Expressed Sexual Assault Legal Context and Victim Culpability Attributions

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Journal of Interpersonal Violence 27(6) 1023–1039 © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0886260511424493 http://jiv.sagepub.com 424493JIV 27 6 10.1177/0886260511424493M iller et al.Journal of Interpersonal Violence © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav 1 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA 2 Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA Corresponding Author: Audrey K. Miller, Box 2447 Huntsville, Texas 77341 USA Email: [email protected] Expressed Sexual Assault Legal Context and Victim Culpability Attributions Audrey K. Miller 1 , Keith D. Markman 2 , Amanda M. Amacker 1 , and Tasha A. Menaker 1 Abstract Legal scholars have argued that laws have an expressive function, specifically that sexual assault laws may convey social-level messages that victims are culpable for crimes against them. In a university sample, we conducted the first experimental test of legal scholars’ proposal, hypothesizing that legal messages—specifically their clarity and effectiveness in conveying that sexual assault is a crime—affect victim culpability attributions. Results demonstrat- ed that greater culpability was attributed to a victim of sexual assault within a context expressing unclear and ineffective sexual assault law than within a context clearly and effectively expressing that sexual assault is a crime. We also garnered empirical support for a mediation model, that is, negative affec- tive reactions to a victim statistically accounted for the relationship between expressed legal context and victim culpability attributions. Implications for future psycholegal research and potential legal reforms are discussed. Keywords sexual assault, expressed legal context, victim culpability, victim blame Article

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Journal of Interpersonal Violence27(6) 1023 –1039

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1Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA2Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:Audrey K. Miller, Box 2447 Huntsville, Texas 77341 USA Email: [email protected]

Expressed Sexual Assault Legal Context and Victim Culpability Attributions

Audrey K. Miller1, Keith D. Markman2, Amanda M. Amacker1, and Tasha A. Menaker1

Abstract

Legal scholars have argued that laws have an expressive function, specifically that sexual assault laws may convey social-level messages that victims are culpable for crimes against them. In a university sample, we conducted the first experimental test of legal scholars’ proposal, hypothesizing that legal messages—specifically their clarity and effectiveness in conveying that sexual assault is a crime—affect victim culpability attributions. Results demonstrat-ed that greater culpability was attributed to a victim of sexual assault within a context expressing unclear and ineffective sexual assault law than within a context clearly and effectively expressing that sexual assault is a crime. We also garnered empirical support for a mediation model, that is, negative affec-tive reactions to a victim statistically accounted for the relationship between expressed legal context and victim culpability attributions. Implications for future psycholegal research and potential legal reforms are discussed.

Keywords

sexual assault, expressed legal context, victim culpability, victim blame

Article

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Law has an expressive function. It not only reflects, but also shapes social norms. Current rape victim fault defenses tell women, individually and as a group, that they are at fault for rape when they choose to enter situations in which they risk being victimized by rape. According to the current law, women should restrict their liberties as a result of crime against them–after all, reason-able women do.

Bublick, 1999, p. 1463

Sexual assault is a common experience among community and college women (Fisher, Cullen, & Turner, 2000; Koss, 1985; Koss, Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987; Schwartz & Leggett, 1999; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). In a landmark national study of female college students, Koss and colleagues (1987) found that 54% of participants had experienced unwanted sexual con-tact, and 25% had experienced events meeting legal criteria for rape or attempted rape. Research also has demonstrated that sexual assault survivors are vulnerable to diverse negative consequences including anxiety, depres-sion, posttraumatic stress, social and sexual problems, and amplified risk of future sexual victimizations (Classen, Palesh, & Aggarwal, 2005; Gidycz, Hanson, & Layman, 1995; Kilpatrick et al., 1985; Resick, 1993). Moreover, sexual assault survivors may fear negative social stigmatizations and blame themselves for their experiences (Miller, Handley, Markman, & Miller, 2010), and these factors appear to amplify vulnerability to sexual revictim-ization (Arata, 1999; Miller, Canales, Amacker, Backstrom, & Gidycz, 2011; Miller, Markman, & Handley, 2007).

