Fatwā-Instigated Violence and the Struggle for Authority. An Analysis of the Punitive Fatwā...

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UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN

Fatwā-‐Instigated Violence and the

Struggle for Authority An Analysis of the Punitive Fatwā Phenomenon Prevalent in

Bangladesh during the 1990’s

Beveren, C.C.H. van

17-‐08-‐2014

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. The concept of fatwā

2.1 Classical notion of fatwā

2.2 The history of fatāwā in Bangladesh

2.3 Fatāwā in Bangladesh during the 1990’s

3. Fatwā instigated violence -‐ case studies

3.1 Noorjahan

3.2 Roquaiya

3.3 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)

4. Parties involved: salish, women and NGO’s

4.1 Salish

4.2 Bangladeshi rural women

4.3 Non Governmental Organisations (NGO’s)

4.4 Mutual dynamics

5. Political context and social responses

5.1 Politics: from secularism to Islamism

5.2 Social responses to punitive fatāwā and violence

6. Conclusion and final thoughts

7. References

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1. Introduction

The Islamic term fatwā made headlines in-‐ and outside of the Islamic world in 1989

when Ayatollah Khomeini called for the assassination of the Indian born author Salman

Rushdie in response to his novel The Satanic Verses. According to Khomeini, the book was

“compiled, printed, and published against Islam, the Prophet and the Koran.”1 Consequently,

he issued a fatwā calling “on all zealous Muslims to execute [Salman Rushdie and his

publishers] quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will dare to insult the Islamic

sanctions.”2 Several years later, another author found herself at the centre of a highly

mediatized fatwā controversy. Taslima Nasrin, a Bangladeshi physician known for her

writings on women’s issues and religion, angered Islamic sentiments in her native country

with her novel Lajja (Shame): the story of a young Hindu man whose sister has been

kidnapped by Muslims fanatics.3 Shortly after the publication of the book in December 1992,

a fundamentalist group named Shahaba Sainik Parishad issued a fatwā. They put a bounty

on Nasrin’s head, demanded a ban on all her books and argued that the author should be

put to trial for charges of blasphemy. The threats directed towards the author reached an

absolute high in July 1994, when approximately 200, 000 Islamic fundamentalists took to the

streets of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, in a demand for Nasrin’s death. Finally, Western

ambassadors and representatives of the Bangladesh government reached an agreement

enabling Taslima Nasrin to leave for Stockholm, Sweden.4

Surely the issuance of a fatwā is not an isolated event. Ayatollah Khomeini called

upon all Muslims to take Rushdie’s live in the aftermath of the revolution, the Shia struggle

for power and recognition.5 Similarly, the Taslima Nasrin controversy does not stand in itself.

Rather, it is part of a broader phenomenon in Bangladeshi society. The last decade of the

twentieth century saw a remarkable upsurge in the amount of fatāwā against women.

Opposed to the Nasrin case, these fatāwā are primarily aimed at poor, rural women, and in

some instances at the non-‐governmental organisations (NGO’s) that aim to help them.6 In

1 Mehdi Mozaffari, Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1998), 46. 2 Ibidem, 46. 2 Ibidem, 46. 3 Habiba Zaman, “The Taslima Nasrin Controversy And Feminism In Bangladesh: A Geo-‐Political And Transnational Perspective,” Atlantis 23, no. 2 (1999), 44-‐46. 4 Ibidem, 47. 5 Mozaffari, Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy, 39. 6 Ali Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 40 (2005): 171.

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many instances, these women become the victims of violent attacks, sometimes even

resulting in death.

The increase in fatwā-‐instigated violence has not gone unnoticed. Reports of these

fatāwā and the violence resulting from them have appeared in national and international

media. Moreover, human rights organisations, such as the Bangladeshi Ain O Salish Kendro

(ASK) and Amnesty International have published numerous reports on the matter, urging the

Bangladesh government to take strong measures against these practices.

In order to fully grasp the practice of futyā as it developed in Bangladesh in the last

decade of the twentieth century, it is necessary to closely examine all the elements that

constitute part of this phenomenon. In the following study, I will first discuss the concept of

fatwā, its history in Bangladesh society and the specific type of fatāwā that are the focal

point of this discussion. Second, I will discuss three fatāwā that were issued during this

period and led to grave acts of violence. Subsequently, I will elaborate on the parties

involved in the practice of futyā: the men issuing the fatāwā and the women and NGO’s that

are targeted. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the political and social developments in

Bangladesh that form the backdrop against which fatwā instigated violence has become a

manifest aspect of Bangladeshi society. Finally, I will discuss how the upsurge in fatāwā

directed against women can be explained and what conclusions can be derived from this

development.

