Didikin À. B. The trends of legal regulation of education in Russia // Philosophy of Education....

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Editorial Board

N. V. NalivaykoEditor-in-chief, Doctor

of Philosophical Sciences,Professor, Director of the

Research Institute ofPhilosophy of Education

at Novosibirsk StatePedagogical University

V. I. ParshikovAssistant Editor-in-chief,Doctor of Philosophical

Sciences, Professor

T. S. KosenkoScientific Secretary

of the journal, Candidateof Philosophical Sciences

The foundersof the journal:

Novosibirsk StatePedagogical University,the Research Instituteof Philosophy ofEducation

Institute of Philosophyand Law of the SiberianBranch of the RussianAcademy of Sciences

The journal isregistered by Federalservice on supervisionin sphereof communication,informationtechnologies and masscommunications

PI ¹ 77-12553 fromApril, 26th, 2002

© The ResearchInstitute of Philosophyof Educationat Novosibirsk StatePedagogicalUniversity, 2012

All rights reserved

Scientific journal (Special issue)

Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University

Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Univerzita Karlova v Praze,Pedagogicka‰ Fakulta

CONTENT

Part I. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN EDUCATION

Sabau I. (Illinois, USA). Internet Learningand multitasking ................................................................. 3

Santi A. M. (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Philosophyof Education in the era of technological reproducibility:literacy of image as the literacy of contemporary time .... 9

Part II. PSYCHOLOGICAL-PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTSOF THE PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION

Pelcova‰ N. (Prague, Czech Republic). Philosophyof imagination .................................................................... 15

Vertgeym L. B. (Novosibirsk, Russia). Emotionsin teaching mathematics .................................................. 24

Begalinov A. S. (Novosibirsk, Russia). În someaspects of the student youth’s upbringing in modernconditions .......................................................................... 30

K. K. BegalinovaE. V. BryzgalinaA. D. Gerasyov

A. A. GriykalovA. Zh. ZhafyarovA. A. Korol’kov

B. O. Mayer

V. I. PanarinN. PelcovaI. A. PfanenshtilN. A. Ryapisov

N. S. RybakovO. N. Smolin

V. S. Stepin

Ya. S. Turbovskoi

V. V. Tselishchev

E. V. UshakovaA. HogenovaA. N. ChumakovN. M. Churinov

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor(Kazakhstan)Candidate of philosophical sciences, docent (Moscow)Doctor of Biological Sciences, Professor, Rectorof Novosibirsk State Pedagogical UniversityDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, ProfessorDoctor of Physical and Mathematical SciencesDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor,Academician of the Russian Academy of EducationDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, SciencePro-Rector of Novosibirsk State Pedagogical UniversityDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, ProfessorDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor (Prague)Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor (Krasnoyark)Doctor of Economics Sciences, Professor, Pro-Rectorof Novosibirsk State Pedagogical UniversityDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor (Pskov)Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Deputy Chairon Education of the State Duma Committee (Moscow)Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences,President of the Russian Philosophical Society (Moscow)Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Professor, Academicianof Academy of Pedagogical and Social Sciences (Moscow)Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Directorof the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the SiberianBranch of the Russian Academy of SciencesDoctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor (Barnaul)Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor (Prague)Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor(Moscow)Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor(Krasnoyark)

6 2013

PHILOSOPHYOF EDUCATION

6 2013

The journal is includedin the list of theleading reviewedscientific editions andjournals that arerecommended by theState Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles (VAK) forpublication of basicscientific results of theCandidate of Scienceand Doctor of Sciencedissertations.

The journalis included in theRussian scientificcitation index.

TranslatorL. B. Vertgeym

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Part III. CONCRETE PROBLEMS IN MODERNEDUCATIONAL SPACE

Hogenova‰ A. (Prague, Czech Republic). On the issueof the temporal body ........................................................ 37

Hauser Ì. (Prague, Czech Republic). Emancipationfrom consensus. Prolegomena to pedagogy of dissent .... 41

Ticha‰ M. (Prague, Czech Republic). The aims ofeconomic education and purpose of economic activity .... 49

Filho A. L., Mendonca S. (Campinas, Brazil). The issue ofthe student‰s autonomy in Dewey‰s “New Pedagogy” ..... 57

Cue‰llar R. H. (Mexico Citi, Me‰xico). «Pointing theway» in Buber’s philosophy: education basedon the I-Thou relationship ................................................. 69

Part IV. EDUCATION AND CULTURE: MORAL ASPECT

Oleinikova O. D., Saprygin B. V. (Novosibirsk, Russia).The axiological coherence between the free marketparadigm of education and the consumer society ........ 81

Dike B. (Liverpool, United Kingdom). Reflecting onthe process of a philosophical research on valuesmotivation in exploratory activity of adolescents ......... 87

Eliopoulos P. (Peloponnese, Greece). Moral valuesand education in the neohellenic enlightenment .......... 97

Horsthemke K. (Johannesburg, South Africa). Indigenisation,internationalisation, and transkulturalita

..t: approaches

to transmission and transformation in education ....... 103Zhernosenko I. A., Ushakova E. V. (Barnaul, Russia),

Mamyev D. I. (Village Onguday, Altai Republic).Interrelation of the traditions and modernityin the organization of culture-creativity schools ........ 121

Beck M. C. (Batesville, USA). Education for the Loveof Wisdom: the Ancient Greeks .................................... 130

Part V. EDUCATION IN THE CONDITIONSOF GLOBALIZATION: POLITICS

AND THE RIGHTS (history and modernity)

Benetatou M. (Athens, Greece). Does a politicianneed paideia? The contextualized vantage of (Neo)Confucian and Platonic Ethics ...................................... 150

Didikin À. B. (Novosibirsk, Russia). The trendsof legal regulation of education in Russia .................... 165

Nalivayko A. V., Nalivayko N. V. (Novosibirsk, Russia).The value guides in education and the educationalpolicy ................................................................................. 170

Ashilova M. S. (Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan). Globali-zation of education and the problems of its combinationwith the national and regional educational models ..... 176

Part V. INFORMATION

Vertgeym L. B. (Novosibirsk, Russia). Review of the bookby Beatrice O. Dike “Love Capital and Education” .... 183

3

Part IINFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN EDUCATION

Ðàçäåë I. ÈÍÔÎÐÌÀÖÈÎÍÍÛÅ ÒÅÕÍÎËÎÃÈÈÂ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÈ

UDC 004 + 372.8

INTERNET LEARNING AND MULTITASKING

I. Sabau (Illinois, USA)

Abstract. The accelerated pace of social networking developments coupledwith the increasing reliance on Google, YouTube and text messaging have greatlyincreased the available distractions while promising to keep users engaged andprovide them with the ability to be continuously connected. The exponentialboom of these new means of communication provide both exciting new possibilitiesfor increasing participation in educational environments, while at the sametime rising questions about pedagogy and educational practice. This paperproposes to analyze these new developments and the challenges they introduce tothe development of critical thinking skills.

Key words: digital revolution, Internet, Google, multitasking, learning.

ÈÍÒÅÐÍÅÒ-ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ È ÌÍÎÃÎÇÀÄÀ×ÍÎÑÒÜ

È. Ñàáî (Èëëèíîéñ, ÑØÀ)

Ðåçþìå. Óñêîðåííûé òåìï ðàçâèòèÿ ñîöèàëüíûõ ñåòåâûõ êîììóíè-êàöèé âìåñòå ñ óâåëè÷èâàþùåéñÿ îïîðîé íà Google, YouTube è îáìåíòåêñòîâûìè ñîîáùåíèÿìè î÷åíü ñèëüíî óâåëè÷èë äîñòóïíûå îòâëåêàþ-ùèå ìîìåíòû, îáåùàÿ â òî æå âðåìÿ ñîõðàíÿòü âîâëå÷¸ííîñòü ïîëüçî-âàòåëåé è ïðåäîñòàâëåíèå èì âîçìîæíîñòè îñòàâàòüñÿ íåïðåðûâíî íàñâÿçè. Ýêñïîíåíöèàëüíûé, âçðûâíîé áóì ýòèõ íîâûõ ñðåäñòâ ñîîáùåíèÿîáåñïå÷èâàåò çàõâàòûâàþùèå íîâûå âîçìîæíîñòè äëÿ óâåëè÷åíèÿ ó÷àñ-òèÿ â îáðàçîâàòåëüíîé ñðåäå, è, â òî âðåìÿ, îí ñòàâèò âîïðîñû î ïåäàãî-ãèêå è îáðàçîâàòåëüíîé ïðàêòèêå. Äàííàÿ ñòàòüÿ ïðåäëàãàåò ïðîàíà-ëèçèðîâàòü ýòî íîâîå ðàçâèòèå è òå ïðîáëåìû, êîòîðûå îíî ïðèâíîñèòäëÿ ðàçâèòèÿ íàâûêîâ êðèòè÷åñêîãî ìûøëåíèÿ.

© Sabau I., 2013Isabella Sabau – Doctor of philosophy, Professor of the Chicago university.Èçàáåëëà Ñàáî – äîêòîð ôèëîñîôèè, ïðîôåññîð ×èêàãñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.E-mail: [email protected]

Philosophy of Education, 6, 2013

4

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: öèôðîâàÿ ðåâîëþöèÿ, èíòåðíåò, Google, ìíîãîçà-äà÷íîñòü, îáó÷åíèå.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the digital revolution, the applications invented forthe use of telecommunications have been increasing exponentially especiallyin the last few decades. The Internet has been incorporated in most aspects oflife and in particular in the realm of teaching and learning. Unlike previoustechnologies, the electronic world is highly interactive and lends itself to greateradaptability as new applications are continuously forged and the usersthemselves are able to impact both the development and the use of emergingadvances. The Pew Research center, which conducts various surveys focusedmainly on the US, recently reported in a new study “that 93 % of teens ages12–17 go online, as do 93 % of young adults ages 18–29. Three quarters (74 %)of all adults ages 18 and older go online. Over the past ten years, teens andyoung adults have been consistently the two groups most likely to go online,even as the internet population has grown and even with documented largerincreases in certain age cohorts (e.g. adults 65 and older).”[1] The variousstudies usually categorize individuals by generations with older generationsutilizing the Internet for research, banking and shopping while the youngergenerations increasingly focuses on the use of social networks andentertainment. [2] With the invention of cell phones, the stress has been onmobile technologies which today appear to have surpassed the other methodsof communication, as they encourage continuous connectivity through the useof social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and other means of instant textmessaging options. These developments have given rise to optimistic promisesfor learning while at the same time have also created social and even safetyconcerns. While many educators have eagerly embraced these new means ofincreasing learner participation, others have questioned the academic valueand overwhelming reliance on technology, especially in the development ofcritical thinking skills. In what follows the use of some of these modalities willbe further explored and their relevance to educational environments discussed.

Google and the Internet

Since its original inception in 1997 and official launch in 1998, Google hasgrown exponentially, achieving one of the highest ranks for web searches,offering a wide variety of applications including image and video searching aswell as free email options, with a global reach of over 84 %. [3] Although theaccuracy of a search result is improving as more criteria are added by both thesoftware developers to their search algorithms and by the user throughadvanced searching techniques, the accuracy of the information that resultsfrom the query must be scrutinized and triangulated against other reliablematerials. It is at this point that critical analysis is most necessary to preventthe proliferation of misinformation, as often happens when users rely onWikipedia and related sites which by their open nature allow any subscribersthe opportunity to change the material and thereby minimize reliability of

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I. Sabau

information. Google queries result in thousands of links, limiting the attentionand concentration possible, thereby fundamentally changing the way peoplethink and organize their knowledge, as Peter Norvig, Google Research Directorexplains: “…when you have access to thousands of articles, blogs, videos, andpeople with expertise on the topic, a good strategy is to skim first to get anoverview…”[4] The process of skimming information relies on a fast overviewof the material as the reader focuses on catchwords or phrases and seeks theconclusions rather than the arguments. The hyperlinking technology enablesfurther research but can often lead to tangents and distractions. It is imperativein educational environments that learners gain appropriate skills not only forresearching information online but for determining the importance andrelevancy of the materials they find. The myriad distractions one may encounterin the online environments can fragment thinking processes and result in asuperficial understanding of the material. These distractions are also timeconsuming, further preventing learners from completing their tasks andsuccessfully manage their time. One important concern is the fragmentationof knowledge and superficiality of information. Often summaries are used inthe place of the full textual works – as both lack of time and shortened attentionspan prevent learners from consulting original works of literature or philosophyand instead to rely increasingly on sites designed to provide a shortenedsynopsis of the material. Once again the importance of critical analysis becomesevident as the New Media Consortium’s latest report indicates: “It is incumbentupon the academy to adapt teaching and learning practices to meet the needsof today’s learners; to emphasize critical inquiry and mental flexibility, andprovide students with necessary tools for those tasks; to connect learners tobroad social issues through civic engagement; and to encourage them to applytheir learning to solve large-scale complex problems.”[5]

While the new generation is comprised of ‘digital natives’ – individuals whohave grown in a world of the Internet and are surrounded by various electronicdevices, rendering them highly functional and comfortable in theseenvironments, their use of these applications is often social rather thanacademic. They often lack the skills of academic research, analysis of data,writing of essays and creating presentations. Educators need to be able to assessthe levels of these necessary skills required for participation in technology-rich environments, while institutions of higher learning need to offer coursesand workshops for the development of such skills.[6] The numerous hoursindividuals, and especially the newer generations of 15–45 year olds, spendbeing engaged with the available digital media, the more the desire for instantgratification becomes ingrained in their personalities to the detriment ofpatience and the ability to concentrate for longer periods of time. This, in turn,affects their ability to fully engage with traditional educational structures andraise the demand that more such media be incorporated in the formaleducational practices. In the online environment these changes manifestthemselves in slightly different ways, namely that students have difficultybridging the gap between academic use of media and entertainment. MarkPrensky, an important researcher and author of several books, including thelatest Don’t Bother me Mom – I’m Learning, explains that digital natives: “taketechnology for granted…they have higher confidence in their abilities to use


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the technology and are often proud of their fast speeds in text messaging,…theyconsider technology their friend and instinctively approach its use…”[7] Asthe information overload increases individuals cope by creating new filters butthis also impacts their ability to retain information in negative ways as theyrely on Google for their basic data and on electronic organizers to keep themon track.

Todd Oppenheimer, a journalist and the author of The Flickering Mind,recently discussed a 16-year German study which found that our range of“…hearing has decreased from one generation to the next as the ability todistinguish 300000 diverse sounds a generation ago has dropped in adults to180000 sounds and in teens to 100000 different sounds…”[8] He furtherexplains this change in terms of a metaphor between classical music and popmusic emphasizing that the younger generation has lost the ability to perceivethe necessary diversity of sounds to appreciate the wide variation in classicalmusic.[9] The effect of continuous bombardment of the various media havecreated a world in which stillness and quietness are virtually non-existent andone may need to dull the senses in order to cope with the overwhelming amountof multimedia one encounters. One is left to wonder if other senses may besimilarly affected by the increase in media. This heightened level of noise mayfurther distract learners from scrutinizing their own ideas, beliefs, attitudesand activities and may further diminish their capacity for self-reflection. Thisrather disturbing aspect of today’s hyper connectivity may also affect our abilityto concentrate demanding that academic information be provided in very smallbytes that can be quickly processed and absorbed, once again forcing anincrease in simplification and fragmentation of the material.

Another study, conducted by Dr. Gary Small, director of the UCLA Memoryand Aging Research Center used fMRI techniques to investigate and imagethe brain of young people engaged in reading a book versus conducting aGoogle search online.[10] Dr. Small discovered that the results are strikinglydifferent – the brain scans revealed a two-fold increase in brain activity especiallyin areas of decision making in the brain for those conducting a search online.[11]Although these results cannot provide qualifying information about the qualityof the brain processes observed, nevertheless they do indicate that in the onlineenvironment more areas of the brain are active and those are connected withdecision making abilities driven by the hypertext interface which demandsthat the user constantly make choices about the information retrieved eitherby clicking on links or pursuing other embedded materials. For educators thesefindings may signal the necessity for the development of more interactivecontent which would further the mini-lectures already available in onlinelearning environments by linking them to other Internet content such as videoson YouTube, presentations with additional linked content, and simulations andgames that further explore the learner’s decision making skills. The Virtuallearning environments should incorporate library links, collaborative projectsand different opportunities for interaction among participants while at the sametime provide reusable content with an open architecture that can be personalizedby each user. [12]

It is important to note that the Internet and all its related applications havecreated a generation which values their own creative power and judges others

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by the content they create and share online. This democratizing ofcommunication has opened greater opportunities for people to share their ideasacross the globe. Since the online environment provides lessened possibilitiesto use non-verbal cues and encounter others face-to-face, the persona individualscreate online, as they often reinvent themselves, enables for both highercreativity and reasons for concern that increasing disregard for privacy mayrender individuals more vulnerable to cyber attacks, stolen identities ormalicious behavior. At the same time, these new trends may encourage higherscrutiny of the content one creates and shares online and especially ineducational settings. Learners can exercise their creative powers with onlineportfolios, multimedia presentations and graphic visualizing software, whichcan be used to assess their learning as well as engage them in the learningprocess. The rise in social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace andTwitter coupled with the high number of mobile users increase the need forcollaboration on the go and just-in-time learning where materials are offeredon demand. Since most college students carry some portable devices fromsmart phones to netbooks these machines are seen as tools for increasedproductivity, learning, and communication.[13] The stress on productivity inevery sector of society has led to a strong push toward multitasking – theability of individuals to perform many different tasks at the same time.

Multitasking

In the current world of increased demands on everyone’s time, multitaskinghas become hailed as the novel most important skill and numerous articleshave been written since the 1990’s when this new skill was considered as thesavior of all our difficult pressures. Christine Rosen explained in her articleentitled “The Myth of Multitasking”: “Used for decades to describe the parallelprocessing abilities of computers, multitasking is now shorthand for the humanattempt to do simultaneously as many things as possible, as quickly as possible,preferably marshalling the power of as many technologies as possible.”[14]Thus multitasking endows people with the confidence that they can and in factdo perform multiple tasks at the same time; however a number of more recentstudies are raising questions about this perceived ability. Professor CliffordNass, who is also the founder and director of the Communication betweenHumans and Interactive Media Lab at Stanford University in California,explained that his recent studies reveal low performance of heavy mediamultitaskers. Nass and his colleagues discovered that multitaskers werecontinuously distracted by irrelevant information, performed poorly on memorytests and underperformed on tests of their abilities to switch their concentrationfrom one task to another. [15] In another study, Russell Poldrack, a psychologyprofessor at the University of California, Los Angeles, found that “multitaskingadversely affects how you learn. Even if you learn while multitasking, thatlearning is less flexible and more specialized, so you cannot retrieve theinformation as easily… multitasking changes the way people learn.”[16] Foreducators these studies should raise a warning flag and encourage them tocreate activities that increase concentration and focus the mind by stressingthe art of paying attention.


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Conclusion

Concerns about the increase in digital media consumption as 8–18-year oldsare spending 50 hours or more a week engaged with digital media forceeducators and scientists to consider the effects of this media on the developingbrain of young adults and children. At the same time it is paramount that theeducational process requires reform and especially the inclusion of digitalliteracy skills. In addition, time management and prioritizing skills are necessaryfor learners to develop the discipline and concentration for stronger, deeperand critical thinking abilities. While higher levels of inter-and multi- disciplinarycollaborations have greatly benefited from the use of digital visualizations andcommunications technologies – the full impact of the ongoing electronicrevolution remains to be seen, but today more than ever educators must takenotice of the various opportunities technologies provide for engaging learners.And yet the most important aspect of learning remains the need for highlydeveloped critical thinking and higher level thinking skills. Hopefully,simulations, games, and interactive virtual environments will be further utilizedto create rich and immersive stimulating learning opportunities in the futurewhich can increase motivation, participation and focus the learners attention.

REFERENCES

1. Pew Internet and American Life Project Surveys, 2010, retrieved from http://pewresearch.org/millennials/teen-internet-use-graphic.php,

2. Jones Sydney, Research Assistant and Susannah Fox, Associate Director, Pew Internet& American Life Project, January 28, 2009, retrieved from http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1093/generations-online

3. Nielsen NetView Ratings, January 2010, retrieved from http://en-us.nielsen.com/rankings/insights/rankings/internet

4. Anderson, Janna Quitney, Elon University, and Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & AmericanLife Project. February 19, 2010, retrieved from http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1499/google-does-it-make-us-stupid-experts-stakeholders-mostly-say-no

5. Johnson, L., Levine, A., Smith, R., & Stone, S. (2010). (2009). The 2010 Horizon Report.Austin, Texas: The New Media Consortium, retrieved from http://wp.nmc.org/horizon2010/chapters/challenges/

6. Ratliff Victoria, Are College students prepared fro a Technology-rich Learning environment?,Merlot Journal of Online Learning and Teaching, volume 5 No. 4, December 2009,retrieved from http://jolt.merlot.org/vol5no4/ratliff_1209.htm

7. Prensky Marc, What makes a Digital Native – interview for Frontline – Digital Nation –Life on the Virtual Frontier, February 2, 2010, retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/living-faster/digital-natives/what-makes-a-digital-native.html?play

8. Oppenheim Todd, Losing our senses Literally, interview for Frontline – Digital Nation –Life on the Virtual Frontier, February 2, 2010, retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/living-faster/where-are-we-headed/losing-our-senses-literally.html?play

9. Oppenheim Todd, Losing our senses Literally, interview for Frontline – Digital Nation –Life on the Virtual Frontier, February 2, 2010, retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/living-faster/where-are-we-headed/losing-our-senses—literally.html?play

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10. Small Gary, Your Brain on Google, interview for Frontline – Digital Nation – Life on theVirtual Frontier, September 9, 2009, retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/living-faster/where-are-we-headed/your-brain-on-google.html?play

11. Small Gary, Your Brain on Google, interview for Frontline – Digital Nation – Life on theVirtual Frontier, September 9, 2009, retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/living-faster/where-are-we-headed/your-brain-on-google.html?play

12. Weller Martin, Virtual Learning Environments – Using, choosing and developing yourVLE, New York: Routledge, 2007

13. Johnson, L., Levine, A., Smith, R., & Stone, S. (2010). (2009). The 2010 Horizon Report.Austin, Texas: The New Media Consortium, retrieved from http://wp.nmc.org/horizon2010/chapters/technologies/

14. Rosen Christine, “The Myth of Multitasking,” The New Atlantis, Number 20, Spring2008, pp. 105-110, retrieved from http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-myth-of-multitasking

15. Gorlick Adam, Media multitaskers pay mental price, Stanford study shows, August 24,2009, retrieved from http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/august24/multitask-research-study-082409.html

16. Rosen Christine, “The Myth of Multitasking,” The New Atlantis, Number 20, Spring2008, pp. 105-110, retrieved from http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-myth-of-multitasking

Signed for publication 01.02.13

UDK 811.111 + 378

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE ERA OFTECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY: LITERACY OF IMAGE

AS THE LITERACY OF CONTEMPORARY TIME

A. Santi (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Abstract. In this work, we analyze what we call teacher illiteracy. Suchilliteracy refers to the fact that we live in the age of image and we do not knowhow to read it. The reference to the image in the field of knowledge, when itoccurs, is associated usually with unilateral critique, as if it were amisrepresenting element in the training of students, able to entice, induce,misinterpret. This reference dates back to the Ancient Greece and Plato.Understanding the need to learn to read the culturally produced images, as wellas their sense of imitation, Walter Benjamin has brought up a concept ofdialectical image and editing, as well. He associates the image to a work ofinterruption of the ordinary experience; it is important for the extreme restlessness

Angela Santi, Doctor degree in Philosophy by PUC/RJ. Adjunct Professor of PhilosophicalFoundations of Education.

Àíõåëà Ñàíòè, äîêòîð ôèëîñîôèè Ôåäåðàëüíîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà, àäúþíêò-ïðîôåññîðôèëîñîôñêèõ îñíîâ îáðàçîâàíèÿ.

E-mail: [email protected]


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that characterizes the today that one can fix the mind on an image, revealingnew meanings about what it represents. So, according to him, the historian andthe photographer are engaged in the same task, the crystallization of the time,retaining it in a dialectical image. The relevance of this topic wins forcefulnesswhen Benjamin in Pequena Histî‰ória da Fotografia – Short History ofPhotography, states that “the illiterate of the future will not be those who cannotwrite, but those who cannot shoot.”

Key words: education, image, Walter Benjamin, dialectical image.

ÔÈËÎÑÎÔÈß ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß Â ÝÏÎÕÓ ÒÅÕÍÎËÎÃÈ×ÅÑÊÎÉÂÎÑÏÐÎÈÇÂÎÄÈÌÎÑÒÈ: ÎÁÐÀÇÍÀß ÃÐÀÌÎÒÍÎÑÒÜ ÊÀÊ

ÃÐÀÌÎÒÍÎÑÒÜ ÍÀØÅÃÎ ÂÐÅÌÅÍÈ

À. Ñàíòè (Ðèî-äå-Æàíåéðî, Áðàçèëèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Â äàííîé ðàáîòå ìû ïðîàíàëèçèðóåì òî, ÷òî ìû íàçîâ¸ìíåãðàìîòíîñòüþ ó÷èòåëÿ. Òàêàÿ íåãðàìîòíîñòü îòíîñèòñÿ ê òîìóôàêòó, ÷òî ìû æèâåì â ýïîõó îáðàçîâ è íå óìååì èõ ïðî÷èòàòü. Ññûëêàíà îáðàç â îáëàñòè çíàíèÿ, êîãäà ýòî ïðîèñõîäèò, ñâÿçàíà îáû÷íî ñ îä-íîñòîðîííåé êðèòèêîé, êàê áóäòî áû ýòî áûë íåâåðíî ïðåäñòàâëåííûéýëåìåíò â îáó÷åíèè ñòóäåíòîâ, ñïîñîáíûé çàâëå÷ü, ñêëîíèòü íà ñâîþñòîðîíó, íåâåðíî èíòåðïðåòèðîâàòü. Ýòà ññûëêà âîñõîäèò êî âðåìåíàìÄðåâíåé Ãðåöèè è Ïëàòîíà. Îñîçíàâàÿ ïîòðåáíîñòü ó÷èòüñÿ ÷èòàòüèçîáðàæåíèÿ, ïðîèçâåäåííûå êóëüòóðîé, à òàêæå èõ ñìûñë èìèòàöèè,Óîëòåð Áåíäæàìèí òàêæå ââ¸ë ïîíÿòèå äèàëåêòè÷åñêîãî îáðàçà è ðå-äàêòèðîâàíèÿ. Îí ñâÿçûâàåò îáðàç ñ ðàáîòîé ïî ïðåðûâàíèþ îáûäåííî-ãî îïûòà; ýòî âàæíî äëÿ ÷ðåçâû÷àéíîãî áåñïîêîéñòâà, êîòîðîå õàðàê-òåðèçóåò ñåãîäíÿøíèé äåíü, ÷òî ìîæíî çàôèêñèðîâàòü âíèìàíèå íàèçîáðàæåíèè, ðàñêðûâàÿ íîâûå ñìûñëû â òîì, ÷òî îíî ïðåäñòàâëÿåò.Ïîýòîìó, ñîãëàñíî åìó, èñòîðèê è ôîòîãðàô âîâëå÷åíû â îäíó è òó æåçàäà÷ó êðèñòàëëèçàöèè âðåìåíè, ñîõðàíÿÿ åãî â íåêîòîðîì äèàëåêòè-÷åñêîì îáðàçå. Óìåñòíîñòü ýòîé òåìû ñòàíîâèòñÿ ÿâíîé, êîãäà Áåíä-æàìèí â «Êðàòêîé èñòîðèè ôîòîãðàôèè» çàÿâëÿåò, ÷òî “íåãðàìîò-íûé ÷åëîâåê áóäóùåãî íå áóäåò òîò, êòî íå óìååò ïèñàòü, íî òîò, êòîíå óìååò ôîòîãðàôèðîâàòü”.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáðàçîâàíèå, îáðàç, Óîëòåð Áåíäæàìèí, äèàëåê-òè÷åñêèé îáðàç.

1. Introduction

This work tries to approach the question which is considered to be afundamental one for the philosophy of education of the 21st century: it concernswith what we call the illiteracy of the instructors. Such illiteracy refers to ourdifficult condition: to live in the era of image not being able to read it. Weintend to understand in which way the question of image is embodied (or not)to the pedagogical practices and in which proportion the teachers and professorsnowadays are image-“illiterate”, when they do not recognize the legitimacy of

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image within the pedagogical process (turned to the literacy). By that, we aregoing to work with Walter Benjamin and the categories of dialectical images,editing, and also to strengthen his analysis about the photograph and hisconsideration about the “illiterates of the future”.

2. Walter Benjamin and his assertion of image in philosophy

Walter Benjamin and Dialectical ImageWe are going to deal with the question of image according to Walter

Benjamin broadly through the notion of dialectical image, a category that wasinitially in his theory about history, but that is applied here for us for our thinkingabout the question of image inside education. The dialectical image “is like alightning”. It is an encounter, of one instant, of opposites, like the ancient andthe modern (the dreaming and the awaking, the closest and the furthest), in acomplex conjunction where one constitutes itself only in consonance with theother – in a still dialectic.

The dialectic image is a point where the flow of events stops in an image,and then we can access the present, saturated of nows, saturated of tensions. Asa dialectical image, each event presents its contrary, updating itself, redeemingitself. Benjamin says (DIDI-HUBERMANN, 1998, page 182):

“each present is determined by the images which are synchronized with it;each Now is the Now of one recognisability (…) with it, the truth is loaded oftime until explode (…). One image is that on which the preterit meets theNow in a lightning to build a constellation. In other words, the image is thedialectical in suspending (…) the preterit relation with the Now is dialectical,it is not from temporal nature, but from imagery nature. The dialectical imageproduces itself a criticizing reading of its own present, in the conflagration theproduces with its Preterit (…)”.

Thus, the dialectical image enlightens the senses, it makes the latent sensesarise, in a flash, presents a new configuration: “The dialectical image is acondensed image from all hatchings and all destruction, (…) traces from alllightning and all fires of the history (idem, page 174)”.

From Benjamin, we want to think of the ways to make positive the imagewithin the universe of knowledge, while we want to give you some positivityfrom its current embodiment, comprehending it as a way to respond to theproper stimulus of the present time, strengthening it as dialectical image.

Walter Benjamin and the image in the era of its technical reproducibilityIn A Obra de arte nae‰poca de sua ReprodutibilidadeTe‰cnica – The Work of

Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, and Pequena Histî‰ória da Fotografia– A Short History of Photography, the Benjamin’s analysis about image will bedeveloped more accurately. In the text about photography, the author saysthat “the illiterate of the future will not be those who cannot write, but thosewho cannot shoot” (BENJAMIN, 1986, p. 107). Such sentence, placed underquotation not mentioning the author, is from Moholy-Nagy and saves in itself aprophetic tone. Also Dondis (2007), in his book Sintaxe da Linguagem Visual –Syntax of the visual language, says that “the cultural and universal strengththat comes from the cinema, photography and television, in the configuration


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of the mankind self-image, sets the urgency in teaching the visual illiteracy(…)”. In 1935, Moholy, a brilliant professor of Bauhaus, said: “the illiterate ofthe future will ignore such the use of the pen as of the camera”. (p. 04). In thiscontext, it not only talks about the scholarly academic formation associated tocertain arts languages, but, also talks about a formation that responds to theimpact the image produces over our perception and the changing constitutiveof the subjects.

The impact of image joins in the text of Pequena Histî‰ória da Fotografia, itstask is to crystallize the time, retain it in a dialectical image that, presentingthe contraries of an event, reveals it. The photographer performs such taskwhen the “click” of the machine freezes and extracts the fact from a senseutterly given, launching it into a new net of meanings. The photography,“belongs to the order of the interrupts” (Lissovsky, 1995, 112), interrupts theflow of actions, becoming, fundamentally, a dialectical image.

Benjamin selected Atget as the photographer that embodied thephotography that he considered legitimate in his time, in destabilizing contexts,scenarios, events, and throwing them into new possibilities, proceeding to theunmasking and to the construction. He removed the human element andrecords the metropolis without what defines it as such, without the man, withoutthe crowds. Benjamin (1986) says that these places “Are deprived of anyatmosphere; these images, the city was emptied, like a house that has not metvillagers. In these works, the surrealistic photography prepares a healthyalienation of man in relation to his environment. It frees to the politicallyeducated look the space in which all intimacy gives way to enlighten the details(102)”.

Benjamin says that the images taken by Atget are associated with “a crimescene (107).” Through Atget we can make the exercise of attention that comesfrom a displacement of elements within a set usually established. Benjamingets to call the photographer the successor of augursand aru‰spices, priests ofthe Ancient Rome who were omens from the habits of animals. In this sense, itis the task of the contemporary readers, reading images as fortunetellers andastrologers, predict the time, read what constitutes an epoch, the epoch inwhich one lives, and unveil it, like a detective before the scene of a crime:revealing what is not there, the fundaments of the scene that is absent in there.Likewise, it intends to be the reflection of the use of the image to us, in theuniverse of the education: the act of producing the shock that results indestabilization of the usual senses and the action of the construction of newmeanings.

3. Editing

The editing is the constitutive element of the arts at the time they becomereproductive, in the photography and cinema, associating the treatment of thematerial, connected to the separation of the parts of its context and theconstitution of the work by the adjustment of the fragments and the fixation ofthe meaning “(BURGUER, 1993). Thus, with respect to Cubist collages:

“what distinguishes these works of techniques practiced since theRenaissance is the incorporation of fragments of reality in painting, likewise,

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materials that have not been designed by the artist. So if it destroys the unityof the work as an absolute product of subjectivity of the artist. The piece ofwire that Picasso glue in a frame can be chosen according to an intention ofcomposition; as piece of wire, it remains as part of reality, and is incorporatedinto the framework as it is, without essential change. Thus, it breaks up thesystem of representation based on the reproduction of the reality (...)”. (p. 122)

In extracting the things, the senses of their habitual contexts and relocatethem in new contexts, the editing shows the modus operandi by which thehistorian (or educator, in our case) can work, avoiding the metaphysical orideological traps - identifying a necessary value of truth to things, to associatethem with contexts and univocal meanings. This dynamic becomes aconstruction method and the reading of the real, of the history, in Benjamin.For us, it becomes a powerful material to be used in the reflection about theeducation today.

4. Contemporary possibilities for the image use in the school

In terms of practical observation, we have noticed that the presence of imagein the classroom is associated, almost exclusively, to the illustration of a text,an ornament. The image is softened and submitted to the text, appearing as itsconfirmation. However, the process of visual literacy that involves teachersand students need to be a formation process that problematizes the image andthe knowledge: the system of correspondence between cognition and truth -so dear to the philosophy. Therefore, supported in the categories of Benjamin,we aim to propose a reflection on the use of image associated with the perceptionof the contemporary, associated to the shock, the discontinuous, contributing,by it, to the education for image at the same time as to the education to thecontemporary, enabling teachers and students to participate actively andconsciously in the complexity of the actuality.

We understand that the process of image formation for teachers and studentsmust occur in two stages. On one hand, a process associated with reading anddeconstruction of the materials produced by the media. On the other hand,the pursuit of building of the new imagery materials, so as to make the teachersexercise as producers, doing the same with theirs students.

Specifically, in the philosophy field, the image may appear as a structuralelement to put into question the mainstay of the classical thought: thecorrespondence between knowledge and reality; between truth and reality. Asa central matter of the philosophical tradition, such question is central to thephilosophy, at the same time that sets us at the epicenter of the contemporarylogic of its own. It teaches then, philosophy and contemporaneous ways ofperception, it teaches contents and “experience”. The image, seen andempowered under this perspective, active in the student the ability to work outfor the contemporary, experiencing in a positive (constitutive) way the elementsassociated with the uncertainty, interruption, shock.

Considered the image from the references from Benjamin, leveraging it asshock, constituting it as a dialectical image, we can think of the image as anagent of promotion of a thought experiment (KOHAN and GUIMARÃES, 2006,


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p. 85), with the “power of beginning “(Gallo, 2006, p. 18). This would not concernmore and only about the transmission of knowledge, but to promote an event.Here are a possibility in which we can build an antidote to the “teacher illiteracy”,an antidote that sites us at the center of the contemporary and its challenges.

REFERENCES

BENJAMIN, W. Passagens. Belo Horizonte, Editora da UFMG; Sa~o Paulo: Imprensa oficialdo Estado de Sa~o Paulo, 2006

Obras Escolhidas – Magia e Te‰cnica, arte e política, 2a. ed., Sa~o Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986a,vol. 1.

BURGER, P. Teoria da Vanguarda. Lisboa: Vega, 1993DIDI-HUBERMANN, D., O que vemos, o que nos olha. Sa~o Paulo: Editora 34, 1998.DONDIS, D. Sintaxe da Linguagem Visual. 3a. Ed. Sa~o Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007GALLO, S. “A Filosofia e seu Ensino: Conceito e Transversalidade”, in: Revista Ethica, vol.

13, no 1, 2006GUIMARA

~ES, M. “Ensino de Filosofia e Formaa~o de Cidada~os”, in: Revista Ethica, vol.

13, no 1, 2006LISSOVSKY, M. A Fotografia e a Pequena Histo‰ria de Walter Benjamin. Dissertac,a~o estrado

em Comunicac,a~o. UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1995.


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V. I. Kudashov

Part IIPSIHOLOGICAL-PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTS

OF THE PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION

Ðàçäåë II. ÏÑÈÕÎËÎÃÎ-ÏÅÄÀÃÎÃÈ×ÅÑÊÈÅ ÀÑÏÅÊÒÛÏÐÎÁËÅÌ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß

UDC 378

PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION

N. Pelcova‰ (Prague, Czech Republic)

Abstract. This paper addresses the nature of human creativity and the issueof whether creativity can be “taught”, as well as the birth of art and the relationshipof art and truth in philosophical reflection. It is based mainly on the texts ofGadamer, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (and interpretations of ancientphilosophers), who critically define aesthetics and aesthetic consciousness.

Key words: art, truth, reality, art as an addition to being, creativity.

ÔÈËÎÑÎÔÈß ÂÎÎÁÐÀÆÅÍÈß

Í. Ïåëüöîâà (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà)

Ðåçþìå. Ýòà ñòàòüÿ îáðàùàåòñÿ ê ïðèðîäå ÷åëîâå÷åñêîé êðåàòèâ-íîñòè è âîïðîñó î òîì, ìîæåò ëè êðåàòèâíîñòü “ïðåïîäàâàòüñÿ”, àòàêæå ê ðîæäåíèþ èñêóññòâà è îòíîøåíèþ èñêóññòâà è ïðàâäû â ôèëî-ñîôñêîì îòðàæåíèè. Ñòàòüÿ îñíîâûâàåòñÿ, ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì, íà òåê-ñòàõ Ãàäàìåðà, Õàéäåããåðà è Ìåðëî-Ïîíòè (è èíòåðïðåòàöèÿõ äðåâ-íèõ ôèëîñîôîâ), êîòîðûå êðèòè÷åñêè îïðåäåëÿëè ýñòåòèêó è ýñòåòè-÷åñêîå ñîçíàíèå.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: èñêóññòâî, ïðàâäà, äåéñòâèòåëüíîñòü, èñêóññòâîêàê äîïîëíåíèå ê áûòèþ, êðåàòèâíîñòü.

© Pelcova‰ N., 2013Doc. PhDr. Nadezda Pelcova‰, CSc. works at the Pedagogical faculty of Charles University,

in the department of civil education and philosophy.Ïåëöîâà Íàäåæäà – äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, çàâåäóþùàÿ êàôåäðîé

ôèëîñîôèè è ãðàæäàíñêîãî âîñïèòàíèÿ Êàðëîâà óíèâåðñèòåòà.Å-mail: [email protected]


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The Postmodernistic voice of Vile‰m Flusser says: “The historical distinctionbetween true and false, between reality and fiction, between science and artmust be left to fail. And leaving such an ontological, epistemological and ethical-political distinction, i.e. criticism, is what we mean by “posthistory”. It is neitherhere nor there whether we evaluate it negatively or positively. It is importantthat we learn to live with it” (Flusser 1996: 131). Despite the opening words ofthe article, “The Power of Image” by Vile‰m Flusser, neither he (although headvises us to learn to live with it) nor other postmodernists remain completelyimmune to the disappearance of the difference between truth and falsehood,between reality and fiction. They know that we have something to fear. Can wedismiss thinking and art from the power of truth? Can we give up on the truth?What would it mean? The whole of Western philosophy and thinking are basedon the difference between reality and illusion, the ability to distinguish betweenfact and fiction. What are we afraid of? Gadamer with Heidegger would probablysay that beauty should not disappear only for aesthetics to remain, Flusserwould say that art should not disappear only for design to remain, andBe‰lohradsky‰ would say that loga should not replace logos.

It is the fear of losing the distinction between truth and falsehood, losingthe human sense of truth and lies, losing the meaning and the truth in humanbehavior which brings contemporary philosophy back to the very origin.

Philosophers have always wondered how we discover something new,unfamiliar, unprecedented (be it human activity, thought or universal events).How do we make great scientific discoveries, create brilliant works of art, thinkup new thoughts, come up with original ideas, reveal different, unusual andpreviously unsuspected associations, or create a whole new concept?

People have connected this ability to create with the idea of a kind of innerstrength, a mysterious power, which they call imagination, imagery, and fantasy.Besides the fact that it helps the birth of new work, ideas, discovery, it concealsa latent danger, it can also be delusion, presumption, a mirage, an illusion anda dream. It is born in the womb of the natural world and manifests itself in verydifferent forms; it evades all by unequivocal determination and takes on variousdifferent appearances.

Perhaps the oldest example of concretization of ancient Greek imaginationis Heraclitus’ fraction B89: “The wakeful have one common world, but thesleeping turn everyone into their own.”(Svoboda 1962: 51) If we take the fractionas an example of cosmic imagination, it assumes the world is a structuredwhole and leaves this order – logos – that rules the world and people, to breakthrough into the world and human knowledge, so that the truth emerges frominvisibility into visibility. Non-reason, non-consciousness, somnolence turn usaway from the common world. If we give up logo, we give up the whole and wesink into particularity. Heraclitus’ fraction B64: “Lightning dominates theuniverse” (Svoboda 1962: 57), tells us that being breaks through into everydaylife, a man stricken with logo is truth apprehended and pervaded, ruled,illuminated. Therefore, in relation to Heraclitus and later Plato the polymathPosidonius called it the most important thing in man, which allows himknowledge and creation, as hafe‰, ignition, touch (KratochvI‰l 1995: 63), like themeeting with the truth of being itself.

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These “spark” types of activities (art and creation), for which the Greeklanguage has the term “techne”, were first mentioned by Plato. In the dialogueIon, Socrates wants to penetrate the secrets of the profession of a rhapsode(incidentally, Ion is one of the best, or even the best lecturer of the Homerpoems), to explore its type of knowledge; he poses the question of whether itis a skill or something else. And after he deduces that it is not a skill because itshows that it is nothing to do with what the Ion lectures, he does not have deepknowledge, his attention turns to it being “something else”. He calls this “divineinfluence” and offers the metaphor of a magnet. Just as a magnet attracts ironrings and passes on the power to attract other iron objects, a Muse creates adivine spark of enlightenment in people and through them is created a chain offurther enthusiasts, enraptured, transformed, but also easily modifiable andmanipulable in their enthusiasm, which itself is contagious. Their power entersthe weak. Plato says: “The poet is weightless, ephemeral, sacred, he cannotwrite poetry until he receives divine inspiration and until he is conscious, untilreason prevails.” (Platon 1979: 20) “Imagination, creativity are gifts to thosewhose “divinity is eliminated by reason” and who “use them as their servants,prophets and divine oracles, so we understand that it is not them who tell usthese precious things if they are not sane, but that it is God Himself who speaksto us and is heard through them.” (Platon 1979: 20-21) The Ion thereforereceives this skill from the gods rendering him their unwitting tool.

It is widely known that Plato changed from this ambivalent concept of theartistic techne of his first dialogues to a position of apparent opposition. Bycalling rhapsodes “interpreters of interpreters” (Platon 1979: 22) and painters“imitators of imitators” (Platon 2003: 352-353) he claims that creation is theimitation of something “appearing as it appears” (pros to phainomenon, osphainethai.). The ontological non-origin of this volatility, lightness andelusiveness, the ontological non-anchorage, non-original imitation changes, asis stated in “Constitution”, all kinds of artistic forms (painting, poetry) “fromtruth to the third place”. For humanity and thus human behavior to be truthfulit must turn to goodness, beauty and justice, it must be characterized by“residing in the vicinity of goodness”, it must be borne by a desire (mania) forgood.

For Plato these are the primarily reasons for him ultimately demanding theexpulsion of artists from Kalipolis. The decision was not an easy one, as hewrites, even he was educated in the love of Homer, he connects him with asense of “awe” (Platon 2003: 343), but: “... man should not value himself morethan truth, so that which I say should be spoken.” (Platon 2003: 343) Fromnow on, the only vanishing point legitimizing art as a thoroughly human activitywill be the truth of existence. The hierarchy of the structured world, at thepeak of the highest good idea (ton Agathon), ideas of ideas, ideas of things andthe last perceptible things themselves, is reflected in the Platonic hierarchy ofhuman activity, distinguishing the maker from the imitator, but who is the realcreator?

When Plato rejects Homer and the tragic poets, he permits them neither inhis state nor in education, it is something more than just a quirky theory of art.It is, as Fink says, a “devastating attack on the mythical substance of Hellenism”(Fink 1970: 102) or according to Patoc‰ka it is a “burning of tragedy”


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(Patoc‰ka 1991: 155). Plato’s criticism of the poets is a crucial judgment aboutbeing, truth and the world. Plato wants to replace the tragic principle of internalconflict overcoming faith and mythical internal enhancement with Socrates’pervading logos. This starting point could perhaps be called imagination logos,Plato characterizes it not as being a myth but as being “solid, grounded,”mathematical or geometric, in which the soul gains “solid contours”, “edges”.Therefore, Kierkegaard in his text “The Present” refers to Socrates (who heregards as an ambassador of ardor and truth) in connection with moral characterand “charassó” which in ancient Greek means “to sharpen” (Kierkegaard1969: 27). He understands moral character, “ordering of the soul”, its arete asbeing an indentation, a notch in the soul, peace and a scale. It is a peace-knowingsoul which will no differentiate the outward signs of things: larger from smaller,common from rare, heavier from lighter. This level of the soul, “knowledge” ofthe soul, “wisdom” (sofia) is not knowledge of the many but knowledge of theindividual (idea). It does not discard things in contradiction; it does not seeone thing as being good and the other as being evil. It is the opposite ofuncertainty, sophisticated ambiguity.

The Alcibiades dialogue speaks of this internal struggle between unity andambiguity, where the questions: What is “care of the soul”? What does therequirement “care for thyself” mean in the sense of the maxim “gnothi seauton”,know thyself? Who is this “thyself” to which they are referring? How can weknow what “care for thyself” requires? Can we understand him as being anegoistic, utilitarian, and pragmatic Sophist in the dialectical play of oppositesfrom which I choose the alternative which seems to me the more favorable?

The Alcibiades dialogue develops other dialectic knowledge of thyself andcare of the soul than we find in Constitution. Unlike the strict rejection of vision(or sensory knowledge) as a source of knowledge in the order of doxa – popularopinion, to which are condemned prisoners in the cave in the VII book of Plato’sConstitution, Alcibiades speaks in his Plato’s Socrates of a kind of knowingvision: “Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the onlyone suitable to my purpose.” As the Delphi inscription advises: Know thyself,we should also “see thyself”. Where, however, should we look if we want tosee ourselves? Alcibiades proposes (like an egocentric) to look in the mirror,however, Socrates on the other hand considers the possibility of looking intothe eyes of others, and of meeting with them. He says: “Then the eye, lookingat another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is theinstrument of vision, will there see itself.... if the eye is to see itself, it mustlook at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of theeye resides (arete).” (Patoc‰ka 1990: 118) Such a view into the eye will thenspawn the right image in the soul itself, namely arete (virtue), emergence ofthe true self, consistent and detectable for thyself. The other, who looks intoyour eyes (the eye is the window the soul) is not public opinion, anonymous,but parallel, it is the other. It allows me to see myself through the “eyes of theother” to see myself through (dia)-logos. Self-knowledge requires twoexamining powers of sight which reflect and collide with another examiningforce. The requirement to see myself as others see me is not an attractivealibis, this is how the power of questions and answers must be answered, thepower to remain in a dialogue with puzzling questioning. Self-awareness is, as

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Patocka says: “the emergence of our new form, of arete itself, which arisesfrom dwelling in the overall good.” (Patoc‰ka 1990: 119)

It is as if our relationship with the truth has passed through other people.Either we move toward the truth with others or we move to somewhere wherethere is no truth. Because care of the soul does not apply to our own selfishinterests it is always care of the whole (unity and oneness of self, unity ofcommunity and the cosmos). It is not any old vision, sensory experience, whichgives birth to popular opinion (doxa) but a knowing vision, focusing on afundamental and comprehensible whole.

This explains another reason for Plato’s rejection of the poets: the differencebetween ancient mythical imagination and imagination of logos. “Sophocles inAntigone speaks of two things that not even man, the most amazing creaturewith its all-controlling and all-restraining ability, can do: overcoming death andovercoming evil. Sophocles saw this as being elementary, definitive, andfundamentally beyond human possibility and human reach, however, Socratesshows that if something is “beyond the reach of human techne” it does notmean that it is beyond the reach of man, that there is something like humanwisdom, a strangely obscure approach, negatives entwined, knowing notknowing.” (Patoc‰ ka 1991: 155) “Poets make man too passive,” he says, however,in contrast to this educating philosophy, they turn the soul to good, they givethe soul a solid form (eidos), whose expression is arete, “virtue”, which is notprivate virtue but something firmly determined and occurring in changingspecific situations, it is man’s attempt to examine the whole when faced with aparticular situation.” (Patoc‰ka 1996: 33) Plato uses the term “arete” to conveythe effort to find the meaning of life and life’s plan of the pedagogical processof education as the formation and shaping of the soul, like “care of the soul”.