Culpability Attributions Toward Sexual Assault VictimsResearch has shown that negative social reactions to sexual assault survi-vors’ disclosures include criticizing the woman’s actions, questioning the validity of her experience as an assault or rape, and suggesting she may have been responsible or blameworthy (e.g., Dunn, Vail-Smith, & Knight, 1999). Indeed, citing miniskirts to acquaintance with the perpetrator, attractiveness to race, the empirical literature is replete in documenting diverse factors that amplify perceivers’ blame and responsibility attributions toward sexual assault victims (e.g., Hammock & Richardson, 1997; Johnson, Jackson, Gatto, & Nowak, 1995; Mason, Riger, & Foley, 2004; Miller, Amacker, & King, 2011; Miller, Wang, Backstrom, & Canales, 2011; Norris & Cubbins, 1992; Shotland & Goodstein, 1992; Stormo, Lang, & Stritzke, 1997;

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Whatley, 1996; Workman & Freeburg, 1999). Even police officers are not immune to making negative attributions toward sexual assault victims, par-ticularly those who have been assaulted by acquaintances (Areh, Meško, & Umek, 2009; Ask, 2010; Brown, Hamilton, & O’Neill, 2007; Campbell & Johnson, 1997; Page, 2008).

Despite a voluminous empirical literature documenting culpability attribu-tions toward sexual assault victims as well as decades of theory suggesting that cultural context perpetuates sexual assault and victim blame (Brownmiller, 1975; Grauerholz, 2000), little experimental research has been conducted that directly investigates the impact of expressed legal context on victim culpabil-ity attributions (see Pugh [1983] for an exception). As elaborated in the fol-lowing section, we define expressed legal context as pertaining not necessarily to the precise letter of the law (lay citizens often are unacquainted with the specific content of the law), but rather to naturalistic understandings of the law that are conveyed by legal context. A study by Miller and colleagues (2007) provided initial grounding for the proposal that naturalistic understand-ings of law (i.e., those derived in the absence of actual legal instructions) influ-ence sexual assault survivors’ self-blame attributions and their negative consequences. Specifically, in a sample of female sexual assault survivors, women (uninformed by the study of actual sexual assault laws) blamed them-selves for their victimizations to the extent they more strongly believed a man’s perpetrating unwanted sex against a woman (in five different scenarios) “did not meet the legal standard for sexual assault” (Miller et al., 2007).

Expressed Sexual Assault Legal ContextHinting at naturalistic understandings of expressed sexual assault legal con-text among victims, Fisher and colleagues (2000) found in a national study that less than 5% of sexually victimized college women reported their expe-riences to law enforcement. Survivors’ reasons for not reporting included lack of clarity that a crime had occurred or that harm had been intended (44.4%) and lack of clarity that their experiences were serious enough to report (65.4%). Similar results were obtained more recently in a university sample of female sexual assault survivors (Miller, Canales, et al., 2011). Only one of 144 survivors had reported her victimization to law enforce-ment. Interviewed to determine reasons for not reporting, women commonly minimized the event (e.g., “It wasn’t something serious enough to take to the police”) and took personal responsibility, sometimes in the process high-lighting ambiguities in actual sexual assault legal criteria (e.g., “I didn’t say no flat out, so I couldn’t do anything about it”; Miller, Canales, et al., 2011;

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see Remick [1993] for a thorough discussion of consent standards in sexual assault law).

