Explaining Odlin Road

Explaining Odlin Road: Insecurity and ExclusivityAuthor(s): Laura HueyReviewed work(s):Source: The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 28, No. 3(Summer, 2003), pp. 367-386Published by: Canadian Journal of SociologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341928 .Accessed: 01/11/2012 10:40

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Explaining Odlin Road:

Insecurity and Exclusivity

Laura Huey

Abstract: The multiple layers of inclusion and exclusion that exist within a community that prides itself on being tolerant are explored through a case study of protests against a local recovery home for addicts. The basing of exclusionary and coercive inclusionary demands in both culture and democratic rights, leads the author to argue that the identity politics fostered by multiculturalism is divisive, and ultimately runs counter to the wider aims of social justice. The author advocates instead for an emancipatory politics - multidimensionalism - that seeks to resolve and accommodate differences based in class, race, gender, sexuality and marginalized status through community building efforts, and at the level of the state.

Resume: Il existe plusieurs couches d'inclusion et d'exclusion a l'interieur d'une collectivit6 ex-

primant la fiert6 de sa tolerance. Le present travail est une 6tude de cas des protestations soulev6es contre une maison de r6tablissement pour les toxicomanes. Les fondements des exigences d'exclusion et d'inclusion contrainte de la culture et des droits d6mocratiques amenent l'auteur a soutenir

que les politiques d'identite appuyees par le multiculturalisme sement la discorde et vont a l'en- contre des buts plus vastes de lajustice sociale. Plut6t, l'auteur pr6conise des politiques affranchies

(voir multidimensionnelles) qui cherchent a resoudre et satisfaire les differences de classe, de race, de sexe, de sexualit6 et de statut marginalis6 par l'entremise d'efforts communautaires et d'etat.

The Turning Point

It is shameful and almost embarrassing to see members of my multicultural community call each other names and stereotyping one another. We have to keep in mind that we were once all

immigrants and understand that there is a diversity of beliefs and values because it is part of identity (Fong 1999a; accessed November 4, 2001).

Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 28(3) 2(X)3 367

368 Canadian Journal of Sociology

In the spring of 1999, a quiet bedroom community within Vancouver's Lower Mainland became the site of a local controversy. It began simply enough with an announcement in the mail. The Western Steps Recovery So- ciety, a non-profit organization, notified residents of the Crestwood and Crimson Estate areas of Richmond that it was planning to move an existing recovery home for alcoholics and drug addicts onto Odlin Road, a street in their neighbourhood. The announcement immediately kicked off a maelstrom of anger and resentment among some of the area's residents who voiced strong opposition to the move.

The general area of Richmond that Turning Point chose to move into is

composed of approximately 2,000 residents living mainly in single and semi- detached houses' (Richmond 1996 census data2). It can be characterized primarily as a relatively stable, middle-class family neighbourhood. Rental

properties make up only 10% of the area3; the other 90% are owned and occu-

pied, mainly by family groups of 3 or more individuals (ibid). Of the approximately 500 dwellings in the area, only 10 are classified as "non-family households" (ibid.); thus Turning Point was moving into an already rather small category.

Residents offered a variety of reasons for their objections to having the

Turning Point home in their midst. Decreased property values and diminished quality of life were cited by some. Others complained that there should have been community consultation prior to the move4: "As a non-profit organization and a social worker, they have a social obligation to consider the community as a whole" (protestor cited in Porter 1999b: B1). Many also repeatedly cited fears that the facility's clientele would pose a substantial threat to the

community in the form of crime and disorder. Angry residents variously complained of the move to City Hall, vocalized

their opposition in a variety of public forums, and struck up petitions demanding that the Society relocate the home elsewhere, preferably outside of their neighbourhood. When the Turning Point facility went in despite the

objections of some of its new neighbours, area residents began staging nightly protests outside of the home. The protests went on for over month, complete with signs proclaiming their carriers "orphans of bureaucracy," and vitriolic accusations in the media and at City Hall from various sides of the dispute (Clough 1999: A4). Protestors stated that they were determined to see the

1. The average value of a dwelling in this area is $366,361. 2. Demographic data on the neighbourhood was supplied by the City of Richmond upon request.

It is drawn from census data from 1996, as 2001 data had not yet been processed by the City. 3. None of the rental properties are apartment dwellings; they are all row houses or single or semi-

detached houses. 4. No city ordinance or provincial statute required the municipal government or the Recovery

Society to institute the public consultation that residents had demanded.

Explaining Odlin Road: Insecurity and Exclusivity 369

recovery home forced out of their neighbourhood, and advised that they would "fight to the bitter end - till they move out" (protestor cited in Porter 1999a: B 1). City Hall responded by forming a Group Home Taskforce, mandated to formulate a set of proposals for addressing the now contentious issue of group home siting. After months of consultation, the Taskforce issued its recommen- dations, which included: amending the Richmond zoning by-law to bring the siting of residential care facilities under City Hall's control, implementing a neighbourhood information and notification process, and the establishment of a cultural relations committee for the purpose of promoting "harmony within the City's multicultural community" (Group Home Taskforce Report 2001b: 2). As of this writing, the Turning Point remains in operation on Odlin Road5.