When considering the nature of imagination it is not possible to overlookthis period. The question of the legitimacy of art was raised for the first time.For the first time in human history art was put into the context of not onlybeauty, usefulness, usability, but also the truth. Gadamer alludes to this whenhe says: “If fact, as far as we know, it was in the context of the new philosophicaloutlook and the new claim to knowledge raised by Socratic thought that artwas required to justify itself for the first time in the history of the West. Here,for the first time it ceased to be self-evident that the diffuse reception andinterpretation of traditional subject matter handed down in pictorial or narrativeform did possess the right to truth that it had claimed. Indeed, this ancient andserious problem always arises when a new claim to truth sets itself up againstthe tradition that continues to express itself through poetic invention or in thelanguage of art.” (Gadamer 2003: 5) Plato was the first to build traditional formsof art on the unclaimed right to truth and truthfulness. This new artisticexpression is not raised and given by tradition but must always look and findits own meaning to legitimize the new form, shape, content and meaning ofartistic communication.

The search for truth of art took on a variety of forms, one of the mostimportant was the German mystical tradition (greatly inspired by neo-Platonism) associated with the names of Meister Eckhart and Paracelsus. Itcould perhaps be described as being mystical imagination, in which manhimself is traditionally conceived as a biblical image, in the image of God, imago

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Dei. The similarity of the terms image (Bild), education (Bildung) and creativepower, imagination (Einbildungskraft) suggest the relation: education is self-realization, creation and self-creation. Angelus Silesus said: “In front of everyman is an image of what he should be. If it is not, it is not full of peace”(Lichtenstein 1966: 264). Meister Eckhart offers us a path to this peace,“A man is transformed into what he lovingly regards” (Sokol 1993: 39). MeisterEckhart’s mystical imagination explains not only the self-creation of man, butalso the universal nature of art as creation: “When an artist makes an imagefrom wood or stone, he transmits the image onto the wood, cutting off only thepieces that hide the image and helping to reveal it; what is thick, he removes,what hinders, he removes, and then finally he reveals what is hidden beneaththe surface” (Lichtenstein 1966: 272).

Michelangelo (also deeply influenced by neo-Platonism) believes that theartist, the sculptor is not a privileged creator, but he only carves out the statuefrom inside the marble (as his sculptures of slaves in the Stanze suggest). Justas the philosopher assists in maieutike techne, he assists in the birth of truth(truth is born as a child when it comes into the world), as an artist, sculptor, heassists in the birth of beauty from stone. Therefore, art has the nature of truth,ancient Greek Aletheia in the sense of the unconcealedness of beauty, thetruth of art lies in leading art from concealedness to unconcealedness. In otherwords, art is an obvious truth.

Paracelsus translated the word “Imaginatio” into German as the above-mentioned “Einbildungskraft”. Fantasy and imagination and the power ofvisualization are but three terms for the human ability to transform the outerworld into the inner world, to create inner worlds of imagery (Bildwelten) whichreflect the outer world and to express this interiority through human workwhich may be within man himself. Paracelsus says that “man is created baseon his Bildung” (Lichtenstein 1966: 265). According to Paracelsus, Bildung isan order, a signature all human reality. That which is divine in man is notcontained only in a small extent, it is not undermined by substance. The worldand man are fully-fledged images of God.

This is also echoed by Leibniz: “Nothing external enters into our soul fromcasualness” (Leibniz 1982: 82), all of these forms are contained and constantlyfostered in our soul. Therefore, we cannot learn anything, whose “idea was notalready in our soul” (Leibniz 1982: 83). Leibniz deliberated the problem ofSelbstbildung, self-education on the grounds of the individual metaphysicalmonads based on the principle of “pre-established harmony”, the harmony ofGod, the world and man. Leibniz’s fragment “On true mystical philosophy”says: “In our very nature stands a true picture of infinity, omniscience and theomnipotence of God. In each individual substance, like you and I, is somethingeternal consisting of three distinct parts: soul, spirit and body. In everyonethere is everything and everything in everyone acts with a certain strength ofclarity.” (Lichtenstein 1966: 271) Every part of the universe, including man, insome way reflects the whole. Man is a microcosm highlighting the cosmos ormacrocosm. Because everything is interrelated, because everything resemblesone another, one can understand from another, from analogy. This completesthe widely shared view that human activity, education, art, production is actuallynothing more than ars imitatur naturae, art imitating nature, the work of God.

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Heidegger calls the search for the truth of art in modern philosophy a taskof finding the “essence of a work of art”. An example of this can be found in hisessay “The Origin of a Work of Art” (Heidegger 2008). Interesting here is themethodological assumptions of the possibility of such finding. If the authorintends to find the essence of a work of art, he shows it primarily as a whole,referring to the artist (“The artist is the origin of the work. The work is theorigin of the artist. Neither is without the other.”(Heidegger 2008: 7)), the art(“In themselves and in their interrelations artist and work are each of them byvirtue of a third thing which is prior to both, namely that which also gives artistand work of art their names – art.”(Heidegger 2008: 7)), the thingness of thework (“There is something stony in a work of architecture, wooden in a carving,colored in a painting, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous in a musicalcomposition. The thingly element is so irremovably present in the art workthat we are compelled rather to say conversely that the architectural work is instone, the carving is in wood, the painting in color, the linguistic work in speech,the musical composition in sound.” (Heidegger 2008: 10)), and to what exceedsthe thingness of the work (“The work makes public something other thanitself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory. In the work of art somethingother is brought together with the thing that is made. To bring together is, inGreek, óõìâÜëëåéí. The work is a symbol.”(Heidegger 2008: 10)), thesymbolic nature of the work. Attentive readers will not miss the analogybetween the Aristotelian concept of cause and Heidegger’s characteristics: thewhat, how, what and what design and creation based and face. Besides itsimmediate importance which he calls “usefulness” (“The basic feature fromwhich this entity regards us, that is, flashes at us and thereby is present andthus is this entity.”(Heidegger 2008: 21)) and reliability, is something else, orbetter yet something more. Heidegger shows an example of this using vanGogh’s painting of peasant’s shoes (he painted it several times, withoutperspective, without giving any context), merely resting, shoes from which, asthe philosopher says, “being stares” at us.

What is painted here? Does the art change the diction of the philosopher‘sspeech, a poem instead of a categorical piece of equipment? (“From the darkopening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the workerstares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulatedtenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrowsof the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richnessof the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as eveningfalls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripeninggrain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty ofbread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, and tremblingbefore the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace ofdeath.”(Heidegger 2008: 27-28)).

The “truth” of the shoes is understood through a flash of imagination as thetruth of human action, the truth of the world, on which we walk, the truth oflife that is given to us. Or in other words, Heidegger’s is every human work –for instance a bridge is not only a technical construction connecting the oppositeshores (usability), a tool (reliability), over which you can cross the river with

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dry feet, but it is what spans the landscape and thus it helps to create . Not onlyis a temple built in a certain style, but (like Notre Dame for Victor Hugo) awork, which in itself “fits together and at the same time gathers around itselfthe unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster andblessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape ofdestiny for human being”(Heidegger 2008: 37). A work, a great work of art isnot a depiction, description, or interpretation, “in the work the work makes thetruth of being,” writes Heidegger (Heidegger 2008: 34).

Heidegger‘s lecture given in Freiburg in 1935 as an attempt to critique theconceptual apparatus of traditional metaphysics, encouraged Gadamer to tryto find the real, authentic experience of art, to understand the speech of awork of art and ask of the truth of art. This, he describes in the first part of his“Wahrheit und Methode” in contrast to aesthetic consciousness, which hedenotes as being secondary since it was established on the basis of aestheticexperience which is verbalized by an aesthetic court either accepting orrejecting the work of art. However, external verbalization, categorization andabstraction, which want to deal with a merely “pure work of art” miss thatwhich is essential, i.e. the “language of a work of art” and the “truth of a workof art”.

And there is one more important feature. Imagination as chiasmus -consistency, woven into one whole, crisscrossing and meeting inside and out,eye and spirit, visible and invisible. Maurice Merleau-Ponty alluded to thisimportant structure for the creation and perception of an image. WhileHeidegger pondered over the essence work in the context of artist-work-art,Merleau-Ponty saw it from the context, seer-seen-visible, transforming the usualconcept of the nature of sight. An image based on a subject-object layout of theseer and seen proved to be insufficient, due to the fact that these identicalobjects in vision firstly issue an “empty” subject to the seer. Merleau-Pontyshows that vision is not a passive reflection of the seen; he wonders what visionactually allows, not in the sense of a posteriori “to have eyes to see” (ears tohear ...), but in the sense of a priori, what enables human vision? What is givenin vision. This “given”, allowing vision, is then called visible.

“The visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as though our vision wereformed in the heart of the visible, or as though there were between it and us anintimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not possiblethat we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision would vanishat the moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of the visible.What there is then are not things first identical with themselves, which wouldthen offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty andwho, afterward, would open himself to them – but something to which wecould not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could notdream of seeing ‘all naked’ because the gaze itself envelops them, clothes themwith its own flesh… As though it were in a relation of pre-established harmonywith them, as though it knew them before knowing them, it moves in its ownway with its abrupt and imperious style, and yet the views taken are notdesultory – I do not look at a chaos, but at things” (Merleau-Ponty 1998:128–129).. The seer and seen not in the relationship of subject and object,rather it is a tangle of interdependencies. The painter lives in fascination. The

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actions most proper to him–those gestures, those tracings of which he alone iscapable ... to him they seem to emanate from the things themselves”. “Inevitablythe roles between the painter and the visible switch. That is why so manypainters have said that things look at them” (Merleau-Ponty 1971: 14) so themountain Saint-Victor “paints”. And it is true in other forms of art, writers saythat the characters who breathe life suddenly seem to live their own lives, torevolt against their creators, and then their creators can do nothing else but letthem die or kill them off (A. C. Doyle with his Sherlock Holmes, Agatha Christiewith her funny little man Hercules Poirot).

Merleau-Ponty considered art and specifically painting as a form ofprimordial experience. When he spoke of Ce‰zanne, which for him was theprototype of an artist, he says the he does not want to be a cultured animal, buthe seizes culture at its beginning (origin) and reestablishes it, he paints as ifnobody ever painted before. Art is not an expression of ideas, communication,as this would be already formed and spoken to others. The “idea” cannotprecede the “execution”. An artist creates his work, like a child speaks his firstwords.

REFERENCES


N. Pelcova‰

Fink E. (1970), Metaphysik der Erziehung im Weltversta..ndnis von Plato und Aristoteles,Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Flusser V. (1996), Moc obrazu, In Vy‰tvarne‰ ume‰nI‰ 3-4/96, ISSN 0862-9927.Gadamer H.-G. (2003), Aktualita kra‰sne‰ho. Ume‰nI‰ jako hra, symbol a slavnost. Praha: Tria‰da,

ISBN 80-86138-48-8.Heidegger M. (2008), Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. Stuttgart: Reclam. ISBN

978-3-15-008446-5.Kierkegaard S. (1969), Souc‰asnost, Praha: MF.KratochvI‰l Z. (1995), Vy‰chova, zr‰ejmost, ve‰domI‰, Praha: Hermann a synove‰.Leibniz G. W. (1982), Monadologie a jine‰ pra‰ce. Praha: Svoboda.Lichtenstein E. (1966), Von Mister Eckhart bis Hegel. Zur philosophischen Entwicklung des

deutschen Bildungsbegriff, In: Kritik und Metaphysik Studien. Hens Heimsoeth zumachzigsten Geburtsjahr. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Merleau-Ponty M. (1998), Viditelne‰ a neviditelne‰, Praha: OIKOYMENH, ISBN80-86005-04-1.

Merleau-Ponty M. (1971), Oko a duch a jine‰ eseje, Praha: Obelisk.Patoc‰ ka J. (1996), Pe‰c‰e o dus‰i I., Praha: OIKOYMENH. ISBN 80-86005-24-0.Patoc‰ka J. (1991), Plato‰n. Pr‰edna‰s‰ky zoanticke‰ filosofie, Praha: SPN. ISBN 80-04-25609-0.Patoc‰ka J. (1990), Sokrates. Pr‰edna‰s‰ky zoanticke‰ filosofie, Praha: SPN. ISBN 80-04-24383-0.Plato‰n (1979), Dialogy o kra‰se, Praha: Odeon.Plato‰n (2003), U‰stava, In Plato‰novy spisy, Sv. IV. Praha: OIKOYMENH, ISBN

80-7298-067-X.Sokol, J. (1993), Mistr Eckhart a str‰edove‰ka‰ mystika. Praha: Zvon.Svoboda, K. (1962), Zlomky pr‰edsokratovsky‰ch mysliteluo, Praha: NC‰SAV.


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UDC 37.0

EMOTIONS IN TEACHING MATHEMATICS

L. B. Vertgeym (Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract. The author considers the role of emotions in teaching mathematics.It is indicated that an erroneous tradition has been formed of dry, emotionlessteaching of mathematics, within the framework of which the teaching is reducedto the transference of a set of mathematical facts. This tradition has its roots inthe centuries-old philosophical opposition of reason and emotions. As a result,mathematics is considered as belonging entirely to the realm of reason. Someways of solving the indicated problems are proposed.

Key words: reason, emotions, relation, beauty, meaning, purpose, teaching,mathematics.

ÝÌÎÖÈÈ Â ÏÐÅÏÎÄÀÂÀÍÈÈ ÌÀÒÅÌÀÒÈÊÈ

Ë. Á. Âåðòãåéì (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Â ñâîåé ñòàòüå àâòîð ðàññìàòðèâàåò ðîëü ýìîöèé â ïðåïî-äàâàíèè ìàòåìàòèêè. Îòìå÷àåòñÿ, ÷òî ñëîæèëàñü íåïðàâèëüíàÿ òðà-äèöèÿ ñóõîãî, ëèøåííîãî ýìîöèé ïðåïîäàâàíèÿ ìàòåìàòèêè, â ðàìêàõêîòîðîé ïðåïîäàâàíèå ñâîäèòñÿ ê òðàíñëèðîâàíèþ íàáîðà ìàòåìàòè-÷åñêèõ ôàêòîâ. Äàííàÿ òðàäèöèÿ îáóñëîâëåíà èìåþùèì ìíîãîâåêîâóþèñòîðèþ ôèëîñîôñêèì ïðîòèâîïîñòàâëåíèåì ðàçóìà è ýìîöèé. Â ðåçóëü-òàòå ìàòåìàòèêà ðàññìàòðèâàåòñÿ êàê öåëèêîì ïðèíàäëåæàùàÿ êîáëàñòè ðàçóìà. Ïðåäëàãàþòñÿ íåêîòîðûå ñïîñîáû ðåøåíèÿ îáîçíà÷åí-íûõ ïðîáëåì.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: ðàçóì, ýìîöèè, îòíîøåíèå, êðàñîòà, ñìûñë, öåëü,ïðåïîäàâàíèå, ìàòåìàòèêà.

The title of the paper may seem to be surprising. If someone is going towrite about emotions in teaching, then we will, probably, think of such subjectsas music, pictorial art, literature, or theater. Mathematics as a subject appearsto be infinitely distant from the emotional sphere; it looks like a certain bulwarkof iron, emotionless logic, a collection of formal indisputable truths, firmlyconnected with one another. It is a great pity that many people, havingcompleted mathematical courses in a high school or even in a university, are

© Vertgeym L. B., 2013Vertgeym Lev Borisovich – Docent of the Siberian Independent Institute and the

Novosibirsk State University, Researcher at the Research Institute of Philosophy ofEducation at the Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University.

Âåðòãåéì Ëåâ Áîðèñîâè÷ – äîöåíò, Ñèáèðñêèé íåçàâèñèìûé èíñòèòóò, Íîâîñèáèð-ñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé óíèâåðñèòåò, íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê, ÍÈÈ ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçî-âàíèÿ, Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò.


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left with such or similar image of mathematics. As a result, people have a sortof aversion, rejection of mathematics; they believe they do not possess anyaptitude to mathematics.

Let us, however, listen to those people, who really knew what mathematics is.Karl Weierstrass, a great German mathematician of the XIX century, wrote:

“A mathematician, who is not somewhat of a poet, will never be a perfectmathematician” [1]. G. H. Hardy, a prominent English mathematician of theXIX-XX centuries, claimed: “A mathematician, like a painter or poet, is a makerof patterns. If his patterns are more permanent than theirs, it is because theyare made with ideas. <…> The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s orthe poet’s must be beautiful; the ideas like the colours or the words, must fittogether in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanentplace in the world for ugly mathematics.” [2] As another example, AleksandrSergeevich Pushkin, the greatest Russian poet, wrote: «Inspiration is neededin geometry just as much as in poetry».

As we see, as the main criterion of true mathematics there is declared,quite unexpectedly, not the logical rigor (an intellectual, rational criterion),but beauty, an emotional criterion. Indeed, beauty is not a logical notion; itcannot be understood rationally but can only be felt. From this point of view, themain purpose in teaching mathematics should be not to make the pupils mastercertain mathematical facts, rules, recipes, but to reveal the beauty ofmathematics before them, to enable them to appreciate this beauty.

Let us compare this with the issue of teaching poetry. It would be obviousabsurdity to reduce studying poetry to just considering various poetic forms,meters, rhyme schemes, genres and mechanical memorizing a certainnumber of poems, would it not? Of course, the main thing here is to show thebeauty of poetic perception of the reality, beauty of poetic working with words.Why, then, the studying of mathematics more often than not is reduced todemonstrating several recipes of solving standard problems (the pupils areusually not explained the origins of these recipes) and to controlling theirmemorization? Such “studying” of mathematics is not only unfruitful butharmful waste of time. Indeed, as is well known, our memory is selective; wememorize firmly only those facts with which we established a sufficiently strongemotional connection. Therefore, those unemotional recipes of solving thestandard mathematical problems will be erased from the memory shortly afterthe corresponding tests or exams.

In the present paper, I will try to analyze the problems of teachingmathematics, connected with taking into account the emotional factors.

First of all, the idea about the importance of emotions in teaching in generalis by no means new. Already in the second half of the XVII century Jan AmosKomensky, a great Czech pedagogue, wrote in his “Panpedia”: “Problem XVI.To achieve that people learn everything with pleasure.” Also, a great Russianpedagogue K. D. Ushinsky emphasized the importance of emotions for thedevelopment and upbringing of the person: “… Upbringing, without assigningan absolute significance to the feelings of the child, nevertheless, should seeits main task in their direction” [3]. In the XX century a famous Russianpsychologist L. S. Vygotsky claimed that “the emotional development of

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children is one of the most important directions of the professional activity ofthe pedagogue. Emotions are the central element of the psychic life of theperson, and, particularly, of the child.” On the basis of theoretical studies, hisfollowers have been developing the idea about mutual connection of all thecomponents of human psyche, in particular, the emotional and the intellectualones.

A similar understanding is expressed by a contemporary expert on on-linelearning Connie Malamed, who writes [4]: “The idea that emotion and cognitionare opposing phenomena comes from a long philosophical and scientifictradition. It was thought that if emotions were connected to feelings and bodilysensations then they must be quite separate from cognition, which wasassociated with logic and the mind. Now sophisticated imaging tools like thefMRI have demonstrated the error in this thinking. We now know that emotionand cognition are dynamically intertwined and interdependent in terms of bothneurology and psychology. Emotion and cognition not only interact, but theirintegration is necessary for adaptive learning.”

However, as it was indicated, for example, by a contemporary Germanpsychoanalyst Peter Kutter, nowadays there is advertised upbringing andeducation which lack feelings and empathy in the relations with the child.Modern education is reduced to cognition. From very early age the person istrained to be rational, he/she do not get enough lessons of sensual life. Thisresults in the development of monotony (boredom) of the students and pupilsduring lectures and lessons, which was studied in detail by N. P. Fetiskin [5].In the same vein, A. Ya. Chebykin demonstrated that the emotions which thestudents would like to experience during lessons (enthusiasm, joy, curiosityand so on) are not the same as the ones they experience in reality (indifference,boredom, fear and so on) ([6], [7]).

When we start thinking about mathematics and teaching mathematics, allthe above become even more topical. In the context of the centuries-olddichotomy of reason and feelings, mentioned above, mathematics is, of course,assigned entirely to the realm of reason. But this is a big misapprehension,based on viewing mathematics only in terms of its results: rigorous, rationalmathematical truths. However, would it not be absurd, if, applying the sameapproach, we would assign the art of sculpture to the realm of geology andmineralogy, because the results of the sculptor’s work are some figures madeof various kinds of stones? Of course, mathematics is not only about its results.To teach mathematics properly, we should look at mathematics wider: as aprocess, as a human activity, as a part of culture and the history of intellect,and so on. As it was indicated earlier, mathematician, working on a certainproblem, is motivated not only by the desire to discover some truths (this goeswithout saying: the sculptor works with stones, the mathematician works withtruthful statements), but is motivated by the pursuit to create beauty out ofthese truthful statements, to get connected with other mathematicians in spaceand time, who worked or are working on the related problems.

It will be very appropriate here to recall the history of the mathematicsorigination as a science. As is known, mathematics as a science appeared inAncient Greece. Prior to that, there existed in the cultures of Babilon and Egypt

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some collections of segmentary, experimentally obtained facts, which weretransferred by the priests from generation to generation. By the way, some ofthese facts were mathematically incorrect, but only approximate. Moreover,their justification was based exclusively on the authority of the priests andtradition.

So, what had the Greeks done? Having borrowed the known mathematicalfacts from the neighboring cultures, the Greeks put them to the critical test “the same way they did with the religious believes of other cultures, which wasprecisely what led to origination of philosophy. It turned out that the entireimmense collection of mathematical facts allows possibility of their logicalderivation from a very small set of “obvious” axioms. Every Athens citizencould independently verify the derivation of any mathematical statement insteadof just blindly believing it.

However, what tendencies can be observed in teaching mathematics inrecent years? Paradoxically, we see its regress to the pre-scientific period ofthe history of mathematics. Many teachers of mathematics become just likethose priests, when their lesson is reduced to declaration of certain facts, truthsand mathematical recipes (supported only by the authority of the teacher andthe textbook) and solution of some examples using these recipes. This tendencyhas especially deepened in connection with the widespread transition (includingin Russia) to the multiple-choice-type system of knowledge testing. Duringthe final years of school, the lessons become more and more focused on training,cramming the pupils for solving a certain set of standard problems.

What kind of emotions may the pupils experience in such situation? Mostprobably, these will be the emotions of rejection, alienation, lacking of meaning.The pupils will master mathematical knowledge only by forcing themselves,due to the feeling of duty, motivation of fear, purely pragmatic desire to gethigh scores on the Unified State Examination in math.

And what may the teacher feel at that? Quite obviously, if he/she has beenfor many years “broadcasting” the same formal mathematical recipes at theschool blackboard, then, no surprise, this would give rise to the feeling ofboredom, fatigue, professional burning-out and the same internal alienation,rejection and lack of meaning as in his/her pupils. For what is a human teacherneeded then? A computer could do the same. Indeed, if the described formaltest-oriented trend is preserved, then it will be, quite possible, the ultimatefuture of teaching mathematics.

But it is precisely by the complete lack of emotions, feelings and livinghuman attitude that the computer-teacher differs principally from the humanteacher. It is impossible to imitate these properties even by the most advancedcomputer. No robot with the most powerful software can pass the “emotionalTuring test” in front of the pupils (we refer here to the famous Turing test forthe artificial intelligence). It is obvious that the child’s clear intuition willimmediately recognize a machine in the most human-looking robot.

Thus, if teaching mathematics is reduced to formal mastering of the rulesand recipes, then it objectively fosters the substitution of human teacher bythe computer. Numerous catastrophic consequences of such reform for thedevelopment of pupils are clearly seen.

Therefore, we must consider an alternative way of teaching mathematics,

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which is better oriented to the human being, taking into account the emotionaldimension.

Let us begin with a simple example. In the final part of the “Algebra andMathematical Analysis” course from the Russian high school program, thereis a chapter on Combinatorics, which includes some material aboutpermutations. Let us remind that permutations are various orderings of a finiteset of objects: for example, if there are altogether three presentations plannedfor a certain session of a conference, then they can be scheduled one afteranother in precisely six different ways. The authors of one of the textbooksstart this topic with another (quite standard) example: how many ways arethere of arranging four books in one row on a bookshelf? (The answer isprecisely 24 ways). Surely, this is a real life example. Let us think, however,whether it is sufficiently emotionally “charged”. First of all, as far as the moderngeneration of students is concerned, books do not evoke the kind of feelings ofrespect and awe, as they used to with the people of the “pre-computer” epoch.It is very unlikely for anyone of the modern your people to exclaim togetherwith a Russian writer of the beginning of XX century Maxim Gorkii: “All thegood I have in me “ I owe this to books”. Nowadays, the main sources ofinformation are different. Secondly, even if a pupil had to rearrange the bookson his/her shelf, most likely, this process was not to any degree emotionallysignificant for him/her.

Clearly, the authors approached the selection of this example in a rationalmanner, without thinking about its emotional reception. Consider one of thepossible alternatives, which might seem even too emotionally charged. So, weare to address the high-school senior students, adolescents of 16-17 years ofage. This is the age of first love, first love expressions. In this age this subjectis the most emotionally interesting for the students. So, let us consider themost usual love expression in Russian language: “Ya lyublyu tebya”, whichmeans, word-by-word, “I love you”.

Let us note that using Russian language is important for our example,because it is built on its specificity. Namely, in Russian language there is nostrict order of words, and it is permissible to arbitrarily permute three wordsin the above love expression. All the resulted sentences will be grammaticallycorrect and, surely, will reflect some subtle nuances in the expressed thought.How many different love expressions altogether can be obtained this way?This will be far from an idle question. Surely, the answer is analogous to theone concerning the presentations (mathematically, it is just the same problem):there are precisely six sentences and all of them are permissible. Here theyare (placed in a certain ordered fashion):

“Ya lyublyu tebya”, “Ya tebya lyublyu”,“Lyublyu ya tebya”, “Tebya ya lyublyu”, “Lyublyu tebya ya”, “Tebya lyublyu ya”.

(Let us note that it is impossible to use such example in a British or anyother English-speaking school, because it is not allowed to permute words inthe English sentence “I love you”.)

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So, in Russian we have here six options for this love expression. What doesit give us? For example, it provides a young man with the possibility to expresshis feelings differently every day during almost a week. And what if we considera more sophisticated and warm love expression: «Ya goryacho lyublyu tebya»(meaning “I dearly love you”)? It turns out that again these four words can berearranged in Russian language absolutely arbitrarily. So, how many differentsentences are we going to get this time? (Do we still remember that our subjectis mathematics? It would be wonderful if the students had already forgottenthis!) As in the example about four books, the numerical answer will be 24.Finally, if we consider the sentence “Ya lyublyu tebya vsem serdtsem” (“I loveyou with all my heart”), these five words can be once again permuted in arbitraryfashion, yielding 120 (!) options altogether. Even though this time not all theresulted sentences will be equally good in terms of style, some of them like“Tebya lyublyu vsem serdtsem ya” sound like a ready line from a potentiallove poem, written in iambic tetrameter. Here the teacher can make a diversionfrom mathematics and talk about Russian poetry and how this flexibility of theword order helps Russian poets in finding new forms of poetic expressions,fresh rhymes and rhythms.

Thus, the considered example shows how it is possible to climb fromunemotional and abstract mathematical problems to the heights of feelingsand poetry. It is quite possible that in many years after graduation this examplewill be still in the memory of pupils, when many other things will be longforgotten (due to the already mentioned emotional foundation of humanmemory). But this means that this example will become a piece of their trueeducation, for, as Albert Einstein said, “education is what remains after onehas forgotten everything he learned in school”. Let us add: “learned withoutthe emotional connection”.

REFERENCES

1. Compte Rendu du Deuxieme Congres International des Mathematiciens, Gauthier-Villars(Paris), 1902, p. 149.

2. Hardy G. H., A Mathematician’s Apology, Cambridge: University Press, 2004 (reissue);see also http://www.math.ualberta.ca/~mss/misc/A%20Mathematician’s%20Apology.pdf, p. 13.

3. Ushinsky K.D. Materials for the third volume of “Pedagogical Anthropology”. Completecollection of works, Publishing House of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of theRSFSR, vol. 10, 1950, p. 537. [in Russian]

4. Malamed Connie. Emotions and learning. http://theelearningcoach.com/learning/emotions-and-learning-part-i/

5. Fetiskin N. P. Systemic study of monotony in the professional activity. Candidate ofScience Dissertation, Saint-Petersburg, 1993. [in Russian]

6. Chebykin A. Ya. On the emotions which determine the cognitive activity. Psychologicaljournal, 1989, no. 4, pp. 135-141. [in Russian]

7. Chebykin A. Ya. The problem of emotional regulation of the learning-cognitive activityof the pupils. Voprosy Psikhologii (The Problems in Psychology), 1987, no. 6, pp. 42-47.[in Russian]


L. B. Vertgeym


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UDK 37.0 + 378

ON SOME ASPECTS OF YOUNG STUDENTS’ EDUCATION INMODERN CONDITIONS

A. S. Begalinov (Novosibirsk, Russia)

Summary. Education of young students is an important social issue. Thebasis of the problem appears to be all-round development and formation of thestudent’s personality, which is understood as a product of social development,the subject of labor, communication and cognition, determined by the specifichistorical conditions of the society. In modern research literature it is emphasizedthat education must have the personality-oriented nature. To successfully achievethe purposes of education, it is necessary to know what is the individual as asubject of education, what is its development and what should be the theoreticaland methodological approaches to the formation of the student’s personality inthe university. Understanding of the development of the student’s personality onthe part of the teacher-adviser creates the preconditions for psychological andpedagogical model of the educational plan in communication with the academicstudent group. University teachers should form the generation of individualswho can build and develop the future of the society. University does not onlyeducate but also socializes the students, develops the capacity for cultural self-organization and self-development.

Key words: education, upbringing, studentship, person, personalitystructure, socialization, creative adaptability.

Î ÍÅÊÎÒÎÐÛÕ ÀÑÏÅÊÒÀÕ ÂÎÑÏÈÒÀÍÈß ÑÒÓÄÅÍ×ÅÑÊÎÉÌÎËÎÄ¨ÆÈ Â ÑÎÂÐÅÌÅÍÍÛÕ ÓÑËÎÂÈßÕ

À. Ñ. Áåãàëèíîâ (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Âîñïèòàíèå ìîëîäûõ ñòóäåíòîâ — âàæíûé ñîöèàëüíûé âîï-ðîñ. Â êîðíå ïðîáëåìû – âñåñòîðîííåå ðàçâèòèå è ôîðìèðîâàíèå èíäèâè-äóàëüíîñòè ñòóäåíòà, êîòîðàÿ ïîíèìàåòñÿ êàê ïðîäóêò ñîöèàëüíîãîðàçâèòèÿ, ïðåäìåò òðóäà, êîììóíèêàöèè è ïîçíàíèÿ; îíà äåòåðìèíè-ðîâàíà îïðåäåëåííûìè èñòîðè÷åñêèìè óñëîâèÿìè îáùåñòâà.Â ñîâðåìåí-íîé èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîé ëèòåðàòóðå ïîä÷åðêèâàåòñÿ, ÷òî âîñïèòàíèåäîëæíî íîñèòü ëè÷íî îðèåíòèðîâàííóþ ïðèðîäó. Äëÿ óñïåøíîãî ðåøå-íèÿ çàäà÷ âîñïèòàíèÿ íåîáõîäèìî çíàòü, ÷òî åñòü ÷åëîâåê êàê ñóáúåêòâîñïèòàíèÿ. Ïîíèìàíèå ðàçâèòèÿ îòäåëüíîãî ñòóäåíòà ó÷èòåëåì ñî-çäàåò ïðåäâàðèòåëüíûå óñëîâèÿ äëÿ ïñèõîëîãè÷åñêîé è ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîé

© Begalinov A. S., 2013Begalinov Alibek Serikbekovich – graduate student at the Research Institute of

Philosophy of Education at the Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University.Áåãàëèíîâ Àëèáåê Ñåðèêáåêîâè÷ – àñïèðàíò Íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîãî èíñòè-

òóòà ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçîâàíèÿ, Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèéóíèâåðñèòåò.


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ìîäåëè âîñïèòàíèÿ. Óíèâåðñèòåòñêèå ó÷èòåëÿ äîëæíû ñôîðìèðîâàòüïîêîëåíèå ëþäåé, êîòîðûå ìîãóò ïîñòðîèòü è ðàçâèòü áóäóùåå îáùå-ñòâà. Óíèâåðñèòåò íå òîëüêî îáó÷àåò, íî òàêæå è ñîöèàëèçèðóåò ñòó-äåíòîâ, ðàçâèâàåò ñïîñîáíîñòè êóëüòóðíîé ñàìîîðãàíèçàöèè è ñàìîðàç-âèòèÿ.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáðàçîâàíèå, âîñïèòàíèå, ñòóäåí÷åñòâî, ÷åëîâåê,ñòðóêòóðà èíäèâèäóàëüíîñòè, ñîöèàëèçàöèÿ, òâîð÷åñêàÿ àäàïòèðóå-ìîñòü.

The modern system of higher education has high requirements to theeducation of young students. Studentship serves as a specific socio-professionalgroup which includes students in higher education institutions acquiring oneof the chosen professions. Despite the fact that they have a temporarilyorganized character they are distinguished by some characteristics such asspecial conditions of work, life and leisure, the availability of the different fromother youth associations value orientations and subculture systems. Hence,there is the uniqueness of social behavior and student psychology which directlydepends on the socio-political, historical and cultural conditions of the era. Forexample, Western literature of the Middle Ages describes the type of wanderingscholar, i.e. a learner or a student. A scholar, usually a young man, is a discipleof a city or monastery school, university. The concepts of the student or scholarin that era were synonymous, and their content included such features as“diligent, thoroughly studying something”, driven by a thirst for knowledge,wandering the world in search of the best universities, the best teachers. “Awandering scholar loves freedom, is poor but happy and cheerful, Epicureanismin them is present as much as passion for science ... They are not discouragedby failures, they are - a true friend and a storehouse of the most diverse andfascinating information in all areas of science and practical experience thathelps them to consistently come out unscathed from the most incredibleadventures and troubles “. [1] A scholar was endowed with a number of specialrights and privileges, which included lack of jurisdiction to general court.Scholars have also strictly adhered to corporate ethics although moving fromone university to another was considered commonplace. Latin was the primarylanguage of education and during years of training schoolboys mastered it tosuch an extent that it became for them the language of communication whichbrought students together but separated them from other social groups.

In Russia traditional education of boys abroad did not stop even during theTatar-Mongol conquest. During the reign of Peter I mass sending of Russianyouths abroad began. Once a private affair, higher education has become acompulsory duty. It is no accident that the image of a Russian nobleman appearsin literature as a scapegrace, a student by force, which tries to avoid studyingby all means possible. However, of course, even among Russian students,especially those from lower classes the same types of student attitudes andbehavior as throughout Europe were dominant.

During Pushkin’s time in Russian society there appears a new type ofintellectual person, educated abroad - in “Eugene Onegin” it is embodied inthe image of Vladimir Lensky, then appears in Griboyedov’s “Woe from Wit” –

A. S. Begalinov


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in Chatskii. These images emphasize the intellectual value and social alienationof an educated young man in Russia. Important is the fact that a universityeducation and the need for reform activity of the young heroes in the classicalRussian literature was opposed to common sense, life experience of the oldergeneration, order, normative culture of the real society.

The situation of departure abroad for the sake of knowledge is changing inthe modern era, when the national universities occupy stronger position andteaching is provided on the national language. So there is formed a studentshipas a part of the national intelligence. However, the practice of sending some ofthe students to study in the best universities abroad continued in our time.During the years of independence Kazakhstan made available higher educationto several thousand young people thorough the “Bolashak” presidentialprogram.

The basis of education in the institutions of higher education is the studentas subject, object and the end goal in itself. Comprehensive development andthe formation of their personality - this is the main goal of the educationalprocess. Scientists in the field of psycho-pedagogy suggest that nowadayseducation should be of personality-oriented nature. To successfully resolveeducational issues it is necessary to know what is individual as the educationsubject, how it develops and what the theoretical and methodologicalapproaches to the formation of the student’s personality within the universityshould be.

Identity of the student is the study object of not only education andpsychology but also sociology, history, medicine, ethics, aesthetics and manyother sciences which are studying the emerging personality from differentangles, in different connections and relations.

There are thoughts on the formation of the individual student in the worksof Y.A. Komensky, A. Disterveg, K.D. Blonskii, A.S. Ushinskii, A.S. Makarenko,V.A. Sukhomlinskii, S.L. Rubinstein, A.N. Leontyev, S. Freud, D. Watson,A. Maslow, K. Rogers and others.

S.L. Rubinstein identified three aspects of a personality’s mental image inpsychological-pedagogical science. What does a person want? What is attractivefor them? What do they seek? These are the questions of needs, interests andideals. What is a person capable of doing? This is the question of abilities andtalents. That of social trends and attitudes became flesh and blood, were fixedas the core personality traits? This is the question of character.

Jung’s theory is focused on different types of people:1) Extraverted – a sociable person, always and everywhere showing a special

interest in what’s going on. They put outside world above their internalsubjective experiences.

2) Introverted - all person’s attention is directed to the person themselvesand they became the center of their own interests. Personality puts themselvesand their own individual inner world above what is going on outside.

The most significant contribution to the theory of personality developmentwas introduced by E. Erickson. He described the eight vital psychological crisesthat inevitably occur in every human being. They are:

1) Early infancy (birth to 1 year);2) Later infancy (from 1 to 3 years);

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3) Early childhood (around 3 - 5 years);4) Middle childhood (from 5 to 11 years);5) Puberty, teenage youth (from 11 to 20 years);6) Early adulthood (from 20 to 45 years);7) Middle adulthood (from 40 – 45 to 60 years);8) Late adulthood (over 60 years).Psychoanalytic theory of S. Freud defines the structure of the personality

from three components:1). “It” – it is actually unconscious, including deep desires, motivations and

needs. “It” operates in accordance with the so-called pleasure principle. “It” isa product of man’s animal biological experience legacy.

2). “I” – consciousness, guided by the principle of reality. “I” – is, as a rule,self-awareness, perception and evaluation of a person’s own self and behavior.

3). “Superego” – is guided by the ideal notions, moral standards and valuesaccepted in society. “Superego” is the result of the impact of society on theconscious and subconscious of a human being, their acceptance of the normsand values of public morality. The main sources of identity formation areparents, caregivers, teachers, professors, tutors and other people with whomthis person had a prolonged contact and personal contacts throughout life, aswell as works of literature and art.

The essence of mental characteristics, states and processes (temperament,character, gender differences, interests, aptitudes, ideals, sentiments) arestudied by the sciences of pedagogy and psychology.

As a living being, a person is subject to the basic biological and physiologicallaws, as a social one to the laws of social development.

As a biological individual the person is characterized by vital physiologicalneeds what is very important especially for the comprehensive developmentof the student’s personality (the need to eat, sleep and have proper rest).A man is born not only as a biological individual, organism but also as a socialbeing. A social human being has the ability to master the external world, toacquire knowledge, skills, norms and rules of conduct. As a person they havethe ability to make a choice, to build their life, to coordinate their behavior inthe system of social relations with other people. These levels are hierarchicallyorganized, the highest of them – personality, the lowest – body.

Thus in the development of an individual there are two interrelated lines -biological and social. These two lines are clearly seen in the process of humandevelopment, from the moment of their birth. A man is born as a biologicalentity and is formed during the process of education becoming a person.Accordingly as a biological being a person during the course of its life producesand develops a number of social features and qualities that characterize itssocial nature.

Psychologist S.L. Rubinstein wrote that personality is characterized by sucha level of mental development, which allows them to consciously manage theirown behavior and activities. That’s why the ability to think about their actionsand take responsibility for them, the capacity for autonomous activity is anessential feature of personality. For completeness of characteristics of theperson as a social creature such a thing as an individual (from Latin - the

A. S. Begalinov


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singularity) cannot be ignored. As a concept, it refers to a single representativeof the human race regardless of their qualities.

Once born a man grows physically the increase of their individual organsand systems is observed. They master speech, enrich their vocabulary. Theypossess many social and domestic and moral skills, working skills and habits.All this must be borne in mind when it comes to personal development. Henceunder development should be understood an interconnected process ofquantitative and qualitative changes that occur in the anatomical andphysiological maturation of the person to improve the nervous system andmind and also their cognitive and creative activities, about enriching their world,morality and socio-political attitudes and beliefs.

Formation also acts as a result of the development of the individual andrepresents their formation, acquisition of stable properties and qualities inaggregate. To form - means “to shape something... stability, completeness, acertain type.” Formation is seen in the psycho-pedagogical science as a processof becoming human as a social being under the influence of any and all factors- social, economic, ideological and psychological. Upbringing is one of the mostimportant but not the only factors in the formation of personality. The processinvolves the formation of a kind of perfection of the human person, to achievea level of maturity, stability.

Formation of the person is an objective and consistent process, in whichpeople do not only act as an object of influence, but also as a stakeholder (thesubject of education - teacher-adviser, the object of education - student ofacademic group). Modern science has proven that the human personality isformed and revealed in the process of active interaction with the surroundingsubject and social environment.

Formation of a student’s personality is done through the process ofsocialization and aimed education at university (mastery of learning activitiesand further development as a professional). To form professional identity inthe educational process - that is to bring out in the individual student a positive,humane treatment of future engineering profession, personal interests,aptitudes, ability, systematic desire to improve their qualifications meet thematerial and spiritual needs, engaging in their chosen profession.

Student in the learning process at the university creates a social environmentand a wealth of social and spiritual relationships that define and serve as thesource of their further personal development. For completeness of this pictureimpact of the teacher-adviser must demonstrate pedagogical skills, emotionaland sensory influence. For example for the student to do well, you need avariety of tips, teachings and observations of the teacher-adviser. And they willbe effective only when they find a positive response in their mind and feelings,turning them into internal imperatives of their activity in the acquisition ofknowledge and personal forming.

Formation of the student’s personality in the university conceives followingexternal criteria of personal growth:

Acceptance of others. In interpersonal direction personal growth ismanifested primarily in the dynamics of the relationship to other people.Personality is more mature when it is more able to accept other people as theyare, to respect their identity and the right to be themselves, to recognize their

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absolute value and trust them. This in turn is associated with the “basic trust inhuman nature,” and a sense of depth, the essential commonality between people.

Understanding others. Mature personality is different from others byfreedom from prejudice and stereotypes, the ability to adequate, complete anddifferentiated perception of reality and in particular other people. The mostimportant criterion for personal growth is a willingness to engage ininterpersonal communication through a deep and subtle understanding,compassion, empathy.

Socialization. Personal growth leads to more efficient expression of thefundamental human desire for constructive social relationships. People incontact with others are becoming more open and natural, but more realistic,flexible, able to competently resolve interpersonal conflicts and to live withothers in as much as possible harmony.

Creative adaptability. The most important quality of a person a willingnessto boldly and openly tackle life’s problems and deal with them, not making iteasier but showing the “creative adaptation to the novelty of a particularmoment,” “the ability to express and use all potential internal capabilities.”

Philosophy and psychology of education today should be related to thegeneral theory of communication, because the relationship of the student andthe teacher, student and university bureaucracy, the student group and theattitude of the student determines the choice of the model of the educationalprocess. Pedagogical paradigm of higher education to the twenty-first centuryshould be determined according to the relationship to the student. If theeducational process is exchange of services, the student is a partner orcustomer. If the learning process is interpreted as broadcast of socially relevantinformation and communication of generations, the student is the learner,forming, being educated. Originally laid in the mentality of the student are theneed for independence and the need for teachers, therefore, the interpretationof the educational process is fundamental for the formation of the developmentstrategy of the educational system and the definition of the essence of thebusiness and interpersonal communication of its main actors.

Modern higher education system produces its own requirements forstudents. The main ones are: unified training program, follow the norms andstandards of student life, community groups and the forced flow, forced relianceon teachers and local bureaucracy. The only way to encourage is to show agreat study on a common plan. Another dominant complex is aggressiveness.It can be: conscious or unconscious, is aimed at teachers, fellow students,parents, i.e. in all directions, is connected to the basal anxiety, enhancedawareness and lack of partner-developed installation for total resistance. Atthe same time, the system of education in the form of demands obedienceperformance discipline creates a system of rewards and punishments, but itfocuses on the cooperation. In other words, changes in the educational processfocused on partnership and cooperation, whereas there is virtually stableinstallation of the resistance and opposition. From the analysis of the researchliterature on the subject, most students show a much more stereotypedthinking, what can we expect from young people? Of course, it cannot affectthe willingness of teachers to develop creative learning technologies.

A. S. Begalinov


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The identity of the student thus is treated as a product of social development,the subject of labor, communication and cognition, deterministic specifichistorical conditions of society. Understanding of the development of theindividual student to the teacher-adviser creates the preconditions forpsychological and pedagogical model of the educational plan in communicationwith an academic student group.

That model, when there is not just about training and education, whichinvolves the formation of individual thinking, creativity is, the emphasis is noton the issue of “what to teach” and “how to teach”, which is usually kept in theshade. It is this issue helps achieve the goal set before the open society in anygeopolitical space. The World Declaration on Higher Education for theXXI Century, adopted by the World Conference of UNESCO in Paris in 1998noted: “Higher education institutions should ensure that education of thestudents, which brings them well-informed and deeply motivated citizens, whocan think critically, analyze problems of society, and the use of search solutionsto the problems facing society, as well as to ensure that they take socialresponsibility“. [2]

In achieving these goals, “an important role must be played by the teachingstaff of higher education institutions,” according to the document. Universityteachers should form the generation of individuals who can build and developthe future of society. University does not only educate, but also socializesstudents, trainees develops the capacity for cultural self-organization and self-development. You can learn this by associating to culture – a common humanexperience. “Culture – is not just a medium, rearing and feeding the personality,and the effort of man to be a man”, – claimed philosopher M. Mamardashvili. –Developing the profession, a student at the same time developing as a person,as the process of learning in high school and is a process of socialization.

REFERENCES

1.Wheel of Fortune: Vagant. / Comp., Bus., Introd. Art. VB Ants. Moscow, 1998. (World ofPoetry). C. 7.

2. World Declaration on Higher Education for the XXI century. UNESCO. Paris. 1998.


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Part IIICONCRETE PROBLEMS IN MODERN EDUCATIONAL

SPACE

Ðàçäåë III. ÊÎÍÊÐÅÒÍÛÅ ÏÐÎÁËÅÌÛ Â ÑÎÂÐÅÌÅÍÍÎÌÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÒÅËÜÍÎÌ ÏÐÎÑÒÐÀÍÑÒÂÅ

UDC 13 + 159.9

ON THE ISSUE OF THE TEMPORAL BODY

A. Hogenova‰ (Prague, Czech Republic)

Resume. The body is not only a spatial formation but it is also a formationin time. It is constructive to investigate the phenomenological concept of theconnection between the body and the world through intentionality, i.e. throughthe phenomenology of internal temporal perception. This provides a new approachto physical illnesses.

Key words: the body, time, intentionality, urimpression, retention andprotention, the Dasein issue.

Ê ÂÎÏÐÎÑÓ Î ÂÐÅÌÅÍÍÎÌ ÒÅËÅ

À. Õîãåíîâà (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà)

Ðåçþìå. Òåëî åñòü íå òîëüêî íåêîòîðîå ïðîñòðàíñòâåííîå îáðàçîâà-íèå, íî ÿâëÿåòñÿ íåêèì îáðàçîâàíèåì âî âðåìåíè. Êîíñòðóêòèâíûì áóäåòèññëåäîâàòü ôåíîìåíîëîãè÷åñêîå ïîíÿòèå ñâÿçè ìåæäó òåëîì è ìèðîì ÷å-ðåç èíòåíöèîíàëüíîñòü, òî åñòü ÷åðåç ôåíîìåíîëîãèþ âíóòðåííåãî âîñïðèÿ-òèÿ âðåìåíè. Ýòî äàåò è íîâûé ïîäõîä ê ïîíèìàíèþ ôèçè÷åñêèõ áîëåçíåé.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: òåëî, âðåìÿ, èíòåíöèîíàëüíîñòü, ïåðâè÷íîå âïå-÷àòëåíèå, ðåòåíöèÿ è ïðîòåíöèÿ, ïðîáëåìà Dasein.

The body should be understood as being temporal. Nearly everyoneunderstands it as being spatial, we describe the position of the individual organs

© Hogenova‰ A., 2013Anna Hogenova‰, PhD., Charles University – Pedagogical faculty, Univerzita Karlova v

Praze, in the department of civil education and philosophy.Õîãåíîâà Àííà, äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð êàôåäðû ôèëîñîôèè è ãðàæ-

äàíñêîãî âîñïèòàíèÿ Êàðëîâà óíèâåðñèòåòà .E-mail: [email protected]


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and the individual functions etc. but many bodily functions occur at the sametime and not in succession i.e. one after each other. When we apply the breaksin our car we perceive the situation in front of us at the same time, we drivewith our hands, we apply the clutch with our foot, and sometimes we evenmanage to throw our mobile phone somewhere safe. This all happens at thesame time, simultaneously. An orchestral conductor hears each individualinstrument but at the same time he hears the whole music. It is as if the mysteryof the body were its ability to perform many different things at the same time.

Of course, we scientifically research these as things that occur in succession,through causality. Causality is the cornerstone without which there would beno science. We search for the cause and effect but our body works differently.It is as if there were only a single deliberateness – intention, which drags all ofthe functions and processes along with it. The greatest mystery of all is connectedwith our speech. A word is both deliberated and delivered at the same time, indoing so this word is only a small part of the intention which makes sense of ourspeech as it attempts to release our thoughts into the world which are usually notclear at the beginning of the speech, i.e. they have no clear geometric shape,they are not “clare et distincte”. If intention was recognized as the basis ofhuman movement, it would probably be taken from its analytical methodology,which is the modern-day foundation of the science of the human body anddisease. What if things were slightly different? It is not sufficient to observeand measure causality and then falsify it and continue in infinitum.

