DISSO - 6DAY WAR

Maha Al Kharusi Why Did The 6 Day War of 1967 Transform the

Regional Order of the Middle East over the next three decades?

WHY DID THE 6-DAY-WAR of 1967 TRANSFORMTHE REGIONAL ORDER OF THE MIDDLE EAST

OVER THE NEXT THREE DECADES?

By:

Maha Al Kharusi

April, 2013

1



The w ork contained w ithin this docum ent has been subm itted by the student in partial fulfilm ent of the requirem ent of their course and aw ard

Contents:

Introduction page 3

Chapter 1 – The Superpowers page 5

International political order

& the Middle East

The Soviet Union in the Middle Eastpage 5

Post ’73 The US in the Middle East Page 9

Chapter 2 - Regional Level Page 12

Pan-Arabism Page 13

Political Islam Page 18

2



Black September Page 20

Chapter 3 – Domestic Level Page 23

Israel Page 23

Syria Page 25

Egypt Page 28

Palestinian Movement 0

Conclusion Page 35

Q: WHY DID THE 6-DAY-WAR of 1967 TRANSFORM THE REGIONAL ORDER OF THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE NEXT THREE DECADES?

Introduction:

The events that led to the outcome of the six-day war can be

compared to shifting tectonic plates that results in

unavoidable disaster that leaves the inhabitants of the

scorched land forced to adapt with a new way of life, unable

to revert the disaster that occurred. That is precisely what

happened in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Six-Day

War in 1967. This essay will analyse how the Six-Day war of

3



1967 transformed the regional order of the Middle East in the

coming three decades after the event. The aftermath of the War

had created a seizure throughout the Arab world that resulted

in a restructure of the regional order, directly affecting the

states involved and causing rippling effects to their allies

and brothers. Looking at how the regional order was affected

by the war in three levels throughout the three decades in the

consequences of the war.

This paper will be divided into three sections accordingly,

the International/systemic level that observes how the

Superpowers, engaged in a Cold War, extended toward the Middle

Eastern region which adverse affects that created a division

of axis among Israel and the Arabs as well as amongst the

Arabs themselves. The systemic level analyses the shift in

regional influence between the United States and the Soviet

Union that vied for power in the geostrategic and wealthy

region that, throughout the decades has seen the Soviets as

protectorates of the Arab’s throughout the late 60’s with its

closest and most powerful ally in the region, Egypt under the

auspices of President Nasser and The United States over Israel

in its battle for security and peace. The death of Nasser and

succession of the pragmatist, Sadat in the 70’s was the first

significant shift in influence. His policies evolved Egypt

that had domestic and regional implications. American

influence bared its teeth during the ’73 Yom Kippur War

successfully petitioning a ceasefire that the Soviets had

4



failed to accomplish. The period of Detente had cooled

relations between the Soviets and the Arabs in which America

drew her hegemonic dominance throughout the decades, the 90’s

direct involvement in the Gulf War, in the emergence as the

sole superpower. The Regional level looks at the intricacies

of relations between each state that had evolved as an entity

through one trend after another as a result of the war.

Throughout the 60’s to the early 70’s Pan-Arabism thrived in

the region, with slogans of unity and justice however, after

the war its descent hastened as a result of its failure to

unite the Arabs and guide them to victory, after the ‘73

October war states became increasingly isolated followed by an

upsurge of Political Islam that ascended in parallel to

Nassersim’s decline, which can be perceived as another form of

nationalism. This, coupled with the revolutionary mood in the

aftermath of the war revived Palestinian nationalism for self-

determination that held grave consequences for themselves as

well as the Arabs in the events of ‘Black September’. The

Domestic level focuses on three states that had a profound

impact following June’s events, Israel, Syria, Egypt and the

Palestinian people in Jordan and Lebanon. Each shares a

similar societal trend that saw an evolving society in

reaction to and cause for changing political systems and

leadership style and policies. However, each state had very

distinctive changes in the following years of the War. Israel

saw a demographic change that diluted Israels culture with

that of the Arabs in the Middle East, in Syria it was the

5



ascendency of Hafez Al Assad through a series of turbulent

internal struggle for power. For Egypt it was a complete

revamp of the political and societal and ideological structure

in the succession of Sadat, along with the shift towards the

US in the aftermath of the October War and the policy of

'economic openness' as well as a break with Nasserism. For the

Palestinian people, it was the end of 19-year period of living

under Egyptian-Jordanian authority which was a profound change

for the Palestinians that transgressed to revolutionary mood

which embraced the start of daily conflict with the Israeli

occupation army to liberate their land.

The paper discusses events that relate to each level, each of

which present a different impact during the occurrences, which

ties each section together to reveal how deeply the war

affected the Middle East. This will conclude with the

evaluation at which level was deeply affected in the analysis

of the impact the war inflicted.

6



THE SUPERPOWERS – INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL

ORDER & THE MIDDLE EAST

The Arab battle against Israel was also a battle between

the superpowers. Soviet and American interest in the region

was an extension of the Cold War, in which each sought to

expand power and dominate by way of influence. The outcome of

the Six-day War affected the development of the Cold War in

the Middle East which resulted in a shift of balance that saw

a declining Soviet influence over American dominance in the

region over three decades, mimicking the demise of Soviet

strength and presence on the world stage against the west

throughout the years of the Cold War. This paradoxical shift

was the result of a number of factors including the battle at

the UN over resolution 242 in 1967, The Rogers Plan & War of

Attrition in 1969 - 70 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 which

led to a peace process headed by the US from the late 70’s –

90’s. The Soviet policies in the Middle East were personified

by the competition between themselves and the United States,

“During the Cold War period one view is that, these local

states had their own domestic and regional agendas which they

tried to make the Cold War serve. The other, is that they [The

ME states] were mere pawns in a game played by the

Superpowers” (Bregman, 2000).

7



SOVIET UNION & THE MIDDLE EAST – The enemy of my enemy...

The Middle East post-colonialism had adopted an anti-

Western sentiment, largely as a result of the establishment of

Israel, a foreign entity in the heart of the Middle East.

Therefore, Soviet influence dominated; this was largely

evident in the Marxist-Socialist ideologies adopted in the

region as well as the anti-Imperialist tone chanted by

autocratic regimes that resembled the Communist rule in the

East in the “Ba’thist regimes in Syria and Iraq and the

nationalist government in South Yemen. But the cornerstone of

Soviet strategy in the Middle East was Egypt”(Taylor, Francis,

1979) which the Soviets enjoyed strong relations with latter.

Also, Soviets provided Arabs with military, economic and

diplomatic aid. The development that led to the Six-Day War

was a result of Soviet intelligence in the region; tragedy of

the 6-day war occurred due to false reports eluding that

Israel was planning to attack Syria which brought the Arab

world to the precipice of war as a means to prevent such a

development. The Soviets encouraged and strived to “unite the

Arab states...together with Arab political

organizations...into a larger anti-imperialist Arab front

directed against Israel – and its Western

supporters”(Freedman, 1979:55). Nonetheless, the outcome of

the War indicated the beginning of the end for Soviet

influence, given that the actions taken by Egypt, Syria &

Jordan were led under false pretence by the Soviets, ergo

8



making the Soviets indirectly responsible for the Arab defeat.

The Six-Day War was part of the Cold War between the Soviets

and the US, with western backed Israel and Soviet supported

Arabs, making the defeat for the Arabs, a defeat for the

Soviets.

Soviets maintained close relationships with Egypt and

Syria and its inability to protect them during the war

“tarnished Soviet reputation both with regard to the quality

of their arms and training and Soviet willingness to assist

its Third World client in a crisis situation. Further, it led

to renewed American interest and involvement in the Arab-

Israeli conflict”(Golan, 1990). This prompted a Soviet

reinforcement to the Arabs by throwing its weight in the UN

towards Resolution 242 in November 1967 which called for the

recognition of Israel as well as stipulating ‘respect for and

acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and

independence of every state in the area and their right to

live in peace within secure and recognised borders free from

the threat of force’. The Soviets battled the Americans over

the agreement of the amount of territory that should be

receded, with the Soviets advocating the retreat of all

territories pre-67, however the mediation failed to

materialise much to Arab delight, the denial of Israel’s

existence was to continue and to further seek military action

that the SU disputed, fostering tensions amongst the two in

1968 (Golan: 71).

9



A period of detente took effect in 1969, “a critical era

in the history of the Cold War”(spokesmen, 2007),where Soviet-

American relations had begun to improve, deviating Arab

support whereby hindering their influence in the region that

manifested the deterrence of Soviet initiatives to create a

peace plan under the auspices of America, Britain & France.

Soviet attitude was contradictory in its support for the Arabs

which fluctuated in certain instances only when it proved to

be beneficial to the former against its rivalry with the

Americans. “The Soviets did not oppose the Egyptian commando

raids which, by the spring of 1969, were known as the War of

Attrition”(Golan, 1990) which was a change to the previous

opinion of pro-political instead of military action toward

Israel. However shortly after, the call for easing hostilities

towards Israel triggered a harsh response from Egypt in the

form of accusations of the Soviets surrendering to American

power. Driven by President Nasser’s persistent and independent

personality that dominated the Arab region at the time

“Nassersim clashed with America’s designs: Political

difference provided a cultural buffer of sorts, kept the

Unites States at bay”(Ajami, 1993:205), Egypt ignored the

appeal; an attack on Israel was an attack on America however,

this defiance confirmed the weaning influence of the Soviets

in the region. By December 1969, Soviet stance became more

‘militant’, this was a response to Egypt and their actions but

also following break-down of talks between themselves and the

US in which the latter had chartered its own course without

10



the concession of the Soviets (Golan, 1990) in the formation

of a peace plan; the 1969 Rogers Plan was rejected by all

parties including Israel. It is worth noting the basis of the

Soviet-Egyptian relationship which was based on a

“Strong mutual need...Nasir needed the USSR as a supplier of

arms. Given his ambition to lead...the Arab world, he had to

be prepared ...in armed conflict with Israel. The USSR needed

Egypt because it was uniquely positioned and equipped not

merely to supply it with the air and naval facilities it

required, but to give it entree into the Arab world”( Taylor,

Francis, 1979).

