of the global goods as well as global bads produced in the international

system and most of all play a key role in questions concerning war and peace.

It is a truism that there are certain global challenges that can’t be met individually but only in

coordinated or even concerted measures. Some of these challenges might be of a nature

that allows up to a certain point for a unilateral response. Terrorism for example can of

course be fought unilaterally, but the chances for success might be extremely higher when

different countries try to work together. Other challenges, like climate change eschew

unilateral responses altogether, they will either be addressed collectively or not at all.

The gravest risk however might very well be the next system-wide, great power war. While

some scholars now subscribe to the thesis of the “obsolescence of major war” (John

Mueller) and cite as diverse phenomena as continued nuclear deterrence and the spread of

democracy as causes of continued great power peace1, others still disagree. But even if one

concurs with the notion that interstate war let alone interstate war between the major

powers is much less likely today than say in the late 19th and the early and mid 20th Century,

one can still see it a dangerous possibility, as the probability of occurrence cannot stand

alone but has to be multiplied with the expected ramifications. And as these ramifications of

a war between modern (mostly nuclear armed) great powers go beyond anything that

humankind has experienced before, even a minimal probability of occurrence cannot serve

as pacifier. One can also ask: Is the probability of occurrence really minimal? While this

might seem so today, the changing global power patterns point in a slightly different

direction.

The current situation is characterized by latent and manifest conflicts between great powers

combined with seminal structural shifts in the global power structure. Already dangerous by

themselves, these phenomena combined represent a hazardous powder keg that imperils

the peace and stability of the international order more than is commonly noticed.

1 There have of course been other forms of warfare (for example intra-state wars and proxy wars). A security

structure based on great power multilateralism should also deal with these phenomena but they pale in comparison to a war between the great powers themselves.

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Power Shift and Power Transition as Structural Challenges to Global Peace

The current world order is denoted by a system of transatlantic hegemony. This hegemony

started with World War II and defended pride of place, even in the bipolar rivalry throughout

the Cold War. As of now, we have without a doubt left the era of bipolarity that ended along

the Cold War in 1989. Bipolarity was followed by what was termed by some the unipolar

moment, indicating that US preponderance would not be a lasting feature of the

international system. Specifically realists like Kenneth Waltz und John Mearsheimer

expected other countries to balance US Power rather sooner than later. However, US

predominance proved to posses more longevity than was expected. Today still the US is

leading in all major power indicators, from GDP to military expenditure and also sits atop of

most2 power indices combining several single indicators.

The current configuration of power in the international system is as follows: While the US

emerged victorious from the Cold War and unquestionably remains the strongest power

today, its unipolar moment is waning fast It has become clear that Washington can neither

manage international challenges on its own, nor within the transatlantic framework, nor

through its increasingly disputed claim of normative leadership. Rising powers like China and

India advance their own views about how best to manage the international system and

demand a greater say in international decision-making processes.

While the US continues to stay at the top for the time being, recent years and future show

that major shifts in power are currently underway (Smith 2002; Kupchan 2003; Layne 2006).

This is exemplified through the development of GDP growth rates: While the US still keeps

an enormous advantage in absolute numbers, its (as well as the Western European and

Japanese) growth rates have been significantly lower than those of some rising powers

(especially China and India). Projecting these trends into the future, as has been done for

example by the famous BRIC studies of Goldman-Sachs (Wilson/Purushothaman 2003,

Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group 2007) shows not only some power rearrangements

in the international system and the establishment of some new power poles but also points

towards the possibility of a literal power transition, that is an overtaking at the top of the

international system.

2 One exception ist he CINC index of the Correlates of War Project. Here China has overtaken the US as

strongest power as soon as XXXX.

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Annual GDP-Growth of the United Staes, China und India 1990-2010 in %3

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

19

90

19

92

19

94

19

96

19

98

20

00

20

02

20

04

20

06

20

08

20

10

China Indien USA

Regarding the distribution of power in the international system we are therefore facing to

related but (especially theoretically and analytically) different developments:

1. In the short and medium term: The relative decline of the current dominant

power coupled with the relative rise of some other actors4 leading to a

multipolarization of the international system.