On the surface, the Odlin Road example appears to be merely another case of NIMBYism (the not-in-my-backyard syndrome), with a group of middle- class homeowners objecting to the siting of a facility to house recovering alcoholics and addicts in their midst. However, some of the protestors, in explaining their objections, pointed to a fact that had undoubtedly not escaped wider notice: a substantial number of people living on or near Odlin Road in the spring of 1999 were Chinese-Canadian immigrants from Hong Kong and mainland China, some of whom had "landed a few months ago and others have been here for seven or eight years" (protestor cited in Porter 1999c: B 1). That the protest group should contain a number of Chinese-Canadian residents is hardly surprising. Of the 1,985 residents of the neighbourhood, 1,430 self- identify as ethnic Chinese6 (Richmond 1996 census data). What is of interest though is that some of the protestors who pointed out that their group contained a large contingent of Chinese-Canadians, did so in relation to citing cultural opposition to having addicts in their midst as a motivating factor in supporting opposition to the Turning Point.7 Thus, the ethnic composition of some of the objectors, the basing of objections in cultural differences, the invocation of multicultural discourse to support claims, and the presence of a countering assimilationist discourse, makes a reading of this event somewhat more complex than the usual protests against the presence of "undesirable human elements."

5. The Turning Point's management were able to move into the neighbourhood, and to stay there, because local and provincial laws did not require them to obtain special site licensing or meet by-law approval Provincial statute allows for the siting of recovery homes in residential neighbourhoods if the number of persons accommodated is less than ten (Brodie 1999; accessed November 4,2001). Furthermore, Richmond had no zoning by-laws in place that would prohibit or set restrictions on recovery home siting.

6. Of 1,985 residents the ethnic breakdown based on mother tongue is as follows: 300 English (non-differentiated); 10 Italian; 1430 Chinese; 25 German; 15 Dutch; 50 Punjabi; 30 Arabic; 80 Pilipino; 10 Gujarati; and 10 Japanese (Richmond 1996 census data).

7. The coalition against the home was also composed of Anglo- and Indo-Canadians.


Explaining Odlin Road

[Turning Point Program Director] Mr. Sas indicated that Turning Point quickly became aware that cultural differences in the neighbourhood were adding to the problem. He noted that in Hong Kong, "addicts" are sent to an Island and not integrated into the community, and that in some cultures the term "alcoholic" denotes violence, which had people worried about their children (Group Home Taskforce minutes June 6, 2001a: 3).

My intent in this paper is to offer an analysis of the Odlin Road dispute. What this analysis reveals is the multiplicity of forms of exclusion that can occur within a community that prides itself on its members' tolerance. What we see through an unpacking of some of the discourses that shaped this dispute is a series of justifications for excluding others from full participation in civic life. These justifications are variously offered under the banners of "multiculturalism," "democratic values," and "respect for tradition," among others. While each of these justifications will be examined here, my principle focus is on the discourse of multiculturalism and how it relates to the practise of exclusivity.

Because I am working with several different themes that are inter-related, it may be helpful if I begin by mapping out what is to follow. First, using the work of Giddens, Young, Bauman, and others, I review the literature on what

many view as the crisis of modernity: the existential angst engendered by the search for identity in chaotic, post-traditional, pluralist societies. I then advance the argument that the discourse of pluralist multiculturalism, and the politics of identity that are based on it, are in part a response to concerns that arise out of this chaos. Second, I examine the nature of exclusionary demands in the instant example, where multiculturalism was invoked variously as a means of counter-balancing demands of inclusion, while lending moral weight to calls for the exclusion of "others." Third, following Fraser (1997), I argue that the discourse of multiculturalism preaches tolerance of diversity, but limits this tolerance to cultural diversity. This leads me to conclude that non- transformative multiculturalist policies simply allow for the reconstituting of social inequalities through the expedient of privileging some claims - namely those based in culture - over others, including those based in material, power and/or status differentials - and that this privileging is contrary to the wider aims of social justice. I conclude by arguing that what we need instead is a return to emancipatory politics, with a renewed focus on the multi-dimensional nature of oppression, a commitment to both embracing difference and crossing lines of difference through coalition building, and a goal of recreating communities as welcoming sites of non-oppression.

This work relies heavily on my analysis of public statements made by citizens affected by the campaign to force the relocation of the Turning Point recovery home. Such statements were found in newspaper coverage and in


letters to the editor located in three local newspapers - the Richmond Review, the Vancouver Province, and the Vancouver Sun - over a period of several months. Province and Sun sources were located through a search of the Canadian Newsdisc database. As the Richmond Review posts its back issues on its web site, I was able to download copies of both news articles and letters to the editor8 following several searches. While newspaper articles were used

generally to reconstruct events, letters to the editor formed the basis of my understanding of the forces that shaped these events because they provide the justifications used by the various factions in the dispute for the positions taken. I was fortunate in that the controversy surrounding the siting of the recovery home generated substantial mail from both protestors and supporters, in some cases from the leading architects of the opposing campaign. In all, I was able to locate and to analyze seventy-one letters to the editor.9 The records of City Council, and some of its committees, also aided in reconstructing events and

provided additional data on the cultural-political dimensions of the dispute.