It may not be surprising that sexual assault survivors often hesitate to con-ceptualize their experiences in legal terms. Unfortunately, survivors neither anticipate (Patterson, Greeson, & Campbell, 2009) nor experience (Frazier & Haney, 1996) justice in the legal system. Systemic legal injustices to sexual assault survivors include frequent dropping or plea bargaining of cases (Bohmer, 1998) and, among cases that do reach trial, introduction of irrele-vant or potentially stigmatizing information such as “proof” of victim resis-tance and “evidence” of victim character or sexual past (Berger, Searles, & Neuman, 1988; Berliner, 1991; Bohmer, 1998; Flowe, Ebbesen, & Putcha-Bhagavatula, 2007; Remick, 1993; Taslitz, 1999). Although an in-depth review of precise legal criticisms is beyond the scope of the present study, it is important to point out that legal scholars have converged in critiquing the clarity and effectiveness of sexual assault laws and further have suggested that lack of legal clarity and effectiveness contributes to social-level mes-sages that victims are responsible for sexual assaults (Berger et al., 1988; Berliner, 1991; Bohmer, 1998; Bublick, 1999; Remick, 1993; Taslitz, 1999).

The Present StudyAn important precursor to efforts at legal reform (e.g., evaluations of specific sexual assault laws that may be revised on the basis of potential harm to vic-tims) is to first empirically evaluate the proposed essential mechanism, that legal expressions (i.e., messages) indeed may adversely affect victims. The most rigorous available method to evaluate such a proposition would be to subject it to experimental test. This is the focus of the present study: to exper-imentally evaluate the proposition that expressed clarity and effectiveness of sexual assault legal context affects victim culpability attributions. By experi-mentally manipulating expressed sexual assault law (i.e., clear/effective or unclear/ineffective), we can better understand whether this factor exerts a causal impact on culpability attributions toward a sexual assault victim. Consistent with the proposal of legal scholars, we hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Participants presented with sexual assault legal context expressing unclearly and ineffectively that sexual assault is a crime, relative to those presented with clear and effective sexual assault legal context, will attribute greater culpability to a sexual assault victim.

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An additional prediction is that, relative to participants in the clear and effec-tive legal-context condition, participants assigned to a “status quo” (control) legal-context condition also will perceive sexual assault legal context as unclear and ineffective.

We also test the specific proposal that sexual assault survivors receive greater culpability attributions for their victimizations insofar as they are per-ceived to have entered situations that beget risk of victimization (Bublick, 1999). To test the potential influence of “contextual danger” on victim culpa-bility attributions, we include an experimental manipulation that attempts to vary the perceived likelihood that a male-scenario target had perpetrated and would perpetrate nonconsensual sex against a woman (i.e., high vs. low dan-gerousness). Pilot data collected by study authors suggested that, across such experimental manipulations, college men are perceived as relatively likely to perpetrate nonconsensual sex against women, suggesting that a “dangerous,” victimization-prone context is commonly assumed (Miller et al., 2009). Thus, it is possible that despite varying information on “contextual danger,” participants across conditions will perceive that a man is likely to have previ-ously perpetrated and/or to eventually perpetrate unwanted sex against a woman. This possibility would accord with Bublick’s (1999) proposal that women must restrict their basic liberties not to be perceived to have entered a risky sexual situation.

Finally, we test a meditation hypothesis derived from a theoretical con-ceptualization of ordinary blame ascription, the culpable control model of blame (Alicke, 2000; see also Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008). This model emphasizes that blame is attributed based on “affective reactions to features of harmful events and the people involved” (Alicke, 2000, p. 564) that shade subsequent “reasoning” (i.e., culpability attributions) about these events. As applied to the present study, we hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Participants exposed to an unclear and ineffective legal context will experience more negative affective reactions to a sexual assault victim and, in turn, attribute greater culpability to her.

MethodParticipants

Participants were 106 undergraduate students (83% women) at a university in the southern United States who volunteered to privately complete a study entitled “Society and Sex” and were compensated with course credit. About

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one half of the sample was 21 years or younger (47.2%), and the remainder of the sample was 22 years or older. Most were neither engaged nor married (83.0%). Participants were 9.4% African American/Black, 17.0% Hispanic/Latin American, 71.7% European American/White, and 1.9% “Other.”