2. In the medium and long term: The meteoric rise of some powers that will

eventually overtake the struggling hegemon and lead to a power transition.

From differing theoretical positions both of these trends seem to be troubling as they could

heighten the risk of occurrence of interstate great power war.

Realism is the one school of thought that has always paid most attention, to the power

distribution in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001, Waltz 1979;

Morgenthau/Thompson 1993). While there have been disputes in the past about which

configuration is most conductible to peace and stability, it has become somewhat canonic

since the work of Kenneth Waltz to see multipolarity as most conflict-prone power-

configuration. Overreaction and misperception reign supreme and multipolar alliance

system are vulnerable to pathologies such as chain ganging and buck passing. Randall

3 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG;.

4 Here we are concerned mainly with states. But an argument can be made that power is not only being

redistributed among states but also diffusing and wandering to non-state actors like international firms, NGOs etc.

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Schweller has highlighted in his work that the most dangerous form of multipolarity is

tripolarity (Schweller 1998). However, tripolarity (with the US, China and India as the major

poles) might be exactly what lies before us in a few decades time.

Power transition theory, just as realism, has a focus on international power, but in a quite

different way (Tammen et al. 2000, Organski/Kugler 1980, Organski 1958). The approach

claims that the international system is most stable and peaceful when one power is

predominant. It follows that times of power transitions are particularly prone to great-power

war. When new powers are rising and preponderance is giving way to parity, wars of

transition become possible or even likely. The reasons are as follows: The international order

with its norms, regimes and institutions was established by the dominant power and its

allies. They receive most of this order’s benefits, turning these into private rather than public

goods. These goods may be of material (wealth, security) or immaterial (status, recognition,

justice) nature. Whenever there is a rising power with the potential to overtake the current

dominant power there is the danger that the former might decide to challenge this

international order and to replace it with one of its own making.5 The declining state’s

tendency to cling to its privileges and the eagerness of rising powers to recast the system to

their advantage substantially raises the likelihood of violent conflict – and even system-wide

war.6 However, not all power transitions in history have led to war. It is still disputed within

the power transition school why some transitions have progressed peacefully. The majority

views the rising power(s)’ (dis-)satisfaction with the status quo of the international order as

crucial: The more dissatisfied a rising power, the higher the probability for a violent power

transition. This – not changing power patterns per se – is the reason for big system wide

power transition or hegemonic wars. Hence a rising power that is satisfied with the current

international order does not necessarily feel the need to attack the hegemon. To satisfy the

rising power, while at the same time keep the dominant power satisfied and also not to

forget the satisfaction status of secondary powers is, unfortunately, all but trivial.

5 Lesser powers might harbor such wishes too but they do not have the capabilities to be more than a mere

nuisance to the dominant power. 6 In today’s world according to this perspective conflicts between the former superpower, its European allies

and newly emerging powers appear to be likely; while the former cling to their leadership positions in the institutions and systems of governance established after WWII, the latter call for positions corresponding to the actual and future distribution of power. Because all sides formulate legitimate demands from their respective points of view, the coming power transition needs to be understood in terms of justice disputes - a type of conflict that has a high potential for violence.

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While realism and power transition theory are the usual suspects for rather pessimistic

policy forecasts, even generally more optimistic perspectives like liberalism (in the form of

democratic peace theory) and constructivism lead the some provisos concerning the

“obsolescence of major war” (Mueller 1989). According to liberalism (Moravcsik 1997) and

constructivism (Wendt 1999, Katzenstein 1996), ideational factors like ideology and identity

can also contribute to conflict.7

Concrete and latent Great Power Conflicts

But not only is structural conflict a serious possibility, additionally there are latent as well as

concrete points of conflict between today’s major power. Thus we now turn to relations as

well as conflicts between the quadruple of the US, India, China and Russia. Those four are

arguably those between who the top spot of the international power pyramid will be

contested, which makes their clash all the more dangerous according to the above

discussion about polarity and power transition.8

Besides some interests, concerns and perceptions that may lead to conflicts down the road9,

some conflicts already exist now, even if in nascent form: Maybe the most virulent issue in