Theorizing the Crisis of Modernity

Since much of what passes as NIMBYism is actually a manifestation of exclusivity, beginning with an exploration of the conditions which are seen to engender exclusivity seems a good place to start. In Modernity and Self-Identity, Giddens (1991) takes up the question of the profound mood of existential angst that, as others have similarly noted (see Lasch 1979, 1984; Bauman 1995; Young 1999), is seen to run deep within Western societies. This is done through an examination of the self's search for personal meaning in the face of the possibility of an utter, eternal void. Giddens develops as his argument the notion that self-identity has become a major preoccupation of individuals in Western culture for two main reasons.

First, major structural changes have resulted in a dynamic world where the historical and institutionally organized bonds that formerly embedded one's biography are loosened. The result is individuals cut adrift. Giddens identifies three elements that he sees as contributing to this process: the separation of time from space; the disembedding of social institutions through the use of abstract systems such as symbolic tokens (i.e. mediums of exchange) and ex-

pert systems; and, the development of reflexivity as an integral human practice in late modernity. Of these, reflexivity is seen as particularly problematic for

8. For this reason, citations from this source are without page numbers. 9. The bulk of these letters (sixty-one) were found in the Richmond Review. I located a further ten

from the Province and the Sun (five each).


the developing self, in that its practice raises doubts which can no longer be easily satisfied with reference to one's understanding of his or her place as being fixed institutionally, socially, or otherwise.

Second, the cult of individualism stresses identity not as a fixed entity - a biological creation, an accident of birth, socialization, etc. - but rather as a work of self-creation, an ongoing "project." To illustrate this effect, Giddens

provides snippets from several rather tedious self-help manuals that we need not bother with here. Where his discussion on this subject does become interesting is in relation to his premise that pluralism of choice renders this

project a source of yet more anxiety for the weary individual. According to Giddens, post-traditional societies open up the possibility of an incredible array of daily choices for the individual, some available, some blocked. In the context of the project of self, pluralism creates and nurtures insecurity; the individual is given a diversity of options, each with attendant risks, and provided very little guidance, if any, as to which choices to exercise.

Existential angst is produced from the risks of plurality and a weakened traditional order that requires individuals to develop coping mechanisms. Giddens notes the development of several coping mechanisms. Those of interest here include life politics, risk management and exclusion.

The Politics of Existential Angst

Giddens (1991) discusses at some length the notion of life politics, which he sees as an outgrowth of the modernist emancipatory project. According to him, emancipatory politics is marked by three concerns: freedom from traditional bonds and customs; a desire to eliminate oppression and exploitation; and

preoccupation with ideas of justice, equality and full civic participation. Life

politics, on the other hand, arose out of the modernist project's destabilizing of traditional values and power arrangements (ibid.) It offers a new emancipa- tion of the self, one built on the benefits of plurality, including the offer of

greater freedom and choice in constructing self-identity. In discussing life politics, Giddens does not raise the subject of multicultur-

alism, which would seem to fit naturally into this discussion. This is a

shortcoming that I will address here. Multiculturalism as discourse is an extension of life politics, although it is one with a radically different agenda. Like life politics, multiculturalism can be seen, in part, as a response to

pluralism and its demands on the self. Life politics posit that diversity of choice equals increased freedom. Multiculturalism is premised on the belief that recognition and tolerance of human diversity will increase freedom. Life

politics arose from the chaos and anxiety of high modernity, and its project can thus be seen as a response to the sense of rootlessness that post-traditional societies experience. While some might suggest that official multiculturalism


is best understood as an attempt at rectifying the wrongs of historical and contemporary racism, it is evident that feelings of insecurity aroused by the appearance of unfettered multiplicity"' are also antecedents of multiculturalism. For multiculturalism allows individuals struggling with the crisis of identity in post-traditional societies to preserve group-based identities and affiliations by offering state legitimation and validation of beliefs, customs and traditions. In short, we can see the operation of Pavlich's view that "unity is a condition of multiplicity and vice versa" (2001: 63).

Himani Bannerji (2000: 45) and other critics of the Canadian style of multiculturalism suggest that it is an "ideological elaboration from above." Bannerji correctly observes that multicultural policy serves as a decoy to draw attention away from the structured inequities within Western capitalist states. Multiculturalism, as defined by Ottawa and the provinces, "rearranged questions of social justice, of unemployment and racism, into issues of cultural diversity and focused on symbols of religion, on so-called tradition" (ibid.: 45). I completely agree with Bannerji on this point: multiculturalism as an official policy does little to alleviate many of the central concerns of individuals who are economically or socially disadvantaged. However, aside from obscuring the inability of the state to effectively deal at an institutional level with racism and intolerance that leads to social and economic disparities, state-sponsored multiculturalism does provide individuals both political benefits and a sanctioned retreat into the relative security and safety of culture. I will discuss the latter claim here, while taking up the former shortly.

