Duverger's Concept: Semi-presidential Government Revisited. In: European Journal of Political...

European Journal of Political Research34: 201–224, 1998.© 1998Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Duverger’s concept: Semi-presidential government revisited

HORST BAHRO, BERNHARD H. BAYERLEIN & ERNST VESER†University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract. The article attempts to follow up the fate of the concept Maurice Duverger createdto explain the regime of the French Fifth Republic: semi-presidential government. Duvergerexpounded the concept in his fundamental bookÉchec au roiin 1978, trying to illustratethe fact that regimes of this type worked quite differently in the seven Western and NorthernEuropean countries that institutionalized it. ‘Semi-presidentialism’ is now widely, but veryoften controversially, used. The recent appearance of such regimes in newly democratizingstates points to the fact that this form of government is often the preferred solution in timesof transition. A critical review of Duverger’s concept seems expedient as the diversification ofthese regimes raises new and perhaps intriguing questions. Due to the rejection of Duverger’sconcept or its ignorance in parts of the European scientific community, it is necessary todefend it as an important tool for political analysis. Moreover, it opens the opportunity forthe examination of fundamental problems in political science.

Introduction

The conventional analysis of government in democratic countries by politi-cal science and constitutional law starts from the traditional types of presi-dentialism and parliamentarism. There is, however, a general consensus thatgovernments in the various countries work quite differently. This is why someauthors have inserted distinctive features into their analytical approaches, atthe same time maintaining the general dichotomy. Maurice Duverger, tryingto explain the French Fifth Republic, found that this dichotomy was notadequate for this purpose. He therefore resorted to the concept of ‘semi-presidential government’: The characteristics of the concept are (Duverger1974: 122, 1978: 28, 1980: 166):1. the President of the Republic is elected by universal suffrage,2. he possesses quite considerable powers and3. he has opposite him a prime minister who possesses executive and gov-

ernmental powers and can stay in office only if parliament does not ex-press its opposition to him.

By 1976, there were six countries besides France that met these constitutionalcharacteristics. Duverger realized that the utilization of the political powersof the president, however, were quite different: While in Austria, Iceland and

202 HORST BAHRO, BERNHARD H. BAYERLEIN & ERNST VESER

Ireland, the president is restricted to a formal role, the contrary is the case inFrance where he can act in a very powerful way. In the Weimar Republic,Portugal and Finland, Duverger perceives a balance in the distribution ofpowers between the president and the prime minister (1978: 22–31, 1980:167–177). He explained these differences by the content of the constitution,tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majorityand the president’s position in relation to it (1980: 165).

This article is intended first, to describe the reception of the concept bythe scientific community. Here, it has to be stressed that many authors havemisunderstood or ignored it where it has seemed to deserve at least someattention. This is why our criticism concentrates on the frequent disregard ofthe concept, especially in France and Germany.1

Duverger’s concept deserves such a discussion as it is a noteworthy con-tribution to the explanation of the functioning of governmental regimes.2 Wewant to point out that Duverger has legitimately constructed and developedthe concept, observing the rules of analytical theory. However, the conceptshows built-in vaguenesses that come to the fore especially with the analysisof the recently implanted semi-presidential forms of government in democra-tizing countries. These vaguenesses have to be found, named and clarified. Onthe other hand, the concept offers opportunities for further research in fieldsthat are out of the contemporary mainstream of political science research. Wewill return to this point at the end of our exposition.

Duverger elaborated his concept in various and varying ways. As earlyas 1960, he pointed to the fact that the French constitution of 4 October1958 incorporated elements of both the parliamentary and the presidentialsystem (1960: 686). Then he maintained that the regime of the French FifthRepublic be parliamentary (1960: 633, 679), although at the same time heproposed the popular election of the president if the system of the FifthRepublic was to be upheld (1960: 678). He also pointed to the structuralkinship of the French model and the configuration of the Weimar Republic(1966: 492). In 1970 (197O: 277) he used the word ‘semi-présidentiel’ [semi-presidential] for the first time (Lovecy 1992: 388) and solely for France; in1974 (1974: 121ff), he introduced six other semi-presidential ‘monarchiesrépublicaines’ [republican monarchies]. The culmination of his concept canbe seen in hisÉchec au roi[Check to the King] (1978) with thepléiadeofseven semi-presidential states.3 But his article ‘A new political system model– semi-presidential government’ that was published in this journal in 1980(Duverger 1980), has found much more attention in the scientific communitythan hisopus magnum. It has given rise to a discussion on forms of govern-ment in many countries, promoted by the dissemination of such regimes inthe recent past. As the editor of the collected papers of a colloquy, held on

DUVERGER’S CONCEPT: SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT REVISITED 203

20 and 21 January 1983 with politicians and scholars from France, Portugal,Finland, and Germany, Duverger supplemented his concept by distinguishing‘apparent’ (Austria, Ireland and Iceland) and ‘effective’ (Weimar, Finland,France, Portugal) semi-presidential regimes (1986: 8ff, 17). Somewhat later,he decomposed hispléiademto six variants, not mentioning Ireland at all(1982: 103–116). In his contribution inDictionnaire constitutionnel[Consti-tutional dictionary] he also included new countries in Eastern Europe underthe heading of semi-presidentialism (1992: 901).

Thus Duverger’s concept underwent varying descriptions that render hisdefinition of ‘semi-presidentialism’ somewhat questionable. As far as thepowers of the ‘semi-president’ are concerned, he never specified them in anexact way. In a graph (1978: 33) he shows several powers of semi-presidentsthat were distributed differently among his seven semi-presidential countries.This exposition, however, neither mentions the important powers concerningthe military nor the declaration of the state of emergency which are foundrather often in semi-presidential government. Moreover, he uses several dif-ferent denominations for such powers as: ‘pouvoirs notables’ [considerablepowers] or ‘importants’ [important], ‘pouvoirs propres, comme en régimeprésidentiel’ [proper powers as in presidential regimes] (1978: 11, 17), ‘quiteconsiderable powers’ (1980: 166), or ‘notables pouvoirs propres’ [importantproper powers] (1986: 7).