7 Democracy, for example, has been widely interpreted as force of peace, but recent research has shown that

the very same factors that compel democratic states to be peaceful between one another can also induce them to engage in aggressive politics towards non-democracies (Müller/Wolff 2006). Also cultural differences come to mind. While some countries now see sovereignty as a conditional good (depending on for example human right standards) it remains the central tenet of their foreign policy for others. Especially those powers whose own sovereignty was jeopardized, impaired or even revoked during large parts of the last century (ironically often by the same powers that now call the value of sovereignty in question again) are not at all ready to accept any qualification of the concept. 8 Before we come to some more or less hot conflicts it should also be pointed out that there are some

structural dissensions about certain issues which might lead to conflict or at least prevent joined conflict management/resolution. Often these issues are related to ideological and cultural factors. Regarding the former, Democracy, for example, has been widely interpreted as force of peace, but recent research has shown that the very same factors that compel democratic states to be peaceful between one another can also induce them to engage in aggressive politics towards non-democracies. It remains to be seen how the democratic powers of today are able to cope with a more assertive non-democratic China and a Russia that seems to become rather more than less autocratic. Regarding the latter cultural differences and different historical experiences come to mind: While, for example, some countries now see sovereignty as conditioned on observing certain standards of governance, it remains an indispensible asset for others. Especially those powers whose own sovereignty was jeopardized, impaired or even revoked during large parts of the last centuries are not to accept any conditionality of the concept. Furthermore the use of (military) force to resolve international crises and the relationship between states and markets also depend very much on (political) culture. 9 There are a number of more or less troubling relationships between them: India is ostensibly America’s new

strategic partner but its relations with the other great powers remain somewhat ambiguous. While the country is wary of China on issues of hard security, it is closer to China and wary of the West on other issues of core interest, in particular soft security problems such as climate change and the world economy as well as the question of humanitarian intervention. China in return is concerned over India, perceiving the territorial

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the future will be the South Chinese Sea where China pursues territorial claims against those

of the members of ASEAN bordering this international water, and the US takes the role as

the protector of the latter ones. Then there is the issue of Taiwan which may flare up at any

point. Between India and China, there are unresolved territorial disputes and China is also a

relevant factor in the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Additionally, China has

warned India against joining the US as naval protector of the ASEAN neighborhood, where

the US, China and India are conducting a kind of naval arms race. Furthermore, the U.S.,

Russia, China, and India are involved in an incipient nuclear arms race, triggered by superior

strategic US conventional strike options and the pursuit by America of a national missile

defense system; either development is seen as a threat to the viability of the national

nuclear deterrent by both Russia and China, and either is reacting with countermeasures,

Russia with producing a new multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, and China

enlarging slowly but steadily its nuclear arsenal. Since India will determine its own

deterrence need with regard to the Chinese posture, a four-side arms race is under way that

might contain the risk of instability. A “wildcard risk” is the growing hunger for crude oil in

the US, China and India which makes the Persian Gulf a potential conflict hot spot between

them. But even in the absence of such a resource driven conflict the wider middle east, with

issues like the Arab spring, the civil war in Syria, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the recurring

conflict about the Iranian nuclear program shows the necessity of great power cooperation,

as well as the dangers associated with missing cooperation and conflicts that might arise

over such cooperation (e.g. differences between the West and Russia/China how to handle

Syria and Iran).

Despite these conflicts all of today’s major powers, fortunately, can also be said to share

some general stability-related interests, including the elimination of threats posed by

terrorism, the spread of WMDs and the prevention of conflict. Furthermore some global

dispute over Zangnan as a potential source of war as well as Indian harboring of Tibet’s exile government as a threat to its territorial integrity. With respect to the U.S., China furthermore believes that the country is trying to balance or even constrain China’s “peaceful development” from the international level down to the domestic level. Although in principle maintaining good relations with Russia, nevertheless some conflictual issues remain such as Russian arm trade with ASEAN countries or China’s increasing influence in Central Asia. Furthermore there is some Russian concern about Chinese immigration into Eastern Siberia and both countries continue to be somewhat suspicious of each other’s (potential re-) rise. Russia’s relations towards the U.S., significantly driven by the former superpower’s status concerns, remain severely restrained. Russia accuses the U.S. of acting as a “political engineer” both in strategically important regions and in matters of internal affairs such as the latest opposition movement. The possible enlargement of NATO towards its borders and the unresolved dispute over the planned anti-ballistic missile system remain a matter of concern.