Hence, our hypothesis is that the body is intention which the body leads inthe main direction and everything else is subordinate. This would mean that adisease should firstly be treated by observing this intention so that the otherparts of the body ‘felt’ well. To tune a patient into their overall life intentionmeans nothing more than to support all of the functions of the human body,even those which are at the center of our medical interest.

If Henri Bergson is correct then our body is only a fragment of continuousmovement and this movement is mainly in time. We must try to understanddisease temporally, not statically, i.e. not only causally. If life is the movement ofgenesis and phthora, audzesis and phthisis, alloiosis and phora, then everything isdifferent. Here we have mentioned the four types of Aristotle’s movement, ofwhich our modern times have accepted only the fourth, locomotion .There will be no innovation in medicine if Cartesian methods are used, i.e. inparticular the analysis of a statically conceived body, which is an incrediblyinsignificant part of the human body. Temporal understanding of the body, thebody in movement, must always come from something not go somewhere; soit experiences situations which we cannot predict. Aristotle speaks of arche(beginning), telos (end), dynamis (possibilities in a situation) and energeia(accomplishment of these possibilities). Finally there is ergon, which is theact that conceals arche, telos, dynamis and energeia within. It is a system ofhermeneutic serenity. “You will recognize them by their fruit”, is known fromthe Bible. Actions are ergons and the “fruit” is our bodies, this is what it is allabout! What if a person has no telos, he has nowhere to go, no direction, nointention to the world, that which is the most fundamental. Then he does nothave the purpose to seek the cause of the diseases in the organs, in the tinyparts of these organs. It lies somewhere else, we only ask the wrong questions.

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It has been revealed that questioning is the devotion to thought. This isHeidegger’s view hitherto misunderstood and unelaborated. If a patient cannotperform a movement, it could be due to them having no end (telos), intention,which drives the whole of our life.

If a person sees red color, he clearly recognizes and names it; then thatperson must have the ‘color’ already inside him as a basis without which hewould not recognize it at all. What does this mean for us? It means that thegoal of life’s movements must have a purpose. What if we do not have thispurpose? Where can it be found, how can it be understood? Maybe we have aflawed beginning (arche) inherited from our ancestors, perhaps it is only thesituation to which our life “is immersed” and we do not consider it as being aproblem. It does not speak to us, we do not sense what is the most importanti.e. the question. Situations are typical in that they ask questions of us. How dowe overcome this obstruction? We charge to our goals which are far ahead ofus. Only intention contains arche, telosand the properly formed choice ofdynamis (possibilities) from the given situation.

Maybe, Paracelsus spoke the truth when he said that we must understanda disease from the disease itself, or when he states that the human body issomething that cannot be understood through analysis of phases in the flow ofa single future time. Many functions are performed together in a single pointin time. How can we understand this ability of the human body? It is a mysterywhich may also be the key to many incurable diseases. Perhaps we would notonly describe steps of being if our body takes the steps simultaneously. It is as ifthe body were a tiny universe which is almost impossible to fill with our ideas!

In order for us to encounter the temporal body we must first do one thingunbeknown to doctors. We must undergo transcendental epoche. What is this?It is achange in our cognitional point of view, it forms our will. We must look atthe problem as if we are small, inexperienced children. This is a priori or inother words a transcendental cognitive attitude. Only after this transformationwe are able to understand that our encounter with the problem is always pre-arranged, although we do not even realize it. Paracelsus knew nothing of epochebut he understood that it is always necessary to start with the nature of thedisease itself. Nevertheless, we always start with unquestioned assumptionswhich are part of our consideration, scientific methods. To look at the issue asif for the first time means the onset of protention from which we can understandthe disease. If five different people look at a single object, each of them projectstheir own experiences. We do not even realize this. If a fisherman and a poetlook at a stormy sea, they see the same thing but it is a very different thing foreach!

A doctor can recognize things from a distance. His expression betrays him.Assurance is ‘emitted’ from him. We must learn to see the body as an incisionin the center of a continuous transformation in time. Each and every changepenetrates intention to the world giving everything simplicity. It is this simplicitywhich is the source of disease, if it does not control all of the bodily functions,the body has no ‘orchestral conductor’, functions become independent and theprincipal of isonomy, where the organs listen to a single law (nomos), isdisturbed. In such a case monarchy rules – aonso, – beginning).

A. Hogenova‰

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It is necessary to treat the whole of the intention which leads us and introducesus to the world. Implicated meanings are convoluted and cannot be understoodanalytically, i.e. developed and described. Explicated meanings can bedeveloped and mechanically described. The body as a structure is implicatedwith significance, it is pregnancy, i.e. that which is made, born, finally for thefirst time. And so from man a motive figure is born, a present day permeationof thought, motor functions, emotions and will. Skiing, dancing, playing musicalinstruments, driving a car – these are all made up of very complex motivefigures which are born from the body in the present, and not one after eachother. This must be understood once more, not analytically, Cartesian.

The key is intentionality. It is something ancient, Aristotle called it , Toma‰s‰ Akvinsky‰ and scholastics called it intentionality. It is the linkbetween man, his body and the world through ties which were made based onthe internal perception of time which was brought to us by Edmund Husserl.This demonstrates that the perception of time is a kind of “dissection” of ourworld, our Dasein, which drastically influences even the possibilities of ourmovement and not only our learning. Heidegger speaks of the importance ofthe Dasein phenomenon (movement here and now) for the treatment of physicalillnesses. The link between the body of an ill person and the world around himis neglected by doctors, it is not “clare et distincte”. At best it deals with socialcharacteristics. But in this regard new ways to patients are possible. It isnecessary to examine the internal perception of time in a non-Cartesian way.Urimpression (primal impression) metamorphoses into retention, which isretained in the flow of our cogitations. Due to the interest in urimpression,protention is formed from retention which is the lens through which our livingworld, our own Dasein can be implicitly seen. In other words, if we want tounderstand the patients, we must join in their protentional plan, their noesis.Noesis carries inside it that which we find as noema. This is a phenomenologicalapproach to illness.

REFERENCES

Husserl, E. Vorlesungen zur Pha..nomenologie der inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Freiburg 1928.Merleau-Ponty, M. Pha..nomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Berlin: Rudolf Boehm 1960.


UDC 37.0 + 378

EMANCIPATION FROM CONSENSUSPROLEGOMENA TO PEDAGOGY OF DISSENT

M. Hauser (Prague, Czech Republic)

Summary. This article concerns the problematic of consensus and of liberaldemocracy in general as well as from the perspective of Central Europe. I attemptto link Adorno’s description of cultural industry and Z‰iz‰ek’s concept of fantasy.I consider one of the main elements of consensus to be the fantasy of consensus.

πώς

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Due to the production of consensus, emancipatory politics cannot directly relyupon the agreement (disagreement) of the majority – the majority ultimatelymight agree with an authoritarian regime. The main question, however, iswhether liberal democracy itself isn’t starting to appear as something “unnatural”.

Key words: Consensus, liberal democracy, Adorno, Z‰iz‰ek, fantasy.

ÝÌÀÍÑÈÏÀÖÈß ÈÇ ÊÎÍÑÅÍÑÓÑÀ.ÂÂÅÄÅÍÈÅ Â ÏÅÄÀÃÎÃÈÊÓ ÈÍÀÊÎÌÛÑËÈß

Ì. Õàóñåð (Ïðàãà,×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà)

Ðåçþìå: Ýòà ñòàòüÿ êàñàåòñÿ ïðîáëåìàòèêè êîíñåíñóñà è ëèáå-ðàëüíîé äåìîêðàòèè êàê â öåëîì, òàê è ñ òî÷êè çðåíèÿ ÖåíòðàëüíîéÅâðîïû. ß ïûòàþñü ñâÿçàòü îïèñàíèå Àäîðíî èíäóñòðèè êóëüòóðû èêîíöåïöèþ ôàíòàçèè Æèæåêà. ß ðàññìàòðèâàþ ôàíòàçèþ êîíñåíñóñàêàê îäèí èç ãëàâíûõ ýëåìåíòîâ êîíñåíñóñà. Â ñèëó ïðîèçâîäñòâà êîíñåí-ñóñà ïîëèòèêà ýìàíñèïàöèè íå ìîæåò íåïîñðåäñòâåííî îïèðàòüñÿ íàñîãëàñèå (ðàçíîãëàñèå) áîëüøèíñòâà – áîëüøèíñòâî, â êîíå÷íîì ñ÷åòå,ìîãëî áû ñîãëàñèòüñÿ ñ àâòîðèòàðíûì ðåæèìîì. Ãëàâíûé âîïðîñ, îä-íàêî, ñîñòîèò â òîì, íå íà÷èíàåò ëè ñàìà ëèáåðàëüíàÿ äåìîêðàòèÿâûãëÿäåòü êàê íå÷òî “íååñòåñòâåííîå”.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: ñîãëàñèå, ëèáåðàëüíàÿ äåìîêðàòèÿ, Àäîðíî, Æè-æåê, ôàíòàçèÿ.

Production of consensus

Slavoj Z‰ iz‰ek breaks through one vexing vicious circle of “critical theory”(first generation) and (neo)Marxism, including Althusser’s: given that thesubject is (over)determined by the historical situation, and its consciousness,unconsciousness, self-perception as well as behavior are shaped by therepressive and ideological mechanisms of late capitalism, where is the spacefor criticism of society, of capitalism, of repression? Althusser tried to reckonwith this difficulty by implementing a radical critique of humanism, and herejected the self-perception and immediate consciousness of the “humanpersonality” as a form of ideology, thus he took a step similar to that of Foucault,who viewed humanism as part of the power discourse. If this space disappears(by integrating wage laborers, labor unions, or groups or movements thatexpressed opposition to the system, such as the Western student movement

© Hauser Ì., 2012Mgr. Michael Hauser, PhD. The Department of Civics and Philosophy, Charles University –

Faculty of EducationÌàãèñòð Ìàéêë Õàóñåð, äîêòîð ôèëîñîôèè, êàôåäðà ïðàâîâåäåíèÿ è ôèëîñîôèè.

Êàðëîâ óíèâåðñèòåò – ôàêóëüòåò îáðàçîâàíèÿ.E-mail: [email protected]

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of 1968), it is easy to brand the societal critics as pro-totalitarian, antidemocraticand elitist “dinosaurs.” After the disappearance of the disclosed societal agent,it is possible to dismiss every criticism of society, as the expression of hystericaland irresponsible individuals. The authorities of the existing order (the powerelite, media, teams of experts sponsored by large corporations)1 can thenwithout any great difficulties produce consensus.

The production of consensus has two layers, the first one material and thesecond one fantasy. The material layer is composed of the system and natureof information, interpretations, images, “personalities” who are connected withwhat is traditionally called the cultural industry or the industry ofconsciousness.2 The fantasy layer is harder to pin down, but it is no lessimportant: it is the fantasies that are connected with the previous layer, butwhich can’t be assigned to it. The first layer on the one hand presents thetexture of the big Other, and it has the function of Law (it instills models ofthought and perception), but at the same time has its obscene supplement, thesphere of the superego, in which fantasies originate which aren’t the immediatecontents of the products of the industry of consciousness. The production ofconsensus, which plays out on the first layer, is supported by the second layer,which can act as a negation of the contents of the first layer. An example ofsuch a fantasy might be the right-wing fantasy of “the unemployed,” whichoriginates in response to the question, “what does the Other want from me?”and is personified in images, information, “personalities” of the first layer. Thisfantasy presents “the unemployed” as an idler who lives off social support andexploits the taxpayers. It is similar with the consensus about “Czech nationalinterests”, which the Civic Democratic Party (a neoliberal party with featuresof populism) tries to produce in the Czech Republic. Here too must be thefantasy of the European Union as the last bastion of socialism, wanting to depriveus of our national enjoyment (jouissance).

The first layer has to do with the contents of consciousness, and the second,the fantasy layer, of unconscious desire. Existence of the second layer ispossible under the proviso that the first layer isn’t entirely coherent, that thereare gaps in it, which gives rise to the creation of a fantasy to fill them. The firstlayer at the same time represents what Althusser and Z‰ iz‰ek call the material

1. It is necessary to differentiate the ruling class and the power elite, which according tothe classic definition of Pareto and Mosca is made up of those who take part in theformation and acceptance of government decisions, those who influence the decision-making agents, or who themselves participate in the decision-making process. Theelite, it’s true, is limited by class domain (certain questions which are connected withthe economic domain, such as the production process, is outside this discussion), butat the same time has a certain autonomy from it.

2. See Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, chapter “The Cultural Industry,”in which there is a detailed analysis of “the a priori schemata of perception and thought”that produces and is instilled in the cultural industry. (Adorno-Horkheimer, 1979) InDebord we read that the production of goods is connected with the production ofspectacles, and that every type of good has its own spectacle. These spectacles are thusextremely inconsistent, but at the same time are integrated “in the universal systemthat contains them: […] capitalism.” (Debord 2006: par. 56)

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existence of ideology, which is connected with mundane practices like readinga tabloid newspaper.3

The trap of “critical theory” is that it stems from this consensus as somethinggiven, more precisely said, it identifies the content of the material layer withthe content of desire because it lacks the concept of fantasy, which makes itpossible to see the gap between the industry of consciousness and thepsychosocial life of individuals and communities. The fantasy layer nevercoincides with the layer of consciousness: It is never possible to preciselycalculate it; it is its spectral supplement.

Using Z‰ iz‰ek’s concept of the fantasy, it is possible to achieve another slightshift of perspective: A part of the production of consensus is also the productionof the fantasy of consensus. One of the primary ways to produce consensus isto create the illusion that the presented contents and attitudes are shared bythe majority, and whoever doesn’t share them is in the minority or is even asolitary eccentric, a romantic dreamer or an extremist who is unwilling to acceptthe “reality” of the majority consensus. Whoever doesn’t accept the majorityconsensus, which it is possible to easily pass off as the will of the majority, is apotentially dangerous elitist or an authoritarianist contemptuous of democracy.

That doesn’t mean that the production of consensus isn’t efficacious. In thefield of sociological research, especially that which poses questions in a biasedway, the statements are often in accordance with consensus, but Z‰ iz‰ek’s theorymakes it possible to differentiate between public self-presentation in polls andsociological research and the fantasy framework in which this self-presentationplays out. The great merit of Althusser, Lacan and Z‰ iz‰ek’s “theoreticalantihumanism” is that it succeeds in eroding the “myth of the given” (Adorno),thus preserving one of the essential theoretical imperatives of “critical theory”of the first generation, which Habermas replaced with the imperative ofcommunication, which comes from the manifest content of the statements ofthe participants.

This “antihumanistic” embrace of consensus then can be connected withthe issue of the dominant theory or discourse. Its dominance is alwaysconnected with the production of consensus, for the theory or discoursebecomes dominant only when it succeeds in producing consensus, a part ofwhich is the fantasy of consensus. The dominance of the theory or discourserests upon this fantasy element. The dominant theory or discourse loses powerover us, if we succeed in discovering and barring this fantasy element. Itsbarring leads to a situation in which our interpretation is not driven byconsensus, by our fantasy of consensus, but rather by the voids in the dominanttheory or discourse.

3. See for example Z‰ iz‰ek 1997: 6. Fantasy, which operates during the production ofconsensus, corresponds to the narrative form of fantasy, which obscures some traumaticevent by categorizing its elements into a particular chronological sequence. The exampleis the sociopolitical myth of primitive accumulation, about two workers, one lazy andthe other one industrious (and who became rich), which obscures the trauma offundamental societal antagonism. Z‰ iz‰ek 1997: 10n. Description of the mechanismwhereby fantasy originates, see Z‰ iz‰ek 1997: 32n.

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If we are coming from a liberal democratic conception of consensus,depolitization itself is ambiguous – the problem in some respect becomes theproblem itself. If this consensus begins to drive our interpretation ofdepolitization, we are snared by the question-trap: What happens whendepolitization meets with consensus? In the name of whom or what do wecriticize depolitization? Isn’t it possible that the majority wishes to live theirprivate lives and they perceive depolitization as freedom from politics? In thisway criticism of depolitization gets into the position of authoritarianenlighteners, who view the desires of the majority from on high and see inthem manifestations of irrationality. It is possible to avoid these traps by lettingour point of departure be not consensus, but rather a symptomatic reading,which in the “reality” of consensus sees its Real, its incoherence, gaps andcontradictions.

How is an authoritarian regime becoming natural?

How to define the crisis of liberal democracy? A definition that takes intoaccount a distinction between the ruling classes and the power elite mightlook something like this: the crisis of liberal democracy is the process by whichincreasingly only the power elite participates in the formation and acceptanceof decisions that have a direct or indirect impact on society as a whole. Duringthis process there is generally a restriction of civil rights and freedoms. As thespace for decision-making is closed off from the majority of citizens, it isincreasingly difficult for the majority to reverse this process with lawful means.

This and similar definitions assume that the excluded majority disagreeswith the erosion of liberal democracy, which means that the production ofconsensus fails, and in place of consensus the general mood of the majoritybecomes one of disagreement. This concept of disagreement corresponds tothe liberal understanding of consensus – disagreement can be, simply put, justas much a fantasy as consensus is. It comes from the notion that a breakdownor restriction of liberal democratic procedures automatically triggers theopposition of the majority, and thus it is an extension of the basic utopianconstruct of liberalism: that the majority agrees with the procedures andprinciples of liberal democracy because the people are free and rational beings.If the majority freely rejects liberal democracy, for example by voting for theNazi Party or the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (which won in freeelections in 1946), then liberalism mostly sees the manipulated masses – themajority of voters are not acting as free and rational beings. A person is a freeand rational being only when he accepts liberal democracy.

The scenario then becomes quite clear: The power elite, which limits themajority’s access to decision-making, isn’t capable of producing consensus andit loses legitimacy. Thus the gulf grows wider between the increasingly powerfulhandful and the increasingly powerless majority. During this process, thepowerful handful veers more and more toward the use of violence against itsopposition, and there is a spiraling loss of legitimacy: When it loses legitimacy,it can hold onto power only through violence, and if it uses violence, it loseseven more of its legitimacy. This state is unsustainable in the long run, andtwo possibilities remain: either the overthrow of the handful by the majority,

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or the implementation of self-restraint and a partial redistribution of power.The inclination toward partial self-restraint of power appeared toward the endof real-existing socialism with “perestroika.” From the perspective of the logicof power, it is possible to interpret perestroika and its accompanying politicalliberalization as self-restraint of power for the purpose of retaining it. For radicalopponents of the regime, it must have been their worst nightmare thatperestroika would be successful, for it would have meant a stabilization of theregime.

But things aren’t necessarily so simple. Z‰ iz‰ek speaks about a much moreeffective means of creating agreement with the regime than the concept oflegitimacy. Every regime presents a particular form of the organization ofenjoyment (jouissance), corresponding to one of Lacan’s four discourses. Forexample, Nazism organized enjoyment by means of the obscene supplement,which was the persona of the Jew, who was stood in the way of its attainment:If there weren’t any Jews in Germany, problems would disappear and Germanswould finally create a society of solidarity.4 There are also other ways to createagreement, such as the aestheticization of evil or the shared awareness of acrime as a common dark secret, which is evinced by the fact that Nazism couldrely on the agreement of the majority.

The crisis of liberal democracy is thus seen in a different light. With both ofthese undemocratic regimes of the 20th century there was a far greaterpolitization than there is today in liberal democratic countries. At first glance itis possible to say that Nazism as well as “communism” (in several periods)were regimes during which liberal democratic depolitization (pursuing privateinterests, consumerism) alternated with unprecedented repolitization (a hard-to-ignore number of people who often voluntarily participated in building a“new world”, the growth of membership in unions and the party, public rallies,politization of thinking). After the regimes’ demise came depolitization: peopleretreating into private life and indulging in a consumerist lifestyle.

Politization can be connected with the accession of an authoritariandictatorship and depolitization, by contrast, with the accession of liberaldemocracy. Neoconservative theoreticians and politicians therefore canproclaim that depolitization is the hallmark of a free democratic society, whereaspolitization breaks out wherever some enemy of democracy appears. Politizationand depolitization therefore can’t be appraised independently of thesociopolitical framework in which they play out. Politization can mean eitherthe accession or the side-effect of an authoritarian dictatorship or themanifestation of opposition to it.

But what’s happening today? How exactly do we describe the contemporarycrisis of liberal democracy, and what is the symptom? If we proceed from theaforementioned definition of it as the closure of political space, we should addto it the problem of consensus. The question then becomes whether the closureof political space isn’t accompanied by the production of consensus. In otherwords, if depolitization can’t be consensual – if the production of consensus isnot successful. That would mean that it isn’t possible to immediately rely on

4 The basic premise of Z‰ iz‰ek’s concept of enjoyment (jouissance) as a factor that createsagreement with Nazism and Stalinism, see Dean 2006: 47–93.

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the disagreement of the majority to oppose the crisis of liberal democracy,because the majority might accept the produced consensus. We see thisphenomenon today in Russia, where in free elections the majority supportedPutin, even though he advocates a centralization of power and depolitization inthe sense of closure of the political space, which of course doesn’t preclude an“authoritarian” form of politization.

How to describe the current production of consensus in connection withdepolitization? The production of consensus again has two layers: material andfantasy. On the one hand there are mobilizing slogans, such as the war onterrorism, which, as Z‰ iz‰ek demonstrates in his book about Iraq, are quiteinconsistently substantiated: There are missing links in the chain of evidenceor this chain is absent altogether.(Z‰ iz‰ek 2004) On the fantasy layer arises thefantasy of Islam, which threatens “Western civilization,” our way of life and ourform of enjoyment (jouissance). In the postcommunist countries of CentralEurope, in which the slogan war on terrorism doesn’t resound very stronglydue to geopolitical reasons, its supplements or surrogates appear, above allso-called belated anticommunism. Its fantasy is the persona of the communist,who plots and plans to grab power and undermine freedom and democracy. Itwould be possible to show that belated anticommunism relies on a similarlyincoherent chain of arguments as the war on terrorism: It assumes that we areliving at the beginning of the “Cold War,” not after its end, or that thecommunists could again carry out a “proletarian revolution,” even though noclassical proletariat exists. Anticommunists who today fight against communismas the destroyer of liberal democracy refuse to see the real threat to liberaldemocracy, which comes from global capitalism, economic crisis or the waron terrorism. Another fantasy that underpins consensual depolitization are“troublesome” immigrants or ethnic minorities, who start to appear as the rootof our problems and trigger yearning for a “firm hand,” which replaces thedysfunctional “invisible hand of the market.”

If the production of consensus is successful, then all of these themes stopbeing a question about where the political struggle is heading and become themyth of the given: It is senseless to doubt what is perceived as self-evident.What was not obvious becomes obvious and “natural”, “second nature”(Luka‰cs). (“Second nature” is the result of some type of production, whichappears as something natural.) Precisely this naturalization is the primary resultof the successful production of consensus.

One of the main questions now emerging, however, is the converse: Isn’tliberal democracy and its “a priori” principles affected by the converse process?Doesn’t it happen that what was obvious becomes unobvious and unnatural?Why should citizens decide about important issues when ... (they aren’t experts,they have no responsibility, they think only about themselves, and so on)? Thereasons here are unimportant, what’s decisive is whether a fantasy frameworkhas begun to be created, without which these reasons will not have an effect.In other words, isn’t it the dawn of the denaturalization of liberal democracy? Itisn’t so difficult to imagine that the fundamental principles of liberal democracy(“man is a free and rational being and has the right to decide about that whichin some way affects him”) could be gradually forgotten and in their place would

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emerge other principles that adhere to the production of consensus. Or heremight be the obscene supplement of the officially recognized liberal discoursein that this would be interpreted in terms of it (“yes, man is a free and rationalbeing, but only if he is native-born French, German, Czech ...”).

It is possible then to read the denaturalization of liberal rights and freedomsas the symptom of the “absent” content, which is, of necessity, suppressed sothat this denaturalization can proceed. What is this suppressed content? It is acrisis of the liberal democratic framework in which this process takes place:the de-form(ation) of form because of its content. If its effective publicationoccurred – if it became a topic for the mass media, teams of experts,politicians – it would mean that depolitization had become the political issue,and the very politicization of depolitization would have occurred. Drawing publicattention to it would rid this process of its self-evidence and naturalness and itwould render it an object of political struggle, which would begin to dividesociety into its supporters and opponents, for example into autocrats anddemocrats. Said another way, naturally occurring depolitization would stop andits politicization would begin. But it isn’t possible to count on this, because themass media, experts and politicians, insomuch as they act as components ofthe existing order (Ranciere’s “police” order), are forced to not-see its crisis,and the only exception are far-right politicians, who speak openly about thecrisis of liberal democracy, but only in order to try to create a majorityagreement with further political restrictions of the majority. All of this iscontinually playing out within the framework of liberal democracy, whichinhibits the seeing of its crisis, because as the dominant order it must concealits errors, oversights and gaps. If this process continues as “natural,” theirexposure and publication will take place only when this framework will bereplaced by another framework, within which their invisibility already will bebeside the point, or it will be one of the sources of legitimacy.

The example might be postcommunist liberal democracy, which draws asizable part of its legitimacy from exposing and publicizing the “crimes ofcommunism.” To paraphrase Masaryk’s famous assertion that “states are upheldby the ideals of which they were born,” then it is possible to say: Postcommuniststates are upheld by the communism of which they were born, as its obscenesupplement. If the experience with “communism” withers away, it is necessaryto revive it again. Belated anticommunism is the attempt to restore the dwindlinglegitimacy of postcommunist liberal capitalism. A full exposure and publicationof concealed voids and crisis points always happens retroactively, and as wesee in postcommunist countries, this exposure and publication can have thetraits of an “eternal return of the same.”

All this of course does not imply that the process of depolitization acts as anirreversible historical determination. As Immanuel Wallerstein says, the currentsituation is the situation of the protracted transition to another socioeconomicconfiguration, to another “world-system.” It is not possible to assume how thiswould be from the components of the existing situation, because “notparadoxically, it will also be a period in which the ‘free will’ factor will be at itsmaximum, meaning that individual and collective action can have a greaterimpact on the future structuring of the world than such action can have inmore ‘normal’ times, that is, during the ongoing life of a historical system.”

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(Wallerstein 1998: 35) Due to structural reasons, the result isn’t determinedbeforehand – it is a matter of political struggle. Nor is naturalization anddepolitization itself a process that takes place “behind our backs” with naturalnecessity, for there always must be political agents here who promote andproduce naturalization and depolitization.

The most serious consequence of naturalization and depolitization is thedisappearance of the demarcation lines between the proponents of theemancipatory potential of liberalism (universality of rights and freedoms) andthose who promote “liberalism” without the emancipatory core or who try toproduce the consensus that universal emancipation is unnatural, unwanted orreserved for privileged groups or citizens. The main problem is that theproduction of consensus establishes demarcation lines that follow completelydifferent criteria (an attitude toward a “clash of civilizations,” toward the “waron terrorism,” toward “political extremism,” toward “totalitarianism”). The mainresponse to the current depolitization should therefore be the drawing of clearlines of demarcation that divide the side of emancipation from the side of“order”.

REFERENCES

Adorno, T.W.–Horkheimer, M.: Dialectic of Enlightenment. London, New York 1979.Dean, J.: Z‰ iz‰ek’s Politics. London, New York, Routledge 2006.Debord, G.: The Society of the Spectacle. Oakland, AKPress 2006.Derrida, J.: Specters of Marx. London, New York, Routledge 1994.Ferretter, L.: Louis Althusser. London, New York, Routledge 2006.Fukuyama, F.: The End of History and the Last Man. London, Penguin 1992.Johnston, A.: Z‰ iz‰ek’s Ontology. A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity.

Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press 2008.Ranciere, J.: Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis, London, University of

Minnesota Press 1999.Wallerstein, I.: Utopistics, Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century, New York,

The New Press 1998.Z‰ iz‰ek, S.: In Defense of Lost Causes. London, New York, Verso 2008.Z‰ iz‰ek, S.: Iraq. The Borrowed Kettle.London, New York, Verso 2004.Z‰ iz‰ek, S.: The Plague of Fantasies. London, New York, Verso 1997.Z‰ iz‰ek, S.: Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology.

Durham, Duke University Press 1993.


UDC 339

THE AIMS OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION AND PURPOSEOF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

M. Ticha‰ (Prague, Czech Republic)

Annotation. The essay points out the purpose of human economic activity,which is focused on production of wealth, and the difficulty emerging from the

49

fact that market, working on the basis of private property of production sources,is able to evaluate only products that can be possessed. The market cannot handlethe spiritual wealth of society and spiritual values, whose owner is hard to identify.Economics is able to encompass only economic dimension of human actionsand behaviour; it cannot deal with their non-economic aspects. For this reason,it is important that other social sciences as philosophy and ethics be fostered ina sufficient extent. They have the ability to tend the wealth of society in a waydifferent from the approach of economics. In this aspect, they play an indispensablerole, since a long-term economic development is impossible without cultivationof the spiritual wealth of society. For this reason, the aim of economic educationshould not be merely obtaining the knowledge how to create and raise the personalwealth but particularly the development of such attitudes which would lead toresponsible economic decision-making and to dutiful management of personal,familial and public property.

Key words: purpose, economics, economic education

ÖÅËÈ ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÎÃÎ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß È ÖÅËÜÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÎÉ ÄÅßÒÅËÜÍÎÑÒÈ

Ì. Òèõà (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà)

Àííîòàöèÿ. Ýññå óêàçûâàåò íà öåëü ÷åëîâå÷åñêîé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé äåÿ-òåëüíîñòè, êîòîðàÿ ñîñðåäîòî÷åíà íà ïðîèçâîäñòâå áîãàòñòâà, è íàòðóäíîñòü, âûòåêàþùóþ èç òîãî ôàêòà, ÷òî ðûíîê, ðàáîòàþùèé íàîñíîâå ÷àñòíîé ñîáñòâåííîñòè ïðîèçâîäñòâåííûõ èñòî÷íèêîâ, â ñîñòî-ÿíèè ïîíÿòü öåííîñòü òîëüêî òåõ ïðîäóêòîâ, êîòîðûå ìîãóò íàõîäèòü-ñÿ â ñîáñòâåííîñòè. Ðûíîê íå ìîæåò îáðàùàòüñÿ ñ äóõîâíûì áîãàòñòâîìîáùåñòâà è äóõîâíûìè öåííîñòÿìè, âëàäåëüöà êîòîðûõ òðóäíî èäåíòè-ôèöèðîâàòü. Ýêîíîìèêà â ñîñòîÿíèè îõâàòèòü òîëüêî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîåèçìåðåíèå ÷åëîâå÷åñêèõ ïîñòóïêîâ è ïîâåäåíèÿ; îíà íå ìîæåò ðàáîòàòüñ èõ íåýêîíîìè÷åñêèìè àñïåêòàìè. Ïîýòîìó âàæíî, ÷òîáû äðóãèå îáùå-ñòâåííûå íàóêè, òàêèå êàê ôèëîñîôèÿ è ýòèêà, ïîîùðÿëèñü áû â äîñòà-òî÷íîé ñòåïåíè. Îíè â ñîñòîÿíèè çàáîòèòüñÿ î áîãàòñòâå îáùåñòâàñïîñîáîì, îòëè÷íûì îò ïîäõîäà ýêîíîìèêè. Â ýòîì àñïåêòå îíè èãðà-þò íåçàìåíèìóþ ðîëü, òàê êàê äîëãîñðî÷íîå ýêîíîìè÷åñêîå ðàçâèòèåíåâîçìîæíî áåç êóëüòèâèðîâàíèÿ äóõîâíîãî áîãàòñòâà îáùåñòâà. Ïîýòî-ìó öåëüþ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ íå äîëæíî áûòü òîëüêî ïîëó÷åíèåçíàíèé î òîì, êàê ñîçäàòü è óâåëè÷èòü ëè÷íîå áîãàòñòâî, íî â îñîáåí-íîñòè ðàçâèòèå òàêèõ îòíîøåíèé, êîòîðûå ïðèâåëè áû ê îòâåòñòâåí-íîìó ýêîíîìè÷åñêîìó ïðèíÿòèþ ðåøåíèé è îòâåòñòâåííîìó óïðàâëå-íèþ ëè÷íîé, ñåìåéíîé è îáùåñòâåííîé ñîáñòâåííîñòüþ.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: öåëü, ýêîíîìèêà, ýêîíîìè÷åñêîå îáðàçîâàíèå.

© Ticha‰ M., 2013Milena Ticha‰, Charles University – Pedagogical faculty, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, in

the department of civil education and philosophy.Ìèëåíà Òèõà, êàôåäðà ôèëîñîôèè è ãðàæäàíñêîãî âîñïèòàíèÿ Êàðëîâà óíèâåðñèòåòà.E-mail: [email protected]

M. Ticha‰


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The main purpose of human economic activity is the production of wealth.For this reason, the founder of modern economics and the top representativeof the classical economic theory Adam Smith (1723-1790) entitled his key workfrom 1776 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations1.Thus he laid the foundations for defining the subject of inquiry of economicsas a science, which in its broadest sense is supposed to be concerned with theproduction and distribution of wealth2. A general definition of the subject ofeconomic inquiry was created after a period of discussions: “Economics is thestudy of how societies end up choosing to employ productive resources thatcould have alternative uses to produce various commodities and how theydecide on their distribution among various groups“3. It is obvious thateconomists keep monitoring the processes leading to the production of wealth.They are concerned with questions how and where the wealth is producedand how is possible to contribute to its multiplying. They also focus on howand by what criteria the wealth should be distributed among individuals anddifferent social group for both present and future consumption, how scarceresources should be used to produce various commodities and services, andhow optimally use the limited resources with respect to ever-growing needs ofpeople.

To meet the various needs of people, advancing their own interests in theconditions of scarceness and limitedness of economic resources, it is necessaryto select a certain principle that becomes the basis for the coordination ofactivity of all involved economic subjects in given society. Via this principlethe society must be able to find the answer to the three basic economicquestions: What should be produced, in what quantity and when? How shouldgoods and services be produced? And finally, for whom to produce? In marketeconomy these questions are answered by the market. The above-mentioned founder of modern economics Adam Smith, who has characterizedthe well-known principle of “invisible hand of the market”4, supposes that inmarket economy, where every economic subject advances primarily their owninterest – the consumer strives to achieve the maximum benefit from consumedproducts, the goal of the producer is the maximum profit – and where mutualrelations between market subjects are built on the individual’s egoism, it is themarket that can coordinate various interests of different economic subjectsand leads to their concordance, which indirectly contributes to the welfare ofall people5. In his key work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealthof Nations he describes the basic principles of market functioning as follows:“By directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the

1 SMITH, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Praha : SNPL,1958.

2 KONEC‰NY‰, B.; SOJKA, M. Modern Economics. Praha: Economia, 1991. ISBN 80-85378-01-9. p. 3.

3 SAMUELSON, P.; NORDHAUS, W. Economics. Praha: Svoboda, 1991. ISBN 80-205-0192-4. p. 13.

4 SMITH, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Praha : SNPL,1958. p. 35.

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greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many othercases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of hisintention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of thesociety more effectually than when he really intends to promote it”6. Accordingto Adam Smith and all economists, who followed him in their theoreticalconceptions, the representatives of classical and neoclassical economics, themarket is able to harmonize both the individual and social interestsvia its “invisible hand”. To put it simply, they suppose that “Smith’s “invisiblehand of the market” leads individual market subjects in such a way that whenthey advance their own interests and benefits, they simultaneously act in theinterest of the market and society“7.

At this point it is necessary to mention that an important condition foreffectual functioning of the “invisible hand of the market” is ethical andresponsible behaviour and social empathy of people, who are the bearersof market relations. It is imperative that they follow both non-formal, i.e.unwritten, and formal, written and generally accepted norms of behaviour,determined by customs and traditions, as well as laws, regulations anddirectives, and that they follow the basic moral principles. In the conception ofthe” invisible hand of the market”, this condition is somehow taken for granted,but obviously, the market itself does not encourage people to adopt thiskind of behaviour.

The market is a simple tool of the exchange of goods and services betweenindividual economic subjects. It is the place, where the purchaser and sellermeet and where the price is created. It is nothing more, nor anything less. Themarket itself does not have and cannot have morality. “It does notdistinguish noble needs from the low ones. It just mediates the exchange ofproduced goods and services. It secures that scarce commodities are offeredto those, who can pay for them. It equally well mediates the exchange of basicfoodstuffs, realty, but also of drugs and weapons. It sells everything but whatis outlawed“8. The market has no compassion for the poor, the socially weak orthe handicapped. It has not any social empathy and it does not giveanyone anything for free. It does not distinguish who needs the givencommodity more and who less. The market sells it to the one who pays thehighest price. It is not interested in solving social problems. It ratherreproduces and deepens social inequality than blur it. Besides, themarket cannot deal with externalities; they are not in its competence.Externalities are the results of production that are not taken into account bythe market. Therefore, the market cannot evaluate, nor allocate them. A typicalexample of negative externality is environmental damage. The expenses spent

5 VLC‰ EK, J a kol. Economy and Economics. Praha: ASPI, 2003. ISBN 80-86395-46-4.p. 105–106.

6 SMITH, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Praha : SNPL,1958. p. 35.

7 FUCHS, K.; TULEJA, P. The Bases of Economics. Ekopress, 2003. ISBN 80-86119-74-2.p. 27.

8 KLVAC‰OVA‰, E. State, Market and Citizen. Ekonom, 1993, c‰. 32. ISSN 1210-07-14. p. 17.

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on its disposal are not included in the production cost, nor in the price of goods9.The environment, not having any owner, cannot be taken as goods; thereforeit has no price. For this reason the market lets the companies producing thewaste harmful to soil, air or water unnoticed10.

All of the above-mentioned imperfections of the market are termed marketfailures11. The features of the market, which are perceived as injustice, socialharshness, failure in the field of environmental protection etc., lead to effortsto regulate the market, to rectify its functioning and weaken its negative aspects.They enforce the state’s interference that helps to correct and eliminatemarket failures. The interference of the state is realized in two forms. First,the state helps to cultivate the market and delimits it by the bounds of law,which determine the external conditions of its smooth functioning. Second,the state can directly interfere in the operation of the market economy andthus influence it and regulate its inner functioning12. The bearers of the state’sinterference are people, and for this reason, it is again their goals, long-term intents, but also their responsibility, character, morals andattitudes to the non-economic wealth of society that matters.

The economists strive to find an appropriate solution that wouldavoid the market failures and rectify its negative impact. In all today’seconomies the efforts are promoted to offset the imperfect functioning of themarket by interference of the state in economy. “The exact proportion betweenthe state regulation and the role of the market is the result of compromisebetween economic and political power of the given country”13. It is based onspecific theoretical foundations and actual conditions of the given economy.“If the 1960s and 1970s were marked by numerous liberals’ criticisms of thestate’s activity in economy, then since the early 1990s the emphasis is laidagain on the responsibility of the state in matters of solidarity, infrastructureand economic prospect. Nonetheless some economists follow the trend of 1980sand speak of the crisis of the welfare state”14.

Despite the facts mentioned above, the market, which itself has not anymorals or social empathy, is still considered by the majority of economistsacross different economic schools and streams of economic thought to be sofar the most perfect of known regulators of economy. Hard economiccompetition between economic subjects, with its fierce and uncompromisingfight, is not considered to be something unnatural especially by liberaleconomists, but rather a desirable, positive and necessary phenomenon.

9 MERTLI‰K, P; RUSMICHOVA‰, L.; SOUKUP, J. An Introduction to General Economics.Praha : VS‰E 1990. ISBN 80-7079-372-4. p. 24.

10 TICHA‰, M. Several Comments on the Economic Aspects of Violence. In: Violence inEducation, Sport and Art : The Proceedings from the InternationalConference Held atFaculty of Education of Charles University on 4th May 2006. Praha : Faculty of Education,Charles University, 2006, p. 112-119. ISBN 80-7290-272-5. p. 113.

11 VLC‰EK, J. A KOL. Economics and Economy. Praha : ASPI, 2003. ISBN 80-86395-46-4. p. 107.12 KLVAC‰ OVA‰, E. State, Market and Citizen. Ekonom, 1993, è.32, p. 17. ISSN 1210-07-14.13 VLC‰EK, J. et al. Economics for Non-economists. Praha : Codex Bohemia, 1998. ISBN 80-

85963-66-3. p. 84.14 VLC‰EK, J. et al. Economics and Economy. Praha : ASPI, 2003. ISBN 80-86395-46-4. p. 394.

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If an economist monitors the production and distribution of the wealth, heconcentrates mainly on commodities and services that can be possessed. Themarket, which works on the basis of private property, is able to appreciateonly the products that can be owned. It cannot handle the spiritualwealth of society and spiritual values, whose owner is hard to define. Forthis reason it is not able to appreciate them, nor it motivates people to createand cultivate them. Not having any owner, they cannot be considered goodsand therefore they are not of any value in the market environment. The marketcompletely ignores the values as good manners, morality, responsibilityor honour. The business, which is in the market economy focused primarilyon as fast gaining of the maximum profit as possible, creates stimuli rather forsuppression of such values than their active development. In the hardcompetition wins the one who, making an economic decision, takesinto account the criterion of profit as the most important – and thisone is very often in conflict with other non-economic criteria of decision-making. If something is economic, it does not have to be always and in allcircumstances moral, ethical, ecological, socially acceptable or in accord withvalid legal norms of behaviour15.

Economics can handle only the economic dimension of human actionand behaviour, but it cannot deal with its non-economic aspects. Inthis respect, its potential is limited. In the condition of market economy it cannotfully appreciate the spiritual wealth of society. For this reason, it isimportant that other social sciences, ethics and philosophy, be cultivatedin a sufficient degree. These sciences do not focus on man and his activitiesonly in relation to production and distribution of wealth in economic sense, butthey are concerned with a wider dimension of human behaviour. Regardingthe fact that not only the wealth and values that can be appreciated by themarket have their indispensable place in human life, economists mustunderstand that the market and market principles can function as an effectualregulators of economy in society only when the bearers of market relations,people, will respect the values unimportant for the market and behave in accordwith moral and ethical principles. From the short-term standpoint, a simplecriterion of profit can seem sufficient for reaching the economic success.However, in a long-term perspective, disrespect for such principles asfairness, reliability and responsible relation to the cultural wealth ofsociety, signifying a continual marginalization of non-economic criteriaof decision-making, can become a substantial barrier to reaching thesatisfactory economic results.

For that reason, it is very important, that not only economics be fostered inorder to produce more wealth, but also other social sciences, ethics andphilosophy. From the viewpoint of an economist, resources expendedin their development may appear ineffectual, but they can tend the

15 TICHA‰, M. Ethical and Economic Criteria of Decision-Making and Education to EconomicThinking. In: PELCOVA‰, N.; HOGENOVA‰, A. Ethos in Education, Art and Sport. Praha :Faculty of Education of Charles University, 2009, p. 221–230. ISBN 978-80-7290-387-0.p. 222.

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wealth in other than purely economic aspect. Therefore, their irreplaceablerole in society should be respected also by economists, because withoutcultivation of the spiritual wealth the long-term economic developmentis virtually impossible.

Here the question arises what should be the aim of economic or financialeducation, so often praised and emphasized in pedagogical documents today16.The Handbook for Creating School Education Programmes for GrammarSchools. In which way the pupils should be led in schools to independenteconomic thinking and responsible decision-making. How the preconditionsshould be created to provide both today’s and future citizens with a sufficientset of knowledge, skills and attitudes to the values that are indispensable forthem “to be able to financially provide for themselves and their family andactively participate in the market of financial products and services”17 and to beable “to manage their personal and family budget, including the administrationof financial assets and obligations with regard to changes in life situation”18.

Considering the above-mentioned reflection, the emphasis within theframework of economic and financial education should be put not only onacquiring knowledge relevant to production and multiplying of personal wealthand the practice of skills necessary for economic decision-making, based onsimple profit criterion; particular attention should be paid to development andadoption of such attitudes and norms of behaviour that would lead toresponsible economic decision-making and dutiful management ofpersonal, familial, but also public property. The part of economic problemssolution should be also a comparison of achieved results according todifferent criteria of decision-making and ability to find a sensiblecompromise. Economic criterion is usually not the only one that leads us tothe conclusion. Beside economic, or profit criterion we usually consider otherequally important criteria of decision-making, such as ethical, ecological,political, social and legal. However, these criteria of decision-making areordinarily at variance with each other. What is economically advantageousis not always ecologically beneficial, politically correct, socially considerate,

16 Framework Education Programme for Elementary Education. Praha : Vy‰zkumny‰ u‰stavpedagogicky‰ v0Praze 2005.

Framework Education Programme for Secondary General Education. Praha : Vy‰zkumny‰u‰stav pedagogicky‰ v0Praze, 2007.

The Handbook forCreating School Education Programmes for Grammar Schools. Praha :Vy‰zkumny‰ u‰stav pedagogicky‰ v0Praze 2007.

17 The Strategy of Financial Education Within the Meaning of Concept Material Created byMinistry of Finance. [online]. October 2007. [cit. 2009-5-15]. Available on: <http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xbcr/mfcr/Strategie_Fin-vzdelavani_CR.pdf>.

18 System of Building the Financial Literacy on Primary and Secondary Schools. Joint documentof Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports and Ministry of Industryand Trade of the Czech Republic, created on the basis of government resolution n. 1594from 7th December2005, updated version in accord with Strategy of Financial Educationfrom December 2007 [online]. 2007, December. [cit. 2009-5-15]. Available on: <http://www.msmt.cz/uploads/soubory/zakladni/SP_SBFG_2007_web.pdf>.

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and in accord with valid law and generally respected ethical norms ofbehaviour19.

One-sided emphasis and praise solely of the narrow concept of education toeconomic thinking and decision-making, preferring only the profit criterionof decision-making without regard to other above-mentioned criteria, canhead towards misleading, or even undesirable results. Economic decision-making cannot be concerned only with reaching of profit, without regard toenvironmental protection, political stability, social security and valid norms oflaw. Education to economic thinking and decision-making can be entirelymisdirected if it is deprived of its ethical dimension and if the economicbehaviour is evaluated without regard to its moral dimension20.

The space for broadly-based independent economic thinking and responsibledecision-making is created by interdisciplinary outlined education. It leadspupils to acquirement of basic methodological principles of various social-scientific disciplines, including philosophy and ethics. It provides teachers withan opportunity to work with different criteria of evaluation, to consider theirimportance and compare them while assessing the wealth of man and society.

To implement such a demanding concept of education, it is important thatalso the preparation of teachers be based on the interdisciplinaryapproach. The future teachers should be led in a way that would help them toovercome the narrow view of the single scientific discipline in their searchingfor solutions to social problems and also to enable them to work not only withthe narrow profit criterion of evaluating, while solving economic problems. Asa part of preparation they should acquire the ability to cooperate with theirpupils in evaluating the results of different patterns of behaviour and in assessingthe real value of seemingly economically ineffectual steps. The introducedinterdisciplinary concept of teachers’ preparation has many strong points, ofwhich the most important is the possibility to include ethical criteria ofevaluation in education to economic thinking and decision-making.Thus preconditions are created for setting of economic and financial educationto a broader, socially desirable framework of education to citizenship.

REFERENCES

FUCHS, K.; TULEJA, P. The Bases of Economics. Ekopress, 2003. ISBN 80-86119-74-2.KLVAC‰OVA‰, E. State, Market and Citizen. Ekonom, 1993, c‰. 32. ISSN 1210-07-14.KONEC‰NY‰, B.; SOJKA, M. Modern Economics. Praha: Economia, 1991. ISBN 80-85378-01-9.MERTLI‰K, P; RUSMICHOVA‰, L.; SOUKUP, J. An Introduction to General Economics.

Praha : VS‰E 1990. ISBN 80-7079-372-4.SAMUELSON, P.; NORDHAUS, W. Economics. Praha: Svoboda, 1991. ISBN 80-205-0192-4.SEN, A. Ethics and Economics. Praha: Vys‰ehrad, 2002. ISBN 80-7021-549-6.

19 TICHA‰, M. Profit – The Symbol of Success. In: PELCOVA‰, N.; HOGENOVA‰, A., et al.Symbol in Education, Art and Sport : A Philosophical Reflection. Praha : Faculty ofEducation of Charles University, 2011, p. 277–284. ISBN 978-80-7290-428-0. p. 278.

20 TICHA‰, M. Ethical Aspects of Financial Education. Methodical Portal RVP : EducationPortal. (online). Praha : VU‰P v Praze, 2010 (cit. 2010-4-16). ISSN 1802-4785. Availableon: http://clanky.rvp.cz/clanek/o/g/8167/ETICKE-ASPEKTY-FINANCNIHO-VZDELAVANI.html/.

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SMITH, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Praha : SNPL,1958.

SOJKA, M. A KOL. A History of Economic Theories. Praha : VS‰E, 1991. ISBN 80-7079-937-4.TICHA‰, M. Several Comments on the Economic Aspects of Violence. In: Violence in

Education, Sport and Art : The Proceedings from the International Conference Held atFaculty of Education of Charles University on 4th May 2006. Praha : Faculty of Education,Chales University, 2006, p. 112-119. ISBN 80-7290-272-5.

TICHA‰, M. Ethical and Economic Criteria of Decision-Making and Education to EconomicThinking. In: PELCOVA‰, N.; HOGENOVA‰, A. Ethos in Education, Art and Sport.Praha : Faculty of Education of Charles university, 2009, p. 221 – 230. ISBN 978-80-7290-387-0.

TICHA‰, M. Financial Literacy and Financial Education. Methodical Portal RVP : EducationPortal. (online). Praha : VU‰P v Praze, 2009 (cit. 2009-10-14). ISSN 1802-4785. Availableon: http://clanky.rvp.cz/clanek/c/G/6761/financni-gramotnost-a-financni-vzdelavani.html/.

