Evidencing International Threat: Examining Iraq Survey Group’s Post-invasion Verification of...

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Journal of Language and Politics 12:1 (2013), –. doi 10.1075/jlp.12.1.02chaissn 1569–2159 / e-issn 1569–9862 © John Benjamins Publishing Company

Evidencing international threat

Examining Iraq Survey Group’s post-invasion verification of Iraq’s WMD threat

Gordon C. Chang, Kerstin Lueck & Hugh B. MehanWestern Illinois University / University of California, Berkeley / University of California, San Diego

By studying the discourse utilized by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and its chief officers during 2003–2004, we show the methods by which U.S. government-appointed experts helped to affirm the existence of an Iraqi threat even in the absence of physical evidence for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles or active weapons programs found in Iraq during U.S. ground search. Their data collection and interpretation work illuminates the principle that the claims and calculations of international threat can be primarily constructed by language and discourse processes rather than by direct/concrete material referents. It also points to the need for institutions and a lay audience to apply a higher evidentiary threshold to ascertain the existence of an international threat.

Keywords: cognition and knowledge; risk and threat assessment; argumentation; Iraq war

1. Introduction

The topic of international risk is important because international aggression can be waged when a state is labeled as a global threat. Despite the scientistic guise in the discourse of international threat, threat identification is neither exclusively subjective nor objective. Rather, it is essentially judgment based on a set of con-cepts and “data” serving as direct or indirect evidence. This paper seeks to show how the detailed evidential and epistemic processes of threat identification were mediated by the framing and characterization of the enemy. With appropriate contextualization and data construction work, a materially grounded argument of international threat can be systematically assembled even in the scarcity of direct, concrete material evidence.

© 2013. John Benjamins Publishing CompanyAll rights reserved

Gordon C. Chang, Kerstin Lueck & Hugh B. Mehan

. Research approach and methods

Research in critical discourse analysis (CDA) or critical discourse studies (CDS) have offered theoretical groundwork and empirical models for social science scholars to examine how power arrangements in society are shaped by detailed, practical, and artful social practices, centering on the use of language in text and discourse (cf. Wodak 2009: 53–56). Recently, scholars from the multidisciplinary field comprising CDS have turned attention to more complex cognitive and inter-pretative processes, which include the dynamic use of pragmatic and semantic devices to achieve mental distancing, conceptual association, and argumenta-tive structure (Chilton 2004; Cap 2008, 2010; Van Dijk 2008, 2009; Fairclough & Fairclough 2011; Hart 2011).

This study engages the question of the constitution of knowledge holistically, utilizing a mix of discourse-analytic approaches to conduct what can be called a “critical epistemic discourse analysis” (Van Dijk 2011: 35). This study builds on two previous studies (Chang & Mehan 2006; Chang & Mehan 2008) examining how modes of discourse are connected to modes of evidential use. In those studies we showed that immediately after 9/11 the George W. Bush Administration con-structed and applied a “War on Terrorism script” to frame the event. Grounded in the institution of American civil religion, this script was characterized by a set of good and evil actors engaged in a scene of war, possessing different motives, quali-ties, and strategies (cf. Lazar & Lazar 2004; Leudar, Marsland & Nekvapil 2004; Hodges 2011: 23–40). By institutionalizing certain ways of conceptualization and holding a set of premises to be true, the script made it possible for the United States to generate an elaborate line of argument in favor of invading Afghanistan and Iraq.

This study examines how the U.S.-led Coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003 was re-justified after an extensive ground search conducted by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a “fact-finding” organization jointly created by the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA after the U.S.-led coalition occupied Iraq in 2003. This study is especially fascinating because Saddam Hussein’s threat was resolutely re-affirmed by ISG spokespersons, President Bush, Secretary Powell, and many politicians in light of the absence of physical evidence for weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) programs or stockpiles found in ISG’s reports. It is one matter that a claim of Iraq’s international threat was made before the 2003 military invasion, since the U.N. inspection was never complete and Hussein allegedly hid and deceived the inspectors successfully. It is an even more significant matter, however, when the same claim was unwaveringly maintained by the Bush Administration after several months of exhaustive ground search by U.S. inspectors. The detailed


Evidencing international threat 1

and artful work that went into interpreting and re-presenting data by the U.S. government invites attention, since it shows the elaborate procedures enabling a political knowledge system to incorporate adversarial information. The facts that George W. Bush was re-elected in 2004 – only a month before of the release of the final ISG report – and so much damage has been caused in Iraq also add historical importance to this post-hoc justification episode.

Our data corpus consists of three main sources: (1) the final, 900-page offi-cial report released by ISG in September 2004, entitled Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD1 – thereafter abbreviated as The Duelfer Report or DR in this paper; (2) key public statements and congressional testimonies of ISG chiefs and spokespersons, David Kay and Charles Duelfer; and (3) key public statements of President George W. Bush as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell in response to the ISG findings and ISG spokespersons’ state-ments. Although The Duelfer Report is the focus of our analysis, we approach the three sources because not a single institutional agent retrospectively determined and calculated the political threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Instead, it was an intertextual accomplishment between the ISG, ISG spokespersons, and the Bush Administration officials – each playing a somewhat different part in the discourse.

Drawing on classic argumentation analysis and modeling techniques (cf. Toulmin [1958]2003; Van Eemeren et al. 1996), and especially Van Dijk’s recent works (2008, 2009, 2011) on “context models” and sociocognitive approach,2 our analysis first identifies the arguments made by ISG spokespersons (Kay and Duelfer) and the Bush Administration officials (President Bush and Secretary Powell). We compare their argumentative claims with the “evidence” (or infor-mation) being cited from the ISG investigation. This process of argumentative “grounding” relies on applying a set of premises located in “context models.” We draw out the systematic methods by which these premises influenced knowledge construction. In this sense, our approach is akin to ethnomethod-ological and constructionist approaches that seek to display or elucidate the detailed practices that enabled the construction of social facts or social reality (cf. Rawls 2002).

. Technical findings from the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)

ISG was mandated to search extensively for WMD as well as documents pertain-ing to Iraq’s weapons development activities, issues which were repeatedly men-tioned as sources of concerns before the invasion. The investigation team, first



headed by David Kay, began its ground search effort starting in May 2003 and delivered its first report in October 2003. Based on David Kay’s congressional testimony,3 the group had “not yet found stocks of weapons” but had discovered “dozens of WMD-related program activities” as well as evidence of “concealment effort” – such as deliberately destroyed documents and hard drives. It also claimed to be “ uncovering significant information” with regard to biological warfare activi-ties. This report was not quite authoritative because the ISG was supposedly still in data “collection and analysis mode” and was describing only about three months of investigative work. As the search process went on, however, no stockpiles of weapons were found and the number of potential sites – identified through inter-views and intelligence – was quickly running out. On January 23, 2004, David Kay made a high-profile resignation from his post for undisclosed reasons. In mass media interviews as well as his testimony to Congress on January 28, 2004, he claimed that he did not believe stockpiles of WMD would ever be found.4 Aside from concrete evidence about a long-range missile program – which consisted of conventional weapons and not WMD – as well as some “small activities” related to WMD development, there was “no scientist, no documentation nor physical evidence of the production plants” of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.5

Kay’s admittedly inconclusive report did not entirely shut the door to a pos-sible groundbreaking discovery. Some officials (e.g. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) insisted that WMD stockpiles might still be found. However, several months later the investigation effort largely came to a close when ISG exhausted all searchable sites and investigative leads. Charles Duelfer, who headed ISG after Kay’s resignation, delivered The Duelfer Report in late September 2004, which was considered to be a conclusive document pertaining to the weapons search. Released only about a month before the November 2004 Presidential election, the report did not add significant evidence to Kay’s report with regard to WMD stock-piles or programs, and it dismissed some of its previous suspicions. The report stimulated a wave of criticisms against the George W. Bush Administration about its pre-war assertions. To counteract critics, President Bush, Secretary Powell, and Charles Duelfer insisted that the ISG report affirmed that Iraq presented a strong threat to the United States warranting of the Coalition’s forced disarmament.

