From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest

Front. Hist. China 2012, 7(2): 175–197 DOI 10.3868/s020-001-012-0010-1

Nicola Di Cosmo ( ) Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA E-mail: [email protected]

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Nicola Di Cosmo

From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest Abstract Before 1644, the Manchu rulers pursued a deliberate policy of alliances with the southern (later “Inner”) Mongol tribes. In the 1630s the system of treaties and alliances gave way to the creation of the League-Banner system, the jasaq system, and the Lifan Yuan. The new territorial and political organization meant that the southern Mongols, while retaining a degree of autonomy, became subjects of the Qing dynasty. This essay explores the historical circumstances of the transformation of the relationship between Manchus and Mongols from partnership to subordination. It also aims to explain the political principles deployed by the Manchus in the redefinition of their relationship with the Mongol elites. More specifically, the essay proposes that the new forms of administration of Inner Mongolia stemmed from a condition of “tutelage.” Tutelage was not simply imposed by the Manchus upon their erstwhile allies, but actively sought by Mongol aristocrats in the context of the intra-Mongol wars carried out by the Čaqar leader Ligdan Khan. Keywords Manchus, Mongols, southern Mongols, Qing, tutelage, alliance, Ligdan Khan

Introduction

Over the past several years a compelling, if somewhat unfocused, discussion has taken place among Qing historians about the relationship between the Qing frontier and empire building. Scholars have questioned the notion that the Manchus were only responsible for the reunification of China or restoration of a preexisting imperial unity.1 Rather, the territorial expansion of the Qing has been 1 This argument was at the crux of Frederick Wakeman’s The Great Enterprise. The special role of the frontiers, in particular the northern and western ones, in the evolution of the Qing empire is emphasized in Peter Perdue’s China Marches West, James Millward’s Beyond the Pass, Yingcong Dai’s The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing, and the contributions by Perdue, Millward, and John Wills in Lynn Struve, ed., The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time.

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interpreted as a process that defined the empire by creating both culturally discrete forms of imperial ruler ship and a frontier administrative bureaucracy— primarily the Lifan Yuan—that came into existence with the Qing for the first time.2 This debate also emphasized the different approach of the Qing with respect to previous dynasties, even though such departures often meant blending new features with old ones.3 The Qing northern and western frontiers, thus, differed radically from the Ming “Great Wall” frontier as well as from the continental frontiers of former regimes, from the Han to the Yuan.4

Generally speaking, the Qing territorial expansion, the political and military frame within which it took place, and most of the solutions adopted in pursuit of a new multicultural and multinational imperial order, signal a robust break with past notions of frontier defense, territorial organization, and ethnic relations in border areas. Yet, at the root of this “discontinuity” model, and at the very source of the process leading to the specific forms taken by the Qing, there are some critical and so-far unanswered questions. The political choices made by the Manchu rulers as they were striving to establish their authority and administrative control over the border areas are still to be investigated. Likewise, it remains unclear by what means, and under what circumstances frontier institutions came into existence before 1644.

It is common practice to divide the early history of the Qing dynasty into two periods, which in English are called sometimes pre-conquest and post-conquest (and variations thereof), and in Chinese ruguanqian 入关前 and ruguanhou 入关后, with reference to the Qing armies crossing into the pass of Shanhaiguan. Such periodizations for all practical purposes coincide, and the watershed is, of course, the year 1644. Recent studies have discussed the development of a Qing 2 On the first point see Pamela Crossley, “The Rulerships of China,” 1468−83; on the second point see Ning Cha, “The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing,” 60–92; and Nicola Di Cosmo, “The Qing and Inner Asia: 1636−1800,” 333−62. An excellent summary of the new directions in Qing historiography and reconceptualizations of especially seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Qing history can be found in William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 1−10; the frontier issue has been engaged by scholars who have espoused what Rowe’s calls the “Inner Asian turn” and the “Eurasian turn.” 3 An example of this are the military colonies established on the northwestern frontier (Xinjiang), which in Chinese history find several precedents, going back to the agricultural military colonies (tuntian) established by the Han dynasty in the Western Regions. 4 Here I am only referring to the northern and north-western frontiers. Different arguments, stressing the Ming colonization as a starting point of frontier strategies of incorporation and a longer, more continuous, process of penetration of the Chinese state, have been made with regard to the southern frontiers. See, for instance, John Herman’s Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou 1200−1700. A full comparative study of the Qing frontier strategy with respect to the south (in particular the southwest) and the north and west (in particular Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet) has not been carried out yet even though there are some limited but important studies such as Peter Perdue’s “Coercion and Commerce on Two Chinese Frontiers,” 317–38.

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frontier policy in the post-1644 phase and throughout the evolution of frontier relations spanning the reigns of the Qing emperors Kangxi and Qianlong.5 Frontier expansion followed, in fits and starts, the evolution of Manchu relations with Mongols and Tibetans, their campaigns against the Zunghars and the latter’s allies undertaken by the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors, and the succeeding establishment of Manchu rule in Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang.6