TICHA‰, M. Financial Education and Pregradual Preparation of Teachers at Faculty ofEducation of Charles University in Prague. Methodical Portal RVP : Education Portal.(online). Praha : VU‰P v Praze, 2009 (cit. 2009-10-14). ISSN 1802-4785. Available on:http://clanky.rvp.cz/clanek/c/G/6763/financni-vzdelavani-a-pregradualni-priprava-ucitelu-na-pedagogicke-fakulte-uk-v-praze.html/.

TICHA‰, M. Ethical Aspects of Financial Education. Methodical Portal RVP : EducationPortal. (online). Praha : VU‰P v Praze, 2010 (cit. 2010-4-16). ISSN 1802-4785. Availableon: http://clanky.rvp.cz/clanek/o/g/8167/ETICKE-ASPEKTY-FINANCNIHO-VZDELAVANI.html/.

TICHA‰, M. Profit – The Symbol of Success. In: PELCOVA‰, N.; HOGENOVA‰, A., et al.Symbol in Education, Art and Sport : A Philosophical Reflection. Prague : Faculty ofEducation of Charles University, 2011, p. 277–284. ISBN 978-80-7290-428-0 .

VLC‰EK, J. A KOL. Economics for Non-economists. Praha : Codex Bohemia, 1998. ISBN80-85963-66-3.

VLC‰ EK, J. A KOL. Economics and Economy. Praha : ASPI, 2003. ISBN 80-86395-46-4.

PEDAGOGICAL DOCUMENTS

Strategy of Financial Education Within the Meaning of Concept Material Created by Ministryof Finance. [online]. October 2007. [cit. 2009-5-15]. Available on: <http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xbcr/mfcr/Strategie_Fin-vzdelavani_CR.pdf>.

System of Building the Financial Literacy on Primary and Secondary Schools. Joint documentof Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports and Ministry of Industryand Trade of the Czech Republic, created on the basis of government resolution n. 1594from 7th December 2005, updated version in accord with Strategy of Financial Educationfrom December 2007 [online]. December 2007. [cit. 2009-5-15]. Available on: <http://www.msmt.cz/uploads/soubory/zakladni/SP_SBFG_2007_web.pdf>.

Framework Education Programme for Elementary Education. Praha : Vy‰zkumny‰ u‰stavpedagogicky‰ v Praze 2005.

Framework Education Programme for Secondary General Education. Praha : Vy‰zkumny‰u‰stav pedagogicky‰ v Praze, 2007.

The Handbook forCreating School Education Programmes for Grammar Schools. Praha :Vy‰zkumny‰ u‰stav pedagogicky‰ v Praze 2007.


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UDC 159.92 + 378

THE ISSUE OF THE STUDENT‰S AUTONOMY IN DEWEY‰S“NEW PEDAGOGY”1

A. L. Filho, S. Mendonc,a (Campinas, Brazil)

Abstract. This paper aims to comprehend how the issue of student autonomywas thought about in John Dewey‰s “New Pedagogy”. The research is developedthrough the prism of Philosophy of Education, justifying thereby using the methodof literature review, characteristic of this type of study. The pedagogical conceptionof Dewey, the object of this work, criticizes the vertical and methodical impositionof the traditional school system that inhibits the participation of students, pre-establishes strict standards of conduct and is based on a kind of stagnantknowledge, which disregards personal characteristics and experiences of students;on the other hand, the central purpose of the school educational processes shouldbe the development of autonomous individuals, considering people as exclusiveand unique, with particular characteristics, needs and interests. Dewey hadadvocated the importance of education as a process endowed with a purpose initself, certainly necessary for the future life of the student, but becoming especiallyrelevant even in the present. Thus we perceive that the purpose of educationwould be the day-by-day process itself, which has as the propelling forces thepersonal interest and previous knowledge of children. The basis of Dewey‰spedagogy consists of a practical education, based on learning by doing, enablingthe student to build and rebuild knowledge starting from the situations that arecommon in daily life, i.e., of logical and concrete elements to their perception,present in their cultural experience, what the author proposes is a lively school,based on action and learning through experience. From this, as a conclusion,we realize that, for Dewey, the development of the autonomy of the student isoriented mainly by practical life, real life. Therefore, the philosopher insists thatthe school should be understood as the child’s life itself and not something aliento it; so his education proposal is through experience and action, based on life,that usually occurs beyond the school boundaries.

Key words: Dewey, student autonomy, philosophy of education, newpedagogy.

1 This paper was written originally in Portuguese. Translated into English: LaI‰s Pereira deMello.

© Filho A. L., Mendonc,a S., 2013Armando Lourenc,o Filho, Master in Education from Catholic University at Campinas.Àðìàíäî Ëîóðåíñî Ôèëüî, Êàòîëè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò Êàìïèíàñà.E-mail: [email protected] Mendonc,a, coordinator of the Education Postgraduate Program of Catholic

University at Campinas, Brazil, and the President of the Latinamerican Philosophy ofEducation Association – ALFE.

Ñàìóýëü Ìåíäîíñà, Êàòîëè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò Êàìïèíàñà.E-mail: [email protected]

A. L. Filho, S. Mendonc,a


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Ê ÂÎÏÐÎÑÓ ÎÁ ÀÂÒÎÍÎÌÈÈ ÑÒÓÄÅÍÒÀ Â «ÍÎÂÎÉÏÅÄÀÃÎÃÈÊÅ» ÄÜÞÈ

À. Ë. Ôèëüî, Ñ. Ìåíäîíñà (Êàìïèíàñ, Áðàçèëèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Â äàííîé ñòàòüå èìååòñÿ ïîïûòêà ïîíÿòü, êàê ïðîáëåìàñòóäåí÷åñêîé àâòîíîìèè ðàññìàòðèâàëàñü â «Íîâîé Ïåäàãîãèêå» Äæî-íà Äüþè. Èññëåäîâàíèå ïðîâîäèòñÿ â ñòèëå ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçîâàíèÿ, îï-ðàâäûâàÿ, òàêèì îáðàçîì, èñïîëüçîâàíèå ìåòîäà ëèòåðàòóðíîãî îáçî-ðà, õàðàêòåðíîãî äëÿ ýòîãî òèïà èññëåäîâàíèé. Ïåäàãîãè÷åñêàÿ êîíöåï-öèÿ Äüþè – îáúåêò äàííîé ñòàòüè – êðèòèêóåò âåðòèêàëüíîå èìåòîäè÷åñêîå ïðèìåíåíèå òðàäèöèîííîé øêîëüíîé ñèñòåìû, êîòîðàÿòîðìîçèò ó÷àñòèå ñòóäåíòîâ, çàðàíåå óñòàíàâëèâàåò ñòðîãèå ñòàí-äàðòû ïîâåäåíèÿ è îñíîâàíà íà ñâîåãî ðîäà çàñòîéíîì çíàíèè, êîòîðîåèãíîðèðóåò ëè÷íûå îñîáåííîñòè è îïûò ñòóäåíòîâ; ñ äðóãîé ñòîðîíû,öåíòðàëüíàÿ öåëü øêîëüíûõ îáðàçîâàòåëüíûõ ïðîöåññîâ äîëæíà áûòüðàçâèòèå àâòîíîìíûõ ëè÷íîñòåé, ðàññìîòðåíèå ëþäåé êàê èñêëþ÷èòåëü-íûõ è óíèêàëüíûõ, ñ íåïîâòîðèìûìè îñîáåííîñòÿìè, ïîòðåáíîñòÿìè èèíòåðåñàìè. Äüþè çàùèùàë âàæíîñòü îáðàçîâàíèÿ êàê ïðîöåññ, èìåþ-ùèé öåëü â ñàìîì ñåáå; íå òîëüêî íåîáõîäèìûé äëÿ áóäóùåé æèçíè ñòó-äåíòà, íî è ñòàíîâÿùèéñÿ ðåëåâàíòíûì äàæå â íàñòîÿùåì. Òàêèì îá-ðàçîì, ìû âèäèì, ÷òî öåëü îáðàçîâàíèÿ – åæåäíåâíûé ïðîöåññ ñàì ïîñåáå, èìåþùèé äâèæóùèìè ñèëàìè ëè÷íûé èíòåðåñ è ïðåäûäóùèå çíà-íèÿ äåòåé. Îñíîâàíèå ïåäàãîãèêè Äüþè ñîñòîèò èç ïðàêòè÷åñêîãî îáðà-çîâàíèÿ, îñíîâàííîãî íà îáó÷åíèè íà ïðàêòèêå, ÷òî ïîçâîëÿåò ó÷åíèêóñòðîèòü è âîññòàíàâëèâàòü çíàíèå, íà÷èíàÿ ñ ñèòóàöèé, êîòîðûåðàñïðîñòðàíåíû â ïîâñåäíåâíîé æèçíè, òî åñòü, ëîãè÷åñêèõ è êîíêðåòíûõýëåìåíòîâ ê èõ âîñïðèÿòèþ, ñóùåñòâóþùèõ â êóëüòóðíîì îïûòå: àâòîðïðåäëàãàåò æèâóþ øêîëó, îñíîâàííóþ íà äåéñòâèè è èçó÷åíèè ÷åðåç îïûò.Îòñþäà, â çàêëþ÷åíèå, ìû âûâîäèì, ÷òî äëÿ Äüþè ðàçâèòèå àâòîíîìèèñòóäåíòà îðèåíòèðóåòñÿ, ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì, ïðàêòè÷åñêîé æèçíüþ, äåé-ñòâèòåëüíîñòüþ. Ïîýòîìó ôèëîñîô íàñòàèâàë, ÷òî øêîëà äîëæíà áûòüïîíèìàåìà êàê ñàìà æèçíü ðåáåíêà, à íå ÷òî-òî ÷óæäîå åé; òàêèì îáðà-çîì, åãî èäåÿ îá îáðàçîâàíèè – ýòî îáðàçîâàíèå ÷åðåç îïûò è äåéñòâèå, îñíî-âàííîå íà æèçíè, ÷òî îáû÷íî ïðîèñõîäèò âíå øêîëüíûõ ãðàíèö.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: Äüþè, àâòîíîìèÿ ñòóäåíòà, ôèëîñîôèÿ îáðàçî-âàíèÿ, íîâàÿ ïåäàãîãèêà.

IntroductionThis study seeks to establish reflections in order to answer the following

question: how the Dewey’s new pedagogy understood the issue of the autonomyof learners? Situated in a social context marked by profound political andeconomic changes, Dewey, positioning himself critically to the traditionaleducational paradigm, elaborates a pedagogical proposal that seeks to givegreater freedom and compatibility to the student for a world in change, providinghim, through personal experiences, the development of a meaningful learning –hence the lettering of pragmatism – which would position him in a condition toexercise his personal life in a democratic way.

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A century after the Enlightenment, inspired by the educational discussionsraised by philosophers of the Enlightenment, a philosopher and a NorthAmerican educator, John Dewey (1859–1952) developed, in opposition to thetraditional education method, an educational theory, known as new pedagogyor progressive education, grounded on Greek’s educational concepts of theclassical period2 and inspired on the teaching and social advances from thatmovement and deeply influenced by the active pedagogy of Rousseau – centeredon the figure of the child – and, by the Kantian moral psychology3.

To contextualize Dewey’s starting point for developing a new educationaltheory, we take the pedagogical vision shared by Rousseau (1968) and Kant(1996), for whom education could be classified into two distinct phases: thephysical education and practice education (or moral). To Dalbosco(2011, p. 113), although both Enlightenment philosophers “see them as twosteps defined during the formation of human being, assigning them specificroles and goals, conceive them deeply bound and dependent on each other.”The first step, for instance, refers to the care of children and was responsibilityof parents or tutors, being considered extremely important for the developmentintegral of an individual. Dalbosco (2011, p. 113) states that, for Kant “the manwho in childhood had been able to strengthen his body properly and refine hissenses, is in better condition to develop their intelligence and (...) to form thecharacter morally”.

However, the new economic demands occurred since the industrialdevelopment, causing social changes that also influenced the education sector,assigning the school an increasingly important role in children’s education.Accordingly, Dewey (2010, p. 12) realized that “concentration of industry andthe division of labor have practically eliminated household and neighborhoodoccupations – at least for educational purposes.” This resulted, according tothe American philosopher, in a “radical conditions which have change, andonly an equally radical change in education suffices” (Dewey, 2010, p. 12),justifying thus the need for an educational reshaping, both in practical andphilosophical areas.

Furthermore, Dewey (1998, 2010), paradoxically, understood that the schoolitself appeared to lose its original sense of educational community, becomingabstract and alien to social life. He had said: “If then you contrast this scenewith what goes in the family, for example, you will appreciate what is meant bythe school being a kind of institution sharply marked off from any other formof social organization” (Dewey, 1998, p. 3). Therewith, Dewey warned to thefact that school did not follow the social and economic development in whichpeople were actually entered and for which they worked and lived.

According to Dewey (1998, p. 4), the school was stuck in a stagnant kind ofknowledge and in a wisdom outdated, since the main goal of the school was to“prepare young for their future responsibilities and for success in life, by meansof acquisition of the organized entities of information and existing forms of

2 According to Cunha and Sacramento (2007, p. 279), “in Democracy and Education, Deweyuses the Greeks to establish a relation of similarity to the contemporary era, whetherrelative to the social order, whether with regard to education. The similarity betweenthe two social orders is based on the notion of ‘democratic society”.

3 The doctoral thesis of John Dewey addressed the moral perspective of Kant’s work.



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skills which comprehend the material of instruction”. In opposition to thisconception of school and education, Dewey advocated the importance ofeducation as a process endowed with a purpose in itself, certainly necessary forthe future life of the student, but mainly, being alive and important in the present.

1. Dewey’s pedagogyIn his presentation of Dewey’s pedagogy contained in the introduction to

the book Vida e educac,a~o (Dewey, 1973), AnI‰sio Teixeira (1973, p. 37) exposesthe philosophical position of the author that understands that “education islife, not preparation for life”. Thus, he continues, “everything should be taughtwith a view to its use and function in life” (Teixeira, 1973, p. 37).

Gadotti (2002, p. 144) also believes that “according to this point of view,education was essentially a process, and not a product; a process ofreconstruction and rebuilding of experience, a process of continuousimprovement of individual efficiency.” The purpose, thereby, of education wouldbe in itself, day by day, through the process, admitting as the driving forcesthe personal interest and the previous knowledge of children.

The central structure of Dewey’s pedagogy consists of a practical education,based on learning by doing, enabling the student to build and rebuild knowledgestarting from the situations that are common in daily life, i.e., from logical andconcrete elements to their perception, existing in their cultural experience. Inorder for this, Teixeira (1973, p. 37) insists that “the school has to repudiatethe old system, to adopt as a unit of its program the real ‘experience’ instead of‘lesson’, if it wants to satisfy its purpose “, supporting the revolutionary positionof the North American thinker in the formulation of a new pedagogy ratherthan the old traditional education.

This same criticism had been made by Dewey, recognizing the traditionalschool as potentially limited and proposing to that, a new pedagogy, ameaningful education, especially marked by the activity of the learner, achievedand developed through experience.

In Democracy and Education, Dewey (2012, p.69) presents its pedagogicproject4, defining that the “aim of education is to enable individuals to continuetheir education – or that the object and reward of learning is continued capacityfor growth”. In other words, Dewey believes that the function of education isto prepare the students to “learning to learn5” and, therefore, adapt to the variousdemands that life imposes on their future. Accordingly, we have clearly the

4 It is essential to mention the fact that this perspective presented by Dewey refers to agenuinely democratic context – democracy, for Dewey, was something of a utopia beingbuilt – which, according to the author, can only be developed “where intercourse of manwith man is mutual, and except where there is adequate provision for the reconstructionof social habits and institutions by means of wide stimulation arising from equitablydistributed interests. And this means a democratic society” (Dewey, 2012, p. 69).

5 It is worth clarifying, in this case, that the concept of “learning to learn” understood inthis text, is not related to the approach advocated by Perrenoud (1999) which outlinesa pedagogy of skills, though many of his assumptions are referring in fact to activepedagogy of Dewey, especially learning through problem solving. We highlight thisimportant distinction, because, Duarte (2001), in a text that is exactly about this topic,relates directly the Perrenoud’s pedagogy of skills and Dewey’s active pedagogy, statingthat the two strands are consonants, classifying them as “pedagogy of learning to learn”.

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notion of emancipatory education6, which aims to promote freedom of theindividual, because provides them conditions for walking by themselves andto be independent to grow and instruct themselves.

By reflecting on the democratic-progressive proposal of Dewey, Teixeira(1977) states that it is only possible to contemplate a democratic nationeffectively, if considered a basic postulate that establishes a close link betweendemocracy and education. “This postulate is that all men are educable enoughto lead the life in society, in a way that each and every one share it as equal,despite differences” (Teixeira, 1977, p. 205).

Thus, similarly to the Enlightenment, Dewey (1991) criticizes the verticaland methodical imposition of the traditional school system, which inhibits theactive participation of students and presets strict standards of behavior andconduct, often disproportionate to infant development and maturity, withoutconsidering the personal characteristics and experiences of students, finallyunderstanding that the central purpose of the school educational processesshould be the development of autonomous individuals, considering people asexclusive and unique, with particular characteristics, needs and interests.

For Dewey (1998, p. 4), the “traditional scheme is, in essence, one ofimposition from above and from outside. It imposes adult standards, subject-matter, and methods upon those who are only growing slowly toward maturity”.This type of scheme, according to the author, further extends the distancebetween the object of study and the child’s mind, creating a “gulf between themature or adult products and the experience and abilities of the young” (Dewey,1998, p. 6).

Reflecting thereby about the necessity of designing a new school, Dewey(2010) observes even the traditional school furniture, consisting of fixed desksand aligned, which conveys the idea of the existence of an intrinsic goal relatedto the maintenance of submission and order for teachers to deal with the largestnumber of students, thus implying of their part in a passive attitude and onlyreceptive. However, what the author suggests is a living school, based on actionand learning through experience7.6 The concept of emancipation has different treatments throughout the philosophy’s history.

Rancière (2010), for example, from another perspective, points to the direction of aconstruction made by the student independently, without direct intervention or theteacher’s intentionality in this process.

7 According to Cunha and Sacramento (2007), the issue of experience is essential in Dewey’seducational theory, which seeks to endorse both on the classical Greek philosophy andon the modernist to substantiate its conception of education built through experience.In contrast to the Greeks, Dewey develops the thesis that knowledge “is acquiredthrough experience and research, process in which the interests and skills of each oneare taken into full breadth and variety (...) thereby prioritizing the experience, ratherthan purely theoretical knowledge “(Cunha, SACRAMENTO, 2007, p. 282). On the otherhand, “the fact that the modern valued the experience and research, Dewey draws thethesis that it is possible to obtain true knowledge through experience and research”(Cunha, SACRAMENTO, 2007, p. 284). Thus, Cunha and Sacramento (2007, p. 287)explain that in trying to understand the concept of experience from the classics of thehistory of thought, “Dewey’s argument, both on the thinkers of classical Greece and on themodernity, results in the thesis that we must develop a new philosophical view that overcomesthe dichotomies still existing in contemporaneity”, and that is precisely what he doeswhen think about education from a new progressive paradigm and pragmatic.



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Dewey believes that, according to the traditional pattern, learning hasreduced its full potential because, in that context, “learning here meansacquisition of what is already incorporated in books and in the heads of theolder” (Dewey, 1998, p. 5) and, accordingly, the development of studentautonomy is hampered by the form, by the method. While in the traditionaleducation the “subject-matter furnishes the end [of the instruction], and itdetermines method” (Dewey, 2010, p. 8), being represented by a range of closedand static knowledge, defined by some kind of social convention particular ofthe culture in which it operates, and the role of students is restricted, they areonly assigned the duty of being docile, obedient and submissive to simplyreceive and accept what they have been told (Dewey, 1998, 2010 , 1991), in thenew education, on the contrary, “the child is the starting-point, the center, andthe end” (Dewey, 2010, p. 9).

Morandi (2008, p. 56) states that for Dewey “the proposition of newpedagogies is based on the model of the child’s activity, his action, his interestsand his freedom.” All educational efforts are heading on the direction of meetingthe educational needs and intellectuals of the student, having as starting pointthe use of their common elements present in their everyday experience.

Contrasting his new educational model to the old traditional paradigm,Dewey (1998, p. 5) comprises that:

To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivationof individuality; to external discipline is opposed free activity; tolearning from texts and teachers, learning trough experience; toacquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill, is opposedacquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make directvital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposedmaking the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aimsand materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world.

In this little snippet in form of summary, we realize the essence of the newpedagogy of Dewey, structured as opposed to the traditional paradigm, arguingfor the importance of liberty, learn by doing, the contextualization of schoolknowledge with the reality of learners, education as an end in itself, finally,openness to the new and commitment to the future and to social development.In the next section, we will discuss a bit more the issue of learn by doing,highlighting the importance of the relationship between knowledge and reallife, transforming the school into a “miniature community.”

2. A “miniature community”: learning through experience

On the same direction of understanding the theoretical framework,underlying the new pedagogy of Dewey, Teixeira (1973, p. 14) states that“school itself shall be made a genuine form of active community life, instead ofa place set apart in which to learn lessons”.

Thus, Dewey (2010, p. 18) provides the school the opportunity of changingfrom a “miniature community” to an “embryonic society” where it is able todevelop citizenship, social responsibility and participation of their students,bringing the reality experienced and learned in the classroom to the concrete

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and everyday life and of their students while social life is rethought andreproduced within the school environment.

Dewey (2010) elaborates, in contrast to the traditional school model, a newconcept of school concept developed based on action and learning throughpersonal experience, saying that “the moment children act they individualizethemselves; they cease to be a mass and become the intensely distinctive beingsthat we acquainted with out of school” (Dewey, 2010, p. 33), highlightingthereby paradoxically, the importance of individualization for a good socialdevelopment of the student, not ignoring, however, the clearly contributionmade by the collective aspect.

With a view to understanding the social, Dewey (2010, p. 6) discusses theissue of individual versus collective in the field of school education, statingthat “we are apt to look at school from an individualistic stand-point, assomething between teacher and pupil”, due to the fact that what matters mostin learning processes mediated by the school, ends up being the individualprogress of each student, but perceptively he warns us by saying that “yet therange of the outlook needs to be enlarged” (Dewey, 2010, p. 7), reaching alsothe size of social thus:

Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon,it destroys our democracy. All that society has accomplished foritself is put, through the agency of the school, at the disposal of itsfuture members. All its better thoughts of itself it hopes to realizetrough the new possibilities thus opened to its future self. Hereindividualism and socialism are at one. Only by being true to thefull growth of all individuals who make it up, can society by anychance be true to itself (DEWEY, 2010, p. 7).

For Dewey (2010), the school must relate to the real life of children,becoming their “second home.” Dewey’s project involves transforming schoolsinto an “embryonic community life, active with types of occupations that reflectthe life of the larger society and permeated throughout with the spirit of art,history, and science” (Dewey, 2010, p. 29), providing students, according tothe author, “instruments of effective self-direction” (Dewey, 2010, p. 29). Weemphasize the last sentence of Dewey, which uses the term effective. For him,the development of student‰s autonomy is oriented mainly by practical life,real life, that is why he insists that the school must be understood as the verylife of the child and not oblivious to it, and that is also the reason for his educationproposal through experience and action, by the mold of the life that usuallyoccurs beyond the school boundaries.

The transposition of what is discussed and learned in school to the otherspheres of the lives of students, materializes especially regarding communitylife, when students exercise themselves in their role as citizens. In this respect,we conclude about the importance of school in social development of itsstudents, preparing them not only for life, but expressing their own lives associal beings embedded in a community, practicing them in this instance anddeveloping their collective sense and guiding them to training for citizenship.

The exercise of citizenship is closely related to the quality of educationaland cultural background received and developed by the individual, especially



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regarding his freedom to think and act based on principles that he learned toelect as right, fundamental elements of the ethical and moral dimensions. Weassume therefore that the citizenship training, not conceptual, but active, awareand participatory, coincides with the formation of autonomous students.

Therefore, Dewey (2010) explains that one cannot disassociate the concretelife of the children from what is taught in school, on the contrary, one shouldappreciate and take advantage of the prior knowledge that students possess,developing and using them as the starting point for the development of newknowledge, that make sense in their lives, because when they realize itsimportance, they strive with more interest in learning and develop theirautonomy seeking the answers – from a problem situation presented by theteacher, for example – willingly.

Thus, Dewey (2010) emphasizes the importance of the teacher in exercisingthe correlation between the contents learned in the classroom and theenvironment that surrounds and accompanies the children throughout theirlives, both in the natural and the social sphere. This exercise comes from theteacher’s effort toward building a consistent context, creating opportunitiesfor understanding from the particular experiences of students, which shouldbe the foundation for the development of their new interpretations andconceptions of the world, combined with their freedom of creativity andimagination. Morandi (2008, p. 55) agrees, in this respect, with Dewey sayingthat “teaching (...) should be tied to the logic of the student”.

According to Teixeira (1973, p. 39), “the teacher is the essential element ofthe situation in which the student learns, and his function is, precisely, to direct,guide, stimulate activity through the paths achieved through knowledge andexperience of adult”.

About the interest in learning, Dewey (1973, p. 59) states that can beawakened “if the subject-matter of the lessons be such as to have an appropriateplace within the expanding consciousness of the child, if it grows out of hisown past doings, thoughts and sufferings”, however, when the content ispresented only in accordance with the logic of the adult, being totally obliviousto the child’s life, such involvement will require many maneuvers by theteacher because there is “any relationship to childhood experience” (Dewey,1973, p. 60), so it is necessary to make this content “alive for intelligence”,which briefly refers to the exercise of highlighting its relevance and importanceto students, causing them to realize the sense of learning and make them feelchallenged to learn.

However, it is noteworthy that Dewey is totally against the use of “artificialand trick of method” (Dewey, 1973, p. 61), which, if on the one hand seem to“motivate” the student, the other let down intellectually8. For Dewey

8 Interest to note that in this text of 1902 (The Child and The Curriculum) Dewey alreadydiscussed elements that are currently in school’s paper-ruler, the issue of studentmotivation. In a recent study about motivation for student learning, Bzuneck andGuimaraes (2010) point out, with other words, exactly to what Dewey has said at least110 years ago: the students’ efforts should turn to developing a “intrinsic motivation”,based on the contextualization of content, in discussion of its relevance, rather than aform of “extrinsic motivation”, related to awards or “embellishment of the lessons”.

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(1973, p. 61), “mental assimilation is a matter of consciousness; and if theattention has not been taking part of the learning process so it has not beenlearned, nor changed into intellectual faculty”.

Teixeira (1973) also presents a discussion based on his studies on thepedagogy of American philosopher about two different ways of understandingthe educational activity: the mechanical training and education itself. Accordingto Teixeira (1973, p. 22), “training leads only to certain external conformationon habits and practices whose meaning we do not participate fully”, i.e., it issomething far from the child’s life, which does not provides conscious learningto the child. “The child does not participate in the social significance of hishabit” (Teixeira, 1973, p. 22), he does not actually educate. In conclusion,Teixeira (1973, p. 22) states that “training is thereby a form of preliminary andincomplete education” in a way that “true education” must lead the child tosomething superior to what training or memorization reach, must provide hisunderstanding, assigning new meanings to the knowledge, or, as the termTeixeira uses, the child “redirection” by experience. Therefore, Dewey(1973, p. 46) states that “the goal is not the accumulation of knowledge, butthe development of skills”.

Thus, Dewey (2010) justifies the need for a new school, where “the life ofthe child becomes the all-controlling aim” (Dewey, 2010, p. 36). The teachingbased on problem solving and common situations of everyday life of thesechildren becomes a foundation for this new teaching model. Dewey (2010)argues that by encouraging the child to think and react on certain key situations,it does not teach by rote, but make them understand the principles involved.

On this foundation – learning based on solving problem9 – we have theexplanation of Dewey (2010, p. 40):

(...) for the child to realize his own impulse by recognizing thefacts, materials, and conditions involved, and then to regulate hisimpulse through that recognition, is educative. This is thedifference, upon which I wish to insist, between exciting orindulging an interest and realizing it through its direction.

As we have said, to Dewey (2010), the learning process should start froman element of everyday life, from a real and concrete situation, from a socialpractice that meshes directly with the life of the student. Then “for the child torealize his own impulse by recognizing the facts, materials, and conditionsinvolved” (Dewey, 2010, p. 40), this refers to a phase of reflection andquestioning, evaluating the possibilities and trying to understand what in facthas in hands, relying on his knowledge previously acquired, on baggageinformation accumulated throughout life and, of course, on teacher’s

9 It is worth clarifying, at this point that the method proposed by Dewey does not refer tothe PBL (problem based learning) method, widely used in medical courses, however,this method is based on Dewey’s thoughts. Koschmann (2001), in an article that dealsprecisely about the contribution of the pedagogical ideas of Dewey for the PBL, clearlydemonstrates that the method searches, in Dewey’s educational theory, elements forits improvement and development, recognizing in the methodology of the Americanphilosopher about the learning developed through problem solving, the foundation forimportant contributions to the advancement of medical PBL.



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interventions. The next step concerns the regulation of the initial impulse,thinking about and seeking the best alternatives for solving the problempresented. Finally, the last step is the action itself, through which there isinterference in society, solving the proposed situation, by putting the fruit oftheir labor. The teacher in this process is the supervisor, acting primarily“through criticism, question, and suggestion” (Dewey, 2010, p. 40) and thenmaking the child “consciousness of what he has done, and what he needs todo” (Dewey, 2010, p. 40).

According to Dewey (2010, p. 54), this type of work stimulates thedevelopment of students’ autonomy, making them acquire “more training ofattention, more power of interpretation, of drawing inferences, of acuteobservation and continuous reflection”. When the student engages on its owninitiative in their education, on a spontaneous, serious and productive way,exercising his autonomy, the results of this process tend to be more efficient(Dewey, 2010).

Thus, the primary perspective which the author seeks to highlight isprecisely the relationship between the concrete life of the child and what istaught in the classroom. For Dewey (2010), the ideal would be if theschool “be a place in which the child should really live, and get a life-experiencein which he should delight and find meaning for its own sake” (Dewey,2010, p. 59), providing, effectively, both a social and instructive aspect,developing in students the germ of citizenship.

Final thoughts

We realized in this paper that the essence of Dewey’s new pedagogy consistsof a practical education, living and active, based mainly on learning throughexperience, which enables the construction of knowledge on the part of thestudent, from what he already knows, what it is common in his daily life, i.e.,from real elements, logical and concrete for his understanding, elements presentin his cultural experience. Also noteworthy is that in the process ofcontextualization of knowledge, Dewey recognizes and highlights theimportance of the teacher in the role of establishing an intermediation betweenthe object of education and its access to the student’s mind. However, theconception of what might be described as a good education would go a littlebeyond the accession of learning through experience. For him, “the trouble isnot the absence of experience, but their defective and wrong character” (Dewey,1998, p. 15), so it is not about providing the student a range of randomexperience and disconnected from the whole education, first of all, “everythingdepends on the quality of experience” (Dewey, 1998, p. 15), that is the reasonof the importance of teacher preparation and his intervention.

On the issue of learn by doing, we can affirm that Dewey deems educationas the children’s real life, not just the preparation for a life to be lived in thefuture, however, he emphasizes that his main goal is to empower the educatingfor the proper exercise of life in community, which the school is a smallerscale model, or, as he states, an “embryonic community”.

If, from this we can see that, for Dewey, the development of an independentlearner is oriented mainly from practical life, real life – therefore the

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philosopher’s insistence for school to be understood as the child’s life itselfand not alien to it, so his proposed education through experience and action,by the mold of life that usually occurs beyond the school boundaries – then wecomprehend that when Dewey proposes a school that represents society in aform of community miniature, it is because he seeks developing social attitudesnecessary for the formation of future citizens, promoting their autonomy andenabling the students encounter problem-situations in which they are able toexercise both brainpower and practical actions.

Finally, looking for answer our initial question: how Dewey’s new pedagogyunderstood the issue of autonomy of learners? We affirm that his democratic-progressive pedagogical conception, displays, par excellence, a great potentialto help promote the autonomy of the students, and, as opposed to the traditionalmodel – that had the focus on memorization of static and dogmatic knowledge –encourages the use of rationality and critical thinking, supported by the notionof freedom of thoughts and attitudes, in addition to recognizing in sciencesand in the general principles of nature, elements that enable the constructionof knowledge by the student.

From the Enlightenment legacy, the freedom proposed by Rousseau, aswell as the reorientation of education for the student perspective, recognizingand valuing the child’s potential, become bases of Dewey’s pedagogy. Theemergency appeal that Kant expresses – leave the intellectual immaturity andlearn to think on their own – is somehow understood and exercised by Dewey,because his method assumes the student action in a way to promote his owninstruction, there is no copy of a particular program or content, but a recreationfrom his personal experiences.

Thus, based on Enlightenment thinking, Dewey’s educational conceptionhas as its central focus the need of training the individual for the socialparticipation, i.e., for the performance of his active citizenship, from a practicaland collaborative activity along with society; that, of course, presupposes theneed for the development of his intellectual autonomy. The learner’s autonomyis therefore considered as the element that makes the connection between theworld of theory, present in the educational activities and in the practical life ofeveryday, where it is located as critical citizen, participatory, and finallyemancipated. Because of this, we might say, the manner of Socrates10, thatautonomy is what “gives birth” to educational practice because it confersmeaning and purpose, and its necessity and importance, irrespective of socialstatus or historical moment that the person lives, due to the fact that it must bepresent in all of them, after all we cannot conceive the idea of a citizen whowould educate himself in order to keep inert, passive, dependent and dominated.

To sum up, the issue of student autonomy encompasses the wholepedagogical project of Dewey since the development of the student’s interest,using elements of his circle of knowledge as a basis for future learning, such

10 According to Ma..rz (1987), Socrates, inspired by his mother’s profession, a midwife,

believed that in the same way could bring to light the knowledge of his disciples, helpingthem to externalize it, even though did not consider himself capable of generating inthem the knowledge: “never learned anything from me, although they do remarkableprogress, the knowledge was already in them”, he said.



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as developing and stimulating his participatory social behavior, but moreimportantly, enabling him to learn to think for himself, experiencing theproblems based on the principles that he elected as appropriate, finally enablinghim to learn how to learn right, to continue to develop in the course of his life.The goal of Dewey’s education, ultimately points to the betterment of sociallife enshrined by democracy.

REFERENCES

Anisio Spinola Teixeira (1973). A pedagogia de Dewey. In: DEWEY, John. Vida e educac,a~o:(i) a crianc,a e o programa escolar e (ii) interesse e esforc,o. Trad. Anisio Teixeira. 8. ed.Sa~o Paulo: Melhoramentos.

_________ (1977). Educac,a~o e o mundo moderno. 2. ed. Sa~o Paulo: Cia Editora Nacional.Claudio Almir Dalbosco (2011). Kant & a educac,a~o. Belo Horizonte: Aute‰ ntica.Franc Morandi (2008). Introduc,a~o à pedagogia. Sa~o Paulo: A‰ tica.Fritz Ma

..rz (1987) Grandes educadores: perfis de grandes educadores e pensadores pedago‰gicos.

Trad. Edwino A. Royer. Sa~o Paulo: EPU.Immanuel Kant (1996). Sobre a pedagogia. Trad. Francisco Cock Fontanella. Piracicaba:

Unimep.Jacques Ranciere (2010). O mestre ignorante: cinco lic,o~es sobre a emancipac,a~o intelectual.

Trad. Lilian do Valle. 3. ed. Belo Horizonte: Aute‰ ntica.Jean Jacques Rousseau (1968). Emilio ou da educac,a~o. Trad. Se‰rgio Milliet. Sa~o Paulo:

Difel.John Dewey (1973). Vida e educac, a~o. Trad. Anisio Teixeira. 8. ed. Sa~o Paulo:

Melhoramentos._______ (1998). Experience and education. The 60th anniversary edition. Indianapolis,

Indiana, USA, Kappa Delta Pi._______ (2012). Democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education.

Indo-European Publishing, Los Angeles, California, USA._______ (2010) The child and the curriculum, including The school and society. Cosimo

Books, New York, New York, USA.________ (1991) John Dewey – The later works: 1925 – 1953. Vol. 13: 1938 – 1939. Edited

by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press.Jose‰ Aloyseo Bzuneck; Sueli E‰di Rufini Guimara~es (2010). A promoc, a~o da autonomia

como estrate‰gia motivacional na escola. In: Evely Boruchovitch; Jose‰ Aloyseo Bzuneck;Sueli E‰di Rufini Guimara~es (Orgs.). Motivac, a~o para aprender: aplicac,o~es no contextoeducativo. Petro‰polis: Vozes.

Marcos Vinicius da Cunha e Leonardo Freitas Sacramento (2007). Os gregos nas estrate‰giasargumentativas de John Dewey. Revista Brasileira de Educac, a~o, Rio de Janeiro, v. 12, n.35.

Moacir Gadotti (2002) Histo‰ria das ide‰ias pedago‰gicas. 8. ed. Sa~o Paulo: A‰tica.Newton Duarte (2001). As pedagogias do “aprender a aprender” e algumas iluso~es da

assim chamada sociedade do conhecimento. Revista Brasileira de Educac, a~o, ANPED,n. 18.

Philippe Perrenoud (1999). Construir as compete‰ ncias desde a escola. Porto Alegre: ArtesMe‰dicas.

Timothy Koschmann (2012). Dewey’s contribution to a standard of problem-based learningpractice. First European Conference on Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning(EuroCSCL). Holanda, Maastricht, mar/2001. Disponivel em <http://methodenpool.uni-koeln.de/problembased/koschmann.pdf>. Acesso em: 02.12.2012


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UDC 008 + 378 +37.0

«POINTING THE WAY» IN BUBER’S PHILOSOPHY:EDUCATION BASED ON THE I-THOU RELATIONSHIP

R. H. Cue‰llar (Mexico City, Me‰xico)

Abstract. Maybe the most famous writing by Martin Buber is «I and Thou».In this text the dialogic relationship acquires a very well known shape, but thisidea could be traced back to many other writings. These ideas had been presentfrom his early young days, as Martin Buber states. Although many of the dialogicprinciples were dealt with very early, it was only later on that he could manageto write them down as we know them from the book:

“When I first wrote a blueprint of this book, over forty years ago, there was apushing internal need. A vision that had besieged repeatedly since my youngage always coming back to overshadow now had acquired a permanent clarity,it had a quality so clearly supra-personal that I immediately knew that I shouldattest.” (2006:109)

In this paper I would use the difference presented by the Viennese Jewishphilosopher between the relationships defined as “I – Thou” and the ones “I – It”.By doing this, I would try to show those two kind of relationships with what isexposed generally in one of the less famous, yet most important, Buberian textsabout Education (“Rede u..ber das Erzieherische”) that contains a talk that MartinBuber gave in August 1925 at the Educational Conference at Heidelberg,compiled and printed in 1926. In this conference, in which Buber was thekeynote speaker, the subject was “The Development of the Creative Powers inthe Child”. I would try to show which connections could be drawn between thetwo texts. As Buber acknowledges, the ideas of the dialogic perspective was presentway before he wrote I and Thou. What are the characteristics found in thedialogic perspective with regard to the educational perspectives? Who is theeducator? What are his/her responsibilities?

Taking into account several aspects of Buber’s life, I would work around thephrase “Pointing the way” as a manner in which Buber’s life and the educator’srole could be bounded. This way of representing Buber’s life as an educatorcould be presented as a way of philosophy of education. In order to accomplishthis, I would try to analyze what Gershom Scholem remembers Buber’s image asan educator when Scholem was young back in Germany. Taking this specificrelationship into account, many things could be said around Buber and Scholem’slives and the dialogic perspective in philosophy of education.

Many of the aspects presented could provide a different approach to Buber’sphilosophy and Buber’s life taking into account the importance of education,specifically the dialogic perspective in the 20th century.

Key words: dialogic perspective, educational perspectives, relationship,dialogue, education, experience.

Renato Huarte Cue‰llar, Facultad de FilosofI‰a y Letras, Universidad Nacional Auto‰nomade Me‰xico.

Ðåíàòî Õóàðòý Êóýëüÿð, ôàêóëüòåò ôèëîñîôèè è ëèòåðàòóðû, Íàöèîíàëüíûé Àâòî-íîìíûé Óíèâåðñèòåò Ìåêñèêè.


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«ÓÊÀÇÀÍÈÅ ÏÓÒÈ» Â ÔÈËÎÑÎÔÈÈ ÁÓÁÅÐÀ:ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ, ÎÑÍÎÂÀÍÍÎÅ ÍÀ ÎÒÍÎØÅÍÈÈ ß – ÒÛ

Ð. Õ. Êóýëüÿð (Ìåêñèêà)

Ðåçþìå. Âîçìîæíî ñàìîå èçâåñòíîå ïðîèçâåäåíèå Ìàðòèíàì Áóáå-ðà – ýòî “ß è Òû”. Â ýòîì òåêñòå äèàëîãè÷åñêèå îòíîøåíèÿ ïðèîáðåòà-þò õîðîøî èçâåñòíóþ ôîðìó, íî ýòó èäåþ ìîæíî óâèäåòü è âî ìíîãèõäðóãèõ ïðîèçâåäåíèÿõ. Êàê óòâåðæäàë ñàì Ìàðòèí Áóáåð, ýòè èäåè áûëèó íåãî, íà÷èíàÿ ñ ðàííèõ äíåé. Õîòÿ ìíîãèå äèàëîãè÷åñêèå ïðèíöèïûáûëè ðàññìîòðåíû èì î÷åíü ðàíî, òîëüêî ïîçæå åìó óäàëîñü çàïèñàòü èõâ òîì âèäå, êàê ìû çíàåì èõ ïî åãî êíèãå:

“Êîãäà ÿ ïåðâûé ðàç íàïèñàë ÷åðíîâèê ýòîé êíèãè, áîëåå ñîðîêà ëåòíàçàä, ê ýòîìó áûëà ïîáóæäàþùàÿ âíóòðåííÿÿ ïîòðåáíîñòü. Âèäåíèå,êîòîðîå íåîäíîêðàòíî ïðåñëåäîâàëî ìåíÿ, íà÷èíàÿ ñ ìîåãî ìîëîäîãî âîç-ðàñòà, âñåãäà âîçâðàùàþùååñÿ, ÷òîáû îòáðîñèòü òåíü, òåïåðü ïðèîáðå-ëî óñòîé÷èâóþ ÿñíîñòü; îíî èìåëî íåêîòîðîå êà÷åñòâî, ñòîëü ÿñíî ñâåðõ-ëè÷íîñòíîå, ÷òî ÿ íåìåäëåííî îñîçíàë, ÷òî äîëæåí ñâèäåòåëüñòâîâàòüî í¸ì.” (2006:109)

Â äàííîé ñòàòüå ÿ èñïîëüçîâàë ðàçëè÷èå, ïîêàçàííîå ýòèì âåíñêèìåâðåéñêèì ôèëîñîôîì, ìåæäó îòíîøåíèÿìè “ß – Òû” è îòíîøåíèÿìè“ß – Ýòî”. Äåëàÿ ýòî, ÿ ïîïûòàëñÿ ïîêàçàòü ýòè äâà âèäà îòíîøåíèé âñâÿçè ñ òåì, ÷òî áûëî ïîêàçàíî â îäíîì èç ìåíåå èçâåñòíûõ, íî âñå æåâàæíåéøèõ òåêñòîâ Áóáåðà îá îáðàçîâàíèè (“Rede u..ber das Erzieherische”(«Ðå÷ü î âîñïèòàíèè»)), êîòîðûé ñîäåðæèò äîêëàä, êîòîðûé ÌàðòèíÁóáåð ñäåëàë â àâãóñòå 1925 íà îáðàçîâàòåëüíîé êîíôåðåíöèè â Ãåéäåëü-áåðãå, è êîòîðûé áûë íàïå÷àòàí â 1926. Òåìà ýòîé êîíôåðåíöèè, íàêîòîðîé Áóáåð áûë îñíîâíûì äîêëàä÷èêîì, áûëà “Ðàçâèòèå òâîð÷åñêèõñïîñîáíîñòåé â ðåáåíêå”. ß ïîïûòàëñÿ ïîêàçàòü, êàêèå ñâÿçè ìîãëè áûáûòü óñòàíîâëåíû ìåæäó ýòèìè äâóìÿ òåêñòàìè. Ïî ñëîâàì Áóáåðà,èäåè äèàëîãè÷åñêîé ïåðñïåêòèâû ñóùåñòâîâàëè çàäîëãî äî òîãî, êàê îííàïèñàë «ß è Òû». Êàêèå õàðàêòåðèñòèêè ìîãóò áûòü íàéäåíû â äèàëî-ãè÷åñêîé ïåðñïåêòèâå ïî îòíîøåíèþ ê îáðàçîâàòåëüíûì ïåðñïåêòèâàì?Êòî åñòü ó÷èòåëü? Êàêîâû åãî/åå îáÿçàííîñòè?

Ïðèíèìàÿ âî âíèìàíèå íåêîòîðûå àñïåêòû æèçíè Áóáåðà, ÿ èñõîäèëèç ôðàçû “Óêàçàíèå ïóòè” êàê íåêîòîðîãî ñòèëÿ, õàðàêòåðíîãî äëÿæèçíè Áóáåðà è äëÿ ðîëè ïåäàãîãà. Ýòîò ñïîñîá îïèñàíèÿ æèçíè Áóáåðàêàê ïåäàãîãà ìîã áû áûòü ïðåäñòàâëåí êàê ïóòü ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçîâà-íèÿ. ×òîáû äîñòèãíóòü ýòîãî, ÿ ïîïûòàëñÿ ïðîàíàëèçèðîâàòü òî, êàêÃåðøîì Øîëåì âñïîìèíàë îáðàç Áóáåðà-ïåäàãîãà, êîãäà Øîëåì áûë â Ãåð-ìàíèè â åãî ìîëîäûå ãîäû. Ïðèíèìàÿ ýòè îïðåäåëåííûå îòíîøåíèÿ âîâíèìàíèå, ìîæíî ìíîãîå ñêàçàòü î æèçíè Áóáåðà è Øîëåìà è äèàëîãè-÷åñêîé ïåðñïåêòèâå â ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçîâàíèÿ.

Ìíîãèå ïðåäñòàâëåííûå àñïåêòû ìîãëè áû îáåñïå÷èòü äðóãîé ïîäõîäê ôèëîñîôèè Áóáåðà è æèçíè Áóáåðà, ïðèíèìàÿ âî âíèìàíèå âàæíîñòüîáðàçîâàíèÿ, îñîáåííî äèàëîãè÷åñêîé ïåðñïåêòèâû â 20-îì ñòîëåòèè.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: äèàëîãè÷åñêàÿ ïåðñïåêòèâà, îáðàçîâàòåëüíàÿ ïåð-ñïåêòèâà, îòíîøåíèå, äèàëîã, îáðàçîâàíèå, îïûò.

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I – Thou, I – it

For Martin Buber, in the perspective of the Human Being, there are couplesof words that enable us to approach the world. It is through words, in thiscase, through these couples of words that we can approach experience. Thesecouples of words are not something else outside of the experience. They areexperience itself. The first couple of words is “I – Thou” (Ich – Du). Thesecond one is “I – it” (Ich – Es). According to Buber, “When the Thou is said,the I that is part of the couple is also said. When the it is said, the I that is partof the other couple is also said. It is only possible to say the basic word I-Thou,with all the being. The basic word I – it cannot be said with all the being.”(2006:11)

This way of understanding the World taking language as its basis ischaracteristic of Buber’s way of seeing what happens around us(Weltaunschauung). When one person is speaking, the existence is madepossible since our relations with the World are exposed in them. The “being”is “becoming”. Buber cannot accept the duality of the experience by beingdivided in “internal” and “external”. For him, “The one that experiments theworld cannot participate in it. Experience is “inside him”, and not betweenhim and the word. The world does not participate in the experience. The Worldenables itself to be part of experience, but that does not alter anything, andnothing happens to it.” (Buber, 2006:13)

Taking into account this premises, as experience, the World, according toBuber, is part of the basic word “I – it”. The basic word “I – Thou” is part of theWorld of relationship. Our philosopher explains that, according to his point ofview, there are three levels of relationships. The first relationship is the onethat is given with the World where we see the creatures that inhabit it in a pre-Linguistic relationship. In this way, we are unable to relate to these beings.On a second level, there is the relationship between human beings, in whichwe use language. Due to language one human being “can give the ‘you’” toanother human being. It is language that enables human beings to connect ina way. The third level of relationship, according to Buber, includes the onesthat are not based on the articulate language. There is no linguistic contact.We do not perceive them, and thus “we are called, and we answer: building,thinking, acting.” (2006:14)

“In each and every of the spheres, due to everything that appears to us aspresent, we go from the eternal border of the you, and in each sphere weperceive its wail; with each ‘you’ we call the eternal ‘you’, en in each sphereaccording to the form of its own.” (2006:14) Buber gives the classic example ofthe tree to show this kind of relations. When walking in the woods andapproaching a tree, one might see the leaves, the branches, or even the roots.There are tall trees, and short ones. We perceive the differences in the parts ofeach and every tree. In Buber’s perspective, this is a possible way ofapproaching a tree, but there is another way of having an experience with one

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tree. It might be possible to see a tree as not being part of our experience aswe understand it. It might be possible to see the tree as something else, andnot a mere object. When one is capable of really seeing a tree, its shine is notperceptible, nor the green of its leaves, or its general height, or any otherspecific characteristic. Beyond perceiving it, classifying it, volatilizing it orperpetuating it as a number, when one is able to perceive the tree, it must beunderstood as a whole, as totality. In Martin Buber’s words: “Everything thatis part of the tree is incorporated: its shape and mechanics, its colors and itschemistry, its dialogue with the elements and the dialogue with the stars, andeverything as an entirety.” (2006:15)

Following that train of thought, human beings, when related to things,animals, plants, and even other human beings and thinking of them aspartialities, we establish a connection I-it in which no relationship is possiblesince there is a reification and a purpose of using the other. This kind of I – itconnection is based on the “usable” part of the other. In the case of things, werelate to them only for what they can be of practical use. The same happenswith other “objects” of nature, as long as we see them as “natural resources”.Also with human beings, seen as partialities, connects people because they“are good for some purpose” or another. We use the other: person, animal,plant, or thing. In this Buberian sense, every encounter of this type is the sameI-it connection.