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2. The concept of fatwā

Following the previously mentioned Khomeini-‐Rushdie affaire, many have wrongly

used the term fatwā synonymously with death sentence. This misconception does not do

justice to this important element of Islamic legal practice. Below, I will discuss the classical

notion of fatwā, its history in Bangladesh and the distinguishing characteristics of the fatāwā

that became frequent in the 1990’s.

2.1 Classical notion of fatwā

The dictionary description of the Arabic words fatwā reads “formal legal opinion.”7

Throughout the years, many definitions have been formulated, some more accurate than

others. For the purpose of this study, I have chosen to follow the concise yet sound

definition given by Ali Riaz in his article Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in

Bangladesh:

An opinion on a point of law rendered by a mufti (legal consultant) in response to a question

submitted to him by a private individual or by a qadi (religious judge, magistrate).8

It is important to note that for a great deal the concept of fatwā is defined by what is it not.

A fatwā is not a verdict or a decision. Instead, its aim is to clarify a matter of Islamic

jurisprudence.9

Originally, a fatwā has three constitutive elements, namely:

1) Mufti or mujtahid. According to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence the person

giving a fatwā should be a righteous person with extensive knowledge of the sources of

Islam (Quran and Sunnah) and Islamic law.10

2) Question, object of the fatwā. In accordance with the norms of Islamic jurisprudence,

fatāwā should not be issued on initiative of the mufti. Instead, a fatwā should be

delivered as an answer to a question the mufti is presented with.11

7 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Arabic English), fourth edition (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), 815. 8 Ali Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 176. 9 Ibidem, 177. 10 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 476-‐479. 11 Mozaffari, Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy, 31.

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3) Mustafti. Traditionally, fatāwā have a caller. The mustafti approaches the mufti or

mujtahid with his question pertaining to a matter of (Islamic) religion.12

2.2 The history of fatāwā in Bangladesh

Understanding the practice of fatwā issuance in the period at hand requires a brief

review of earlier times. During the years of British colonial rule, fatāwā were employed as a

political instrument against the colonial regime. Prominent, religious leaders like Shah Wali

Allah proclaimed their opinion (i.e. fatwā). They declared the area as an “abode of war,”

making it a duty for all Muslims to migrate to areas more suitable for observing the Islamic

duties.13 On the other hand, some delivered fatāwā in support of the foreign ruler. For

example, in 1870 Maulana Keramat Ali proclaimed jihad against the colonial ruler to be an

un-‐Islamic practice.14

Mid-‐twentieth century, the so-‐called Pakistan period, some fatāwā were issued by

religious leaders and politicians. However, these opinions did not spark any notable

responses, nor were they directly aimed at individuals or implemented. It can be concluded

that fatāwā did not appear as a significant element in public discourse. Only in 1993 when

Taslima Nasrin became the target of a death threat proclaimed in a fatwā, did the Islamic

practice become an issue of national and international concern.15

2.3 Fatāwā in Bangladesh during the 1990’s

As mentioned earlier, the 1990’s saw an upsurge in the amount of fatāwā issued in

Bangladesh. Unfortunately, these religious edicts have not been without consequences, as

had been the case in the past. Instead, occurrences of fatwā-‐instigated violence have

become frequent throughout the country.

The fatāwā that were delivered throughout the 1990’s differ from the classical notion

of fatwā as well as from those delivered in Bangladesh in the past. To start, the legal

opinions are mostly proclaimed by the local elite of rural villages, comprised of landowners

12 Mozaffari, Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy, 31. 13 Mozaffar Hossain, “The Story of Fatwa,” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 4, no. 2 (2002), 241. 14 Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 177. 15 Ibidem, 177.