ProcedureA between-subjects experiment was administered using the psychology department’s online research administration system. After providing informed consent to participate and demographic information, participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. First, one of three expressed-legal-context conditions was presented (clear/effective, unclear/ineffective, or status quo/control):

Clear/effective expressed legal context: Before beginning this study, it is important to know that sexual assault law is clearly defined and, thus, is considered effective in deterring (preventing) sexual assaults from taking place. That is, the law makes clear to men that engaging in unwanted sex with a woman breaks the law.

Unclear/ineffective expressed legal context: Before beginning this study, it is important to know that sexual assault law is NOT clearly defined and, thus, is NOT considered effective in deterring (pre-venting) sexual assaults from taking place. That is, the law does NOT make clear to men whether engaging in unwanted sex with a woman breaks the law.

Status quo/control expressed legal context: Before beginning this study, it is important to consider whether or not sexual assault law is clearly defined, whether or not it is considered effective in deter-ring (preventing) sexual assaults from taking place, and whether or not it makes clear to men whether engaging in unwanted sex with a woman breaks the law.

Following this experimental manipulation, participants responded to three questions assessing manipulation effectiveness, each according to a 7-point scale (1 = extremely unclear/ineffective, 4 = neither unclear/ineffective nor clear/effective, 7 = extremely clear/effective): “How clear is the law as to whether a man initiating unwanted sex with a woman is illegal?” “How clearly defined is sexual assault law?” and “How effective is sexual assault law in deterring (preventing) sexual assaults from taking place?” Responses were combined to create a “perceived context clarity/effectiveness” index (α = .78).

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Next, all participants read a prototypic acquaintance sexual assault vignette describing how a freshman college student, Laura, attended a party wearing a new outfit, stayed after her friends left, drank alcohol, listened to music and danced, and fraternized with a male acquaintance, William, who invited Laura to a private room and ultimately engaged in nonconsensual, unwanted sex with her. In otherwise parallel vignettes, the male-vignette target, William, was described either as a (nondescript) student (based on pilot data, a context perceived as relatively victimization laden/dangerous) or as a “shy,” “nice,” “serious” student, who is “respectful toward women” (a context that might be perceived as relatively less victimization laden/dangerous). Following the vignette, participants responded to two questions assessing manipulation effectiveness, each according to a 7-point scale (1 = extremely unlikely, 4 = neither unlikely nor likely, 7 = extremely likely): “How likely is it that, before the event with Laura, William had initiated unwanted sex with a woman?” and, “How likely is it that, after the event with Laura, William will initiate unwanted sex with a woman?” Responses were combined to create a “context dangerousness” index (α = .85).

Finally, victim culpability attributions were assessed. Specifically, partici-pants responded to three items, “To what extent was Laura (or were Laura’s actions) to blame for the event,” “responsible for the event,” and “the cause of the event,” each according to a 4-point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = slightly, 3 = moderately, 4 = completely). Ratings were combined to create a “victim culpability” index (α = .89). Next, a two-item index (along the same 4-point scale) assessed participants’ negative affective reactions to the victim, spe-cifically that the terms “stupid” and “weak” described Laura or her actions (α = .67). Finally, perpetrator culpability attributions were assessed using the same index that assessed victim culpability attributions (α = .87).

Manipulation ChecksExpressed legal context (clear/effective, unclear/ineffective, status quo/control) was crossed with context dangerousness (high, low) in a two-way multivari-ate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The effectiveness of the expressed-legal-context manipulation was demonstrated by a main effect of this factor on the perceived context clarity/effectiveness index, F(2, 98) = 3.73, p < .05. Planned comparisons revealed as hypothesized that participants in the clear/effective expressed-legal-context condition (M = 4.97, SD = 1.12) evaluated the law as clearer/more effective than those in either the status quo/control context condition (M = 4.23, SD = 1.35) or the unclear/ineffective expressed-legal-context condition (M = 3.99, SD = 1.64), all ts > 2.09, all ps < .05. Also,

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as anticipated, perceived legal clarity/effectiveness did not differ between the status quo/control and unclear/ineffective context conditions, t < 1.

