Digitisation of the battlefield29 octobre 2013 News

By Giles Ebbutt

Not so very long ago the majority of battlefield communications consisted of VHF and HF voice channels over combat net radio (CNR) complemented by tactical networks that provided limited data channels. Tactical satellite communications(SATCOM) were an exotic luxury largely limited to Special Forces (SF) or for long-haul reach back links. As a result information availability decreased in direct proportion to closeness to the tactical battle, so that those who had most need of accurate, up to date information were the most ill-informed, whilethe provision of locational data was almost entirely dependent on voice messages transposed by hand onto a map. In mobile operations this was inevitably almost immediately out of date.

The advent of digital communications led to what became known as the Revolutionin Military Affairs (RMA) and the development of the concept of Network CentricWarfare (NCW). Like all revolutions, particularly technological ones, its adherents claimed that the world of warfare would be changed for ever. In the NCW world every entity on the battlefield connected seamlessly in a vast network, with information flowing smoothly in all directions. In its most extreme form NCW was going to provide such overwhelming information superioritythat the messy business of the contact battle would be largely replaced with accurate long-range strikes.

The reality has fallen somewhat short of this, even if today the individual soldier has access to information that his predecessor of 20 years would never have dreamed of seeing. The process that has achieved this is digitization. In its broadest sense this has affected operations across the entire battlespace, in land, air and maritime environments, but this article will consider the effect in the land environment, although it could be argued that this is slightly against the whole philosophy of digitisation which has been the catalyst in freeing operations from the single environment strait jacket and making the joint battlespace a reality.

Digital communications freed command and control (C2) of the tactical battle from the constraints of voice communications. Coupled with GPS, locational datacould now be passed and displayed on an electronic map, reducing dramatically the amount of air time used passing messages essentially saying “I am here,

where are you?” and increasing the accuracy of that information. The result is Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) – everyone having the same tactical picture – and this is one of the key advantages of digitization. Furthermore, information from sensors could now be made available quickly and easily to those who could make good use of it, in forms that were easily understandable, such as data from a laser range finder.

Fundamentally, “digitization of the battlespace” is the process enabling the elaboration and transfer of a variety of information amongst different players in the operational domain in real time, or in near-real time, by using digital systems and technologies to gain, exchange, correlate, and use the information quickly.

The concepts began to crystallise into reality as the US Army developed its plans for “Force XXI”, which was to define the shape of the army for the new century. These plans revolved around developing a lighter, more flexible and easily deployed force with greater strategic mobility and the ability to tacklea that would rely more on its information superiority than its weight to achieve success. These were refined in a series of experiments and trials whichincorporated the first group of systems which would provide a degree of automation of the command and control (C2) process. These included the Manoeuvre Control System (MCS), the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical. Data System (AFATDS), the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), which with others collectively formed what was known as the Army Battle Command System (ABCS).

The various systems within the ABCS were all stovepipe development s– that is, they were all separate projects, intended to meet separate requirements with nooverarching architecture or framework. This is a problem by no means unique to the US; virtually every country began its modernisation process with autonomousprogrammes both across defence and within individual services. So although theywere all heading in roughly the same direction they were on parallel tracks, and the real benefits of network centricity were not being achieved.

Automated C2 systems had been around for some time both in the US and Europe, and it was well understood that a key requirement was to achieve interoperability between the systems. Through the NATO forum what eventually became the Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) was established, the objective of which was to achieve C2 interoperability at reduced cost by

developing and implementing technical standards agreed by Nations and prescribed by NATO. The aim of the programme was to identify the minimum set ofspecifications, to be included within C2 systems, which would allow interoperability of multinational C2 systems.

The programme continues to this day. The MIP specification “is a managed interface between C2 information systems. When incorporated into a system it enables interoperability of information between any other system that also incorporates the specification. Battlespace data is transferred as information.The meaning and context of the information is preserved across national boundaries precisely and without any ambiguity.” But at this early stage there was limited, if any, interoperability between national systems, let alone across national boundaries.