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and religious leaders.16 These men often lack the knowledge and the authority to be

considered a mujtahid, qualified to issue a fatwā.17 Second, in many of these occurrence of

fatwā issuances there is no direct question put forward by a mustafti. Although this differs

from the classical notion, it is a practice that already occurred during the colonial and

Pakistan period. More importantly, the fatāwā issued during the 1990’s are directly aimed at

individuals (and organisations), followed by direct, violent actions. This course of action blurs

the line between the advisory character of fatwā in the classical sense and a judgment as

passed by a judge in a court of law. For this reason, Amnesty International uses the term

‘punitive fatwā’, among others, to describe the phenomenon.18

In the following chapter, I will discuss three fatāwā that were issued during the 1990’s

and are representative of the phenomenon of fatwā-‐instigated violence.

16 Elora Shehabuddin, “Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in Bangladesh,” Signs: Journal of Women and Culture in Society 24, no. 4 (1999), 1012. 17 Mozaffar Hossain, “The Story of Fatwa,” 241. 18 Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Fundamental Rights of Women Violated with Virtual Impunity (London: Amnesty International, 1994), 19.

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3. Fatwā instigated violence -‐ case studies

Supposedly, 162 women became victims of punitive fatāwā between 1992 and

2000.19 Evidently, it falls beyond the scope of this study to examine all these fatāwā at

length. Moreover, local leaders orally proclaim the opinions in an informal setting. This

means that there are no written accounts of these fatāwā. It is the violent actions that

succeed the deliverance of a fatwā that bring about a written account of the situation in

newspapers and reports of human rights organisations like Ain O Salish Kendro (ASK) and

Amnesty International. Below I will describe three instances of punitive fatāwā and the

violence it instigated in more detail.

3.1 Noorjahan

Noorjahan grew up in a remote village in northeastern Bangladesh, in a large and

poor family. At the age of 16, her family arranged for her to get married. However, the

marriage did not last and after a year and a half Noorjahan’s husband divorced her and

disappeared. Another 18 months later, her husband reappeared. He claimed that he had not

meant to divorce her and that, since the divorce was not officially recorded, she should

come live with him again as his wife. Noorjahan and her parents did not head to his plea,

whereupon he returned to his home village. Several days later, Noorjahan’s parents decided

that their daughter should remarry. Her father met with her former husband and obtained a

written document from him confirming the divorce. Noorjahan’s father showed this

document to the leader of the local mosque; in return for a sum of money he validated the

divorce document. A new man was found for Noorjahan and they remarried. However, the

local leader who previously had validated the divorce together with other influential locals

spread rumours that Noorjahan’s second marriage was not in accordance with the rules of

Islam, an offensive for which she should be punished. On January 10, 1993, the local leaders

convened a salish, a village council consisting of village elders, influential local people and

the village clergy, and reached a conclusion.20 The next day, Noorjahan’s husband, her

parents and those who had attended the wedding ceremony were called before the salish,

where the leader of the local mosque delivered his fatwā. He stated that the marriage was

invalid and that Noorjahan would have to be buried in the ground up to her waist and 19 Shammy, Farah Jabin. “Fatwa and the helpless women of Bangladesh,” Nonviolent Radical Party transnational and transparty, 18 December 2002. 20 The concept of salish will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.

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stoned 101 times. Her husband was to receive the same punishment, while her parents were

given 50 lashes each for taking part in an un-‐Islamic act. After the issuance of the fatwā

Noorjahan was also brought to the salish to hear the fatwā. The organizers of the arbitration

meeting immediately acted upon the ‘advise’ given by the local leader in his fatwā. After the

humiliating punishment, Noorjahan went back to her father’s house. There, she drank

poison and died instantly.21

3.2 Roquaiya

In January 1994, Roquaiya and her two children returned to her parents’ home in

south-‐eastern Bangladesh after her husband had passed away. There, she became intimately

involved with Dulal, a neighbour who promised to marry her. However, after Roquaiya

became pregnant, he refused to marry her. She approached the local court and filed a case

against Dulal. When local influential people heard of this, they exerted pressure on Roquaiya

to drop the charges. Shortly after she had succumbed to the pressure, Dulal came to her

house and raped her. The following day, he returned to her home, dragged her out of the

house naked, beat her up and locked her inside the house for days. A local salish issued a

fatwā stating that Roquaiya was guilty of having extra-‐marital sex, an act for which she

should be punished. Following this utterance, she was dragged to an open field in the village

half naked. After her head was shaven and her face and breast were covered with soot in

front of hundreds of people, Roquaiya was tied to a three for eight hours. Subsequently she

was dressed in a garland made of shoes and paraded through the streets.22

3.3 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Commitee (BRAC)

Since the mid-‐1970’s, many NGO’s in Bangladesh have set up programs to provide

poor, rural women with education, credit, employment and health care. However during the

1990’s, these organisations were targeted by fatāwā just like the women they were (and to

this day are) supporting.