Far less attention has been paid to the frontier of the Manchu (or Jušen, or Later Jin [Hou Jin 后金, amaga aisin gurun]) state before 1644. Yet, the later development of the Qing frontier organization was based on principles and practices that pre-dated 1644, even though they were not initially designed specifically as “frontier policies.” These policies relate to the relationship between the Manchu rulers and the southern Mongol nations,7 and to the principles and practices out of which a “frontier system” and its organs of governance came into existence.8 The motives behind the choices made by the 5 Peter Perdue assumes the existence of an egalitarian relationship between Manchus and Mongols in the pre-1644 period, essentially as allies and partners in the “conquest elite,” explaining the development of Mongol allegiance to the Manchus in terms of the Manchus’ relationship to Mongol lineages and the special legitimacy gained by the acquisition of the seal of the Yuan dynasty but the emphasis on frontier building is on the later period. See Peter Perdue, “Culture, History and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing Conquest,” 269. 6 For a historical account of the Qing expansion see Perdue, China Marches West. 7 I use here “Southern Mongols” to refer to the Mongol people inhabiting the region to the south of the Gobi desert. These will eventually converge into the category of “Inner Mongols” but to speak of Inner Mongols before the establishment of the Qing dynasty would be anachronistic. 8 I translate the Mongol term ulus as “nation,” meaning by that term a politically coherent people, with a recognized “puissant” aristocracy, a specific name that identifies its members (such as Qorčin), and territorial claims over which they can assert their jurisdiction. In some cases the term ulus can also stand for a more generic “people” as in “Mongγol ulus” in which case it assumes an ethnic rather than political coloration. This type of semantic flexibility exists in many languages and we should not be overly concerned by the fact that both the Mongols as a whole and specific lineages or polities within that particular ethnic galaxy are defined as ulus (for an example related to Anglo-Saxon uses of gens, natio, and other terms, see for instance Stephen J. Harris, Race and Ethnicity in Anglo-Saxon Literature, 41). It goes without saying that this usage of “nation” should not be confused with the modern “nation-state” but rather linked to some ancient as well as modern uses, as in respect to Native American peoples, defined as nations and sometimes tribes. The term “tribe” in relation to Inner Asian and in particular Mongol history has come under attack by anthropologist David Sneath (see The Headless State: Aristocratic Order, Kinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia), and while some aspects of his argument have come under criticism, it is true in my view that the term “tribe” is less satisfactory than “nation,” because it carries meanings that make its use much less flexible and neutral than the word it allegedly translates, namely ulus. While ulus is interchangeable with “people” and “nation” in most or even all of its uses (depending on context), “tribe” is certainly not, as one can hardly translate “Mongγol ulus” as “the Mongol tribe.”

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Manchu leadership in this pre-1644 phase had long-term consequences and formed the foundations of later frontier strategies.

A discussion over relevant pre-1644 events will hinge first and foremost on a single issue of overwhelming importance: how did the Manchu rulers manage to bring the Southern Mongol tribes into the fold of the Qing “conquest elite” and territorial organization? This process spanned approximately thirty years, involved diverse political and social groups (i.e., the imperial clan, the Mongol Eight Banners, and the Mongol territorial Banners, Leagues, and dependent territories), and generated a complex administrative machinery. The aim of this study is to clarify the manner in which the Manchu rulers envisioned their relationship to the Mongol aristocrats and “engineered” their incorporation into the Qing system. A clearer view of the political rationales (rather than simply cultural or military factors) that effected in the transformation of the relationship between Manchus and Mongols is critical to understanding the overall evolution of the Qing frontier, and the role played by the frontier in the making of the Qing empire. Posing this question is different from either assessing the position of the Mongols within the Qing state or measuring the impact that the Qing state had on the ethnic and political coherence of the Mongol nations.9

Historical Background

Any account of these important Manchu-Mongol relations must begin with the well-known narrative of the establishment of political liaisons between the Aisin Gioro clan of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji and various Mongol aristocratic lineages.10 These relationships were overwhelmingly made in two ways: first, by sacred oaths sworn “to Heaven and Earth” with ritual sacrifices, and, secondly, by marriage alliances.11 Diplomacy operated, broadly speaking, through a class system and a kinship system, and the marriages offered Mongol and Manchu aristocracies the possibility to recognize and co-opt each other into their respective political sphere. Nurhaci’s main consorts came from Jurchen clans, such as the Tunggiya, Fuca, and Nara, but he also had Mongol wives, such as a main consort from the Qorčin nation. The relationship between the Aisin Gioro clan and the Qorčin nation became particularly close, but also Jarut, Čaqar, Barin, Auqan, and Abaγa. The political dimension of the marital diplomacy can be fully appreciated by looking at a letter sent by Hong Taiji to a Mongol aristocrat (Oba) 9 On the position of Mongols in the Qing state see Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Making Mongols,” 58–82. 10 Wada Sei, “Some Problems Concerning the Rise of T'ai-tsu the Founder of Manchu Dynasty,” 51–63. 11 On some aspects of Mongolian oaths see Henry Serruys, “Oaths in the Qalqa Jirum.”


at a time of severe political strain:

You let the tent of your guilty wife12 be set up in the front [of the encampment, i.e., the most honored place], while you had the tent of our daughter set up in the back. Over and over again you have said that your guilty wife is the offspring of a great man; but what qaγan prepared [her for marriage] and married her to you? What kind of great princes are her relatives now? Have they not all become retainers? They [i.e., the Čaqar] killed your paternal uncle. Then you were afraid that they would kill you, and therefore you call her the offspring of a great man. Why would you make this woman higher [than ours] when her Čaqar family was going to kill you? Why would you make our daughter lower, when we always cherished you? This is the sixth instance in which you humiliated us. Bring our lowly man’s offspring back to us, and live with the descendant of the great man!13

As we can see from this text, the position of wives and the obligations exacted in the name of bonds of kinship can be likened to needles on the compass of tribal politics.

Oaths and alliances were likewise a fundamental component of Manchu- Mongol diplomatic customs. In 1619 Nurhaci made an oath of alliance with the Five Qalqa tribes.14 In 1623 twenty-five Qorčin tribal chiefs concluded an alliance with the Manchus, and in 1626 the Manchus and Qorcin concluded an important alliance treaty.15 The intense diplomatic activity, and more generally the political maneuverings, of the Manchus were highly effective. As a result, many Mongol aristocrats joined the Manchu regime at different stages, “paid allegiance” to the dynasty, and, it is assumed, eventually became the “subjects” of the Qing dynasty.

How this outcome was achieved, however, has been the object of some discussion. Johan Elverskog contends that the Manchus appropriated Mongol terminology in order to more effectively establish themselves as the superior political force.16 Elverskog’s analysis is based on his interpretation of the terms ulus as “people” and törü as “state,” and on their political uses in the context of Manchu-Mongol relations. A similar argument was advanced several decades ago by David Farquhar, who said that “[i]t was no strange and foreign order that was imposed on the Mongols by the Manchus, but one greatly resembling Mongolian 12 This “guilty wife” is one from the Čaqar tribe: guilty by association with Ligdan Khan. 13 Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, Manchu-Mongol Relations, 57. 14 Manbun Rōtō. Tongki fuka sindaha hergen i dangse, vol. 1, 191–12, 196–200. 15 On these events see Veronika Veit, “Die mongolischen Völkerschaften vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1691,” 396–98. See also Michael Weiers, “Der Manschu-Khortsin Bund von 1626.” 16 Elverskog, Our Great Qing, 14–39.