His dialogic proposal is based on the idea of the encounter with anyexpression of the world as a totality. To have an encounter means to have ameeting with totality. To be related is to be bound to the other as a holisticpossibility of sense in which by saying “thou / you” we are willing to come intouch with the other, without partialities.

The true dialogic sense of the human being is given within experience.Buber understands experience as the basic condition established by theenunciation of the “I – Thou”. Maybe with an example of Buber’s childhoodand his anecdote with his horse the idea of the dialogic relationship might getclearer:

When I was eleven years of age, spending the summer on mygrandparent’s estate, I used, as often as I could do it unobserved to stealinto the stable and gentile stroke the neck of my darling brad dapple-gray horse. It was not a casual delight but a great, certainly friendly, butalso deeply stirring happening. If I am to explain it now, beginning fromthe still very fresh memory of my hand, I must say that what I experiencedin touch with the animal was the Other, the immense otherness of theOther, which however, did not remain strange like the otherness of theox or the ram, but rather let me draw near and touch it. When I strokethe mighty mane, sometimes marvelously smooth-combed, and othertimes just as astonishingly wild, and felt the life beneath my hand it wasas though the element of vitality itself bordered on my skin, somethingthat was not I, was certainly not akin to me, palpably the other, not just

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another, really the Other itself; and yet it let me approach, confided itselfto me, placed itself clemently in the relation of Thou and Thou with me.The horse, even when I had not begun by pouring oats for him into themanger, very gently raised his massive head, ears flicking, then snortedquietly, as a conspirator gives a signal meant to be recognizable only byhis fellow-conspirator; and I was approved. But once – I do not knowwhat came over the child, at any rate it was childlike thought – it struckme about the stroking, what fun it gave me, and suddenly I becameconscious of my hand. The game went on as before, but something hadchanged, it was no longer the same thing. And the next day, after givinghim a reach feed, when I stroked my friend’s head he did not raise hishead. A few years later, when I thought back to the incident, I no longersupposed that the animal had noticed my defection. But at the time Iconsidered myself judged. (Buber,1976:26-27)

The horse, in Buber’s case, was the possibility of understanding a differentkina of relationship. Martin Buber, as a kid, was accepted by the horse not asthe one that could give him something to it. The horse, at least for the time ofthe petting of the mane, was not a mere toy. According to the anecdote, a non-linguistic dialogue was possible. The hand was not important, just as the maneor any other part of the horse or of young Buber was important. The wholenessof the relationship between them was at the core.

If the idea of the I-Thou relationship is clear, let us now see what is theconnection between the dialogical aspects of Buber’s philosophy with Buber’sphilosophy of education.

“Pointing the way”

Whatever Martin Buber had to say about education, there might be severalinterpretations taking into account the different approaches to his philosophy.As his own life, we only have small fragments, like the one about the horse inhis childhood, that might be very relevant in the way in which we consider thedifferent elements in Martin Buber’s proposal. Maybe the life of eachphilosopher that tries to be congruent with his own way of thinking is vital tounderstand the philosopher’s own proposal. I think that in Buber’s philosophy,this is the case. As Maurice Friedman puts it in the introduction to the bookMeetings, fragments of Buber’s life narrated by the author:

These “events and meetings” are in the fullest sense of the term“teachings” and perhaps, in the end, the most real teaching that MartinBuber has left us. “I am no philosopher, prophet, or theologian,” Bubersaid at a celebration of his eightieth birthday, “but a man who has seensomething and who goes to a window and points to what he has seen.”In the highly significant Foreword to his Hasidic chronicle-novel For theSake of Heaven, Buber wrote: “He who hopes for a teaching from methat is anything other than a pointing of his sort will always bedisappointed.” (Buber,1976:4-5)

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In 1925 Martin Buber was invited to be the keynote speaker to the ThirdInternational Educational Conference at Heidelberg. Although Buber dealswith the main subject of the Conference, i.e. “The Development of the CreativePowers of the Child”, there are many issues around his educational thoughtbeyond the creative powers and beyond the specific age of childhood thatalready we can trace several ideas that are to be found in later papers, articles,and essays. In that sense, the title of the speech has been translated intoseveral languages with very different titles. For example, in the Hebrewtranslation made by Tzvi Voiselevsky (Buber, 1959) and authorized by Buberhimself back at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, we find the title “Aboutthe educational fact”. Moacir Gadotti and Mauro Ângelo Lenzi (Buber,1982)prefer to translate it into Portuguese with the title “About the educationalfunction”. Someone might be tempted to see what is the distinction between“fact” and “function”. That might require further analysis in a different paper.In any case, Ronald Gregor-Smith prefers to simply call this essay in English“Education” (Buber, 2002). A comparison was made among the translations inorder to quote in this work.

This text, from now on only “Education”, is not the only text Buber wrotearound the subject. Although a further research should be made around theconnections between I and Thou and the other writings with regard to educationwritten by Buber, I should try to show how this specific text, opens up a vastpossibility of understanding not only the educational facts and the educationalfunctions in Buber’s times, but also from our own time.

We might understand education if we see in the “development of creativepowers” (Buber, 2002: 98) within the individual what Buber sees in the child.Children are always willing to develop different activities (1959:240), and thisdetermination is what enables to give form to matter. This is only possiblewithin a human context, as a fundamental condition for the individual. Buberexplains it with the metaphor of a chorus (Buber, 1959: 241) that I might justas well expand in order to explain in a better way the contents of the conference.

There is no such thing as a song that has been badly put together or a badlyorganized symphony taking into account the individual voices. But it is veryimportant to point out that harmony is not achieved only by hearing theindividual voices. Even in the cases when we get to hear a solo, there is asilence from the rest of the participants of the chorus. In order to hear onevoice, it is necessary to pay attention to other voices. A silence of the rest ofthe voices of the chorus is necessary in order to hear the individual voice. Theinstruments have to be silent in order to hear the solo of a specific instrument.Much attention is needed in any case, either to be able to sing a solo or to bequiet and be silent for the time needed.

Martin Buber calls this phenomenon “author’s instinct”. This instinct isnatural in every human being. The desire to be at the origin of something isthis instinct, and this is revealed from a very young age. “Man, the son of man,wants to do things. It is not the mere pleasure to see how a form is being born

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from matter that, just moments before, seemed to have no form at all. Whatthe child desires is his participation in the origin and development of things:he wants to be the subject in the process of production.” (Buber, 1959: 241)Nonetheless, this “author’s instinct” has to be regulated in the relations withthe others in order to avoid a despotic instinct.

This ability of human beings to go into a relation and to be aware of theother enable “choruses” to exist. This is the way to reveal “the true life of thehuman being”. (Buber, 1959: 242) From this perspective it might be impossibleto think about living without taking into consideration the rest of the voices. InBuber’s words, the Project of the individual and the project of being aware ofthe other are different from one another. The individual has to be able toconsider him or herself, but only when we understand the collectiveparticipation, the utmost importance of the being is revealed. The person existsdue to the others in a dialogical perspective.

As we might follow in the article “I and Thou”, the importance of the beingis not given by the perspective of the self per se, but rather within the relationshipof one individual with the other. “Only when someone takes someone else bythe hand, then we are not on a relationship of a ‘creator’, but rather in arelationship of creating from his or her own nature in the world, not aiming theart of crying, but as a friend, lover, knows that in his or her heart there isreciprocity with whom he or she belongs. An educational fact that does notseem to repair the creation of the birth of things, will find in its future theconviction of a new loneliness in thinking.” (Buber, 1959: 243)

In this sense, education is understood as a dialogue with two faces (Buber,1959: 255): one that is responsible (from respond, in Latin respondere – res-pondere “the weight of the thing”), on the one hand. Dialogic education inBuber’s perspective implies the recognition of the other, the avoidance of hisnegation. By recognizing that my own existence depends on the recognitionof the existence of the other, there might be a sort of dialogue in which the“self” is unable to find itself in a relationship with the other. That is seen inBuber’s perspective as a “conviction to a new loneliness in thinking” as wasstated before. Nonetheless, there is a real dialogue in which, like in the chorus,one understands him or herself by the relationship with the other. The voiceof the other, as well as his silence enables my voice to be heard. When I havebeen able to understand this simple fact, then I am also able to understand thatmy silence is needed for other voices to be heard. The relationship betweenmy voice and the rest of the voices must come into balance or tension, up to acertain point, in order to attain harmony.

That is the role of the educator, to be the director of the choir or a conductor.But maybe, just as the conductor, the only way to get to be the one in charge ofthe baton, and of the whole orchestra or choir, one has to understand whatimplies to play an instrument or even to play several instruments. Maybe onehas to be able to learn how to play several instruments, and then understandingthe res-ponsibility of the union of voices as a totality. From this dialogic

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perspective, the totality of voices must be given in a full way, to the child and tohuman beings in general. As Buber puts it: “The true elements educate him –the air, the light, the life in a plant and in an animal; and the social circumstanceseducate as well. The true educator represents one and the other; and in spiteof his presence, in front of the child, he has to be as one of the elements.”(Buber, 1982: 11) And, without even noticing, childhood becomes the centralissue of the conference and unfold the possibility of education of the humanbeing in the whole meaning of the words until the end of his or her existence.

To educate implies pointing a way and not imposing a path already walked,because experience, according to Buber, is unrepeatable. Experience in thisdialogic sense that has been exposed cannot be repeated because therelationship I – Thou cannot be forced; and nonetheless, the conditions fordeveloping those bonds could be fostered. In this very frail line the real educatorhas to work. “The educational function means, a high Askese without rigortowards the world, because of the existence of the responsibility of the dominionof the life that is rendered upon us and in which we must influence, but that wemust not be intrusive, neither by will of power, or erotically.” (Buber, 1982:15)

By clearly opposing the idea of will of power established by F. Nietzsche orthe idea of Eros established by Plato, Buber tries to put the stress of his proposalon a world that implies the understanding of the experience within the worlditself without divisions. In Buber’s words, if there is a human relationshipbetween a physician and a patient, this relationship must be established byexperiencing this bond in his soul. (1959:16)

In case this is not attainable, we might call this act as quackery, even ifthere is the slight intent of domination or enjoyment. Sometimes the basicexperience of contact supports our sense of security, but sometimes it goesbeyond that point, “with a violence that makes it happen again, hasting it to theheart of the instinct itself.” (Buber, 1982:16) By this way of making a turn inthe particular instinct that turns around the system of direction, the Basicexperience happens. With this experience the educational influence starts. Thisis possible because education is based on the experience. Buber calls this“the experience of adversity” (1982:16) This is the ability of turning somethingaround but at the same time enables the openness for the relationship “I –Thou”.

In this sense, for Buber, the “envelopment” of the other implies the desireof the other. To “envelop” means to turn the existence of the other completelypresent, not only by imagination but by the actualization of the being. (Buber,1982: 17) To envelop the other in my wholeness is the dialogic relationshipaccording to Buber. This means to embrace the other and give myself my ownbeing. To embrace other beings, at least for an instance, is to enter in a dialogicalbond, being very careful not to stifle him or her.

It is very important to state the following questions: What kind of educationalrelationship is Buber talking about? Is there an asymmetric relationship in

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education as there is a greater responsibility from the educator’s side? Howcan we be part of the existence of the other beings and accomplish a dialogicbond by enveloping without stifling the other being?

Buber answers with three basic configurations of the dialogic relationships.The first one is called “abstract configuration”. This kind of relationship can beexemplified by the following case: two people that hate each other and fight allthe time. One person wants to be heard by the other one. A fight is a way ofrecognizing the other person. Each one of them acquires legitimacy by theother, not by the utility of the other, but as a basic call among them. There isa sort of reality between the two persons, there is mutuality. There is nopossibility of ignoring the other. Even when wanting to scream at the other,there is a sense of recognition. From this perspective, human beings as aspiritual persons make an abstraction of the full reality of its being and of his orher life. (Buber, 1982: 19)

This first relationship, nonetheless, is not an ideal form of bond. The secondconfiguration is what we understand as the educational function. If Buberunderstands education as the way of setting a selection of the world in such away that one person is capable of interacting with another one, then, by doingso, the person is able to re-signify the set of elements from his own personalposture. This human being is a better person if the experience is richer in adialogical sense. Being an educator is not simple and can be very dangerousfrom this perspective. He or she might become arbitrary. Buber says: “thenew phenomenon, the educational will, is dangerous because it might becomearbitrary power, because the educator might take the place of a teacher, theeducator risks himself to proceed with that selection and exercise of hisaction, putting himself from his own perspective and under his perspectiveof what he thinks of the student, and not according to the student’s reality.”(Buber, 1982: 20)

Beyond that, Buber talks about a third configuration of the dialogicrelationship. This bond is a possibility of giving and receiving mutually. Theeducator might experiment and the pupil too. The educator stands at bothsides of the common situation. Martin Buber states that if this phenomenonhappens “the educational relationship would end, unless it gets transformedinto friendship. // Friendship: that is the name we give to the third configurationof the dialogical relationship, when it is founded on the concrete experienceand on mutual envelopment. Within this relationship, the human souls envelop,really, one another.” (Buber, 1982: 21)

Up to this stage we have seen what Martin Buber has exposed in his articlewith this respect. Dialogic relationships enable education. That is what wecall “to point the way”, accomplish to be a guide that is able to orient the otherbeing sufficiently with the experience without impeding the experience of theother. That is the dialogic education, the one based on the “I – Thou”connections.

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A certain addendum: Scholem – the disciple, the friend?

If we have understood properly Buber’s proposal, I would like to return toMartin Buber’s life in order to see his relationship with Gerhard (Gershom)Scholem and try and understand his proposal in his own life.

Buber was Scholem’s teacher back in Germany when Buber was very activetrying to educate groups of young adults before the Nazis came to power.Although Scholem became a very well know scholar in Jerusalem, just as Buber,although the latter arrived only in 1938 to Palestine, both of them wrote aboutHasidism, Jewish mystical though in the 18th, 19th and 20th century. As grownupsthere was a certain rivalry between the two of them. Buber was the translatorof the Hasidic stories, and Scholem was the great scholar that studied theJewish mystical tradition. Maybe what makes a difference between the worksof both authors is the tone of their writing. Buber preferred the joyful tone ofthe Hasidic experiences in the stories. Scholem preferred to make deepreflections and academic papers around the subject.

What Buber suggested at his eightieth birthday, “pointing the way”, seemsquite convenient. Maybe Buber was making relevant for the 20th century thoseBiblical words of Proverbs 22:6 (“Educate the young according to his ownway, and even at old age he will not part from it.”). This might seem easy: Asimple movement of the hand, and not even that; a simple finger pointing theway. Nonetheless, the true educator understands that after some time he orshe has walked a long way. He or she has gone astray, has come back and hastaken a new path. Although that is true, someone always pointed out the “perils”of the way. If we really tried to reveal all the ways to those that ask to point theway with their finger, they would not understand fully what the intention of thepointing is. They themselves need to experience the path. Despite this, theyknow they have to walk the ways, but knowing that there will always be aneducator, next to the window, pointing the way.

We would tend to think that an education based on “Modern” theories mightgive the educator an active role. It seems that by “pointing the way”, Bubergoes against the idea of an active participation of the educator. The idea ofaction – inaction is a little bit more complex. In this sense a real educator thathas gone through his or her own paths, knows that making mistakes is alsopart of the experience, and that the real educational function is a presence thatis dialogic and at the same time enables the presence of the other, includingthe experience. There seems to be a connection between this principle andthe Jewish mystical tradition of the “contraction” of God in order to enablecreation. If God is wholeness, how is it possible to create when there is nospace for creation? Only by the tzimtzum, the contraction of the wholeness,creation is possible. Maybe a similar perspective could be traced in this way ofexplaining the educational function.

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In educational terms, “activity” understood in a way in which the educatorhas to be present in every experience could be authoritative as we havepresented previously in this same paper. It seems that Buber suggests thatthe educator has to be inactive in some cases. This establishes a difficultywithin the educational relationship. The educator, as well as in Proverbs 22:6,receives the commandment of educating, but educate the young in a way inwhich the own person is able to find his or her own way. The responsibility ison the side of the educator in order to even restrain him or herself and let theother be. This makes the educational relationship asymmetrical. Maybe thisis why only when the educational bond is transformed into friendship, that thedialogical relationship is possible in a symmetrical way. And despite all this, aneducator’s presence is permanent, being “always there” for the other. Onemight say that this presence is as subtle as necessary in each dialogicrelationship.

There is still something to be said. When Gershom Scholem talks aboutBuber’s death, it seems that his words reveal not the simple but the harsh wayof being an educator. According to Scholem, Buber’s disciples back in pre-Nazi Germany had a different perspective. At least these are Scholem’s words:“At the same time, forty years ago, Buber came with a tremendous influenceto the workshop for young Jews in Germany and Austria: we were young,Highschool or College students, and we needed a path to follow. Great wasthe fermentation and great the awakening of our hearts. Also great was theintention of hearing voices that came to us from the past and from the present.”(1976: 456-457)

What was that incredible force? Even when that amazing force that Bubermeant for those young men, the image was still there and not a mere pointingof a finger? Was Buber aware of all this? Maybe Buber was always looking forthe dialogic perspective. Could we understand or see what is at the other sideof the dialogic bond? Maybe that is why Buber not only was Scholem’s “greatteacher” and not his friend. Their rivalry seems quite clear from thisperspective. Buber was trying to be consistent with what he was proposing,but Scholem was in such a need of a path to follow that there might be quite adivergence, even at Buber’s death. Even when Scholem was asking for a path,Buber would not force any way (metaphorical or explicit) to the young studentshe was talking to. Despite the resentment one might feel after readingScholem’s words, there seems to be a great responsibility mainly by notimposing a way, but just pointing it. Many times we demand a path, but not amere suggestion, but a path that one has to follow, maybe because it is moreconvenient.

When thinking about Buber and Scholem one might ponder: What tookthem apart? We might never know. They are not around here any more. Buber’sresponse is still important for our way of building relationships. I think that, inmany ways, people’s bonds with other human beings, animals, plants or thingsare still utilitarian. They are “I-it” relationships. Nonetheless, the “I-Thou”relationships are still possible. I think we could still “point the way” and follow

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our own paths. We could never follow our master’s path because that isimpossible. We can only walk our own way, our own experience.

REFERENCES

Buber, Martin 1973. Meetings. Ed. by M. Fiedman. LaSalle, Open Court.___________ 1986. Reden u..ber Erziehung. Unvera..nderete Neuausgabe. Heidelberg, Verlag

Lambert Schneider.___________ 1959 “Al hama’ase hahinuchi” (U

..ber das Erzieherische) in Besod Siah.

Jerusalem, Bialik Institue. p. 237-261. (Hebrew)__________ 1982 “Da func, a~o educadora” (U

..ber das Erzieherische). Reflexa~o. Ano VII No.

23, maio / agosto. Instituto de Filosofia, PUC, Campinas. p. 5-23. (Portuguese)__________ 2002. “Education” in Between Man and Man. London, Routledge.__________ 2006. Yo y tu‰ y otros ensayos. Buenos Aires, Lilmod. (Spanish)Scholem, Gerhard Gershom 1976. Dvarim Bagov. Pirkei Morasha Utchia. Tel Aviv, Am

Oved. (Hebrew)


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Part IVEDUCATION AND CULTURE: MORAL ASPECT

Ðàçäåë IV. ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ È ÊÓËÜÒÓÐÀ:ÌÎÐÀËÜÍÛÉ ÀÑÏÅÊÒ

UDC 152.32

THE AXIOLOGICAL COHERENCE BETWEEN THE FREEMARKET PARADIGM OF EDUCATION AND THE CONSUMER

SOCIETY

O. D. Oleinikova, B. V. Saprygin (Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract. The authors consider the conditions in which domestic educationoperates in the consumer society. There is an analysis of works by J. Baudrillardand è G. E. Debord who discuss the influence of the consumer society on culture.The consumer society is shown to be interested in people who can be easilymanipulated, which is why it thrusts upon them a system of instrumental valuescapable of orienting them firmly to material prosperity as a criterion of socialsuccess. The article investigates coherence of the axiological features betweenthe free market paradigm of Russian education and the consumer society.

Key words: consumer society, consumerization of education, value system,free market paradigm of education, axiological coherence.

© Oleinikova O. D., Saprygin B. V., 2013Oleinikova Olga Dmitrievna, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Professor at the No-

vosibirsk State Pedagogic University.Îëåéíèêîâà Îëüãà Äìèòðèåâíà – êàíäèäàò ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, çàâåäó-

þùàÿ êàôåäðîé ôèëîñîôèè, Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíè-âåðñèòåò.

Å-mail: [email protected] Boris Vladimirovich, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent at the No-

vosibirsk State Pedagogic University.Ñàïðûãèí Áîðèñ Âëàäèìèðîâè÷ – êàíäèäàò ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, äîöåíò êàôåäðû

ôèëîñîôèè, Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò.Å-mail: [email protected]


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ÀÊÑÈÎËÎÃÈ×ÅÑÊÀß ÊÎÃÅÐÅÍÒÍÎÑÒÜ ÐÛÍÎ×ÍÎÉÏÀÐÀÄÈÃÌÛ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß È ÏÎÒÐÅÁÈÒÅËÜÑÊÎÃÎ

ÎÁÙÅÑÒÂÀ

Î. Ä. Îëåéíèêîâà, Á. Â. Ñàïðûãèí (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Àâòîðû ðàññìàòðèâàþò óñëîâèÿ ñóùåñòâîâàíèÿ îòå÷å-ñòâåííîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ â óñëîâèÿõ îáùåñòâà ïîòðåáëåíèÿ. Ïðåäñòàâëåíàíàëèç ðàáîò Æ. Áîäðèéÿðà è Ã. Äåáîðà, â êîòîðûõ õàðàêòåðèçóåòñÿâëèÿíèå ïîòðåáèòåëüñêîãî îáùåñòâà íà êóëüòóðó. Îáîñíîâàíî, ÷òî ïî-òðåáèòåëüñêîå îáùåñòâî çàèíòåðåñîâàíî â ëþäÿõ, ñîçíàíèå êîòîðûõìîæíî ëåãêî ìàíèïóëèðîâàòü è ïîýòîìó íàâÿçûâàåò ñèñòåìó èíñòðó-ìåíòàëüíûõ öåííîñòåé, ñïîñîáíûõ íàäåæíî ñîðèåíòèðîâàòü íà îáðåòå-íèå ìàòåðèàëüíîãî äîñòàòêà êàê êðèòåðèÿ ñîöèàëüíîé óñïåøíîñòè.Â ñòàòüå èññëåäîâàíà êîãåðåíòíîñòü àêñèîëîãè÷åñêèõ îñîáåííîñòåéðûíî÷íîé ïàðàäèãìû ðîññèéñêîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ è ïîòðåáèòåëüñêîãî îá-ùåñòâà.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáùåñòâî ïîòðåáëåíèÿ, êîíñüþìåðèçàöèÿ îáðàçî-âàíèÿ, ñèñòåìà öåííîñòåé, ðûíî÷íàÿ ïàðàäèãìà îáðàçîâàíèÿ, àêñèîëî-ãè÷åñêàÿ êîãåðåíòíîñòü.

The social experiment our country is going through is characterized by itspopulation drifting into a condition which J. Baudrillard called “consumersociety”. E. I. Sapozhnikov gives this definition to the term. “The consumersociety is a system that organizes joint activity and lives of people in such away that manipulation by the cultural codes initiating consumer attitudesbecomes its dominating contents. This system is characterized by massivemanipulation of cultural symbols and formation of a corresponding hierarchyof values, on the top of which there is a permanent choosing, buying and regularchanging of goods”. [1, p. 54]

The consumer society cannot become a society of common happiness andgeneral well-being because the artificially created needs are multiplying andthe thirst for consumption is insatiable in principle. Baudrillard states that theconsumption under overabundance leads to the loss of transcendental meaningthat consolidates a population into a nation as it leads to wastefulness and cryingabuse that entails wealth of the few and poverty of the majority. Thus the overalleconomic growth benefits not all strata of society but only the few who aremajor shareholders of prosperity. The equality of wishes protectively disguisesthe real discrimination and inequality of opportunities. The priority growth ofrequirements is ensured by social inequality which is necessary for producingand renewing consumer appetites. Social inequality is progressing continuallyreproducing the relations of domination and subordination, the privileged andthe outsiders. According to Baudrillard, the consumer society is a society ofsocial collusion [2, p.192] where everyone is happy in their own way and livesby the principle “Take care of yourself.” The complacency of conformists isthe stronghold of the consumer society wellbeing and the basis of its stability.This society simulates its concern for its agents through advertisements, such

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as “Tefal – Always thinking about you”, “L’Oreal loves you”, “Electrolux willmake your life easier.”

The consumer is not required to have original and profound thinking, aspread of interests and erudition. The consumer society is only interested inpeople whose minds can be easily manipulated, that is why it imposes on thema system of instrumental values that can reliably orientate to material prosperityas a criterion of social success.

The consumer intensions of the modern post-industrial society are embodiedin an infinite expansion of consumerism by means of involving all socialinstitutes into the sphere of the market relations, including those instituteswhich are of inherently non-market nature, e.g. education. As to education,today they use the term “educational market”. This is because education hasbecome an article of trade, and educational services a profitable businessrespectively. Today high and higher schools are involved into market relationsof the consumer society. They presented themselves as a form of social institutethat allow you to implement a simplified pragmatic program of adaptation tolife rather than shrines of science. Education becomes an instrumental valuefitting into the consumer society context.

Education is not possible without focusing on a specific value system thatdetermines the spiritual life of a person. M. Heidegger analyzing Plato’s parableof the cave in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth elucidates the essence of education.The passage from the cave to the daylight, from ignorance to knowledge,according to Heidegger, should be slow, steady and gradual because “theturning around has to do with one’s being and thus takes place in the veryground of one’s essence. This means that the normative bearing that is to resultfrom this turning around must unfold from a relation that already sustains ouressence, and develop into a stable comportment” [3, p. 163].

Plato calls the essence of this process paideia. Heidegger insists that theword cannot be translated, and he gives his own interpretation of it. “Paideiameans . . . guiding the whole human being in turning around his or her essence”[3, p. 163]. According to Heidegger, the German word Bildung (“education,”literally “formation”) comes closest to capturing the word paideia, but notentirely. True education captures and changes the very soul. In other words,in the judgment of Heidegger as well as Plato the genuine education isassociated with the holistic development of one’s personality, taking into accountone’s inexhaustible creative potential aimed at obtaining knowledge and moralself-improvement. Heidegger, after the manner of Plato, presents his notionof education. “Bildung [“formation”] means two things. On one hand, formationmeans forming people in the sense of impressing on them a character thatunfolds. But at the same time, this “forming” of people “forms” (or impresses acharacter on) people by antecedently taking measure in terms of someparadigmatic image, which for that reason is called the proto-type [Vor-bild].Thus at one and the same time “formation” means impressing a character onpeople and guiding people by a paradigm. The contrary of paideia is apaideusia,lack of formation, where no fundamental bearing is awakened and unfolded,and where no normative proto-type is put forth.” [3, p. 163]. Therefore, educationis a human activity that has as its basis the need for development with thepurpose of achieving some degree of perfection.

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Today consumerization of education is taking place, i.e. its transformationinto a component of the consumer society. Baudrillard explains that an objectas a cultural value is of no interest to the consumer, it is viewed as a sign of astatus hierarchy, as a means of entering into a social group significant to theconsumer. The education establishes certain consumer model. Its functionalsuitability for the social system becomes the criterion of education quality.

Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron shows in Reproduction inEducation, Society and Culture that the existing bourgeois relations dictate theneed for an education system which would form a law-abiding and hard-workingcitizens characterized by the lack of considerable culture “because in mattersof culture absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed.”[4, p. 210] The lowering of the culture level is seen here as a blessing becausethe lack of intellectual ambitions make people come to terms with thecircumstances. “Blessed, then, are ‘modest’ folk who, when all is said anddone, aspire in their modesty to nothing but what they have; and praise be to‘the social order’ which refuses to hurt them by calling them to over-ambitiousdestinies, as little suited to their abilities as to their aspirations.” [4, p. 207]Therefore, education is now required to meet social demands for «thereproduction of the social hierarchies» rather than to work as a social elevator.In this case, its primary function now is the “function of social conservationwith an efficacy that much greater because it remained better concealed.”[4, p. 198] According to the authors, any educational system is determined bythe structure of class relations, serving the interests of the ruling classes. Infact, “the educational system succeeds so perfectly in fulfilling its ideologicalfunction of legitimating the established order only because this masterpieceof social mechanics succeeds in hiding, as if by the interlocking of false-bottomed boxes, the relations which, in a class society, unite the functionof inculcation, i.e. the work of intellectual and moral integration, with thefunction of conserving the structure of class relations characteristic of thatsociety.” [4, p. 199–200]

The lowering of real quality of the education in our country is a consequenceof the expansion of consumer ideology to an area which is of essentially non-market nature. The consumer society dictates its requirements for educationwhich is demanded to give as much useful knowledge as possible promotingthe development of the skills suitable for gaining social success because onlya wealthy and successful individual can allegedly be a true consumer. Theideal of such education is a narrow specialist who is characterized, in the wordsof Karl Marx, by “professional cretinism.” Such axiological attitude leads toprimitivization of education.

The consumer of educational services makes a special demand to the systemof education – to be given such services for a minimum amount of effort, spiritualin the first place. Innovations in education are to promote comfortableinformation gaining, which manifests itself in simplifying educational standards,introducing fast-speed educational technologies, eliminating “unprofitable”disciplines, such as literature.

The education system is no longer conducive to the homogenization ofsociety so far as consumption in this area depends on the level of materialprosperity. The social nature of consumption in education reveals itself in the

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notions of prestige, social differentiation, hierarchy, and status. The moral of ahistorically irresponsible, consumption-oriented person who is a total strangerto selfless spirituality begins to dominate, which results from the triumph ofthe principle “everything has its price,” and so everything can be bought orsold. If that is the case, all the other genuine humanistic values which cannotbe measured in monetary terms in principle lose their meaning and are madesenseless. Selfishness and consumerism as the only appropriate life strategyfind axiological justification. A living embodiment of this strategy are all thosewho are not ashamed of their own self-interest and money-grubbing and donot hesitate to demonstrate their success in life by acquiring football teams,yachts, castles, or islands. Zygmunt Bauman calls such a person as a productof the consumer society “negative individual” because their ambitions areselfish, lack a sense of solidarity and social responsibility [5, p.129]. Theaxiological basis of their life is a principled rejection of any moral restraintsand norms with a pronounced consumerist orientation.

The role of education in establishing social solidarity and cohesion isimportant. The universal schooling is a factor of sustainable development. Itsaccessibility must be a real opportunity for everyone. At least education shouldremain an island of fairness in the market ocean of inequality, competition and“natural selection.” It must be psychologically comfortable, mentally andphysically safe.

Having analyzed the life strategies to be or to have Erich Fromm comes toconclusion that the contemporary society prefers possession to true humanbeing. The desire to possess turns into a loss of personal identity anduniqueness. Fromm mentions the great promise of unlimited happiness,freedom, material abundance, and domination of nature. The human beingshave started dreaming about becoming the gods of earth.

Guy Debord goes further in his book The Society of the Spectacle, suggestingthat the consumer society, just like any spectacle, creates an illusion of havingin the eyes of the consumer. The dramatic concept of the society of the spectaclerequires of the audience passive empathy, dedication and obedient shoppingin supermarkets and boutiques, taking part in shows and advertising actions.The spectator becomes a unified agent of the spectacle organized by skillfulproducers. “The spectacle is able to subject human beings to itself becausethe economy has already totally subjugated them.” [6, p. 7] The modernconsumer society of the spectacle has absorbed the masses. “The spectacle isthe bad dream of a modern society in chains, and ultimately expresses nothingmore than its desire to sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of this sleep.” [6, p.8] Staginess and theatricality are now an integral part of everyday life. Whilethe classical theater is literally localized to the social time and space, in thesociety of the spectacle the pseudotheatricalized performance is totalitarian,that is it permeates the whole area of life. Anyone can be a hero or antiherowith the help of a mobile phone camera by posting the evidence of their exploitor base act on the Internet.

The society of the spectacle is designed by the consumer civilization andmass media. The world of illusion being created determines life strategies ofthe modern individual who has turned into a “desiring machine” (G. Deleuze,F. Guattari), an object of marketing. Desires are being artificially created and

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intensely imposed on. False values give rise to false needs. Redundant mass ofcommodities generates unhealthy insatiable appetites for consuming. The basictype of freedom is now the freedom of consumer choice. The measure of humandignity is declared to be the quantity and quality of consumption, which is avisible embodiment of social differentiation. Consumption is to be an indicatorof idle luxury lifestyle, a manifestation of material prosperity, prestige, successand power.

The total pervasive alienation, “the social separation reflected in the spectacleis inseparable from the modern state – that product of the social division oflabor that is both the chief instrument of class rule and the concentratedexpression of all social divisions.” [6, p. 9]

At that stage of capitalism which was criticized by Marx, Luka‰cs and theexistentialists it was the products of labor that were alienated, the workerhimself remaining the owner of his free time that he could devote, for example,to self-education. In the consumer society, the worker has no free choicebecause he becomes a consumer. The antagonism between labor and capitalhas continued but now it is disguised by the consumer society because freetime is to be devoted to the consumption of commodity fetishes and massmedia products. The creativity attitude gives way to an insatiable hunger forhaving.

The consumption in the field of culture and education leads to a devaluationof both of them, inasmuch as they have become symbols of prestige and asocial hierarchy. Higher education is viewed as a sign of its owner’s status andcareer. It is not so much the quality and quantity of knowledge and skills astheir symbolic representation, a diploma, that becomes significant. The morediplomas a person has, the greater their chances for vertical mobility are. Thetokens of knowledge replace the value of true education.

Higher education, like any other, begins to be viewed as service industries.Thus, it is being bought by the market rules. Having become a commodity,education tries to acquire effective packaging as an important feature of itscommercial quality. Without the trappings it is difficult to make semblance ofcommercial success. Education takes the form of marketing, and higher schoolshire experts in advertising and PR. Applicants become consumers of educationalservices, and the education system turns into a form of commercial business.Investments in education are supposed to secure formation of a social identityas an opportunity of joining in the near future the circle of successful peoplewho can afford consumerist life strategy. The consumer society is not interestedin education that would aim at forming a many-sided, well-educated, ethicalperson of culture because such a person would certainly not spend all theirspare time only on shopping. So, it can be stated that there is coherence of theaxiological features between the free market paradigm of education and theconsumer society.

REFERENCES

1. Sapozhnikov, Å. I. The Consumer Society in the Western Countries // Voprosy filosofii,2007. – ¹ 10. – P. 53–63. [in Russian]

2. Baudrillard, Jean. The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures. – London: SagePublications, 1998. – 208 pp.

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3. Heidegger, Martin. Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. Published in Martin Heidegger. Pathmarks,ed. William McNeill. – Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press,1998. – 385 pp.

4. Bourdieu, Pierre; Passeron, Jean-Claude. Reproduction in Education, Society andCulture. – London: Sage Publications, 1990. – 254 pp.

5. Bauman, Zygmunt. The Individualized Society. – Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. – 259 pp.6. Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. – Canberra: Treason Press, 2002. – 58 pp.


UDC 378 + 008 + 37.0

REFLECTING ON THE PROCESS OF A PHILOSOPHICALRESEARCH ON VALUES MOTIVATION IN EXPLORATORY

ACTIVITY OF ADOLESCENTS

B. Dike (Liverpool, United Kingdom)

Abstract. This work is a reflection on the process of a philosophical Researchon values motivation in exploratory activity of the adolescent. It is an importantwork to share, because of the empirical nature of data, which developed aphilosophical theory. The metaphor of ‘end’ carries across associations of a journeyin which we want or hope to ‘arrive’ at an end. For the adolescents, is creatingchains of positive values (inter-dependent) that will free them (us) from fixedideology.

Key words: philosophical research, exploratory activity, adolescents, valuesmotivation, reflection, mind map.

ÐÀÇÌÛØËÅÍÈß Î ÏÐÎÖÅÑÑÅ ÔÈËÎÑÎÔÑÊÎÃÎÈÑÑËÅÄÎÂÀÍÈß ÖÅÍÍÎÑÒÍÛÕ ÌÎÒÈÂÀÖÈÉ Â

ÏÎÇÍÀÂÀÒÅËÜÍÎÉ ÄÅßÒÅËÜÍÎÑÒÈ ÏÎÄÐÎÑÒÊÎÂ

Á. Äàéê (Ëèâåðïóëü, Âåëèêîáðèòàíèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Ýòà ðàáîòà – ðàçìûøëåíèå î ïðîöåññå ôèëîñîôñêîãî èññëå-äîâàíèÿ â îáëàñòè öåííîñòíûõ ìîòèâàöèé â èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîé äåÿòåëü-íîñòè ïîäðîñòêà. Ýòèì âàæíî ïîäåëèòüñÿ â ñèëó ýìïèðè÷åñêîé ïðèðî-äû äàííûõ, êîòîðûå ïðèâåëè ê ðàçâèòèþ ôèëîñîôñêîé òåîðèè. Ìåòà-ôîðà ‘êîíöà’ íåñåò â ñåáå àññîöèàöèè ïóòåøåñòâèÿ, â êîòîðîé ìû õîòèìèëè íàäååìñÿ ‘ïðèáûòü’ â êîíå÷íûé ïóíêò. Äëÿ ïîäðîñòêîâ ýòî ñîçäàåò

© Dike B., 2013Beatrice Dike – Professor, Centre For Academic Excellence, Policy &Research, Liverpool

Hope University, United Kingdom.Áåàòðèñ Äàéê – ïðîôåññîð óíèâåðñèòåòà Õîóï, Öåíòð àêàäåìè÷åñêîé óñïåâàåìîñ-

òè, ïîëèòèêè è èññëåäîâàíèé, Ëèâåðïóëü, Âåëèêîáðèòàíèÿ.E-mail: [email protected]

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öåïè ïîëîæèòåëüíûõ öåííîñòåé (âçàèìîçàâèñèìûõ), êîòîðûå îñâîáîäÿòèõ (íàñ) îò ôèêñèðîâàííîé èäåîëîãèè.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: ôèëîñîôñêîå èññëåäîâàíèå, èññëåäîâàòåëüñêàÿ äå-ÿòåëüíîñòü, ïîäðîñòêè, öåííîñòíàÿ ìîòèâàöèÿ, ðåôëåêñèÿ, êàðòà ðà-çóìà.

Thoughts disentangle themselves when they pass through your fingertips.

In a linear, one-way logic, we proceed from premises to conclusions. Wejustify our conclusions by reasoning ‘back’ to our premises. Our reasons foracting are always values. In conceptual analysis, we reason in a reverse directionand seek to dis-cover our assumptions. We do this by examining our conclusionsand actions and discovering what we ‘must’ have presupposed. We have toreason both ways. Philosophers in education often try to chop things up intoclear-cut compartments like this, but our world is not like that; it is, in almostall its aspects, much more like a rainbow – a continuous spectrum in whichone colour shades imperceptibly into the next.

The research was on forms of exploratory activity of adolescents. ActivitiesI considered include: cadet forces, music clubs and other organisations whichare independent of schools and the curriculum. The special feature of suchlearning is that it is largely self-chosen and self-motivated or ‘inner-directed’(self-determination). To determine what values may arise from and motivatetheir participation. Consideration of the kinds of thing which adolescents wantand value among activities could profitably, in my view, be put higher on thegovernment’s educational agenda. The reason for this is that, multiple gainsmay accrue to the child and society.

This study supports the value of action-thought loops and spirals. Fromreflexivity perspectives, how-ever, the young adolescent is its own father; bringitself up by trial and error. If we see life as an emergent perspective on reality,then it changes continuously ‘with’ a person’s life. People act towards thingson the basis of their understandings; the consequences of our acting then oftenchange our understanding.

I consider that exploratory activity is a science. The common ground forscience and exploratory activity is that of problem solving. “Science should bevisualised as progressing from problem to problem… it is the problems whichchallenge us to learn; to advance our knowledge; to experiment; and to observe”Popper (1973:222).This was applicable to exploratory activity of adolescents.

Popper describe the progression from problem to problem, with thefollowing notation, or schema P

1 –> TS –> EE –> P

2, where P

1 is the original

problem, TS is the tentative solution, EE stands for error elimination and P2 is

the second problem which is different from the first. In the “exploratory activitiesprocess” it will be seen that P

1 corresponds to the “Situation”(values and

motivation in exploratory activities), TS to the “Investigation” and “Solutions”,

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EE to “Best Solution” and P2 to “Appraisal”, i.e. not necessarily the answer to

the original problem. More than likely a new problem, probably “Does itwork” – if not, why not? But in exploratory activity (in which instrumentalconnections play an important part), there are likely to be a number of activitieswhich could satisfy a particular situation so then popper’s schema could alsotake in the extra tentative solutions, and would thus be written:

P1 – TS

1 – EE – P

2 TS

2 “

“ “ “ “ TS

n

Background Knowledge

The term ‘Background knowledge’ could be translated to mean the expert’sexperience.

With this schema in mind set, I immerse myself again in the spirit,atmosphere and context of the research. In this I am, as it were, like a thirdperson observing the situation.

I realise that with this kind of conventional method, achieving revolutionaryscience may not be all too simple. The reason is because the situation orsubject of investigation is about Values and motivation. Value motivation andrelevance is subjectively experienced in the thinking of everyday life as systemsof motives for action, of choices to be made, of activities to be carried out, ofgoals to be reached. Subjective meaning ‘attach’ or ‘connect with’ activitiesimplies that only the participants know about their activities and the valuemotivation attached to them. To understand their motives, goals, choices andplans originating from their activities, we have to ask them. With this discovery,the very narrow walls of methodology in philosophy of education researchseem exposed. That band round the walls is it a belt or cravat? It would beextremely undemocratic to insist on everyone aiming for one single way of lifedominated by any single value. A few more chinks of light appeared at thispoint. Perhaps there is a way of achieving revolutionary science in philosophyof education research.

If we regard the authors of The Bible as linguistic philosophers (“In thebeginning was the word.”) then they suggested that little children may havewisdoms which adults have forgotten or lost: “Lest ye become as a littlechild …. Your wisdom will be very narrow and inflexible?” Maybe, there ishope in starting from awareness of ignorance? We have to ask them. Thecommon sense theory of knowledge is to all intents and purposes subjectivist.(although for Popper it should be called organismic knowledge since it consistsof the dispositions of organisms.)

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That legitimating of science lies in the sphere of its applications to problemsolving. The research took multi-faceted questions routes, to success, so as toobtain an understanding. To arrive at an understanding implies that there willbe a successful achievement of two individual but interdependent processes:description and explanation of the phenomena, with a view towards future theoryfor improvement of practice.

Multi-faceted questions are fructifying or productive route which payattention to complex multiple dimensions. It draws from parts of scientific fieldthe truths relating to the production of the different and heterogeneousconditions necessary to each effect. In order words, it traces one effect to itsmultiplied and diversified causes and conditions. Revolutionary scientific workis built upon complex and often unexamined structures of theory, methodology,and technique. There could be an even deeper description here because ittherefore could not be completely described. For Kuhn, science is notcompletely rational if, by “rational”, is meant completely stated, specified andjustified.

The questionnaire was constructed in the light of data collected in the moreopen context of the interviews. This increased the probability of relevance torespondents. The questionnaire covered a range of issues raised in the interviewanalysis. It was divided into three sections A-C. In designing the questionnaire,I used simple language and kept questions short, since shorter questions areless confusing and ambiguous. The use of open (open-ended, open coded, free)and closed (forced choice, pre-coded) question types was to allow opportunityfor self-expression in the former and, in the latter, because questions arestandard, comparison between respondents is facilitated.

The questionnaire was used to explore the activities and the subjectivemeanings attached to them. Should it be supposed that the boundaries betweenthe strategies are clear and sharp? Do I have to be completely one or theother? If steeped in a discipline we are also steeped in the conventional(noneRevolutionary science), ‘orthodox’ and assumptions - the ‘fashionablecorrectnesses’ of those disciplines. Calling them disciple-lines suggests thatsome ironic, even child-like, questioning of knowing authorities may be in order.The pejorative image of ‘chains’, like the tyrant Gyges, are still, mostly, invisible,concealed in miss-leading uses of words.

The fructifying or productive route is important and capable of evaluatingsuccess in scientific research. Many little lights, like little truths in Pluralperspectives, have star quality. They do not bind us with knowledge. We becameaware of being in the dark (at least half the time, alternately). Or speeds are‘Knowable’ only ‘relative’ to some fixed points, directions and lines which wehave to choose and fix, for ourselves, for our own purposes. Only then mightphilosophers caught up with Galileo’s revolutionary relativity.

Epistemology stance, I suppose is that of a pluralist. Try to incorporatedifferent approaches in an existential awareness of my own and the other’s

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unavoidable subjectivity and difference. “By pluralism, I want to show that theresearch methodology is both pluralistic and coherent. And coherent can beread as harmonious.

There is only one example of ideas which philosopher tend to ignore whenthey cling, in a desperate rear guard action, to Either/Or’, singular thinking,one-way reasoning, or logic and one-way causality. In evolutionary science orlogic, causality and creation are (at least) two-way, reversible: chickens lay(create) eggs which become (create) chickens. We create societies and thosesocieties then tend to constitute and ‘define’ what a ‘citizen’ ‘is’ or ‘ought to beseen as’ or ‘can be seen, in part, partially as’. We gather data; develop theorywhich can become a precept or policy.

Now we have a philosophical prima which belongs to revolutionary science.To frame philosophy of education research for futurity there is need for scientifictruths derived from generality of science higher in conceptual abstraction.Reasoning is and can only be rationalisation of our own values. No-one canescape his or her own ego, any more than a tortoise can escape his own shall(mobile home-premises).

Analysis of data took a process of describing phenomena, classifying andestablishing significant themes, then further questioning and refinement ofthese themes as part of an ongoing analytic process. The logic put forward for,or the cognitive process inherent in such analysis is a movement between thephases of comprehension, synthesis, theorising and recontextualising.

Coding using inductive, method of theory development was advantageousin developing chains of evidence, meaningful links between research questions,raw data, and emergent themes. Another advantage was to provoke criticalthinking: for example, should I separate value from motivation? What is value?From my understanding, value has two different meanings: sometimes itexpresses the utility of some particular object (like reading or writing poetry,writing or playing musical instrument and participating in cadets), andsometimes the power of ‘purchasing other goods’ (the acting force to achieve)the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use’;the other ‘value in exchange.’ In some sense, ‘use value’ is something we cannotmeasure literally, although it can be measured with a degree of priority attached.Value in exchange in this context is the power of purchasing (the acting forceof achieving) in that object which has ‘use value’. In other words things whichhave the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange;and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange havefrequently little or no value in use.

Nietzsche, (1886) would say that to act presupposes a value as motivation.The level of value placed on an activity determines the intensity, or strength ofmotivation to achieve, acquire and maintain it. Values are conferred on thingsand activities by people. If no one valued gold, it would ‘have’ no value ‘initself’. The motive for possessing gold may be ostentation. Or it might be held

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for its money value, as an investment or the ‘good’ secure feeling of having anest-egg safely tucked away. What may be common to all types of valuing, Ithink, is a positive, additive, moving attachment between a valuer and the valuedentity. This needs illustration: Gold acquired value when human beings beganto value it. It has no value aside from the value conferred on it by people valuingit. Distinctions between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ values are distinctionsbetween attitudes of valuers towards the objects valued. All motives are internalto the moving person but in some cases my motive for doing X is simply that Ienjoy X or am interested in X while in other cases I do X because it isinstrumental to some further value, Y, which is external to X. Both kinds ofanswer are present in the data about their values motivation in exploratoryactivities.

Successful participation in many-valued liberal educational activities requiresa high rate of output of energy. If I have a high rate of output or energy, I maybe able actively to value many things, or fewer things with great intensity. Butthe direction of causality implied by this ‘requires’ is, as so often, problematic.It could be argued that high energy output is the result of acquiring manyinterests as motivation. Two-way reinforcement – interest is a function of energyand energy is a function of interest. I use ‘energy’ somewhat loosely here.Strictly, since we tend to compare people’s activity over similar time periods,the relevant factor is not energy but rate of application of energy, that is effectivepower, but ‘power’ has so many other overtones that it is probably best tospeak of energy, leaving an analysis in terms of power to another occasion.

Having identified categories and themes for reporting there was a doubt oran intuition something I could see with my mind’s eyes as well as with myphysical eyes a set of themes jumping out within emergent evidence (themesfor reporting).The themes that were jumping out include intensity, certainty,propinquity, fecundity and extent. I remembered hesitating to code in this way,with feeling of surprise that data is developing ideas on a level of generalityhigher in conceptual abstraction than qualitative material being analysed. Thisis an inductive method of theory development. In comparing data one learns tosee categories in terms both of their internal development and of their changingrelations to other categories.

Reflecting on why I hesitated, it comes to mind that Bentham,(1987) in his‘Principle of utility’ argued that “the value of a lot of pleasure or pain, ifconsidered by itself will be greater or less according to circumstances of itsintensity, certainty, propinquity, fecundity and extent (PP. 65, 86-87 word initalics added). At this point my coding (analysis) began to make sense: as towhy the emergent themes or categories for reporting changed relations toother categories – philosophical themes.

On a deeper level of reflection, I asked the question, have the emergedthemes or categories discovered, come from analysis of data, or has it beenread into it? My answer is: The data seemed to fit the categories. The categories

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emerged from the data.From the onset in the research proposal, the aim wasnot to disprove or prove theory, but rather to discover theory. If I had set outto prove or disprove theory in this research I would have developed hypothesesto reject or accept the theory. (This could have led to experimental research).If I had not read Bentham’s philosophical ideas about the ‘Principle of utility’,there could have been the need to invent new words to describe the emergingcategories (theory). But because I have read Bentham’s ideas on value, I wasable to see and use the same words as Bentham in the coding of the data forfurther analysis and interpretation.

