Freedom to drink, freedom to sell drink

The Freedom to Drink and the Freedom to Sell Drink: A HundredYears of Danish Alcohol-Control Policy

Kim Moeller

Journal of Policy History, Volume 24, Number 3, 2012, pp. 499-517(Article)

Published by Cambridge University PressDOI: 10.1353/jph.2012.0017

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the journal of policy history , Vol. 24, No. 3, 2012.© Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2012doi:10.1017/S0898030612000152

k im m oeller

The Freedom to Drink and the Freedom

to Sell Drink: A Hundred Years of Danish

Alcohol-Control Policy

Alcohol-control policies in the Nordic countries have historically been closely

tied to the development of the welfare states. Th e balancing act between the

freedom of citizens to drink alcohol and the freedom to make a living selling

alcohol has to be considered against the public health and the public good.

All of the involved interests have sound arguments; everybody wants freedom,

health, and public order. From the start of the twentieth century, Danish poli-

cymakers have strived to achieve “increased sobriety and quiet in the streets” 1

through legal regulation of alcohol sales, but “modernization” 2 has both

fueled and complicated these eff orts. From the bar owner’s perspective, strict

regulations have been viewed as “provisional measures” 3 based on pater-

nalism and “obsolete dogmas” 4 that unjustly discriminate a trade that gener-

ates large tax revenues. In contrast, insuffi cient regulation has demonstrated

repeatedly to have “detrimental and demoralising” 5 consequences in the form

of “fornication, inebriety, and indecency.” 6 Th is article presents a study on

morals, politics, and culture by examining how this dilemma has permeated

Danish alcohol-control policy through its establishment, consolidation, and

eventual dismantling. How did Danish policymakers originally establish suc-

cessful alcohol-control systems and why is it so diffi cult to justify them now?

Tracing the priorities in balancing the public health and the public good

informs us on the relation between state authority and the citizen’s rights and

obligations, and thereby the foundation of the welfare state.

Th e Nordic countries have traditionally been spirits-drinking countries

with a widespread acceptance of drinking to intoxication. In a historical

500 | The Freedom to Drink

perspective, the initial objectives of Danish policymakers were to interchange

spirits with beer and move drinking from public spaces and into bars.

Authorities could then regulate the bars and hope for a self-fueling civilizing

process. Th e policy objectives of changing the spirits-drinking tradition and

decreasing total consumption were common for the Nordic countries; how-

ever, the way this was done in Denmark was unique. While the other Nordic

countries implemented state monopolies on alcohol sale, Denmark primarily

relied on a heavy excise tax on spirits. A monopoly on alcohol sales was per-

ceived as infringing too much on both the citizens’ freedom to drink and

their freedom to sell drink. Interestingly, the Danish model did succeed in

changing drinking culture away from spirits, and it did so much earlier than

the other Nordic countries. Unfortunately, total consumption was hard to

keep down. By the late 1970s, Danish alcohol-consumption rates had soared

to twelve liters of pure alcohol per capita (14+), which is in the high end of the

European spectrum, and Danish youth (15 to 16 years of age) are currently the

heaviest drinkers in all of Europe. 7 How did we get here?

We can analyze this question by studying the legal documents of the

time. Th e primary data are the law texts, which are viewed as “petrifi ed

politics” 8 —a snapshot of society and the dominant interests at a particular

time. To understand further how various interest groups may have been suc-

cessful in their lobbying eff orts or how a spirit of the time may have aff ected

regulation, my analysis includes a wider variety of legal documents and

parliamentary white papers and proceedings, as well as scholarly analysis of

alcohol-policy history in other, primarily Nordic countries. Choosing repre-

sentative confl icts from a time span of a hundred years holds a problem of

selection. Th e criterion applied is that the confl icts and their offi cial resolu-

tion in laws are suited to contribute toward explaining the current predica-

ment of high consumption and the absence of controls.

Th ese confl icts pertain not only to alcohol-control policy. Alcohol con-

trols in the Nordic countries are implemented as part of a general civilizing

process in extension of the establishment of parliamentary political institu-

tions at the turn of the century. Th e developments in the relation between

state controls and the citizens’ rights to drink and to sell drink are interpreted

as an integral part of the overall development of the Danish welfare state. 9 In

order to better present this general idea, I separate the period of analysis into

three sections. Th e earliest history, roughly from 1912 to 1960, is seen as the

time of the “constitutional state”; the period from 1960 until the late 1970s is

the “welfare state”; and the period aft er the welfare state is interpreted with

Sulkunen’s theory of the “saturated society.”

KIM MOELLER | 501

Sulkunen describes how the ideals of industrial progress, egalitarian

universalism, and nationalism have been intimately linked to alcohol con-

trols and have accelerated modernization of the Nordic welfare states. 10

According to Sulkunen, these processes ran their course during the periods

that are described above as the constitutional state and the welfare state. Th e

period aft er the welfare state is termed the “saturated society,” in which the

ideals have become part of an achieved reality and where risks take on a new

form—consumption risks. Th is claim is tested. Has alcohol-control policy in

the postwelfare state period gone through its own modernization? Does the

legal regulation in this period refl ect the processes of externalization, particu-

larization, and naturalization? 11 “Externalization” means that regulation is

infl uenced by pressure from the European Union and the demands of legal

and economic convergence. “Particularization” refers to the argument that

alcohol should be treated like any other commodity. “Naturalization” means

that deregulation of alcohol control is explained as a natural consequence of

an overall deregulation of diff erent markets.