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institutions because it was to some extent of the Mongols’ own making; it was implemented by a people who spoke much the same language and shared many of the same customs.”17 There are however limits to this type of conceptual and linguistic analysis, since specific political terms used in official communication, statements, and declarations, would remain abstract notions if left unrelated to the historical circumstances based on which communication occurred, actions were taken, choices and decisions were made. Hence, while a clear understanding of these concepts matters, a historical explanation must surely go beyond lexical analysis. The various narratives of the Mongol incorporation into the Manchu state, at any rate, have not investigated the dynamics inherent in the Mongol nobility’s change in political status. The change was a consequence, in turn, of institutional changes introduced by the Manchus in southern (later “Inner”) Mongolia. Also little investigated is the impact of this process upon the Qing frontier strategy of later years.18

After 1635, the once allied southern Mongols were turned into “vassals” or “surrendered people,” and were organized administratively into Leagues and Banners (mengqi, ciγulγan-qosiγun), and politically through the jasaq system.19 Edicts and decrees were issued to fix the new organization’s legal, military, administrative, territorial, and ceremonial aspects. A specific political organ of the nascent Qing state, the Mongol Bureau, (Monggo Jurgan, Menggu Yamen) was created probably in 1636, and renamed in 1638 as the Lifan Yuan.20 The Lifan Yuan thus became the government’s arm for the administrative and political reorganization of Inner Mongolia. In later years it was charged with the oversight of most functions that governed the relationship between the Qing 17 Farquhar, “The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” 205. 18 See the classic studies on Mongol society by Tayama Shigeru, such as Mōko hōten no kenkyū, and Shindai ni okeru Mōko no shakai sedo. The latter has been translated into Chinese as Qingdai Menggu shehui zhidu (Beijing 1987). One of the best recent studies on the constitution of the League-Banner system in Inner Mongolia is by Oka Hiroki 岡洋樹, Shindai Mongoru ‘mengqi zhidu’ no kenkyū, based on extensive analysis of Manchu and Mongolian archival sources; see in particular 23–79 for the early phase of the establishment of the system. Qiang Yang focuses on the impact of the system on the local Mongolian economy and politics (see “Jianlun mengqi zhidu”). A connection between the pre-conquent Menggu Yamen (and Lifan Yuan) and Qing frontier policy is made in passing in several studies (see for instance Liao Li, “Jinglüe bianjiang: Qingdai zhi bian zhi fa de deshi”), but the issue of Qing frontier management and the question of the status of Mongol nobility and the jasaq system in the pre-1644 period are typically treated as separate topics. 19 I borrow the term “vassal” from the translation of the article by Zhang Shiming “A Historical and Jurisprudential Analysis of Suzerain-Vassal State Relationships in the Qing Dynasty.” The term “system” translates Chinese as zhidu, and is a standard way of referring to the League-Banner administrative apparatus and its political, military, and social components. 20 Yuan Senpo, “Qingchao zhili Meng Zang fanglüe,” 43; see also Dalizhabu, “Qingdai nei Zhasake liu meng he Menggu Yamen sheli shijian lice,” 55. Note that in 1638 the Lifan Yuan was under the Board of Rites (Li Bu), and became an independent Ministry only in 1661.


court and the outer domains of Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.21 But right from the outset, in the late 1630s, it is clear that the peoples brought under its administration, beginning of course with the southern Mongols, had acquired a different status. Namely, they were no longer “allies” but not quite subjects either. How the status of southern Mongol polities changed in the 1620s and 1630s has indeed baffled researchers. The problem has been often bypassed by taking for granted that at some point some Mongols simply decided (or chose) to join the “winning” side while others were conquered. The Manchus obtained the “submission” of Mongol lords using a mixture of blandishment and force. “Paying allegiance” and “submitting” to Qing rule are the terms most commonly used to describe what the Mongols did.22 But they do not explain either the reasons for the change of status of those Mongols who had previously been allies (and therefore already on the winning side, as it were) or the political rationale behind the system that was eventually implemented. Let us consider two points. First, the early treaties, whether they had been “sealed” by oath or by marriage, were binding only in name. It was exceedingly rare that even very serious violations of such compacts by Mongol leaders provoked the armed reaction of the Manchus regardless of the vehemence with which those who were deemed to have violated the terms of the treaties were sometimes condemned in speech. Therefore, there was a substantial symmetry of the treaty itself, in the sense that it was concluded between two sovereign entities, and that one had no authority to impose or enforce implementation other than by going to war. Secondly, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Banners and Leagues set up in Inner Mongolia were fundamentally different from—and thus not compatible with— the Mongol Eight Banners.23 These were the result of several Mongol companies (niru) having come apart from the Manchu Banners. These Mongols previously had been brought into the Manchu establishment and Banner organization as a consequence of the expansion of the population under Manchu rule, and later separated into an ethnically specific branch of the Eight Banner system. If the Eight Banner Mongols could be regarded as full members of the Manchu state, the nobility of Inner Mongolia enjoyed a semi-autonomous, and peripheral, condition, and a subordinate status.

In the 1630s the greater part of the Mongol nobles in what became Inner Mongolia relinquished their own sovereignty and the system of alliance that had until then guaranteed political advantages in regulating their relations with the 21 Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia,” 287−309; id., “The Qing and Inner Asia.” 22 Crossley, “Making Mongols,” 67. According to Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors, 67, the Qing “reduced the autonomy of the hereditary Mongol nobility by enrolling the tribes into the banner organization.” 23 Li Jing, “Qingdai de mengqi zhidu,” 228.

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Manchus, and accepted to be incorporated in the League-Banner system under the authority of a new organ: the Lifan Yuan. This was a key moment in the history of the early Manchu state, which arguably freed Manchu energies to devote to the conquest of the south (China) and eliminated a potential military threat. It also, and possibly not fully consciously, established a model for frontier administration to be used in later years for other continental regions. Since the structure, functions and prerogatives of the Lifan Yuan changed over time, it is necessary to look at the semantic genesis of this name to identify the meaning of the bureau’s central “mission.”