The reception of the concept by the academic community

Duverger’s concept of ‘semi-presidentialism’ was not welcomed as the foun-dation for a comprehensive and systematic debate on fundamental problemsof institutions in transitional societies. On the contrary, in France, where clas-sification of political systems is mainly the domain of constitutional lawyers,the designation ‘semi-présidentiel’ [semi-presidential] or ‘semi-présidential-isme’ [semi-presidentialism] is rarely used. Just to quote a few examples: Ina leading French handbook on constitutional law (Luchaire & Conac 1987:50ff; also Conac 1992a: 815, 1992b: 897f, 899f) the 1958 constitution isnamed ‘presidentiel’ [presidential] (with some limitations). Avril (1964: 163,164 and passim) calls the French regime ‘principat’ [principat] and describesit as a ‘democratic plébiscitaire’ [plebiscitary democracy]. Gicquel (1989:142, note 69) even speaks of a latent danger of aberration [‘puissance d’égare-ment’ – force of aberration] by using Duverger’s expression. An outstandingexample as to the attitude of French scholars to avoid the application of theword ‘semi-presidential’ to the French Republic seems to be Vedel (1992:138) who states that the term is too weak to comprise its ‘ultra-presidential’reality.


Yet the French discussion is somewhat ambiguous. For instance, Colliard(1978: 280f) emphasizes the differences of France and Finland on the onehand and Austria, Ireland and Iceland on the other hand. He states that thepopular election is a necessary, but not a sufficient prerequisite for the strongposition of the president and it would be more appropriate to use the words‘correctif présidentiel’ [presidential corrective] instead of ‘semi-présidentiel[semi-presidential]’. It is clear, therefore, that his critique concentrates mainlyon denomination (Duhamel 1987: 584f; Lovecy 1992: 389). The same istrue of Gicquel’s position (1989: 142f) who correctly perceives the popularelection of president as the special quality of the 1958 French constitution,but holds that his powers merit naming the regime ‘présidentialiste [presi-dentialist]’. Duhamel (1987: 581) sharply criticizes the fact that in FranceDuverger’s concept has deliberately not been used or has been put aside byconstitutional legal thought. According to his exposition (1987: 582f), thereare five excuses for doing so. The French regime is either seen as ‘dualistparliamentarism’, a ‘system of different phases’, as ‘mixed’, adorned withspecial epithets, like ‘consular republic’ or ‘plebiscitary monocracy’, and,finally, simply ‘parliamentary with presidential corrective’. Duhamel goeson to point out that at least some of these authors do not offer a substan-tial deviation from Duverger’s concept, but that the differences are only ofterminological character (Duhamel 1987: 585f).

Duhamel also criticizes Duverger for introducing a difference betweenreal and apparent semi-presidential regimes, thereby substituting a conceptbased on constitutional structure by one based on the behaviour of the govern-ing (1987: 586f). Rather than using ‘régime’ [regime] and ‘système’ [system]indiscriminately, the former should be reserved for the constitutional classifi-cation, thus creating a third type besides the traditional ones. Duhamel (1993:81–85, 90, 653f) later developed this approach further: He stresses the factthat the French construction does not correspond to either the parliamentaryor the presidential form of government, and then develops the distinction of‘système politique’ [political system] and ‘régime constitutionnel’ [constitu-tional regime]. While the former comprises the exercise of power that resultsfrom the dominant institutional practice, the latter is the totality of the rulesfor the exercise of the power. In this way, France appears as a ‘presidentialistsystem’ endowed with a ‘semi-presidential regime’ (Duhamel 1987: 587). Bythis standard, he recognises Duverger’spléiadeas semi-presidential regimes,as well as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania (1993: 87f).

Quermonne & Chagnollaud (1991: 592ff) accept Duverger’s term ‘semi-presidentialism’, but only as a partial explanation of the French regime as hebased it on the party system; they stress its singularity and state – rightly


so – that it does not make a difference whether it is called either ‘semi-presidential’ or ‘unnamed’ (1991: 605).

We may speculate about why Duverger’s denomination has not foundgeneral acceptance in the French discussion. One of the reasons is perhapsa certain conservative tendency of political science (and even more so ofconstitutional legal thought), especially in the field of institutional analysisand institutional change.4 Moulin (1978: 39) offers the hypothesis that theconstitutionalists could not but stick to the classical dichotomy. The persever-ance of the traditional dichotomy of presidentialism and parliamentarism infirmly established opinions renders it difficult or even impossible to approachthe understanding and analysis of the democratic functioning of institutionsand societies – even of democracy itself – when new realities emerge. It mustbe admitted that the concept shows a certain vagueness, especially concerningthe working of the regime. Duverger himself has quite often argued that it isnot the rules of the game, but the game itself that counts (Duverger 1978:10). Independent of its functioning, the semi-presidential regime overcomesthe boundaries of parliamentary rule and personalization in democratic sys-tems, thus opening the way to a more topical contemplation of the forms ofgovernment.

Duverger’s concept has not been left unnoticed in countries outside ofFrance. His article inEuropean Journal of Political Researchwas quotedby many foreign authors dealing particularly with the political system of theFrench Fifth Republic. Following Duverger, it has also been applied to otherregimes as Weimar, Portugal and Finland. In Portugal (Gonçalves Pereira1984; Braga da Cruz 1994: 235f) and Finland (Nousiainen 1994),5 hardlyany doubts have been raised about the usefulness of the term to describethe respective political regime. Especially in the Portuguese case, supportedby Duverger himself,6 the concept has been firmly accepted, giving rise toa political and academic discussion, especially in connection with the 1982revision of the constitution.