Bruun et al. defi ne “alcohol-control policy” as government controls on

alcohol availability. 12 Th e various Danish governments throughout the period

are perceived as representing the “public good,” which pertains to the balance

between public health and the citizen’s freedom to drink and to sell drink. 13 In

the early periods, the public health position is represented by the national

temperance movement; 14 and the free-trade/individual freedom position is

represented by the bar-owners union. Th e confl icts between these positions

and the outcomes in the form of policy are discussed in relation to the number

of alcohol-serving outlets and the annual total consumption rates. 15

Th e earliest history of Danish alcohol controls, from the nineteenth

century until World War II, has been analyzed in previous studies, 16 but gen-

erally there is not much research on Danish alcohol-control policy compared

to the other Nordic countries. In recent review articles on Nordic alcohol-

control policies, 17 only one Danish study was included, and this study con-

cerned developments in the twenty-fi rst century. 18 Th e available material on

the intersecting period has been published either by state authorities, the

bar-owners’ trade association, or the temperance movement. Th is material

provides valuable accounts on how the challenges of the times were perceived,

but it lacks the balanced analysis necessary to understand how the inherent

policy dilemmas are connected to the development of the welfare state.

Th e fi rst part of the Danish licensing system was introduced in 1857.

From then on it became a legal requirement to have a publican’s license, called

a “citizenship,” in order to be allowed to serve “strong beverages.” 19 In rural


municipalities, only one public house that served strong beverages was

permitted. In the cities, every public house could serve alcohol but only to

ill-defi ned “closed tables.” 20 Th is legal ambiguity led to a doubling of the

number of public houses between 1840 and 1870, culminating with a concen-

tration of per 122 citizens. 21 In an attempt to stop this trend, the local author-

ities (the parish councils in rural areas and the municipal councils in the

cities) separated the licensing system into two parts: “citizenship” to run a

public house and a separate license for serving alcohol. 22 An applicant had a

legal claim to run a public house if he met a set of objective demands, but the

license to serve alcohol depended on the discretion of the local authorities.

Th e presence of public houses was contested. Publicans and the temperance

movement alike used the discretionary element to apply pressure on policy-

makers. During this time, the temperance movement was an important pop-

ular movement that saw alcohol as a burden on the Danish people, a burden

that was imposed by the upper classes. Th e temperance movement success-

fully campaigned locally and the map was now dotted with rural municipal-

ities where the single legal public house had been closed. 23 Th is is the point of

departure: the constitutional state and its democratic institutions were hardly

in place, but the confl icts that it faced were already plain.

t he s obriety c ommissions

At the behest of the temperance movement, a “sobriety commission” was

appointed to formulate a parliamentary white paper in preparation for the

fi rst comprehensive legal regulation of public houses: the Publican’s Act of

1912. Th is act would soon become the cornerstone in the legal regulation of

alcohol availability, so it is interesting to note that it was markedly more

liberal than the recommendations in the white paper. Th e act introduced an

upper limit for the concentration of public houses with licenses to serve

strong drinks at 1 per 350 citizens, which is quite an ambitions reduction

from the level 1 of per 122 citizens. Th e act also included the fi rst provisions

on hours of operation and the legal age limit for drinking. 24 These three

regulatory mechanisms have been used to adjust the direct availability of

alcohol from bars ever since.

Parallel to the process of regulating the public houses, a steep excise tax

was introduced in 1917 and this tax came to defi ne the Danish model of

alcohol control. From one day to the next, the price of distilled spirits

increased tenfold, which of course had a series of interrelated positive eff ects.

Th e farmers were most responsive to the increase in price. Th ey could no

KIM MOELLER | 503

longer aff ord distilled spirits and began to drink beer instead. Th is helped to

reduce the average consumption of pure alcohol per citizen over the age of

fourteen from nine liters to a historic low of two liters. 25 Alcohol-related

crime was halved almost immediately, compared with the period between

1912 and 1916. In particular, arrests for public drunkenness and violent crimes

decreased. 26

Th e reason beer was exempt from the tax is illustrative of the context.

First, the Carlsberg brewery supported the tax on distilled spirits and pre-

sented nutritional arguments with patriotic undertones; beer contains more

nourishment than the grain alone. Second, the temperance movement

acknowledged that distilled spirits were much worse and that beer, could

therefore be accepted in some circumstances. Th is type of pragmatism would

eventually compromise the integrity of the Danish temperance movement

within the international temperance movement, but for now it served to

achieve important national regulations. Th e results from the combination of

regulating bars and the steep excise tax on distilled spirits left policymakers

pondering: “Why force a ‘dry’ tedious alcohol culture when a ‘wet’, pleasant

and non-problematic alcohol culture is possible?” 27 This compromise

exemplifi es an early success for social reform in Denmark. Th e compromise

included all of the relevant interest groups and also helped reduce social

unrest. Th e workmen of the lower classes were free to congregate in public

houses and at the same time were saved from the ravages of distilled spirits;

as such, the results exemplify early social progress and nationalism.

Th e second Commission on Sobriety was formed in 1918 to evaluate the

eff ects of the Publicans Act of 1912 and the excise tax of 1917 and to discuss the

option of introducing a state monopoly on alcohol sales as the other Nordic

countries were doing. Th e temperance movement was part of the commis-

sion and was critical of the lack of active enforcement of the provisions in the

Publicans Act. From its perspective, the police were not eager to close down

bars on their own; they had to be put under local pressure to do so. 28 Th e

other members of the commission perceived the new regulations as great

successes, and the Second Commission on Sobriety concluded that the

decline in consumption was attributable to taxation and legal regulations.