One of these fatāwā involved the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC),

an organisation that creates employment opportunities for rural women through

21 Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 178-‐179. 22 Shehabuddin, “Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in Bangladesh,” 1017-‐1018.

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sericulture.23 Majeda, a 22 year old woman expecting her first child, had registered for

prenatal care at a BRAC clinic. One day, her husband Kalimuddin came to the clinic and

forcefully dragged her home, beating her as they went. The child was born prematurely and

died after two days. Underlying Kalimuddin’s behaviour is a fatwā that was issued by local

religious leader. They declared that it is inappropriate for a woman to display her pregnancy

to strangers, such as the workers at the clinic. Those who issued the fatwā deemed even

travelling to a clinic inappropriate behaviour. Additionally, they claimed that any child born

under the medical care of doctors and health workers employed by NGO’s would be born a

Christian. Sadly enough, the fatwā prevented hundreds of pregnant women from receiving

medical treatment at BRAC clinics.24

These three fatāwā are exemplary of the phenomenon that has plagued Bangladeshi

rural women from the early 1990’s onward. It follows from these examples that most fatāwā

that result in violence towards women deal with matters of illicit sexual relationships, love

affairs and divorce.25 In all three cases, it becomes evident that local religious leaders aim to

determine the codes of social behaviour. By issuing fatāwā, religious leaders uphold the

patriarchal societal structures in the name of Islam. Consequently, the position of women is

marginalized. Women in rural Bangladesh are marginalized and denied their rights.26 At the

same time, villagers are prompted to engage in horrendous acts of violence by local leaders

who claim to represent religion.

Shehabuddin, “Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in Bangladesh,” 1019. 24 Ibidem, 1020-‐1021. 25 Hossain, “The Story of Fatwa,” 241. 26 Lailufar Yasmin, RCSS Policy Studies 16 Law and Order Situation and Gender-‐based Violence Bangladeshi Perspective (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000).

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4. Parties involved: salish, women and NGO’s

As we have seen in the foregoing chapter, there are three different parties involved

in the punitive fatwā phenomenon in Bangladesh: local villages councils, i.e. salish, presided

over by the religious leaders, the women and the NGO’s that are targeted by these fatāwā.

Below, I will elaborate on these three parties, their role in Bangladeshi society and mutual

dynamics.

4.1 Salish

Salish is a traditional form of conflict resolution through mediation common to rural

areas in Bangladesh. The village councils used to provide villagers with a forum were

conflicts ranging from family disputes to quarrels over land or cattle could be settled.

Usually, a salish consists of village elders, influential people and the village clergy. The

councils have no legal status, nor are there any uniform terms of references or legislation

that govern them. Bangladesh has three laws that deal with arbitration and mediation; none

of these acknowledge the authority of the salish. Furthermore, The Criminal Code of

Procedure is the main legal instrument in dealing with criminal activities. This renders

resolutions (i.e. fatāwā) given by a salish non-‐binding to any party involved.27

Clearly, reality does not reflect this informal character of the resolutions passed by

the village councils. Despite the fact that salish have no legal authority to try criminal cases,

through fatāwā they have taken the law in their own hands, simultaneously prompting

villagers to execute their harsh sentences. In Bangladesh, opinions on these village councils

differ. Some consider salish an effective way to seek justice without having recourse to a

more formal, slow and expensive judicial system. Conversely, human and women’s rights

organisation have repeatedly emphasized that salish are dominated by conservative

members of rural society who impose traditional social structures on the community and

punish those who do not conform to their notion of societally accepted patterns of

behaviour.28

27 Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 176. 28 Amnesty international, Bangladesh, Taking the Law in Their Own Hands: The Village Salish (London: Amnesty International, 1994), 1.