I must make clear here that the analysis did not use the emerged categoriesor themesin the same way as Bentham. In Bentham’s thesis he used the‘Principle of utility’ as a function of pleasure and pain which is wider than thecategories discovered. In this analysis the categories or themes are used asmeasures (functions) of values motivation in the exploratory activities ofparticipants in this study. A mathematical illustration is thus.

principle (Utility) = Function (Pain, pleasure) > (x1, x2, x3, x4) BenthamCategoris (x1, x2, x3, x4) = Measure (Value Motivation) Beatricewhere x1 is intensity, x2 is certainty, x3 is propinquity, x4 is fecundity)and x5 is extent.

Example of list of values motivation that emerged from data: ‘intensity’,passionate commitment. ‘Propinquity’, how near and accessible is the activity.Does it bring distant colleagues closer through collaborative performance.‘Duration’, does it give a ‘one-off feeling of satisfaction or does it offer a lifetimepursuit, hobby or ‘calling’. ‘Fecundity’, how ‘fertile’ is the activity in leading onto other values. Extent, does the activity spread over a large number of people,with whom it is shared.

Values provide the motivation to increase value. Increase of valuing is areason for valuing. In an aesthetic appraisal, perhaps a picture may be judgedgood partly because of, say, the fine details; such aesthetically appealing factorsmay well be persuasive. I am suggesting that something positive or beautifulor inspiring can be built with or on the value itself or by showing that it haspositive (instrumental) connections with other values.

Data analysis also confirm connections with other values which include forexample, building friendships, competition, self-challenge, self-discipline, beingactive, fit and healthy, wanting to hear about other people’s viewpoint andopportunity to help others. These are important values in a culture ‘for living,tolerance, for wider educational achievement and possible employability’.

I then, Reflected on the question about ‘instrumental’ attitudes towardsjustifying values by reference to their positive connection with (utilityUsefulness for) other value and the intrinsic, ‘valuable for its own sake’ attitude.My interpretations are thus: If I am seen reading books, Journals or newspapers,

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then my reading books presupposes I value reading for some reason. It maybe instrumental to my health (to stimulate and keep my brain active), to mysocial or business contacts or simply to my enjoyment of reading. Or I mightread as a professional, for money (If I am being paid to write or as part of myjob). In all those cases, I read for reasons which are internal to me. I do it ‘formy own sake’ even if I do it also for the sake of others (to teach my children ormy students, for instance). My reading is then instrumental to my valuing ofothers. I do not read for its own sake or saving but for my own ‘proper’) sake,or for the sake of some other person or persons. I read for the sake of somevalue other than reading itself. But that is huge and difficult question in ethicsand I am not sure of the right solution”. I am hoping you will contribute someanswers.

It is a rational procedure, to justify one value by reference to its positiveinstrumental connection with another value. The chain or network thus startedmight lead to a progressive linking up of a wider range of values to create abeautifully moving network of a culture and of Love Capital. It is tempting tosuggest that this roughly describes, for instance how ideologies and the systemof values and beliefs called science grows. Accumulation of data about ourworld and our solar system for instance was continuous, from Galileo via TychoBrahe and Kepler until Newton integrated it in a ‘grand theory of gravitation’.Einstein (also integrating work of many others) added to this schema to createan even more comprehensive world-view. Einstein’s theories, too, will not bethe last word in the story. I think there are parallels in the development of allinterconnected systems of values and belief (ideologies, philosophies, ways oflife and faiths, for instance).

The ‘loopy’ or reflexive nature of data analysis was discovered. The datalead to categories under which they are described. The categories anddescriptions then alter the (appearance of the) data rather in the same way asobservations lead to theory which, reflexively, prompts new observations. Thebeauty of using a constant comparison method in this study is that it led toemergent theory of the emergent theory development. Glaser and Strauss(1967) are right to claim that constant comparison method thrives on the needto theorize. There is a sense of confidence in following systematic ordering ofdata analysis into an integrated theory.

The use of constant comparison is not an easy task because it requiredgoing forward and backward into data. The procedure itself is complex becausewhen followed correctly it develops to substantive coding which could lead indifferent directions. This may be seen as an ambiguity which need filtering.But I am not interested in filtering out any ambiguity since practice, particularlyexperience of mistakes, gives rise the theory for improving practice. Theimproved practice, driven by theory, gives rise to new experience, new theory(new motivating values).

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This Is (Can Be Seen As) A PHILOSOPHICAL MIND MAP WhichGuided the Questionnaire

Figure 1

.

Explanation of Figure 1

Figure 1 show five groups of factors (makers, creators) which ‘feed in’ tocreate the consequent ‘Activities and Attitudes’ in the central, diamond-shapedbox.

As explained in the text, the direction of causality is two-way: values, forinstance, motivate and cause action and experience in acting ‘feeds back’ togive rise to, or to change valuing.

Starting at the top with ‘Cognitive Factors’, the word ‘efficacy’ reflects aninsistence that, to believe, or to value ‘for real’ is to act on the belief as true oron the value as good (not merely to believe in words or to say that we value).

Proceeding clockwise, the next box ‘Actual Expectations, refers to theindividual’s expectation of future consequences of acting on values and beliefs –another aspect of motivation.

The box ‘Unexpected’ refers to factors which are more or less intrinsic tothe activity – how near it is, or to the unforeseen consequences of engaging init.

‘Commitment’ is another two-way factor. Commitment, tentative orotherwise, leads to engagement. Experience in the activity may strengthen orweaken the commitment.

Under ‘Other Issues’, family support, perception of society’s expectations,peer pressure may encourage or discourage engagement.

.

ACTIVITIES ANDATTITUDE

OFTHEADOLESCENTS

COGNITIVE

Efficacy of beliefs Reasons for choice

View of society’s expectations

OTHER ISSUE

ACTUAL EXPECTATIONS

Effort put into activities (commitment)

COMMITMENT

UNEXPECTED

What they see as valuable in their activities

Intensity Propinquity Certainty Fecundity

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“There is no event, no phenomenon which does not have a multiplesense. A thing is something this, something that, sometimes somethingmore complicated – depending on the forces which take possession ofit. The pluralist idea that a thing has many senses, the idea that thereare many things and one thing can be seen as this and then that isphilosophy’s greatest achievement, the conquest of true maturity andnot its renunciation of infancy. For the evaluation, the delicate weighingof each thing and its sense, the estimation of the forces which definethe aspects of a thing and its relations with others at every instant – allthat depends on philosophy’s highest art –that of interpretation”(Deleuze 1992:4).

Conclusion

What is interesting for me in the schema devised by Popper i.e. P1–>EE–>

P2 is that although a researcher would work through a system that follows the

same lines, it might be said that to an expert-researcher there is no P2 i.e.

another problem, at the end of the job. She has made her artefact and thattherefore solves the problem. This logically is so until one thinks about thequestion of time. Consider this: “time is the measure of change. There is notime apart from change”, Aristotle in (Vertgeym, 2012:69 – Education and NewUnderstanding of Time). Leading to the conclusion, what solves the problemat one particular time (age) does not necessarily solve the same problem at adifferent time (age) i.e. one stills ends up with another problem, for one neverfully solves the first problem for all time in the first place, hence Popper’s P

2.

The Multi-faceted questions approach of the research was fruitful inproducing data. Constant comparison method of analysis was as a commitmentto the truth –to technique of doing, of deepening understanding, of developingthe emerged philosophical theory of values motivation in exploratory activitiesof the adolescents.

REFERENCES

Bentham, J. (1987) From An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (ed.Alan Ryan): Utilitarianism And Other Essays J. S. Mill and Jeremy Bentham. PenguinClassics.

Vertgeym, L.B.(2012), Education and a New Understanding of Time. Philosophy ofEducation.

Deleuze, G. And Guattari (2011) A Thousand Plateaus Capitalism and Schizophrenia.TheAthlone Press. Translation and Foreword by Brian Massumi.

Nietzsche, F. (1886) Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude To A Philosophy Of The Future.Translated by Hollingdale, R. J. (1973) Harmondsworth, Penguin.

Popper, K. R., (1973) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford UniversityPress.

Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Chicago, IL: Aldine.


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MORAL VALUES AND EDUCATIONIN THE NEOHELLENIC ENLIGHTENMENT

P. Eliopoulos (Peloponnese, Greece)

Abstract. In the Era of the Neohellenic Enlightenment thinkers such as Korais,Psalidas, Moisiodax and Lesvios share the common realization not only for theneed of liberation but also of reformation for the Greek Nation. In their writings itbecomes evident that moral values play a crucial role in the establishment of anew moral and political reality. The genesis of a continuous and vivid interest inthe philosophical ideas from Europe which embodied the ancient Hellenic wisdomhad significant impact on the issue of education. The depuration of the languageand terms so as to seek new science but also the introduction of Ethics in the dailypolitical and individual life became the cornerstone of the new understanding ofhow is to live. The Neohellenic Philosophers share the certainty that man is notnaturally evil, but evil is the result of bad thinking, of bad habit or of ignorance.Virtue is teachable, an individual but also collective goal, and the prerequisite foreudemonia.

Key words: Education, Neohellenic Philosophy, Enlightenment, moral values,language, virtue, eudemonia, making of people.

ÌÎÐÀËÜÍÛÅ ÖÅÍÍÎÑÒÈ È ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ Â ÍÅÎÝËËÈÍÑÊÎÌÏÐÎÑÂÅÙÅÍÈÈ

Ï. Ýëèîïóëîñ (Ïåëîïîííåñ, Ãðåöèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Â ýïîõó íåîýëëèíñêîãî ïðîñâåùåíèÿ òàêèå ìûñëèòåëè, êàêÊîðàèñ (Korais), Ïñàëèäàñ (Psalidas), Ìîèñèîäàêñ (Moisiodax) è Ëåñâèîñ(Lesvios) ðàçäåëÿëè îáùåå ïîíèìàíèå íå òîëüêî ïîòðåáíîñòè îñâîáîæäå-íèÿ, íî òàêæå è ðåôîðìèðîâàíèÿ ãðå÷åñêîé íàöèè. Ïðè ÷òåíèè èõ ïðî-èçâåäåíèé ñòàíîâèòñÿ î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî ìîðàëüíûå öåííîñòè èãðàþò êðè-òè÷åñêè âàæíóþ ðîëü â óñòàíîâëåíèè íîâîé ìîðàëüíîé è ïîëèòè÷åñêîéäåéñòâèòåëüíîñòè. Âîçíèêíîâåíèå óñòîé÷èâîãî è æèâîãî èíòåðåñà ê ôè-ëîñîôñêèì èäåÿì èç Åâðîïû, êîòîðûå âîïëîòèëè äðåâíþþ ãðå÷åñêóþ ìóä-ðîñòü, îêàçàëî çíà÷èòåëüíîå âëèÿíèå íà ïðîáëåìàòèêó îáðàçîâàíèÿ.Î÷èùåíèå ÿçûêà è òåðìèíîëîãèè äëÿ ïîèñêà íîâîé íàóêè, à òàêæå ââå-äåíèå ýòèêè â åæåäíåâíóþ ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ è ëè÷íóþ æèçíü, ñòàëè êðàåó-ãîëüíûì êàìíåì íîâîãî ïîíèìàíèÿ òîãî, êàê äîëæíî æèòü. Íåîýëëèíñ-êèå ôèëîñîôû ðàçäåëÿëè óáåæä¸ííîñòü â òîì, ÷òî ÷åëîâåê íå çîë ïîïðèðîäå, íî çëî ñóòü ðåçóëüòàò ïëîõîãî ìûøëåíèÿ, äóðíûõ ïðèâû÷åê èëè

© Eliopoulos P., 2013Ïàíîñ Ýëèîïóëîñ – äîêòîð ôèëîñîôèè, Óíèâåðñèòåò Ïåëîïîííåññà.Panos Eliopoulos – PhD, University of Peloponnese, GreeceE-mail: [email protected]

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íåâåæåñòâà. Äîáðîäåòåëè ìîæíî íàó÷èòü – ýòî ëè÷íàÿ, à òàêæå è êîë-ëåêòèâíàÿ öåëü è ïðåäïîñûëêà äëÿ ýâäåìîíèè (eudemonia – ñ÷àñòüå, áëà-ãîïîëó÷èå).

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáðàçîâàíèå, íåîýëëèíñêàÿ ôèëîñîôèÿ, ïðîñâåùå-íèå, ìîðàëüíûå öåííîñòè, ÿçûê, äîáðîäåòåëü, ýâäåìîíèÿ, ñîâåðøåíñòâî-âàíèå ëþäåé.

The Neohellenic Enlightenment is rightly considered to be a branch of themain European Enlightenment. For the Neohellenes of the 18th and 19th century,the potential alignment with the achievements of the developed countries inthe west presupposed a reformation of values, those which had survived fromAntiquity. Europe had become enlightened and benefited, to a large extent,due to the Greek letters and values of the past. That was a “loan” that could bereturned, so the Greek nation would find again the intellectual and moralprinciples that it needed in its strife for liberation. The term that the GreekEnlightener Korais used to mark this transition of knowledge was“metakenosis”, which connoted the recovery of the classical heritage. Certainlythat signified a degree of eclectic assimilation of ideas coming from currents ofthought in the western European countries. Nonetheless, the thinkers of thetime that are classified in the frame of Neohellenic Enlightenment, contributedwith original ideas and declared their commitment to proliferating these valuesto their compatriots in an innovative and very efficient manner. As a matter offact, the Neohellenic Enlightenment had a very strong pedagogical andadmonitory character despite the fact that it did not have the opportunity tocome under the didactic influence of the Renaissance, due to the Turkishdominance in Greece1. Neohellenic culture before the Enlightenment remainedimbued mainly by the Orthodox Christian ethical code, which was the exclusivebut crucial connection of the present with the Byzantine and Hellenic past2.The acute problem for the new era in Greece was the almost totally destructedstructures of official education. The Enlighteners realised that to aid the nationin its liberating effort they had to evangelise the advent of the Greek lettersfrom the past, so as to re-connect the nation with its historical collective intellectand to secure its continuation. The genesis of a continuous and vivid interestin the new philosophical ideas from Europe which embodied the ancientHellenic wisdom had significant, almost predictable, under the circumstances,impact. The subsequent revitalization of ancient studies by important thinkersseriously affected, if not focused almost completely, on the issue of education.Education, in the Neohellenic Enlightenment, became the vehicle for the newideas, also the stable basis from which the Neohellenes could progress andearn back the perspective that was lost during the Ottoman occupation.

1 Cf. Anna Tabaki, “Les Lumieres ne‰o-helle‰niques. Un essai de de‰ finition et de pe‰riodisation”,Les Lumieres en Europe. Unite‰ et Diversite‰. E‰dite‰ par Werner Schneiders avecl’introduction ge‰ne‰rale de Roland Mortier, BerlinerWissenschafts – Verlag, 2003,pp. 45-56.

2 For a thorough historical understanding of the era and the evolution of the NeohellenicEnlightenment see Nicolaos Psimenos, The Greek Philosophy from 1453 to 1821, vols.A & B, Gnosi, Athens 1989.

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The problematic of their writings regarded greatly the issue of moral values,due to the fact that these seemed indispensable in the effort for national andindividual reformation. Morality and values were sine qua non in the neweducational proposal. To elucidate the quest for education in the NeohellenicEnlightenment, I will here adopt a definition of value as a socially acceptedprinciple. The existence or non-existence of values and the criteria for theircomprehension3 is, generally speaking, a query that is consistent with theexamination of morality within a particular society. As education and societyare destined to be, to a larger or smaller extent, interconnected and interactedin a continuous way, it is entailed that values which are embodied in the formerare imbued in the latter in a canonical manner. Hence, the Greek Enlightenersof the 18th and 19th century proceed to a discussion of the individual moralvalues with a view to the larger context of society and, especially, of thosevalues that regard specific parameters of education so as to realize potentialgains in politics, which is the ultimate and catholic expression of the values ofthe social and pedagogic becoming.

In the philosophy of education, with the help of analytic philosophy, itbecomes necessary to gradually and carefully purify and decongest languagefrom the wrong meaning. Moreover, the axiological meaning of moral languageis, of course, fundamentally prescriptive. In consequence, we treat moral wordsand phrases to express imperatives, to ourselves or to others4. In this sense,the principle of education and the approach of values from society as a wholecan be considered the reflective conceptual and ideological preoccupation withthe terms, the protection of the concepts in order to achieve such an equilibriumand rescheduling orientation towards learning which will be beneficial toeveryday life. In the Greek Enlightenment and in the intellectual production ofthinkers such as Adamantios Korais, Veniamin Lesvios, Athanasios Psalidasand Iossipos Moisiodax5 serious effort is made in order to restore this balanceexactly, between the clearance of the language and terms so as to seek newscience, and the introduction of Ethics in the daily political and individual life ofthe Greek people who were fighting for freedom and resurgence6. The harmonioussymbiosis of the individual and a political society is, thus, located at the verycentre of the issue raised by a multitude of books on ethics at that time.

The main question is, for these Enlighteners, to find a guide for the new eraand the new culture that would occur so that the Greeks would be liberatedpolitically and also spiritually7. The New Philosophy aims to establish a steadyState, so it is not only an educational philosophy, but also political and liberating.Iosippos Moisiodax, who believes in the power of science and wants education

3 On values cf. Theodosios Pelegrinis, Lexicon of Philosophy, Ellinika Grammata, Athens2004, p. 76.

4 Cf. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, London 1972, part I.1.5 In this paper I will discuss these four Enlighteners as they are some of the most influential

thinkers of the epoch but also due to the fact that their theories converge quite to thesame inquiry, i.e. to education and its benefits on a moral and political level inseparably.

6 Cf. Paschalis Kitromilides, Neohellenic Enlightenment, Cultural Foundation of the NationalBank of Greece, Athens 2000.

7 Cf. Athanasia Glykofrydi-Leontsini, Neohellenic Philosophy. Moral and Political Questions,Athens 2001.

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to be reformed in the new spirit, outlines with clarity this guide. According tothe Greek philosopher, each person feels the need of a well-reasoned guide,which could instruct him about the natural truths, so as to reach the potentialityof a reasonable and stable State. This necessary and infallible guide is thehealthy Philosophy, “by virtue of the cultivation of which Europe recently wasrestored from an unfortunate and unlearned place, a place without beauty, tothe most eudemonistic, the most teeming with beauty and wisdom, place inthe Ecumene”8. The healthy Philosophy, that Moisiodax describes, is theexperimental philosophy, i.e. that philosophy which is aided by the newinstruments of natural science and is served indeed by right reason, that is thenatural reason, which knows its own limits and fights against the obscurantist,anti-intellectual forces with vehemence. Right reason must be integrated ineducation so that the nation can return to its former intellectual status. Thisaffirmation is clarified with optimism by Veniamin Lesvios: “we are still in thebeginning of education…our nation has already sided with those nations whichlabor for the knowledge of the being and dispose of illiteracy. Thus we wish toperfect all the sciences and human knowledge, assuming the character of ourformer self as a nation”9.

The Greek Enlighteners believe, just as the ancient Greeks did, in thestrength and capabilities of right reason. Thus, among other things, theyformulate epistemology because science, with the help of philosophy, leads toeudemonia. In that context philosophy becomes really an irreplaceableinstrument. As Korais adduces: “no science and no art can be delivered easilyor come into perfection without the guidance of Philosophy”10. Philosophyliberates men from superstition by discovering the true causes of things andteaches men virtue, without which even religion would be unavailing11. Thephilosophical ideas form the basis of an effort for self-knowledge desired byscience as a collective institution and by the individual himself. Addressingthe deficit of values, that has occurred because of the long bondage and spiritualdarkness, during that epoch is mainly of an epistemological, educational andphilosophical character. Such a morality and worldview may be based, assertthe Enlighteners, on good language, derived from a careful choice of wordsand terms from the ancient Greek or modern Greek language, which cansupport the weight of the concepts, and is also based on clear, unambiguousdefinitions.

Morality enters the forefront of philosophical thought and takes the lead inthe “Healthy Philosophy” of Moisiodax. According to the perceptions of thedeacon from Tsernavoda, ethics prevails over other branches of philosophyand aims to the smooth and orderly social life and to the political eudemonia.Veniamin Lesvios in the Elements of Ethics ascribes to Ethics the most essentialrole compared to any other science: “but since even if one has the knowledgeof the celestial and terrestrial phenomena he will be blamed in the case that heis not virtuous, ethics demands primacy among all sciences…”12. According to

8 Iossipos Moisiodax, Apologia, Vienna 1780, p. 95.9 Veniamin Lesvios, Elements of Metaphysics, Vienna 1820, pp. 7–13.10 Adamantios Korais, Prolegomena to the Ancient Greek Writers, vol. I, Cultural Foundation

of the National Bank of Greece, Athens 1986, p. 178.11 Adamantios Korais, ibid, p. 187.

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his ideas, ethics can be taught, therefore it is a science, one that seeks to renderthe human being good. This science is based on secular criteria arising fromknowledge. The nature of man makes him susceptible to this teaching. Lesviosfurther maintains that since man by nature is capable of learning, and isconsidered to be the only reasonable being, one that is receptive of mind andscience, it is entailed that it is made thus so as to become virtuous. If theseconditions were not valid then every form of teaching would be useless13.

The words of philosophy and the proper knowledge and use of languageare indispensable, in Korais, in order to lead the people to the acquisition ofvirtue. The relationship between language and morality is mutually functionaland effective, as one who does not use the concepts correctly, also does notcall and does not use morals correctly either. According to Korais: “If thebarbarization of the language, twisting the true meanings of the words, ends inthe corruption of morals, it is deduced that the correction of the language alsocorrects the morals of the nation and makes them meeker. Virtue, justice,prudence, sainthood, and even more, countless words, which denote thedispositions of the soul, mean another thing in an uneducated man’s mouthand another in the enlightened man’s mouth”14. The common people must beeducated. The scholar from the island of Chios upholds that they must be apeople of philosophers, able to live by the theoretical principles that will allowthem a true life. Those people, whose mind is deprived of education, do notever fulfil the teleological role attributed to them by Nature15.

The scholar from Ioannina, Athanasios Psalidas, maintains that without theknowledge of the divine truths, nobody can be rendered good and moral, andas a consequence, not felicitous, as he will become a slave to several passions.The Eudemonia that he advocates has a social and personal character, as ifman did not believe in the existence of God he would rush to pleasures andwould obey neither to natural law nor to the law of the people, in other wordshe would resort to a savage and animalistic state of being. Psalidas, in his bookTrue Eudemonia, affirms that such a dimension of moral life would incur evilson political life as well. If everyone is absorbed in his own private good andprofit, then no one would become considerate of the situation of others andwould not contribute to the common good. Even worse, one would not be ableanymore to offer to the end of social or individual perfection, as the uniquemoral principle would be private gain and benefit16. For Psalidas, the alignmentwith the natural law requires fighting passions17. He argues that we are bynature equipped with everything we need to be happy with just ourresponsibility, and only because of the ignorance and passions that distract us,do we manage to lose the path of happiness. The political eudemonia isconstantly in the mind of Psalidas, as he believes that a person becomes a

12 Veniamin Lesvios, Elements of Ethics, chapter A, par. 2.13 Veniamin Lesvios, ibid, chapter A, par. 3.14 Adamantios Korais, ibid, p. 504.15 For the views of the Neohellenic Enlightenment on nature cf. Konstantinos Petsios, I

peri fyseos sizitisi sti neoelliniki skepsi. Opseis tis filosofikis dierevnisis apo ton 15o eos ton19o aiona, Ioannina 2002.

16 Athanasios Psalidas, True Eudemonia, Vienna 1791, § 25.17 Athanasios Psalidas, ibid, § 20.

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participant in the political process through the morals which characterize him.By benefiting others man becomes virtuous and he completes his missionteleologically18, a syllogism that resonates the above views of Korais.

Korais notes conclusively in his Improvised Meditations on the GreekEducation and Language19: “Philosophy does not only tackle with the problemof the correction of one’s mind but also of one’s will. Where you may see amalignant and perverse man, do not doubt that his malice is the result either oftotal lack of any education or of bad and unmethodical education”. In this waythe wisdom of Socrates20 returns in the Neohellenic Philosophy, the certaintythat man is not naturally evil, but evil is the result of bad thinking, of bad exis(habit) or of ignorance. Quite characteristically Korais affirms that the educationof young people is not a work similar to technical works. Education is anontological process, directly connected with refining man so that he can be abetter being21. Furthermore, it is a work of pacification, honesty and virtue22.This recognizes an education based on targeting claims and not on a randomcultural basis. It includes the enlightening concept of “anthropourgia” (makingof people), i.e. the formation of people according to an axiological-formativeexemplar which will influence constructively and imbue the natural constitutionof man so as to render man eudemonistic but also socially beneficial. Moralvalues, as considered in the Greek Enlightenment, must be mixed with scientificaction, they must comprise an unaltered and unswerving component ofeducation. The moral and practical proposal of Neohellenic philosophy focusesattention on the education of young people and, salva veritate, on lifelongeducation, in the form of an endless quest and effort for virtue, on the onehand, and individual and political eudemonia, on the other. Values are notplaced in a utopian manner in the minds of societies and individuals. Virtue isteachable but at the same time it is a daily, not automated pursuit. It mostlycomprises a war against bad habits, therefore it mobilises man’s best abilitiesand devoted will. Virtue guides to mental and social health, beyond all otherthings, and seeks the right ontological repositioning of man within the true,the essential and the natural. This is the uncompromising message, the broadanthropocentric conception of the Neohellenic Enlightenment that still is sorelevant in modern societies due to the fact that there is an ongoing discussionon education and the recharge of the moral values in it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fournaros Sotiris, “Socrates in Koraes”, Journal for Classical Studies MS, number 7 (2005),pp. 91–102.

Glykofrydi-Leontsini Athanasia, Neohellenic Philosophy. Moral and Political Questions,Athens 2001.

18 Athanasios Psalidas, ibid, § 25-26.19 Adamantios Korais, ibid, pp. 178-179.20 Cf. Sotiris Fournaros, “Socrates in Koraes”, Journal for Classical Studies MS, n. 7 (2005),

pp. 91-102.21 For a thorough guide on education in the years under discussion see Konstantinos

Malafantis, The pedagogy of neohellenic enlightenment, Poreia, Athens 2001.22 Adamantios Korais, ibid, p. 159.

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Hare R. M., The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, London 1972.Kitromilides Paschalis, Neohellenic Enlightenment, Cultural Foundation of the National

Bank of Greece, Athens 2000.Korais Adamantios, Complete Works, Vols. Á & Â, Vlassis Publishing, Athens 1990.Korais Adamantios, Prolegomena to the Ancient Greek Writers, Cultural Foundation of the

National Bank of Greece, Athens 1986.Lesvios Veniamin, Elements of Ethics, National Hellenic Research Foundation, Athens 1994.Lesvios Veniamin, Elements of Metaphysics, Vienna 1820.Malafantis Konstantinos, The pedagogy of neohellenic enlightenment, Poreia, Athens 2001.Moisiodax Iossipos, Apologia, Vienna 1780.Pelegrinis Theodosios, Lexicon of Philosophy, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 2004.Petsios Konstantinos, I peri fyseos sizitisi sti neoelliniki skepsi. Opseis tis filosofikis dierevnisis

apo ton 15o eos ton 19o aiona, Ioannina 2002.Psalidas Athanasios, True Eudemonia, Vienna 1791.Psimenos Nicolaos, The Greek Philosophy from 1453 to 1821, vols. A & B, Gnosi, Athens

1989.Tabaki Anna, “Les Lumieres ne‰o-helle‰niques. Un essai de de‰finition et de pe‰riodisation”,

Les Lumie res en Europe. Unite‰ et Diversite‰. e‰dite‰ par Werner Schneiders avecl’introduction ge‰ne‰rale de Roland Mortier, BerlinerWissenschafts – Verlag, 2003,pp. 45–56.


UDC 37.0 + 159

INDIGENISATION, INTERNATIONALISATION,AND TRANSKULTURALITA

..T:

APPROACHES TO TRANSMISSION AND TRANSFORMATIONIN EDUCATION

K. Horsthemke (Johannesburg, South Africa)

Abstract. There have been various approaches to the transfer andtransformation of educational systems, knowledge, concepts and practices inrecent decades, chief among which are drives towards indigenisation, on theone hand, and towards internationalisation, on the other. After briefly discussingand dispensing with radical versions of these, theories that reject any claim tovalidity or legitimacy by the rival approach, the present paper examines morenuanced accounts that deserve appropriately serious consideration. Thus, inthe former instance there is an emphasis on the local that nonethelessacknowledges a debt to the global, while conversely the emphasis on the global isseen as compatible with an acknowledgement of diversity, difference andparticularity. What is gained and what is lost in these various approaches toeducational transmission and transformation? After reflecting, in this regard,on lessons from Africa – in particular, on the debates around Africanisation

© Horsthemke K., 2013Horsthemke Kai, PhD, Associate Professor: Philosophy of Education, Wits School of

Education, University of the Witwatersrand.Õîðñòåìêå Êàé, äîêòîð ôèëîñîôèè, àäúþíêò-ïðîôåññîð.E-mail:[email protected]

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and globalisation – I cautiously endorse the idea of Transkulturalita..t (ascontrasted with ‘multiculturality’ and ‘interculturality’) as a pertinentphilosophical perspective on transmission of knowledge and practices, and onthe transformation of educational systems. The role of philosophy, in particular,consists in counteracting the hegemony of both traditional and homogenising(‘colonising’) authority.

Key words: Africanisation; indigenisation; interculturality;internationalisation; multiculturality; transculturality; transmission andtransformation of educational systems

ÈÍÄÈÃÅÍÈÇÀÖÈß, ÈÍÒÅÐÍÀÖÈÎÍÀËÈÇÀÖÈß È“ÒÐÀÍÑÊÓËÜÒÓÐÍÎÑÒÜ”: ÏÎÄÕÎÄÛ Ê ÏÅÐÅÄÀ×Å È

ÏÐÅÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÞ Â ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÈ

Êàé Õîðñòåìêå (Éîõàííåñáóðãá ÞÀÐ)

Ðåçþìå. Â ïîñëåäíèå äåñÿòèëåòèÿ áûëè èçâåñòíû ðàçëè÷íûå ïîäõî-äû ê ïåðåäà÷å è ïðåîáðàçîâàíèþ îáðàçîâàòåëüíûõ ñèñòåì, çíàíèé, êîí-öåïöèé è ìåòîäîâ, ãëàâíûìè ñðåäè êîòîðûõ áûëè ñòðåìëåíèå ê èíäèãå-íèçàöèè («îòóçåìëèâàíèþ»), ñ îäíîé ñòîðîíû, è ê èíòåðíàöèîíàëèçà-öèè, ñ äðóãîé. Ïîñëå êðàòêîãî îáñóæäåíèÿ è îòêëîíåíèÿ ðàäèêàëüíûõâåðñèé ýòèõ ïîäõîäîâ – òåîðèé, îòêëîíÿþùèõ ëþáîå òðåáîâàíèå ëåãè-òèìíîñòè ñî ñòîðîíû êîíêóðèðóþùåãî ïîäõîäà – äàííàÿ ðàáîòà èññëå-äóåò áîëåå òîíêèå âåðñèè, çàñëóæèâàþùèå ñåðüåçíîãî âíèìàíèÿ. Òàêèìîáðàçîì, â ïåðâîì ñëó÷àå èìååòñÿ àêöåíò íà ìåñòíóþ êóëüòóðó è, òåìíå ìåíåå, ïðèçíàåòñÿ äîëã ãëîáàëüíîé; â òî æå âðåìÿ êàê ñ äðóãîé ñòîðî-íû, àêöåíò íà ãëîáàëüíîå âèäèòñÿ ñîâìåñòèìûì ñ óòâåðæäåíèåì ðàç-íîîáðàçèÿ, ðàçëè÷èÿ è îñîáåííîñòè. ×òî ïðèîáðåòàåòñÿ è ÷òî òåðÿåò-ñÿ â ýòèõ ðàçëè÷íûõ ïîäõîäàõ ê ïåðåäà÷å îáðàçîâàíèÿ è åãî ïðåîáðàçîâà-íèþ? Ïîñëå ðàçìûøëåíèÿ â ýòîì ïëàíå îá óðîêàõ Àôðèêè – â ÷àñòíîñòè,î äåáàòàõ âîêðóã àôðèêàíèçàöèè è ãëîáàëèçàöèè – ÿ îñòîðîæíî ïîääåð-æèâàþ èäåþ òðàíñêóëüòóðíîñòè (Transkulturalita..t) (â ïðîòèâîïîëîæ-íîñòü «ìóëüòèêóëüòóðíîñòè» è «èíòåðêóëüòóðíîñòè») â êà÷åñòâå ïîä-õîäÿùåãî ôèëîñîôñêîãî âçãëÿäà íà ïåðåäà÷ó çíàíèÿ è ïðàêòèê è íà ïðå-îáðàçîâàíèå îáðàçîâàòåëüíûõ ñèñòåì. Ðîëü ôèëîñîôèè, â ÷àñòíîñòè,ñîñòîèò â ïðîòèâîäåéñòâèè ãåãåìîíèè êàê òðàäèöèîííîé, òàê è ãîìî-ãåíèçèðóþùåé (‘êîëîíèçèðóþùåé’) âëàñòè.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: àôðèêàíèçàöèÿ, èíäèãåíèçàöèÿ («îòóçåìëèâàíèå»),èíòåðêóëüòóðíîñòü, èíòåðíàöèîíàëèçàöèÿ, ìóëüòèêóëüòóðíîñòü,òðàíñêóëüòóðíîñòü, ïåðåäà÷à è ïðåîáðàçîâàíèå îáðàçîâàòåëüíûõ ñèñòåì

The institution of universities is based on the ideal of universality in itswidest sense, universality of the domain of enquiry, striving for truth,unaffected by extraneous aims, intentions or prejudices. Striving foruniversality of the spirit, unrestrained by national or other politicalmotivations. In short, what matters is the striving for universality of mindand spirit. It is no secret that we have been far more successful in

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developing the mind than in developing the personality. It seems thateven the quest for knowledge is threatened by lack of persons of a trulyuniversal spirit. If the universities remain true to their fundamental task,they may contribute significantly to the solution of the crises whichthreaten us today.(Albert Einstein, speaking about the fundamental role of the university,in a tape recording made in Princeton in 1951; Einstein, 2003, CD 2,track 7)

Introduction: Philosophy, transfer and transmission in education.Philosophy might be claimed, cautiously, to be one of the deliberative and criticalresources that ought to be brought to bear on the transfer and transformationof educational systems, knowledge, concepts and practices, if such processesare to be justifiable, consistent and effective. I say ‘cautiously’, because thecontribution that philosophy can offer is likely to be modest – for at least tworeasons. First, philosophy is only one of the ‘deliberative and critical resources’relevant to educational transfer and transformation. Second, deliberation andcriticism may be necessary but are not sufficient for the justifiability, consistencyand effectiveness of the processes in question: there are vast and significantcontingencies in context and practice that are likely to remain decisive.1

A promising approach to establishing the appropriate contribution ofphilosophy of education in this regard (and here I follow suggestions made byTerence McLaughlin, albeit in a different regard2) is arguably to focus on the‘embeddedness’ of philosophical considerations in (many) processes drivingtransfer and transformation. Many of these contain, to a greater or lesser extent,concepts, beliefs, values, assumptions and commitments that, although theythemselves may not be of a directly philosophical kind, can be subjected tophilosophical scrutiny and analysis.

Indigenisation and internationalisation. With rapid changes in recentdecades, in terms of technological advances, communication and travel,economic connectivity and dependencies, and – even more recently – in termsof increasing democratisation of societies, it comes as no surprise thatcorresponding changes have occurred and continue to occur in education.These changes concern not only how education, its nature and its aims, is (tobe) conceptualised, but also the very transfer and transmission of educationalsystems, knowledge, concepts and practices.

1 Interestingly, there are also recent examples of critical interrogation of efficiency, planningand control as ‘ends-in-themselves’ or inherently valuable. Where these have beenelevated to guiding principles of exclusive validity, argues Konrad Schily, Germanpolitician and founder and ex-director of the Private University of Witten-Herdecke, itshould come as no surprise that students bring efficiency, planning and control to bearon their intellectual and temporal resources – i.e. that they become increasinglyconformist (Schily, 2009, p. 46).

2 See McLaughlin, 2000, pp. 443–444. His focus is on the contribution philosophy canmake with respect to educational policy and its analysis.

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There have been a variety of responses to the transformational implicationsof globalisation, for education and in particular for higher education. Chiefamong these are drives towards indigenisation, on the one hand, and towardsinternationalisation, on the other. The radical versions of these theories rejectany claim to validity or legitimacy by the rival approach. Thus, radicalindigenisation involves a ‘back to the roots’-type of traditionalism and/ ornationalism that are more often than not inspired by the colonial experienceand/ or the need for political consolidation, respectively. Examples of thisresponse include radical endorsements of Africanisation3 and Afrocentrism4,which tend to reject any ‘outside’ (‘colonial’, ‘Western’, ‘Northern’, ‘European’,‘Eurocentric’, etc.) influence, and also segregationist forms of nationalism (suchas some trends manifest in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia etc.). Whatthey arguably share, apart from an intense belief about internal homogeneityand an equally strong rejection of heterogeneity, is an instrumental usage ofthe concept of indigeneity. Indigenisation is seen not only as an effectiveinstrument for political persuasion, mobilization and justification, but also as atool in transformation, educational, socio-economic and cultural. As such, itbecomes symbolic, and may actually produce a virulent form, of the‘ethnicisation’ of education, politics and the economy (see Andreasson, 2008,p. 7; for a thinly veiled endorsement of this kind of reverse racist, indeedethnocentric, orientation, see Makgoba and Mubangizi, eds., 2010, especiallythe chapter on ‘Leadership challenges’).5 By contrast, radical internationalisation

3 As I will show in what follows, the idea of ‘Africanisation’ of educational systems indicatesboth interesting congruencies as well as dissonances with the problem of transformationin European education. What is noteworthy is, on the one hand, the parallel with‘Europeanisation’ of the respective (higher) educational terrain – while, on the otherhand, ‘Africanisation’ contains a strong ideological proximity to ‘indigenisation’. Myinterest here resides with the possible contribution Africa can make to the ‘European’(and, even more to the point, the global) enterprise.

4 The idea of ‘Africanising’ universities is frequently couched within a conception andlanguage that are explicitly ‘Afrocentric’. Afrocentrism does not simply mean teachingstudents about Africa, its history, cultures, philosophy and values. It means ‘placingAfrica at the centre’, historically, culturally, philosophically and morally (Schiele, 1994,p. 152; Ani, 1994). It encompasses the view that Africa is the cradle of humankind andthe locus of the first great civilisations from which all others derive (Asante, 1980, p.45; Asante, 1987, p. 170; van Sertima, 1999; Seepe, 2000). It teaches that Africa is thebirthplace of technology, metallurgy, astronomy, mathematics, agricultural science andmedicine (Asante, 1980, p. 45; van Sertima, 1999; Seepe, 2000), and that African valueshave priority over European values. With regard to the latter, theorists like Molefi KeteAsante claim at times that African values are superior for Africans, just as Europeansdeem European values to be superior (Asante, 1980, p. 54; Asante, 1987, pp. 62, 180),and at other times that African values are plainly superior (Asante, 1980, pp. 9, 10;Asante, 1987, p. 170).

5 One of the characteristics of this approach, one of its ‘normative entanglements’, is thatthe rejection of Eurocentrism is linked to an express sympathy with the ethnocentrismof non-European cultures (Cesana, 2000, p. 452). As I have argued elsewhere, to respondto Eurocentrism by embracing Afrocentrism is relevantly like responding to school-ground bullying with corporal punishment, or to murder with capital punishment.Motivational reasons do not amount to justification, in any of these cases (seeHorsthemke, 2006, p. 456).

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envisages the spread of a more or less monolithic educational and socio-economic culture and tends to ride roughshod over local/ indigenous histories,values and cultural traditions (see Auf der Heyde, 2005, p. 41), on the basis ofthese societies’ and cultures’ lack of epistemic, moral and political education, ifnot backwardness and ignorance – in short, their proneness to superstition,blatant lack of democratic structure and institutions, and the like.6

I take it as fairly evident that neither of these positions holds much promise.While the former errs in favour of increasing insularity and (self)marginalisation, the latter errs in favour of dogmatic homogenisation and lackof regard for difference and diversity. More seriously still, apart frommanifesting an essentialist conception of culture and identity (I return to thispoint later), both perpetuate a cycle of disregard, disrespect and intolerance,with ever-increasing ossification of the opposing fronts.

So much for the caricatures. There are obviously more nuanced versionsthat deserve correspondingly serious consideration. Thus, in the instance ofindigenisation, there is an emphasis on the local that nonetheless acknowledgesthe significance, if not the inescapability, of the global.7 Conversely, in the

6 Bernhard Dernburg, the first German colonial minister, provided a frank definition of theenterprise of colonial expansion: ‘Colonisation is the harnessing of the soil, its naturalresources, flora, fauna and especially of the people, all for the sake of the economy ofthe colonising nation, which in turn is obliged to make a return gift of its higher culture,its moral concepts and its superior methods’ (quoted in Grill, 2003, p. 79). One couldalso express this more bluntly: subjugation, exploitation, re-education. – An interestingvariation on this theme is found in Cameroonian exile Axelle Kabou who – in her book‘Et si l’Afrique refusait le de‰veloppement?’ – blames not only autocratic rulers and thepower-hungry and corrupt elites for Africa’s ongoing misery but also – and especially –ordinary Africans, because of their refusal and rejection of development, progress andmodernisation (Kabou, 1991).

7 Thus, Kgabo Masehela, a research manager at the (South African) Human Sciences ResearchCouncil, writes in an article in the Johannesburg newspaper This Day,

We [Africans] have to construct our own epistemological framework from which towe can explore ideas and build our own knowledge. … Africans must create our ownparadigm from which we can also dialogue meaningfully with Europeans. (Masehela,2004, p. 11)

Malegapuru Makgoba, vice-chancellor of the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa,maintains, ‘It is the duty of academics and scholars to internationalise, articulate, shape,develop and project the image, the values, the culture, the history and vision of the Africanpeople and their innovations through the eyes of Africans’:

African people should develop, write, communicate and interpret their theories,philosophies, in their own ways rather [than allow these to be] construed from foreignculture and visions. (Makgoba, 1997, p. 205)

Moreover,global economic competition is high and unless we develop a competitive hightechnology economy we face economic ruin, stagnation and under-development, withdire consequences for the impoverished rural and urban communities. (Makgoba,1997, p. 179)

While the latter insight is surely correct, Makgoba does not elaborate on the assumptionthat ‘Africanisation’ is compatible with ‘internationalisation’, with developing ‘a

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instance of internationalisation, the emphasis on the global is seen as compatiblewith (as perhaps even requiring) an acknowledgement of diversity, differenceand locality/ indigenousness.8 The latter position broadly characterises themotivation that gave birth to the Bologna Declaration – just insofar as the thispledge can be characterised as a commitment to globally shared values etc,9 –as well as post-Bologna initiatives by the Council of the European Union. Morerecently, the 3013th Education, Youth and Culture Council meeting in Brussels,which employed ‘the term “internationalisation” … to refer to the developmentof international cooperation activities between EU higher education institutionsand those in third countries’ (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 1 n.1),articulated a commitment ‘to returning knowledge to society at … the local,national and global level, thereby helping to meet society’s needs and importantsocial challenges’ (p. 5).

Transformation as convergence: The Bologna Declaration andEuropeanisation. Perhaps I should commence with a discussion of pertinentaspects of the Protocol and its implications, as well as some of the criticismsthat have been leveled against it during the past decade. Among the centralconcerns of the Bologna Declaration are the transformation of educationalsystems and the transfer of educational knowledge, as well as the possibility ofactive and meaningful engagement across historical, social, cultural andlinguistic borders.

The Bologna Declaration was a pledge by each of the 29 signatory countries,… a commitment freely taken [ …] to reform its own higher educationsystem or systems in order to create overall convergence at Europeanlevel. …The Bologna process … is not a path towards “standardisation” or“uniformisation” of European higher education. The fundamentalprinciples of autonomy and diversity are respected.The Declaration reflects a search for a common European answerto common European problems. The process originates from therecognition that in spite of their valuable differences, European highereducation systems are facing common internal and external challenges

competitive high technology economy’. Further argument, too, is required to establishhow an ‘Afrocentric orientation’ is supposed to cater for the demand, ‘as we enter theera of globalisation, … to rethink ourselves anew, and bring in new ideas if we are to bea significant part of the information age and an era of knowledge industries’ (Ntuli,2000, p. 66) or with the ‘need to develop people and prepare young South Africans forthe future and the tough world of global competition’ (Makgoba, 2003, p. 2).

8 According to Nonnie Botha, director of the School for Education Research andEngagement, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa:

It is clear that internationalization takes strong cognizance of the local culture, that, withoutthe local, there would be nothing to offer the other and a strong local culture wouldenhance the value of internationalization. The own and the other culture are, therefore,cornerstones of both internationalization and Africanization … (Botha, 2010, pp. 208-9)

9 ‘The way of life of an economist, a scientists or a journalist is no longer simply German orFrench but, on the contrary, European or global’ (Welsch, 2000, p. 337; emphasis added).

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related to the growth and diversification of higher education, theemployability of graduates, the shortage of skills in key areas, theexpansion of private and transnational education, etc. (The BolognaDeclaration, 1999, p. 3; emphasis in original)

The stated goal was to establish, by 2010, ‘a European space for highereducation in order to enhance the employability and mobility of citizens and toincrease the international competitiveness of European higher education’(p. 4). The set of specified objectives included the following:

– the adoption of a common framework of readable and comparabledegrees …;

– the introduction of undergraduate and postgraduate levels in allcountries …;

– a European dimension in quality assurance, with comparablecriteria and methods;

– the elimination of remaining obstacles to the free mobility ofstudents (as well as trainees and graduates) and teachers (as well asresearchers and higher education administrators). (p. 4; emphasis inoriginal)

In addition, the Declaration ‘specifically recognises the fundamental valuesand the diversity of European higher education:

– it clearly acknowledges the necessary independence and autonomy ofuniversities; …

– it stresses the need to achieve a common space for higher educationwithin the framework of the diversity of cultures, languages andeducational systems. (p. 6; emphasis in original)

According to the joint declaration of the European ministers of education inJune 1999,

A Europe of knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factorfor social and human growth and as an indispensable component toconsolidate and enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving itscitizens the necessary competencies to face the challenges of the newmillennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belongingto a common social and cultural space. (p. 7)

Preceding the Bologna Declaration, the Sorbonne Declaration of 25 May1998 stressed

the universities’ central role in developing European cultural dimensions.It emphasised the creation of the European area of higher education as akey way to promote citizens’ mobility and employability and the Continent’soverall development. (p. 7)

The main criticisms of the process, ten years after it was initiated, point tothe ‘educational injustice’ and the Verschulung10 it has come to embody. In

10 Verschulung has somewhat pejorative connotations: it means ‘schoolification’ (say, of agiven system, educational or other), and in particular the rigidity, rule-governedness,and bureaucratic and administrative workload associated with strongly regulatedinstitutions and processes.

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Germany in particular, the introduction of the Bachelor and Master degreeshas been widely criticised on the grounds of being too verschult – packed withexams and content material that require rote learning and cramming, thusallowing little reflection on what has been learnt. As Jan Martin Wiarda andMartin Spiewak have pointed out in an article in Die Zeit, this discussion hasnot been without contradictions. After all, the Humboldtian ideal of Bildungthat used to underpin German academic life was exclusivist, elitist and preventeda vast majority from studying and further education. It was indeed the old system(with the Diplom, Magister and Staatsexamen) that favoured children of civilservants over those of workers at a ratio of 4:1, in terms of affording them theopportunity to study. This system was also characterised by high dropout ratesand excessively long duration of studies (Wiarda & Spiewak, 2009, p. 31; Meyer,2009, p. 711). The new system has led to a drastic reduction of both duration ofstudy and dropout rate (at least in the human and social sciences), and to a risein the number of first-semester students. In addition, the exams at the end ofeach semester have replaced the draconian, all-encompassing final exam.

This, however, has meant not only an increase in bureaucracy andadministrative work (see Schily, 2009, p. 46) but also more contact time lecturersand professors are required to devote to greater numbers of students. Manyuniversities in Germany have somehow missed the boat, and frequently theold content is squeezed into new courses and curricula (Wiarda & Spiewak,2009, p. 31). The net result is that both students and lecturers complain aboutperformance and achievement stress (this has been one of the main issues ofcontention during the Bildungsstreik a few years ago) – even though studieshave indicated that the actual workloads have not increased (Wiarda & Spiewak,2009). What has happened, however, is that the more rigid structures haverobbed many of a sense of autonomy or self-determination, and consequentlyof a sense of joy or excitement about studying.

The response has been to make the customary three-year Bachelor a four-year degree and to facilitate semester-long studies abroad. A further trend hasbeen towards establishing an equivalence between excellence in teaching andexcellence in research, the idea being to reward those who increasingly spend

11 In an article otherwise highly critical of the changes the German tertiary educationalsystem has undergone in the wake of the Bologna Declaration, Hans Joachim Meyer,former minister of science and art in the German federal state of Saxony, also pointsout that under the old system there were many students who considered an unlimiteduniversity sojourn, without corresponding demands on their performance orachievement, a basic human right (Meyer, 2009, p. 7). In essence, however, Meyerlaments the death of the Humboldtian university. He detects in the introduction ofEnglish terminology in reports, proposals, symbols and degrees a systematicdisplacement of the German language from Germany’s academic and scientific life.This poses, he argues, the acute dangers of both intellectual self-expropriation andseparation of science and society. Meyer blames ‘the left’ for promoting the distancingfrom all things German, because of a ‘national self-distrust and multicultural tendencies’,a ‘near-hysterical fear of a new Wilhelminism’ (p. 7). He equally blames ‘the right’ for itslong-time uncritical infatuation with America.