In this light, a state monopoly was neither necessary nor appropriate. Th e

monopoly option was seen as an infringement on the freedom of trade, and

the “screening” of customers, which was in place in other Nordic countries,

was perceived as ineffi cient. 29 Th is is an example of regulating for the public

good. Moderate drinkers are made to sacrifi ce some of their freedom of

accessibility, but the sacrifi ce is accepted as a gesture of solidarity with heavy


drinkers, who are more at risk. Th is illustrates the principle of universalism in

regulation that characterizes the early constitutional state. After this, it

became a matter of balancing freedom of trade with the citizens’ “physical

and spiritual health and cultural development.” 30

Th e fi rst legal issue was to establish the age at which a person is consid-

ered a citizen. A revision in 1924 introduced the eighteen-year age limit on

buying alcohol in bars. 31 Th is was the fi rst national age limit, and it was

intended to strengthen the municipalities in order to meet the loft y objective

of creating a civilized drinking culture that contributes to social progress.

Prior to the Publican’s Act of 1912, the age limit on buying intoxicating drinks

was controlled only by local police regulations. Th is was not a lasting model

because the laws could vary greatly from one municipality to the next. In

addition, the age restriction that was in place only banned serving “children.”

Generally, the limit was sixteen years old, but some local police regulations

permitted serving to fourteen-year-olds. 32 Th e majority of the members of

the Second Commission on Sobriety thought the temperance movement’s

pressure on local police was going too far. In some parts of Denmark, a

factual ban on alcohol had been instated by the “discretionary” application

of age restrictions. Th e local temperance movements had pressured police

into enforcing an unusually high age requirement. 33 Seen in this historical

context, the age restriction that was agreed upon in 1924 not only raised the

previous limit; it also established a universal legal right to buy alcohol.

Th e fi nal and most controversial aspect of the licensing system was the

option for citizens in the country municipalities to make objections and

recommendations concerning alcohol licenses. If one in three members of

the parish or the municipal council voted in favor of a referendum, the council

would hold a public referendum among citizens on a specifi c license. Th e

aspects considered are still applicable today. 34

Th e owner’s conduct, business qualifi cations, and economic situation

Th e size, character, and location of the bar

Social circumstances and sobriety and policing issues directly or

indirectly related to the concentration of bars in the area

Th is discretionary licensing procedure has been a source of discontent for bar

owners since its inception. Originally the bar owners thought the discre-

tionary elements were an “unconstitutional provisional measure,” 35 that is, a

government act working against the people. Th e temperance movement,

however, assessed the procedure as strengthening both grassroots involve-

ment and the burgeoning local democratic institutions. At this point, the

KIM MOELLER | 505

Danish temperance movement had accepted a pragmatic stance that brought

it into confl ict with other social organizations internationally. 36 For example,

the Danish branch of the Nordic Independent Order of Good People had

accepted the serving of beers with reduced alcohol content as a national com-

promise to break with the spirits-drinking culture. Th is move away from

absolute abstention did not sit well with the International Order of Good

Templars and the Danish branch was excluded. In the years to come, the

popularity of the temperance movement declined as its role was supplanted

by other movements and political parties.

t he l icensing s ystem, 1912–1970

Th e growth of the regulatory framework was aff ected by the temperance

movement’s committed eff ort to portray alcohol as the cause of “poverty,

crimes, insanity, suicide, disease, and death.” 37 Th ese sentiments caught on

among rural populations, and the average consumption rate remained at the

low levels achieved in 1917 for forty years. Th is model of a “top-down civilizing

liberalism” was widely accepted in Danish society at the time, with the excep-

tion of bar owners. 38 Th e regulation of the concentration of bars was intro-

duced at an initial level of 350 inhabitants per bar. In 1939, this was further

reduced to 550 inhabitants per bar in the larger towns. In 1958, the level was

adjusted to 600 citizens per bar. Th ese increasingly restrictive measures refl ect

a growing concern over the destructive eff ects of alcohol also in the cities.

Th is was also a time of the constitutional state. Th e legitimacy of initia-

tives toward the social progress and welfare state provisions rested on their

universality and capacity for “ensuring order and social controls through

legal regulations.” 39 State authorities and health policy experts enjoyed a high

degree of legitimacy during this period because of their record of universality

in rules and regulation and their eff ective control policy. Note how this Danish

model of regulating prices, hours, and density predates the “total consump-

tion theory” and its modern universalistic principle of prevention. 40 Th e

theory’s core assumption is that there is no clear demarcation between alcohol

use and abuse, which is a cornerstone in the Danish policy. Th e total con-

sumption theory was adopted as a guiding principle by the WHO in 1975.

Th e fundamental structure of the licensing system’s regulation of alcohol

availability was in place before 1939. Between 1939 and 1963, the law was

adjusted with rather minor changes three times: 41 a limitation on the duration

of the alcohol license, the extension of opening hours to prevent illicit bars,

and the application of the age restriction to apply to retail sales as well. All


three laws adjusted the rules on license concentration. Th e last local alcohol

ban in a rural municipality was removed in 1945.

Aft er 1960, the welfare state consolidated and expanded as the popula-

tion saw a steady increase in overall income. Th e income increase is believed

to have fostered a more “relaxed” and individualized attitude to the risks

associated with alcohol, referred to as particularization. 42 Alcohol use increased