The Lifan Yuan: A Terminological Analysis

The translation of “Lifan Yuan” and related concepts has been controversial. In an essay published some years ago the late professor Wang Zhonghan reacted correctly to the Western understanding of the Lifan Yuan as an office in charge of “colonies,” on the grounds that the regions under the jurisdiction of the Lifan Yuan could not be compared to the colonial possessions of European powers.24 Thus, the common translation of Lifan Yuan as “Court of Colonial Affairs” was to be rejected as it was deemed to be both arbitrary and anachronistic. In my view this is right, since it is very difficult to see the Lifan Yuan, at the time of its creation in 1638, as anything resembling a colonial administrative structure. On the other hand, some scholars often apply to the borderland peoples and regions the equally anachronistic definition of “minority people” (shaoshu minzu), which is a term of recent coin, and inevitably results in an equally anachronistic reading of the political and legal positions of these peoples within Qing China.25 Whether “fan” should be taken, in practice, as a Qing version of shaoshu minzu is surely equally anachronistic, and belies a misunderstanding about the status of the “fan” peoples and of their relationship to the sovereign.

Translations of Lifan Yuan have offered different renderings of the term “fan” 藩 to explain the nature of the relationship between these peripheral regions and the dynastic “center.”26 If we compare the Chinese, Manchu and Mongol 24 Wang Zhonghan, “Shilun Lifanyuan yu Menggu,” 167. 25 The reference to non-Han peoples during the Qing period as shaoshu minzu is very common in Chinese historical literature. As just one example, see Lin Qian “Qingchao yi fa zhi bian de jingyan deshi,” 17. Here the author states that “during the Qing period the national minorities lived for the most part in the border region.” 26 H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom rendered the Lifan Yuan as Court of Colonial Affairs but its successor, the Lifan Bu, was translated as Ministry of Dependencies, Present Day Organization of China, 160−61. William Frederick Mayers translates it as “Mongolian Superintendency,” specifying that the Lifan Yuan was also sometimes called the Colonial Office, The Chinese Government, 23.


versions of the word fan, we find that it translates the Manchu phrase “tulergi golo” that is, outer, external, or outlying, provinces.27 Far from reflecting an actual political relationship (that is, something like “subordinate vassals”), fan should probably be understood as an elegant word drawn from ancient Chinese classics during a phase in which the Manchu government was deliberately resorting to terms drawn from the Chinese administrative tradition to pursue the nominal and sometimes actual adoption of Chinese institutions.28 The use of fan is a good example, we should note in passing, of the need to distinguish between the formal Manchu adoption of Chinese structures of government and way in which they actually functioned. The choice of this word finds inspiration, possibly, in phrases from ancient texts such as the Zhouli.29 In early Chinese representations of an idealized political space, the fan were located outside the established administrative divisions. It is clear that no administrative analogy between the moral-cosmological constructions of the Warring States period, and the role played by the Lifan Yuan within the early Qing government can be invoked to explain the use of this term.

Turning to the Manchu name for the Lifa Yuan, tulergi golo be dasara jurgan, which literally means “Board for the Administration of the Outer Regions,” we might say that the incorporation of the Mongol peoples that lived south of the Gobi desert into the Manchu political fold led to the identification of Inner Mongolia as a tulergi golo, an “external region.” As the Lifan Yuan was the successor of the Menggu Yamen—the Mongol Bureau—it does appear that fan could have been a term to identify Mongolia, but the Manchu term tulergi golo leaves no doubt that we are dealing with a territory regarded as “external.” Since this Board (jurgan) was established before the conquest of China proper began, it would seem that the Manchus already operated a distinction between an internal and an external administrative sphere before the conquest of 1644.

The Mongol form of the name is yet again different. The term γadaγadu Mongγol törö-yi jasaqu yabudal-un yamun has been translated as “Court of Administration of the Autonomous Mongolian States.”30 The translation of γadaγadu as “autonomous” rather than “external” and törö as “states” rather than “domains” may not meet universal acceptance, but in general we can say that the Mongol title makes it clear that the Chinese fan and Manchu tulergi golo refer, in practice, to the Mongol regions which came under the administration of the 27 The character 藩 fan should not be confused with the homophone 番, which by Ming times was applied as an ethnonym largely to Tibetan populations and other peoples on the Western frontier. 28 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 17–18. 29 Zhouli, vol. 1, 491: 九州之外谓之蕃国. “what is outside the nine divisions are called the fan countries.” 30 Atwood, Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, 333.

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newly established Board. The problem with the translation of “γadaγadu” as “autonomous” begs an obvious question. If the Board was in charge of the administration of “autonomous” domains, to what an extent were these territories really autonomous? What can be inferred by looking at the basic and common meaning of Mongol γadaγadu and Manchu tulergi is that these domains were indeed considered as lying outside the central administration of the Qing (pre-conquest) state and enjoyed, as such, a partial “self-governing” status. Their being “external” or “outer” would reflect, therefore, not so much a peripheral geographical location but their political standing vis-à-vis the central government.

The administrative divisions into which these territories were divided (the Leagues and Banners, mentioned above) were placed under the authority of local aristocrats bearing the title of jasaq and forming a system of government that fully reconfigured the political map of Inner Mongolia. Through the “jasaq system” the Qing established a series of dependent domains whose political essence has been perceptively captured in the aforementioned essay by Zhang Shiming on “sovereign-vassal” relationships in the Qing dynasty.31 According to Zhang, the differences in the Mongol and Manchu versions of the name Lifan Yuan reflects different sensitivities. For the Mongols the term emphasized the independent status of their own domains, while for the Manchus it indicated a category of peoples that was external to the Eight Banner System, and therefore separate from the Eight Banner Mongols. Zhang posits a distinction between “internal submission” and “external domain” which would be at the origin of the notion of fan (or wai fan). From the point of view of the Mongols the latter indicated a degree of autonomy and independence, while for the Manchus the separation meant that these peoples were outside the Eight Banner system.32

This distinction, however, is not clear from the analysis of the terms. A translation of törö as “domain” is certainly warranted (and better than “state”) but still significantly different from the golo of the Manchu version, which is a territorial term, and, while it does not include the qualifier “Mongol,” it did so in the first incarnation of this office’s Manchu name, Monggo Yamun. Given that the Lifan Yuan continued to be in charge of Inner Mongolia, to speak simply of “external territories” in the Mongol version of the name, when what was meant were in fact Mongol domains, may have simply created an ambiguity for the newly incorporated Mongol peoples that the qualifier “Mongol” was meant to 31 Zhang Shiming, “Qingdai zongfan guanxi de lishi faxue duowei toushi fenxi,” 21–38. See note 19 above for the English version of this article. Since the English translation is in parts unclear I will refer in the following notes to the Chinese version as the main reference, with pages in parentheses for the analogous passage in the English version of the essay. 32 Zhang Shiming, “Qingdai zongfan guanxi de lishi faxue duowei toushi fenxi,” 27–28 (136–37).


clarify. Those territories were “external” to the Manchus, and “Mongol” to the Mongols, but their being external to the Eight Banner system is, in my view, an unwarranted inference, even though in practice the Board was not in charge of Bannermen.