Italian scholars have also contributed to the discussion. As early as 1983a special issue of the Italian Review of Constitutional Law ‘Quaderni consti-tuzionali’ [Constitutional issues] has systematically treated semi-presidentialgovernment in various articles (Editoriale 1983: 255). In the same year, Lu-cifredi (1983: 685) has examined the Portuguese presidency in the light ofsemi-presidentialism. Also Bartolini dealt with problems of semi-presidentialgovernment in his article on direct election of the head of state (1984: 224,225). The outstanding book by Ceccanti, Massari & Pasquino (1996) ispresently the final result of Italian research on the topic, where Pasquino em-phazises that the election of the president by universal suffrage is a necessarymodality of semi-presidentialism (1996: 105). It is interesting to note that


the ‘bicamerale’7 has proposed a new constitution with the definite traits of asemi-presidential regime.

So far, many country studies, especially on France, Finland, and Portu-gal, have been presented. In those publications, however, there is hardly anymention of the fundamental principles that can be found on the basis of theconcept; and a thorough study of its principal traits and its role in the processof transition of political systems has not been produced. This is why the semi-presidential systems of Western Europe with long and standing governmentalexperience should be examined as to their success or failure. Of course, al-ready enough material on over forty years of semi-presidential experience inFrance is available.

Dealing with Duverger’s concept obviously raises many questions: Is therea specific power of the popularly elected president, and if so, what is the rea-son for this? Was it the power of the ‘semi-president’ that made the WeimarRepublic break down? Or is it the consolidation of party system that givesstability to Portugal? Can the French political system be compared with theAustrian? And is the latter anew in a process of transition? These are some ofthe problems that are worthy of being studied in depth.

In the Anglo-American context, where originally there seemed to be lessinterest in this discussion, Bogdanor (1987: 561–562), Linz (1991: 90–104),Lijphart (1991: 121–137), Shugart & Carey (1992: 23–54), Weaver & Rock-man (1993: 4) and Sartori (1994a, b, 1995) have entered the debate. Althoughtheir analyses and evaluations vary, they seem to be more enthusiastic aboutthe concept than their French colleagues. While Linz and Bogdanor agreethat semi-presidentialism is a scheme of alternative phases, they differ asto its function and its capability to guarantee political stability. Weaver &Rockman do not show any doubt about the semi-presidential character ofthe French Fifth Republic. Lijphart (1991: 127) seems to be undecided onthe problem of semi-presidential regimes: He calls the existing ones parlia-mentary and assumes that a semi-presidential regime would only exist wherethere is a distinct equilibrium of president and prime minister. Yet in 1992(Lijphart 1992b: 210) he does not advance any reservation in calling Poland’sand France’s regimes ‘semi-presidential’ and states (Lijphart 1992a: 1) thatrecently the semi-presidential model has been especially influential and there-fore receives the greatest attention. Sartori (1994b: 109, 110, 115; 1995: 18,19f) goes so far as to attribute to semi-presidential government the quality toimprove presidentialism and to solve the problems that pure presidentialismcannot solve.

There are also attempts to accept ‘semi-presidentialism’ as a categoryof its own, but this argument needs differentiation. This is true of the veryspecial approach that is presented by Shugart & Carey (1992: 23f). They


acknowledge that there exists a controversy about the traditional conceptsof categorizing systems as only parliamentarism and presidentialism, despitethe fact that many systems do not fit these schemes. Beginning with systemsthat possess a popularly elected president, they introduce their notions of‘premier-presidential’ and ‘president-parliamentary’ regimes, where in thelatter the president wields more power than in the former.

Most constitutions of post-communist states cannot be attached to thetraditional types of ‘parliamentary’ or ‘presidential’ regimes but rather corre-spond to Duverger’s criteria. This has been noticed, for example, by Garlicki(1993: 65, 69) who distinguishes ‘systemy prezydenckie, systemy półprezy-denckie czy quasi-prezydenckie oraz systemy parlamentarne’ [presidentialsystems, half-presidential or quasi-presidential systems and parliamentarysystems] and numbers the Polish among the ‘half-presidential’, stating thatthe French Fifth Republic was its ‘foremost source of inspiration’. Sakharov(1994: 25) classifies systems of government as ‘prezidentskye’ [presidential],‘poluprezidentskye’ [half-presidential] and ‘parlamentarnye’ [parliamentary];he does not attach any importance to the election of the chief of state byuniversal suffrage, but rather shows in detail the differences of the three typeshe developed (1994: 30–32, Table 2). Neither does he range the RussianFederation among his taxonomy, although it fits his description of ‘half-presidential’. For Sartori (1995: 13), however, Russia has entered into a semi-presidential regime. Deleanu (1991: 20) mentions the regimes originallyquoted by Duverger as ‘semi-prezidential’ [semi-presidential], omitting theWeimar Republic, yet does not apply the word to Romania. Duverger himselfhas named post-communist states that had turnouts in presidential electionsbetween 87 and 98. 7 percent, ‘semi-presidential pseudo-regimes’, prolong-ing communist rule under a different name (Duverger 1993: vi).

The dissemination of semi-presidential forms of government in times oftransition

Obviously, ‘semi-presidentialism’ is being institutionalized in processes ofbasic transformations from authoritarian or totalitarian political systems intodemocracies when party structures are nonexistent or weak.8 This can alreadybe ascertained for Duverger’s original seven semi-presidentialisms that wereintroduced in times of revolution, after secession or in times of crisis. Theobservation that semi-presidential government is a form of government suitedfor political systems in transition seems even more pertinent to the new ornewly democratizing states that have formed in recent years. This is whyLijphart has stressed the importance of this regime in the world-wide discus-sion on constitutional changes (1992: 1). Moreover, Linz has pointed out that


a systematic and behavioural study of the different institutions in the politicalprocess is still lacking and the pertinent differences between parliamentary,presidential and semi-presidential systems have not yet aroused the interestof political science (Linz 1991: 62f).