as the rise in income levels decreased the real price of alcohol and infl ation

further eroded the eff ect of taxation. Ten years later, average consumption

had almost returned to the level before the introduction of the excise tax in

1917—around eleven liters pure alcohol per inhabitant over the age of four-

teen. Th is rapid increase has been interpreted as a revolt against the tradi-

tional moral values and the institutions that embodied these values. 43 Th is

revolt signaled the demise of the disciplined subjects of the constitutional and

welfare states and introduced the free individuals of the affl uent consumer

society, where alcohol is part of status-oriented consumption. 44

Th is shift is refl ected in the laws passed during this period. State author-

ities moved away from universal controls and the establishment of basic indi-

vidual rights and toward a focus on reducing the harmful eff ects of alcohol

use on individuals, especially crime and misuse. Th e intellectual ownership of

these issues was ascribed to a new category of experts, whose authority was

rooted in science. All the while, moralistic ideologies lost ground. Th is time

period was characterized by a lack of faith in positive eff ects from further

expansions of the state’s universal restrictions on serving alcohol. Control

policy had reached a point of saturation. Governance by objectives was

replaced by government by rules. 45

Th ese rules are apparent in the committee established by the Ministry of

Commerce in 1966. Th e committee examined the options for liberalizing the

Fig. 1. Liters of pure alcohol per person over fourteen years old

KIM MOELLER | 507

law because the population had a new set of demands. Th e workforce was

changing and urbanization was accelerating. Women increasingly worked

outside the home, and the distance traveled between workplace and home

was growing. Th ere was a new demand for aff ordable eateries, with the option

of serving alcohol. Th e fourteen members of the Ministry of Commerce’s

committee focused on easing the administrative burdens of license owners.

Th e members of the committee were mostly representatives from the restaurant

trade, with the exception of two representatives from the Danish Temperance

National Union and an alcohol consultant from the Ministry of the Interior.

Th ese three had the responsibility to oversee that the interests of sobriety and

society were included in the fi nal recommendations. 46

Th e recommendations included replacing the Publican’s Act with a new

Bill of Restaurants. 47 Th is new law included both elements of tightened and

loosened regulation. First, the last remains of the distinction between town

and country were removed. Second, the limit to the number of bars in an

area was removed, and with this also the option of holding referendums on

specifi c licenses. Hereaft er, the responsibility for assessing a reasonable local

bar quota was to be shared between the municipal council and the police. Th e

goal was still the same: to prevent “public drunkenness, serving of minors,

vandalism, night disturbances.” 48

t he r estaurant and h otel a ct of 1970

Th e Bill of Restaurants was replaced by the Restaurant and Hotel Act of

1970, which was presented as a “liberalization.” Th e bar owners again pro-

tested the discretionary assessment of the owner’s fi nancial situation. Th ey

claimed that it was in confl ict with the Danish constitution and that it would

eventually confl ict with European Union regulations as well. Denmark

became a member of the European Union in 1972 and the bar owners used

this to argue that the “locking systems” ought to be removed so that alcohol

could be sold like any other commodity—a naturalization, similar to the

status of nicotine. 49 In the European Union, alcoholic beverages are treated

as economic commodities, and alcohol-control policies are not allowed to

be more restrictive than required to meet health and social policy objec-

tives. 50 Th e paternalism of the welfare state had to give way to this “New

public health” perspective. 51 Th e problems associated with alcohol were

increasingly seen as personal problems that should be solved by applying

expert advice on risk, rather than having the state limit citizen’s actions in a

universal way.


From the state’s perspective, the basic idea of regulating bars was the

same as it had always been: “Th e time spent in restaurants and bars, dining,

recreation and entertaining is spent under circumstances that are secure and

Table 1. Acts and parliamentary white papers

On a license to serve strong drinks, Act no. 73 of May 23, 1873

On publicans and public houses, and selling strong drinks, Act no. 104 of May 10, 1912

Parliamentary White Paper of 1918 reported by the Second Commission on Sobriety

appointed by the Minister of the Interior, First section—Bill on public houses and

innkeeping, including serving of strong drinks

On publicans and public houses, including serving of strong drinks, Act no. 99 of March

29, 1924

Parliamentary White Paper of 1927 reported by the Second Commission on Sobriety

appointed by the Minister of the Interior, Second section on prohibition of manufacturing,

import and sale of strong drinks

On public houses and innkeeping including trade in strong drinks, Act no. 129 of March

15, 1939

Parliamentary White Paper no. 104 (1954), White paper regarding changes in the act on

public houses, part 2, Reported by the Commission of 1947 on the alcohol issue

Publican’s Act, Act no. 207 of June 7, 1958

Parliamentary White Paper no. 264 (1960), Final remarks of the Alcohol Commission

On hotel and restaurant activities etc., Act no. 214 of June 7, 1963

Parliamentary White Paper no. 539 (1969), Ministry of Commerce’s Publican Commission

On hotels and restaurants etc., Act no. 121 of March 25, 1970

On changing the act on hotels and restaurants etc., Act no. 201 of May 22, 1985


Parliamentary White Paper no. 1206 (1990), Ministry of Industry’s Commission on hotels

and restaurants


On changing the penal code, weapons law and act on hotels and restaurants etc. (Increased

penalties for aggravated violence, including possession of knives and striking weapons,

safety requirements for restaurant interior etc.), Act no. 350 of May 23, 1997

On act on hotels and restaurants etc. (Changing the resolutions on dispossession of alcohol

licenses, prohibition of sojourn and sentencing), Act no. 1084 of December 17, 2002

On changing the act on hotels and restaurants etc. (Ban on sale of tobacco and alcohol to

persons under the age of 16)] Act no. 213 of March 31, 2004

On retail sales from stores etc., Act no. 606 of June 24, 2005

KIM MOELLER | 509

not subversive or demoralizing.” 52 For the publicans, the connection between

regulating the bars and the public’s sobriety was not suffi ciently substantiated,

but rather was a “quite inexplicable . . . discrimination of a line of business”

and an expression of “obsolete dogmas.” Th e bar owners did acknowledge

that some problems remained because of the rapid growth in the number of

bars. Among the new bars, there were “many smaller and harshly operated

bodegas” that “attracted elements with economic crime as a specialty.” In

general, the idea had been to prevent unsavory types such as “gamblers,

‘loose’ women, pimps and drunks” from obtaining licenses to sell alcohol.