Perhaps the most interesting point in this study, based on a comparative analysis between Western and Chinese notions of “dependency” is Zhang’s definition of the sovereign-vassal relationship exactly in the form of “protection” (bao hu 保护) as the basic quality of the relationship between sovereign state and dependent state during the Qing dynasty.33 Zhang casts the relationship between the Qing court and the border regions as one of dependencies that, on the one hand, enjoyed a degree of autonomy while, on the other, were subject to the “protection” of the state.

At the same time, there are a number of points in Zhang’s analysis that are less persuasive. In particular, the notion that the three characters 藩, 番, and 蕃 (all read fan) may have been freely interchangeable is debatable. For instance, the term 番 in Qing times, as in Ming times, did not mean a generic “barbarian” entity or individual, but referred specifically to Tibetans and other groups, such as the Salars, that lived in the Gansu and Tibetan regions, including Qinghai.34

The assumption that the Manchus before entering Shanhaiguan could not have known about the Zhou “five domain” theory, and that they lived in a “dark and militaristic phase”35 is reminiscent of Sinicization theories that would see the Manchus “convert” to Chinese political terminology only after the conquest, together with a wholesale acceptance of Chinese cultural traditions. In fact, the Manchus critically adopted several features of Chinese politics and administration from early on, but with specific meanings and through a process of cultural translation that is still not well understood.

Finally, and most importantly, Zhang does not clearly explain what he defines as a gradual devolution “from equality to submission” and specifically why the Mongols should have accepted a vassal position other than by stating that this was the result of a trend that saw the Manchus rise higher and the Mongols sink lower.36 The difference between “dependent states” 属国 (shuguo) and “vassal states” 藩国 (fanguo) is unclear, and these two terms appear to be interchangeable in Zhang’s analysis. In the last instance, Mongol “vassalage” is understood as a form of dependency. This was the necessary outcome of Manchu victories on the 33 Ibid., 35 (154). 34 See Haiyun Ma, “Fanhui or Huifan? Hanhui or Huimin? Salar Ethnic Identification and Qing Administrative Transformation in Eighteenth-Century Gansu,” 1–36. 35 Zhang Shiming, “Qingdai zongfan guanxi de lishi faxue duowei toushi fenxi,” 27; note that the English translation (136) is especially misleading here. 36 In the Chinese text, 由平等逐渐臣属, see Zhang Shiming, “Qingdai zongfan guanxi de lishi faxue duowei toushi fenxi,” 26 (135).

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battlefield—in particular against the Čaqar—which led to a gradual evolution of the Mongol aristocrats from a position of equality to one of submission.

From Equal Partners to Subjects

The problem of what the evolution actually consisted of cannot, however, be resolved by semantic analysis. In order to determine the actual position of the regions and peoples designated as fan within the nascent Qing state it is necessary to inspect the historical circumstances that led to the change of status of the Southern Mongol nations, whose leaders—no longer independent agents nor full partners in the Qing “conquest elite”—acquiesced in a reduction to subject (if partially autonomous) status.

The pre-Qing Manchu state (aisin gurun) incorporated some Mongols within its Eight Banner system. Mongol subjects, chiefly Qaračin, Oirat and Qalqa that had previously submitted to Nurhaci and organized into companies (“niru”) within the Manchu Banners, were formally constituted into a separate organization of Mongol Eight Banners (menggu ba qi) starting in 1635. On the other hand, after 1636 Mongols in Inner Mongolia were ruled by their own jasaq, who in turn were subjects of the Qing state.37 The Lifan Yuan provided the bridge between central government and local governments but the relationship was of course asymmetrical. The appointment of the jasaq has to be submitted to and confirmed by the Qing authorities. Moreover, the areas of political authority of the jasaq became eroded overtime, not least because of legal provisions introduced at different times.38 In sum, the form of government for Inner Mongolia, already at the start, was a combination of “horizontal” aristocratic ties and “vertical” state institutions, of course topped by the Qing emperor, who represented the ultimate authority.

The beginning of the complicated historical process that in the 1630s culminated in the creation of “Inner Mongolia” can be traced back to 1606, when Nurhaci made an oath with a delegation of Qalqa aristocrats led by Enggeder Taiji, and was addressed as Kündülen Qaγan (Most Honored Ruler).39 By this act the Qalqa Mongols neither “paid allegiance” to Nurhaci nor submitted to the nascent Manchu (or Jurchen) state. The mission was a diplomatic overture meant to establish peace and trade relations. Addressing Nurhaci with a title higher than the one he used for himself (i.e., Sure Beile, meaning “Wise Prince”) presumably 37 Elliot, The Manchu Way, 73–74. 38 On the Manchu legislation in Mongolia see Dorothea Heuschert, “Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols,” 310–24. 39 Qing Taizu Wuhuangdi shilu 2, 28. Michael Weiers, “Die erste Schriftwechsel zwischen Khalkha und Mandschuren und seine Überlieferung,” 107–39.


was a gesture of respect to overcome the turbulence that had marked the relationship between some Mongol nations and Nurhaci in previous years.40 Relations with the Qalqa, in other words, went from hostile to peaceful, not from “horizontal” to “vertical.”