4. Claims and evidence of threats

This paper focuses on the argument specifically connected to the ISG empirical investigation – i.e. the threat from weapons of mass destruction and their devel-opment. Three major sources of Iraq’s threat were argued in light of the absence of direct, physical evidence: (1) Iraq’s chaos and corruption; (2) Iraq’s WMD



intent and capability; and (3) mysterious, unresolved issues. Whereas Kay empha-sized the first in January 2004; Duelfer, Bush, and other officials emphasized the second in October 2004; and the third source was addressed in The Duelfer report. We show how all three arguments were constructed in the interplay between contextualization and material referents. Particularly, many ambiguous material referents become mysteriously dangerous upon a series of decontextualization and recontextualization processes.

4.1 Threat from chaos and corruption

In his January 24th 2004 U.S. Senate hearing, Kay stated that Iraq posed an even greater threat than the United States had imagined and portrayed, concluding that “the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein.” He offered the rationale that either the Iraq society – or the Iraqi government – had become so chaotic that prospective buyers and sellers of WMD could take advantage. He stated:

(1) Senator Warner, I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein. I have said – I actually think this may be one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought. I think when we have the complete record you’re going to discover that after 1998, it became a regime that was totally corrupt. Individuals were out for their own protection, and in a world where we know others are seeking WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and a buyer meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous country than even we anticipated with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate estimate.6

It is challenging to locate a speaker’s arguments in one or two textual excerpts, because arguments are often not succinctly or explicitly articulated. Especially in the case of ISG and Bush’s discourse which we analyze, causal linkages were often made ambiguously. Nevertheless, based on the material above, we represent his line of reasoning in Figure 1.

The second and third premises (statements #2 and #3) are not explicit in the cited texts but can be inferred. Statement #2 is necessary in order to reach the conclusion that “the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein.” Having a chaotic or corrupt country in itself cannot lead to the conclusion; only when the chaotic condition is connected to the properties of Saddam Hussein does the argument become intelligible. Statement #3 was related to Statement #5; Iraq was “more dangerous” than anticipated because the pre-war estimate was “not…a fully accurate estimate” – that is, an underestimate, which came from overlooking the effects of chaos and corruption in the likelihood of terrorists attaining WMD.


4 Gordon C. Chang, Kerstin Lueck & Hugh B. Mehan

The following quotes by Kay in a TV interview on January 26, 2004 show a somewhat different argument, in which Saddam Hussein was detached from the active creation of risk. Although Kay stated that “Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened,” by “Iraq” he did not necessarily mean Saddam Hussein. Instead, Kay explicitly pointed out that Saddam Hussein no longer controlled the society – thereby divorcing his role as an active agent in a hypothetical occurrence of terrorists’ acquiring WMD through trade.

(1) KAY: Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It’s not a technical judgment. I think Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened.

HOST: But as you know, the administration and its supporters, not just suggest, but insist that there was a real connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorist organizations that would be a threat to the United States.

Because: (1) Iraq was an environment (with a corrupted government and society) conducive to terrorists’ acquiring WMD through trading.Corresponding texts: “a regime that was totally corrupt. Individuals were out for their own protection”. “the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller [of WMD] and a buyer

meeting up”(2-Implied) Saddam Hussein is responsible for creating and/or sustaining such an environment.Corresponding texts: “the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam

Hussein”(3-Implied) The United States relied on Saddam Hussein’s intention as the primary criterion to estimate likelihood of terrorist attainment of WMD in Iraq, instead of a chaotic and corrupt environment.Corresponding texts: “the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and a buyer meeting up

would have made that a far more dangerous country than even we anticipated with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate estimate”

Therefore: (4) The world is far safer with the removal of Saddam Hussein.Corresponding texts: “the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam

Hussein”(5) Iraq was a more dangerous country than anticipated.Corresponding texts: “it was even more dangerous than we thought” “a far more dangerous country than even we anticipated”

Figure 1. First version of the ‘Threat from chaos and corruption’ argument



KAY: Look, I found no real connection between WMD and terrorists. What we did find, and as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist groups and individuals that passed through Iraq.

(2) [Iraqi scientists] describe in Iraq that was really spinning into a vortex of corruption from the very top in which people were lying to Saddam, lying to each other for money; the graft and how much you could get out of the system rather than how much you could produce was a dominant issue.7

Here, the role of Saddam Hussein causing the chaotic environment was much less suggestive, but the ultimate conclusion of an Iraqi threat remained the same. The argument can be simplified as follows (see Figure 2):

Because: (1) Iraq was an environment (with a corrupted government and society) conducive to terrorists’ acquiring WMD through trading.Corresponding texts: “a vortex of corruption from the very top in which people were lying to

Saddam, lying to each other for money”Therefore: (2) Iraq was a more dangerous country than anticipated.

Corresponding texts: “Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than

even we realized” “In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that

supplier”

Figure 2. Second version of the ‘Threat from chaos and corruption’ argument

The strong assertion – that this environment would eventually lead to terror-ists attaining and buying WMD8 was largely grounded in presuppositions about the enemy simplistically referred to as “terrorists.” This general characteriza-tion de-emphasized their differences, identities, capabilities, and sociopolitical motives.9 Despite the differences between the two arguments, the quantity and quality of evidence is similar. Both claim an Iraqi threat even though the ISG did not actually find any WMD in Iraq, or any actual instance or documented plan of WMD trading, or any “real connections between WMD and terrorists,” or any non-governmental WMD development program with any significant capabili-ties. The material facts Kay cited to support the war were generic: (1) a state of normlessness and disorder within the Iraqi government before the war (with Iraqi scientists lying to Saddam Hussein and government officials lying to each other), and (2) unspecified “terrorist” individuals and groups having “passed through” the country. These two “facts” could be “found” in many nations, especially if they are politically destabilized and if “terrorists” are defined broadly (even the United States has “terrorists”). The ontological properties of the things being displayed



were far away from proving any actual instance of the hypothetically dangerous occurrence. To establish such a relation required the activation of cultural pre-sumptions. By enacting the utterance as if the meaning was sensible and intelligible the audience was encouraged to process the data in terms of such presumptions, while casting such presumptions as natural and legitimate.