Th eir lack of “moral qualifi cations,” it was feared, would lead to bars that

would be “hard serving,” which implied “fornication, drunkenness and inde-

cency,” or even criminal acts such as “fencing, illicit drug sales and violence

such as muggings.” To underline that it is the individual licensee’s responsi-

bility to maintain proper operating conditions, failure to complete the

“required inspections” became punishable by law in 1978. 53 In this sense, the

goal of a civilizing process still existed but, in practice, conformity with

international free-trade commitments trumped any argument based on

morals or universal regulations. Th is externalization of alcohol-control policies

has dominated the discussion ever since.

From 1979 until 1990, the law was revised six times. With an act from

1985, it became the responsibility of the bar owner to ensure that nonalcoholic

drinks were available so that guests weren’t “forced” to drink alcohol, a rule

that the Ministry of Commerce’s Commission had originally recommended

in 1969. 54 Th e reach and ambitions of alcohol-control policies were generally

reduced. What remains are the problems associated with individuals who

drink too much, as well optimizing the excise-tax level and avoiding price

violations of the open market.

Th ese developments illustrate how the inherent confl icts and limitations

of the Danish model persist, yet change. Th e growing aversion to state inter-

ference creates a dilemma for the control of problematic alcohol consump-

tion. Th e process of particularization undermines state-imposed restrictions.

Th e public acceptance of universal rules has been saturated; they are now

seen as paternalistic and obsolete, rather than progressive and solidary.

Two confl icting trends in alcohol regulation occurred during this period.

On the one hand, the increase in consumption levels and new expert knowl-

edge on the harmful eff ects of alcohol require some state reaction to secure

public health. On the other hand, untimely interference in the individual’s

private sphere is scorned. Th e state’s legitimacy previously hinged on its con-

tribution to the public’s well-being, this role is now being questioned because


it confl icts with the growing individualization. On top of this comes external-

ization. Th e naturalization of alcohol is being pursued aggressively. In the

European Union, alcohol is widely regarded as a regular commodity. Th ese

confl icts regarding the regulation of alcohol embody the dilemma of indi-

vidual rights versus state authority in a globalized economy. Increasingly the

state authorities would place the responsibility for preventing abusive

drinking in the hands of bar owners, not necessarily because this was thought

of as a good idea, but because a small and open economy like Denmark does

not have much of a choice. At this point, Sweden and Finland struggled with

the EU court to maintain some remnants of monopoly regulation, 55 but the

Danish model’s focus on excise taxation stood no chance against the price

convergence principle.

c ontrolling the p ublic o rder

In 1990, a new commission was formed with the purpose of implementing a

thorough deregulation. 56 An economic downturn in the 1980s had hurt

alcohol sales and put a strain on the restaurant business. Out of the fi ft een

members of the commission, only one was appointed by the temperance

movement. However, the commission still recommended that section 1 of the

law be used to declare that the overall purpose of the law is to safeguard the

interest of society and sobriety. In this way, the fi rst section would serve as a

pervasive contribution to interpreting other sections of the law. Th e white

paper was ready in 1990 and the parliamentary negotiations lasted through

1992–93. From the parliamentary proceedings, it is clear that the commission

was confl icted between the interests of the restaurant trade and public health

concerns. Parliament deviated from the recommendation of the commission

because in the white paper the restaurant trade “had not been able to have

their voice heard.” 57 As a result, the specifi cation of the societal interest in

sobriety was relegated to a less signifi cant position in section 12, part 12, as a

consideration that the licensing authorities must respect in their decisions,

not as a pervasive contribution to interpretation. Th is decision has signifi cant

implications.

Alcohol-control policy objectives transcend policy sectors. If these

objectives are to have any chance against the competing interests of external-

ization and particularization, they will require “an integrated center that can

coordinate the intersectoral integration.” 58 Having Section 1 of the act state

that the objective of regulation is to include society and sobriety could have

been the formal recognition of such an integrated center. Instead, several of

KIM MOELLER | 511

the contributions in the parliamentary negotiations refer to the need for a

“modernization.” 59 In practice, this means relaxations of rules in anticipation

of EU court decisions on anticompetitive practices. Th is argument had previ-

ously been put forth by the bar owners in relation to the law from 1970, but it

had more political support this time. Traditional political demarcations and

voting patterns were dissolving, and politicians were forced to ingratiate

themselves with less faithful voters. Citizens were becoming consumers and

had little patience for politicians with moral agendas, and this helped alcohol

become a naturalized and regular commodity and less of a dangerous intoxi-

cant. 60 Still, the considerations regarding concentration of bars, tax evasion,

and pricing practices were included as part of the overall alcohol policy

objectives. Figure 2 illustrates that these considerations may have halted

the continuous increase in the concentration of bars in the bigger cities, but

perhaps at a point of saturation.

Th e limit to individualization comes when our choices have conse-

quences for others, for example, when the public order is threatened by

violence or other disturbances. It used to be the responsibility of bar owners

to ensure that intoxicated persons “under adequate escort are brought home

or to a police station.” 61 Th ey also had to prevent minors and people in treat-

ment for alcohol abuse imposed by public authorities from being served.

Th ese installments were removed in 1993 because they were too diffi cult to

administer. Th e required inspections hereaft er became a duty of the police.

Fig. 2. Concentration of licenses in Denmark’s biggest cities


A bar owner’s responsibility, under the threat of legal sanctions, was to contact

the police if the provisions were breached. For all intents and purposes, the

law from 1993 is the current governing law when it comes to running a bar.