The 70’s – Changing Tides

The 1970’s proved to be a tumultuous time in the Arab-Israeli

conflict as well the Cold War. The death of Nasser was

succeeded by President Anwar Sadat in the ongoing War of

Attrition. The change of leadership was complimented by the

change of Soviet presence and increasing American influence.

Relations between the Superpowers during the Cold War had an

immediate effect on the crisis in the Middle East. The break-

down of diplomatic talks in the period of detente fostered a

volatile time in the region, “Soviets was increasingly to

invoke detente in connection to settling the Arab-Israeli

conflict and the need to apply detente to the

region”(Golan[Taylor francis book], 1979: 8) this was evident

11



in Brezhnev and Kosygin’s message to Nasser to contain the

matter before it escalated and to Nixon to constrain Israel in

order to achieve an indivisible peace in the region. The move

towards a political solution in the atmosphere of detente was

due to a shift in Soviet policy, the increasing risk involved

in continuing with the current course but also for fear of

severing relations between the US which had repaired, as well

as the benefits of acquiring a final peace settlement for all

the parties involved.

The Egyptians, chartering a new course of their own away from

the era of Nasserism took a defensible position to the Soviet

shift is strategy, a ‘friendship and assistance treaty’ signed

with Egypt in 1971 marked a shift away from the initial Soviet

position, also highlighting the deteriorating relationship

between the two, “the idea of such a treaty with a non-

Communist state was a departure for Soviet tactics in the

Third World...Soviet-Egyptian treaty was not, therefore, a

sign of increased Soviet influence but rather a Soviet effort

to salvage something from a faltering relationship”(Golan,

1990). A peace plan proposed by the Soviets marked a

challenging time for Egypt, Soviet military and economic

assistance had not faltered yet their position in the conflict

was contradictory to their interests in detente which proved

critical for the Middle East situation. The shift marked a

different strategy, it would ensure Egypt’s leadership in the

Arab world following a military defeat in the War of

12



Attrition, to which the Soviets had given their unwilling

support through arms and men, moreover to counter American

initiatives in relation to Israel by which the Soviets would

accede influence in both spheres, whereby cementing Soviet

role as a crux to the solution. However, Egypt had already

taken the liberty to exclude over some 20,000 Soviets from the

country in July 1972, for the reasons that Sadat “ believed

that Egypt had stagnated under Soviet tutelage and that Soviet

intervention in his country’s affairs was as humiliating and

oppressive as colonial rule”(Taylor Francis, 1979) further

highlighting the deteriorating relationship between the two.

The period of Detente dismantled military solutions in favour

of political diplomacy, thus the SALT agreement between the SU

& US posed a constraint on arms procurement for Egypt and

other Arab states that subsequently led to a faltering

relationship in the region.

The October War had proved to be the last stance in which

Soviet-Egyptian would cooperate before severing most ties with

the Superpower. However it still maintained its influence in

the region through Syria and the support of the PLO with its

increasing interest in the Persian-Gulf. In an era of Pan-

Arabism, the Gulf States rallied together to support Egypt and

Syria by means of promoting an oil-embargo which “enabled the

Arabs to buy quality technology from the West and Japan, and

this has helped weaken the economic bond between the Soviet

Union and a number of Aran states such as Iraq and

13



Syria”(Freedman, 1979:55). There was a shift in the regional

order of the Middle East, an Egyptian-Saudi axis emerged and

the role Nasserism played in the relations with the Soviets

had been exchanged for the re-emergence of Islam. “The Soviet

Union was five thousand miles away and the ideology of

Communism was anathema to the Moslem religion. But America had

emerged from World War II richer...and people were receptive

to the idea of the Americans playing a major role in the

Middle East”(Ajami, 1993:205), this new shift was marked by

the rise of ‘Saudi-era’ in which the West enjoyed good

relations with. Thus the Soviets still sought to maintain the

remnants of its relationship and influence with the Arabs but

with an air of defensiveness. By June 1973 Brezhnev’s visit to

Washington ratified a high point in Detente between the two

Superpowers, which severely limited SU contact with Syria and

Egypt. On the outbreak of war between the Arabs and Israel,

the Soviets sought to redeem their position by providing

support and ‘assistance’ as the treaty stipulated, however in

a manner of caution as not to disrupt relations with the US.

Therefore the Soviets position on the War was one of immediate

ceasefire which fell on deaf ears, “prolongation of the

hostilities ran counter to Soviet interests”(Golan, 1990).

However, the opportunity called for a re-emergence of Soviet

influence by way of support, in which they had granted

indirectly through the Arab states. This confirmed the Soviets

limits of power for fear that a direct Soviet presence would

generate an American rebuttal in the region. Despite the risk,

14



Soviets had recommitted themselves to their Arab counterparts

and resupplied them with the armour required “given Arab

resentment of Soviet inactivity during the 1967 war, Moscow

presumably did not want to suffer another blow either to its

prestige or credibility as an ally”(Golan, 1990). However the

call for a cease-fire did not persist, unfortunately to any

avail. Therefore a joint US-SU initiative was taken to the UN

in which resolution 338 was established that called for a

cease-fire and the implementation of Res. 242 as well as peace

negotiations. The joint initiative was frowned upon by the

Syrians to which the Soviets had viewed as closer allies to

Egypt, however it could not prevent “the emergence of a core

of a pro-western Arab states in the aftermath of the war

[that] left the Soviet Union in a weak position in the Arab

world at the time of the Carter Administration’s accession to

power”(Freedman, 1979:55)

POST ’73: THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST -

Turning Tables

The outcome of ’67 proved to be a victory for the America in

the Middle East over the Soviet Union during the period of the

Cold War. Israel had emerged a strong and strategic ally for

the American’s that felt sympathy for the Jews amongst its

surrounding Arab enemies. The Arab-Israeli conflict attested

to the difficulties of detente that that US and SU were

15



undergoing. However, during the sporadic outbursts of violence

between the two, none proved more problematic as the Yom

Kippur War. It had tested international relations and global

security as well as the course of detente that compelled the

US to put the regional conflict at the top of its foreign

policy agenda that allowed for more influence and presence in

the region. Over the years, there has been a gradual shift in

the region towards a pro-Western attitude; none was more

evident after the ’73 Yom Kippur War that consolidated a

string of events, through Kissinger’s diplomacy, “Washington

has played a central role in the protracted, if checkered,

effort to address the conflicting security and territorial

objectives of Arabs and Israelis”(Burr, 2003). This has led to

the ‘74 disengagement agreements and the Camp David Accords in

1978 in which the US played a major role in bringing together.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 marked the US as a sole

Superpower that mediated the 1991 Gulf War and solidified US

hegemony that had taken root in the aftermath of the October

War.

The October War had established a joint Saudi-Egyptian axis

and “by 1976 appeared to be the dominant force in the Arab

world”(Freedman, 1979:55) thanks to Kissingerian diplomacy,

the US built a coalition of Arab states and leaders and

strengthened them which would keep the moderate leaders busy,

that would allow the US to promote the relationship with key

countries that the US needs in conjuncture to maintaining a

16



close relationship with Israel and the Middle East (Kamel,

1986). The strategy adopted had peace-making, oil-related and

containment of the Soviet reasons, despite the growing

relations, which had made an unduly presence and effect in the

October War. The results of the ’73 War made it feasible to

undertake peace negotiations that took place in 1974, thus

emerged a new world order. Under Kissinger, disengagement

agreements took effect between Israel – Egypt and Israel –

Syria. The diplomatic achievements of the US underline the

Soviet presence post ’73 despite their aid and support during

the war. The deterioration of Soviet presence in the region is

accounted by a number of factors such as inter-regional

conflicts in which the Soviets would support one while the

Arab counterparts support another that undermined their tactic

to unite the Arabs in an anti-imperialist front. The ’73 war

severely damaged the economic, military and diplomatic ties,

with respect to the Geneva conference. The oil-embargo enabled

the Arabs to purchase superior arms from the west, weakening

the economic and military bond, moreover post ’73 the Arabs

presumed a course of isolation which backtracked Soviet

agenda.

The Soviets sought to represent the Arabs on an international

scale in the Geneva Conference that put the heart of the Arab-

Israeli conflict, the Palestinian plight and resolution 242,

on the table where the US – SU constructed a joint statement.

Where the US would call for a link to Jordan and the SU would

17



call for an independent Palestinian state which won the

support of the Arabs but also because both superpowers

represented both sides that the US would need the SU as a

chairman. However, the Geneva Conference failed to materialise

when Egypt took the independent initiative in 1977 to

instigate what would become the Camp David Accords and

“although the United States was not responsible for the Sadat

initiative, the pressure was on it to make that initiative

succeed”(Freedman, 1979:48). Although it posed a chance for

the US to gain more leverage in the Middle East, Egypt had

isolated itself throughout the Arab community which the

Soviets acted on with hopes that, were the process to fail,

the Geneva Conference would reconvene. However, Sadat’s

visited instinctively worried the Soviets as it would isolate

them from the region while a Western-led peace-settlement

would dominate. American policy had changed post Sadat that

brought to light the new place of the Soviets. The new

American strategy came in the form of “three concentric

circles”, under which the first step would include only

Israel, Egypt and the US leading into the second phase which

would absorb the moderate regimes such as the Jordanians and

the PLO (supported by the Soviets) and then finally, the

Soviets and Syrians (Freedman, 1979). Camp David was a great

disaster for the Soviets but a major achievement in

establishing US hegemony over the Middle East.