Shortly after Kay declared that the ISG might not find WMD, Bush referenced Kay’s conclusion – but excluded the nuances – and incorporated it into his own argument. The following quote represents how he responded to the technical find-ings of ISG as reported by the ISG chief inspector. It was uttered in a TV interview on February 8, 2004, only days following the David Kay scandal.10

(1) HOST: In light of not finding the weapons of mass destruction, do you believe the war in Iraq is a war of choice or a war of necessity?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I think that’s an interesting question. Please elaborate on that a little bit. A war of choice or a war of necessity? It’s a war of necessity. We – in my judgment, we had no choice when we look at the intelligence I looked at that says the man was a threat. And you know, we’ll find out about the weapons of mass destruction that we all thought were there. That’s part of the Iraqi Survey Group and the group I put together to look at. But again, I repeat to you, I don’t want to sound like a broken record, but David Kay, who is the man who led the Iraqi Survey Group, who has now returned with an interim report, clearly said that the place was a dangerous place. When asked if President Bush had done – had made the right decision, he said yes. In other words, the evidence we have uncovered thus far says we had no choice.11

This quote shows how David Kay’s statements were borrowed by Bush in public political discourse. The materials referenced were not the technical objects discov-ered by ISG; instead, they were Kay’s generic statements that Iraq “was a dangerous place” and President Bush “had made the right decision.” Borrowing Kay’s conclusion without engaging his evidencing process permitted Bush to avoid directly engaging evidence while maintaining his own line of reasoning; the expert’s statement served as evidence sui generis for his claim. While this act of mis- contextualizing could be considered a fallacy (cf. Wilson, Sahlane & Somerville 2012) – as it was an act of unreasonable portrayal or meaning distortion – in practical terms he had appropri-ated the unique authority of an expert who had exclusive, first-hand engagement with the WMD data (Irvine 1989; Van Dijk 2009: 38).12

So far Saddam Hussein’s causal linkage to Iraq’s chaotic and corrupt environ-ment has only been drawn implicitly or ambiguously. But a clear link was drawn in the “Transmittal Message” section of The Duelfer Report:

Saddam, his family, and cronies rose, enriched themselves, became corrupt, combusted, and collapsed. Saddam’s huge commitment to weapons technology consumed the best and brightest and led them to nothing but destruction. The



Fertile Crescent was turned into a land filled with risk and chaos. In many ways the arms inspectors have merely been leading the way in exploring the decay that Iraq became, and, indeed the corrupt systems that grew parasitically on Iraq as it decayed (DR, Volume 1, “Transmittal Message,” p. 1).

This quote shows that the reason why “the Fertile Crescent [I.e. Iraq] was turned into a land filled with risk and chaos” was because of Saddam Hussein’s corrup-tion and “huge commitment to weapons technology.” In other words, Saddam Hussein’s characteristics – miscalculating, ambitious, deceptive, and corrupted – caused the chaotic and corrupt environment of Iraq.

To summarize these two lines of reasoning pertaining to the Iraqi threat stem-ming from chaos and corruption, which overlap ambiguously and occasionally, consider Figure 3. The dotted arrows represent the connections that were made or suggested by Bush and ISG officials. They represent causal relationships that they made implicitly, ambiguously, and/or occasionally. According to one version of reasoning, Saddam Hussein had caused Iraq’s chaos and corruption, making the country conductive to terrorists trading WMD. In another version, in an environ-ment in which chaos and corruption reigned, regardless of the origin or cause, a leader like Saddam Hussein ought to be removed, since his presence would increase Iraq’s international threat. In either line of reasoning, the construction of threat was fundamentally mediated by Saddam Hussein’s personal properties; the absence of technical material verification of WMD was pushed aside.

Iraq’s chaos and corruption

MechanismSaddam Hussein’s

characteristics

Terrorists’ characteristics

Saddam Hussein’s characteristics

Iraqi threat

Figure 3. An integrative model of the ‘Threat from chaos and corruption’ argument

4. Threat from WMD intent and WMD readiness

Another argument made about the Iraqi threat was that Saddam Hussein’s regime had the intent and readiness to develop WMD. This argument surfaced primar-ily when the Bush Administration responded to The Duelfer Report’s release in October 2004.



4..1 Framework, genre, and context model of The Duelfer ReportLet us first discuss the manner and genre in which the final report was written, which influence knowledge-construction processes. A government report can be written in different genres, but most often it is written to account for material facts – for example, the U.N. report delivered by Hans Blix, Colin Powell’s U.N. presentation, ISG’s progress reports, or a report on educational, economic, or demographic statistics. Although part of The Duelfer Report certainly contained an “inventory” of the ground search, it was preceded by a section that resembled a political history/political biography, as well as an instructional note of how to interpret the report. In the “Transmittal Message,” Charles Duelfer emphasized that the report must be viewed in context:

Readers will draw their own conclusions about various national and international actions and policies. This report will, hopefully, allow a more complete examination of these events by showing the dynamics involved within the Regime and where it was headed as well as the status of the WMD on the ground in 2003. The events surrounding Iraqi WMD have caused too much turmoil to be reduced to simple binary discussions of whether weapons existed at one moment in time versus another. They deserve at least an attempt to look at the dynamics rather than a description of a single frame of a movie. It deserves calculus not algebra. This report will deny the reader any simple answers. It will seek to force broader and deeper understanding from multiple perspectives over time (DR, Volume 1, “Transmittal Message,” p. 2).

These statements served a meta-cognitive function; they provided instructions to readers to think how to think. Duelfer guided readers to interpret the empirical facts using the framework established about the Regime – “the dynamics involved within the regime” – which was presented side by side with and juxtaposed to “the status of the WMD on the ground.” Doing so exercises a kind of “dynamic analysis” superior to a “simple static accounting of the debris found following Operation Iraqi Freedom” (DR, Volume 1, “Transmittal Message,” p. 1). The meta-phors employed – calculus versus algebra, movie versus movie frame – reinforce this point.

In this system of dynamic interpretation, a particular set of readily available information and way of seeing was espoused. Duelfer himself added a disclaimer noting that he had exercised “independent judgment” in writing up the final report and chosen “directions and methodologies… not typical of the intelligence community” – thus admitting that the information could have been reported and analyzed within a different frame of reference.13 But the crucial point is that he was in the unique position to collect and analyze raw data, leave out (i.e. hide) and analyze information, assemble an epistemic framework, and speak on the topic in official and media settings as an expert.



Duelfer’s interpretive framework first involved an unconcealed, subjective, and personal indictment about Hussein’s character and leadership:

Introduction. Iraq has endured decades of collapsing hopes and accumulating tragedy. It is numbing to consider the waste of so much human and resource potential. Saddam’s ambitions conflicted with the region and the international community. True to his name, he too often chose confrontation over cooperation. Ultimately these decisions led to total collapse.…

The international community has struggled with the Regime. Various attempts to coerce, co-opt, placate, or ignore Iraq produced confusion and inconstancy. It is understandable that Saddam may not have understood where international forces were headed. Indeed, the international community’s focus on Iraq and WMD was affected by serendipity as well as considered national policies. Had the events of 11 September 2001 not occurred, Saddam might well be still in power. But, he deeply miscalculated one last time and curtailed his own leadership. Saddam, his family, and cronies rose, enriched themselves, became corrupt, combusted, and collapsed (DR, Volume 1, “Transmittal Message,” p. 1).