Th e most recent regulations mostly deal with the issue of public order in and

around locations that serve alcohol. Th e blame and responsibility for public

order disturbances is not the alcohol or those selling it, but the few problem-

atic persons among those buying it.

a nalysis

Nordic alcohol policies have been a “spectacular social experiment” in the

“power over individual choice, and ideas about the justifi cation of that

power.” 62 In many ways, the history presented above is the story of how citizens

and businesses alike have perceived the state’s legitimacy in regulating the

public’s choice, and vice versa. This is also the story of a country pursuing

the ideals of industrial progress, egalitarian universalism, and nationalism,

and eventually achieving them, at least for a period of time. Th is period of

time is referred to as the welfare state and was a time of economic growth as

well as increasing individualism. Th ese processes would prove to be detri-

mental to the Danish model of alcohol control. Th e ideal of egalitarian uni-

versalism and nationalism were instrumental in the decision to apply what

was essentially a practical predecessor to the total consumption theory: a

steep excise tax on distilled spirits, regulation of availability, and restrictions

on age and opening hours. Th is model was a tremendous success for as long

as the economic restrictions were proportional to income levels, and as long

as the hardest drinkers were found among the poorest rural populations. Th e

success of the welfare state in raising incomes, leveling economic inequalities,

and accelerating urbanization became the bane of the universal policy. Th e

process of individualization confl icted with the paternalism that was essen-

tially the basis of the civilizing ambitions.

Th e developments in alcohol policies beyond the welfare state underline

this. Th e deregulation of alcohol controls aft er the 1970s and into the 1990s

has coincided with a general trend in public administration arrangements

toward decentralization and privatization. Th e ambition of improving the

public good by restricting alcohol availability is now an issue that must be

settled between the state and the market. In this confrontation, the processes

of externalization, naturalization, and particularization have trumped public

health, which is now reduced to providing information to risk-taking

consumers.

KIM MOELLER | 513

Th e process of externalization relates to how the state authorities have

dealt with the temperance movement as well as the increasing strength of

market forces. Th e infl uence of this process is most obvious in the post-

welfare state period. Market forces are apparent in the bar owners’ trade asso-

ciation’s support from the EU courts in their demand for removing barriers to

competition. Th e temperance movement’s loss of infl uence aft er World War

II had eff ectively reduced popular opposition to the bar owners’ trade associ-

ation. Th is lack of civil society opposition to the free-trade position prevented

the state’s attempt to curb free trade from gaining momentum. Th is is clear

when the factual aspects of a proposed legal bill are not even debated in par-

liament because representatives in the preparatory commissions have already

referred to the rules of the EU courts, which take precedence over Danish law.

Th e conclusion that the publicans’ and the alcohol producers’ interests have

had more infl uence following Denmark’s membership into the European

Union in 1972 is not controversial. Similar developments have occurred in the

other Nordic countries as well. Here, however, the state monopolies provided

a stronger foundation that was not as easily eroded as the Danish policy

model founded on universal egalitarianism. Th e publicans’ original protests

against the moralistic state infringing on the right to sell alcohol was nothing

compared with the international market forces that would pummel alcohol

regulation aft er the 1970s.

In extension of this gradual development, a process of naturalization has

occurred. Naturalization refers to how alcohol increasingly has come to be

seen as a regular commodity, a commodity associated with some health risks,

but risks that citizens have been informed about. As long as the intoxication

occurs out of sight and does not threaten public order, alcohol is sold freely

and consumed by risk-managing adults. Social well-being and sobriety are

only formally limited by the police’s duty to uphold public order and stop

neighborhood disturbances.

Finally, the process of particularization describes this autonomy and

individual responsibility. Th e emancipation from the paternalistic state was

slowly removed as incomes began to gain momentum from the 1960s on. Th e

remaining restrictions are few and increasingly are seen as interferences to

individual freedom more so than a reasonable regard for the public good.

Individualization and increased prosperity aff ect the legitimacy of political

interventions. In the end, society’s alcohol problem is the problematic con-

sumption by some individuals. Th at average consumption is high is unfortu-

nate, but it is not a valid reason for the state to intervene in individual cases.

Th e state’s legitimacy has been reduced to supplying general information and


providing treatment options in the most serious cases. Th is is most clearly

observable in regard to the question of public order. Alcohol consumption

can and will disturb the public order, but the explanations that are addressed

in the legal regulation pertain to an individual’s lack of self-control or insuffi -

cient surveillance and security measures in bars. Th e steady increase in the

concentration of bars is perhaps the clearest illustration of this process.

When seen over a period of a hundred years, alcohol controls in Denmark

have gone from a socially progressive way of preventing threats to the bur-

geoning social order of the welfare state to a paternalistic attempt at reducing

the societal costs of a regular, but somewhat risky, commodity.

Aarhus University , Denmark

n o t e s

1. Rigsdags proceedings 1918–1919, appendix A, column 4809 [Rigsdagstidende,

Ordentlig samling].

2. Parliamentary proceedings 1992–1993, appendix A and B, column 86

[Folketingstidende].

3. National Temperance Movement , Memorandum of 1911 [Redegørelse af 1911]

( Copenhagen , 1911 ), 4 .

4. Bent Nielsen , Bill of Restaurants: Commented Edition [Restaurantloven:

Kommenteret udgave] ( Copenhagen , 1979 ), 9 .

5. Rigsdags proceedings 1918–1919, appendix A , columns 4763–64.

6. Ministry of Commerce’s Publican Commission [Handelsministeriets

Beværterlovudvalg], Parliamentary white paper no. 539 (Copenhagen, 1969), 38.

7. OECD 2010, OECD Health Data 2010 (OECD); ESPAD 2007, the 2007 ESPAD

Report: “Substance Use Among Students in 35 European Countries: Th e European School

Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs” (by Björn Hibell, Ulf Guttormsson, Salme

Ahlström, Olga Balakireva, Th oroddur Bjarnason, Anna Kokkevi, and Ludwig Kraus),

www . espad . org .

8. Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen , Th e Constitutional State, the Welfare State, and Th en

What? [Retsstaten, Velfærdsstaten og hvad så?] ( Aarhus , 1984 ), 23 .

9. Robin Room , Anders Romelsjö , and Pia Mäkelä , “ Impacts of Alcohol Policy: Th e

Nordic Experience ,” in Th e Eff ects of Nordic Alcohol Policies: What Happens to Drinking

and Harm When Alcohol Controls Change? ed. Robin Room ( Helsinki , 2002 ), 167 –74 ;

Dalberg-Larsen, Th e Constitutional State, the Welfare State, and Th en What? 23.

10. Pekka Sulkunen , “ Ethics of Alcohol Policy in a Saturated Society ,” Addiction 92 ,

no. 9 ( 1997 ): 1118 .

11. Pekka Sulkunen , Caroline Sutton , Christoff er Tigerstedt , and Katariina

Warpenius , “ Introduction ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Pekka Sulkunen , Caroline Sutton ,

Christoff er Tigerstedt , and Katariina Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 9 .

KIM MOELLER | 515

12. Kettil Bruun , Griffi th Edwards , Martti Lumio , Klaus Mäkelä , Lynn Pan , Robert

Popham , Robin Room , Wolfgang Schmidt , Ole-Jørgen Skog , Pekka Sulkunen , and Esa

ôsterberg , Alcohol Control Policies in Public Health Perspective , vol. 25 ( Forssa , 1975 ).

13. Th omas Babor , Harold Holder , Raul Caetano , Ross Homel , Sally Casswell ,

Michael Livingston , Griffi th Edwards , Esa Österberg , Norman Giesbrecht , Jürgen Rehm ,

Kathryn Graham , Robin Room , Joel Grube , Ingeborg Rossow , and Linda Hill , Alcohol, No

Ordinary Commodity: Research and Public Policy ( Oxford , 2003 ).

14. At its height of popularity at the end of World War II, the temperance move-

ment had an estimated 67,000 members (“Final Remarks of the Alcohol Commission , ”

Parliamentary white paper no. 264 [Copenhagen, 1960], 199), but it never became as strong

or consistent as in the other Nordic countries ( Sidsel Eriksen , “ Th e Making of the Danish

Liberal Drinking Style: Th e Construction of a ‘Wet’ Alcohol Discourse in Denmark ,”

Contemporary Drug Problems 20 , no. 1 [ 1993 ]: 4 ). In my article, I have reduced the many

facets of this movement to a homogeneous whole.

15. Statistics Denmark 2010 [Danmarks Statistik], Consumption of Pure Liters of

Alcohol , www . statiskbanken . dk .

16. Sidsel Eriksen , Communities in Provincial Towns: People and Associations in

Grindsted, 1880–1949 [Stationsbyens samfund: Folk og foreninger i Grindsted 1880–1949]

( Grindsted , 1996 ) ; Eriksen, “Th e Making of the Danish Liberal Drinking Style, 1–32;

Sidsel Eriksen, “Illicit Bars as a Form of Protest: Contribution to the Study of Local Bans

on Alcohol and Th eir Signifi cance for Alcohol Consumption in Denmark”[Smugkroer

som protestform: Et bidrag til studiet af de danske lokalforbuds betydning for alkoholfor-

bruget i Danmark, Oplæg fra NAD’s konference om offentligt drikkeri], Alkoholpolitik

3 (1989).

17. Robin Room , Anders Romelsjö , and Pia Mäkelä , “ Impacts of Alcohol Policy:

The Nordic Experience ,” in The Effects of Nordic Alcohol Policies: What Happens

to Drinking and Harm When Alcohol Controls Change? ed. Robin Room ( Helsinki ,

2002 ), 167 –74 ; Pia Mäkelä , Ingeborg Rossow , and Kalle Tryggvesson , “ Who Drinks

More or Less When Policies Change? The Evidence from 50 Years of Nordic Studies ,”

in The Effects of Nordic Alcohol Policies , ed. Robin Room ( Helsinki , 2002 ), 17 – 70 ;

Pekka Sulkunen , Caroline Sutton , Christoffer Tigerstedt , and Katariina Warpenius ,

“ Introduction ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Sulkunen , Sutton , Tigerstedt , and Warpenius

( Helsinki , 2000 ), 7 – 16 .

18. Lars Møller , “ Legal Restriction Resulted in a Reduction of Alcohol Consumption

Among Young People in Denmark ,” in Th e Eff ects of Nordic Alcohol Policies ,ed. Robin

Room ( Helsinki , 2002 ), 158 .

19. C. C. Heilesen , Publican’s Act of March 29: 1924 in Review [Beværterloven af 29.

marts 1924 i hovedtræk] ( Copenhagen , 1925 ), 3 .

20. Erik Groes-Petersen and Joergen Sandholt , Publican’s Act of March 1, 1939

[Beværterloven af 15. marts 1939] , ( Copenhagen , 1956 ), 80 .

21. Rigsdags proceedings 1918–19, appendix A, columns 4802–3.

22. On Licenses to Serve Strong Drinks [Om bevilling til udskænkning af stærke

drikke], Act no. 73 of 23 May 1873.

23. Eriksen, “Illicit Bars as a Form of Protest,” 156–57.

24. Ministry of Commerce’s Publican Commission, Parliamentary white paper

no. 539 (Copenhagen, 1969), 8.


25. Other factors played a role as well. A decline in consumption had already begun,

and the economic downturn due to World War II intensifi ed the eff ects of the price increase

(Eriksen, “Illicit Bars as a Form of Protest,” 162).