18



The Soviet reaction to the new American policy was re-enforce

Soviet tactic to unite the Arabs and support through military

aid at a rejectionist conference in December 1977. However,

the organization lacked stimulation that saw the failure of

the Arab rejectionist states, as well as the Soviets, to aid

the PLO in an Israeli invasion that a US resolution, backed by

the UN issued an Israeli withdrawal. The lack of action caused

the PLO to take part as an ‘observer’ in an Arab Summit that

undermined the Soviet initiative. The result of the invasion

also had consequences for Superpower relations that had began

to deteriorate as the soviets took a more grudging position

against the US. All the while relations between the SU and the

rejectionist states had begun to strain with problems emerging

from the communist Iraq party, and although still sending

military aid to Syria, it was the isolation of the communist

party that was the problem while pro-western Saudi Arabia

undermined Soviet actions in the Gulf. As a result of these

events, the SU was sidelined in Middle Eastern issues while

America had taken lead role. This was never more transparent

in the 90’s with the end of the Cold War and America emerging

victorious as well as the Gulf War that stressed the Arab

economic and military dependency on the west. In the wake of

the invasion the Arab states “opted for US defence

pacts”(Hinnebusch, Jawad, 1994:122), as a sign of how deeply

the US penetrated the Middle East, and apparent weakness and

lack of autonomy in the regional system.

19



Conclusion:

American influence has been gradually ascending and cementing

its place in the Middle East since 1967. It’s initial motive

was the safety of Israel, however it quickly changed in the

Middle East’s’ geographically strategic placement as well as

the untapped resources and manpower that accrued special

attention to the region. Soviet influence, in parallel, began

its decline. The Cold War had impacted the actions and motives

in the Middle East that resembled a game of chess in which the

Arab states were the cumbersome players in the Super powers

game in the quest for supremacy. However, it can be perceived

as the states limiting and expanding power to the Superpowers

in a game of national interests. Nevertheless, by The October

War, the US had the upper hand in instigating a cease-fire and

brokered peace agreements between the region’s most

influential state, Egypt and the regions military might,

Israel largely leaving the Soviet Union marginalised as well

as establishing promising relationships with the Gulf States

in which America became the protectorate and saviour during

the Gulf War with increasing economic and military ties with

the oil-rich states. The Soviets, through the period of

detente had decreased its influence, although historically

tied to regions such as Egypt, domestic politics affected

regional relations that manifested itself against the Soviets

which gave the US a pass into the region establishing

20



dominance and hegemony at the end of the Cold War and the

dismantling of the Soviet Union.

REGIONAL POLITICAL ORDER – TRANS-NATIONAL

The impact of the Six-Day War on the regional level of the

Middle East approached three major developments. These are

the shift in Pan-Arabism due to the sharp decline of Nasserism

as a dominant force in the region since 1952; the socialist

Ba’athist Party in Syria & Iraq that posed a power struggle

for Arab leadership against Nasser, The Palestinian National

movement for ‘Self-determination’ that was crushed by their

brothers, known as ‘Black September’, the parallel upsurge of

political Islam that has shifted the uniting force, narrowing

the scope from Arabs to Muslims “Arab Nationalism is strongly

linked to issues and analysis of political Islam and

ethnicity”(Milton-Edwards, 2006: 46), especially since it

began to define itself increasingly as an alternative to

Nasserism in the region; the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which

came as a response to the refusal of Israel to negotiate a

return of the Occupied Territories and the first oil embargo

21



that resulted from this war which highlighted the shift in

regional power to the monarch oil-rich Gulf states.

THE DECLINE OF PAN-ARABISM

Nasserism: Golden Era to Decline

Nasserism was an ideology against colonialism, American

imperialism and the West, the imported ideologies of Marxism

and Socialism from the Eastern bloc bloomed into nationalist

sentiment. It emulated a united confrontationist front. He was

able to gather tenacious veracity as it presented an anti-

colonial movement; the nationalisation of the Suez in the 50’s

was viewed as unclenching the grip the West had over the

Middle East in the outcome of the 1957 Suez Canal crisis,

which contextualized the ideology. Another element in his

Nationalist movement tied to the Arab centre was the

Palestinian cause, a proponent of Pan-Arabism is that “Israel

is seen as a foreign entity in the midst of the Arab world,

which must be removed if Arab unity is to be

achieved”(Freedman, 1979: 90). The creation “of Israel in the

heart of the Arab world and the special support it received

from the West have created bitter feelings”(Jawad, 1994: 109).

Since Nasser and all who identified with him were necessarily

22



anti-western, they were seen as a threat to US hegemony in the

region and therefore axiomatically on the side of the Soviet

Union in terms of the Cold War that had extended over the

Middle East. The Soviets won Arab recognition through their

support of Fateh’s leader, Yassir Arafat, that was under the

tutelage of Nasser who played a hand in Arafat’s leadership in

the PLO.

Though, despite Nasser’s rallying cries of Arabism, there was

a seemingly more important agenda hidden beneath the wave of

unity, “[a]chieving relative advantage internationally and in

the Arab state system, gaining adherents among Arab public

opinion, and staying in power”(Louis, Shlaim, 2012: 265).

Nasserism as Pan-Arab rhetoric was a tool to strengthen

domestic as well as regional position which promoted Nasser as

a “guardian of Arab nationalist norms and could bolster or

subvert the domestic legitimacy of other leaders”(Hinnesbusch,

2003) his leadership granted him a presidential status in the

United Arab republic that was formed with Syria in 1958 as a

beacon of unity, strength and anti-imperialist. Egypt “sought

to extend Egyptian influence over the rest of the Arab

world”(Freedman, 1979: 93). Thus, the Egyptians engaged in the

war in Dhofar (Oman) played a prominent role for Nasser. The

Cold War between both superpowers had created a proxy with the

Soviets surrogate Egypt at one end and US backed Saudi Arabia

that had clashes with Oman in the past engage in a war in

Southern Arabia. This was significant for Nasser’s leadership

23



because it battled with Gulf forces whose monarchies were US

allies that Nasser sought to liberate from and expand his

revolutionary ways throughout the Gulf, “the victory of the

communist National Liberation Front (NLF) in neighbouring

South Yemen, [saw] the Soviet Union’s growing presence in the

Indian Ocean” .(Devore, 2011). This signalled Nasser at the

height of power, projecting this view is supported by similar

army coups mimicking Nasser, like Qadaffi in Libya and the

Ba’athist coup of general Abdul Karim Qassem in Iraq in 1963

which was significant since the Ba’ath doctrine embodied Pan

Arabist ideals.

The Palestinian issue assembled and united Arabs which Nasser

thoroughly acknowledged and successfully acted upon in ensuing

“that confrontation with Israel would be part of his Pan-Arab

policy”(Freedman, 1979: 92). Israel was an entity that

embodied "the other" which Nasserism construed in order to be

able to identify itself negatively against the west and all

that it embodied. Nasserism voiced the frustrations felt by

the Arab people at the colonially defined borders through the

Sykes-Picot agreement as well as the puppet governments in

place that allowed the west to usurp its resources like the

Hashemite monarchy in Jordan or the Gulf monarchies. In as

much, the ideology carried “elements of Pan-Arabism and state

nationalism [that were] in the policies of every Arab

state”(Freedman, 1979: 90), thus the ‘67 defeat caused a

devastating blow, their defeat was Nasser’s defeat (Milton-24



Edwards: 68) however it was not the physical essence of

defeat, it was countered as Nasser’s defeat more so because

the united Arab front that was at the heart of Nasser’s Pan-

Arab agenda failed.

In the aftermath of the 1967 War, the Arab states were shook

with humility that left them militarily, psychologically and

morally threatened and filled with disdain with a widespread

sentiment brewing that unity had become the main issue. “It

was not a frontal attack against Pan-Arabism but a deeper

agnosticism that saw no utility in banding together so long as

the fundamental issues of Arab society were unresolved”(Ajami,

1993: 45). The condition within Syria was strife with

political instability with a string of coup d’etats and the

members of government struggling for power left the Syrian

army in such a poor state, mainly as a result of infighting.

This left no organization, no communication between the

infantry and the air force and corruption led to huge funds

dedicated to the army being usurped. The rebellion in Oman had

clear fractions amongst the Arab world; It was proxy Cold War

with the de-facto states representing each superpower and

ideology. However, the suffering sparked an Arab resurrection,

especially with the emergence of resources such as oil and

manpower that elevated the region as an economic and strategic

power. Arab Nationalism (al-qawmiyya al-arabiyya) seemed to be the

solution to reconstruct the Middle East through the common

values shared such as, religion, culture, history and language

25



that identified them as one. These values were to cement the

bond and strengthen the region

The late 60’s and 70’s was a turning point for Nasserism in

the regional order and Arab leadership, power was beginning to

shift. 1967 exposed the facade of Arabism, indeed fragments

appeared within the Arab society that had been brewing before

the tragedy in June. “The Arab summit conference in Rabat,

Morocco in December 1969 [offered] an excellent example of

Egypt’s inability to solicit the aid of other Arab states [for

the 1968 War of Attrition against Israel], and the conference

also highlighted other divisions in the Arab world”(Freedman,

1979: 96).The 1969 Khartoum conference presented a platform in

which the gradual shift in allegiance was apparent; Egypt now

allied herself with Jordan and Saudi Arabia as opposed to

Ba’athist Syria. The leadership had transferred to “the

conservative oil producing countries”(Jawad, 1994: 113). This

was in part due to the amending relations between the

superpowers in the period of detente. The cooling relations

with the Soviets had led to an economic crisis, the solution

rose in the oil-rich Saudi.Israel, was still at large and

because of this Nasserism continued through the spirit of

Arabism in the form of Egpyt-Saudi axis. The new alliance

constituted a profound impact in the region. The oil boom

created opportunities for Egypt to gain advantage of the

growing leverage Saudi obtained over the West, this coalition

was most potent during the ’73 Yom Kippur War (Freedman: 98).

26



Sadat’s reforming policies throughout the 70’s led to the

death of political Nasserism, while the conservative states

became the main authority of Arab issues, “The shift reduced

the weight of the pan-Arab agenda”(Jawad, 1993:114). Nasserism

had created a profound change to the Middle East, Egypt held a

never before illustrious position as regional leader also, as

a unifying agent against Israel that produced an ‘us’ against

‘them’ environment it allowed the Arabs to confront and

challenge the Westphalian state order. Unfortunately, it

failed to amend the underlying fractions between the Arab

states; events of ’67 retarded the movement and the success of

the “1973 war inspired solidarity across the

region”(Hinnebusch, 2003: 60).