Combined with the excerpt we have cited earlier, we can identify the main descriptive characteristics about Hussein in the framework: confrontational, non- cooperative, ambitious, corrupt, and miscalculating. In other parts of the section, Hussein was portrayed as prestige-seeking, secretive, calculative, and heavy-handed. A simple plot summary of the story was told: “Saddam, his family, and cronies rose, enriched themselves, became corrupt, combusted, and collapsed.” Saddam Hussein’s agency was spotlighted. Action words like “he too often chose,” “Saddam may not have understood,” and “he deeply miscalculated” casted him as the primary initiator in the web of political interaction; the actions of other actors were largely omitted and under-emphasized. As such, the Coalition’s invasion of Iraq was implied to be the result of Saddam Hussein’s act of miscalculation, instead of the choice made by the Bush Administration – i.e. he “curtailed his own lead-ership.” Representing events in this context, Duelfer attributed many outcomes, including the waste of resources and the final dissolution of his regime, to the agency of Saddam Hussein.

The next part of Duelfer’s framework involved Saddam Hussein’s intent. Some-what divergent from President Bush’s pre-war statements that Saddam Hussein wanted to develop WMD simply because he was evil and mad, The Duelfer Report attributed Iraq’s history of WMD development to Hussein’s sociopolitical intent. The report used interview data with senior Iraqi scientists and officials to conclude that there was a widespread understanding that Hussein wanted to resume WMD development after the U.N. sanctions ended – one purpose of which was to deter a possible attack from Iran.14 Such evidence countered the claim that Saddam Hussein would develop WMD before the end of sanctions – plausibly because



doing so would provide a reason for the continuation of U.N. sanctions. Hence, Hussein’s main political strategy had been to lobby and bargain for the lifting and relaxation of U.N. sanctions on one hand and, on the other, to sustain the intellec-tual capital and infrastructures needed for a prospective revival of WMD program after the end of U.N. sanctions. These observations actually concurred with the understanding expressed by skeptical scholars and political players prior to the Iraq invasion, who believed that Iraq had a strong disincentive to develop WMD while the sanctions were in place. However, like the statements on the outcomes in Iraq, the presentation of Saddam Hussein’s sociopolitical intent and the general sociopolitical dynamics focused on the details of Hussein’s decision-making and actions. Downplayed in the narrative were details and nuances pertaining to the actions and interests of the Clinton and Bush Administrations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.N. inspectors, Russia, China, France, Iran, and other players.

Echoing Van Dijk’s conceptualization of “context model” (Van Dijk 2008, 2009) and Leudar and Nekvapil’s (2011) study on historicization, the review of Hussein’s characteristics and sociopolitical intent had profound implications in how data should be collected and read. Regarding the collection of data, the framework established a relevancy of a “pragmatic motive” – that is, a reason to pay close, detailed attention to many objects and be concerned with certain matters that may be problematic (cf. Schutz & Luckmann 1973: 18, 138–142, 208–217). Regarding the analysis of data, the framework prevented many classes of objects to be automatically dismissed as irrelevant or non-dangerous; instead, amidst many interpretive possibilities, it helped to make the objects brought to attention to appear as potentially dangerous – or at least provided a large stock of materials for interested discourse players to do so (e.g. by proving a reason for suspicion). Lastly, as the framework functioned as a staple for interpretation, it readily provided a way to speculate on certain missing data or theoretical gap. Saddam Hussein “secretive” tendencies could “explain” the lacking of evidence (or the presence of contradictory evidence) to substantiate certain speculations; his “corrupt” characteristic could deflate the suspicion that any act from him may be any ordinary or good intentions; his history of “miscalculating” could explain seemingly irrational behaviors – or behaviors not accounted for evidence alone. As we will see later, his habit of delegating authority and giving implicit rather than explicit instructions could attribute problematic actions of many different agents to Saddam Hussein, even though those individuals could have well been acting on their own accord. Hussein’s “ambitious” character gave reasons to extrapolate the danger flowing from his possible capabilities – such as the invasion of other countries.



4.. Discourse of summative capabilityIraq’s readiness or capability to develop WMD were not calculated by finding any physical stockpile of ready-to-use WMDs or production or development program of WMD that were actively operating before the war. Instead, reference was made to objects that invoke a discourse of summative capability, which we have divided into several classes (see Figure 4).

Code Class of Objects[AO1] Destroyed or sanitized documents, electronic data, and hard drives [AO2] Destroyed or sanitized laboratories and equipment [AO3] Retained scientists/expertise, UN-permitted[AO4] Prospectively convertible or dual-use applications, declared or undeclared[AO5] Dual-use applications, declared or undeclared [AO6] “Seed stocks” retained by scientists or found in Iraq, undeclared [AO7] Expired WMD uncovered and undeclared [AO8] Unexpired WMD uncovered and undeclared [AO9] Expired or Unexpired (expiration status not determinable) WMD, not yet

uncovered or accounted

Figure 4: Classes of objects used to evidence Iraq’s threat

These classes of objects carry multiple possible meanings. Allegedly “destroyed” or “sanitized” materials and infrastructures (AO1 and AO2), for example, could have been for confidential purposes unrelated to military uses, could have been related to WMD production activities in the distant past, could have been destroyed by Coalition or insurgents’ bombings, could have been the result of the overcompensating efforts of independent government officials to impress the U.N. inspectors or the regime, or could have been looted by mobs or miscellaneous agents for monetary or political gains. “Retained scientists/expertise” (AO3) often refer to scientists who had par-ticipated in Iraq’s WMD or nuclear programs before the 1991 Gulf War; they might indeed be directed to participate in WMD programs if sanctions were to be lifted, or they might be directed to perform other tasks. The ready-to-use or prospectively convertible dual-use applications (A04, A05) similarly ambiguous.

These classes of objects were not directly stated as threats in The Duelfer Report. However, by the subtle means of contextualization these objects often appeared as signs of potential threats. Consider the following two examples; the



classes of potentially threatening objects are underlined, and the codes in Figure 4 are assigned:

(1) Al-Nida State Company. This facility… had general-purpose machine shops utilizing CNC lathes, CNC milling centers, hydraulic presses, welding equipment, coordinate measuring machines, quality-control laboratories, nondestructive testing equipment, and CAD/CAM computers [AO2] prior to the recent war. Such facilities would be necessary for a reconstituted centrifuge program. An ISG team visited the Al-Nida site in late August 2003 and found that the entire plant had been systematically looted of all equipment, computers, and documents [AO1, AO2] (DR, Volume 2, “Nuclear,” p. 40).

(2) Site visits to several M16 labs, safe houses, and disposal sites have turned up no evidence of CW-related production or development, however, many of these sites were either sanitized by the regime or looted [AO2], limiting the obtainable information from site exploitations (DR, Volume 3, “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program,” Annex A, p. 43).

The “general-purpose machine shops” housed fragmented groups of objects which were potentially useful – but hardly sufficient – for a nuclear weapons centrifuge program. Such objects were not actually discovered, yet the threat was not dis-missed. Instead, the absence of equipment, computers, and documents were first invoked and the possibility of ‘systematic looting’ was listed. When discussing the M16 labs and other sites potentially linked to “CW-related” activities, the absence of evidence of any object was also not highlighted; instead, the possibility that they were “either sanitized by the regime or looted” became an accounted fact.

A significant threat is suggested if we apply the context model: if the sites were sanitized, then the regime had the power and coordination to skillfully hide its activities from international inspectors; if they were “looted,” then Iraq was a chaotic environment. These two chains of logic connect to the argument we have addressed in the previous section. Either of the scenarios suggested an unspeci-fied degree of potential threat open to speculation even though direct material evidence was largely absent.