Alliances with Mongol aristocrats continued to be central to Manchu politics and diplomacy, since Nurhaci needed to protect his growing but still vulnerable power base. The more elevated status acquired by Nurhaci among the Mongols in 1606 led to a long and intricate string of marriage alliances, especially with the Qorčin and Jarud nations.41 There was, at this time, no overt intention to transform Mongol polities into Manchu subjects.42 These treaties did not turn the relationship of equal standing between the various Mongol nations and Nurhaci’s state into a tributary or subordinate one. Both the volatility of the alliances and the diplomatic language of equality in which the compacts were couched show that the Mongols did not see their status in any way lower than that of the Manchus. This is stated, for instance, in a letter by a Mongol aristocrat to Hong Taiji dated sometime after 1628, in which it is said “We had neither obligations nor hatred towards the Mongol nation with red-tasseled hats [i.e., the Manchus]. Whoever committed an error, this is the one who should bear the burden [of punishment].”43

The pressure that the Manchus could apply to force their Mongol allies to remain true to their word, and to make them abide by the terms of the treaties, was initially very limited. Both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji on occasion complained bitterly about the unreliability, selfishness, improper behavior, and shortsightedness of the Mongols, but beneath their righteous attitude it is not difficult to detect the Manchu leaders’ frustration, as they were powerless to enforce the terms of the agreement.44

In 1628 Hong Taiji attacked in a vitriolic letter the leader of the Qorčin nation, Tüsiyetü Qaγan. The letter denounced the Mongol aristocrat’s behavior on the grounds that he had violated the oath, not on the assumption that the Mongol leader was not behaving as the subject of a higher authority. He was condemned because he could not be trusted as an ally, not because he was “disobedient.”45 40 On the titles acquired by Nurhaci see Nicola Di Cosmo, “Nurhaci’s Names,” 261–79. 41 See Di Cosmo, “Marital Politics on the Mongol-Manchu Frontier in the Early Seventeenth Century,” 57–73. 42 On Nurhaci’s strategy vis-à-vis Mongol and Jurchen nations see Wada Sei, “Some Problems concerning the Rise of T’ai-tsu the Founder of Manchu Dynasty,” 35–73. 43 Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, Manchu-Mongol Relations, 95–96. 44 The problem of enforcing the terms of the treaties concluded with the Mongols was an old one. Nurhaci complained at great length about the fact that he wanted loyalty and trustworthiness from the Mongol chiefs above any material gains. See G. Kara, Chants d’un Barde Mongol, 17–23, note 37. 45 Di Cosmo and Dalizhanbu, Manchu-Mongol Relations, 55–61.

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The question of trust is recurrent in the communication as well as in the ritual ceremonies of oath-swearing, and as such ought to be given special consideration. Oaths were to be sworn with trustworthy words (itegel-tü üge in Mongol) because the essential element in a treaty was that one party could trust the other, and this was true as late as 1628, as evident from the alliance made with the Qaračin (a separate, independent Mongol nation). The oath stated that “Our two nations, the Manchus and the Qaračin, in order to forge an alliance, sacrifice a white horse to Heaven and a black bull to Earth. We place wine in a bowl, meat in [another] bowl, blood in [another] bowl, and dry bones in [another] bowl. Exchanging trustworthy words, we swear [this] oath to Heaven and Earth.”46 These “trustworthy words,” uttered in a ritual performance accompanied by sprinkling libations and other solemn gestures, were key to the lasting power of the oath itself. Breach of trust was the reason for the frequent disagreements between Manchu and Mongol leaders. Controversies were especially heated when they concerned military arrangements, since failure to keep one’s word in joint military operations could have catastrophic consequences for the other party.47

Shortly after Hong Taiji (1627–43) succeeded his father Nurhaci, however, a change can be registered in the diplomatic correspondence, since occasionally the Mongol leaders do assign a higher status to the Manchus in a manner that does not seem to be simply dictated by diplomatic politeness. The reasons for this change can be traced back to 1619, when the head of the Čaqar Mongols, Ligdan (or Lingdan) Khan attempted, as a novel Chinggis Khan, to unify the southern Mongol nations into a new Mongol empire. From the earliest exchanges between Nurhaci and Ligdan Khan it was clear that there was no margin for negotiation.48 Čaqar violence was unleashed against recalcitrant Mongol leaders, who appear to become unwitting pawns between the two emerging khanates.49 Victimized by Ligdan, Mongol aristocrats on several occasions sent the Manchus requests for military aid and protection.

According to the annals (shilu) of Qing Taizu, in Tianming year 10, 11th month (1625), the Qorčin leader Oba, with five other people, reported to Nurhaci on an urgent and grave matter.50 He had been attacked by Ligdan Khan, and therefore asked for Manchu protection. Nurhaci sent an army led by some of his sons 46 Ibid., 52. 47 Di Cosmo and Dalizhanbu, Manchu-Mongol Relations, 100–101, 143. 48 On Ligdan and the unfolding of his hostility with Nurhaci, see Walther Heissig, Die Zeit des letzten mongolischen Grosskhans Ligdan (1604–1634), and Michael Weiers, “Die Kuang-Ning Affäre, Beginn des Zerwürfnisses zwischen den Mongolischen Tsakhar und den Manschuren,” 73–91. 49 On the competition between Ligdan Khan and Nurhaci see Nicola Di Cosmo, “Competing Strategies of Great Khan Legitimacy in the Context of the Chaqar-Manchu Wars (c. 1620–34),” 245–63. 50 Qing shilu, vol. 1 “Taizu shilu,” 9, 131.


(including Hong Taiji) which managed to lift the siege placed by Ligdan on Oba’s city (the Mongols actually had cities in the steppes). Thereafter the Qorčin and Manchus made an oath of alliance that bonded the two together, but the prime reason for the agreement was the Qorčins’ need and request for protection.51

In a letter datable probably to 1626, sent by another Qorčin Mongol leader to Hong Taiji, it is said explicitly that if the Manchus were to protect him and his people from the attacks of the Čaqars, they would “offer tribute” for the love of their lives (ami qayiran tulada alba ögjü saγuqu bayinam bide). 52 Some Mongols, faced with extinction, were willing to trade “protection” for “tribute,” that is, were willing to formally submit to the Manchus.53 As the civil war among the Mongols grew more intense, an increasing number of Mongol aristocrats were forced to seek Manchu protection. Thus, the military support granted by the Manchus to Mongol aristocrats who were being attacked or threatened by the Čaqars allowed a new type of relationship to emerge, which was predicated, effectively, upon the notion that the Manchus were in a position of “tutelage” with respect to the Mongols who not just accepted, but in fact requested, such an arrangement. Rather than saying that “the Mongols were incorporated”—a passive voice that inevitably mutes the role played by the Mongols—the requests for protection show the underlying political causes leading to a change of status.