As far as the formal criteria of semi-presidential government are con-cerned, we have to take note of the fact that the majority of post-communiststates on the territory of the former Soviet Union plus Mongolia, as well asPoland, Romania, Bulgaria and also Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedoniacomply with the scheme.9 The new constitutions of Algeria (1989/1996),Chad (1996), Haïti (1987), Madagaskar (1992/95), Niger (1992), Republicof China (1997), Republic of Korea (1987) as well as three of the formerPortuguese colonies, namely Angola (1992), São Tomé e Príncipe (1990)and Guinea-Bissau (1993) have also resorted to this kind of regime.10 Somedoubts as to the modifications compared with the original European stateswill be raised below. It seems, however, that many of the newer semi-presi-dential regimes work in diverse ways.

The main common denominator of the newly originating semi-presidentialregimes is that they were established during the phase of transition of the po-litical system from monarchies or authoritarianism/totalitarianism to democ-racies – just like Duverger’s originalpléiade. A possible explanation of thisphenomenon may be found in the historical and cultural tradition of the re-spective country – be it positive or negative (Friedrich 1959: 12, 17). Thisdoes not necessarily mean that there will be a recourse to the complete tradi-tional system, but it can also be a combination of some of its institutions withnew, apparently democratic traits as, for example, in the Weimar Republic orin Portugal in 1976. In some cases, the constitution of other states that appearto convey a democratic air was adopted by countries that had no democraticexperience at all, for example, Russia, Romania.

Transitions in general seem to be determined by the fact that no singlepolitical institutions will be created that can dominate the political system.Rather, a diversified arrangement of checks, balances and flexible mecha-nisms helps to adapt the participation of the actors in the process of trans-formation. The election of the president by universal suffrage in like cir-cumstances may be of salient weight as it may assist in the reconstructionof the belief in the legitimacy of the new order which could be decisivefor the transition. On the other hand, in times of transitions from autocracytoward democracy the party system, as a rule, is still in a turbulent processof reconstruction, thus leaving a plebiscitarian president as the only sourceof legitimacy. It has also been argued that stable and firm government canbe guaranteed by an executive presidency with democratic appearance, butwithout too much interference from parliament, standing midway between


totalitarianism and the savagery of wild capitalism (Jeyaratnam Wilson 1980:146). These are exactly the reasons why semi-presidential government seemsto offer a solution under favourable circumstances.

A general indication as to the pace of institutional transformation hasbeen presented by Moulin (1978: 325) who reports on the position of theframers of the preliminary draft of the Peruvian constitution of 7 August1931. They concluded that they could imagine the complete abolition ofpresidential government, but only as consequence of a profound change, forexample, a revolution. Indeed, the time factor is of outstanding importancein autocratic→ democratic transitions (Linz 1986: 18). This is why thereis a tendency toward establishing provisional governments and provisionalinstitutions (Linz 1986: 17f). This tendency can be demonstrated in most ofthese transitions; the temporary auxiliaries, however, may petrify and thuscreate a new tradition. Equally, it has been pointed out that the only wayto avert the consequences after Charles de Gaulle’s death was to change theinstitutions (François 1992: 310).

All these considerations are in accordance with the expositions in histor-ical thought by Braudel (1958), following Bloch (1924), who elaborated on‘long duration’ as a structural principle in historieal development. This meansthat changes in society and government, irrespective of more or less inter-ference from without (war) or within (revolution), will happen only slowlyand gradually. This seems to be also true of institutional change. For ex-ample, after the execution of Louis XVI in France, a monarchic tendencycontinued latently, but could not develop institutional forms even under thebourgeois King Louis Philippe and Napoléon III.11 Apparently it finally dis-appeared definitively during the Third Republic; yet symbolically, it revivedwith de Gaulle, becoming a factor which had to be taken seriously. Thus,semi-presidential government may be an important example of the gradualchange of political systems. In so far as new or newly democratizing countrieslack ethnic-societal identity and coherence, the change toward parliamentarygovernment is rendered difficult and a popularly elected president may serveas a symbol of national unity. If, as often is the case under such circumstances,political parties are weak, then the semi-presidential solution may seem to bethe best option.

Concepts, terms, generalizations and taxonomies

The divergent statements of different authors, especially on the French con-stitutional regime, show that there is confusion about what a regime is andhow it should be named. To us it seems that this confusion is due to mixing(a) concept formation, (b) denomination of the concept, that is, theterm, (c)


generalization, and (d)taxonomyor classificationin this discussion. We shalltry to clarify this disorder by recalling some of the basic findings of the theoryof cognition that are pertinent to our problem.

Duverger was as free as any other person to leave behind the traditionalterms of naming and classifying a form of government that he thought to bea special one. But the proof of the pudding, in this case as in all others thatintend to create knowledge, is the scientific aptness of the new concept behindthe new term: Does the concept have a theoretical or systematic meaning,that is, does the formation of this concept help to advance explanatory orprognosticating principles in the form of general laws or theories (Hempel1974: 26, 47)? It is the quest for the heuristic value of the concept that makesfor its validity.