By 2001 the US digitisation programme had progressed to the extent that the 4thInfantry Division (4ID) had been nominated as the “first digitised division” and was in the throes of developing the operational doctrine and the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) necessary to embrace and get the most out of the new capabilities. This is one of the most significant aspects of the whole digitisation process. While it was clear that the automation of previously unknown processes was going to increase the operational tempo, the US was breaking new ground in the potential availability of information and the impactthis might have on chains of command, operational procedures and so on. In a sense, this is a development process that has not stopped since those first early steps.

The second Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq was the first real indication of the potential that digitisation offered to the tactical user. FBCB2 and particularly its GPS-derived locational data – rapidly christened “Blue Force Tracking” (BFT) – for the first time provided an up to data and accurate tactical picture, limited only by the constraints of communications and the speed of updating. It could be and was used for navigation as well as for C2 and was a revelation for those who used it, rapidly becoming an indispensable tool.

However, the possible drawbacks became equally apparent, particularly for coalition operations. If you are outside the network you are not on the tactical picture and therefore invisible to those inside, and you no longer know where they are because they rely on passing locational data to which you have no access. During the Iraq operations a temporary solution to this problem

for UK forces under US command was achieved simply by providing the UK with a number of FBCB2 terminals.

It was clear that in future any nation that aspired to be effective on the modern battlefield was clearly going to have to proceed in this direction. For the remainder of the NATO nations this eventually emerged as the concept of Network Enabled Capability (NEC), which was less radical than NCW but more pragmatic. It was aimed at the acquisition of the same capabilities in a more gradual and sustainable way, including enabling elements of the existing platforms and systems to operate in the network.

Fast-forward a decade to the present and network capable forces are approachinga reality, particularly in Europe. Blue Force Tracking is ubiquitous down to the individual soldier while text, graphics, images and video can be passed up and down the chain of command, between different organisations and between nations and everyone can have the same view of the battle through access to a Common Operational Picture (COP). When conducting close air support (CAS) the pilot and the Joint Tactical Controller (JTaC) can view the same video stream of the target, bringing close to reality the NCW vision imagined 20 years or more ago.

The principal European nations have all developed comprehensive digitisation programmes, which are in varying stages of maturity. In general they all provide much the same core functionality: BFT; a common tactical picture; the preparation and dissemination of orders and reports using both text and graphics; map and terrain analysis; and messaging and communications use email,chat and SMS. In some cases separate applications support specialist functions such as fire support or combat engineering, in others a separate system has been developed for this which is interoperable with the core system, particularly in terms of drawing on a common tactical picture. This is particularly true of fire support.

The French army selected C2 systems from different manufacturers for the different levels of command, but has managed to make them interoperable to provide an integrated hierarchy which has been deployed operationally in Chad, Cote d’Ivoire and in Afghanistan.

The French Système d’Information Terminal (SIT) in its dismounted version, SIT ComDé (Sagem)

At the lowest level there are various versions of the Système d’Information Terminal (SIT), the Battle Management System (BMS). SIT V1 is the Nexter FINDERS system which is installed in Le Clerc MBT and the VBCI; SITEL (Elémentaire) is produced by Sagem and is installed in a number of different vehicles, while its dismounted version SIT ComDé (Combattant Débarqué) is part of the French Army’s Fantassin a Equipements et Liaisons Intégrées (FELIN) individual soldier system. There is also a helicopter installed version.

At the battalion and brigade level Cassidian’s Système d’ Information Régimentaire (SIR) is used. This has an open architecture and data can be passed both down to and received from the various variants of SIT, and up to the formation-level SICF (Système d’Information pour le Commandement des Forces) produced by Thales, the earliest version of which was first deployed in1991. This can share information with a number of other operational systems used by France, including the Atlas artillery fire control system, Martha air defence C2 system and the SIC21 maritime C2 system. All these are also Thales systems. MAESTRO, produced by Cassidian, is used specifically by reconnaissanceunits to feed ISR data into SIR and thus into the overall tactical picture. However, SIR at present cannot exchange information with Atlas.