No effects were observed for context dangerousness or the expressed legal context × context dangerousness interaction, all ps > .08. Thus, perceptions that the male-scenario target had previously or would subsequently perpe-trate unwanted sex against a woman did not differ between a condition in which he was characterized in a nondescript fashion (M = 5.25, SD = 1.56) and a condition in which he was explicitly described as “shy,” “nice,” and “respectful toward women” (M = 5.06, SD = 1.43), p = .65. Because the male-scenario target was perceived across conditions as somewhat likely to perpe-trate sexual assault, all subsequently reported analyses were collapsed across levels of the context-dangerousness variable.

ResultsThe primary hypothesis of this study was that, consistent with the proposal of legal scholars, participants exposed to a legal context that ineffectively expresses that sexual assault is a crime, relative to those presented with a sexual assault legal context that clearly expresses that sexual assault is a crime, would attribute greater culpability to a sexual assault victim. Before proceeding with analyses, we first assessed and found that demographic characteristics of participants (age, gender, and ethnicity) did not predict any of the dependent variables (victim culpability attributions, negative affective reactions to the victim, or perpetrator culpability attributions), all ps > .07. To test the primary hypothesis, a MANOVA was conducted with expressed legal context (clear/effective vs. unclear/ineffective) entered as the fixed fac-tor and victim culpability attributions (M = 2.20, SD = 0.81), negative affective reactions to the victim (M = 2.30, SD = 0.94), and perpetrator culpability attri-butions (M = 3.05, SD = 0.75) entered as dependent variables, F(3, 77) = 2.85, p < .05, partial η2 = .10. Tests of between-subjects effects revealed significant influence of expressed legal context on victim culpability attri-butions (F[1, 79] = 3.92, p < .05, partial η2 = .07), and negative affective reactions to the victim (F[1, 79] = 4.54, p < .05, partial η2 = .07), but not perpetrator culpability attributions, F < 1. Furthermore, and specifically supporting the primary study hypothesis, a planned comparison revealed greater victim culpability attributions by participants in the unclear/inef-fective legal-context condition (M = 2.41, SD = 0.94) than by participants in the clear/effective legal-context condition (M = 1.96, SD = 0.60), t(79) = 2.41, p < .05. In addition, a planned comparison revealed greater negative affective reactions to the victim by participants in the unclear/ineffective

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Victim Culpability Attributions Negative Affective Reactions 3. Moderately

2. Slightly

1. Not at All_____________________________________________________________

Figure 1. Victim culpability attributions and negative affective reactions to the victim, according to clarity/effectiveness of expressed legal contextNote: Light background = clear/effective expressed legal context, dark background = unclear/ineffective expressed legal context. Group differences are significant at the p < .05 (two-tailed) level.

legal-context condition (M = 2.50, SD = 0.95) than by participants in the clear/effective legal-context condition (M = 2.02, SD = 0.81), t(79) = 2.37, p < .05 (see Figure 1).

Next, hypothesized mediation of the effect of expressed legal context on victim culpability attributions by negative affective reactions to the victim was tested using procedures established by Baron and Kenny (1986) and MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993). First, victim culpability attributions was independently regressed onto expressed legal context (dummy coded: 1 = unclear/ineffective, –1 = clear/effective), β = .26, p < .05. Second, negative affective reactions to the victim (the proposed mediator) was independently regressed onto expressed legal context, β = .26, p < .05. Third, victim culpa-bility attributions was regressed onto negative affective reactions (the pro-posed mediator), controlling for expressed legal context, β = .40, p < .001. With victim culpability attributions simultaneously regressed onto expressed legal context and negative affective reactions, complete mediation by nega-tive affective reactions to the victim was observed, R2 = .22. Specifically, expressed legal context no longer predicted victim culpability attributions, β = .16, p = .13. Further supporting the mediating role of negative affective reactions to the victim, a Sobel (1982) test demonstrated a significant reduc-tion in the effect of expressed legal context on victim culpability attributions in the presence of negative affective reactions to the victim, Z = 2.02, p < .05 (see Figure 2).