An example where tangible objects were transformed into threatening signs can be seen in Figure 5, which includes textual descriptions. While the steel vessel and egg incubator could be used – and have been used – to produce virus vaccine, the descriptive texts raised the point that this device could be used to produce smallpox and miscellaneous viruses. First, two qualifiers were used to elicit doubt – that the devices “appeared” to be for the “expressed” purpose of producing virus vaccine. Then, it generically referred to possible alternative uses, which were many kinds of “pathogenic viruses.” This device that was prospectively convertible into another use was conventionally and crisply labeled as “this dual-use equipment,” hence shortening the distance of imagination. Overall, the descriptive texts placed



one use – its current, non-dangerous use – in the context of many possible mali-cious purposes.

This mode of analyzing and displaying information was pervasive throughout the report.15 Occasionally, some ambiguous objects were judged by the ISG to be non-threatening or irrelevant, such as the trucks alleged to be units of “mobile BW agent production” which were reported to be “almost certainly designed and built…exclusively for the generation of hydrogen” (DR, Volume 3, “Biological Warfare”, p. 44). But very often they were simply left with inconclusive status.

To assemble a more systematic picture, we focus on the section abstracts (i.e. “Key Findings” sections) of the “Nuclear,” “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program,” and “Biological Warfare” sections of The Duelfer Report. Figure 6 consists of excerpts drawn from the section abstracts. These texts represent what we consider to con-tain the strongest material evidence most indicative of the presence of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or their production/research programs. In other words, they are arguably the strongest indicators of an imminent military threat posed by Iraq inside the abstracts. The codes in Figure 4 are applied.

While Iraq seemed to be have very limited potential to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, the ISG report stated that Iraq could have restarted some

Figure 5. Presentation of a dual-use equipment (DR, Volume 3, “Biological Warfare”, p. 31)



Section: “Nuclear”

Main Statement [NA]

ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities [AO4] that would have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.

Indented Statement [NA1]

• The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent and limited research with potential relevance [AO3] to a reconstituted nuclear program.


• Specific projects, with significant development, such as the efforts to build a rail gun and a copper vapor laser [AO4] could have been useful in a future effort to restart a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no indications of such purpose. As funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the introduction of the Oil-for-Food program, there was some growth in programs [AO3, AO4] that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and engineers.


• The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program [AO3] from leaving either their jobs or Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them [AO3], and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge [AO3, AO4].

Section: “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program”

Main Statement [CA]

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry [AO4] after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base [AO3] needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research [AO5], and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals [AO4], but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW related efforts.

Indented Statement [CA1]

• The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts [AO3] from the former CW program.


• Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects [AO4] in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure [AO3], which would have enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.


• Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions [AO4]. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals [AO5] were acquired through this system.



Main Statement [CB]

Iraq constructed a number of new plants [AO4] starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure [AO4], although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Indented Statement [CB1]

• ISG did not discover chemical process or production units configured to produce key precursors or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items [AO4].


• ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings [AO3, AO4, AO5], that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.


• A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors [AO3, AO4, AO5]. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.

Main Statement [CC]

In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment [AO4]. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment [AO4] for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime.

Indented Statement [CC1]

• One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process plants [AO4].

Section: “Biological Warfare”

Main Statement [BA]

Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a course.

Indented Statement [BA1]

• In spite of the difficulties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW knowhow through the scientists [AO3] that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identified civilian facilities and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application [AO5] that could be used for the production of agent.

Main Statement BB ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document complete destruction [AO7, AO8, AO9]. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks [AO6] until their discovery after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Figure 6. A sample of key summary statements from the Duelfer report (Continued)



elementary form of functioning BW program within several weeks and a more elaborate one in a few months (statement BA in Figure 6). Regarding CW, it is stated that “Iraq at OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months” (CB2). Duelfer also stated in a congressional testimony that “[b]y 2003, Iraq have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of months and nerve agent in less than a year or two.”16 These alarming estimations of BW and CW production capabilities, however, have much to do with the apparent ease in producing biological and chemical weapons (which is not the case for nuclear weapons). If materials were made available for biological weapons, only a “couple dozen” of experts and facilities were needed that “can be readily assembled from quite simple domestic civilian plants.” A CW pro-gram requires more experts and more elaborate infrastructure, but Iraq already had a usable chemical production structure due to an indigenous chemical industry. It was for these reasons that it would only take a few months to two years for them to produce biological and chemical weapons; the conclusion was not based on finding surprising materials during the ground search.17

Figure 6 also shows that the conclusion that Saddam Hussein retained WMD capability was mainly based on the claim that he did not disassemble his scientists or avoid developing facilities that could be used for the speculated production purposes. Instead, he sought to retain scientists to work on government projects that would maximize the retention of their technological knowledge; multipur-pose infrastructures were also developed (e.g. CA, CB, BA1). Whether they were intended or legal or otherwise, these activities were represented as having the consequence of shortening the time needed to make WMD.

***Indented Statement [BB1]

• Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until early 1992 [AO6] when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were retained by another Iraqi official until 2003 [AO6] when they were recovered by ISG.

Main Statement [BC]

ISG is aware of BW-applicable research [AO5] since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with a BW program.

Indented Statement [BC1]

• TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous manufacture of bacterial growth media [AO4, AO5]. Although these media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents [AO4, AO5], ISG has found no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifically for this purpose.

Indented Statement [BC2]

• Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox) [AO4, AO5], ISG found no evidence that it retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions.

Figure 6. A sample of key summary statements from the Duelfer report



Consider statements BC, BC1, and BC2 in Figure 6, which were suggestive of Iraq’s BW developmental readiness/capability. The capabilities to produce “bacte-rial growth media” and to “work with viriola major (smallpox)” were cited there. Even though in these cases the capabilities were explicitly judged to be unrelated to weapons production activities, and even though they have been applied for purposes legal under the U.N. framework and appropriate for social well being, they were implicitly counted toward the country’s overall WMD readiness and capability. That is, because these capacities and materials existed, “Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so” (BA in Figure 6).

Statements BB and BB1 in Figure 6 show that some BW “seed stocks” were retained by two Iraqi officials, which, according to the texts of the report, “Given correct storage conditions… would still be viable.” Whereas the first official (Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi) claimed that the vial had been destroyed, the threat was not written off because the documentation for the occurrence was lacking.18 The seed stocks possessed by another Iraqi official could presumably be still potent. Even though this isolated fact could well be hidden by the official’s individual decision instead of an order from the regime, these hypothetical events could be calculated into the pre-war WMD readiness/capability of the Iraqi regime.

Overall, Iraq’s WMD readiness/capability represented in The Duelfer Report was a summative account based on an extensive investigation of disconnected objects, instead of a presentation of findings of any coherent and organized program with sufficient resources to produce chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction.

The threat argument in public political discourse. To get a sense of how The Duelfer Report was used to form a threat argument, it is useful to sample some key moments in which the works were referenced in public political discourse. The report (as well as Duelfer’s senate testimony) surely provided materials for politi-cians – such as President Bush and Secretary Powell – to assemble the argument that Iraq was a threat because it had the intent to acquire WMD and the readiness or capability to develop it.19 Consider how Secretary Powell represented the report in a media interview:

REPORTER: Given that [i.e. the findings of The Duelfer Report] and given the report on [Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi that came out last week – maybe there’s a relationship, maybe there’s not – did the administration miscalculate the threat from Saddam?