Concepts may vary in their level of abstraction – the higher the abstraction,the greater the number of phenomena comprised by it (Van Dyke 1960: 63).What then is the function of a concept in the explanation of government?It is, we think, to offer an approach as to who (actors) decides why (moti-vation) and how (procedures, methods, techniques) on matters of policy. Inthe traditional context of democratic theory, parliamentary accountability ofgovernment, eventually coming a head in the dismissal of government byparliament, may seem to be the decisive factor that distinguishes presidentialfrom parliamentary regimes. Indeed, in constitutional monarchies, pressurecan be put on the prince to change his direction of policy by threatening tocensure his government. In parliamentary regimes, however, where govern-ment is elected by parliament and thus has its confidence, its dismissal is notan indication of the functioning of government: The Parliament of the UKthat overthrows its government overthrows itself; it can only change its topperson, the Prime Minister – but not too often. Parliament in a multipartypolitical system can overthrow its government, but this means that either anew coalition must be formed or new elections be fixed. Although pressurecan be put upon government by important members of its own party or partiesin parliamentary systems, it can hardly be expected that under such circum-stances the course of action of parliamentary government will be geared bysuch a far-fetched danger.

For this reason, we have to relinquish the antiquated idea of a dichotomousclassification of regimes that rests on the basis of parliamentary account-ability of government. It is rather true that the interrelationship of repre-sentative and plebiscitary elements is characteristic of contemporary regimes(Friedrich 1959: 29). Waiving the simple separation of regimes by their formof dismissal of government, we have to dive into the problem of going tothe institutions that govern the political process.12 Here is where actors withtheir own powers enter the arena. If we find – and we do – that the popularly


elected president is an actor in his own right, then he must be included inthe concept; and if we find that a president elected by parliament (or a mixedbody) cannot be such an actor, then he is not a part of it.

Naming a concept is necessary to communicate its content. To use dif-ferent names would only make sense if different institutional constructionswith differing functions are to be described. It can give rise to confusionwhenever different names are attributed to one and the same concept. Thisis exactly what happens in the French discussion. The concept of the Frenchregime is not changed, even if it has been given various names. The realityis the same, the perception is that of a very special form of government,only the names differ. We should not bother whether the French regime isgiven one of these names. Yet we think it is appropriate to accept the namegiven by the scholar who has done most in understanding such a regime,Maurice Duverger. Thus it is irrelevant in the context of concept formationwhether ‘semi-presidentialism’ is a typesui generisor belongs to any otherclassification of political regimes.

It will be more important to look into the actors that direct the courseof policy in a modern democratic state. This is, as has often been stated,government and its party/parties in parliament on one hand, and oppositionon the other. (Let alone, pressures from outside the constitutional system.)If a single discerning feature for the classification of regimes would have tobe found, it would be the opposition’s capacity to torment government andforce it toward new elections. But this, again, would not help to explain theday to day routine and the frequent crises in modern political systems. InGermany, for example, which is recognized as a parliamentary regime, themaking of policy has never been determined at all by the power of parliamentto dismiss the federal government. It is rather the interaction of governmentand the parties in parliament that form it. And when the political majoritiesin theBundestagand theBundesratdiffer, decisions are often made by extra-constitutional actors – meetings of leading members of the federal coalitionparties or of the prime ministers of theLänder.13

The next step moving toward building a theory isgeneralization. To gen-eralise means to apply a concept to more than one specimen in the real world(Van Dyke: 1960: 73). This is the first level of classification, as it puts differ-ent states of affairs into one class of concept. This is what Duverger did whenhe transferred the concept – and the term – ‘semi-presidential government’,used for the French Fifth Republic, to the other members of thepléiade. Herethe first problems turn up: Can such regimes be grouped together that act sodifferently even according to the inventor of the concept? The answer can,maybe, be found in distinguishing theactual and thepotentialbehaviour ofsuch regimes, which means quite a distinct state of affairs than ‘apparent’


and ‘effective’. When the environment of the regime changes, then the ‘sys-tème politique’ (Duhamel 1993a: 653f) may adopt quite different practices,as happens to be the case with cohabitation. Also, if in Austria there wouldhave been a different outcome of the legislative elections in 1995, the role ofthe president in forming the government could have become an active one.14

The objective of ataxonomyof concepts is to find an even higher level ofabstraction of the generalized phenomena. At least in the field of empiricalpolitical science it is necessary to group systems of government according totheir functioning (Moulin 1978: 23). This action can serve to compare differ-ent political regimes or systems according to their institutions, procedures andsubsystems. Such a taxonomy is supposed to help explain and, hopefully, forecast the behaviour of systems within the same category. Duverger himself hasnot ventured into putting ‘semi-presidentialism’ into a taxonomy. Although insome contexts he mentioned ‘parliamentary’ or ‘presidential’ traits or phasesof states with semi-presidential governments (Duverger 1980: 186), he didnot board the wavering planks of the dichotomy.

It is very clear that the framers of the French constitution of 1958 did notwant to implant a presidential regime in France; on the contrary, they thoughtit to be parliamentary.15 There is, perhaps, a political tendency to name eachnew regime parliamentary. Parliamentarism in the contemporary world isconsidered to equal democracy. If a regime similar to that of the French FifthRepublic is democratic, even if some strings may be attached, democracy isguaranteed. Already at the time of the publication of Duverger’s fundamentalbook on semi-presidential government (Duverger 1978) and then his articlein English (Duverger 1980), it could have been observed that – deductingthe monarchies – the majority of the democratic European states had semi-presidential and not parliamentary systems of government, although they arecommonly called ‘parliamentary’.

The introduction of the popular election of the President of the Republicin France by the plebiscite of 6 December 1962, was perceived by the Frenchconstitutionalist as a complete overthrow in the relations of the public powers(Moulin 1978: 27). Moulin (1978: 30f) has convincingly shown by logicaldeduction that political systems in which the government depends on theconfidence of parliament and the president is elected by popular vote, arenot ‘mixed’ systems, but belong to a third category.

A basic impediment of thought for the creative handling of the classifica-tion of concepts in the taxonomy of government is the idea that the executiveis monolithic, that is, it cannot be exercised by different organs. This ideadoes not even hold true in the governmental system of Germany where theministers conduct the affairs of their department autonomously and on theirown responsibility.