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governance problems demand great power coordination, unless they should remain

unsolvable.

The Solution: Great Power Multilateralism through a Concert of Powers

The above should have demonstrated that while there is no immediate powder keg in sight

and while there are good reasons to believe that interstate war has at least lost its place in

the standard tool box of (great power) politicians, it cannot be ruled out and the risk of

occurrence is ascending rather than descending.

As the historical record shows, however, the potential for great power violence should not

lead one to disregard the potential for governance among them. After all, common needs

and interests – especially to avoid costly and bloody wars and to ensure political and

economic stability – have often mitigated the rivalry. From time to time, this has even

resulted in common political will, the successful management of inter-power conflict, and

intense, institutionalised cooperation.

History does not offer many successful structures of this kind. The league of nations in the

interwar period was colossally unsuccessful and did neither hinder the Second World War,

nor individual aggression against other member states by Germany, Italy, Japan and the

Soviet Union in the years before the war. The United Nations are plagued by reproaches

concerning a lack of efficiency as well as a lack of legitimacy. This is not surprising given that

(despite the presence of the five winners of the Second World War as permanent members

of the Security Council) it is an organization that was established during and for the

management of a bipolar world and is now overcharged to deal with the emerging non-

bipolar, non-unipolar world order.

A framework that has been extraordinarily successful in coping with a multipolar

environment was the European Concert in the 19th century (Müller/Rauch 2011, Schulz

2009). While the concert eventually crumbled down, it prevented great power war and

managed great power relations peacefully for more than one generation, which is quite an

achievement in this war-prone era. By contrast, when it malfunctioned or even broke down,

common bads occurred, such as the Crimean War or the First World War. Moreover, in

comparison to other types of peaceful systems which were either based on a hegemonic

(East Asian system from ca 1200 to ca 1700) or bipolar structure (post-WW II world), the

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Concert was run as an institutionalized management system among equals and therefore

seems much more similar to the present time.

3. Towards a Concert Typology

Thinking about a suitable instititution for great power security governance and the historical

record of the “European Concert”, thus led us straightforward to the idea of a concert. But

what exactly constitutes a concert? And what exactly constituted the Concert of Europe?

During our first project conference we witnessed that much lay in the eye of the beholder:

While our group was united in the general problem definition and shared the aspiration to

design a multilateral great power security governance structure, the notion of “concert”

delighted not everyone. We quickly found that some of us associated the concert with the

accomplishment to have kept the peace in Europe, other pointed out is association with

European imperialism and wars in the periphery, while still others questioned if not the main

function was to keep the authoritarian monarchical political systems safe from the

democratic and nationalistic challenges. Some maintained that the concert included ALL of

these features, thus having good and bad sides, while others held that some of these

features genuinely belonged to the concert while others did not.

The notion of “concert” thus, is far less unproblematic than one could imagine, given the

existing historical template. It is worth considering it in detail.10 One can do so in many

different aspects (outward orientation, inward orientation, domain, decision-making etc.).

What we endeavor to do in the remainder of this paper is to first ask who the notion of

“concert” fits with different IR theoretical approaches or as the case may be how these

approaches utilize the concert idea, before sketching a provisional concert typology in which

we compare, how the 19th Century Concert of Europe and our projects envisioned 21st

Century Concert score in some concert-relevant dimensions.

10

While the overall project is more concerned with the empirical and policy related side of a 21st

Century Concert, ours is not the only offspring that tries to come to terms with the notion of concert. An earlier unpublished project working paper entitled “Concerts of Powers in History and Theory” has been prepared by project participants Andrew Hurrell and Andam Humphreys in 2011.