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time teaching, supervising and otherwise helping students, rather thanexclusively or primarily those who excel in research (p. 32).

In another article in Die Zeit, Evelyn Finger (Finger, 2009) laments thegradual disappearance of ‘knowledge for its own sake’ and of the ‘fostering ornurturing of genius’, in favour of competitiveness, mobility and economicmarketability – in short, quicker turnaround, turnover and efficiency (Finger,2009; see also Schily, 2009, p. 46). Social and scientific progress, she says, donot occur on the basis of rules and regulations – historically, their protagonistshave been outsiders. This is a further reason why we need to encourage thereintroduction of a broad education, a spirit that is free from prejudice, a solidfoundation for critical inquiry and interrogation. ‘We need intellectual opennessand education for thinking much more than we need Verschulung’, accordingto Finger (Finger, 2009):

A basic ideal of our culture is under threat from the increasinghomogenisation of the university: namely the esteem for learnedness,the high regard for knowledge in and for itself – irrespective of whether it“pays” in the foreseeable future. (Finger, 2009)

Transformation as resistance: Africanisation and Afrocentrism. IfFinger is right about the disregard in the new system for the inherent value ofknowledge (as contrasted with its purely instrumental value), then this is atrait that the drive towards a ‘Europe of knowledge’ shares with advocacy ofAfricanisation. This pertains not only to political leaders opening tertiaryinstitutions in recently liberated African countries in the 1950s and 1960s, butalso and especially of contemporary theorists and academics emphasizing theneed for higher education to develop an African identity (see, for example,Touré, 1963; Nyerere, 1964; Yesufu, 1973; Makgoba, 1998; Dowling & Seepe,2003; Mthembu, 2004; Adams, 2005; Nabudere, 2006; and Soudien, 2009).12

12 According to Makgoba,The issue of pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and the so-called standards have… become contentious factors around the African university. … The pursuit ofknowledge for its own sake has been one of the cornerstones of university education;but, is there such a thing as knowledge for its own sake today? Knowledge is a humanconstruction that by definition has a human purpose. Knowledge cannot be sterile orneutral in its conception, formulation and development. Humans are not generallyrenowned for their neutrality or sterility. The generation and development ofknowledge is thus contextual in nature. (Makgoba, 1997, p. 177)

That knowledge ascription and justification have a crucial contextual component is surelynot in doubt (see Horsthemke, 2004), but this does not mean that (the pursuit of)knowledge must be described and explained in consequentialist or constructivist terms.It might be the object of knowledge that is and continues to be the legitimate cornerstoneof higher education. ‘The global competition, the involvement of industry in universities,the social, economic and political pressures of modern society, have made the [pursuitof knowledge for its own sake] obsolete’, says Makgoba. ‘The pursuit of knowledge andthe truth with a purpose and social responsibility is what universities are about’(Makgoba, 1997, pp. 181, 182). Surely setting up a commission like the Truth andReconciliation Commission also involved a non-instrumental understanding of knowledgeand truth (see Horsthemke, 2004). If they had an exclusively instrumental function,

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There are further, remarkable parallels between the Bologna Declaration and thecall for the Africanisation of higher education: emphasis on the ‘Africanisation’ ofknowledge and on finding ‘African answers to African problems’, the endeavour tomake ‘the African university’ internationally attractive and competitive, to establishinternational respect for Africa’s rich and extraordinary cultural and scientifictraditions, etc. The major difference is that ‘Africanisation’ and ‘Afrocentrism’emanate less from the political/ economic precedent of the ‘African Union’,and the common objectives of convergence and transnational mobility, thanfrom a (shared) rejection of ‘the European education system’ and‘Eurocentrism’. While the Bologna Declaration may be interpreted as a call tounity by harnessing Europe’s many strengths, the emphasis in Africanisation(and Afrocentrism) is more on unity as a means of resistance.

Closely associated with educational and institutional transformation,‘Africanisation’ embodies traits of both internationalisation and indigenisation.The former link may be more controversial – for is Africanisation not meant tocounteract the dictates of internationalism in education, knowledge and theeconomy? However, ‘Africanisation of education’ has a clearly internationalelement (‘between nations/ nation states’), just like ‘Europeanisation ofeducation’ has. Moreover, the idea of ‘Africanisation of knowledge’ bears morethan a fleeting resemblance to the Bologna Declaration’s internationalistreference to a ‘Europe of knowledge’. ‘Africanisation’ binds together a plethoraof not only sub-Saharan nations and states. Libyan head of state MuammarGaddafi’s vision of a ‘United States of Africa’, with himself as Emperor of Africa,may be a delusional, autocratic fantasy – but at least the first part of it is sharedby many. Coupled with this desire for pan-African unity are the frequent appealto communalism as a ‘typically African value’ and reference to the ‘essence’,‘identity and culture of Africa’ (note the singular).

On the other hand, there is a strong emphasis in ‘Africanisation’ and‘Afrocentrism’ on indigenous, local – as contrasted with, say, ‘global’,‘international’, ‘European’/ ‘Eurocentric’ – educational knowledge, practicesand values. For example, there is a frequent endorsement of Africanmathematics as ‘ethnomathematics’, of African knowledge systems as‘indigenous knowledge systems’ – as opposed to academic or ‘mainstream’mathematics and ‘world knowledge’, respectively. The African is the indigene:colonised, exploited, marginalised and historically excluded from theinternational mainstream.

then substituting them would be entirely permissible – say, with an ‘amnesia drug’ –, aslong as the desired end/ effect/ outcome was the same. With regard to the traditionalroles that universities throughout the world have in society, Makgoba mentions

the preservation, the imparting and the generation of knowledge. … It is important torecognise … that the imparting of inappropriate or irrelevant education, even of thehighest calibre, would … lead to a poor and ineffective product. Thus universityeducation has to be relevant not only to the people, but also to the culture andenvironment in which it is being imparted. (Makgoba, 1997, p. 179)

Without doubt: the trick, of course, is to avoid an education (system) that is impoverishedas a result of excessive concerns with ‘people’s culture’ and ‘user-friendliness’.

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Heading the Ministerial Committee, Crain Soudien wrote in the Committee’s‘Report ... on transformation and social cohesion and the elimination ofdiscrimination in South Africa’s public higher education institutions’ that ‘at thecentre of epistemological transformation is curriculum reform – a reorientationaway for the apartheid knowledge system, in which curriculum was used as a toolof exclusion, to a democratic curriculum that is inclusive of all human thought’(Soudien, 2009, p. 89), something he later refers to as ‘the Africanisation of thecurriculum’ (p. 91). Resistance to Africanisation, he contends, ‘is often advancedunder the guise of a spurious argument suggesting that the debate is not aboutprivileging western scholarship, but rather emphasizing the universality ofknowledge’ (p. 91; for a critical examination of the Africanisation of thecurriculum and of knowledge, see Horsthemke, 2004). It is ‘the local context’that ‘must become the point of departure for knowledge-building in universities’across Africa and, indeed, ‘the world’ (Soudien, 2009, p. 92).

Problems with internationalisation and indigenisation. The notion ofinternationalisation involves the assumption that the worldwide trend of culturesand societies is towards increasing synchronisation of local environments –presumably following the Western model. This is clearly not a wholly accurateassumption, as evidenced by the complementary development or resurgenceof indigenisation, and particular phenomena like Africanisation. Despite its lipservice to ‘diversity’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘particularities’, and howeverbenevolent its motivation and intentions, internationalisation is by its very natureultimately unable to accommodate these differences and counter-currents,especially if and where these are at odds with its central tenets (for example,where they are manifestations of religious fundamentalism, involve non-democratic practices, etc.). A less favourable view considers this rival trend tobe a bothersome, regressive phenomenon that, however, is facing imminentextinction.

Indigenisation, on the other hand, involves what German cultural theoristWolfgang Welsch has referred to as the ‘return of tribes’ (Welsch, 2000,p. 349) and may be interpreted as a reaction against globalisation. Given thehistorical, political and socio-economic background (more often than notcolonial or other expansionist exploitation and oppression) that motivates andexplains indigenisation, the eagerness of people to return to what they perceiveto be the sources of their cultural identity, their ‘roots’, is perfectlyunderstandable. While this desire to (re)turn to and (re)embrace local valuesand indigenous traditions (educational and other) is not implausible13, the move

13 Indigenisation has provided, argues Stefan Andreasson,a way for governments to anchor their policies in a culturally acceptable context whichlends legitimacy to its policies and rule. It does so by providing African citizens witha sense of ‘ownership’ and participation in policy-making, which may in turn enhancesocial stability in an otherwise volatile context of a post-colonial struggle to improveliving conditions, while at the same time addressing the concerns of both (global)economic interests and (local) populist pressures. (Andreasson, 2008, p. 7)

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towards indigenisation has produced some collateral damage. Compoundedby problems emanating from unhelpful immigration legislation and bouts ofxenophobia (or more accurately, violent actions against foreigners), there hasbeen no transfer, exchange and mobility on the African continent comparableto that within, or produced by, European higher education. Instead, the netresult has been a marginalisation not only of the continent as a whole, but alsoin terms of increasing isolation of sub-Sahara African countries from each other.Indeed, ‘these policies of indigenisation may exacerbate existing societaldivisions and lead to new forms of intolerance and discrimination’ (Andreasson,2009, p. 714; see also Chetty, 2010, on reverse ‘racist rhetoric’ and ‘growingZulu nationalism’).

An additional problem with both internationalisation and indigenisation isthat these approaches commit what might be called the fallacy of the collectivesingular. This is an essentialist fallacy that pervades reference to, say, ‘Germanculture’, ‘European identity’, ‘the African university’, ‘the essence of Africa’,and the like. The Bologna Declaration also seems to contain what Welsch hasdefined as ‘the traditional concept of culture’, where cultures are seen asseparate and distinct ‘islands’ or closed ‘spheres’ (Welsch, 2000, p. 330):

The vitality and efficiency of any civilisation can be measured by the appealthat its culture has for other countries. We need to ensure that the Europeanhigher education system acquires a world-wide degree of attraction equalto our extraordinary cultural and scientific traditions. (The BolognaDeclaration, 1999, p. 7; emphasis added; for a similar conception, see Botha,2010, n. 8 above)

In fact, neither internationalisation nor indigenisation appears to be able todo full justice to the ways in which culture and identity are transferred,developed and transformed. It also remains unclear how these approaches couldsatisfactorily account for the worldwide attractiveness of ‘the European’ or ‘theAfrican’ higher education system, respectively.

Multiculturality and interculturality. In Welsch’s analysis, the traditionalnotion of culture is characterised by three pillars: social homogenisation, anethnic foundation and cultural delimitation (Welsch, 2000, p. 329). The problem,in a nutshell, is that the depiction of cultures as separate, distinct islands orself-contained spheres is both unrealistic and normatively dangerous. It isunrealistic, because it is descriptively and empirically weak, if not altogethermistaken. Throughout human history, there has been extensivetranssemination among cultures and civilisations. Even during the times of18th century German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (to whom Welschattributes this notion15), there would have been few, if any, cultures completely

14 Andreasson mentions Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe as an example in this regard, whereindigenisation ‘has been more directly focussed on redistribution of ownership andcontrol of public institutions, coupled with an overtly intolerant rhetoric directed bygovernment against those minority groups to whom the concept of indigeneity is deemednot to apply’ (Andreasson, 2008, p. 8).

15 Among those who have endorsed this conception are William Graham Sumner (1907)and Ruth Benedict (1934).

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untouched, uninfluenced or not otherwise inspired by coexisting cultures. Theidea of single cultures is also normatively dangerous because of its proximityto what might be called ‘culturism’ (cultural racism, elitism or exclusivism).

Given recognition of the significance of these problems, both empirical andnormative, there have been two trends (not least in educational theory) in thelatter half of the 20th century to account for the ever-increasing transseminationand, importantly, to promote recognition, tolerance and respect among humanbeings. Both multiculturality and interculturality seek to transcend the narrowconfines of the traditional concept and to foster mutual understanding amongcultures. For the purposes of my inquiry, does either of these ideas provide aresolution to the impasse in the internationalisation-indigenisation debate?

Welsch argues, correctly I believe, that both concepts are problematic inthat their very structure (one might say, more accurately, their grammar) stillpresupposes the very notion of single cultures they purportedly repudiate. Theidea of multiculturality emphasises the coexistence of different cultures withinone and the same society. While this constitutes an improvement on the demandfor social homogenisation, multiculturality is unable to address the resultantproblems of this cultural plurality. It is not able to do so because of its conceptionof this multitude of cultures as individually homogenous. In fact, all it impliesis the mere fact of coexistence – it says, or can say, very little abouttranssemination, whether descriptively or prescriptively. It comes as nosurprise, says Welsch, that circumstances in the United States should haveentailed some kind of justification of and increasing appeals to interculturaldelimitation by theorists of multiculturality (Welsch cites Amy Gutmann andWill Kymlicka, amongst others; Welsch, 2000, pp. 333 n.20).

The idea of interculturality16 does not appear to fare much better, for verysimilar reasons. It does go beyond emphasising mere coexistence of differentcultures, by concerning itself with the issue of difficulty in cooperation andcollaboration (see Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 2) – but it, too,conceptually presupposes the traditional conception of single, distinct cultures.Therefore, the problems it hopes to address must remain elusive – since theyarise because of the very presupposition that cultures are separate islands orself-contained spheres. The diagnosis of intercultural conflict is followed byadvocacy of intercultural dialogue – yet, the basic problem remains,encapsulated in the thesis of essential separateness or distinctness of theconflicting and dialoguing cultures (see Welsch, 2000, pp. 334–335). Thus,any of the envisaged ‘changes’ would ultimately be little more than cosmetic.

But is this thesis, which constitutes not only the traditional conception ofculture but also underlies the ideas of multiculturality and interculturality,

16 See, for example, the discussions in Adhar Mall, 2000, pp. 307, 310; Cesana, 2000, pp.437/8, 455; Hansen, 2000, pp. 290, 294, 298; Waldenfels, 2000, pp. 246/7, 250, 253, 255/6; and Wimmer, 2000. Ram Adhar Mall, in particular, defends ‘intercultural philosophy’against Welsch’s objections – which, it ought to be emphasised, do not concernintercultural philosophy but rather the idea of interculturality.

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correct? If it is, then the problems of the coexistence and cooperation/collaboration of different cultures would remain with us – and would arguablyremain unsolvable.

Transkulturalita..t. In this section I wish to endorse the notion ofTranskulturalita

..t, ‘transculturality’, as a realistic and defensible response to

the impasse created in the indigenisation vs. internationalisation debate abouteducational transfer and transformation. Although he has perhaps not authoredit (Welsch, 2000, p. 336 n. 27; see also Hansen, 2000, pp. 296, 297), Welsch hascertainly popularised this concept. The central thesis is that the conceptionespoused in the traditional view of culture, and more or less unintentionallyadopted or presupposed by the views that have succeeded it, is simply false. Inother words, the depiction of cultures as islands or spheres is factually incorrectand normatively deceptive. Our cultures, Welsch suggests (Welsch, 2000, p.335), no longer have the purported form of homogeneity and separateness butare, instead, characterised by mixtures and permeations. Welsch describesthis new structure of cultures as ‘transcultural’ – insofar as the determinants ofculture now traverse (i.e. go through) cultures, and cross their traditionalboundaries, and insofar as the new form transcends (i.e. goes beyond) thetraditional conception.

The understanding of transculturality so explained applies both on a macrolevel, pertaining to the changed (and changing) configuration of present-daycultures, and on a micro level, referring to the cultural make-up and shape ofindividuals. The mixtures and permeations that characterise our cultures arethe result of technological advances, communication and travel, economicconnectivity and dependencies, and – even more recently, and importantly – ofthe increasing democratisation of societies. Examples of these permeationsinclude moral and social issues and states of awareness that characterise many,if not all, allegedly different cultures: the debates about human and nonhumanrights, feminist thinking, and ecological consciousness, to mention only a few.Examples from commercial interaction (transactions), sport and popular cultureabound. As Welsch puts it, contemporary cultures are generally marked by‘hybridisation’ (p. 337). Nonetheless, I do not quite agree with him when heclaims that the grounds for selectivity between own culture and foreign (orother) culture have all but disappeared, and (in a reinvention of Rimbaud’s ‘Jeest un autre’) that

there is little, if anything, that is strictly ‘foreign’ or ‘other’; everything iswithin reach. By the same token, there is little, if anything, that can becalled ‘own’: Authenticity has become folklore. It is ownness simulated forothers, to whom the indigene himself has long come to belong. (p. 337)

The Truth and Reconciliation process, underpinned as it was by acommitment to restorative justice, was historically and recognisably SouthAfrican – even though it has been successfully applied, and has transformedjudicial thinking and practice, globally. Similarly, knowledge of the thirst- andappetite-suppressing qualities of the !khoba cactus (or Hoodia gordinii)originated with the San community, although the product has since beencommercialised and is now available at pharmacies all over the world. I do not

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mean to suggest here that this points to the manifestation and plausibility ofideas like ‘local justice’ or ‘indigenous knowledge’ – not at all, in fact! – butrather that Welsch’s assertion, ‘The regional-specific is increasingly nothingbut décor, surface, aesthetic production’ (p. 337 n.28), is neither compellingnor necessary to make the case for transculturality on a macro (i.e. societal)level.

Transculturality also operates on a micro (i.e. individual) level. The vastmajority of human beings are constituted in their cultural formations by amultitude of cultural origins, affiliations and connections. ‘We are culturalhybrids’, as Welsch puts it (p. 339). We may have a particular national identity,but we have a multitude of cultural identities. For example, I am a Germanliving and working in South Africa, a heterosexual vegetarian atheist, formerprofessional rock and jazz musician, with a love of Italian, Mexican and Indianfood, Native American, Celtic and Japanese music, Czech and Finnish cinema,a preference for Anglo-American analytical philosophy, and married to a QiGonginstructor who prepares our minestrone according to the Five Elements, andwith whom I have two sons with traditional Sotho and Zulu names. The listcould be continued with numerous other examples, and I suspect somethingvery similar may be true for an overwhelmingly large number of people.

So, does transculturality yield a pertinent philosophical perspective ontransmission of knowledge and practices, and on the transformation ofeducational systems? I would suggest, cautiously, that it does. But this verdictmay require some additional conceptual clarification. Welsch asserts thattransculturality is itself a temporary diagnosis, which refers to a transition, orrather a phase within a transition (p. 341 n.37). It takes as its starting point thetraditional idea of single cultures and maintains that this idea – whatever theappeal it may still hold for many – no longer applies, at least not to the vastmajority of contemporary cultures. The concept of transculturality seeks tocapture an understanding of a contemporary and future constitution of culturesthat is no longer monocultural but transcultural (ibid). This does not meanthat the concept of culture has become empty: according to Welsch, it makesgood sense to speak of a coexistence of ‘reference cultures’ (Bezugskulturen)and of new, transcultural nets (or webs) that emanate from these.

An objection that might be raised at this point may take the form of the‘argument from entropy’ – that the ever-increasing transsemination will itselflogically lead to a kind of homogenisation, that the erstwhile ‘individual’(trans)cultural systems will become indistinguishable from one another, andthat transculturality will level out in a kind of bland pan-cultural sameness, aglobal closed system. The argument is that not only will the idea of ‘cultures’have been rendered redundant but the very notion of transculturality will alsohave ceased to apply. It would appear that Welsch himself has brought on thisobjection, by claiming that ‘the diagnosis of transculturality is itself a temporarydiagnosis’. However, further elucidation shows that the new ‘reference cultures’will themselves have transcultural configurations that are the reference pointfor the weaving of new transcultural webs. In addition, the different individual,

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social, geographical-environmental, historical-political contexts will more thanensure that an entropic end state is highly unlikely to be bought about. Thisbrings me to my last point: conceptual clarification and the role of philosophy.

Philosophy of education and the role of the university. Frenchphilosophers Gilles Deleuze and Fe‰lix Guattari claim, ‘La philosophie […] estla discipline qui consiste à créer des concepts’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991,p. 10). Far more, one might argue: apart from its task being the creation ofconcepts (if it is that!), philosophy – including philosophy of education – helpsin determining the appropriateness or applicability of concepts, theirinterconnectedness, role in argumentation, etc. One of the most importantfunctions of philosophy is arguably that of tireless critical interrogation – notonly of concepts, but also of premises, beliefs, values, assumptions andcommitments – and, by inquiring into their meaning and justification, not tomention their truth, to attempt to resolve some of the most fundamentalontological, epistemological and ethical questions. (See McLaughlin, 2000,pp. 444, 448; Wimmer, 2000, pp. 413, 414.)

As Thomas Auf der Heyde (former dean of research, University ofJohannesburg) has pointed out, universities clearly stand to benefit fromglobalisation (Auf der Heyde, 2005, pp. 41, 43, 44, 48) – so, from an economicpoint of view, the question whether they are justified in embracing globalisation(e.g., of the knowledge economy) receives a quick and simple answer. Themore interesting and difficult question is in what way, if any, their role as socialobserver and commentator, and their responsibility to critically reflect on thephenomenon of globalisation (Auf der Heyde, 2005), can be made tocomplement the interest of the state, the universities’ key stakeholders, etc. IfAuf der Heyde is correct in saying that ‘universities … should also be criticallyappraising the issues raised by [globalisation]’ (p. 41), then this is wherephilosophy of education arguably has its natural home.17 The role of philosophyconsists in part in counteracting the hegemony and despotism of bothhomogenising (‘colonising’) and traditional (‘indigenising’) authority.

The Einstein quotation at the beginning of the paper might, I believe, beread as a precursor of the idea of transculturality. ‘Striving for universality ofmind and spirit’, which according to Einstein constitutes ‘the fundamental roleof the university’, should not be understood as ‘striving for homogeneity’ oruniformity (contra Cesana18) but, rather, for transversality. Striving fortransversality should be, in Einstein’s words,

17 In this regard, we may also recall Finger’s plea for ‘intellectual openness and educationfor thinking’ and what she referred to as the requisite philosophical arsenal: ‘a broadeducation, an unbiased spirit, a well-founded ability to critique’ (Finger, 2009).

18 After explaining the concept of cultural pluralism, as referring to a plurality of forms ofknowledge and experience (he distinguishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis here,between practical/ professional and lived experience), the differences between whichare determined by the specific historical-cultural situation, Cesana claims that thestandpoint of universalism is essentially anti-pluralist (Cesana, 2000, p. 458). I wouldargue that this is not at all obvious. One might deem implausible the idea of indigenous

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unrestrained by national or other political motivations ... If the universitiesremain true to their fundamental task, they may contribute significantly tothe solution of the crises which threaten us today. (Einstein, 2003; emphasisadded)

‘Transversality of mind and spirit’, I suggest, refers to an awareness that‘we are all in it together’. The crises and challenges, both economic andenvironmental, we face today may be different from those Einstein was referringto in 1951, but the gist of his Princeton address about the fundamental task ofthe university is still pertinent.

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UDC 37.013.73

INTERRELATION OF THE TRADITIONS AND MODERNITYIN THE ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE-CREATIVITY SCHOOLS

I. A. Zhernosenko (Barnaul), D. I. Mamyev (Altai Republic, Onguday village),E. V. Ushakova (Barnaul)

Summary. The problem of interrelation of the traditions and modernity inpreservation of national cultures in the conditions of globalization of the XXIcentury is investigated. It is substantiated that preservation and development ofthe wealth of cultural diversity of the social sphere is only possible by means ofspecial social programs. The culture-creativity schools can serve as the mainmechanism of continuous transfer of culture to new generations – children andthe youth. The methodological principles of activity of such school aresubstantiated and some practical experience of the organization of culture-creativity schools in the Altai region are presented in the article.

I. A. Zhernosenko, D. I. Mamyev, E. V. Ushakova


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Key words: traditions and modernity, translation of culture, culture-creativity school, education methodology in the culture-creativity school.

ÂÇÀÈÌÎÑÂßÇÜ ÒÐÀÄÈÖÈÉ È ÑÎÂÐÅÌÅÍÍÎÑÒÈÂ ÎÐÃÀÍÈÇÀÖÈÈ ÊÓËÜÒÓÐÎÒÂÎÐ×ÅÑÊÈÕ ØÊÎË

È. À. Æåðíîñåíêî (Áàðíàóë),Ä. È. Ìàìûåâ (Ðåñïóáëèêà Àëòàé, ñ. Îíãóäàé), Å. Â. Óøàêîâà (Áàðíàóë)

Àííîòàöèÿ. Èññëåäóåòñÿ ïðîáëåìà âçàèìîñâÿçè òðàäèöèé è ñîâðå-ìåííîñòè â äåëå ñîõðàíåíèÿ íàöèîíàëüíûõ êóëüòóð â óñëîâèÿõ ãëîáàëèçà-öèè XXI âåêà. Îáîñíîâûâàåòñÿ, ÷òî ñîõðàíåíèå è ðàçâèòèå áîãàòñòâàêóëüòóðíîãî ðàçíîîáðàçèÿ ñîöèîñôåðû âîçìîæíî ëèøü ñ ïîìîùüþ ñïåöè-àëüíûõ ñîöèàëüíûõ ïðîãðàìì. Ãëàâíûì ìåõàíèçìîì ïîñòîÿííîé ïåðåäà-÷è êóëüòóðû íîâûì ïîêîëåíèÿì – äåòåé è ìîëîäåæè – ìîæåò ñëóæèòüêóëüòóðîòâîð÷åñêàÿ øêîëà. Îáîñíîâàíû ìåòîäîëîãè-÷åñêèå ïðèíöèïûäåÿòåëüíîñòè òàêîé øêîëû è ïðåäñòàâëåí ïðàêòè-÷åñêèé îïûò îðãà-íèçàöèè êóëüòóðîòâîð÷åñêèõ øêîë íà Àëòàå.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: òðàäèöèè è ñîâðåìåííîñòü, òðàíñëÿöèÿ êóëüòó-ðû, êóëüòóðîòâîð÷åñêàÿ øêîëà, ìåòîäîëîãèÿ îáðàçîâàíèÿ â êóëüòóðîò-âîð÷åñêîé øêîëå.

The culture is the main creation of the human being and the mankind as awhole, penetrating the entire fabric of social life beginning from the most ancienttimes and up to the present. It is an artificial World, created on the basis of thenatural World; it has absorbed the beauty and harmony of being in varioustypes of human creativity. The main mechanism of translation of culturethroughout the entire history has consisted in its transfer from generation togeneration, through incessant links of Teachers and pupils. In modern

© Zhernosenko I. A., Mamyev D. I., Ushakova E. V., 2013Zhernosenko Irina Aleksandrovna, Candidate of cultural science, Docent, Chair of the

Department of culture and communicative technologies of the Polzunov Altay statetechnical university.

Æåðíîñåíêî Èðèíà Àëåêñàíäðîâíà, êàíäèäàò êóëüòóðîëîãèè, äîöåíò, çàâåäóþ-ùàÿ êàôåäðîé êóëüòóðû è êîììóíèêàòèâíûõ òåõíîëîãèé Àëòàéñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåí-íîãî òåõíè÷åñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà èì. È. È. Ïîëçóíîâà.

Å-mail: [email protected] Danil Ivanovich, Director of the «UchEnmek» ethno-natural park, Altai Republic,

Onguday village.Ìàìûåâ Äàíèë Èâàíîâè÷, äèðåêòîð ýòíî-ïðèðîäíîãî ïàðêà «Ó÷ Ýíìåê», Ðåñïóá-

ëèêà Àëòàé, ñ. Îíãóäàé.Å-mail: [email protected] Elena Vladimirovna, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Chair of the Deparment

philosophy and bioethics of the Altay state medical university.Óøàêîâà Åëåíà Âëàäèìèðîâíà, äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, çàâåäóþ-

ùàÿ êàôåäðîé ôèëîñîôèè è áèîýòèêè Àëòàéñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ìåäèöèíñêî-ãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.

Å-mail: [email protected]

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conditions, the culture translation in time, while beginning in the family, furtherproceeds in the education system. A special place is occupied here by school,because it is exactly there that the main traditions of existence of the people,the way of life of the people, and the most important achievements of materialand spiritual life are transferred in the public cultural-pedagogical form.

In connection with this, in the beginning of the XXI century a number ofinternational organizations (UN, UNESCO, etc.) and cultural communities ofvarious countries, including Russia, have supported a general strategy ofpreservation of unique sociocultural traditions of various countries and peoplesof the social sphere; so that they will not disappear under the pressure of thesoulless mass globalization of financial and economic structures. The dangeris on increase of demolition of the axiological structures of the society, of theloss of eternal values and meanings which has been playing in all times and inall cultures the role of the main Axis on which there stood the Model of theworld of each people and the culture of mankind as a whole.

In the works of modern domestic scientists who study the philosophy andculturology of education (A. P. Valitskaya, M. S. Kagan, N. B. Krylova,F. T. Mikhailov, L. M. Mosolova, Yu. V. Senko, E. A. Yamburg, etc.), a commonthread is the thought that a culture-forming model should be the priority modelof modern school, because, on one hand, it relies on the national specificitiesof education as a sphere of sociocultural practice and, on the other, it ispromising for the world community as a whole [1–3; 5; 7; 8]. For example, onthe territory of the former Soviet Union, with the change from the cultural-indifferent concept of a uniform national community, the Soviet people, intothe direction of national identity of the peoples of Russia, there arise withextreme urgency the issues of both cultural self-identification of the ethnicitiesand peoples living in Russia and the national unity of Russians. It is not bycoincidence that there started to be voiced the appeals to search or create anupdated national idea.

It is well-known that, to ensure development, social stability and self-reproduction, any society forms the corresponding education system. Today,in the conditions of dynamic, multidirectional development of the society, whichkeeps consuming the planet’s resources in a more and more sophisticatedfashion, the educational paradigm is changing: from “Homo Sapiens” to “HomoCompetent”, effectively mastering the benefits of civilization. And a romanticidea of upbringing of “Homo Cultural” which began to dawn in the beginningof Perestroika is becoming more and more ephemeral and utopian. However,as it was noted by E. A. Yamburg, the only form of education in modernconditions can be a culture-conforming educational paradigm which will opposeneither to the cognitive, nor to the personality-focused or the competence-based paradigms, but will incorporate their strengths, having neutralized theirshortcomings [8].

When one speaks about a culturological model of the school, it often happensthat the concept of “culture” in the educational process is defined by theteachers, parents, and pupils as a realization of ethical and esthetic foundationsduring communication at the lesson, introduction of optional classes on art,etc. But it is not enough, since culture cannot be broadcasted in the form of a



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certain set of orientations and ready knowledge. It “grows as one’s own uniqueway of thinking and actions. The school, building a culturological model, hasto create such conditions for the child when he/she starts acting culturally onhis/her own, creatively choosing and putting into practice values, knowledgeand examples” (N. B. Krylova) [3, p. 127].

The culturological model of education implies changing the content ofeducation. But it is impossible without changing the principles of structuringof the educational process. In the culture-conforming model of school thesubject-discipline approach is impossible. It belongs to the scientist or cognitiveapproach. However, culture by its nature has an integrative, poly-systemcharacter. Therefore, the knowledge provided by the culturological school,has to be universal (the “universum” concept comprises such values as integrity,completeness). According to the definition by A. P. Valitskaya, modernizationof education “is possible and necessary only through development of a newmodel of school as a uniform educational space structuring the universum ofmodern knowledge in the forms of humanitarian values” [1, p. 78].

Formation of “Homo Cultural” is based on solving the correspondingproblems:

1. Upbringing of the skillful and mobile person.2. Education of the spiritual person.But, apparently, one of the most marking qualities of “Homo Cultural” is

his/her ability to conduct a dialogue: the highest form of communication wheneach party participating in it not only is self-sufficient and self-identified tobroadcast own values but also is capable to listen to the interlocutor, understandand accept his/her values, make them “significant for oneself”.

It is precisely the dialogue that turns out to be that form of social constructionwhich is capable to take the society out of the long political and cultural crisis.And an essential task of modern school is to bring up the cultural person,ready for the dialogue, integrated into the modern poly-cultural society butwithout losing the own cultural self-identification.

If we would like to reveal the true essence of modern education, then itmake sense to apply “the law of the correct naming of things”, derived byConfucius, i.e. of the direct correspondence of the name to the object called by it.

The concept of “education” is much broader than the concept of “training”.Unlike training as the transfer of a certain sum of knowledge and skills,education is also a process of spiritual formation of the personality. P. Florenskiiconsidered education as the ascension to the Universum, thereby emphasizingintegrity, even syncretism of the “education” concept. According to the Russianword for education (“obrazovanie”, “obraz” = image, “vayanie” = sculpturing),“education” is “sculpturing of an image …”; it is “a process of person’s findingits own image, different from the other ones and, at the same time, aspiring tounity with the ideal Divine Image” [quoted according to 5, p. 21]. It is necessaryto consider education as a process when the person rises “from the kingdomof nature into the kingdom of spirit” (Vl. Solov’yov) [6] and also acquires theability on his/her own will to make (paraphrasing F. Engels) a transition “fromthe kingdom of freedom to the kingdom of necessity” [9, p. 294–295] which isunderstood, first of all, as responsibility.

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Therefore, today the problem of restoration of a scale of values is of a specialurgency. It is impossible to train without bringing up; whereas, to bring upwithout training is always an ambivalent process. While teaching mathematicalformulas, it is necessary to remember that they have in themselves thefoundations of harmony and beauty, and this beauty is of the same nature asthe beauty of the flower. A famous aircraft designer Andrey Tupolev claimedthat an ugly plane would not be able to fly.

It is necessary to introduce into the educational process (within theframework of an educational-culturological experiment) such basic principlesof forming the culture-creativity model of school as integration, enculturationand dialogue. The practice of application of these principles in a number ofeducational institutions has showed, first, their efficiency in terms ofimplementation of the content of education, and, secondly, their culture-creativity inexhaustibility connected with generation of numerous versions ofeducational institutions which have chosen the culture-creativity strategy ofdevelopment. The indicated principles are manifested in the specialized schoolsin a multidimensional fashion, essentially penetrating the entire school world,forming a certain field structure which can be defined as the Field of Culture.Let us consider these practical culture-philosophical principles in more detail.

For example, one of the priority directions of realization of the experimentis a gradual mastering of the principles of integration. At the initial stage therecan be lessons with the semiotic component, which is in the basis of integration.Then there may be creation of training programs with a culturologicalcomponent (based on the principles of integration, enculturation and dialogue).Such programs create the foundations for the inter-subject and inter-cycleintegration inside a parallel, at each educational stage. They allow revealingthe cultural universals underlying both the local, regional cultures and theworld culture as a whole.

While forming an educational program of the new school, it will be necessaryto overcome the narrowness of scientist ideas of scientific knowledge as “exact”,formalized, empirically verifiable and repeated, and being realized in the blockof natural-science and mathematical disciplines. But moreover, today it isimportant to understand the intrinsic positions of humanitarian knowledge,which is essentially “inexact”, filled with the personal values and meanings.This knowledge cannot be fit into the one-dimensional sign systems of theexact sciences. It is comprehended and kept in the symbolical andmultidimensional images. Therefore, a semiotic component plays a profoundsystem-forming role in the formation of new content of education, because thiscomponent consists of universal categories, which are realized in human activitythrough various symbols, myths, archetypes and the cultural constants. It canbecome one of the ways of integration of humanitarian and natural-science-mathematical knowledge in an integrated educational space of the school. Thesemiotic component can also become a basis of the cross-cultural dialogue.

The historical-cultural approaches in forming the integrated curriculum arevery effective within the middle stage, when there are formed in theconsciousness of the child the abilities to analysis and synthesis, therelationships of cause and effect are built. During this period “the cultural



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experience of mankind can be actualized as the spiritual biography of thepersonality” (A. P. Valitskaya). This technology can become a tool ofhumanization of consciousness and practice of the pupils, which will allowinitiating the process of overcoming the total gap between scientific-technological progress and spiritual degradation of the society. There is noneed to convince once again that knowledge – the science and technologicalprogress – may become a dangerous tool if they are alienated from the properhuman, humanitarian meanings, are withdrawn from the spiritual, value fieldof culture.

A result of constructing a culture-creativity model of the school must be anintegrated curriculum of school built both along the horizontal and along thevertical, realizing the continuity of psychological and age-specific models ofthe world at each educational level and integrity of the developing picture ofthe world.

Simultaneously with educational process the school builds a uniformsociocultural space, being integrated with the institutions of additional educationand becoming a local pole of cultural attraction.

No less essential role in the formation of a culturological model of the schoolis played by the principle of enculturation, “immersion into the space ofculture”. In modern conditions, education is impossible without mastering thevalues and meanings of culture, which represents the integrated experience ofmankind. The exponentially increasing volume of information creates pressing-type conditions for the existence and development of the person’sconsciousness. If today we do not help the pupils to develop a system of valuecriteria, do not teach them to filter the incoming information, to make conscious,morally justified choice, then it will be impossible to avoid catastrophes: thepersonal, social, interregional and global ones.

According to M. V. Boguslavskii, formation of the personality is possible onthe condition of unity of “three Ss”: self-identifications, self-consciousness andself-realization. Only on the condition of the person’s mastering the cultural-historical values of mankind, their making significant for the person him/herself, there is possible the formation of the personality capable to creative,productive and constructive activity.

However, to cultivate such creative, culture-conforming person, there isimportant to have an environment forming the corresponding conditions.Therefore, school becomes not just a place of geographical localization of theexperiment, but a genuine institute of culture, where there are cultivated thetraditions, ethical and esthetic constants, creating a unique aura of the Field ofCulture. The subject of this process is the Teacher of a new type, capable ofrealization of his/her own creative position and organizing the creative activityof pupils which allows them to realize their own cultural belonging.

The third and, in fact, the system-forming principle of the culture-creativitymodel of the school, which is dialogue, penetrates all the spheres of its activity:from the heuristic situation at the lesson when the teacher and the pupil act asequal partners of the joint cognitive activity, having as its purpose the mutualincrement of both positions by new cumulative knowledge; from the joint designactivity in the group forms of work at the lessons and the extra-curriculum

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events; from revealing and reconstructing the synchronic and diachronicdialogues of cultures in the content of education; to the formation of a productivedialogue with the partners in the experimental activity.

As an example of practical realization of the culture-creativity school, wewill turn to the experience of scientists and teachers, gained in the Altai region.

As it was noted above, during Perestroika (reorganization of our state) therewere rightly raised the questions of preservation of aboriginal cultures of thesmall peoples of Russia, including, the culture of Altai people. Various ways forachieving that were suggested. For example, many cultural figures broughtup a question of preservation and conservation of such cultures as if in amuseum, preservation of culture in the form of certain “exhibition articles”and folklore samples demonstrated during various public events as a kind of“local color”.

However, already at that time some experts who understood culture as aliving organism, tried to substantiate a fundamental idea that the essence of atraditional culture is in its viability which is impossible without the direct linkwith the territory where this culture arose and exists now. And in the presentconditions the traditional knowledge for the first time for many centuries canbecome a basis of sustainable development of not only individual territories,but also the entire state. And, certainly, it is necessary to begin in the childhoodage, imparting to new generations of citizens the best centuries-old traditionsof the people, in the union with other peoples and cultures of the territory andthe country. And then in the center of the culture-creating activity there is aliving social organism, school. But this is a special school, of the culture-creativity type.

Within the framework of this concept of the living culture of peoples, in theterritory of Altai (the Altai territory and the Altai Republic) there have beenbuilt for several years a network of the schools which have chosen the culture-creativity approach as the strategy of development of the educational institution.In the foundation of the experiment there is the concept of the culture-creativity school (its author is A. P. Valitskaya, corresponding member of theRussian Academy of Education, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences), which hasbeen tested in some schools of St. Petersburg, Nalchik, Yekaterinburg, Barnaul,etc. One should pay attention to the creative, reformative, practice-orientednature of this experimental educational model.

Presently seven educational institutions of Altai Republic and the Altaiterritory are actively participating in the network project of “Culture-creativitySchools of Altai”, which set various vectors of development within the declaredparadigm: among them there is a culturological model of school in theconditions of a military town (the Altai territory, the Siberian settlement);national models of schools, a network of culture-creativity schools of theKarakolsky valley of the Ongudaysky region of the Altai Republic; “Thechildhood planet” gymnasium of the Rubtsovsk town.

There is an interesting experience of five schools of the Karakolsky valley(the Altai Republic), which are developing within the logic of formation of amodel of the culture-creativity school and which have chosen as the prioritydirection of their development the restoration of continuity of traditional ethics



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of interaction between the person and the nature and the transference to younggeneration of the foundations of the ancient spiritual knowledge as a system-forming world-outlook dominant. The indicated five schools have assumed aleading role in forming a strategy of sustainable sociocultural development ofthe territory of the Karakolsky valley. They are acting as an equal social partner“included” into the local social networks, the initiator of cooperation andactivation of all the social institutes for the solution of vital issues of life of thelocal community, a participant of the processes of the territory development.

The schools actively include in the educational content the topics onethnography, the region’s cultural history, traditional environmentalmanagement, ethno-pedagogics; they join the scientific and nature-protectionactivity of the “Uch Enmek” ethno-natural Park, which territory includes thesacred for the Altai people Karakolsky valley; they initiate socially significantprojects of the ecological and sociocultural orientation. The scientists andteachers, who are directly participating in the functioning of the culture-creativity schools, have developed a set of educational and methodical textbooks“The Altai reserves” (the scientific advisor of the project is I.A. Zhernosenko,the consultant is D. I. Mamyev) under the support by the UN DevelopmentProgram and the Global Ecology Fund.

The entire set of textbooks (their list is given below) follows a uniform conceptand is based on an integrative principle. From the methodological and methodicalpositions it creates the optimal conditions for the formation in pupils’consciousness of a uniform integral picture of the world, allows practicalunderstanding of the interdependence and mutual complementarity of thenatural and sociocultural processes of the uniform and harmonious World. Theprinciple of integration is maintained not only in the textbooks, uniting thesubject knowledge into the areas corresponding to them (the natural-sciencesand humanitarian-arts ones), but also between the contents of the books whichis also emphasized by the similarity of the titles of the textbooks for the middlestage of general education school: “The world of the reserved nature of Altai”and “The world of the reserved culture of Altai”. They have a uniform structure:the contents of the chapters of the textbooks are distributed according to thelandscape zones of the mountain and steppe Altai where the key SPNTs(specially protected natural territories) of the Altai Republic and the Altaiterritory are situated. It is known that each SPNT is a unique, original and one-of-a-kind phenomenon both in terms of biodiversity and the historical-culturalheritage. These territories became reserved since people always felt theirnatural uniqueness and, therefore, they consecrated the place, giving significantmeanings to them, creating conditions for the biodiversity preservation. Thecontents of the textbooks mutually respond; they are a meeting place of theviewpoints of the modern scientific knowledge and the traditional knowledgeof local population.

The “Ecology and culture” textbook for the senior pupils is a logicalcontinuation of the textbooks for the middle stage, integrating the natural-science and culturological approaches into a uniform picture of the world,mastered not on the knowledge level but on the spiritual-ecological and theworld-outlook levels.

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The set has received a highest expert mark: the classification of being“recommended” by the Russian Academy of Education; it was designated asan innovative one. And in the year 2011 it became the winner of the 19thcompetition “The best books of the year” of the Publishers Association of Russia,having won “The Best Educational Book” nomination.

We believe that the future of our planet in many respects depends onwhether we will be able to train the people, substituting us, in a such a mannerthat they will be capable of keeping and increasing the beauty and richness ofthe natural-social variety of the world.

The set of educational-methodical textbooks “The Altai reserves”(For the 8-11 classes of the general education school)

1. The world of the reserved nature of Altai / Textbook / R. V. Oparin, A. V. Bondarenko,N. P. Malkov, P. Yu. Malkov, A. G. Maneev, A. M. Marinin, I. A. Zhernosenko,Ch. D. Almashev, S. N. Shchigrev.

2. The world of the reserved culture of Altai / Textbook / I. A. Zhernosenko, E. P. Dvornikov,D. I. Mamyev, V. A. Muytuyev, L. N. Mukayev, A. A. Telesova, R. M. Erkinova,E. E. Yamayev, G. V. Aydarkhanova.

3. Ecology and culture / Textbook / I. A. Zhernosenko, D. I. Mamyev, P. Yu. Malkov,A. N. Malkova, R. V. Oparin.

4. Oparin R. V. The world of the reserved nature of Altai / Work-book.5. Shalabod L. M. The world of the reserved culture of Altai / Work-book.

REFERENCES

1. Valitskaya A.P. A new school of Russia: the culture-creativity model / A. P. Valitskaya /The culture-creativity schools of Altai: searches and solutions. – Saint-Petersburg–Barnaul: ARTIKA, 2007. – 182 pages. [in Russian]

2. Dmitriev G. D. Multicultural education. M: Narodnoye Obrazovanie, 1999. – 208 pages.[in Russian]

3. Krylova N. B. The culturology of education. M: Narodnoye Obrazovanie, 2000. – 272pages. [in Russian]

4. Culturology. Encyclopedic dictionary / V.A.Bachinin. – Saint-Petersburg: Publishinghouse of Mikhailov V.A., 2005 . – 288 pages. [in Russian]

5. Sen’ko Yu.V. The humanitarian foundations of pedagogical education: a lecture course.A textbook for the students of Higher Pedagogical Educational Institutions. – Moscow:the “Akademiya” Publishing center, 2000. – 240 pages. [in Russian]

6. Solov’yov V. The justification of the good. Moral philosophy (Second part, Chapter 8,VI) [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://www.vehi.net/soloviev/oprav/08.html[in Russian]

7. The philosophy of culture. Formation and development / Ed. by M. S. Kagan. Saint-Petersburg: the “Lan” Publishing House, 1998. – 448 pages. [in Russian]

8. The school of Yamburg / Dialogues with Valery Vyzhutovich [An electronic resource].– Access mode: http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/28/yamburg.html [in Russian]

9. Engels F. Anti-Duhring / Marx K., Engels F. Collection of works, vol. 20, 1966. [inRussian]




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UDC 37.0

EDUCATION FOR THE LOVE OF WISDOM:THE ANCIENT GREEKS

M. C. Beck (Batesville, USA)

Abstract. This paper will argue that the goal of education in Ancient Greekculture was the development and continual exercise of the power of the humanmind, nous in both its theoretical and practical dimensions. Aristotle gives atheoretical account of all of the powers of soul related to the power of mind.Aristotle argues that children must be properly educated from the time they areborn in order to have the character strength and intelligence necessary to beable to exercise the power of mind in every aspect of their adult lives. I will beginwith a very brief description of Aristotle’s theory of the virtues and their relatedvices as he presents it mostly in the Nicomachean Ethics. Then I will argue thatall the texts passed down to us from the Ancient Greeks are dedicated to cultivatingthe life of the person of practical and theoretical wisdom, the education of themind. I conclude that the image of human nature and its education passeddown to us from the Ancient Greeks still has a great deal to teach us today.

Key words: education, wisdom, soul, mind, intelligence, human nature,Ancient Greeks.

ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ ÐÀÄÈ ËÞÁÂÈ Ê ÌÓÄÐÎÑÒÈ: ÄÐÅÂÍÈÅ ÃÐÅÊÈ

Ì. Ê. Áåê (Áåéòñâèëë, ÑØÀ)

Ðåçþìå. Â ýòîé ñòàòüå áóäåò äîêàçûâàòüñÿ, ÷òî öåëüþ îáðàçîâà-íèÿ â äðåâíåãðå÷åñêîé êóëüòóðå áûëî ðàçâèòèå è ïîñòîÿííîå òðåíèðîâ-êà âîçìîæíîñòåé ÷åëîâå÷åñêîãî ðàçóìà, èíòåëëåêòà êàê â òåîðåòè÷åñ-êîì, òàê è ïðàêòè÷åñêîì èçìåðåíèÿõ. Àðèñòîòåëü äàë òåîðåòè÷åñêîåîïèñàíèå âñåõ âîçìîæíîñòåé äóøè, ñâÿçàííûõ ñ ñèëîé ðàçóìà. Àðèñòî-òåëü óòâåðæäàë, ÷òî äåòåé íåîáõîäèìî îáðàçîâûâàòü íàäëåæàùèì îá-ðàçîì ñ ìîìåíòà èõ ðîæäåíèÿ äëÿ òîãî, ÷òîáû îíè ïðèîáðåëè ñèëó õà-ðàêòåðà è èíòåëëåêò, íåîáõîäèìûå äëÿ ïðîÿâëåíèÿ ñèëû ðàçóìà â êàæ-äîì àñïåêòå èõ âçðîñëîé æèçíè. ß íà÷íó ñ î÷åíü êðàòêîãî îïèñàíèÿòåîðèè Àðèñòîòåëÿ î äîáðîäåòåëÿõ è ñîîòâåòñòâóþùèõ ïîðîêàõ â òîìâèäå, êàê ýòî ïðåäñòàâëåíî â åãî «Íèêîìàõîâîé ýòèêå». Çàòåì ÿ áóäóäîêàçûâàòü, ÷òî âñå òåêñòû, äîøåäøèå äî íàñ îò äðåâíèõ ãðåêîâ, ïðåä-íàçíà÷åíû äëÿ êóëüòèâèðîâàíèÿ æèçíè ÷åëîâåêà, îáëàäàþùåãî ïðàêòè-÷åñêîé è òåîðåòè÷åñêîé ìóäðîñòüþ, îáðàçîâàíèåì óìà. Â çàêëþ÷åíèå ÿäåëàþ âûâîä, ÷òî îáðàç ÷åëîâå÷åñêîé ïðèðîäû è åå îáðàçîâàíèÿ, ïåðåäàí-íûì íàì äðåâíèìè ãðåêàìè, äî ñèõ ïîð ìîæåò ìíîãîìó íàó÷èòü íàñ.

© Beck M. C., 2013Beck Martha Catherine, Dr., Professor of Philosophy, Lyon College.Ìàðòà Ê. Áåê, äîêòîð, ïðîôåññîð ôèëîñîôèè, Êîëëåäæ Ëàéîí.E-mail: [email protected]

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Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáðàçîâàíèå, ìóäðîñòü, äóøà, óì, ðàçóì, ÷åëîâå-÷åñêàÿ ïðèðîäà, äðåâíèå ãðåêè.