Tutelage in the Context of Manchu-Mongol Relations

The term “tutelage” is helpful in describing the emerging political relationship between Mongols and Manchus because, unlike the word “protection,” it implies the loss of full sovereignty but, unlike the word “submission,” it does not exclude the retention of autonomy. Moreover, “tutelage” in a political sense often pertains to a temporary or transitory arrangement that is functional in changes of status. As such, “tutelage” may be applied to the political changes occurring in Manchu-Mongol relations that eventually led to the formalization of the League- Banner system in Inner Mongolia.

In current usage, “tutelage” has primarily a legal meaning to indicate the relationship of an adult to a minor or other person that is not self-sufficient, and needs to be placed under the supervision or in the care of a tutor. In a non-legal sense, a tutor can be any person (a teacher, a priest, etc.) to whom the care of another person is entrusted for the purpose of learning, moral guidance. In other 51 Weiers, Michael, “Der Manschu-Khortsin Bund von 1626,” 412–35. 52 Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, Manchu-Mongol Relations, 24. 53 On the conduct of war between Manchus and Mongols and among Mongols see Di Cosmo, “Military Aspects of the Manchu Wars against the Čaqars,” 333–63.

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words, the tutor has supervisory powers over the whole or a portion of the life of the tutee.

In a political sense, especially in the area of modern international relations, tutelage is often used to refer to a transitional period during which a given political entity is placed under the control and broad supervision of another to allow a given process to take place. The prerogatives of the country being tutored and of the political body (for instance the United Nations) providing “tutelage” can be a rather technical matter, but the essence of the relationship is one of diminished sovereignty for the country or people placed under “tutelage.”

In historical research, however, “tutelage” may be used to describe a number of different forms of dependency. Morocco, for instance, was not a French colony but, in terms of the distribution of political power, “was clearly in a state of colonial tutelage.”54 Peoples who were not recognized legally as countries or nations could also come under the “tutelage” of a greater power. According to Sanjay Subramhaniam the encomiendas established by the Spanish colonizers in the Philippines included “some 668,000 Filipino residents under Spanish tutelage.”55 Moreover, even though we can find any number of examples of usage of the word tutelage in a relatively recent “colonial” context, it is certainly not exclusive to it. In a study on medieval history, for instance we read that in 749, “the Lombard monarchy was coming under pontifical tutelage.”56

These few cases, so different from one another, indicate both the range of uses that the word “tutelage” can encompass, but also some common features. At its most basic level, this term indicates the granting of a certain degree of protection and guidance in exchange for limitations imposed upon the political independence, autonomy or sovereignty of a given nation, ethnic group, country or other entity. In other words, protection and guidance are exchanged for a certain degree of dependency. At its most basic level, “tutelage” is descriptive not of “colonial situation,” but simply of the change in power relations in consequence of a given political development. To the extent that it reflects a state of diminished sovereignty, the concept of tutelage can be used as an operational term to explain the type of external administrative structure set up with the formation of the League-Banner system.

On such grounds it would thus be possible to argue that the regime of protection granted by the Manchus to Mongol aristocrats against Ligdan Khan in 54 Kenneth J. Twitchett, “Colonialism: An Attempt at Understanding Imperial, Colonial, and Neo-Colonial Relationships”; Colin Newbury, “Patrons, Clients, and Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies in Asia and Africa.” 55 Sanjay Subramhaniam, “Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640,” 1375. 56 Jan T. Hallenbeck, “Pavia and Rome: The Lombard Monarchy and the Papacy in the Eighth Century,” 52.


exchange for a form of dependency or tribute can be defined as one in which the Mongols, rather than “being incorporated,” actively placed themselves under Manchu tutelage. In this case we also need to investigate whether, in addition to the abovementioned requests for protection, we can find in the political “tool-box” of Manchu and Mongol diplomacy a language that is descriptive of, or can be related to, a relationship of tutelage.

Perhaps the clearest expression of a concept related semantically to “tutelage” in the sense of guardianship is the title that Nurhaci chose for himself as he proclaimed the foundation of the Jin (or Later Jin) state (aisin gurun) in Hetu Ala in 1616: “abka geren gurun be ujikini seme sindaha genggiyen han” or, “Enlightened Khan Appointed by Heaven to Care for (or nurture) All Nations.” To my knowledge the use of ujimbi as a political concept early in the Manchu state has not been investigated, but it can be connected semantically to words such as gosimbi (to cherish) and karmambi (to protect). In political terms, Nurhaci considered himself to be loved and nurtured (gosime ujimbi) by Heaven, that is, to be under the protection of Heaven, as it appears in the oath of 1626 made with the Oba Taiji of the Qorčin.57 The same nurturing was then extended to the people who joined him in alliance; however, it is clear that the state of being under the protection of Heaven is extended to the Mongols through the Manchu khan. In the correspondence with Mongol chiefs the Mongol term ömüglekü, “to protect,” occurs frequently in contexts of the Mongols requesting protection or the Manchus offering it.58 A terminology that refers to caring, protecting, nurturing and cherishing is in my view not unrelated to the notion of “tutelage” as a principle that formalizes the establishment of political authority over a given constituency. Such a rhetoric went beyond the mere (and somewhat crude) political promotion of military victories as being “ordained by Heaven,” and therefore as a means of legitimate rulership. On the institutional and political level, the notion of a “nurturing” khan opened a space for a type of authority aimed to transform the political order within a given society through the supervision, guidance, and control of a separate and obviously more powerful entity.

In concrete historical terms, the language of protection that arose from the context of the Čaqar wars opened the possibility to intervene in the transformation of the Southern Mongols’ political organization in ways that directly served the purposes of the Qing state. During the late-1620s and early-1630s, the war with China, the campaigns against Korea, and the military operations against Ligdan all placed extraordinary demands on the Manchu military, thus the integration of Mongol troops was essential to meeting the war objectives. Arguably, the 57 Manbun Rōtō, vol. 3, 1074–75. 58 Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, Manchu-Mongol Relations, 24, 30–31, 56, 71.