Duverger’s concept cannot be refuted by asserting that it does not fit intothe traditional dichotomy or by simply stuffing it into one of its compart-ments. Yet it is far from being acknowledged as a means that helps to betterexplain such forms of government. To reach such a level of epistemologicaldignity, the proof has to be furnished that this concept as the foundation of anovel theory can better analyse the behaviour and decision making processesof political systems that make use of this model.

Specification of Duverger’s concept in view of the multiplicity of newsemi-presidential regimes

There are essential differences of ‘semi-presidentialism’ as to parliamentaryas well as presidential government. The main distinguishing feature as re-gards both is the possibility of ‘cohabitation’. Only from a superficial pointof view this situation can be equated with that of an American presidentfacing Congress16 with a majority from the other party as, for example, BillClinton is since November 1995. But there is a significant difference: TheUS-president can act on his own in many instances as he has the whole gov-ernment apparatus at his disposal. A ‘semi-president’, however, has to rely onthe prime minister to make government work. On the other hand, cohabitationcan never occur in a parliamentary system of government as prime ministerand government cannot be in opposition to the president or monarch.

Some of the major differences of the semi-presidential president as againstthe parliamentary17 prime minister are:− during the president’s incumbency the stability of the executive is guar-

anteed (until parliament adopts a vote of no confidence);− minority governments can easier be carried in a semi-presidential regime;− the president cannot directly interfere in legislative deliberations;− the semi-president has (as a rule) a veto (with overrides) on legislation

passed by parliament while the prime minister does not need one;− parliament the prime minister risks the majority for his party while the

semi-president has only to respect the reaction of his constituency if newelections happen too often;

− only the semi-president can use a referendum as a means to pressuregovernment (and parliament).

These differences preclude any attempt to incorporate semi-presidentialismas a subgroup of parliamentary governments.

The establishment of presidential governments, that is, governments ina semi-presidential system appointed by the semi-president without the ex-plicit backing of parliament, is also a special trait in some semi-presidentialregimes. They deviate from the principle of responsibility of government


vis-à-visparliament. Yet they can only live as long as they are tolerated byparliament (as proved by the vote of no-confidence against the Franz von Pa-pen government in the Weimar Republic 1932, or the Mota Pirito governmentin Portugal 1978–79). Recently, the Dini government in Italy, established andmaintained by President Scalfaro who was not elected by universal suffrage,seems to show that presidential governments can exist also in a parliamentarysystem. But is it then by chance that we have a discussion on ‘semipresi-denzialismo’ [semi-presidentialism] in Italy (Bartolini 1984; Pasquino 1996;Sartori 1995; and the bicamerale18)?

Some doubts and, if possible, clarifications shall be introduced. The ulti-mate legitimation of Duverger’s concept is its aptness in the search for thenecessary and sufficient conditions for the functioning of systems with a pop-ularly elected president. Does Duverger’s concept obey the rules of conceptformation to construct a nominal definition to eliminate it from parliamentary,presidential, superpresidential, etc. forms of government? Some doubts maybe allowed. The three elements of his definition seem to be quite clear. But,as has been observed above, already his ‘important powers’ remain vague.

Maurice Duverger gave an elaborate exposition of his concept inÉchecau roi, based on the observation of seven democratic systems in WesternEurope. Since then, with Portugal at the beginning of the ‘Third Wave’ ofdemocratization (Huntington; 1993: 1), many other, new or democratizingcountries have resorted to a solution of the constitutional problems of theorganization of government which at least correspond to the formal criteria of‘semi-presidentialism’: popular election of the president who holds consider-able powers, and a government, depending on the confidence of parliament.In an early phase of the acceptance of democratization, some of the newlysovereign states in the wake of the Portuguese revolution followed the im-age of their former master. There are also countries that may have taken theFrench Fifth Republic as a model, as the constitutions of Sri Lanka, Haïti andNiger as well as the recent constitutions of Algeria and Madagascar. Muchgreater importance may be accredited to the new or newly democratizingpost-communist states in East and South Eastern Europe as well as in Mid-dle Asia plus Mongolia. But do really all of them correspond to Duverger’sconcept?

The problem if these countries can be considered to be ‘democratic’ mustbe left aside as this would lead to an extensive exposition of ‘democratic the-ory’. But, perhaps, the forms of governments that have been adopted by someof them may give a clue for those who would like to answer this questionaccording to their understanding of democracy.

In Duverger’s view, obviously, it is the prime minister who depends on theconfidence of parliament. This may promote the impression that also regimes


in which the prime minister (and the ministers), depending on parliament, actunder direct command of the president, should be included in the conceptof semi-presidentialism. This is, however, not in accordance with Duverger’sapproach as we see it.

First, he did not mention states in which the ministers are under directcontrol of the president among hispléiade. He already omitted from hisconcept the construction of the Second French Republic, in which the con-stitution of 4 November 1848 established a popularly elected president andthe ministers were dependent on the confidence of the Assemblée Nationale.Indeed, there was no Prime Minister, although Odilon Barrot seems to haveacted like one.19 This is to say that Duverger’s basic idea consists in (thepossibility of) an interdependence of president and prime minister (Duhamel1993: 90). The prime minister must be in the position to be – at least in timesof cohabitation – the opposite number of the president (Sartori 1995: 4, 7, 14).Thus when there is a prime minister who has to act according to the ordersof the president, this element is missing. This is at least the case when thepresident is head of the government and a vote of no confidence, accordingly,affects only its other members.20 The more so this holds true when there isnot a prime minister at all, and the ministers are under direct control of thepresident but also dependent on the confidence of parliament. If the majorityparty in parliament differs from the party of the president, he and he alonewill decide on who is the prime minister or who are his ministers, and ifparliament resolves on a vote of no-confidence, the executive proceeds eitherwith new ministers or even with no ministers at all, as the president is theruler.