SECRETARY POWELL: The only thing that I think we got wrong, really, was that he did not have stockpiles. And I think between what Mr. Kay [former head of Iraq Survey Group] has said and what Mr. Charles A. Duelfer [current head of Iraq Survey Group] has said, it appears they did not have weapons. But I still have no doubt in my mind about the intention that he had and the capability that he retained. And as you saw from the Duelfer report, he was doing everything



he could to get out from under the sanctions. He was cheating on the sanctions. He was deceiving the world, sometimes in ways that are incomprehensible as to why he was trying to deceive the world in that way, which was just putting him at greater risk. But that’s what he was doing. And the intention and the capability were there…20

As evident in this statement, Powell implicitly maintained that the calculation of threat was accurate (“The only thing that I think we got wrong… was that he did not have stockpiles”). Upon conceding that physical weapons were probably absent upon the release of the ISG report, Powell emphasized the presence of “the intention and the capability.” But the reference to Saddam Hussein’s “intention” to develop WMD was a very selective extraction from The Duelfer’s Report’s treat-ment of the issue, which was already a selective caricature of the situation. Omit-ted was the important information that analysts only speculated that Hussein wanted to develop WMD after the sanctions ended. Instead, the support offered about Hussein’s intention was that he attempted to “get out from under the sanc-tions,” “cheated on the sanctions,” and “deceiving the world, sometimes in ways that are incomprehensible….” Stating that Saddam Hussein had retained nuclear capability was sufficient to pragmatically support the pre-war argument of Iraq’s threat.

The following two statements were uttered by President Bush in October 2004, immediately after the ISG released its final report and a month before the November 2004 election.

(1) We didn’t find the stockpiles we thought would be there. We didn’t find the stockpiles everybody thought would be there. But I want you to remember, Saddam still had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction. He could have passed that capability onto an enemy, and that is a risk we could not have afforded to have taken after September the 11th. Knowing what I know today, I would have made the same decision. (Applause.)21

(2) They’re trying to say, “Did you make a mistake going into Iraq?” And the answer is, “Absolutely not.” It was the right decision. The Duelfer report confirmed that decision today, because what Saddam Hussein was doing was trying to get rid of sanctions so he could reconstitute a weapons program. And the biggest threat facing America is terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. We knew he hated us. We knew he’d been – invaded other countries. We knew he tortured his own people….22

In these two quotes, Bush affirmed the correctness of the Iraq invasion based on certain stated “facts.” The statement that “Saddam still had the capability of mak-ing weapons of mass destruction” was divorced from certain details – for example, without the qualification that it would take several months and very coordinated



mobilization in order to produce even a limited amount of a specific type of BW that many other nations could produce. The possibility that Saddam “could have passed that capability onto an enemy” was asserted without specifying the enemy. In other words, both the “capability” and the “enemy” were highly abstract objects removed from the physical findings; nevertheless, they constituted a threat that Bush stated as one that “we could not have afforded to have taken….” In the second quote, Bush argued that The Duelfer Report offered support to the risk argument (“The Duelfer report confirmed that decision today….”). He did so by invoking Iraq’s intent – “he [Saddam Hussein] was trying to get rid of sanctions so he could reconstitute a weapons program.” Saddam’s attempt was not situated in the context laid out in The Duelfer Report, however Bush’s reading of these intentions was con-sistent with the War on Terrorism script’s characterization of the situation and U.S. enemies – such as their irrationality and evilness, their hate of freedom, their love for torture and destruction, and their propensities to collaborate against U.S. and international interests. Uttering these trans-historical characteristics (“We knew he hated us. We knew he’d… invaded other countries. We knew he tortured his own people.”) side by side with the Saddam’s political acts like “trying to get rid of sanctions” and/or “reconstitute a weapons program” develop a level of association and coherence between the acts and the War on Terrorism script context model (cf. Chang & Mehan 2008: 468–472), hence imbuing danger to the acts.

4. Threat manufactured from mystery

In addition to the threats identified from chaotic conditions and from Iraq’s imagined capability, The Duelfer Report also implicated threats stemming from some mysterious, unresolved sources. These assessments, too, were based on little material evidence. Consider the quote below:

A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and intentions remain unanswered, even after extensive investigation by ISG. For example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we definitively answer some questions about possible retained stocks. Developments in the Iraqi Intelligence services appear to be have been limited in scope, but they were certainly never declared to the United Nations. What did they really represent and was there a more extensive clandestine activity with another set of technical experts? We cannot say for certain.23

This quote summarizes three possibilities: (a) WMD materials were moved out of the country before the war; (b) some WMD stocks were retained in unknown locations; (c) some set of WMD technical experts existed but were inaccessible by the ISG. These possibilities could present enormous impact if they were true, yet



they were evoked with no empirical evidence. Quite commonplace phenomena created the signs of these potential threats: chaotic and corrupt conditions; cleaned up or “destroyed” equipment and sites; and gaps between interview and observational data. In this case, the fact that Hussein did not declare the national intelligence service activities to the United Nations – which could be due to a variety of reasons – became a raw material to create a suspicion linking to the topic of WMD. In short, unresolved matters become data to generate dangerous signs.

Some threats were based on objects bearing a somewhat closer relationship with WMD – most notably those counted by Duelfer toward Iraq’s summative capa-bility. When these objects and events were documented, they were systematically made into signs of potential threat by a range of language processes – most notice-ably via modalities like “could be,” “could have been,” and “might be.” Although there was no conclusive evidence detailing how some governmental projects were related to the manufacturing of weapons, these activities (even though most were legal) were represented as “could have been” and “might have been” related to Hussein’s active effort to develop CW and BW programs. For the act of mate-rial verification, proving that something “could be” or “could have been” has a far lower evidentiary threshold than proving something “will be” or “will probably be.” In this manner, objects that could otherwise be negative or irrelevant (i.e. no evidence to support a claim of threat) were transformed into inconclusive pieces of evidence for a potential threat (that is, they “certainly” could help to strengthen Iraq’s WMD capability).24 And when the report was consisted of hundreds of pages documenting a wide range of such activities and objects – e.g. suspicious labo-ratories, sanitization efforts of inspection sites, fermentation devices, suspicious trucks and activities, undeclared materials – with each item carrying a degree of suspiciousness, what became generated were the culmination of numerous signs of potential threat that were materially substantiated. How this repetitive discourse process works is illustrated in Figre 7.

ISG ReportsTechnical data of

ambiguous objects andunverifiable events

No conclusive evidence of a threat.

Abundant inconclusive evidence of a threat.