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4.2 Bangladeshi rural women

Violence against women appears in many forms in Bangladesh, such as rape, acid

throwing, dowry killing and fatwā instigated violence as elaborated on in this study. For

ages, patriarchal structures, particularly prevalent in rural societies, have formed a particular

image of woman and their role in society. Traditionally, Bangladeshi women are depicted as

weak and submissive. Women are a symbol of purity and fertility and should not be visible in

the public sphere, where they run the risk of coming into contact with strange men. It is

important to note that this image of women is not based on Islamic law. Rather, it is the sum

of national customs and local traditions.29 In line with these traditional views, women in

Bangladesh are disadvantaged in comparison to men. For instance, the female literacy rate is

considerably lower and female workers receive only 42 per cent of wage of a male worker.30

Although women’s rights are guaranteed in the Constitution, these are repeatedly violated

by Muslim clerics, such as the men presiding over the village salish and Islamist groups active

in Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh generally responds to these violations with

inaction; a sign that gender inequality is deeply embedded in society.31

The women who are targeted by punitive fatāwā belong to the poorest class in rural

society. In these areas, traditional social structures are maintained and legitimized in the

name of Islam as interpreted by local religious leaders.32 It is practically impossible for

women to break free from this situation. However, NGO’s providing women with education,

employment and health care seem to offer an alternative to the traditional structures and

persistent gender inequality.

4.3 Non-‐Governmental Organisations (NGO’s)

As noted earlier, NGO’s became a visible presence in Bangladesh from the early

1970’s, shortly after the independent state was declared. Prominent organisations include

29Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 182. 30 Farah Jabin Shammy, Fatwa and the helpless women of Bangladesh,” Nonviolent Radical Party transnational and transparty, December 18, 2002. 31 Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Fundamental Rights of Women Violated with Virtual Impunity, 1. 32 Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 182.

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the aforementioned Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Garmeen

Bank, whose developmental work has specifically brought benefits for poor, rural women.33

Together with the rise in punitive fatāwā, the 1990’s saw an increase in Islamic

criticism of the NGO’s operating in Bangladesh. Village elders and local Muslim leaders

accused the NGO’s of 1) destroying Islamic cultural values and threatening the country’s

independence 2) spreading atheism 3) converting people to Christianity under the pretext of

helping the poor 4) creating an aggressively feminist and impure society and 5) degrading

women and preaching that ‘Islam was a religion of illiterates’.34

These accusations prove that local Muslims leaders opposed the development

brought about by the work of NGO’s in an attempt to uphold traditional social values and

structures. Through the issuance of fatāwā barring women from involvement with the

NGOs, they ‘protect’ their community from what is believed to be “part of a global Islamic

assault.”35

4.4 Mutual dynamics

The dynamics at play between the salish, rural women and NGO’s seem to run in a

circle. Traditionally, women are expected to be submissive symbols of purity, kept away

from the public arena. The salish employ punitive fatāwā to uphold this traditional social

structure and maintain their hold on society. At the other end, NGO’s have set up many

programs to offer women health care, employment and education. Evidently, this makes

women more independent, assertive and visible in the public sphere. Basically, the NGO’s

offer the women everything the salish and local leaders are trying to keep out of their

societies. In response, the salish target the organisations who offer developmental care to

women. In the end, women become the victims of tradition, but foremost of local leaders’

conservative and disputable interpretations of Islamic law.

33 M. Rashiduzzaman, “The Dichotomy of Islam and Development: NGO’s, women’s development and fatawa in Bangladesh,” Contemporary South Asia 6, no. 3 (1997), 240. 34 Rashiduzzaman, “The Dichotomy of Islam and Development,” 241. 35 Ibidem, 244.

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5. Political context and social responses

The upsurge in punitive fatāwā cannot be studied without an examination of the

political and social conditions in which the phenomenon has developed. I will first discuss

the political context, from the establishment of the young state to the 1990’s. Thereafter, I

will elaborate on the different social responses fatwā instigated violence has evoked.

5.1 Politics: from secularism to Islamism

In 1971, the state of Bangladesh was established. Secularism was declared a founding

principle of the young state and religion was banned from politics. However, the spirit of

secularism seemed feeble when the nation’s leader used Islamic expressions in his speeches

and claimed that secularism did not mean absence of religion. Shortly thereafter, state

controlled media offered equal opportunity for all religions and state funding for religious

education (i.e. Islamic schools) was raised.36

After a string of coup d’états, General Ziaur Rahman seized power in 1975 and

started a programme of Islamization. Islamist parties were allowed to partake in political

activities and several amendments gave the Bangladesh Constitution a distinct Islamic

character. To illustrate, the word ‘secularism’ was replaced with ‘absolute trust and faith in

the Almighty Allah’ and a new clause stated that ‘absolute faith and trust in Almighty Allah’

was to be ‘the basis of all actions.’37

General Hussain Mohammed Ershad, who set out to make Bangladesh an Islamic

country, succeeded Ziaur Rahman’s reign in 1980. Despite his efforts towards further