Ba’athism – What was & what is

Ba’athism emerged parallel to Nasserism. Ba’athism was an

“anti-colonial and pan-Arabist doctrine, not unwilling to ally

with the axis. It was a revolutionary doctrine”(Berman, 2012)

Famously found in Syria and Iraq, Ba’athism was a Socialist

ideology that shared the same Pan-Arab views of unity, even

more so then Nasserism, therefore the Palestinian issue had

been a central theme of the Ba’athist doctrine which was held

with great temerity that was seen in Syria which adopted its

guerrilla faction allied with them. With the absence of

Nasserism, Pan –Arabism still existed through the Ba’athist 27



socialist party that became increasingly militant by 1966.

Ba’athism began with an “agenda based on the principles

[to]... unite all Arabs throughout the region irrespective of

religion, nation or class”(Milton-Edwards, 2006: 68)

Because Syria was a state that emerged as a result of

colonialism it was superficial, in a sense that it lacked

distinction unlike Egypt, therefore “the dominant identity

remains Arab”(Jawad, Hinnebusch, 1994: 128), for that reason

their slogans, “ ‘unity, liberation and socialism. Freedom was

envisioned in a personal as well as a national sense”(Milton-

Edwards, 2006: 69) and themes of Pan-Arab and persistence of

unity and national revival amongst the Arab world were

comprehensible. Although Ba’athisthism encourages unity, it

was hypocritical in its “ideological rivalry between the two

branches...[in]Syria and Iraq”(Freedman, 1979: 114).

Ba’athism lost its central feature of innocence and

romanticism in a series of coup d’etat’s that established a

military relationship “led by young officers...[that] caused a

split in the pan-Arab movement”(BBC, 2012) between Aflaq, the

party’s founder and The Young Officers; by 1970 Syria was

under the rule of Hafiz Assad, an Alawite previously in the

young officers. Through these changes “Ba’thist ambitions for

Arab unity and socialism were maintained”(Milton-Edwards,

2006: 69). The main achievement created by the Ba’athists, in

both Syria and Iraq, was the change they brought in the Middle

East through their support of Palestine, which Syria devoted

28



its support to the cause that transformed “Aflaq’s

creation...into a tale of horror...[by way of] repression,

disillusionment and, finally, the loss of the Golan”(Ajwad,

1979: 52) in the 1967 War against Israel. After 1970,

Ba’athism in Syria became increasingly authoritarian with a

one-party rule that saw a rival Sunni faction crushed between

the late 70’s and early 80’s.

The rift between Aflaq and the party caused Aflaq in 1968 to

set up shop in Iraq, in which the party included Saddam

Hussein. The ideals of Pan-Arabism within the Ba’athist

doctrine had ceased to exist; in fact the Ba’athist party was

overstepped by personal power Saddam craved. The consequences

of this action “meant repeated military campaigns and acts of

extermination” (Berman, 2012), Saddam’s reign in Iraq, shook

Middle East into dismay. Saddam, in the name of Nationalism,

waged wars against his Arab ‘brothers’, eliminating any trace

of Aflaq’s creation. In the name of Pan-Arabism, Iraq

attempted to annex Kuwait during the 90’s during the Gulf War

and waged war against Iran during the 1980s “damaged its pan-Arab

stature and seriously risked regime legitimacy”(Jawad, Hinnebusch,

1994: 1 29).

In the name of Pan-Arabism, Syria remained a confrontationist

state against Israel, though despite the recognition in 1974

of the PLO being sole representatives of the Palestinian

people, Syria sought to “control Palestinian nationalism from

afar, opposing an independent national Palestinian movement,

29



[which]...King Hussein of Jordan would view...as a direct

threat to his rule.”(McKovsky, 2004) thus the Syrian

Ba’athists took the liberty of engaging in proxy wars “against

Israel [...] using guerrilla armies and terrorists in

Palestine and Jordan”(Berman, 2012).The outcome of these proxy

wars will be discussed in the next section.

Regimes in both states saw Ba’athism follow almost the same

evolution, a rise of militancy and authoritarianism while

seeking to expand its influence “The Baath in Syria and Iraq

alike ended up preaching an expansive pan-Arabism while

practicing a narrow politics”(Berman, 2012) that expressed and

practiced Pan-Arabism as seen fit by perception and

exaggerated the role of Islam within the Ba’ath doctrine as

the case of the Iraqi invasion of Iran which Saddam attempted

to justify. Both ‘ideologies’ of Nasserism and Ba’athism were

a form of nationalism “without social improvement [and] was

reactionary and insensitive; both had pledged their allegiance

to a brand of nationalism that incorporated radical reform and

socialism”(Ajami, 1993: 174)

BLACK SEPTEMBER – Brothers in arms take up arms.

30



The Palestinian cause was the cause of all Arabs, therefore

the well-being of the dispersed people were the responsibility

of the Arabs, especially the states responsible for the

defeat. “Following the 1967 war with Israel, Jordan lost the

West Bank of the Jordan River”(BBC –on this day) because of

this, Jordan had become the main host country of a multitude

of Palestinians that fled the conflict which resulted in an

emergence of a state-within-state and “was the only Arab state

to give Palestinians citizenship”(Said, 1994:6). Consequently,

the PLO had established HQ in Jordan where they carried out

their daily operations.

By 1968, the fervour of Nasserism and Nationalism had cooled

and a course of isolation had begun to take effect with a

sweeping tide of change, though the sting of defeat was still

present. Their loss coerced the Arab states to venture

westward toward The United States. This signalled a

Palestinian National Movement that encouraged “Palestinian men

and women to take up arms...to repossess a land and a history

that has been wrested”(Said, 1994: xv) as a result of the

gradual retract from the Palestinian question and ceasefire

with Israel following Egypt’s War of Attrition and proposal

plans (Rogers plan, Reagan plan, Baker plan etc.) of peace

that signalled the faltering stance of ‘Three NO’s’ the Arabs

took toward Israel after Egyptian, Jordanian and Israeli

acceptance of resolution 242, which the PLO had rigoursly

denounced, and jolted the beginning of a series of upraises

31



that drew the line with Jordan’s King Hussein “Because of the

defeat of 1967, the Palestinians actually thought they were

incipient leaders of an Arab revolution. It was a disastrous

temptation, producing the debacles in Jordan and Lebanon”

(McKovsky 2004).This created an upsurge of what Edward Said

coined, ‘Palestinianism’ that displayed a spirit of

repatriation which was never more evident than in Jordan where

various guerrilla groups appeared on the scene. “By early

1970, at least seven guerrilla organizations were identified

in Jordan. One of the most important organizations was the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by

George Habash”(onwar.com)which led to a series of plane

hijacking in the beginning of September 1970 that caused an

uproar in the Arab world, not only because they were losing

stronghold, but because the fedayeen were undermining Arab

strength and challenging the Arab order, between “Habash’s

Marxism and King Husein’s army”(Ajami, 1993: 177).

The somewhat anarchic Fedayeen movements and violent actions

taken by the guerrilla groups highlighted the “fragility of

the PLO’s military structure and the incoherence of its

political strategy”(Freedman, 1979: 224) especially in its

failed attempts to unite the groups under the umbrella

organization. The series of attacks were “for the writer

Adonis, the new “revolutionary moment””(Ajami, 1993: 175),

which came about in March 1968 against the Israeli reaction

towards the increased, yet sporadic, attacks against Israel

32



from Jordan. “Although the brigade inflicted damage, it was

driven back and in the process suffered substantial losses.

The incident boosted Palestinian morale and gave the PLO

instant prestige within the Arab community”(onwar, 2011). In a

sense, the movement had been revolutionary, it was the first

serious clash between the ‘enemy’ and the ‘wronged’ in which

the underdog emerges victorious un aided by the Arabs except

in funds, the beating drum of “Palestinianism” who’s refugee

status sensed a loss of identity, found courage in their sense

of despair. “Ms. Tassin points out that Palestinian armed

conflict had a destabilizing impact, presumably on Jordan and

Syria...and the civil war in Lebanon beginning in 1975 and

lasting through 1990”(McKovsky, 2004)

By 1970 the Fedayeen had posed a great threat to the Hashemite

Throne and towards the stability of Jordan. “The realist

paradigm suggests that states ally against common enemies and

thus states sharing common enemies should not fight each

other”(Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, Telmud, 2007), especially with

an interwoven tapestry of history between the Arabs against

Israel. However, “ By late 1968, the main fedayeen activities

in Jordan seemed to shift from fighting Israel to attempts to

overthrow Hussein”(onwar.com) in which assassination attempts

had been unsuccessful that led the Hashemite king on

September 16 to “declar[e] martial law and, the following

morning, unleashing his loyal Bedouin-led military on the

Palestinian insurgency”(Markey, 2007) as a result of the

33



guerrilla airplane hijackings and the control over major

cities such as Irbid and as-Zarqa by the fedayeen after an

agreement had been signed in the summer of 1970 pacifying to

the fedayeen. Brutal conflict rose between the PLA and

Hussein’s army. These actions had major consequences in

relation to the regional order of the Middle East. Jordan saw

numerous Syrian led- Moscow tanks entering its borders which

signalled a superpower battle of strengths with the US backed

Jordan, while Iraq sent 12,000 able bodies to the oil rich As-

Zarqaa, the US sent a sixth fleet with Israel on defensive

watch. This gradually led to a signed agreement in October

between Hussein and Arafati . The region was in the precipice

of war, with the Middle East divided between the axis and the

Palestinians, once ripe with revolutionary hope, saw it

crushed by Hussein’s Bedouin army. With pressure, Jordan saw

the dismissal of Iraqi soldiers and Syrian tanks by September.

As a result, “the residents of the West Bank were further de-

moralized. The PLO had been weakened severely, and guerrilla

warfare had proven ineffective. King Hussein was anathema, and

animosity towards the pre-1967 ruler swelled.” The Arabism

portrayed in the years before either proved to be false by

these events in which the Arab world was divided amongst its

different ideologies and institutions or proves that calls of

Nasser accruing Israel as the division of the Arab world

correct. This also marked a decisive shift in the region

towards US influence over Soviets since 1967.