If there were 50 percent (and plus) parlamentary majorities carrying thegovernment, the president in semi-presidential regimes would be void of in-fluence, thus reduced to the position of an indirectly elected one. But this isnot always the case as in countries where parliament is elected on the basisof proportional representation, and where governmental coalitions prevail.The significant role of the president in these cases arises from his powers toform government. Also, the popular election of the president creates formaland informal alliances of the parties, as in this case they are dependent uponcooperation.

As concerns the new or democratizing states in Eastern Europe and MiddleAsia, Duverger (1992: 903f) as well as Duhamel (1993: 87f) assign them tothe ‘semi-presidential’ types, but do not deal with them in depth. However,it seems that these regimes may diverge significantly from the ‘ideal type’semi-presidentialism in that they show very peculiar features. Huskey (1995:115–143) has clearly demonstrated that in the Russian Federation there isvirtually no room for the prime minister to follow a policy that is not to the


smallest detail in concordance with the will of the president –or rather hisaides. Moreover, the President of the Russian Federation – and in most othersemi-presidential countries of the Community of Independent States – is notonly endowed with legislative initiative, but can also enact decrees wheneverhe thinks that Parliament is not willing or capable to legislate (Avakyan 1994).

Political systems in which a vote of investiture of the government is notrequired and in which it can continue after nomination by the president, thatis, where tacit confidence (‘confidence négative’ in the words of Duverger) ispresumed, and where a vote of no-confidence does, however, not compel thepresident to dismiss the government, have to be excluded from the concept.Yet can Duverger’s concept be applied to regimes where a vote of confidencefor the investiture of the government, sometimes combined with overt orsilent consent of parliament for its program, is obligatory, but where a voteof no confidence does not oblige the president to dismiss the government (forexample, Sri Lanka) or where the vote of no-confidence can work only undersevere restrictions as in the Russian Federation (Article 117 point 3)?

Semi-presidential government: a challenge for political science

The possibility of electing the president by universal suffrage has even beendiscussed in established democracies, like Italy and Germany.21 Whenevercrises emerge or are perceived, personalization of political power seem tobe the last resort. Of course, this does not necessarily lead to disaster, aswas the case with the Nazi ‘Machtergreifung’ [seizure of power]. Presidentde Gaulle’s creation may be a much better expedient. Yet the expanded useof such solutions should call our attention to the inherent dangers and, as achallenge to political science, to its intellectual foundations.

Duverger has not presented an elaborate theory of semi-presidential gov-ernment, but a concept that can be a foundation for one. This statementdoes not anticipate the value of the new concept, but it could stimulate po-litical scientists to investigate deeper into fundamental problems of the art.At first glance, Duverger’s concept only gives rise to a reexamination of theclassification of systems of government, or regimes, calling in question thetraditional dichotomy of presidential and parliamentary ones. To those whotake more interest in the functioning of regimes than in merely playing onwords, this approach can be left aside. As we have already seen from semi-presidentialism in the context of the transformation of political systems, theconcept comprises a much wider range of problems.

As has been very well observed by Dobry (1992: 261), the real difficulty(in understanding the problem of ‘cohabitation’) rests in the lack of politicalanalysis of the ‘problematique fantaisiste’ [imaginary problematic nature]


of the personalization of power in contemporary political systems. Very of-ten, especially in official disclosures, the semi-president has been called the‘arbiter’.22 This perception comes close to or is even used synonymouslywith ‘pouvoir neutre’ [neutral power] (‘poder moderador’ in Portuguese),the function ascribed to the constitutional ruler by Benjamin Constant. Thispower was to settle controversies between the government, appointed by theking himself, and parliament. But already in the time of constitutional monar-chy it was abused, for example in Brazil, in favour of the supremacy of theEmperor (Bonavides & Andrade 1988: 78, 90f). In its contemporary version,such power is deemed to be based on the popular election of the president bywhich he is supposed to have a higher degree of legitimation than the partiesin parliament. The formula suggests that he is capable of settling controversialsocietal interests. There is no such situation in a semi-presidential set up.Between whom should the president decide in a regime, where there is onlygovernment – either of his own or of an opposite party – on the one handand opposition on the other? He will in any case have to side with one of thepolitical positions. At best, he can be a mediator proposing a compromise.Thus, it seems that the appeal to the role of arbiter is rather an ideology toveil the real strength of the actors.

The conservative metaphor of ‘equilibrium’ has been used even togetherwith ‘pouvoir neutre’ to mark the semi-presidential forms of government(Redslob 1918: 4, 49f; Barroso & Bragança 1989: 321). But the idea ofa popularly elected president as an arbiter is on the contrary opposed tothat of ‘equilibrium’: How can the plebiscitary president settle controversialpolitical problems and – at the same time – exercise the role of a counter-weight – against whom? ‘Equilibrium’ was a favourite of the framers of theWeimar Republic who thought that the popularly elected president should bea counterpoise against the chaotic parties in parliament. This was, of course,a deviation from their mentor Redslob who perceived equilibrium as a meansof the monarch – or, perhaps, a president – to manage struggles between theexecutive and parliament.

While the ideas of the arbiter or equilibrium imply a benevolent insti-tution, reality may tend toward a more negative development. Inherent inthe idea of the charisma of the office that comes to the fore whenever thepopular election of a head of state is at stake (Bahro 1996) the hazard of dem-agoguery and populism is near. The semi-presidential form of governmentmay even revitalize the danger of bonapartism to which French constitutionallawyers have pointed right from the beginning of the popularly election ofthe president (Sur 1982: 212f). Indeed, semi-presidential regimes in theirinitial period seem to live rather often through a bonapartist phase (Bayerlein1996). And even later, they show neo-bonapartist, populist traits concerning


political parties, societal groups and social movements. For the solution ofsocietal conflicts, for instance, (neo-)corporatist approaches are often appliedand political parties are instrumentalized and de-democratized (Quermonne1986: 205, 206f).