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A Disharmonic Choir – IR Theory and the Concert of Europe

Realism and the Concert of Europe

As showed above enduring security cooperation among all the great powers presents a

major disagreement with realism and its conception of cooperation. On the one hand, a

concert of relatively equal great powers is not based on the hegemony of one power. On the

other hand, a coalition of all the great powers is not in danger of a major external threat. It is

hard to imagine a common interest that unites all the great powers and is strong enough to

sustain cooperation among them for a considerable time without being undermined by

conflicting interests. Thus it seems that for realism the cooperation of great powers is very

difficult to explain and realism does not seem especially suitable to explain the structure of

the concert. Korina Kagan disagrees, however, as for her the “great power behavior under

the Concert was in full accord with realist expectations” (Kagan 1997: 3).

Kagan cites two major reasons why realism is the best approach to explain the European

great power concert. First, a concert may be viewed as a short-lived phenomenon that only

emerges temporarily at the end of major counterhegemonic wars. It is a coalition among the

winners that carries over into the first few years of peace, because of a common fear of

renewed aggression on the part of the defeated hegemon, which results in a common desire

to keep it down. Thus, her argument is “the cooperation is indeed based on a common

threat” (Kagan 1997: 14f). A second realist explanation argues with the assumption of a

common threat as well; but in this case the threat is transnational rather than external—

namely, a fear of revolution that was shared by all the European powers (Kagan 1997: 16).

Realism also utilizes the concept of Balance of power to explain the cooperation between

the great powers in Europe. As Branislav Slantchev argues “balance of power is perhaps the

most common, and certainly the most venerable, explanation” (Slantchev 2005:9). The

Concert can thus be explained as “balance of power that deters aggression. Deterrence

operates because states confront each other with relatively equal military capability”

(Kupchan/Kupchan 1991:117). Robert Jervis is more explicit and lists four assumptions that

constitute the foundation of the Balance of Power system: all states must want to survive,

they must be able to form alliances with each other based on short-term interests, war must

be regarded as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, and several of the actors must have

relatively equal military capabilities (Jervis 1985:58-79).

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Adam Humphreys and Andrew Hurrell argue that a study of historical Concerts can adopt a

realist perspective. They introduce a concert as potential help to smooth the transition from

uni- to multipolarity and refer to the work of both Bull (1977) and Waltz (1979).

These realist explanations can explain the foundation of the concert, but realism is even

better in explaining the ultimate decline of the concert as Kagan argues: Great power

behavior was not far enough removed from short-term self-interests. She further maintains

that rather than being the shining example of a strong security regime that it is claimed to

be, the Concert in reality was an “ineffective institution that did not significantly constrain

state behavior, and did not make that behavior much different from what it is likely to have

been anyway” (Kagan 1997:55). This failure of the Concert is hardly surprising from a realist

point of view, given the impossibly high standards of behavior that it set for the great

powers (Kagan 1997: 55). These conclusions endorse the realist view quoted by W. N.

Medlicott that "the Concert was something which existed when the great powers sat around

a conference table, or found it expedient or convenient to join in collective action; there was

a Concert of Europe when the action of the great powers was concerted, and when it was not

there was not; any more formal arrangement seemed to be neither expedient nor

practicable” (Quoted by Betts 1992:24).

Liberal Perspectives and the Concert of Europe

The Concert of Europe is widely hailed as the major paradigmatic case of a strong and

effective international institution in the area of security governance. According to the

standard description provided by both historians and international relations specialists, the

norms and rules of the Concert accounted for an unusually high degree of security

cooperation among all the European great powers. This is argument is mostly based on the

work of Paul Schroeder, the leading diplomatic historian of the concert period (Schroeder

1972, 1984, 1986, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). Jervis describes the Concert of Europe as the

paradigm of a strong and effective security regime (Jervis 1985, 1992). Institutionalist

analyses of the Concert belong to both the liberal and the constructivist schools. Jervis

discusses the Concert in classic liberal-institutionalist terms and criticizes the concept of

Balance of power as an explanation of the concert. Instead he offers an alternative theory.