34



RISE OF ISLAMISM – Looking back in order to move forward

The absence of Pan-Arabism after the ’73 Yom Kippur War, in

which the Middle East enjoyed an oil embargo victory, left an

ideological vacuum in the region. The new found power

following October’s war left people torn between the comforts

of the traditional ways and whether they “were now willing to

see the world as a product of their labor and sacrifices as

well as of their errors”(Ajami, 1993:59). Dr. Khatib notes the

transgression within this newly found enlightenment which

“stifled questioning and political reforms and strengthened

dictatorships”(McKovsky, 2004).

The shift in abandoned ideologues of Pan-Arabism marked a new

movement, Islamism. Mohammed Heikal explains that “the Arab

world has entered the “Saudi era” and that power had passed

from the “charismatic revolutionary” state of Abdul Nasser to

the “traditional” Saudi state”(Ajami, 1979:171). A form of

“religious nationalism”(Milton-Edwards, 2006: 134) surged

throughout the region creating wider divisions, not only

amongst the Christians, but within the Muslim world as well.

Islamic Nationalism, much like the defeat of 1967, was a

watershed in the future of the Middle East in the 70’s. The

rise of political Islam was a reaction to the increasing

dependency and influence of the West in the region. As well,

an apparent isolation over the region in the 70’s which saw

35



the formation of the GCC in the 80’s, left other Arab states

out which concentrated the distribution of wealthii and widened

the gap, as well as the Iranian revolution of 1979. One

distinctive element can be found in the Middle East between

Pan-Arabism and Political Islam, the search for identity.

The social structure of the Arab world had crumbled, leaving

“an opportunity to effect a radical transformation of society,

a break with the past, and the construction of a revolutionary

social order”(Ajami, 1993:31). The failure of ideologies and

the defeat gave leverage to ardent supporters that saw Islam

as a unifying factor, succeeding where all ideologies had

failed and provided the solution to the “economic crisis in

the region..[as well as]the pert bourgeoisie’ and the

culminating cultural effects of the West”(Milton-Edwards,

2006:146) that propped up corrupt dictators that were

increasingly authoritarian. This came in the form of an

Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 which established a

theocracy that attested to the revulsion of western influence,

and control monarchies in the Gulf States sought in the region

by allying themselves with the west. The overthrow of the Shah

led to the succession of exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, a shi’ite

and the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran was the exemplary

case of Islamic Nationalism. The impact of the revolution had

an immediate effect on the Middle East, “The revolution

restored confidence in Islam as a viable alternative to

36



secularism and provided Muslims in other countries with a

model to emulate”(Azm). The PLO’s dissent from proactive

ideological strategy to passivism garnered the rise of Islam

in the form of Political Islamic Nationalism that was highly

radicalised in the formation Hamas which charted the ‘Islamic

Resistance Movement’ in the 80’s of which the “primary

objectives...were resistance to Israeli occupation and

liberation of Palestine”(Azm) This mode created a paradigm of

political and national Islam that challenged the PLO in its

popular support by its military wing. The 1987 Intifada was

effective in aggregating support within and around the Middle

East, however its military actions called to question the

pretence of violence and Islam and its conduct demonstrated

varying success in carrying out its charter of liberation. The

paradoxical shift of militant-Islam exported its charter of

liberation. “By 1978, a core faction within Islamic Jihad

call[ed] for the violent overthrow of the Egyptian government

and liberation of Palestine”(Hussein, Atraqchi, 2009) that

resulted in the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 as a

consequence, partly to peace talks with Israel at Camp David

in the US during the 70’s and partly due to the Iranian

Revolution that was admired in Egypt.

Islamic fundamentalism “internally...[was] directed against

the corruption or the injustice of the political system;

externally, it may be channelled against foreign

influences.”(Jawad, 1994:108) Iran, eluded with belief as the

37



true harbinger of Islam, sought to export the Shi’ite

revolution to neighbouring countries that undermined the

shi’ite majority while the minority Sunni ruled with

susceptible legitimacy “who fostered what [Khomeini] called

“American Islam””(Shahi,2009). This resulted in “the bloodiest

war in the post-war Middle East [that] took place between

September 1980 and August 1988”(PDFIR) between Iran & Iraq,

destabilizing the region and threatening the security of the

Gulf as well perpetuate an axis challenging the balance of

power within the region with the Arabs supporting Iraq with

the exception of Syria. 1982, King Abdullah of Jordan stated

in an interview with The London Times in relation to the

Iranian revolution, “we are facing the most difficult time

that I ever witnessed in this region of the world. The threat

of Zionism is not any greater than threat of Shiite

fundamentalism” creating internal contradiction to the

unifying factor Islam was supposed to harbour. Instead, it

created fragments upon ethnicity and religious sect and

divided the Muslim world accordingly between the

traditionalists and radicals. Thus Islam became a more

prominent part of mainstream life and society during the 1980s

(Esposito 1991: 171).

Conclusion:

The regional implications of the 1967 war were profound; it

transformed the face of the region and posed a major challenge

38



to the immediate postcolonial order which emerged around the

Nasserist/Ba'athist programme that sought to unite the Arabs

with rhetoric of unity, liberty and justice against Israel.

The demise of Pan-Arabism following the split of the UAR in

1961 showcased the strength of Arab unity for Palestine but

also the divisions within the Arab world that led to the

isolation of states by the 70’s. This marked a gradual shift

in regional politics of the Middle East from Egypt towards the

oil-rich Gulf; an increasing American influence followed a

marginalisation of Soviet influence. Increasing moderation

supplanted confrontation in relation to Israel and the

Palestinian question throughout the 70’s where States sought

peace with Israel which triggered the events of ‘Black

September’ in Jordan. Since the defeat of ’67 the Middle East

sought and pursued a new identity, Pan-Arabism was replaced by

Nationalism that marked a different trajectory course of each

state ideologically but all commonly Autocratic in leadership.

“As interpreted by the monarchies, traditional Islam became a

pillar for their kind of order, a prop for the monarchies that

had been warning against wild men, imported ideologies, and

subversive movements”(Ajami, 1979:73)The failure of ideologies

to unite, and the corrupt rule of regimes supported by the

west in the region sparked an Islamic uprising that

‘Islamicised’ Modernity by way of Political Islam and Islamic

Nationalism that was presumed to unify the Muslims but instead

highlighted cleavages within that caused a regional struggle

for influence, power and leadership.

39

i Arafat became supreme commander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the regular military force of the PLO.ii The increase in oil-income created a wide gap in the distribution of wealth

between the Gulf state and other Arab countries.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ORDER

“The outcome of the Six Day War was a textbook case of a

revolutionary situation, with all its standard ingredients:

military defeat, internal exhaustion, the disaffection of

intellectuals, a generation gap that was rapidly turning into an

abyss, scathing critiques of the most sacred facets of a culture’s

life”(Ajami. 1993:174). For the domestic level, the outcome had

drastically transformed the internal functions of states. For the

Arabs, it confirmed a break with the past and the construction of

a new future in the form of new regimes, leadership styles as well

as a realignment of the axis and a shift from previous ideological

contours. A popular trend identified with Israel, Egypt, Syria and

the Palestinian people, a change in the attitude of society, which

occurred as a reaction toward the alteration of a new political

order that had transformed the state economically, politically and

militarily. For Israel, it channelled a division amongst society

and a rift in its political culture, a victim of transforming

forces from external surrounding entities that questioned

leadership capabilities in a fragile state. For Palestine, it was

the unity of a dispossessed population that worked toward a goal

under a leadership that had its authority tested through the

changing phases and turmoil between labels of outcasts and

brother. Each produced a unique change post ’67 that encompassed a

new trajectory course that found its domestic affairs altering its

surrounding region in the process.

ISRAEL -the war within

In the aftermath of the war “an area of 88,000 square kilometres

compared with 20,050 before the war, or eighteen times the

area”(Bregman, 2000)was gained. An internal rift in the Knesset

began to appear in discerning the question of ‘how to deal with

this victory?’ in terms of territories. This sparked an internal

debate amongst society whether to take a diplomatic or military

approach to the newly acquired territory; the government and the

military were two sides of the same coin. The government sought a

diplomatic approach, to secure peace through trade-off

negotiations with its Arab counter-parts whereas the military were

hard-liner IDF General Staff that opposed diplomacy and viewed the

government as the fearful diaspora Jews that were still cautious

of their existence (Louis, Shlaim, 2012:24), These IDF General

staff later formed the Likud Party. The objective was of a real

peace, one which safeguarded the right of Israel’s existence as

well as normal relations and open borders for trade. This was the

aim of the Israeli government from 1967 – 1977 throughout the

leadership of Rabin and Meir. However the methods of Meir’s Labour

and Rabin’s Likud parties would differ in attaining the prized

goal of peace and security. In 1967 three main approaches were

evident in weighing the Israeli decision of the burdening question

of territories: the government, which maintained the position of

negotiating land for peace which had the majority of support, the

‘Hawks’, to the right, that viewed Arabs as backward whom

understood nothing but military might and advocated for annexing

the territories to ensure their security. Finally the peace view

‘Doves’, Left party, argued for the government to invest more in

negotiations and peace (Freedman, 1979).

Until 1977 Labour dominated the Knesset, however decline “ Labor

Party was hampered by internal dissension, persistent allegations

of corruption, ambiguities and contradictions in its political

platform”(Metz, 1988). Labour faced a new regional and domestic

situation, the territories acquired posted historical and

religious sentiment, The West Bank and Jerusalem in which the

Cabinet would decide no withdrawal from the occupied territories

until direct negotiations with the Arabs would be achieved. The

position, which shed unfavourable light towards Eretz-Yisrael

generated an internal rift within the party “over its leaders'

inability to reach a consensus concerning the future of the West

Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula; there was agreement

only on the need to retain the Golan Heights to ensure strategic

depth against Syria”(Metz, 1988). From the right, Land of Israel

movement denounced the governments’ current position and the peace

movement, from the left that supported the peace initiatives

through negotiations. During this time, the Arabs staunchly

begrudged the Israeli olive branch by shutting themselves behind

the three pillars of ‘NO’. The inability of the Labour government

to pacify the Arabs led to a policy change in the aftermath of the

Yom Kippur War. This was partly a result of the “Likud [party

that] was...set up in 1973 to challenge the Labour party”(BBC,

2013), also because of dissatisfaction amongst ‘Oriental Jews’ for

Labour’s inability to prepare the country for the surprise war.