(Applying established conceptions about Saddam Hussein’s tendencies and character)

Figure 7. The construction of technical evidence for a possible Iraqi threat



Constructing these threatening signs required applying a certain framework and interpretive approach. There were two different interpretive frameworks avail-able for interpreters. One was the War on Terrorism script (Chang & Mehan 2006), which operated on a set of taken-as-true assumptions about the properties of Saddam Hussein and “the terrorists.” Another was the readily available contextual framework constructed at the beginning of The Duelfer Report, which involved more technical information. The readily available contextual framework specified why some issues were unresolvable. As such, it served a meta-cognitive function by shaping the way people navigate the lack of evidence or the presence of con-tradictory evidence to reach a conclusion. In the framework, Saddam Hussein’s techniques and visions to develop WMD were embodied in secrecy and deception. Hussein was described as so secretive that “only he knows many of the vital points” about WMD – not even some of his closest advisors have a clear, common under-standing about the status of existence of WMD.25 Furthermore, Saddam Hussein was also said to have deliberately put his WMD development plan into practice by “implicit guidance” instead of just “explicit direction,” he tended to “hold his cards close while he allowed minions to debate” and refrain from taking sides on issues in an intelligible way.26 Relying on these properties enables a systematic explanation of the reason why some evidence was not available or fragmented, why multiple interviewees believing that Saddam Hussein had abandoned WMD, why WMDs were actually not found. Counter-arguments abound: these data could have been the result of Hussein withholding real information from his subordinates; some materials might have been deliberately destroyed without proof in order to con-fuse the world; some officials might be systematically but ‘implicitly guided’ from the top to hide WMD or enhance summative capability. Constructing this context enabled speakers to readily counteract possible counterarguments with alternative theories and maintain a coherent line of argument pertaining to the Iraqi threat in many practical contexts, without specific proof or assertions.

. Conclusions

The Iraqi threat retrospectively identified by the ISG, ISG spokespersons, and the Bush Administration has three main sources: (a) chaos and corruption; (b) intent and summative capability to develop WMD; and (c) mysterious, unresolved issues. Given the scarcity of direct material evidence, we propose that the threat was retrospectively generated by discourse processes more than invoking actual material referents. The knowledge of such a threat was systematically constructed and sustained by discourse actors who (a) instituted an interpretive framework involving context models and meta-cognitive principles; (b) assembled material



cues to be interpreted; and (c) modeled how a threat could be derived and argued. A crucial mechanism enabling the assessments is the characterization of the enemy. Propositions and presuppositions about the enemy’s character mediated numer-ous detailed practices, such as contextualizing ambiguous objects, developing local coherence (and drawing implicit causation), estimating like lihood by using qualifiers and modalities, and “explaining” data shortage and counterevidence.

Many justification arguments may seem forced and tenuous. It is valuable, therefore, to consider the constitutive properties of the epistemic elements that served to enable an internally coherent political knowledge system. The epistemic techniques, methods, and rules at play served pragmatic purposes other than reveal-ing truth, and as such they possess qualities of their own kind departing from uni-versal argumentation criteria. One such pragmatic function is reality construction and ordering. The epistemic mechanisms enable the creation of a believable, coher-ent phenomenon consisting of interrelated concepts and data. To paraphrase W.I. and D.S. Thomas, situations treated as real deliver consequential effects. Another pragmatic purpose is political legitimation in public. It is often necessary for politi-cians to account for experts’ findings when reports surface, to demonstrate some reasons or commitment to rational discourse, and to quickly counteract critics with an intelligible line of interpretation. The degree of intricacy within the propagated knowledge system helps to achieve these pragmatic purposes.

To guard against arbitrary or biased judgment, the IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) led by Mohamed Elbaradei and Hans Blix respectively had insisted on the need for direct and concrete material evidence as a standard of proof, while keeping pre-sumptions open during the data interpretation process. Indeed, our case shows that since these two evidentiary requirements were lowered to a point, many mate-rial referents – even weak, ambiguous, and indirect ones – were made into signs of threat. With the liberal use of cultural presuppositions, these signs and cues were accumulated and arranged in a way to become perceptually realistic, which were then used to support speculations and extrapolations many degrees away.

In addition to upholding a higher evidentiary threshold, an impartial and authoritative institution needs to be empowered to solve epistemological problems and disputes in the international community – particularly one that can make offi-cial, conclusive claims about the absence of objects. Proving an absence with absolute certainty is inherently difficult and laborious – if not practically impossible in some cases. But the IAEA and other agencies have devised impressive frameworks and procedures to officially validate the status of “absence” beyond a reasonable doubt and put in place mechanisms to contain certain alleged but unproven threats.27 Without an effective evidentiary framework and the international support of an international body, allegations based on selected facts and tautological reasoning



can be freely circulated. Our case is a telling example that even an exhaustive absence of direct and concrete material evidence on the ground did not deter the Bush Administration from reinforcing its pre-war allegations. Ultimately, the maze of technical information and experts involved in the ISG investigation only enabled a highly subjectivistic account layered with a highly scientistic appearance.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Lenora Timm, Robin Wagner-Pacifici, and Magali Sarfatti-Larson for their constructive comments on the early version of this paper.

Notes

1. Charles A. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004). Retrieved July 16, 2008 (https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html).

. Van Dijk conceptualizes context model, or simply context, as ‘mental models of social situ-ations of communication’ that individuals bring into the acts of interpretation and/or commu-nication (Van Dijk 2008: 24, 29). Largely subjective and always selectively assembled, context models can be consisted of or expressed by different genres, including that of a narrative or an episode embedding events, settings, and actors; that of a somewhat coherent mosaic of “facts” and information; or that of a set of arguments with various messages, presuppositions, and evidence. These models profoundly influence the knowledge’s construction.

. David Kay, “Text of David Kay’s Unclassified Statement,” CNN, October 2, 2003. Retrieved July 9, 2008 (http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/02/kay.report/).

4. “Weapons Search,” a transcript of Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, PBS Online NewsHour, January 28, 2004. Retrieved November 13, 2011 (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june04/kay_1-28.html).

. “David Kay: Exclusive Interview,” an interview with David Kay by Tom Brokaw, Nightly News with Brian Williams, NBC, January 26, 2004. Retrieved July 11, 2008 (http://www.msnbc .msn.com/id/4066462/).

. David Kay, “Transcript: David Kay at Senate hearing,” CNN, January 28, 2004. Retrieved July 11, 2008 (http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/).

. David Kay: Exclusive Interview,” an interview with David Kay by Tom Brokaw, Nightly News with Brian Williams, NBC, January 26, 2004. Retrieved July 11, 2008 (http://www.msnbc .msn.com/id/4066462/).

. Duelfer stated in the October 2004 senate hearing: “I am convinced we successfully con-tained a problem before it matured into a major threat [of Iraqi chemical warfare (CW) experts collaborating with anti-coalition forces]. Nevertheless, it points to the problem that

http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/02/kay.report/

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june04/kay_1-28.html

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june04/kay_1-28.html

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4066462/

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4066462/

http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/



the dangerous expertise developed by the previous regime could be transferred to other hands. Certainly there are anti-coalition and terrorist elements seeking such capabili-ties.” “Testimony of Charles Duelfer Special Advisor to the DCI for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction,” prepared statement, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, October 6, 2004. Retrieved July 21, 2008 (http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/October/Duelfer%2010-06-04.pdf).

. For a nuanced review of the dynamics of different alleged terrorist groups, see Cole (2009).

1. This argument was also uttered on the day David Kay made his pronouncement. See George W. Bush: “Remarks Prior to Discussions With President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland and an Exchange With Reporters,” January 27, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63642&st=&st1=#ixzz1y9MqHEDh

11. “Interview with President George W. Bush,” Meet the Press, NBC, February 8, 2004. Retrieved October 1, 2004 (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618).