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League-Banner system established in southern Mongolia had as its primary goal the stabilization of the political order and pacification of the region. Of course there were advantages that the Manchus derived from this system, but if and how such advantages could be reaped depended on if and how the southern Mongol tribes could be pacified and brought, in some capacity, into the fold of the Manchu state.

One may argue that the League-Banner system established in Inner Mongolia from 1635 onwards was primarily aimed at making the southern Mongols join the conquest of China, but I see this as, at best, a secondary goal. The Mongol Eight Banners already fulfilled a military role, and many Mongol aristocrats were called to serve in high military position, but by and large the local Southern Mongol jasaq remained in their own territories as caretakers of the imperial order. The Inner Mongols were not meant to enter China as conquerors, but were supposed to provide labor, taxes, and, if necessary, military personnel. Above all, the new order was designed to preserve peace and political stability.59 As a result, the creation of six Leagues and forty-nine Banners redesigned the administrative and political map of Inner Mongolia. Several studies have demonstrated, moreover, that the deepest changes occurred in the area of power relations within Mongol society.60

The League-Banner system set up as a dual military-administrative organization under the supervision of the Qing government inevitably transformed the social position and functions of the Mongols’ traditional elites, perhaps not so much (at least initially) in terms of their internal prestige and hereditary nature, but rather in terms of the prerogatives and limits of their power. Archival sources show that if Manchu officials investing a legal dispute found a Mongol aristocrat guilty of wrongdoing, the case often ended with an imperial pardon or with a reduction of the sentence whereby only material goods, such as livestock, had to be forfeited.61

The protection extended by the Manchus to loyal Inner Mongol aristocrats was, ultimately, the politically modified product of those treaties that sanctioned alliances with those Mongols who had asked for assistance and were granted it during the widespread chaos and violence caused by Ligdan Khan. Such a protection became then “tutelage” in the sense that it was no longer an actual necessity linked to contingent situations of war, but instead a political principle introduced in Inner Mongolia to create new power relations among the Mongols 59 On the tasks and function of the Lifan Yuan see Zhao Yuntian, “Qingchao zhili Meng Zang diqu de jige wenti,” 175–92; on the issue of stability see Niu Haizhen, “Jianlun qingdai Menggu zu diqu de mengqi zhidu,” 1–5. 60 Yang Qiang, “Jianlun mengqi zhidu,” 59. 61 For instance, see documents no. 10, 11, and 15 in Li Baowen, Arban doloduγar jaγun-u emün-e qaγas-tu qolbaγdaqu mongγol-un bičig debter. Shiqi shiji menggu wen wenshu dang’an (1600–1650). 240–41, 242–43, 251–52.


and between them and the Manchu state.

Conclusion

The Čaqar wars, and the havoc Ligdan Khan wrecked among the southern Mongol nations, then, were the true catalyst for change. The Čaqars’ aggressive bid to become a regional power and acquire, ideally, imperial status forced Mongol aristocrats into the uncomfortable position of mobilizing traditional alliances with the Manchus, who were the only local power that could offset Ligdan’s “kill and burn” campaigns. Manchu protection was granted via the usual system of oaths, but often with considerable ambivalence and even diffidence on the Manchu side. The aid received by the Mongols came at a price, and soon enough placed them in a position of political subordination, which turned the system of bilateral alliance into what we may call a “tutelary relationship.”

The subordinate status that this relationship entailed allowed for the creation of new political and administrative units within a comprehensive and centralized structure. The creation of the Lifan Yuan of course was made necessary by the need to regulate and administer the Mongols, whose political and legal position, however, remained closer to the limited sovereignty typical of a situation of tutelage than to the full submission the Manchus expected of Chinese subjects and other conquered peoples.

The tutelary relationship, and the ambivalence between autonomy and subordination that is inherent to it, explains the simultaneous presence of terms like törö, which implies political autonomy, and operative terms for local units, such as qosiγun (Banners) and sumun (companies), which were derived from Manchu state terminology. As the new tutelary relationship transformed the southern Mongols from allies, neighbors, and enemies into a series of orderly dependencies organized according to a new administrative, military and territorial system, it also promoted self-rule and favored co-operation and collaboration between jasaqs and Qing officials.62

In summation, I began by questioning the nature of the political process that first brought the Mongols to accept Qing sovereignty and led to the establishment of the League-Banner system. Subtle changes in the communication between Manchu and Mongol leaders at the time of the Čaqar wars reveal an important change of tone, as several Mongol leaders asked for and obtained “protection.” Historical documentation makes it abundantly clear that Manchu protection was 62 Note that the notion of a Qing civilizing mission, project, or process is completely absent from the early shaping of frontier relations between Manchus and Mongols. For a critique of the applicability of the notion of the civilizing process to peoples such as Mongols, Tibetans and Uighurs see Mark C. Elliott, “Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners,” 33.

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vital to their very survival. The hypothesis explored in this essay is that the Manchu leaders ably exploited

the circumstances, turning a relationship between equal partners into a tutelary one, understood as a combination of, on the one hand, the concession of substantial autonomy (and even limited sovereignty) and, on the other, the imposition of political dependency as well as legal and administrative control. This principle constituted the basis for the establishment of a new system of governance for Inner Mongolia, which rested on three pillars: the Leagues and Banners, the jasaq system, and the Lifan Yuan. The new order rationalized the use of the human and material resources of Mongolia, limited internal conflicts, and provided troops and gifted individuals to be co-opted into the higher ranks of Qing civil and military service. The system remained external to the Eight Banner System but acceptable to the local Mongol elites because it preserved their social privileges and local rule. The southern Mongols’ incorporation into the Qing enterprise was, then, neither a spontaneous result, nor the reflection of an ideology based on the formalization of ethnic categories. Rather, it was the arrival point of a political process specific to intra-Mongol and Manchu-Mongol relations and of choices operated by Manchu and Mongol leaders in that context. The ideological element in these choices stems, rather, from a concept of rulership that included the “soft power” of nurturing, caring, and protecting subjects. The political structures and the administrative units resulting from this process became, in turn, essential features of Qing frontier strategy. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms.

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From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest

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