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Unclear/IneffectiveExpressed

Legal Context

Negative AffectiveReactions

to the Victim

Victim CulpabilityAttributions

β = .26* β = .40**

β = .16 (.26*)

Figure 2. The effect of expressed sexual assault legal context on victim culpability attributions is mediated by negative affective reactions to the victim*path that is significant at p < .05 (two-tailed). **path that is significant at p < .001 (two-tailed).

Discussion

Acquaintance sexual assault is an unfortunately common experience among women in college and in the community, and multiple deleterious conse-quences for victims include receipt of culpability attributions. Legal scholars have long proposed that, by not clearly and effectively expressing that sexual victimization is a crime, sexual assault laws perpetuate victim culpability attributions (Berger et al., 1988; Berliner, 1991; Bohmer, 1998; Bublick, 1999; Remick, 1993; Taslitz, 1999). This investigation was the first direct, experimental test of the proposition that expressed clarity and effectiveness of sexual assault legal context affects victim culpability attributions, and results empirically confirmed legal scholars’ proposal: in the context of unclear and ineffective sexual assault law, victims ironically were attributed greater culpability. Results also confirmed that, consistent with Alicke’s (2000) theoretical conceptualization of ordinary blame ascription, negative affective reactions to a victim mediated the causal relationship between expressed sexual assault legal context and victim culpability attributions.

The strength of any experimental study, including the present one, is establishing the internal validity of a hypothesized relationship; in this vein, an experimental design allowed a novel and stringent empirical test of the proposal that expressed legal context affects victim culpability attributions. Results provided compelling data that the common societal problem of blame toward victims of sexual assault may be owed at least in part to fuzzy and ineffectual legal messages. In particular, results accord with Bublick’s (1999) proposal that expressed sexual assault legal context may convey to women

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that they must “shape their conduct around the reality of pervasive rape and fear of rape in our society” (p. 1413). Indeed, findings suggested that within a legal context that fails to clearly and effectively express that sexual assault is a crime, women may be expected to accommodate their own behaviors to contextual dangers and prevent their own assaults lest they be found culpable.

Interestingly, the results of the current investigation also suggest that clar-ity and effectiveness in expressed sexual assault legal context does not affect perpetrator culpability attributions. Across conditions, moderate culpability was attributed to the male-scenario target. Perhaps more intriguing was that, as in previous attempts (Miller et al., 2009), efforts were unsuccessful to cre-ate an experimental condition in which even a “shy,” “nice,” and “respectful” male college student was perceived as unlikely to perpetrate sexual assault. Most men do not perpetrate violence against women, and men should be as concerned as women about the potentially diverse social repercussions—including general presumptions of male dangerousness—of men who do commit sexual assault (Kilmartin & Allison, 2007).

Although strong with regard to internal validity, experimental studies such as the present one are inevitably weaker with regard to some aspects of external validity. In this vein, it is underscored that the results of the present study cannot be used to criticize the function of any particular “real-world” legal standard. This acknowledged, the present study lays a strong founda-tion for future research to compare across actual legal standards in terms of the critical factor identified here—clarity and effectiveness—and allows researchers to test predictions based on the current findings (e.g., that less clear actual standards inculcate greater victim blame). To evaluate effects of past legal reforms on victim culpability attributions, studies might focus on changes to sexual assault standards that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., specifying rape as inclusive of oral and anal penetration, speci-fying the illegality of assaulting an incapacitated victim; Caringella-MacDonald, 1988; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Gunn & Linden, 1997; Roberts & Gebotys, 1992; Sarre, 1999). To evaluate effects of proposed legal reforms on victim culpability attributions, studies might focus on spe-cific changes advocated by legal scholars (e.g., a “yes means yes” standard; Remick, 1993).