While critics such as Bannerji downplay the overall importance of the state sponsoring cultural events, writers' festivals for people of colour, and so on, to "newcomers" and individuals who wish to retain their ethnic culture in a

pluralist society, it is not clear that all the individuals who organize and attend these events, whose works are commissioned and/or heard by others, who are provided jobs in the new network of multicultural bureaucracies and non- profits feel similarly. It is also not evident that people who may be feeling cut off from their language, traditions and customs, do not take some comfort in using the services of interpreters, multicultural school liaisons, employment programs, and other services, in negotiating their new world. Nor would I guess that individuals who may miss hearing their language, do not benefit from multicultural media (television and radio programming, newspapers), or from cultural associations that derive operating expenses from government grants and subsidies, associations that provide links to one' s "natal" or "ethnic" home. These are all possible avenues of retreat into the relative safety and

10. As I note elsewhere, I agree with Young in that what we are witnessing is the perception of diversity, but that this diversity is largely regulated - ie. limited - through commodification.


security of culture. In short, Bannerji has some very valid criticisms, but overstates her case by ignoring the social benefits provided through some of these programs, and the need of some for cultural retreat.

Young (1999), who shares some ofBannerji's concerns, focuses his critique on the fact that multiculturalism is an ideology based on essentialist notions of difference that are frequently used to perpetuate and legitimize divisions based on what is, after all, a mutable entity: culture. According to Young (ibid.: 189), "Difference multiculturalism is no protection against social conflict, indeed it facilitates it." Fraser (1997: 181-2) supplies an explanation for this: "the multiculturalist view ... sees all identities as deserving of recognition and all differences as meriting affirmation." Thus, the identity politics that result from multiculturalism facilitate social conflict because "difference" multiculturalism demands the use of oppositional definitions and/or recognition of degrees of difference as a starting point. The only commonality readily admitted and ac-

cepted is our humanity. Beyond this, we are told that we have differences that need to be recognized and accepted as of equal merit regardless of their content.

Multiculturalism is not merely cultural, it is also political. It is an attempt to redress very real historical and contemporary wrongs, a very laudable, albeit

imperfectly executed, goal. Its political nature arises through the privileging of claimants under its banner. Moral weight is attached to arguments through the implicit linking of these same historical and contemporary wrongs to current debates. This privileging takes place in the courts of public opinion and, where the necessary legislative and regulatory mechanisms exist for addressing such claims, in rights tribunals, courts of law, political chambers, and over the desks of bureaucrats, among other places. With respect to the Odlin example, protestors' displeasure over the siting of the recovery home is linked in media ink, and in City Council chambers, to both the historical taxation of Chinese immigrants (the "head tax"), 1 and contemporary examples of anti-Asian racism.

The invocation of historical and contemporary wrongs to lend moral weight to claims based solely on culture, may be helpful to redress some disadvan- tages, but also has the effect of reconstituting power relations in a way that is ultimately harmful to the wider aims of social justice. For example, when conflicts are between two historically disadvantaged groups, the result is likely further division and conflict. This is because one side, or perhaps both, see

1. One of Canada's more odious decisions was to impose a head tax on Chinese immigrants during the early 20'h century as a means of curbing Chinese immigration. The demand for the head tax arose mainly among British Columbians - the province where the Odlin dispute took place.


their position as following from a fundamental feature of their identity, and thus as an essential "truth" that ought not to be bargained away, or otherwise weakened through negotiation. This leaves little room for compromise. Furthermore, proponents of positions opposed to culturally-rooted claims are also likely to view privileging on the basis of culture as fundamentally unjust. "Why," such opponents might ask, "should cultural claims be privileged over claims based on gender, economic and/or marginalized status?" The argument that multiculturalism is a response to historical and continuing wrongs fails to satisfy, when the opposing position is, and has been, equally wronged. Indeed, in such cases multicultural discourse actually runs counter to the principles of liberal justice, which cannot accept any rights, protections or policies that legitimize or enable one group to oppress or exploit another (Kymlicka 1995).

As became evident in reading several of the letters that residents and other concerned citizens sent in to their local newspapers, identity politics and multiculturalist-based claims played a role in shaping events on Odlin Road and people's reactions to those events. The sections that follow tease out aspects of this discourse and highlight some of its effects in order to show the difficulties that it can engender.

Defining Ourselves -just like you, but different too

The location is not a good place for those people under recovery because most of their neighbours are scared of them (Cheng 1999; accessed November 4, 2001).

As noted, a large proportion of the Odlin Road protestors self-identified as being of Chinese cultural origin. Furthermore, attention to this fact was initially drawn by members of the protest group themselves, rather than by the media or the protestors' critics. Which is not to say that it was not, or did not, become an issue for the latter two groups, but rather that it was something that the protestors themselves felt to be significant. Reference to cultural values allowed the protestors to shape an understanding for themselves and others in relation to their reaction to the group home. It wasn't simply an example of selfish citizens exhibiting NIMBYism, but rather an affront to culture. One individual exemplified this by defining himself and other protestors through an oppositional definition: "in our culture, [drug addicts] will go to a place to get it out first - a cutoff centre on an island" (cited in Tanner 1999: A10). Similarly, another protestor pointed out what he perceived to be a culturally- rooted opposition in speaking of his fellow residents: "They are trying to become immersed in Canadian culture, but at the same time they carry their Chinese culture, which is very conservative about drugs" (Porter 1999c: B1). This belief in "cultural difference" was also found in comments made by a


member of the Group Home Taskforce noted for his opposition to the Turning Point recovery home:12

[Mr.] Wong explained that in his culture, drug addicts were put into institutions, and not integrated into communities, and so the Asian community felt frightened by such a proposition and unsure of whether it would work. He also explained that it was important for the Asian community to receive assistance to help understand and participate in the democratic, Canadian process. He explained that

people immigrate from Asia, and it takes time to change their views on how a society should function, and that it is especially true of older immigrants ... He explained that in his culture, they stigmatize people who have problems with drugs and alcohol, and he asked for patience from the Task Force and others as Asians get accustomed to living in a democracy (Group Home Task force minutes June 14, 2001a: 9-10).