According to this view, concert systems arise after, and only after, hegemonic wars (Jervis

1985:60-61). Furthermore he adds a second interpretation: It is not possible to form

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profitable short-term alliances. His argument is based on the explanation of narrow self-

interest where “significant changes in behavior [were] produced by changes in the dangers

and opportunities presented by the environment” (Jervis 1992:722).

Schroeder also argues against the realist position. He points out that “the allies chose moral,

legal, and political means rather than balance of power measures to maintain a balance in

this vital respect” (Schroeder 1992:698). But Slantchev criticizes this position: “In arguing

that balance of power cannot explain the Concert, Schroeder asserts that statesmen had

undergone a profound transformation in their preferences. This view is particularly untenable

because it does not explain how that mutual consensus arose, or why states were able to

agree on it. Even worse, the argument reduces to an unwarranted assumption that is derived

from observable behavior. When some evidence contradicts the assumption, it is summarily

dismissed” (Slantchev 2005: 14). Slantchev argues that state preferences remained

essentially the same they had been during the eighteenth century. Only the new strategic

context prescribed a behavior that was remarkably different. Changes in observable

behavior, however, need not implicate new preferences as their source (Slantchev 2005:15).

Kupchan and Kupchan explain the concert as a “form of collective security”

(Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 120). For them the flexibility and informality of a concert allow the

structure to retain an ongoing undercurrent of balancing behavior among the major powers.

Thus, while a concert is predicated upon the assumption, that its members share compatible

views of a stable international order they remind us that power politics is not eliminated

between the members of a concert. (Kupchan/Kupchan 1991:120).

Kupchan/Kupchan explain that three conditions must impose to build a concert: First, that

there is no hegemon in the system and second, that the potential members must share a

common view of the stability of the system. The third condition is that the major powers

must enjoy a minimum of political solidarity and moral community. More specifically, elites

must share an awareness of an international community, the preservation of which furthers

long-term national interests. It is not sufficient for the major powers simply to share

compatible views of a desirable international order; they must also believe that efforts to

protect and promote political solidarity are needed to bring this vision of order to fruition. In

this sense, national self-interest becomes equated with, but not subjugated to, the welfare

and stability of that international community (Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 124/125).

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Schroeder underlines and broadens this third point. He argues with an constructivist

approach, that a transformation of political thinking took place, based on system-wide

complex learning shared by all the great powers, that produced “a shift in collective

mentality” (Schroeder 1994:47).

Kupchan and Kupchan further maintain that the cooperative framework of a concert and

members’ interests in preserving peace ensure that balancing does not turn into deliberate

exploitation or unintended spirals. Additionally they argue that a concert is able to moderate

the security dilemma when compared to balancing under anarchy. But their generally

positive analysis of the concert as a collective security system is somewhat clouded: “One

final disadvantage of a concert is its exclusivity. As it operated during the nineteenth century,

the Concert acted as a great power club, effectively ignoring, and at times violating, the

concerns of Europe's smaller powers. In a normative sense, this attribute compromises the

collective nature of the enterprise of collective security. While a concert's exclusivity may

have been politically acceptable in the nineteenth century, it would not be so today. While

major powers still have more influence than minor powers in shaping events, international

relations have, at least to some extent, been democratized” (Kupchan/Kupchan 1991:144).

What is a “concert”? Minimum requirements

As the discussion above indicates scholars do indeed disagree about a lot of the features and

even accomplishments of the Concert of Europe. We suggest overcoming this disharmony by

first stripping down the notion of concert to its minimum necessary requirements that all

Concerts (past, present or future) must fulfill to be counted as such, before opening up

several dimensions which are relevant for a concert approach, but on which individual

concerts may vary without losing their concert property.

In a concert of powers, as the name reveals a group of mighty states (powers), regularly

interacts in order to come to common decisions in regard to certain issues (act in concert).

This minimal definition which all forms of concerts should be able to meet already

distinguishes it from other arrangement.