One particular aspect of the present study does point toward the potential generalizability of the reported results. Participants randomly assigned to a sta-tus quo/control legal-context condition were prompted to consider their actual legal-contexts—“whether or not sexual assault law is clearly defined, whether

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or not it is considered effective in deterring (preventing) sexual assaults from taking place, and whether or not it makes clear to men whether engaging in unwanted sex with a woman breaks the law.” On doing so, these participants evaluated the expressed function of status quo legal context to be as unclear and ineffective as did participants in the ineffective legal-context condition. Of course, it is yet undetermined the extent to which evaluated effectiveness in the status quo condition indicated mere lack of knowledge about current sexual assault legal standards or affirmative expressions by participants that current sexual assault legal standards are neither clear nor effective, and assessment of this issue should be the focus of additional research. However, a prudent con-clusion in either case is that current sexual assault laws are not effective enough in expressing to citizens (such that citizens can receive, agree with, and report) that sexual assault against women clearly is a crime.

Finally, it is important to highlight that the present research was con-ducted among college students, an apt but exclusive sample for the study of cognitions following sexual assault. It is possible that the perceptions observed here (e.g., inherent likeliness that a man has or would perpetrate unwanted sex) are confined to college perceivers who are, personally or vicariously, all too familiar with the experience of acquaintance sexual assault (Fisher et al., 2000; Koss et al., 1987; Schwartz & Leggett, 1999). Although we have no substantive reason to believe that the present results would not generalize to other social perceivers, future research must be con-ducted before it can be confidently assumed that the current findings gener-alize broadly. Also, although recruitment for the study was unrestricted, the sample was only 17% male. Although reported findings generalized across sex, future research should replicate the reported study in whole or propor-tionally larger samples of men. Similarly, we conducted this investigation in a relatively ethnically diverse sample (i.e., African Americans/Blacks, Hispanic/Latin Americans, European Americans/Whites), and reported find-ings generalized across ethnic groups. Nevertheless, perceptions of sexual assault and victim culpability attributions may vary in ethnic groups not rep-resented here and/or in persons of non-Western cultures. Therefore, we encourage a culturally comparative approach (e.g., Frank, Hardinge, & Wosick-Correa, 2009) in future research examining legal messages and their repercussions for victims.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Miller et al. 1035

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-tion of this article.

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Bios

Audrey K. Miller is an assistant professor of psychology at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, United States. She received her PhD in clinical psychol-ogy in 2005 from Ohio University and completed a postdoctoral fellowship in clinical-forensic evaluation at the University of Washington. Her research broadly integrates clinical, personality, and social psychological perspectives. Specific research foci include contextual and prejudicial factors influencing culpability attributions; self-blame, coping, and growth in victims and socially marginalized persons; personality, prejudice, and prejudice reduction; narrative phenomenology and research methods; and application of these issues to clinical and clinical-forensic domains.

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Keith D. Markman is an associate professor of psychology at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, United States, where he is a member of the Social Judgment and Behavioral Decision-Making program. He received his PhD in 1994 from Indiana University and completed a 3-year postdoctoral fellowship at the Ohio State University. He conducts research in the areas of counterfactual thinking, emotion and motivation, judgment and decision making, and psychological momentum, having published 40 articles and book chapters in these areas. He is currently an associate editor of Basic and Applied Social Psychology and Social and Personality Psychology Compass. He was nominated for the 2003 Theoretical Innovation Prize in social and personality psychology and won the outstanding junior faculty award at Ohio University in 2004.

Amanda M. Amacker is a clinical psychology doctoral student at Sam Houston State University. Her research interests include social reactions to victims (specifi-cally, culpability attributions), posttraumatic victim growth, and sexual assault psycho-legal issues.

Tasha A. Menaker earned a master’s degree in clinical psychology from Sam Houston State University and is currently a doctoral student in Sam Houston State University’s College of Criminal Justice. She is interested in the integration of psy-chology and public policy, particularly with regard to juvenile justice and the com-mercial sexual exploitation of children. Other research interests include gender issues and feminist criminology, forensic assessment, and violent crime and victimization.