1. By uttering a statement of his own justification side by side with a mention of Kay’s excerpted statements, Bush absorbed ISG’s and Kay’s authority to support his own argument for the invasion. This method is evident in the statement he made after the day David Kay gave his congressional testimony. Bush stated: “I said in the runup that Saddam was a grave and gathering danger; that’s what I said. And I believed it then, and I know it was true now, and as Mr. Kay said, that Iraq was a dangerous place. And given the circumstances of September the 11th, given the fact that we’re vulnerable to attack, this Nation had to act for our security.” George W. Bush: “Remarks Prior to Discussions With President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland and an Exchange With Reporters,” January 27, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63642

1. Duelfer noted: “In the end, this [report] is not an Intelligence Community product. Rather, it is my independent judgment as the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intel-ligence on Iraqi WMD. I have had the assistance of many people, but I chose the directions and methodologies, which are not typical of the intelligence community. Yet, in future decisions, I chose the frame of reference outlined. Where there were decisions to be made on interpretation or judgment, they are mine. This will not be the last word on the Iraqi experience with WMD. Many may argue with the interpretation given here” (DR, Volume 1, “ Acknowledgements,” p. 2).

14. For example, see DR, Volume 1, “Regime Strategic Intent,” pp. 49, 51.

1. For additional example of visual illustration of objects – such as chemical laboratory equipment, a sanitized houses, and a “high grade water production plant” – see DR, Volume 3, “Biological Warfare,” p. 43 and Volume 3, “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program,” pp. 50, 52.

1. Duelfer has also made a similar statement in a congressional testimony (p. 6) on Iraq’s CW production capability:

Over time, and with the infusion of funding and resources following acceptance of the Oil for Food program, Iraq effectively shortened the time that would be required to reestablish CW production capacity. Some of this was a natural collateral benefit of developing an indigenous chemical production infrastructure. By 2003, Iraq would

http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/October/Duelfer 10-06-04.pdf


http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618



have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of months and nerve agent in less than a year or two. We have not come across explicit guidance from Saddam on this point, yet it was an inherent consequence of his decision to develop a domestic chemical production capacity “Testimony of Charles Duelfer Special Advisor to the DCI for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction,” prepared statement, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, October 6, 2004. Retrieved July 21, 2008 (http://armed -services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/October/Duelfer%2010-06-04.pdf).

1. See “Testimony of Charles Duelfer,” pp. 1–8.

1. “Doubts persist regarding Iraq’s destruction of bacterial reference strains and isolates. According to Dr. Rihab, she destroyed these materials in early 1992. Dr. Rihab gave a small box containing no more than 25 vials of lyophilized bacterial pathogens, including those obtained from the American Type Culture Collection to the IIS in mid-1991 for safekeeping. Husam Amin returned the box to Dr. Rihab in early 1992. Dr. Rihab ostensibly asked former TRC head Ahmad Murtada what to do with the vials. Murtada took the matter to Husayn Kamil, who ordered the vials destroyed. This was accomplished by injecting the vials with Dettol™ and then autoclaving the vials. ISG cannot verify that these materials were de-stroyed or the other details of Dr. Rihab’s account. Given correct storage conditions, ISG assesses that these seed stocks would still be viable” (DR, Volume 3, “Biological Warfare,” p. 57; see also p. 12).

1. Bush spoke on the Duelfer report after its release: “The Duelfer report also raises important new information about Saddam Hussein’s defiance of the world and his intent and capability to develop weapons.” George W. Bush, October 7, 2004, “Report on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The South Grounds, The White House, Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents 40(41), pp. 2275–2276.

. “Although No WMD Found, Saddam Had Intent, Capability, Powell Says,” interview of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell by Warren Strobel of Knight-Ridder, GlobalSecurity.org, October 8, 2004. Retrieved July 21, 2008.

1. George W. Bush, 1 October 2004, “Remarks by the President at Victory 2004 Rally,” Mcintyre Ski Area, Manchester, New Hampshire, Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents 40(41), pp. 2209–2216.

. The Second Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate,” Commission on Presidential Debates, October 8, 2004. Retrieved October 23, 2004 (http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html).

. “Testimony of Charles Duelfer,” p. 7.

4. Consider Duelfer’s testimonial statement below, which was delivered to the on 6 October 2004:

Some activity that might have been related to a biological program has been examined closely, including work with a bio-pesticide, bacillus thuringiensis. While this work could have been related to advancing Iraqi anthrax knowledge, information is inconclusive. This work could and certainly did sustain the talent need to restart a BW [biological warfare] program, we can form no absolute conclusion on whether this work represented active efforts to develop further anthrax programs or not.

See also statements CA3, BA, BA1 in Figure 6.



http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html



. Here is the exact statement: “This applies especially to Saddam himself, who was a special case in all of this. We had the opportunity to debrief him, but he naturally had limited incentives to be candid or forthcoming at all. Nevertheless, many of his statements were interesting and revealing. In the end, only he knows many of the vital points. Even those closest to him had mixed understandings of his objectives. In fact, there was uncertainty among some of his closest advisors about WMD and whether it even existed” (“Testimony of Charles Duelfer,” p. 8).

. Duelfer stated:

Complicating their [the investigators] lives was the tendency of Saddam to hold his cards close while he allowed minions to debate. Saddam did not lead by espousing detailed goals and objectives. He tended to allow ideas to float up and he would consider them – often never pronouncing on them one way or the other. This meant that much guidance to the government was implicit rather than explicit. For investigators, a consequence is that forensic evidence of Presidential direction may not exist, but it does not mean that such guidance was not there, but simply that we cannot see it in the usual ways. Implicit guidance may exist and be of equal or greater importance than explicit direction. This reality of life in Baghdad under Saddam has the consequence of diminishing the ability to document governmental policies of directions. (DR, Volume 1, “Transmittal Message,” p. 3; italics in original)

. Some investigative techniques employed by the IAEA include radiation survey, collaboration with multiple intelligence agencies, no-notice or short-notice inspection, and independent interviews with scientists and officials. Monitoring techniques include installing tamper-sensitive seals, video and satellite surveillance, and in-person visits. While IAEA was limited to addressing nuclear issues, UNMOVIC led by Hans Blix had adopted a similar framework to examine CW and BW matters. For a review of how the IAEA exercised these mechanisms to solve the “unresolved’ weapons problems with Iraq, North Korea, and Iran at different times, see Elbaradei (2011).

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Authors’ Addresses

Gordon C. ChangDepartment of Sociology and AnthropologyWestern Illinois University404 Morgan Hall, 1 University CircleMacomb, IL 61455–1390, USA

[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ae.1989.16.2.02a00040

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926504041018

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926504041018

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926504041019

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926504041019

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926504041019

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926510382840

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926510382840

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511840005






http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.11.1.01wil



http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230233683

http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230233683



Kerstin LueckDepartment of SociologyUniversity of California, Berkeley410 Barrows HallBerkeley, CA 94720-1980, USA

[email protected]

Hugh B. MehanDepartment of SociologyUniversity of California, San Diego401 Social Science Building, 9500 Gilman DriveLa Jolla, CA 92093-0533, USA

[email protected]

About the Authors

Gordon C. Chang is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Western Illinois University. His current research interests focus on the intersection between discourse and epistemology, especially how irrationality and knowledge operate in social arenas.

Kerstin Lueck is Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Her main research interests include global politics, comparative international development, immigration and intercultural relations.

Hugh B. Mehan is Professor Emeritus in Department of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego. He has studied “the politics of representation” in educational and political settings.

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