France’s “Scorpion” development programme, is a comprehensive project addressing both equipment and doctrine, a key element of which is digitisation.Its first, intermediate objective in 2014, is to enhance the sharing of the

tactical situation and all aspects of battle management through the replacementof SIR-SIT-MAESTRO systems by SI/CS v0 (Système d’Information et de Combat SCORPION). This will be based on a single technical solution with an open architecture and a set of core services, with the specific functionalities provided as applications available as required.

The French SICF in use in the HQ of the Franco German Corps

The second phase will be the fielding of SI/CS v1. This will allow collaborative functions such as the management of direct and indirect fires (with the integration of ATLAS functions) and will benefit from the introduction of vehicle electronic architectures. This vehicle digitisation enables vetronics to be integrated with the BMS, providing automatic updates ofvehicle states and the aggregation of logistic data such as fuel states and is true of all modern vehicle programmes. It also allows the easy integration of vehicle mounted sensors such as laser range finders and elctro-optics, as well as fire control systems.

Other elements within the Scorpion programme include the European GALILEO navigation and positioning system and the CONTACT future software radio system,which will provide the communication linchpin for the system, enhancing joint and multinational interoperability.

Although Thales does not provide all the elements of the French army’s C2 systems, its Comm@nder range covers the whole gamut of functions and provides an integrated system which can either be provided as a complete solution or as individual elements. Thus it has a BMS element, Comm@nder Battle, SICF is marketed as Comm@nder Army, There is a Comm@nder Joint, Atlas is marketed as Comm@nder Fire and its intelligence fusion and assessment software is Comm@nderIntel.

In Germany the Heeresführungsinformationssystem zur Rechnergestützten Operationsführung in Stäben (HEROS) system was developed to support

headquarters above battalion level, while the Führungsausstattung Taktisch (FAUST) BMS was designed for battalion and below. Both of these come from Cassidian, who developed the FüWES Kernel Army (FüWES Kern H), which consists of a common software kernel for all functional warfare areas. It provides an own forces picture, a graphic situation display, information exchange by standardised messages and office functions support. This was combined with the original GeFüSys (Army Battlefield Command and Control system) to become FAUST.The original intention was that the system would also provide interfaces for subordinate battlefield management systems of all branches of the Bundeswehr, such as SAFES for the medical service, RAFES for NBC defence and HERGIS for army aviation.

The German FAUST system

Subsequently, HEROS and FAUST have been subsumed into the Army’s FührungsInformationSystem Heer (FüInfoSysH), which will be used from platform to divisional level providing the holistic system that will allow the seamless passage of information. As far as the individual soldier goes, the Bundeswehr is now on the second generation of its Infanterist der Zukunft (Infantryman of the Future) system. The first was developed by Cassidian and was produced in limited numbers with a BMS that is interoperable with FAUST.

The second generation IdZ is the Gladius system from Rheinmetall Defence. This includes C2 software which provides local situation awareness for each individual, with positional information within the squad being automatically updated. Text messages, tactical sketches and designated targets can be passed.This is interoperable with FüInfoSysH via a bridge installed in the squad vehicle; this was demonstrated recently at IDEX using the command post variant of the Boxer AFV.

Although Cassidian was not selected for IdZ2 it has also developed a new version of its soldier system which includes C2 software with a gateway function which provides an interface with other BMS.

Italy launched its “Forza NEC” programme in 2007 with the overall aim of makingall its armed forces network enabled. The core is an Army-led joint procurementprogramme with Selex as the prime contractor. It aims to achieve by 2025 the so-called Integrated LandForce (Forza Integrata Terrestre – FIT), a force basedon an Integrated Land Brigade (Brigate Integrate Terrerestri – BIT). The futurebrigades will be completely digitized through the entire chain of command, fromthe individual soldier or single platform such as a helicopter or vehicle through all intermediate levels up to brigade headquarters.

The netcentric approach adopted by the Italian Army follows the basic principles of achieving information superiority, SSA, rapid passage of orders and accurate use of a range of assets. The approach is also based on three pillars: use of sensors regardless of which platforms they belong to; use of “effectors” regardless of the units they belong to; and facilitating command interaction regardless of physical location.