Islamization, he did not succeed in winning the support of Islamist political organisations,

such as Jaamat-‐i Islami. After securing a constitutional amendment in 1988 declaring Islam

the state religion, Ershad’s regime was overthrown in 1990 by a popular uprising in which

oppositional parties, secularists and Islamists joined forces.38

From 1990, the Islamic discourse is prevalent in Bangladeshi politics. Even political

parties who took pride in their secularist identity have underlined the importance of Islamic

values for society. Islamist parties have gained recognition as political actors and have

36 Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 172-‐173. 37 Ibidem, 173-‐174. 38 Ibid., 174-‐175.

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managed to secure for themselves a position of kingmakers. It is in light of the Islamists’

effort to gain control over traditional, rural social institutions to advance their own

interpretation of Islam that we should regard the upsurge in fatāwā delivered by local

leaders. 39

5.2 Social responses to punitive fatāwā and violence

Not surprisingly, the large number of occurrences of fatwā-‐instigated violence has

sparked debate in Bangladesh. In the discussion, the secularists and the Islamists are

diametrically opposed.

The group of secularists is made up of urban elite and intelligentsia. They view the

phenomenon of punitive fatāwā and fatwā instigated violence as part of a broader trend of

increasing Islamization of state and society. In many writings of urban liberals terms as

“barbaric”, “backwardness”, “medieval” and “darkness” are used to describe the practices of

the village councils delivering the fatāwā. Since religion is prone to misuse and

misinterpretation, secularists campaign for the total abolition of religion from the public

sphere, from politics and from the legal framework.40

On the contrary, Islamist hold that fatwā related violence is only possible because

Bangladesh in not under Islamic rule. Many Islamists do not oppose the physical

punishments. They do, however, acknowledge that proper Islamic procedures were not

followed as a result of the ignorance of the rural leaders and communities. Under Islamic

rule, the issuance of fatāwā could be regulated, preventing excesses that provoke harsh

criticism of Islam from national secularists and the international community. Others within

the Islamist field contend that Islam has been wrongfully associated with religion based

politics and the highly mediatized incidents of violence against women in Bangladesh. The

widespread attention for the incidents is held to be a conspiracy of liberal secularist and

NGOs to put Islam in a bad light.

39 Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” 175-‐176. 40 Shehabuddin, “Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in Bangladesh,” 1025-‐1028.

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6. Conclusion and final thoughts

In this study, I have set out to analyse the 1990’s upsurge in fatāwā issued against

women in rural Bangladesh and the violent attacks that were instigated by these religious

opinions. We have learned that these fatāwā differ from the classical Islamic notion in

several aspects. Punitive fatāwā are delivered on the one initiative of local religious leaders

and put to action by villagers. For this reason, some have argued that the practice frequent

in Bangladesh does not count as fatwā issuance. However, I would like to propose that the

concept of fatāwā is subject to change and takes different forms dependent on the demands

of the time and society in which the practice is put in to effect.

The examples of punitive fatwā discussed in chapter three demonstrate the

earnestness of the situation and the atrocity of the violence inflicted upon women. Most

fatāwā are concerned with sexual and marital relationships and the standards of proper

Islamic conduct that is expected of women. Women’s rights are denied in the attempt of

local religious leaders to impose their interpretation of Islam in general and Islamic law in

particular as the social standard. For providing women with education and employment,

NGOs have also become targets of fatāwā.

The 1990’s fatāwā are not alien to Bangladesh society. Rather, the practice of salish

is an age old form of conflict resolution through mediation. In line with tradition, rural

women are expected to be submissive and refrain from visible presence in the public sphere.

The punitive fatāwā are used to reprimand women who supposedly have breached the

traditional norms. To further complicate the matter, the development brought about by the

programs made available to the women by the NGO’s steer in the opposite direction, namely

towards independence and public participation. Consequently, local religious leaders view

the NGOs as a threat to their rule, their religion and traditional values. This explains why

together with rural women they form the target of these fatāwā.