Whether the claim of cultural difference in relation to the treatment of addiction is grounded in actual fact is an interesting one, but is immaterial here. What I am more concerned with is the use of the claim and its real or potential effects. In laying a culturally based claim under the banner of multiculturalism, protestors sought to privilege their claim, thus providing them with a firmer political footing on which to base demands in response to their concerns. That this was a desired effect of laying their claim is made evident in the reporting of a Turning Point objector's presentation to City Council:

[Ms.] Wong spoke about the diferences among the variety of cultures in Richmond and stated that these dif'erences should be respected. She stated that group homes were supported and that all that was being asked was that a bylaw be introduced which would provide the opportunity for area residents to voice their concerns about the establishment of a group home in a particular neighbourhood (City of Richmond Council records, March 12, 2000; italics mine).

In essence, this protestor is claiming that expulsion of addicts from communities is part of a "Chinese" cultural value-set, and thus her claim is as equally worthy of respect as any other claim.

However, judging from the diversity of letters written by Chinese- Canadians, these are not values universal to all - a dimension of this dispute that needs to be made explicit. One individual, a self-described "CBC" (Cana- dian born Chinese), stated that he was "saddened and disappointed" by the protestors' reactions to the community care facility (Fung 1999; accessed Novem- ber 4, 2001). Does this make this person, and others like him, "un-Chinese"? Or, is it reasonable to suggest that there is no one fixed "Chinese culture" with a prescribed set of values universal to all people of Chinese ethnic origin?

It would seem to be the latter. Another writer, attempting to define "the Chinese" cultural identity through the language of multiculturalism, suggested

12. The Taskforce was composed of various members of the community representing different factions.


that: "we hold the same values as other Canadians in our cultural mosaic society, and choose to express them in ways that may be different" (Lam 1999; accessed November 4, 2001). This is the "just like you, but different too" thinking often seen in relation to multicultural discourse. Conflicts rooted in a politics of difference based solely on oppositional definitions increase intolerance, largely because no room is left for dialogue. Thus, the "just like you" aspect is an attempt to bridge perceived cultural differences through recognitions of common qualities, in this case shared values. What these shared values are, and how they are expressed differently by people of Chinese ethnicity is unfortunately left unexplained by the writer. However, I read into this a perception that Canadians are generally concerned with issues concerning quality of life, crime, and so on. In this the writer is undoubtedly correct. Where the writer is wrong, however, is in relation to his/her belief that these concerns are expressed differently within the Chinese culture. Exclusion is not a tool of any one particular culture.

Essentializing the "Other"

If the recovery home is set up next to, behind, or across from your house, do you feel good? If you do, I think you are joking. Do you worry about your children having interactions with the drug addicts and alcoholics? If you do not, you are not telling the truth. But if you do not feel good and

worry about your children, I'll give you deep sympathy and support (Lee 1999; accessed November 4, 2001).

If we define ourselves in relation to an essential culture that is different from, or in opposition to those of others, then there must be an "other." And, if we accept that culture is fixed, than that "other" must also take an essential form. One aspect of the dark side of multiculturalism arises, as Young (1999: 109) notes, out of the fact that cultural essentialism fosters a climate where beliefs as to "inherent superiority" can grow, leading others to become de- monized "as essentially wicked, stupid or criminal."

The "other" need not be a "cultural opposite," it is enough that it is a culturally defined "different." In relation to the Odlin Road protests, the "cultural different" was not defined in relation to race, ethnicity, class, gender or even a particular culture, but rather as being a group composed of criminals and

potential criminals. In other words, what distinguished Odlin Road protestors from those protested against was a set of essentialist beliefs concerning the nature of alcoholics and addicts. The Odlin Road residents constructed themselves within the media and through their protests as upstanding, law- abiding citizens, while addicts, by virtue of their addiction, became deviant, bad, and criminal. Again, this is not particularly unique to what is defined by some as a characteristic of Chinese culture. Those perceived to be deviants are most frequently the targets of exclusionary practises because they represent the


possibility of dangers known and unknown, regardless of the excluders' culture.

Exclusivity

The Turning Point clients are good, they have already made up their mind to turn around, they want to be part of society ... What I'm afraid of is their friends. They have to go through the neighbourhood ... to visit them. They might be trying to persuade the clients to go back to drugs. There are too lmany outsiders coming to the area (area resident, cited in Porter 1999e: Al; italics mine).