Labour began to undermine and contradict its policies, which

served the Rights ‘Greater Israel’ programme, they “would not

return to the armistice lines which existed on June 4,

1967”(Freedman, 1979: 203), furthermore beginning soon after the

June 1967 War Labour had established settlements in the

territories and refrained from dismantling illegal settlements,

such as those established in 1968; contradiction in Labor's

political platform concerned Jersualem. All Labor governments have

proclaimed that Jerusalem will always remain the undivided capital

of Israel despite its previous position of accommodating the

religious meaning of other faiths (Metz, 1988). Because of this,

The Labour government had largely lost touch during 1976 which led

to succession of the Likud party in 1977 which was Nationalist in

its Zionist vision of a ‘Greater Israel’. The new Party were hard-

liners which called for the retention of all of The West Bank due

to historical and religious purposes whereas Labour had produced

settlements for purely security reasons and whereas Labour was

calling on defensible borders, Likud sought to retain all

territories. As a result, a demographic problem had arisen in

which the government sought to fill the settlements by inviting

all Jews ‘back home’ in which a majority of Israel's citizens

originate from the Middle East that have emigrated from countries

such as Morocco, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey and Iran. This created a

sense of Middle – Easternization in Israel i.e. the

internationalization of Arab elements into Eshkenazi Jewish

culture such as music, food and other cultures that have imbedded

itself within the Jewish way of life.

“For much of Israel's history, a stigma has been attached to the

culture of the Middle East. The country's founding fathers were

Europeans and encouraged their poorer Jewish cousins to trade up

for Western culture. But after Menachem Begin's Likud Party ousted

the old leadership in 1977 with the crucial votes of Middle

Eastern Jews, this underground culture slowly began to emerge with

greater confidence.”(Sipress, 1994).

SYRIA- Fears & ambitions

Syria’s domestic politics has been turbulent, with a number of

Coup d’etats that led to the succession of Hafez Al Assad in 1970,

“a time when Syria was just emerging from three years of

radicalism”(Freedman, 1979). Hafez Al Assad came to power through

the “Military Committee” The committee was made up of five, Major

Mohammed Omran, Major Saleh Jadid, Captain Abdel-Karim Al Jundi,

Major Ahmed Al Meer and Captain Hafez Al Assad. This secret

committee formed within the Ba’ath party’s years which Syria

shared strongest ties with Egypt under The United Arab Republic

1958- 1961. Domestically, Syrian society was torn between the

unity with Egypt under Nassser’s policies. The Ba’ath ideology

expresses the Pan-Arabist theme which supports Arab unity as well

as nationalism for the Palestinian agenda which “have become focal

points for many political movements”(Freedman, 1979:250). Assad’s

ascent to power was after a series of political instability that

happened through a series of Coup de’tats that led to the Ba’ath

party to rule. The Ruling Ba’athist party has predominantly been

led by minority Alawites, though not formally taking power

publicly; a Sunni President was always elected, they were the

underlying force behind the decisions, pulling the strings so to

speak, in a Sunni majority population which over the years added

to a number of factors that caused a split between Syrians and

Ba’athists. Along with this was a division of civilians between

the military as well as internal divisions within the party. Their

policies had caused “the Baath party [to] agree [] to the

annulment of freedom in Syria. It allowed the country to be ruled

by a regime that didn't allow freedom and banned the formation of

parties. This led to splits in the Arab Socialist Baath Party,"

says Dafi al-Jamaani, a former Baath party leader who was

interviewed on an Al Jazeera programme named ‘Syria: The reckoning’.

The Military Committee had risen to power following the succession

of a military coup in 1963 in the overthrow of Nadhim Al Qudsi,

the first president to be elected after the split with Egypt. The

committee ruled with violence and militancy. In 1966, another coup

d’etat had taken place after a series, placing Salah Jadid in

power thus promoting Assad to Minister of Defence (MoD).

Upon their establishment as rulers, Ba’athism and the elements

within which created the ideology had been abandoned and a

military dictatorship was enforced in its place. According to

Radwan Ziadeh, from the Syrian centre for political studies, the

“Ba’ath party was used as the cover to seize power in the country.

It wasn’t a real party”. The regime, in a tactic to stronghold

its position in a state that carried a history of coup d’etat’s

sought to restructure the economy, state and society, Marshall Law

was imposed, because of this the regime lacked social support.

“constitution was shelved” this statement by Haitham Al Maleh gave

reason for protestors to head to the streets demanding civil

rights that saw a brutal crackdown. In the aftermath of the 1967

war the loss of the Golan Heights was rested on Assad and Meer.

This produced a split between Jadid and Assad, causing the latter

to become more autonomous and sought to rally support and

popularity amongst the Armed forces by bribing their loyalty

through scholarships (Doulah, 2013).This strategy proved to be

effective for future aspirations where it was used as a weapon

against his opponents.

1969 was a shifting point in Syrian politics. Whereas Jadid, being

a strong man that ruled with force who had captured his position

through “revolutionary force” had based his ruling on his

ideological value of leftist Marxism which supported change and

reform whereas Assad was more pragmatic then ideological, a trait

Jundi acknowledged in his fortelling of the course of events under

Assad’s agenda before his suicide. The former Ba’athist leader

Daffi Al Jamani believed that he, “committed suicide because he

knew Assad would carry out a coup” which Assad called a

“corrective movement”. During the events of Black September, 1970

Assad showed his strength in not aiding the Syrians in their

invasion with air support, instead the army was defeated by

Jordanians whose operations were led by Assad, these actions

foretold future events. By 1972 Assad was in full power, raising

another and final successful coup in 1970. Assad’s opponents by

then had become his own member of the committee whom were either

jailed or dead.

Assad transformed politics in Syria, he stabilised the government

through ‘national reconciliation’ which initiated “people of all

different political persuasions”(freedman, 1979:261) as well as

establishing a new constitution with a referendum in 1973

moreover, the economy had started to thrive in the mid 70’s. The

constitution was a written dictatorship in which Assad obtained

power in all branches; it was a tool he exercised in which limited

the public freedom and upheld the state of emergency. Assad was

partly deified, worshipped and seen as the inspirer, the October

war glorified him as a hero for standing up to Israel. According

to Haithem Al Maleh, a Syrian Democracy activist who had lived

through the Hafez years, “Assad wanted peoples love and loyalty.

Late 70’s and 80’s her urged people to speak out and criticize the

government [which was seen as a form of open democracy by some].

When we did, we were arrested”. Assad was perilous in his

strategic thoughts and plans; he uprooted all opponents which he

perceived as a threat. His autocratic rule reigned throughout the

state for 30 years onward.

EGYPT – A resurrection of pasts’ present

Nasser was an influential man with a strong dominating force in

the Arab world “who had become a symbol and legend in his own

lifetime”(CUP, 2011). His temerity led to the premiership of Egypt

in the region. Sadat by contrast was a more moderate man who

lacked the passion and fire Nasser had exuded in his years. Sadat,

inheriting the position of Egypt had lived in Nassers shadow. The

people of Egypt were loyal followers of Nasser, his presence still

lingered in their minds, more of a deity in his death that Sadat

hunted to mortalise and effectively replace in the minds of

society who sought to question his authority and legitimacy at

every turn. Sadat proved his position as President of Egypt in his

own grace and style by way of Corrective Revolution (Harakat Al

Tashihat) in 1971. He proclaimed his status during the 1973 War,

but the result of his brash actions underlined Nasser’s impact on

him by which he sought to legitimise through his policies and

hindering behind his steps that led up to the war. It was only

after he cemented his status post ’73 that he steadily and

noticeably began to tread his own path by way of liberalising the

country and effectively working opposite to Nasser, dismantling

and reconstructing his image and imprint in its place by way of

political moves and policies.

The process or watershed in Egyptian and Arab politics was marked

by the suicide of Abdel Hakim Amer, the commander-in-chief to

Nasser who had blamed himself for Egyptian loss in the outcome of

1967. His actions indicated a turn in Arab politics, a break from

the past that would allow salvation in politics by building a new

future by way of acknowledging responsibilities and “willing to

see the world as a product of their labor and sacrifices”(Ajami,

1992:59). This is what inspired Sadat to undertake his own

political course in the Arab world, it was this change that led

him to pragmatic actions, “We live in a world of facts and we

can’t build on hopes and fantasy. The fact is that you have been

defeated so don’t ask for a victor’s spoil” a sobering quote by

Dr. Henry Kissinger that perpetrates the change Sadat implemented

without promises and fabrication of grandiose. To harbour this

view of change and expound it towards the masses Sadat undertook a

Corrective Revolution in 1971 starting with the internal structure

of the political system which effectively snowballed into a

process of de-Nasserization from 1970 – 75. His first change was

the drafting of a new constitution in September 1971, as well as

changing the nations name from the UAR to The Arab Republic of

Egypt, symbolising it’s break with fragmented history of severed

relationships and a visible step away from the Pan-Arab rhetoric

of the Nasserite years, yet still keeping in line with Nasser’s

strategy of unity, union and leadership amongst Arab nations he

had established the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR, comprising

Egypt, Libya and Syria) in 1972.

Unlike Nasser, Sadat had been successful in maintaining

relationships with Arab states that strengthened unity within the

region that led to the success of the October war. Politically, it

saw “a far reaching liberalisation of the economy and society by

purging the state apparatus of the committed supporters of

Nasser's secular, nationalist and socialist ideology”(EISA, 2012).