26. Rigsdags proceedings 1919–1920 , columns 2943–40; “Final Remarks of the Alcohol

Commission,” Parliamentary white paper no. 264 (Copenhagen 1960), 96.

27. Eriksen, “Th e Making of the Danish Liberal Drinking Style, 3.

28. Report on the Work for the Publican’s Act: Th e Danish Temperance Movement

[Beretning om arbejdet for Beværterloven] (Aalborg, 1914), 7.

29. “Final Remarks of the Alcohol Commission,” Parliamentary white paper no. 264

(Copenhagen, 1960), 208–11.


31. “On Publicans and Public Houses, and Selling Strong Drinks, Act no. 99 of March

1924”; Axel Roelsen and K. Skat-Rørdam, “Act no. 99 of 29 March: On Public Houses and

the Selling of Hard Liquor” [Lov nr. 99 af 29. marts om Beværtning og gæstgiveri samt om

handel med stærke drikke] (Copenhagen, 1937), x–xi.

32. Rigsdags proceedings 1907, appendix A, column 4331.

33. Rigsdags proceedings 1918–1919, appendix A, columns 4791–92; Rigsdags proceedings

1921–22, appendix C.

34. Ministry of Industry’s Commission on Hotels and Restaurants, Parliamentary white

paper no. 1206 [Industriministeriets restaurationslovudvalg] (Copenhagen, 1990), 78–79.

35. National Temperance Movement, Memorandum of 1911 [Redegørelse af 1911]

(Copenhagen, 1911), 4 and 20.

36. Eriksen, “Th e Making of the Danish Liberal Drinking Style,”19.

37. Rigsdags proceedings 1918–1919, appendix A, column 4802.

38. Sulkunen et al ., “ Introduction ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Sulkunen , Sutton , Tigerstedt ,

and Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 16 .

39. Dalberg-Larsen, Th e Constitutional State, the Welfare State, and Th en What? 61–65.

40. Dianna Chapman Walsh , Philip J. Cook , Karen Davis , Marcus Grant , Pekka

Sulkunen , George E. Vaillant , and Th omas L. Delbanco , “ Th e Cultural Dimensions of

Alcohol Policy Worldwide ,” Health Aff airs 8 , no. 2 ( 1989 ): 48 – 62 .

41. On public houses and innkeeping, including trade in strong drinks, Act no. 129 of

15 March 1939; Publican’s act, Act no. 207 of 7 June 1958; on hotel and restaurant activities

etc., Act no. 214 of 7 June 1963.

42. Sulkunen , “ Th e Liberal Arguments ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Sulkunen , Sutton ,

Tigerstedt , and Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 68 .

43. “Final Remarks of the Alcohol Commission,” Parliamentary white paper no. 264

(1960), 185–86; Eriksen, “Illicit Bars as a form of Protest,”156.

44. Walsh et al., “Th e Cultural Dimensions of Alcohol Policy Worldwide,” 48–62.

45. Mika Alavaikko , “ Alcohol Policy and the New Public Management ,” in Broken Spirits ,

ed. Sulkunen , Sutton , Tigerstedt , and Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 138 ; Dalberg-Larsen,

Th e Constitutional State, the Welfare State, and Th en What? 13.

46. Ministry of Commerce’s Publican Commission, Parliamentary white paper no.

539 (Copenhagen, 1969).

47. On Hotels and Restaurants etc. , Act no. 121 of 25 March 1970; Gry Asnæs , Th e Bill

of Restaurants in Practice: Th e Commented Bill of Restaurants [Restaurationsloven i praksis:

den kommenterede restaurationslov] ( Copenhagen , 2006 ), 21 .

KIM MOELLER | 517

48. Ministry of Industry, Newsletter no. 66, 5 April 5 1982; Ministry of Commerce’s

Publican Commission, Parliamentary white paper no. 539 (Copenhagen, 1969), 14.

49. Bent Nielsen , Bill of Restaurants: Commented Edition [Restaurantloven:

Kommenteret udgave] ( Copenhagen , 1979 ), 9 .

50. Trygve Ugland , “ An Integrated Alcohol Control Policy: What, Why, and How? ”

Contemporary Drug Problems 37 ( 2010 ): 45 .

51. Pekka Sulkunen and Katariina Warpenius , “ Reforming the Self and the Other:

Th e Temperance Movement and the Duality of Modern Subjectivity ,” Critical Public Health

10 , no. 4 ( 2000 ): 423 –38.



539 (Copenhagen, 1969), 38–46; Nielsen, Bill of Restaurants, 9 and prologue.


539 (Copenhagen, 1969), 48.

55. Ugland, “An Integrated Alcohol Control Policy, 47.

56. Ministry of Industry’s Commission on Hotels and Restaurants, Parliamentary

white paper no. 1206 (1990).

57. Parliamentary proceedings 1992–1993 , appendix A and B, column 1026.

58. Ugland, “An Integrated Alcohol Control Policy,” 50.

59. Parliamentary proceedings 1992–1993 , appendix A and B, columns 82 and 86.

60. Sulkunen , “ Th e Liberal Arguments ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Sulkunen , Sutton ,

Tigerstedt , and Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 85 ; Lars Bille , Changing Political Parties

[Partier i forandring] ( Odense , 1997 ) ; Börje Olsson , Sturla Nordlund , and Saija Järvinen ,

“ Media Representations and Public Opinion ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Sulkunen , Sutton ,

Tigerstedt , and Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 228 –30.

61. On Hotels and Restaurants, Act no. 121 of 25 March 1970.

62. Sulkunen et al ., “ Introduction ,” in Broken Spirits , ed. Sulkunen , Sutton , Tigerstedt ,

and Warpenius ( Helsinki , 2000 ), 9 .

Freedom to drink, freedom to sell drink

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