The Italian army has a range of legacy systems which Forza NEC aims to integrate under a single and comprehensive umbrella, C2 Difesa, led by Selex. The higher level C2 system is the Sistema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo(SIACCON) which was first introduced in 2000 and is used down to battalion level; V2 of the system is a key element of the Forza NEC programme.

Below battalion level, using the same core software but developed as the vehicle-mounted BMS at the tactical level is the Sistema di Comando, Controllo e Navigazione (SICCONA). This has been trialled and fielded on a limited basis,including in Afghanistan in the Freccia AIFV. intended for installation in all Italian army armoured platforms.

SICCONA will provide mapping and navigation, situational awareness and messaging, plus platform data as it is intended for integration within an electronic vehicle architecture. It is integrated with the platform communications system through a router and can also be integrated with the platform fire control system so that target data from one platform can be passed automatically over the network. A limited version, Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA), has been developed for installation in soft-

skinned and unarmed vehicles to provide position and locational information to the network.

The latest version of the Italian Soldato Futuro C2 system shown at IDEX 13.

At the individual level the“Future Soldier” (Soldato Futuro) programme is stillin development, but the C2 software is derived from SICCONA and has been portedto the Android operating system to allow smartphone compatibility. Data can be passed between this version and the vehicle-mounted SICCONA. Selex ES is also establishing an ‘App Store’ to support the provision of additional software applications for users.

The UK digitisation experience has not been an entirely happy one. Some legacy projects provided automated C2 capability, but with elderly communications systems the UK adopted the “big bang” approach to modernise its whole C2 infrastructure. Having embraced the concept and acknowledged its centrality to future operational doctrine, the overall digitisation programme was closely integrated with the introduction of a new digital communications system, BOWMAN. The prime contractor for this has been General Dynamics UK, which was awarded the contract in 2001after a long and painful gestation period which sawother contractors fall by the wayside.

This was followed the next year by the contract for the Bowman C2 capability, including software, hardware and interfaces for systems in armoured fighting vehicles. This consists of the Common Battlefield Application Toolset (ComBAT),Infrastructure (I) and armoured Platform Battlefield Information System Application (P-BISA), collectively known as CIP. The whole is known as Bowman CIP or BCIP and is intended to provide a mobile, battlefield-wide “tactical

internet”, capable of providing a high-capacity data network, automated positional information and secure voice communications for mounted and dismounted users.

Fielding of the communications system, in itself a huge task, began in 2004 with the first operational deployment in 2005, and although it provided an immediate increase in capability there were numerous teething problems that tainted the whole project. Expectations for what digitisation could deliver hadbeen inflated and when reality failed to match these, coupled with these early problems, the reputation of the Bowman project took several years to recover.

However, successive iteratations of software and hardware development have produced a system that resembles that which was expected at the start. The current BCIP V5.4 now provides the robust tactical internet that was needed to make data communications a reality; improved situational awareness; better hardware; more flexible and usable software; better batteries; and the ability to host the engineer, fire-support and air-defence BISAs which provide the functionality to support these combat support areas.

At the individual level, although the Future Infantry Soldier Technology (FIST)programme was originally conceived as a complete system, it eventually ended upas a series of individual equipment enhancements but with little automated C2 capability. One of the reasons for this was that British soldiers and commanders were reluctant to carry any additional equipment, particularly that which required power supplies, unless it offered clear advantages over the equivalent weight in water or ammunition, and these were not manifest in the solutions offered for individual C2.

The UK has now begun work on the successor to the Bowman project, which is the Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems (LETacCIS) programme. This will include open architectures embracing individuals, vehiclesand fixed installations, providing a capability which allows the maximum flexibility and commonality in the integration of sensors, C2 applications and power supply.

The US FBCB2, the first operationally proven digital C2 system

And what of the US, where it all started? The ambitious Future Combat System (FCS) programme, which would have provided a complete networked system, was eventually cancelled, collapsing under the weight of technological challenges and cost. In its place is an incremental programme of Capability Sets each withlimited objectives, the stove piped C2 systems are being “collapsed” into a single web-based mission command system which will provide access to all the different functions; and FBCB2 will be succeeded by the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) which wil be used by both the US Army and the USMC.