Young (1999) argues that there has been a reordering of boundaries as

people respond to perceived risks by protecting themselves through measures aimed at either self-isolation or the exclusion of others. The result, he suggests, has been a shift to an exclusive society, by which he means a society where

diversity and difference are absorbed and sanitized, and "elaborate defences" are built against those deemed as being "difficult people" or of the "dangerous classes" (ibid.: 59). This shift, while frequently treated as a large-scale phenomenon, can be seen as both occurring within, and having a profound effect on local communities. In spaces where the possibility of encountering strangers is a daily reality, each carrying with him or her some degree of risk, inclusion and exclusion become principal forms of "social protection," a means of managing those strangers who represent identifiable dangers.

Anyone can be an "other" - simultaneous inclusion and exclusion

In Tristes Tropiquese, Levi-Strauss (1973) makes a distinction between

"primitive" and "modern" societies on the basis of how each relates to strange "others." According to Levi-Strauss, so-called "primitive societies" are those that exhibit anthropophagic qualities: they absorb strangers and deviants. By incorporating such people into the social body, their "otherness" is either nul- lified or weakened, while the society gains in strength. This is contrasted with modern societies, which are deemed anthropoemic because they eject or reject "troublesome" individuals and groups. The absorption of such people by "moderns" is viewed as weakening or disturbing the social body, and therefore the alternative - ejection - is viewed as a superior response to the risk that the "troublesome" represent.

Levi-Strauss' interpretation of these processes suggests that they occur

dichotomously and can be used to mark off the boundaries of different types of societies. However, this is a false dichotomy. As Young (1999: 57) contends, "all societies have both swallowing and ejecting aspects" because these are complementary strategies. Indeed, "only as an 'either-or' the two

strategies offer a serious chance of controlling the social space. Both are therefore included in the tool-bag of every social domination" (Bauman 1995:


180). In the Odlin Road example, we see aspects of both the ejection and absorption reflexes.

"[Turning Point residents are] not good neighbours because they're not welcome, because people don't want them here" (Resident Clifford Chan, cited in Porter 1999d: B1).

The ejection reflex results from two factors. First, the perception that differences between people are simply too great to be bridged, that the risk of absorbing an individual or group into the social body outweighs any benefit to be gained in doing so. This inability to absorb difference is illustrated in the following comment by a letter writer: "Though many citizens in Richmond feel safe and secure about living next to a recovery home, in the eyes of protesters, home is about health, happiness and harmony. Not about drug and alcohol sub- stances" (Fong 1999b; accessed November 4, 2001). Second, where alternative measures such as shunning or barricading are seen as ineffectual for the pur- poses of distancing/protecting oneself and family. One writer who supports ejecting the recovery home, attempts to solicit sympathy for his position by noting the difficulty residents face in terms of being able to distance themselves from those who are too different from him: "it is hard for us too. I mean, think about all the mothers and the children. Just imagine having people who hang out with drug (addicts) walking around so close to your home" (Wong 1999; accessed November 4, 2001).

To Odlin Road residents I say: "You are in Canada now where our laws, customs and culture

prevail" (Lightfoot, 1999: A17).

While the Odlin Road protestors and their supporters had no interest in

absorbing the recovery home clientele into their neighbourhood, others within and outside of the immediate community were very much interested in

absorbing the "strangers" - identified now as being the "Chinese" protestors - into their "Canadian" cultural framework. Thus, one of the unintended side effects of the culturally-rooted claims made by the protestors, was to open the door, in a sense to make permissible, the airing of "anti-Chinese culture" claims that were probably boiling away under the surface.

Embedded in the "insiders" anti-exclusionary stances are demands that the perceived "outsiders" -the "immigrants" - "fit in" by immediately adopting and practicing "Canadian" values which are perceived as being superior because they are said to be inclusivist. I found several examples in this vein. For instance, an author who notes that "I have worked diligently over the years for many multicultural endeavours," has the following to say:

It seems every time I pick up the ,aper I read how newcomers are trying to change our way of life. I wonder if they are aware of what had to be accomplished to make our fair city what is it today ... how would they feel if we went en masse to their homeland and decided, after choosing it as the most desirable place to life, to change the rules? (Bassett 1999; accessed November 4, 2001).


Another writer advises the Odlin Road Residents, and similar others, that: "You are not in Hong Kong any more. Adjust and deal with it" (Labrie 1999: A17). One columnist notes of the protestors, "Perhaps it wasn't made clear in the citizenship booklet. In Canada, you get to choose a lot of things - but you don't get to choose who lives on your street (Clough 1999: A4). Moral condemnation of a group's behaviour or attitudes as a means of engendering opposition to that group is hardly new. As Breton (1999) notes, a backlash in Vancouver against Asian immigrants during the 1980s was sparked by the belief that Asian immigration was creating a housing shortage. The dominant trope in that situation was echoed in the Odlin Road example: a particular behaviour and/or lifestyle choice of Asians is incompatible with, or undermines Canadian values, and thus deserves condemnation (ibid.).

Thus, while the protestors utilized the stereotype of the "criminal" addict to lend credence to their calls for exclusion, their opponents depicted Chinese culture as uncompassionate as justification for their demands that Chinese- Canadians drop perceived "Chinese" values in favour of "Canadian" values:

I got sober in Richmond some years ago. I was a resident in, and later an employee of, two recovery homes. Both were located in the middle of residential areas and there was never a problem. That was before the arrival of a group of newcomers from a culture where people who need help are apparently put on an island (Lightfoot, 1999: A17).