The political backdrop against which the phenomenon of punitive fatwā developed

shows a clear line from secularism toward a political system dominated by Islam and

Islamism. This has lead to opposing opinions on the issue. Secularists strive to have Islam

abolished from society, politics and law. Moreover, they hold that fatwā instigated violence

is proof of a barbaric Islamic backlash in the rural areas of the state. Meanwhile, Islamists

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contend that Islamic rule is the solution to the violent practices in the rural areas. They

believe firm Islamic governance is the only way to put a stop to informal conflict resolution

by means of highly questionable interpretation of Islamic law.

Several factors have lead to the upsurge in fatāwā and related violence. Firstly, the

lack of knowledge of Islamic law, methods and procedures of the religious leaders in the

rural areas combined with the ignorance and illiteracy of the villagers has created fertile

ground for the practice. Furthermore, the longstanding Bangladeshi tradition of gender

inequality has enabled the salish to impose restrictive measures on women through their

fatāwā. Surely, the opinions expressed in the fatāwā would not oppose tradition and

culture. Safeguarding tradition through an Islamic practice has only given the rule of local

leaders a sense of legitimacy. Moreover, the Islamists rise to power in the two decades

following the independence of Bangladesh made the village councils an important link in the

ultimate goal of implementing Islamic rule in the country. This political situation explains the

inaction of the government, making women and human rights organizations the sole

advocates for the protection of poor, rural women.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that during the 1990’s in

Bangladesh the Islamic concept of fatwā has been employed by different strata of society as

a tool in the struggle for authority.. Men in rural villages are accustomed to traditional social

structures and expect their wives to be housebound, obedient caregivers. This image is

altered when, through the help of NGO’s women find jobs and acquire education. Their

husbands can turn to local religious leaders and salish to put a stop to this behaviour.

Without exception, fatāwā have been issued against women, leaving the violent behaviour

of men without consequences.

In the same way, religious leaders, village elders and influential local people employ

fatāwā to maintain their positions and ‘keep things as they were.’ Women who strive to

move away from traditional, repressive gender relationships are withheld from succeeding

by religious decrees and violent attacks. Lack of education and knowledge of Islamic law in

rural societies is beneficial to the village salish and their practices. In addition, they feel

strengthened in their work by the broader Islamist struggle.

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Islamists and secularists alike make use of the punitive fatwā phenomenon to push

their own agenda. The Islamists’ (partial) disapproval of the practice is closely followed by

their conviction that Islamic rule is the sole solution to the problem. Conversely, secularists

emphasize the cruelty of fatwā-‐instigated violence only to prove that Bangladeshi society

should leave no room for religion.

However, it seems iniquitous to condemn religion as a whole solely on the basis of

the Bangladeshi village salish. To this day, the institution of fatwā has proven to be helpful to

millions of Muslims inside and outside the Muslim World. Moreover, informal conflict

resolution can be a valuable addition to national courts. However, strict government

supervision is of the utmost importance to prevent abuse and excesses from happening. In

Bangladesh, government inaction seems to lie at the heart of the problem. Education, both

secular and religious, and a firm implementation of constitutional law can improve the status

of women and will eventually create a society that recognizes punitive fatāwā and the

succeeding violence as a severe breach of women’s rights, national law and Islamic law.

Unfortunately, the issue of fatwā instigated violence is still current in the twenty-‐first

century. In 2011, the Bangladesh Supreme Court lifted a 10-‐year ban on fatāwā. Despite the

fact that it is not permitted to enforce a fatwā and no one can be forced to accept the

religious edicts,41 many women still fall victim to violence resulting from fatwā issuance.

41 Jaclyn Belczyk, “Bangladesh high court lifts ban on fatwas, forbids enforcement,” Jurist, 13 May 2011.

20

7. References

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13 May, 2013. Accessed August 29, available at

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forbids-‐enforcement.php

Hossain, Mozaffar. “The Story of Fatwa.” Interventions: International Journal of

Postcolonial Studies 4, no. 2 (2002): 237-‐242. Accessed August 15, 2014,

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Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Cambridge: The Islamic

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239-‐246. Accessed August 15, 2014, doi: 10.1080/09584939708719818.

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doi: 10.1177/0021909605055072.

Shammy, Farah Jabin. “Fatwa and the helpless women of Bangladesh,” Nonviolent Radical

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bangladesh

Shehabuddin, Elora. Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in Bangladesh,”

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Zaman, Habiba. “The Taslima Nasrin Controversy And Feminism In Bangladesh: A Geo-‐

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