First there is a built-in degree of exclusiveness. A concert of powers can never entail all

states of any given system and its members are not chosen primarily according to

democratic or representational criteria but rather because of their potential to do good or

harm. Neither the United Nations nor the League of Nations therefore can count as a

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concert of powers. (However one could debate whether the Security Council is close to one.)

Second a concert implies some regular interaction between those powers. It does not

demand a solid headquarter or even organization but it is more then mere ad hoc

consultation of interested powers that come together to debate a concrete issues.

Some optional concert dimensions

While all will probably agree an arrangement will have to satisfy these two requirements to

be called a concert, this is obviously not all a concert is about. However, these other

dimensions are ordinal or even metric axes and being a concert does not yet determine were

exactly a given great power arrangement does integrate itself. For example the European

Concert clearly dominated the lesser powers in its realm without giving them voice

opportunity whatsoever, which most of those accepted as they saw it in the responsibility of

the great powers to preserve the international order. Today however, international

legitimacy is of much greater importance and much harder to be earned. For a 21st Century

Concert it will thus be necessary to find ways of inclusion for those that are not members of

the concert.

Without claiming to be exhaustive, we believe that at least nine dimensions are worth

contemplating: Width of membership, degree of formality, decision making procedures,

topical breadth, spatial breadth, dealings with lesser powers, outward orientation and

inward orientation.

16

Figure 1: Non-exhaustive Concert Dimensions

Width of Membership

We have already established that a concert of powers is an exclusive club of great powers.

This observation, however, does not close the issue of membership. What exactly counts as

great power is a question that is often open to debate. But even if one has decided on a

measure on how to rank power, there still remains the question how many of them should

be included. Should membership be limited to only the most powerful of great powers, or

should all great powers be included, or is it even necessary to include some members with

lesser power resources for reasons of representation and legitimacy?

Spatial breadth

Some argue that the European Concerts success in stabilizing and pacifying the European

continent hinged on the possibility of redirecting potential expansion outward (see also the

dimension “Outward Orientation”). Thus it seems to be important what kind of spatial

breadth a concert covers. A concert can be spatially bound, to a specific region or (in the

17

case of the European Concert) continent. In this case there might exist spatial areas outside

of the concerts realm in which the rules and norms that govern great power relations inside

the concerts realm do not apply. At the opposite extreme lies a global concert, that claims

responsibility for the entire international order and thus leaves no space to divert potentially

dangerous tendencies to act “unconcerty”.

Topical breadth

While it is difficult (yet not impossible) to imagine a concert that does not deal with security

governance – after all the questions of war, peace and stability are the most important for

any international system or order, concerts may vary in the degree that other issues are

included. At the one extreme a concert might explicitly limit itself to dealing with (hard)

security issues, while at the other side of the scale a concert might be dealing with any and

all important governance issues ranging from security, over economics up to questions of

health and climate or even exclusively with non-security issues.

Means of crisis managment

As security is at the core of (most forms of a) concert, the management of security crisis and

threats to security and stability is also an important feature of any concert. Here the scope

ranges from a concert that primarily resolves such crises by force, mainly utilizing military

means up to a concert that eschews the use of force and prefers peaceful means such as

dialogue.

Degree of Formality

A concert is no international organization with a physical headquarter, general secretary etc.

It is a comparatively informal body. But the degree of formality or informality is not

predetermined it may vary in the frequency and structure of the concerts meetings and

conferences for example.

Decision Making Procedures

In order to produce stability and peace a concert has to take position and sometimes act in

common. But just like in every international institution there is the question how to arrive at

decisions? At the one extreme a concert could function strictly according to the consensus

principle, where each member is a veto player. At the other extreme one could imagine (and

some scholars attribute this to the European concert) a concert in which the majority

18

decides. In between may lie principles like “consensus minus one” or different concepts of

qualified majorities or (un-)conditional veto opportunities for the participants.

Dealings with Lesser Powers

While a concert performs important tasks related to the international order (in terms of its

topical breadth) it remains an exclusive body. Therefore it is an open question how it deals

with the lesser power. Dependent on its own resources, the need to gain international

legitimacy and the wishes of these powers, it can either dominate those who are not

members and just impose its decisions; or it can try to find measures of inclusion, such as

inviting representatives of non-member states to its meetings and giving them some voice

opportunities.