As a result, the Soviet influence in the state was minimal “when

[Sadat] ordered the withdrawal of all Soviet military advisers

from Egypt. It was popular because the Soviet presence was

disliked”(Manfield, 1992:439) due to the souring relationship that

had developed between Egypt and the SU. The consequence of these

actions had regional impacts. Regionally, Sadat’s Corrective

Revolution ultimately led to a closer tie with Saudi Arabia,

Nasser’s foe, and a general growing relationship within the Middle

East. “Sadat was much more successful than Nasser in forming a

united Arab front to which each Arab state contributed the

resources with which it was most endowed”(Mansfield, 1992:440).

The Saudi-Egyptian axis became important for military as well as

economic means. The Soviets were the main source of arms and aid,

the oil-rich Saudi state was an asset for Egypt’s infrastructure.

Economically, Sadat adopted an infitah, open door, policy that had

domestic as well as regional consequences for Egypt. Unlike the

economy under socialism, private enterprises thrived and

westerners had begun to invest, creating better prospects for

employment and lifestyle. This was a hint toward the Westward

trajectory Sadat was embarking upon “which had been Sadat’s

principle objectives”(Mansfield, 1992: 440), a far stretch in the

opposite direction which Nasser had paved; the remnants of

Nasser’s Egypt was negligible. Politically, the police state had

been abolished and there was room for political freedom by 1976

with a political platform for the parties. Sadat gradually

detracted from Nasser’s shadow, where full force was exposed

during the October War.

“Sadat broadly won the limited political objectives he had set

himself”(Mansfield, 1992:440) in the aftermath of the October war

where he had played a leading role in the perceived victory over

Israel, and successfully retrieved Egypt’s prestige in crossing

the Suez which symbolised “crossing from defeat to victory,

division to unity, shame to dignity, oppression to justice, terror

to security”(CUP, 2011). His enhanced authority had allowed Sadat

to act independently despite Arab grievances towards the United

States, unduly alienating himself from his borthers in his search

for peace with Israel that resulted in Egypt becoming a western

client regime. Sadat had disengaged, disarmed and dismantled

Nasserism and Nasser’s Egypt in the process of 5 years that

observed a revamped leadership, allies, economy, society; a new

Egypt.

PALESTINE – A people in limbo

Palestinians have passed from a people with their courage

diminished and identity slipping from their conscious as they

dispersed throughout the Middle East in search for peace, but none

would rest their beings knowing their home was taken by an alien

force that manipulated and gained support of the international

arena that had betrayed the locals and ignored the injustice and

abuse to repent the guilt for their ancestors faults. However, in

1968 these ‘lost’ peoples found their voice and sought to act when

it was apparent their calls fell on deaf ears; their brothers had

lost the momentum and instead looked inward toward their own

domesticities that called for attention. Also, the Palestinians

were enmeshed within their host countries politics, this triggered

a Palestinian movement that established the term ‘Palestinianism’,

“although many of us were shattered by the catastrophe of 1967, we

were reinvigorated by the Palestinian national movement [that was]

felt throughout the Arab world [after the June war]”(Said,

1995:xv). This movement was interpreted in many forms, from

legitimate authority through established channels to rebels,

guerrillas and terrorism, each with a goal, a shared vision of

conquering back their homeland and liberating Palestine.

Because the Palestinian people were fragmented and separated

mainly between Lebanon and Jordan, where within tine the

Palestinian movement would curdle from brotherly hospitality to

complete disdain and revolt, the mood was reciprocated with the

“feeling in other Arab countries that Palestine had neither serves

nor been adequately served by actions taken in the interests of

Arab nationalism”(Said, 1995:13) this gave way to an empty

platform by which a Palestinian could look to a leader of its kin

to guide the people back home in the midst of guerrilla groups

that had emerged as a response to Israeli violence since the first

intifada; the rebellion was the first process of emancipating

Palestine by the 60’s. This void was filled by the Palestinian

National Liberation Movemenet (Harakat al – Tahrir al – Watani al

-Falistini) also known as Fateh, an autonomous movement that was

prominent amongst the various guerrilla groups, which wrested

control of the PLO in the late 60’s which had been under Arabian

tutelage, this resulted in profound significance among the

dispersed people, it signalled a shift in Palestinian legitimacy

and self-determination that was rivalled by George Habash’s

Peoples Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Fateh was

courted by Nasser, through which Arafat had gained recognition by

the Soviet Union. This propelled Fateh as a main entity in the

legitimacy for Palestine. This also encouraged Arab leaders to vie

for influence through the Palestinian cause for regional influence

such as the Jordanians who would “[manipulate]...Palestinians

under its tutelage, but was never able to subdue their nationalist

aspirations”(Said, 1995:41) and Syria which had established their

own faction that would be tied to Damascus. The PFLP and PLO

understood that independent action was tantamount to their cause,

but was also a cause for concern among the Arabs and towards the

stability of their government that produced complications that

resulted in the expulsion of the PLO in both Jordan in 1971 and

Syria 1982.

Fateh, unlike the PLO, “founders came from...refugees arriving in

Gaza”(Sayigh, 1997: 80) and built a reputation with the help of

Egyptian officers which later, much to Nasser’s encouragement, led

to the leadership of the PLO in 1969 by which “the PLO is said to

have “introduced” terrorism”(Said, 1995: 38) which was not an

uncommon accusation felt toward the Palestinian movement in

international perception. Fateh’s two main principles stipulated

“the absolute independence of Palestinian Organization and

decision-making from the Arab governments and the primacy of armed

struggle as the sole means of liberating Palestine”(Sayigh, 1997),

thus when Arafat had taken leadership of the PLO it has taken a

drastic influx of criticism and admiration.

Palestinian refugees harboured the pulse of “Palestinianism” that

coursed through the streets of Beirut, Amman and Cairo, each

playing a significant part in the Palestinian movement. Amman

presented a “impressive dedication to Arab Palestine”(Said,

1995:7) where the armed Palestinians enjoyed a freedom in carrying

out their ‘duties’ against Israel that had frequently committed

air raids to the most densely populated refugee camps that the

Jordanians tolerated, though had become a cause for concern.

Jordan played host while the Egyptians assisted in training and

arms, this effectively legitimised the actions the fedayeen had

taken, even so much to support its dangerous and destabilizing

activities which effectively led to “guerrilla organizations

themselves bec[oming] more elaborate structurally and began to

develop important political functions of a nation-building

character”(Hudson, 1972) which was found in the unique nature of

state-within-state. Arafat’s integration as chairman of the PLO

signalled a new beginning for the movement that was finally

rallied under a leadership, Fatah’s 2 principles by default

established the PLO’s objectives. 1969, the same year of Arafat’

election, Palestinian commandos had shot down a Lebanese Army

helicopter during clashes with the Lebanese state, “the order of

Lebanon is how miraculously it was able to accommodate

everything...Until the Civil War of 1975 Lebanon stood for

accommodation”(Said,1995: 5). This had significant consequences

for the legitimacy and leadership, the Palestinian faction had

revolutionised their own society. Signing of the Cairo Accords

between the armed Palestinians and the Lebanese state effectively

legitimised the armed Palestinians which had dire consequences to

an already politically and ethnically fragile state. These states

were the breeding ground for independent factions that challenged

the PLO’s leadership. Radical Leftist ideology was found in the

PFLP slogans ‘All power to the resistance’ adopting a

revolutionary Marxist doctrine, communicating the Democratic Front

intentions to overthrow the regime (Al Jazeera, 2009). These

highlighted the lack of control Arafat sustained over the movement

in his inability to harbour all the factions and subdue them. The

PFLP’s actions in the airline hijacking during in September 1970

instigated a backlash from Jordanian forces that produced two

observations, the dissatisfaction amongst Palestinian people and

their Arab counter-parts that initiated drastic measures to re-

assert their attention to the Palestinian cause and demonstrated

the power the Palestinian movement garnered. In the knowledge of

the Septembers events had Arabs in the region furious, accusing

the Hashemite kingdom of attempting to eliminate the Palestinian

Liberation Movement (PLM). In the failure of Arafat to accord to

the signed ceasefire agreement, the Palestinians were expelled in

July 1971 which signified a dejected moment for the PLO, stateless

once again.

The 70’s was a changing time in the leadership strength and style.

The events known as ‘Black September’ provoked an upsurge of a

‘terrorist’ faction named Black September Organization (BSO) that

was radicalized. Their actions included the assassination of

Jordanian PM following the Palestinian expulsion in 1971 and the

1972 Olympics in Munich was a sensitive incident in which they

aimed to continue the revolution by murdering Israeli athletes.

Interestingly enough, Arafat had knowledge of these events and

even condoned them. The movement had truly become independent,

acting in the name of Palestinian liberation and power that turned

it against not only the obvious enemy, Israel, but toward their

brethren. The PLO began to lose its credibility in the region,

isolating themselves from two major allies with the third

presenting discontent. The realisation of the Palestinian actions

hindering the cause created a shift in alignment after the 1973

October War. Arafat had acknowledged the limits of the use of

violence and military action to achieve the political objective to

liberation of Palestine. His present shift in attitude had won him

an audience in the UN in 1974 in which he denounced terrorism that

set off a standing ovation in his new objective to seek peaceful

demands to acquire his homeland (Al Jazeera, 2009). As well, the

new strategy adopted involved the recognition of Israel and a two-

state solution; this was an ingenious tactic to gain the support

of international agents, in turn dismissed Israeli leverage. The

PLO had become the sole legitimate of the Palestinian leaders,

this acquired Arafat authority on the international stage that

lined factions and rivals such as PFLP towards Arafat’s strategy

of peace. 1975 put the legitimate authority to the test; Haddad

had broken the peace in a hostage situation in Vienna where OPEC

oil ministers were present. 1975 – 1982 was filed with violence,

the eruption of the Lebanese civil war that the Palestinians

became enmeshed that once again had the region at odds with

another. The 1982 ceasefire following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon

saw the evacuation of the PLO, a major setback in the scheme of

liberation.