Discussion: Where Does this Leave Us??

By allowing the relocation of the Turning Point recovery home to Odlin Road in Richmond, city and regional health officials insisted they have acted on what is "best" for the community. How can it be "best" for the community when the relocation controversy divided the community? How can it be "best" when the issues involved have significantly increased racial tension in Richmond, a city which has served as an example of multiculturalism in its finest form? (Tam 1999: A19).

The writer of the letter quoted above is apparently making the point that multiculturalism - "in its finest form" - means that in some cases people have to be excluded from a community in order to preserve a sense of "racial" harmony. This is my major criticism of multiculturalism as ideology and practise. It lends moral weight to exclusionary claims, which in turns provides a basis for inclusivist demands that are essentially assimilationist in nature.

To begin with, the tensions produced by Turning Point's decision to locate in this neighbourhood, are not racial ones as the author above suggests. They do not stem from biological differences. They are the result of ethnocentric and/or other discriminatory perceptions related to cultural stereotypes. These stereotypes lead to a twin set of demands: those of exclusion and inclusion.

A purpose of multiculturalism, as I understand it, is to reduce tensions produced by pluralism within Western societies by promoting cultural tolerance


as an achievable ideal. As an official state policy in Canada, multiculturalism is prescriptive. It is not merely about espousing an ideal, it is about making that ideal a reality - at least with respect to a liberal conception of formal political equality, if not in the sense of equality one would find under a distributive justice regime (Kymlicka 1995). Human rights legislation, criminal anti-hatred laws, rights tribunals, and other mechanisms aimed at promoting formal equality, provide the coercive edge necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Note that I am talking very specifically about multiculturalism as a means of supporting a relationship between cultural diversity and formal political equality. Multiculturalism is about satisfying political demands based on recognition of cultural difference and, as a state policy, it provides a means of privileging such claims over those of others in the name of tolerance.

Theoretically, multiculturalism is both a laudable goal and a viable solution to problems of racism and ethnic discrimination. However, as a remedy it has several deficits. I will limit myself to discussing two of these. First, as Li (1999) similarly notes, within the Canadian political and social context, the concept of multiculturalism has been at best an amorphous, ill-defined one. It signals a general agreement amongst citizens that cultural tolerance is a worthwhile ambition, but provides Canadians little direction with respect to the hard practicalities of dealing with difference in an unequal world. Thus, we have no means of addressing the question of how we ought to weigh claims made in relation to the goals of social justice (Fraser 1997). In particular, as Fraser (ibid.: 182) argues in Justice Interruptus, multiculturalism does not

provide a means by which we can distinguish "democratic from antidemocratic identity claims, just from unjust differences." For this reason, it cannot "sustain a viable politics or a credible vision of radical democracy" (ibid.: 189). In the case examined here, multiculturalism is invoked as a means of supporting political demands from one group that individuals from another group be excluded from "their neighbourhood." The premises run as follows: P1) that Chinese traditional culture requires that addicts be isolated from others; P2) the exclusion of addicts is believed to be necessary to prevent crime and disorder and preserve harmony; P3) pluralist multiculturalism recognizes the merit of all claims centred on cultural identity and custom; C 1) therefore, demands that addicts be excluded from civil life can be justified and given merit under a policy of multiculturalism.

Why I suggest that multiculturalism is a privileging mechanism is tied into my second complaint against it. Multiculturalism recognizes no diversity other than ethnic diversity, thus a constellation of other forms of discrimination arising from "difference" are not brought under its purview. Couple this with a lack of equal formalized protections and mechanisms in place to process discrimination claims based on material, power and/or status differences, and the result is that one form of potential discrimination is given privilege over


others.13 In the instant case, we see claims made to protection of beliefs and

"way of life" under the banner of multiculturalism by a group claiming to

represent the cultural views of an ethnic constituency, at the potential expense of a marginalized sub-group.

So, to answer the question that I posed in the heading title, multiculturalist discourse is not likely to lead us any closer to a society founded on principles of social justice. Instead, what it leaves us with is a new hierarchy by which

political claims can be treated, a hierarchy that simply reorders inequalities without addressing them (see Pavlich 2001). First, multiculturalism can lend moral weight to unjust demands - in the instant case, demands for exclusion based on unfounded claims. Where opposing claims are rooted in economic, gender and other forms of social inequality, such a policy does little to advance social justice, but rather creates and exacerbates fissures between potential allies. Second, despite its presence in the political firmament of Canada, we still remain some distance from achieving the erasure of racism and discrimination.

What remains, of course, is the issue of where we should go from here. Some Canadian critics of multiculturalism suggest that we ought not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, that the deficiencies of multiculturalism can be addressed through a critical reworking (Day 2000). I disagree. We could

attempt to give multiculturalism a more precise meaning, but doing so would

13. Provincial human rights legislation offers no protection in this situation for two reasons. The relevant section reads:

9 A person must not (a) deny to a person or class of persons the opportunity to purchase a commercial unit or

dwelling unit that is in any way represented as being available for sale, (b) deny to a person or class of persons the opportunity to acquire land or an interest in land, or (c) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding a term or condition of the

purchase or other acquisition of a commercial unit, dwelling unit, land or interest in land because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation or sex of that person or class of persons (Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996 C. 210, s.9.) Thus, the status of drug addict or alcoholic, a marginalized status, is not an enumerated

ground for complaint, unless the complaint is filed as discrimination on the basis of mental or

physical disability. Second, it is unclear that the protesting residents are in a position to discriminate in a conventional sense, meaning that they are not in a direct position to deny services or benefits to the Turning Point clients on the basis of their status, although they are clearly in a position to make it more difficult for the Turning Point to exercise its rights under law.