Outward Orientation

While the last paragraph was concerned with the non-members within the realm of a

concert, it is also of interest how the concert deals with non-member (states or peoples)

outside of this realm. The one extreme has the concert (or individual concert member)

acting in imperialistic and/or colonistic fashion and disregard all the rules and norms

relevant in the concerts realm in the so called terra nullis. At the other extreme the concert

tries to project the peace and stability it keeps within ins realm also to the outside and

interacts in cooperative ways with outsiders.

Inward Orientation

Any concert has a certain degree of exclusiveness that runs counter to its need for

legitimacy. A further point also putting its legitimacy into question is that especially the

Concert of Europe is often seen as a reactionary body.11 Again, this is not necessarily so. A

concerts main task is to provide certain governance goods according to its topical breadth.

That is not inevitably linked to any preference related to the regime type of the participating

states. A concert might however, aggressively promote a certain form of government. That is

not limited to any kind: One could imagine a concert promoting traditional monarchical

values as well as a concert that promotes liberal democracy. That is the two antipodes of this

dimensions are not two regime types (e.g. conservatism vs. liberalism) but the question

whether the concert does concern itself with the regime type of its members (and non- 11

However, as some scholars point out, this might be due to a mix-up of the European Concert and the Holy Alliance, two institutions that had similar membership but quite different goals.

19

members within its realm) at all, or whether it consciously decides not to care about that or

even promotes the Status quo (whatever that may be).

Concert of Europe vs. 21st Century Concert

For a start we have entered the values of our 21st Century Concert (21CC) as envisioned in

our broader research project and compared them with the estimated values of the European

Concert (EC). One has to be cautious, however regarding the European Concerts scores, as

some historians or political scientists may disagree with our codings. We plan to broaden

and advance this scheme in the future by incorporating assessments of different historians

and political scientists (e.g. EC-Schroeder, EC-Jervic, EC-Schulz) to show were their

evaluations of the concert differ from each other as well as from the 21st Century Concert

that our research group plans to develop.

20

Figure 2: The Concert-Dimension and two Concerts

Width of Membership

Smaller Bigger

EC 21CC

Spatial Breadth

Spatially bound (room for expansion)

Spatially unbound (no room for expansion)

EC 21CC

Topical Breadth

Dealing exclusively with security

EC 21CC

Dealing exclusively with non-security issues

Means of CrisisManagment

By force By dialogueEC 21CC

Degree of Informality

More Informal Less Informal

EC 21CC

Decision Making Procedures

Consensus Type Majority Type

EC21CC

Dealings with lesser powers

Dominance Inclusion

EC 21CC

21

Inward Orientation

Promoting a certain regimetyp

Agnostic / Promoting theStatus qou

EC 21CC

Outward Orientation

Imperialistic/Colonialistic

Cooperative

EC 21CC

As is easily apparent and not surprising, the European Concert and the envisioned 21st

Century Concert differ heavily in most of the dimensions with the exception of topical

breadth and degree of informality where the scores are a little bit closer.

4. Provisional Conclusion

We started from the observation that people do not necessarily think of the same when they

utter the term concert. While the 19th Century Europe is praised by most for keeping peace

and stability in Europe, some associate it with less positive traits as imperialism and social

conservatism.

We believe that those are not necessarily part of a concert approach. Thus we stripped

down the notion of concert to two basic requirements: (a) regular concerted interaction

between (b) a exclusive group of great powers.

While all concerts must fulfill these two, there is an array of further dimensions that are

relevant but on which each concert may score on any point of a ordinal or even metric scale.

For now we have filled this proto-typology only with the values of the European Concert and

contrasted them with those of the 21st Century Concert our project envisions. One can easily

see the differences. In further steps we plan to further elaborate this typology adding the

values of different historical approaches two the European Concert. Also it might prove

fruitful, to think about different concert ideal types with the dimensions that we have

established in order to bring more harmony to the notion of concert.

22

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