Conclusion:

Each of the evolving domestic elements conquers with one unified

element, Political reform established under new leadership. This

was apparent in all states and the Palestinian movement. For the

Israeli’s it was the establishment of a hard-liner in the

deteriorating and contradictory front of the Labour party, for the

Syrians it manifested from a number of secessionist coups, and the

struggle for power within the government that led to the

succession of Hafez Al Assad who’s pragmatic approach led him to

rule for over a decade. In Egypt, the reform came in political,

ideological, economical and military reform breaking from its

Nasserite era, Sadat’s presidency marked a profound shift in the

regional as well as domestic order. The Palestinians had found a

leader amongst its various factions which adverted the call of a

violent revolution through the 60’s to reform of its core

principles in achieving the liberation of Palestine through

peaceful movements that resulted in international recognition

after a various events that declined support and expulsion from

Arab states.

The results of the 1967war had affected each country differently;

The Israelis had extended their territory which as a result had

divided the society between peace and detainment. With the choice

of holding on the occupied territories it adamantly saw its

security threatened, mainly by the Palestinians. This also led to

a demographic change within its society that merged Arab and

Middle Eastern cultures with that of Jewish. For the Egyptians

under Sadat it led from a period of leadership which encompassed

the Arab world to isolation and a series of disengagement

agreements followed by the return of Sinai through Camp David. The

influence of America in the societal sphere, with the people

pleased to be rid of the quasi-colonialism that the Soviets

implied to the American one was not easily swallowed. The Syrians

had the most destabilizing effect in the outcome of the 67 war

they say the rise of Hafez Al Assad who controlled the ‘Ba’athist’

with a clenched fist that diminished any opposition. His

‘invincibility’ resembled that of a part deity in his heroic image

after the October war which he played a dominant role. For the

Palestinians it had an obvious effects, it demoralised the

Palestinians even further and drove them to extreme measure to

counter the stagnation in their plight for the liberation of their

nation to the acceptance of the Israelis and finally, peace.

Conclusion:

Looking at the international, regional and domestic level of the

impact inflicted by the Six-Day War in June 1967 has led to an

evaluation of events occurred in the time following the three

decades after the defeat. What are inherent are the trends that

have characterised the Middle East as a result of the war and the

social, political and military changes brought along with it due

to waves of influence upon the three levels analysed which each

had one similar factor in determining or instigating the overall

developments in the region. The international Level that focuses

on the Cold War and the American and Soviet influence had created

a stigma in the region. Upon the analysis of the three levels, the

Regional level is convicted with loopholes that find the actions

undertaken by states to be a result of American and Soviet

influence. The domestic level had seen in social and economical

changes because of the interest in the region post 1967, Egypt saw

the end to the Soviets and the economy embrace the ‘open door’

policy, The cause of the stagnant Palestinian movement was due to

the Arab states investing more into economic and security

dependency that saw an upsurge in the terrorist and guerrilla

factions from the Palestinians toward Israel, a by proxy of

America as well as toward their host states. The Israeli society

would not exist if not of American contractual ties in the region.

For the Syrians, this came in the form of restoring relations with

Soviets for a mean time to counter react the western influence in

the region, the Nassresist and Ba’athist years that transcended

upon other countries that were influenced by the leadership of

states such as Egypt and Syria all had influence by way of the

Cold War that extended Soviet and American influence in the

region. with the US tying itself with Israel and the Soviets with

its main ally, Egypt. Pan-Arsbist ideals set about uniting the

Arabs for the Palestinian cause and the marginalising of western

influence in the region. Political Islam, ascended in parallel to

the decline of Arab nationalism/Nassersim and the ensued economic

boom from oil that opened the world markets to the Arab economies

which had imbalanced the act of state and society on the imprint

of the Arab-Muslim order that finds no other effective way of

fighting the imported influence than Islam. On the regional basis

these trends first manifested in Arab nationalism, under the reign

of Nasser united the Arabs against the West and its penetration

into the heart of the Middle East in the establishment of Israel.

Pan Arabism at the emergence of economic wealth due to value of

oil united the region against western influence, and gave them a

presence on the international stage, however fragments soon

appeared. Political Islam emerged as a result of the growing

economic cleavage and corruption amongst the region. As a result,

it enabled the west to use the economic conflicts to go gain

influence by way of security developments and economic

investments. This came in the form of protection from Iran that

posed the most threat to the Gulf states in its export of its

Islamic revolution in the exasperation of corrupt regimes and a

wide socioeconomic gulf. For the Hashemite monarch in Jordan, the

close ties maintained had consequences for the stability of the

state and in the region. Gulf security dependency on America had

driven them to price moderation of oil, ties between Egypt and

America had bud from the economic prospects. This marginalised the

Soviet influence in America’s predominant attitude in securing

peace between Egypt and Israel and was a key factor in instigating

the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel. It is with

these findings that I feel I am able to conclude that the

International influence was the cause for the transformation of

the Middle East.

Bibliogrpahy

Ajami, F. (1992) The Arab Predicament. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge

Amr, Z. ( - ) ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ The Jerusalem Fund. [online] available from < http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/d/ContentDetails/i/2971> [10 April 2012]

http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/d/ContentDetails/i/2971

BBC News Middle East (2013) Guide to Israel’s Political Party [online]

available from < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21073450> 7 April 2013

BBC News Middle East, (2012) Syria: Syria’s Ruling Baath Party [online]available from < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755>[23 March 2013]

BBC on this day (2005) 1970: Civil war breaks out in Jordan [online] available from < http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/17/newsid_4575000/4575159.stm> [15 April 2013]

Berman, P. (2012) ‘Baathism: An Obituary’. New Republic [online] 14 September. Available from< http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/magazine/107238/baathism-obituary#> [25 March 2013]

Booty, H (2012) The Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars in Historical Context [online] available from < http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/the-six-day-and-yom-kippur-wars-in-historical-context/> [2 April 2013]

Bregman, A. (2000) Israel’s Wars 1947 – 93. London: Routledge

DeVore, M. (2011) ‘ United Kingdom's last hot war of the ColdWar: Oman, 1963-75’ Cold War History [online] available from <http://web.mit.edu/polisci/people/gradstudents/papers/DeVoreMarc-LastHotWarofColdWar.pdf > [26 April 2013]

Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2012) Egypt: Sadat and the "Corrective Revolution" (1970-1981) [online] available from <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/egyoverview8.htm> [12 April 2013]

Francis, Taylor (1979) ed. Ro i, Y. The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East. Surrey: Biddles Ltd.

http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/egyoverview8.htm

http://web.mit.edu/polisci/people/gradstudents/papers/DeVoreMarc-LastHotWarofColdWar.pdf

http://web.mit.edu/polisci/people/gradstudents/papers/DeVoreMarc-LastHotWarofColdWar.pdf

http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/the-six-day-and-yom-kippur-wars-in-historical-context/

http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/the-six-day-and-yom-kippur-wars-in-historical-context/

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/magazine/107238/baathism-obituary

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/magazine/107238/baathism-obituary

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/17/newsid_4575000/4575159.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/17/newsid_4575000/4575159.stm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755



Freedman, R. (1979) World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: Pergamon Press

Golan, G. (2010) Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis. Cambridge: CUP

Golan, G. (1990) Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War Two to Gorbachev. Cambridge: CUP

Halliday, F. (2005) The Middle East in Internationa Relations: Power Politics and Ideology. USA: Cambridge University Press

Hourani, A. (1991) A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber

Hussein, A., Atraqchi, F. (2009) ‘1967 and the rise ofextremism’ Al Jazeera [online]13July.Availablefrom<http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/03/200852518359222993.html > [1 April 2013]

Louis, R., Shlaim, A. (ed.) (2012) The 1967 Arab – Israeli War. New York: CUP

Makovsky, D. (2004) ‘Consequences for the 1967 War’.The Washington Institute [online] 12 January Available From < http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/consequences-of-the-1967-war> [13 March 2013]

Mansfield, P. (1992) The Arabs. London: The Prenguin Group

Metz, H. (Ed.) (1988) Israel: A Country Study. [online] Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available from < http://countrystudies.us/israel/> [15 April 2013]

Milton-Edwards, B. (2006) Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. 2nd

edn. Cambridge: Polity Press

http://countrystudies.us/israel/

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/consequences-of-the-1967-war

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/consequences-of-the-1967-war

http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/03/200852518359222993.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/03/200852518359222993.html

OnWar (2000) Black September in Jordan 1970 – 71 [online] available from < http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm> [30 March 2013]

Said, E. (1994) The Politics of Dispossession. NewYork: Random House

Sayigh, Y (1997) Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Shahi, A. (2009) Thirty years on: The Iranian revolution and its impact on theregion [online] available from<http://www.e-ir.info/2009/02/14/thirty-years-on-the-iranian-revolution-and-its-impact-on-the-region/> [8 April 2013]

Shmah, L. (2013) Political Islam: A Threat to the Political Stability of CurrentRegimes in the Middle East? [online] available from < http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/04/political-islam-a-threat-to-the-political-stability-of-current-regimes-in-the-middle-east/ > [17 April2013]

Sipress, A. (1994) ‘The Pop Culture Of Israel Embraces Its Arabic Heritage Middle Eastern Music, Films And Food Are Hot.Even Falafel Might As Well Be An Israeli Specialty’ The Inquirer

[online] 28 June, available from < http://articles.philly.com/1994-06-28/entertainment/25832835_1_israeli-arabs-jeff-halper-arabic> [12 April 2013]

Syria: The Reckoning (2013) [digital] Al Jazeera

The Winds of Heaven (2009) [digital] Al Jazeera

http://articles.philly.com/1994-06-28/entertainment/25832835_1_israeli-arabs-jeff-halper-arabic

http://articles.philly.com/1994-06-28/entertainment/25832835_1_israeli-arabs-jeff-halper-arabic

http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/04/political-islam-a-threat-to-the-political-stability-of-current-regimes-in-the-middle-east/





http://www.e-ir.info/2009/02/14/thirty-years-on-the-iranian-revolution-and-its-impact-on-the-region/

http://www.e-ir.info/2009/02/14/thirty-years-on-the-iranian-revolution-and-its-impact-on-the-region/

http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm

U.S Dept. Of State (2007) Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs Release of Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972 [online]

available from < http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93778.htm> 13April 2013

http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93778.htm

DISSO - 6DAY WAR

Documents

Transcript of DISSO - 6DAY WAR