Even if, in the end, Duverger’s concept should prove to be useless, dealingwith the problems that it poses it can be expected to be a challenge for polit-ical science. It may call the attention of political scientists to topics that theyhave for a long time not dealt with. Working in depth on problems of semi-presidentialism may also give new impulses to research on the transformationof political systems that has so far neglected, to a large extent, transition ofpolitical institutions, as is shown above.

Our preliminary conclusions are that Duverger’s concept is an importantstep toward a better understanding in the research of political regimes. Itdemonstrates a type of regime that differs both from presidentialism and par-liamentarism: In a presidential regime, the president is in full command of theexecutive; in a parliamentary regime, it is the prime minister and neither thepresident (nor the monarch) can interfere. This is why semi-presidentialism,the ‘republican monarchy’, shows at least one characteristic that cannot ap-pear in the traditional ones: cohabitation. The concept of semi-presiden-tialism, though, needs interpretation and clarification in order to be useful inempirical political science and comparative government. Moreover, it opensthe way to and renders necessary the discussion of other concepts and hy-potheses of political and historical research which, although nearly forgotten,have recently come to the fore, for example bonapartism, equilibrium andpresident as an arbitrator. And, possibly most important, it may open the eyesfor the salience of semi-presidential government in periods of transition fromtotalitarian or authoritarian systems to democracy.

Notes

1. As concerns reception in Germany, see Bahro & Veser (1995: 472–476).2. We use the term ‘regime’ as does Duhamel (1993: 90, 653).3. To our knowledge, this book was translated only into Portuguese, and that twice: in

Portugal (Duverger 1979) and in Brazil (Duverger 1993).4. As to a similar perseverance of traditional images, see Massari (1996; 44f).5. Nouisiainen (1994: 4, 5ff) uses the term semi-presidentialism, but distinguishes ‘by sub-

stantial focus’ four different parliamentary forms, in which semi-presidential regimes ofdifferent kinds are incorporated.

6. Entrevista aoExpresso[Interview to the Express] (Lisbon), 3 December 1976.7. Camera dei Deputati – Senato della Repubblica, XIII Legislatura, Allegato Commis-

sione bicamerale – Commissione Parlamentare per le Riforme Costituzionali: DocumenteEsaminati nel Corso delle Sedute Autimeridiana N. 52 e Pomeridiana N. 53 di Lunedi 30


Giugno 1997 [Chamber of Deputies – Senat of the Republic, XIII Legislature, EnclosureBicameral Commission – Parliamentary Commission for Constitutional Reform: Exam-ined Documents in the Course of the Morning Nr. 52 and Afternoon Nr. 53 Sessions of30 June 1997].

8. As to socio-psychological and political approaches, see Bahro (1996: 785f).9. For particulars, see Bahro (1997a).

10. A more detailed explanation is presented in Bahro (1997b).11. Jacques Le Goff, Eine republikanische Demokratie [A republican democracy],Frank-

furter Allgemeine ZeitungNr. 112, 15 May 1995.12. Merkel (1996: 77) points out that the rough discrimination of regimes by the simple

criterion of the dismissal of government does not do justice to their existing complexity.13. See, for example, Günter Bannas, Allerlei Zirkel – Die SPD und die schleichende Entpar-

lamentarisierung der Politik [Miscellaneous circles – The SDP and the furtive deparlia-mentarization],Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung22 April 1996, p. 12.

14. Sartori (1995: 9f) admits that Austria there could be a remote possibility of the revival ofsemi-presidential action, while in Ireland and Iceland the respective constitutional powersof the president remain ‘dead elements’.

15. Michel Debré, representing the framers of the Constitution called it ‘un véritable régimeparlementaire’ [a genuine parliamentary system] (Sur 1982: 101). This statement bearsa surprising similarity to the characterization of the Weimar Constitution as ‘the genuineparliamentarism’ during the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly and later, basedon Robert Redslob’s book (Redslob 1918).

16. As does Le Divellec who holds that the President of the USA is in general in a situation ofcohabitation, even if majority in the US-Congress is not controlled by the opposing party(1996: 148).

17. As to the differences of presidential and semi-presidential regimes, see for example, Satori(1995: 5f).

18. See note 7.19. von Beyme (1970: 145). But see Duhamel (1993: 712) according to whom parliament

could not overthrow the government – comparable to Sri Lanka. As far as early doubtsof such a construction is concerned, see Duguit (1903: 327f). Why Duverger disregardedMadagascar (Constitution of 21 December 1975) and Cuba (Constitution of 5 July 1940)is not clear. These constitutions, at least in a formal manner, correspond to the criteria onwhich he based his concept.

20. This seems to be true in Sri Lanka where the framers of the Constitution of 7 September1978 (Second Republic) wanted to adopt the regime of French Fifth Republic only in parts(Jeyaratnam Wilson 1980: 10) and ended up with a president as head of the executive(Art. 43 (2); see also Article 49(2) for the consequences of a vote of no confidence). TheNamibian Constitution (9 February 1990) also puts the elected President at the head ofthe government (Article 25, par. 1).

21. In Germany, in the forefield of the election of theBundespräsidentin 1994, argumentsfor the popular election sprang up in which even candidates for the presidency took part.In Australia, in June 1995, 79 percent of the interviewed were in favour of the election ofa president by universal suffrage in case the country should become a republic, seeTheAge(Melbourne), 10 June 1995.

22. Or even the semi-president has named himself as such, see Soares & Bettencourt Re-sendes (1995: 10, 12, 16f, 29, 31, 50).


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Address for correspondence:Dr Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Abteilung für Iberische undLateinamerikanische Geschichte, Universität zu Köln, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, D-50391 Köln,GermanyPhone: + 49 221 470-2446; Fax: + 49 221 470-4996; E-mail: [email protected]

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