Federal anti-hate legislation also affords no protection as it only pertains to members of "identifiable groups." The definition of "identifiable group" underthe legislation is: "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin" (Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.381 (4)).


not address its central flaw: the identity politics which multiculturalism privi- leges draws us away from the goals of emancipatory politics by refocusing our attention on self and group identity (Giddens 1991), rather than on the multidimensional nature of oppression and exploitation. In lumping together whole groups and saying that we ought to address inequality based on one identified dimension, we somehow manage to lose sight of the intersections of inequality, and the ways in which oppression cross-cuts groups and/or, indeed, may be supported by groups under the banner of "difference." If were to retain multiculturalism, and address the problem of the divisions it creates, it would need a radical reworking, one whereby it is re-defined so that it is truly inclusive of all differences. However, the only result that would truly satisfy in the re-working scenario would lead to the creation of fictions; that is, we would have to stretch culture into a shape that would allow for "addict cultures," "homeless cultures," "poverty cultures," and so on, so that groups could

legitimately press claims under its banner - a clearly untenable solution. If we leave multiculturalism largely as it currently stands, than we ultimately lose more than we could gain, because the cross-sectionalizing of groups continues to serve dominant interests by breaking up potential allies through the expedient of giving select groups the appearance of equality, without actually doling out a serious measure of material or social equality to anyone. So, rather than simply going along the same unsatisfactory route, it becomes clear that what is required is a new emancipatory struggle, one that is inclusive without

being coercively so. How does this prescription translate into practise? Bourdieu (1998: 45-6)

suggests that it is "[t]hrough classification systems ... inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals ... the state molds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division" (original italics). Thus, if we want to change the mental structures that fuel divisions, then we need to consider addressing deficiencies that currently exist at the level of the state. This can be done through a lobbying for the substitution of multiculturalism for multidimensionalism. It is clearly not enough to have a discourse or a policy that seeks to address issues of historical and contemporary wrongs on the basis of one dimension on which

disadvantagement occurs. Thus, what are required are policies and practises that operate on multiple levels - multidimensionalism. These policies and

practises need to be inter-related and flexible enough to address, in a meaningful way, issues of disadvantagement that arise through distinctions based in race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, and/or association with stigmatized groups. In connection with such policies, mechanisms need to be established that allow issues that cross these boundaries to be resolved through thorough analysis, taking into consideration the realities of the multiple dimensions and sites at which inequality can occur.


By using the phrase in a meaningful way, I am signaling the need for a discourse that places material equality in a primary position among desirable goals - something that it has been argued has been missing of late in discussions of transformative politics (see Fraser 1997). However, we do also need to retain the goal of social equality, for all human groups, as its twin. This second component replaces the current privileging of claims based

primarily in cultural differences. I note that multidimensional policies at the level of the state do not provide

one-step fixes for what are often difficult social problems. Nor are they intended to; there are no programmable a prioris that could satisfactorily address all social concerns. Rather, what multidimensionalism does at the level of the state and its institutions is to open up existing and future debates, so that that we can start the process of addressing more significant social questions than the rather shallow concerns often hidden under the guise of "culture."

With a change in orientation, that is away from multiculturalism towards a new, non-coercively inclusive form of emancipatory politics, we can also begin to reconcile the multiple subjectivities that constitute our society through coalition-building at the community level. This "opening up" of groups and their spaces, particularly needs to occur within communities given the

overwhelming power of state institutions to create political decisions with significant local impacts. Open community dialogues are a necessary means of

resolving political questions that impact local groups. Multidimensionalism is clearly a politics that recognizes the potential of

communities to be increasingly open, contingent spaces (Fraser 1997; Pavlich 2001). It is also one that refuses naturalistic fallacies toting visions of

inherently estranged human groups. Degrees of estrangement within societies, and conversely of openness, have social causes; this is reflected in differences

among societies, as well as within societies over time. For example, using the work of Giddens, I have argued here that the emergence of a post-traditional order in Western societies - a significant social shift - has had as an effect the creation of spaces of cultural and other refuge, where people desire to close off a site and/or say who may enter. I argue further that we can similarly use Giddens' (1991) concept of active trust relationships as a means of nullifying estrangement through community building. Simply put, it is significantly more difficult to reject someone when you know them, or have an understanding of their situation in life; thus, the best interests of communities lie in the recognition of the benefits to be gained through open dialogue and coalition building, which involves the recreation of "others" as objects of trust, rather than as objects of difference and fear. It is only by replacing division with trust ties that the very notion of the "stranger" - a concept anathema to a tolerant, open society - can begin to be dissolved.


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Explaining Odlin Road

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