The Goal of Greek Paideia: the Education of the Power of the HumanMind (Nous)

The cultural artifacts and institutions of the Ancient Greeks together showimplicitly and explicitly the properties of the human mind which, in turn, explainthe nature of its education.

Mind is natural. The human mind has evolved in response to a universethat is governed by the power of a Divine Mind. The Divine Mind is not personal,but a force that we know of indirectly, by the fact that when we inquire into theunderlying principles and causes of the universe as a whole and of naturalphenomena, we find that an underlying order does, in fact, exist. One of thepurposes of human life is the exercise of the power of mind in the activity ofscientific inquiry. Such inquiry would not be possible and would not yield resultsunless the universe as a whole exists and has evolved within a context of agreater order and limiting conditions.

The exercise of the power of mind is necessary for human beings to realizetheir nature as human beings. When human beings are unwilling or unable toexercise their minds, they become either pathetic and passive or violent andexcessively aggressive. Humans have a natural drive to fulfill their nature. Theymust be educated to exercise the virtues and the power of the mind in order tobe healthy, flourishing members of their particular natural species.

Mind is a kind of energy. It exists when it is being exercised. It is the onlypower unconnected directly to the human body or to any particular humanexperience. It begins to become active when a person steps back from theactivities of daily life, or the exploration of natural things, or engagement invarious kinds of human relationships and realizes that all aspects of life mustbe unified by a vision of the good. The mind begins to think itself, to realize itis a power over and above all the other powers. This power is triggered whena person makes the important change from reacting to what is around them torealize they have the power to choose for themselves what to do in a givensituation and the responsibility to develop a view of good and evil, justice andinjustice, truth and falsity, upon which they must base the choices they make.Human beings make a transition from living according to immediate appetites,to living by imitating what other people do or believing what other peoplebelieve, to living according to their own vision of the best life in general andthe best choice they can make in a given situation. Young people make thetransition to adulthood when they make this transition.1

Mind is dialectical. It is exercised in a context. This might be a social context:making choices about how to treat other people, or it might be what Plato calls‘an inner dialogue of the soul with itself,’ when one is debating about what to

1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross and rev. by J.O. Urmson, in The CompleteWorks of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Vol. 2 of the Bollingen series (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984). All quotes from the Ethics are from this text,1144b15-17.

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do or what to believe, reflecting upon various other positions before making achoice. Rational decision-making includes explaining why one possible choiceamong a number of alternatives is the best in a given situation. Once a choiceis made, whether about what to do in a given situation, or about why one choiceis better, the mind immediately begins to ask more questions, to look for theimplications of one conclusion for a new set of questions or a new set of choices.The mind is always active, leading human beings to live lives of continual activity,whether in the field of politics, the sciences, the arts, social life, or any aspectof human life.

The worldview the mind seeks to understand is holistic and comprehensive.The mind seeks connections between nature and human nature, betweennatural evolution and cultural evolution, between the way authority is exercisedin relation to one’s spouse and children and the way it is exercised in relationto fellow citizens and to foreigners. The mind is continually seeking analogiesand disanalogies, similarities and differences, between one aspect of humanlife and another.

The mind is incarnated. Conclusions arrived at by the power of mind alwayshave consequences for how one should live, for every aspect of one’s life. Whatone eats, how one eats, when, etc. are connected to one’s position on the natureof the universe. One’s personal, social, intellectual, artistic, political, and allother aspects of life are tied together. All the greatest good a person can achievein life.

Aristotle’s Virtues: the Necessary Precondition for the Exercise ofMind as an Adult

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines the virtues as powers (dunamai)of the human soul. At the end of Book III, Aristotle discusses the two mostimmediate virtues and their corresponding vices, temperance and courage.Temperance is self-control in relation to immediate physical pleasures and pains,particularly the pleasures related to eating, drinking and sex. The extremesare self-indulgence, too much, and self-denial, too little. As is true for all thevirtues, the person who possesses temperance as a character-trait is one whocan do the right thing, for the right reason, in the right way, at the right time,etc. and will do this as a matter of habitual desire. A virtuous person wants toexercise the virtues because they are part of being a mature adult, of living alife of complete excellence (1117b25-1119b17). Courage is the virtue in relationto situations that involve something to be feared, such as an early death in war,sickness, old age and death, the loss of one’s reputation, etc. The extremes arerashness, too much, taking unnecessary risks in dangerous situations, andcowardice, too little, running away from fearful situations or simply denyingtheir existence (1115a6-1117b24).

Book IV (1119b18-1128b8) discusses the personal virtues, those weexercise in relation to people we know personally, are: 1) even-temperedness,the mean in relation to situations involving anger; 2) generosity, the virtue inrelation to giving away money; 3) magnificence, the virtue in relation to spendinglarge sums of money; 4) appropriate ambition, the mean in relation to achievingprofessional and social status; 5) appropriate pride, the mean in relation toaccepting honors and giving them; 6) sociability, the mean in relation to putting

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up with various irritations in social life; and 7) self-knowledge, the understandingof one’s own talents and strengths, without being boastful or self-deprecating.

Book V (1129a1-1138b14) discusses, among other things, the virtue of justiceand its various parts. Justice is the virtue exercised in relation to people onedoes not know personally, a fellow citizen with whom one lives under a commonset of laws. A just person hits the mean in relation to:

1) making a profit in the economic sector of life; 2) the distribution of socialgoods and services so as to promote a strong and stable middle class, thefoundation for a healthy political community; 3) the rectification of wrongs,punishing those who violate the laws appropriately; and 4) equity, the abilityto apply the laws to particular cases in a way that recognizes all the nuances ofeach particular case that the laws, being universal, cannot take into account.

Practical wisdom (phronesis) is the virtue of being able to make the rightchoice, for the right reason, in the right way, in every kind of situation. Aristotlediscusses the powers of soul linked to practical wisdom most extensively inBook VI (1138b17-1145a11). He discusses many of the moral and intellectualpowers of the soul and the way they should relate to each other to achieve theultimate goal: practical and theoretical wisdom. Some people with practicalwisdom do not have theoretical wisdom, but the person of practical wisdommust always link the moral virtues to practical reasoning. Reasoning well aboutpractical affairs requires the exercise of other virtues: 1) a good understandingof the object of wish. In a general sense, the object of wish involves having aclear vision of the fully developed human life and of the kind of politicalcommunity that nurtures this development in as many citizens as possible. Ina particular case, the object of wish might be to win a war; 2) a good grasp ofthe object of choice. Everyone wishes for good things, such as universal peace.The person of practical wisdom, however, has a clear idea of how to take suchabstractions and figure out what to do each day in very particular situationsthat might lead toward such a goal or at least that would be most likely toprevent global politics from getting worse; 3) the ability to issue commandswell. A person might be very good at figuring out the first two, but is unable toinspire others to do what he decides because he is too timid or toocondescending or too intimidating. There is an art to knowing how to treatpeople so they, too, will agree with your position and will want to follow outyour orders; 4) the power of understanding. A person of practical wisdom canevaluate the choices of other people and have mature opinions about whetherwhat they did was, in fact, best in the situation and whether they exercised thevirtues. Such talk is not ‘mere talk,’ but is necessary for developing the kind ofwisdom one will need when being put in a similar or dissimilar situation. To beable to do what is best, one has to study what others have done and whether inhindsight what they did has been proven by history to be just or unjust, thebest choice or the wrong choice; 5) the power of good sense. This is the abilityto forgive and move on. Everyone suffers unjustly and, in turn, unjust sufferingand many mistakes. People have to learn not to hold grudges or take revengeon those who made the wrong choice. Otherwise, a nation will be continuallystuck in the past and unable to address the problems of the present and future.

6) The Greek expression for someone who can do what is best in a givensituation is that she can ‘hit the mark’ rather than ‘miss the mark’ (1453a16).

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There is, claims Aristotle, a ‘mark’ to hit, the best choice, even though it isvery difficult to do what is best in every situation (1138b20-25).

The art of legislation is the activity a person who has been elected into,appointed to, or inherited the task of making the laws. Like all other professions,the power to make laws can be done well or poorly and must be done to promotethe well-being of all the citizens. The best laws promote the development ofpractical wisdom in as many citizens as possible to the highest degree possible.Yet no law can mandate that people be motivated to seek practical wisdom.When the character of the citizens is irrational, lawmakers are forced to makemany laws whose goal is to punish citizens who use and abuse each other. In acorrupt society, the laws focus on the prevention of greater evils and onrepressing people’s desires. These laws are more authoritarian because whenpeople do not control themselves the power of the laws and lawmakers muststep in to force people to do what they do not want to do.

The spirit of the people is more important than the nature of the laws. Anyset of laws can be used to promote trust and good will between citizens andpromote human well-being. Any set of laws can also be used to underminetrust and good will and to promote individual self-interest at the expense ofothers. Some laws are better suited to a healthy political life than others, butthe character of the citizens, both rulers and ruled, is still the most importantquality of political life. That is why Aristotle focuses so much on the powers ofsoul necessary for the exercise of practical wisdom in whatever social andpolitical role an individual takes on in adulthood.

Aristotle and the Greeks are accused of being ‘elitist’ because the standardthey set is attainable by only a few. This makes human excellence inherentlyundemocratic. When we study the texts of Greek paideai, however, it becomesclear that the goal of this system of education is to develop the souls of asmany members of the society as possible, including women and slaves, to thehighest level they are able to achieve. The mark of excellence in practicalwisdom is not a leader who thinks he is better than anyone else but, rather, aleader who can weave people together and build mutual trust and good willbetween all the citizens. Some leaders are better at the art of statecraft thanothers. The term ‘elitist’ usually has negative connotations because it isconnected with people who think they are superior when they are not. Oftensuch people are born into families with wealth and political privilege andexercise power without having the virtues necessary to be able to do it well.Aristotle labels such people for who they are, the antithesis of practically wise.

The Texts of Greek Paideia and the Education of the MindThere are many common characteristics of the texts of Ancient Greek culture

because they are all dedicated to the education of the mind. I am includingamong these texts epic poetry, particularly Homer, tragedy, history, and Plato’sdialogues. The Pre-Socratic philosophers and Hesiod have some of thesecharacteristics. Everyone who wants to live a complete life will aspire tobecoming wise. This requires exercising all of the virtues to the greatest extentpossible. Such a life will inevitably include putting oneself in, or finding oneselfin, very difficult situations. Certain choices we have to make, often in critical

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situations that do not allow for a lot of thought, have a great impact on ourpersonal lives, on the lives of those we know, and on the future of our societies.

The texts of Greek paideia focus on such situations, trying to educateaudiences and readers about what they ought to anticipate if they want to livea full life. A number of Aristotle’s criteria for tragedy as listed in his Poetics2

apply to all the texts of Greek paideia. Greek paideia is poetry, not history. Itfocuses on the universal rather than the particular. It presents a mythos, astory, rather than facts about any particular historical event. The reason thetexts are written as mythoi rather than historical facts is so that people canlearn from hearing, seeing, or reading them. Audiences are intended to makeanalogies between the characters and situations represented in the texts andtheir own lives and the lives of those around them. The texts are intended toultimately lead audiences to a higher level of happiness because they aim toeducate human beings and human beings by nature desire to know. “Students,”young and old alike, should recognize the universality of the situation and beable to make analogies between the patterns in the texts and their own lives orthe lives of those they know.

The texts focus most of all on the plots, on what the characters do, thechoices they make, because human happiness or unhappiness is the result ofthe choices people make. Aristotle points out that most people have goodprinciples and opinions. Paideia texts give specific examples of characters whohave good opinions but who misapply them, due to character-flaws or ignorance.The plots are well-organized, with a beginning, middle, and end. The storiesinclude complication and unraveling. Usually the plot gets more and morecomplicated for the first two-thirds, something comes unraveled, some truth isexposed or choice is made, and everything else is the natural consequence ofthat event or revelation. The plots involve a transition from the world ofappearances, the ‘everyday’ world of people living unexamined lives, to areversal and recognition of a deeper, more meaningful and more powerfulreality. After recognizing that reality, the story returns to the everyday worldwith an entirely different perspective.

The characters in the texts experience a transition from happiness tounhappiness. The characters are ignorant about themselves, about theirsituation, about the people around them, and make choices that lead to greatsuffering and unhappiness. The characters follow certain types, so thataudiences can identify with or recognize those types in their lives. Some arebetter than average, some worse than average, some intermediate. Since mostpeople belong to the intermediate types, the texts focus on mistakes in judgmentmade by these types. The main character has good intentions but makes thewrong choice, leading to disaster. The character ‘misses the mark,’ fails to dowhat is best in the situation in relation to someone they have affection for orsomeone they are related to.

The texts show audiences that we are, indeed, social and political animalsby nature. We depend deeply on each other. We leave behind a legacy, a story,as well as a quality of family and community life for those who come after us.

2 Aristotle, Politics, trans. B. Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes.Vol. 2 of the Bollingen series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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The realization of the long-term impact of our choices is an indirect way ofmotivating people to want to take life seriously and pursue the love of wisdomthroughout our lives. The texts focus most on the members of the mostprivileged families, not because they are naturally superior, but because theirchoices have the most impact on the lives of everyone else in their societies.Their lives are more complicated and they have more responsibilities to theircities. They are given privileges that require greater concern for and knowledgeabout what actions lead to the well-being of the society overall than lessprivileged citizens have.

Greek paideia implicitly shows human beings that they have the power ofchoice and that they are responsible for exercising it well. In the story ofOedipus, for example, it appears that Oedipus has been ‘set up’ by fate and bythe gods. He appears to have had no control over his situation and hence is notresponsible for killing his father and marrying his mother. The lesson of theplay is not about Oedipus per se, but about the way Oedipus is living out apsychological pattern in the minds of men. Children are born completelydependent on their parents. Their characters are molded by their parents andother authority figures. Their emotional attachment to their parents is basedon this dependency. One way that this dependency can get perverted is througha little boy’s excess attachment to his mother and his competition with hisfather for his mother’s affection. When this attachment is extreme, a man’sentire worldview, his character and drives and beliefs about good and evil,justice and injustice, are distorted by his desire to compete with his father forhis mother’s affection. This complex is an obstacle to the development ofpractical wisdom.3 Someone ‘possessed’ by these emotions is unable to ‘hitthe mark’ in many personal, social, and political decisions.

The purpose of the play is to get audiences to recognize the way thisparticular complex is distorting their own judgment or that of other peoplethey know. The distorted emotions need to be brought to consciousness,recognized as obstacles to the ability to function as a wise adult, and flushedout. Audiences should be able to leave the play, or call to mind the story, witha greater insight about the power of the Oedipus complex. They shouldrededicate themselves to removing this blindness from their souls. They shouldbe motivated to point out to those who are ‘possessed’ by it that they need toflush it out of their psyches. The texts of Greek paideia, therefore, recognizethe power of the unconscious and the power of social conditioning at a youngage. They also recognize the power and responsibility of adults to live examinedlives. Such a life requires recognizing and deliberately flushing out thepsychological blindness we develop as a result of being raised in a particularcontext. Habits developed during childhood have to be reexamined andmodified according to the insights of the mind. The very existence and natureof paideia texts presupposes both the depth of human blindness and ignoranceand the human capacity and natural desire to transcend that ignorance andlive wisely and well.

8 Beck, Martha C., Essays on Paideia: Education for Practical Wisdom in Ancient GreekTragedy and Philosophy: Finding the Connections between Tragedy, Plato, and Aristotle(New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2011).

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Paideia texts show that most people, those Aristotle calls the “intermediatetypes,” can make serious mistakes about human character, their own and thatof others. They can think they are wise but when put into a difficult situationfind out they are not. They can get manipulated by the rhetoric of wicked people,who use words to distort the truth. They can fail to recognize those who aremost virtuous. They can respect people with power too much and respect thepoor or middle class too little. The texts intend to educate members of everysocial class, male and female alike. All citizens need to exercise their powersof mind to the extent they are able. Paideia texts teach all citizens to ‘seethrough’ the world of appearances, the world of social status, class, etc. and tosee human characters for who they really are, good or evil, just or unjust. Thebest plots included characters that are true to type, characters whose desires,thoughts, and choices are universal and can be recognized by audience member.The plot is also very true to the human condition. It reflects a series of eventsthat occur universally, so that audiences can again identify with the situationsthe characters and in and with the types of disagreements they have.

Ultimately, the texts want audiences to recognize the human condition forwhat it is, including the many, many ways human beings are ignorant andvulnerable. Audience members ought to identify with and have pity on, thecharacter with good intentions that makes a terrible mistake. Audiences oughtto fear for their own capacity to make the same mistake. They ought to advisetheir friends about how to avoid tragic mistakes in judgment. After experiencingpity and fear audiences ought to take great pleasure in the fact that they havelearned something important from the text. They can now live life morecourageously because they know one more obstacle to living well and how toavoid it. Audiences know they have been educated.

The Unity beneath the Diversity of the Texts of Greek PaideiaVery briefly, I will discuss some of the kinds of texts that I think should be

included in the texts of Greek paideia and the particular kind of focus theyhave. They all include most of the qualities and perspectives above and use thesame sort of technique for the education of mind.

A. Greek mythology.The stories of the gods are universals, poetry, even though some Greeks

took them literally, as stories of specific gods that lived on Mount Olympus.Each deity represents a sacred passion, one of the ways human beings transcendtheir own particular existence in order to pass down to posterity some legacy,beginning with offspring but going farther and in many different directions.Each deity also represents how people behave when they become obsessedwith one particular sacred passion and ignore all the others. The deities do nothit the mean; they represent the extremes. They behave in the ways humanbeings do when they, also, are ‘possessed’ by this single god and ignore therest. The gods come into conflict because each has his or her own bias andrefuses to acknowledge the claims of the others. The stories of the gods arecautionary tales for human beings: do not get out of balance in this way or youwill make this mistake.

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1. Poseidon: god of the sea, earthquakes and underwater springs. Herepresents the powers of nature that human beings will never control.Human beings must not arrogantly try to defy these powers but must limittheir choices by the constraints of natural necessity.

2. Demeter: goddess of fertility, both of the earth and of motherhood. She,too, represents natural necessity. Human beings must respect the fertilityof the earth and always remember their dependence on Demeter. Theymust not harm babies and young children because they are the future ofthe society and of the human race.

3. Dionysius: god of wine and of the theater. He represents the emotionalside of life as opposed to Apollo, the god of reason who is detached fromhis emotions. Human beings need to have a complete emotional releasefrom time to time in order to maintain an overall healthy balance betweenemotion and thought. Without such a release, emotions become unnaturallyrepressed and people become self-righteous and condemn all emotionallife.

4. Aphrodite: goddess of beauty and sensuality. She represents not onlysexual pleasure, but the pleasures of vision, hearing, smelling, tasting,touching. These pleasures can be sacred and spiritual, as long as they areconnected to a well-lived life. Sexual pleasure should be connected to alife-long commitment to partners who raise their children together. Thecultivation of the virtues in both the partners and their children is integratedwith sexual desire.

5. Zeus: god of justice. He rules over the other gods and tries to get them toact in ways that promote or at least do not undermine social and politicallife. However, he makes mistakes. His sexual infidelity leads to all sorts ofproblems that even he, king of the gods, cannot control. His story is acautionary tale to humans: do not separate sex from marriage. Not evenZeus can control the negative impact in all aspects of social and politicallife.

6. Athena: goddess of wisdom, justice, and just war. She is a counselor toher father, Zeus and does not make the mistakes he does. Her advice isusually good, although she also can make mistakes. Athena will defendher father’s political order even when it deprives another deity of his orher just criticisms against it.

7. Apollo: god of reason, medicine, and (rational) music. He represents theactivity of scientific inquiry, mathematics, logic, theoretical explanations,definitions, etc. This kind of thinking requires emotional detachment. Inhis leisure time, however, Apollo can be very emotionally immature in hisrelationships with women and can use his powers of calculating the mostefficient means to a given goal in the service of an irrational goal.

8. Artemis: sister to Apollo, goddess of the hunt and midwife to pregnantwomen. She also represents emotional detachment as it is manifested inwomen. She does not want anything to do with men or with civilization ingeneral, but would rather spend her time in the woods, apart from thecorruptions of culture. At best, she reminds humans of the natural contextwithin which they live. At worst, she becomes a man-hater, seeing all the

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harm men do to women and women’s’ great vulnerability and abuse at thehands of men.

9. Hera: goddess of honor and wife of Zeus. She seeks status in the best waya woman can it in a male-dominated society: by marrying the king of thegods. Social honor is a legitimate pursuit in life, both in the desire to receivehonor and in the desire to confer it. Since people are by nature social andpolitical, societies need to reward people who make great contributions tothe well-being of their societies. Honor should be conferred in ways thatinspire citizens to act justly and virtuously. Societies decay when rulersconfer honors in ways that promote greed, power lust, or other vices. Heraherself cares more about honor than about justice and will seek to behonored even at the expense of justice.

10. Ares: god of war and of honor. He seeks honor in the most common waymen seek it: being honored by acting bravely in battle. Ares is willing tocommit great atrocities, to kill unnecessarily and to kill men on both sidesof a war, just to show how brave he can be. Bravery in war is certainlyneeded when a society is attacked, but the love of bravery as an end initself can lead a society into unnecessary and unjust wars.

11. Hephaestus: god of the forge, of crafts, the introverted son of Zeus andHera. Hephaestus confronted Zeus about his infidelity. Zeus through himdown Mt. Olympus and permanently wounded him. Hephaestus is anintrovert who works all day at the forge, making ironworks that are worksof art, although too often swords and shields that are used to fight unjustbattles in unjust wars.

12. Hestia: goddess of the hearth. She protects the hearth at the center ofevery home and ‘keeps the home fires burning,’ She keeps alive the flameof dialogue with family and friends around the fire, awakening andpreserving the light and activity of mind.

13. Hades: god of the underworld. He abducts Demeter’s daughter,Persephone, and takes her to Hades to be his queen. He representsviolence and the consciousness of death in the mind of every human being.The stories of the shades in Hades are designed to encourage people tolive courageous and active lives while they can because life on earth is thegreatest value, far superior to the exclusively reflective life in Hades. Yetthe stories also show that humans must avoid doing evil while alive, evenif it means a certain death, because they must live for eternity with theknowledge of the choices they made while alive.

14. Persephone: goddess of the underworld and victim of abduction andrape. She, the great victim, becomes the great victimizer. Those who havehad irrational ambitions and have victimized others while alive will receiveeternal victimization as the just punishment for the choices they madewhile alive. Her image ought to inhibit those who seek great power andwealth from wanting to commit the most heinous crimes to achieve theirgoals, ‘knowing’ they will, in turn, become victims for eternity after theydie.

Although I cannot discuss the specific stories of the gods, in general theyare stories of what happens when these various legitimate goals become

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obsessions and change from inspiring human beings to do great things drivinghuman beings to become very destructive.

B. Hesiod’s Theogony.Although much can be said, the main point I want to make here is the story

of the gradual evolution from nature to culture in the creation story of Hesiod.The universe began with four forces: Chaos, Gaia (earth), Thanatos, and Eros(desire). Gaia gave birth to Uranos (sky). Collectively they gave birth to manyother natural forces and beings. One of their sons, Chronos, eventually tookover power forcefully from his father because Uranos abused his power.Chronos, in turn, feared that one of his children would forcefully overpowerhim, so he ate them. Zeus got away and eventually took over as the new king ofthe gods, the god of justice. Zeus, in turn, was afraid that one of his childrenwould overpower him.

The main theme here is the gradual evolution from nature to culture. Eachgeneration moves toward a higher level of culture and civilization. If the fatherswould admit their limitations, recognize the higher stage of development oftheir children, and allow their children to take over, the transition could benon-violent. It is going to happen anyway. Evolution is both natural andnecessary. Each generation is born into a more complex situation and hencedevelops more complex powers of the soul. Each generation must alsoacknowledge the powers of nature that will never go away. Zeus cannot denythe power of time or the basic powers of nature when he is trying to rule overall the other gods and create a just social order.

As I will explain, the stories of Greek tragedy, of Homer, and Plato’sdialogues also include the relation between the generations. They all showthat young people need to be mentored by adults who are wiser than they are,but they also need to be released from the authority of their fathers to maketheir own decisions and mold their own lives according to their ownunderstanding of what is just and best. If they have been mentored well, theywill make better decisions. If they have been overpowered or corrupted bytheir elders, they will make poor decisions. They will reject all of the pastrather than add on to what their parents have already achieved. They willbecome destructive rather than creative.

C. Homer: Iliad and Odyssey. The Iliad is the story of two ‘cities,’the Trojans and the Achaeans.

Neither city is dedicated to the love of wisdom.Troy is a monarchy whose ruler, Priam, is dedicated to the accumulation of

wealth. He and his people try to bribe their way to peace and happiness. TheGreeks do not take the bribes. Priam also indulges his son, Paris, by allowinghim to bring Helen into the city even when the Trojans all know the Greekswill come to get her. Paris is allowed to break the hospitality agreement betweenthe two city-states. Such agreements are the only way to prevent war. Whencities cannot trust each other to abide by such agreements, they mustcontinually build up a military to protect themselves against possible attack atany time. In the end, Troy is completely destroyed, due to the bad decisions ofits leaders. The majority of the citizens know their rulers are wrong and want

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to give Helen back, but they are powerless. They suffer greatly for the irrationalbehavior of their absolute rulers.

The Achaeans are a group of city-states, each one governed by a rulingfamily. They elect Agamemnon to lead them, but Agamemnon also abuse hispower, first by taking the daughter of a wise elder priest at Delphi as hisconcubine, they by giving her back and taking the concubine of Achilles, themost outstanding young soldier. The middle-aged generation is abusing bothits elder wise men and its best youth. Achilles, in turn, rebels and refuses tofight, leading to a ten-year extension of the war. The Greeks are guilty of wantingpower and control, first over each other and then over Troy. This conflictbetween members of the privileged elite lead to great suffering for everyoneelse. As with the Trojans, the majority of citizens know both Agamemnon andAchilles are wrong but they are powerless to do anything about it. They suffergreatly for the ignorance and irrationality of their leaders.

Each city-state also has leaders who achieve high levels of human excellence,Hector among the Trojans and Nestor and Odysseus among the Greeks. Thosewho are best do not have the authority to rule their cities. Hector cannot changehis father’s mind. Nestor and Odysseus are able to advise Agamemnon andAchilles. Agamemnon ignores good advice at first but eventually follows it.Achilles never learns. When he returns to battle, it is for all the wrong reasons,even though he helps the Greeks to eventually win the war.

The gods and goddess are on different sides, but Zeus stays on the side ofthe Greeks, even though he also acknowledges the justice in the souls of someof the Trojans. The Greek cause is just while the Trojan cause is not, eventhough the Greeks go to many extremes and make many mistakes during thewar and even though the Trojans achieve high levels of excellence in manyrespects. Even this truncated version of the plot should make clear that thestory is filled with the kinds of characters and tragic mistakes in judgmentdescribed earlier as characteristics of Greek educational texts.

The character of Odysseus in the Odyssey is Homer’s ideal for the excellenthuman life, even though he commits the worst evil, pride, and pays a heavyprice for it. Because of his pride, Odysseus suffers at the hands of Poseidon,god of the sea, who prevents Odysseus from getting home for ten years afterthe war was over. Odysseus is a conscientious member of the Greek army, agood ruler over his city, a good husband, father, and son. During the war, hesuffers at the hands of the irrational behavior of others for ten years. Then hesuffers for ten years due to his own irrational behavior. He does not give in toself-pity or fear, even though there are plenty of reasons he might feel sorryfor himself or be afraid of what will happen next. He refuses Calypso’s offer tostay on her island and enjoy an eternal Paradise with her, including his ownimmortality. He wants to return home, to live an excellent human life, not thelife of a god in paradise. He is faithful to his wife who suffers and endures justas he does. His father has been an excellent role model for him and he, in turn,is a great model for his son. The Odyssey describes Telemachus leaving homein order to, as his mother says, ‘make a life in story’ for himself. Like his fatherbefore him, Telemachus must now make his own choices, live his own life,make a history he can look back on and be proud of and pass on his story toposterity, especially to his own children.

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Following the patterns as listed above, Homer shows all human types, thosebetter, worse, and intermediate, and their relationships with each other. Heshows that everyone has a reason for what they do, even when they make thewrong choices. In his story, the intermediate types know what their rulersought to do, but are powerless to do what is best. Homer is teaching audienceshow to recognize corruption in their rulers. He is also showing them the howto avoid the most common mistakes in judgment in the kinds of situations theyare likely to confront. Homer seems to believe that a society run by the rule oflaw and the vote of the majority is more likely to lead to the best public policythan either a monarchy or an aristocracy. Homer’s work reveals the realityunderneath the world of appearances. It exposes the characters as they are,not as they are often presented and packaged to the public. It teaches listenersto become critical thinkers about their own lives and the lives of everyone intheir societies, rulers and ruled alike. Homer wants to cultivate practical wisdomin as many citizens as possible to the highest level they can achieve.

D. Greek tragedy: Sophocles, Philoctetes4

Sophocles’ play, Philoctetes, has three main characters, a young man,Neoptolemus, a middle-aged man, Odysseus, and an older man, Philoctetes.Each exhibits the character-traits most common among people of their agegroup, following Aristotle’s descriptions of the stages of life in his Rhetoric,with the exception of Odysseus, who is a corrupted version of Aristotle’sdescription of what middle-aged people ought to be like.

Odysseus represents the middle-aged person who is ruling his ‘city,’ in thiscase the Greek troops. He has to get Philoctetes’ bow before the Greeks canwin the war. There are three ways a person can get someone else to act: force,fraud, or persuasion. Odysseus does not think he can persuade Philoctetes.He cannot use force because the Oracle has said Philoctetes must comewillingly. So, he decides to use fraud. Odysseus knows he cannot deceivePhiloctetes because he was the person who dumped him on the island ofLemnos in the first place. So, he uses Neoptolemus as his tool, askingNeoptolemus to tell a lie in order to get Philoctetes to give him the bow‘willingly.’ Odysseus acts on the principles that ‘the end justifies the means.’

Everyone who exercises power will be continually faced with situations thatrequire convincing people to act in certain ways. The people do not alwayswant to do what the ruler thinks is best. Sometimes the people refuse becausethe ruler’s judgment is wrong and unjust. Sometimes the ruler is right and thepeople are wrong. The three methods for getting people to do what you wantthem to do are force, fraud or persuasion. Odysseus assumes that Philocteteswill not listen to rational persuasion. So, he chooses deception. He decides touse the good will and social vulnerability of one of the best young men to dothe dirty work. This is not a good way to educate future rulers in the art ofleadership.

Neoptolemus represents an archetype of the coming-of-age of every youngperson moving into adulthood. At the beginning of the play, he trusts his

4 Beck, Martha C., Interpreting Sophocles’ Philoctetes Through Aristotle’s Theory of Tragedy:How Do We Educate People to Be Wise? (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).

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authority figures and assumes they are just and wise. When Odysseus tellsNeoptolemus to deceive Philoctetes, the young man is at first surprised. TheIliad describes Neoptolemus as a young man of strong character and greatpromise. Neoptolemus describes himself as the son of Achilles, hence from anoble family that does not engage in such activities. Odysseus is abusing hispower to give or deprive Neoptolemus of social respect, the first stop towardopportunities for professional success. If Neoptolous agrees to do it, he will behonored and given more opportunities. If he refuses, he will be ostracized bysociety and will be denied opportunities he deserves. Like all young people,Neoptolemus must decide how much he will compromise the moral principleshe was raised to follow in order to be accepted and successful in his society.

Neoptolemus agrees to go through with Odysseus’ plan. When he meetsPhiloctetes, he is impressed with the humanity and civility of the old man.Even though he has been isolated from society for ten years, Philoctetes is nota barbarian. He longs for family and home. He knows his life on the island ofLemnos is not life for a human being. Philoctetes also recognizes a level ofnobility in Neoptolemus. They develop a friendship bond. When Philoctetesfalls into a swoon, Neoptolemus has an opportunity to steal the bow, leavingPhiloctetes without any way to get food, hence to certain death. Neoptolemusrefuses, even when Odysseus threatens to destroy his reputation.

Neoptolemus recognizes that he has the power of choice, that he shouldnot always trust his authority figures or obey them. When Philoctetes wakesup and finds out Neoptolemus has lied to him, Philoctetes refuses to giveOdysseus the bow and to go to Troy so the Greeks can win the war.Neoptolemus then recognizes that Philoctetes is also wrong: he has become abitter old man. Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes he ought to come to Troy, helpthe Greeks win, and then return home to a hero’s welcome and be reunitedwith his family, friends, and city.

Aristotle describes Neoptolemus’ coming-of-age experience in NicomacheanEthics Book VI. Neoptolemus has made the transition from living according tohabit and imitation to living according to the power of reason. Neoptolemusbegins the play as a well-intentioned and well-bred young man. He has watchedhis authority figures, listened to them, and tried to imitate them in order toachieve the highest level of human excellence he knows of. At this point, hisnatural capacity for deliberation and practical wisdom becomes active. Hebecomes conscious of his own power of choice and of his responsibility toreflect, to use his own reasoning powers as the guide to his choices. He doesnot merely refuse to do what he is told. Rather, he gives reasons, and the rightreasons, for refusing Odysseus’ request and for criticizing Philoctetes’ choices.He has made the first step toward living the life of an adult. By the end of theplay, Neoptolemus emerges as the character who issues commands well.Although Neoptolemus has made the right choice in this situation, however, itis not clear that he is developing a strong moral character. Instead, he mightgrow up to imitate Odysseus’ cynical attitude and to use his own powers ofrhetoric and manipulation to achieve irrational goals or irrational means toreasonable goals.

Philoctetes is the archetype of the old man who has suffered unjustly, bothat the hands of the gods and of men. He was an honorable and just man who

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accidentally stepped on Artemis’ sacred ground and was bitten by a snake.The wound was permanently infected and filled with a puss that had a horriblesmell. Philoctetes periodically began moaning and went into a swoon becauseof the pain. On the way to Troy, the other soldiers in the ship could not standthe smell and the moaning. They asked Odysseus to dump Philoctetes on theisland of Lemnos. Philoctetes had a magic bow he received from Heracleswhen he helped Heracles in one of his labors. The bow indicates thatPhiloctetes, indeed, was a good man.

Now the Oracle has said that the Greeks will not win the war unlessPhiloctetes leads the troops with his bow in hand. This makes sense, since warinvolves so much unjust suffering. There is much to fear. The just can diewhile the unjust live. If Philoctetes can learn to forgive and forget the past,even when he has suffered so unjustly for so long, he will be an inspiration tothe troops to fight bravely. They would be less likely to worry about who livesand who dies and whether they suffer unjustly. The Oracle had great insightwhen it made this demand. However, as Odysseus predicted, Philoctetes atfirst refuses to come. Philoctetes cannot get over his long-suffering past. Hecannot forgive Odysseus and move on.

Every old person has to make the kind of choice Philoctetes had to make.Human life is by nature vulnerable. We suffer, and we suffer unjustly. We sufferfrom illness, accidents, ageing, false friends, military conflict, etc. A completehuman life involves many types of personal, social, and political interactions,which often break down for various reasons. By the time they are old, peoplehave suffered a great deal, justly and unjustly. Old people have to decide whetherto give in to self-pity and fear. If they give in to fear, they become obsessedwith surviving as long as possible and suffering as little as possible. They inspirefear in others, leading them to live less active and less complete lives. If theycan forgive and forget, they will inspire the youth and those in middle-age toavoid self-pity and fear and to live courageously and justly. The Oracle wassending the message to Philoctetes to forgive and forget, to go to Troy andbring about the triumph of the more just cause over the less just.

The play fits all of the criteria for Greek paideia listed above. First, theentire genre of myth, tragedy and all the texts of Greek education are kinds ofpoetry, as opposed to literal history. Clearly Sophocles’ Odysseus in this playis radically different from the Odysseus of Homer. He constructs the threecharacters so they represent archetypes in the midst of an archetypal kind ofsituation, reacting in an archetypal way, making an archetypal type of mistakeand suffering the consequences. Because Sophocles is a poet and writes inmyths rather than merely recording historical events, his audiences can makeanalogies between the characters in the play and their own lives and the lifestories of those they know. By recognizing the connections, they can learn thelessons being taught.

The plot is organized according to Aristotle’s criteria for a well-organizedplot. The play has a beginning, middle and end. The plot gets more and morecomplicated until two-thirds of the way through. At the climax, the world ofappearances, where each characters is playing the role assigned to him bythose in power, to the underlying truth. The powerful are corrupt and unjustwhile the powerless are just. This revelation of the truth leads each character

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to experience a reversal of fortune. At the beginning of the play, Odysseus iscorrupted by power, Piloctetes is corrupted by unjust suffering andNeoptolemus is psychologically blind and ignorant of the characters of theother two. Odysseus experiences are reversal from happiness to unhappiness,from being respected to being condemned and ignored. His mistake in judgmentleads to his loss of authority. Neoptolemus experiences a reversal from blindobedience to authorities to the ability to see for himself what is best. He changesfrom the mistaken beliefs that he ought to follow the commands of others tohis understanding that he has the capacity and responsibility to tell the otherswhat to do and why. Philoctetes experiences a reversal from his anger, isolation,and bitterness, to venturing into a new life, with the help of a noble youngfriend. Neoptolemus and Philoctetes make the transition from ignorance towisdom. Odysseus does not learn from his mistake.

The characters are types and true to type. They are better, worse, andintermediate types. They represent every human begin at some point in life.At some point in life, in respect to some aspect of life, everyone will be temptedto obey unjust rulers to gain social status, to abuse power to achieve animmediate goal, or to become bitter and angry and refuse to live a full life.People usually get over these obstacles to practical wisdom, however, and goon to live more wisely and justly.

The characters are related by a bond, in this case the bond of being fellow-citizens. They need each other because they are all Achaeans fighting for acommon and just cause, the violation of hospitality agreements. They comefrom the privileged families because the decisions they make have more impacton the well-being of the society than the choices of less powerful and privilegedcitizens.

They all have the power of choice, even though it is limited in many ways.The choices they make among the options they have make a profound differenceon themselves and their fellow-citizens. They are much more powerful thanthey think they are. They are all ‘victims’ of fate, or of the human condition.Everyone gets in similar situations. Everyone feels trapped, caught between alimited number of options, none of which seem very good. This should notmake them passive. They should not think of themselves as victims ofcircumstances or of the power of others. Rather, they have the option of makingchoices that empower them and those around them. Like Oedipus, they didnot choose their original position, but they can learn what it is and then makechoices that set an example for everyone because everyone is in thosesituations.

The play, like all texts of Greek paideia, does not preach, does not give adefinition of virtue. Rather, it shows that virtue, as Aristotle says, is an ergon, away of living. Audiences learn by seeing the analogies between their own livesand the lives of the characters. They learn the reasons why one choice is betterthan the other. They make the transition from living according to what theywere told or by imitating those around them to making choices based onreasoning and on good reasoning. The plot, the story, of people’s lives, isconnected to their reasons for living the way they live.

Like all paideia texts, the play tries to motivate people to want to love wisdomfor the rest of their lives because it shows the great need for such a love

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5 Beck, “Plato’s Phaedo: Integrating the Insights of Science and Religion into a PhilosophicalWay of Life,” Athens, Greece: Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Inter-disciplinary Research Vol. XVIII no. 1 (2007).

throughout life, from youth, to middle age, to old age. The text presents anhonest image of the human condition, with its vulnerability and with the powerof choice. It aims to educate people so they can live more complete, activelives. Those who learn from the text realize that they were more ignorant abouttheir own situation before seeing the play than they are afterward. They cango away from the play with greater wisdom and courage to live well.

Plato’s Dialogues and Greek PaideiaI have argued elsewhere5 that Plato’s dialogues also follow these criteria

for Greek paideia. Briefly, Plato’s so-called ‘early’ and ‘middle’ dialogues showhow the great democratic society of Athens destroyed itself. These dialoguesare set in Athens when the city was at the peak of its power. It will not be longbefore the Athenians lose the Peloponnesian War and then elect Critias, whoexercises a dictatorial reign of terror, all in the names of ‘a return to traditionalvalues.’ Plato shows that the most important factor in this self-destruction wasthe belief that what made Athens a great democratic society was that it providedcitizens with the most freedom. Citizens were given the power to decide howto live, without any interference from other citizens, from the laws, or fromthose in power.

Although Plato appears to condemn Homer, a careful reading of Plato’sRepublic should make clear that Socrates is condemning the “Homer” of theAthenians, the way the Athenians have perverted Homer. The Athenians areinterpreting Homer to be promoting irrational desires when Homer is actuallyexposing those desires in order for people to flush them out of their souls.Homer is using the techniques of Greek paideia, as are the tragedians, Hesiod,and even Plato himself. But the Athenians do not understand the foundationsof their own cultural tradition, either the view of the human soul and the powerof the human mind implicit in those texts or the kind of educational methodused to educate the power of the mind. Readers should have their ownexperience of reversal and recognition from the world of appearances to theworld of a deeper reality as they read Plato’s dialogues. Socrates only appearsto be condemning Homer. At a deeper level, Socrates is promoting and evenliving out a way of life very similar to the life of Nestor, one of Odysseus’ mentorsand role models.

Throughout these dialogues, Plato shows his readers that the Atheniansabused their ‘freedom’ to live in ways that undermined the stability of theirsociety, leading eventually to its destruction, both from without and from within.Some chose to live self-indulgent lives, not bothering to develop any expertiseor to contribute to the city in any way. Others chose military careers and triedto rally the military to build a political empire. Some chose to get wealthy,using the military to build an economic empire, exploiting the conquered fortheir wealth, and taxing allies. Others simply wanted personal power at theexpense of everyone else.

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The citizens either forgot or denied that the city was based on thedevelopment of the virtues in all the citizens, especially the power of practicalwisdom. The city’s founders created laws and provided numerous venues forcitizens to discuss public affairs. They wanted to promote a culture wherecitizens helped each other to develop all the moral and intellectual virtuesdescribed by Aristotle and exhibited by Socrates. In order to preserve a freeand open society and avoid the need or desire for an authoritarian ruler thecitizens would have to make good decisions about public policy, especially invery difficult situations. Citizens were given the responsibility to hold theirleaders accountable for ruling well. If the leaders were corrupt or incompetent,citizens had the responsibility to elect better leaders. Citizens had to be able torecognize political rhetoric designed to manipulate the public into voting forand following the policies of would-be leaders whose goal was personal powerand/or wealth without any concern for the public good.

Plato’s dialogues show how every sector of Athenian society was corruptedeither by the tragic but ignorant good intentions of citizens or by the corruptionof citizens who abused their power. 1) The Laches shows lack of leadership inthe military and in politics; 2) The Charmides shows the naiveté of the youthand their manipulation by the ambitious, in this case Critias; 3) The Protagorasshows how the educational system was corrupted by the sophists; 4) TheGorgias shows how the teachers of rhetoric corrupted the decision made inthe Assembly and in the courts. Those trained by sophists could manipulatethe majority to make the wrong choices. 5) The Phaedrus shows the corruptionof the tradition of educating the youth through the voluntary mentoring of anadult. The older and wiser adult was supposed to aid the young in the transitionto adulthood. 6) The Symposium shows the corruption of desire. The corruptionof Eros, passion, is connected to corruption in the arts, the military, the medicalprofession, the legal profession, and politics.

In the end, enough citizens with enough power were able to manipulateenough ‘average’ citizens to drive the city into destruction. Citizens expectedto be entertained at the theater. They expected to be manipulated in theAssembly when they were voting on public affairs and in the courts when theywere acting as jurors. Enough citizens ‘forgot’ or never were taught theunderlying foundations of Athenians culture. They ignored the need to cultivatethe virtues. They traded in the exercise of practical wisdom for personal freedomto live in any way they wanted at any given moment. The city could not survivefor long when no one acted in a way that would preserve it.

ConclusionThis paper has argued that the many different kinds of texts passed down

to posterity by the Ancient Greeks follow the same model for education becausethey have the same goal: the education of the power of mind, especially practicalmind. The texts collectively give a comprehensive image of the humancondition, with all of its limitations as well as its great powers. The textscollectively show human beings that they have the power of choice, that theyhave the power of practical wisdom, and that they ought to desire to exercisetheir power of practical wisdom throughout their adult lives. If they fail, theywill bring great pain and suffering to those they care about most, both during

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their lives and long after they are dead. The texts show that we all leave behinda legacy of some kind. We all have a responsibility to pursue the particularsacred passions that we feel most called to pursue and to pursue them diligently,in the face of many obstacles and unjust suffering of all sorts. We also mustbalance out the various sacred passions, changing our focus at different stagesin life. Further, we must acknowledge the sacred passions that drive otherhuman beings and create a society where all of them are recognized andnurtured.

The texts show those aspects of the human condition that will never change.Yet they do not teach us that we ought to be passive in the face of our fate ashuman beings. Rather, the texts aim to trigger an active response to thesituations we find ourselves in. Giving in to self-pity and fear only makeseveryone’s lives much worse. The texts give us every reason to want to pursueexcellence, not out of fear of divine punishment or for the sake of divine rewardbut, rather, motivated by the recognition of how much is at stake. It makes agreat difference whether we love and seek wisdom all of our adult lives orwhether we turn away from living complete and complex lives. The texts teachindirectly, by showing what happens when people turn away from wisdom, inorder to trigger the desire for wisdom. This desire is the necessary preconditionof a lifelong commitment to continual self-examination and conversation withothers. However, this commitment alone is not sufficient. Some characters arecommitted to the pursuit of wisdom but make serious mistakes anyway. Thelove and pursuit of wisdom, then, are together both necessary, but not sufficient,for making the right decision in every situation involving personal choice.

The texts themselves provide the only hope for human kind. Without thiskind of education, the human condition is hopeless. People are doomed tomake all the same mistakes, over and over. The education exists because thereis hope; there is a path out of the cave of ignorance and irrationality. The powerof the human mind is that hope, that path. The education of that power is thebest way to create the conditions necessary for people to live well. The modelof Greek paideia is the best model I know of for the education of the humansoul. I know that I do not know, however, and am eager to discover the modelspassed down to posterity by all the world’s cultural traditions.

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Part VEDUCATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION:

POLITICS AND THE RIGHTS(history and modernity)

Ðàçäåë V. ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ Â ÓÑËÎÂÈßÕ ÃËÎÁÀËÈÇÀÖÈÈ:ÏÎËÈÒÈÊÈ È ÏÐÀÂÀ (èñòîðèÿ è ñîâðåìåííîñòü)

UDC 378 + 008

DOES A POLITICIAN NEED PAIDEIA?THE CONTEXTUALIZED VANTAGE OF (NEO) CONFUCIAN

AND PLATONIC ETHICS

M. Benetatou (Athens, Greece)

Abstract. The paper examines the conditions, content and consequences ofa sustained moral training specifically conceived for politicians and publicpersons, including senior civil servants. The training is inspired by the (Neo)Confucian, Platonic and Aristotelian virtue theories. The method consists inrecasting ancient theories in the light of modern issues. The relevance of ancientphilosophies from East and West is not a futile speculative exercise. Recastedaccording to the needs and standards of globalization, ancient ethics may providea novel and promising vantage in order to rethink political activity and thepolitician’s profile and qualities. Such an endeavor may further contribute inreforming, or at least seriously questioning, the standards of a political careerin the democratic world. In this perspective, moral training becomes of primaryimportance.

Key words: moral education, virtue theories, ancient philosophies, policy,politician, globalization.

© Benetatou M., 2013Benetatou Marianna, Ph. D., University of Paris-Sorbonne, France Visiting Scholar,

Beijing University, China Greece-China Association, Athens, Greece, GreekPhilosophical Society.

Áåíåòàòó Ìàðèàííà, äîêòîð ôèëîñîôèè, óíèâåðñèòåò Ïàðèæ , Ñîðáîíà, Ïåêèíñèéóíèâåðñèòåò (ïðèãëàøåííûé èññëåäîâàòåëü), Ãðå÷åñêî-Êèòàéñàÿ àññîöèàöèÿ, Ãðå-÷åñîå ôèëîñîôñêîå îáùåñòâî.


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ÍÓÆÄÀÅÒÑß ËÈ ÏÎËÈÒÈÊ Â ÏÀÉÄÅÉÅ?ÊÎÍÒÅÊÑÒÓÀËÈÇÈÐÎÂÀÍÍÀß ÒÎ×ÊÀ ÇÐÅÍÈß

(ÍÅÎ)ÊÎÍÔÓÖÈÀÍÑÊÎÉ È ÏËÀÒÎÍÎÂÎÉ ÝÒÈÊÈ

Ì. Áåíåòàòó (Àôèíû, Ãðåöèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Â ñòàòüå èññëåäóþòñÿ óñëîâèÿ, ñîäåðæàíèå è ïîñëåäñòâèÿäëèòåëüíîãî ìîðàëüíîãî îáó÷åíèÿ, çàäóìàííîãî ñïåöèàëüíî äëÿ ïîëèòè-êîâ è îáùåñòâåííûõ äåÿòåëåé, âêëþ÷àÿ ÷èíîâíèêîâ âûñøåãî ãîñóäàðñòâåí-íîãî óðîâíÿ. Îáó÷åíèå âäîõíîâëåíî (Íåî) êîíôóöèàíñêèìè, Ïëàòîíè÷åñ-êèìè è Àðèñòîòåëåâñêèìè òåîðèÿìè äîáðîäåòåëè. Ìåòîä ñîñòîèò âïåðåäåëêå äðåâíèõ òåîðèé â ñâåòå ñîâðåìåííûõ ïðîáëåì. Ðåëåâàíòíîñòüäðåâíèõ ôèëîñîôèé Âîñòîêà è Çàïàäà íå ÿâëÿåòñÿ áåñïîëåçíûì ñïåêóëÿ-òèâíûì óïðàæíåíèåì. Ïåðåðàáîòàííàÿ â ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ ïîòðåáíîñ-òÿìè è ñòàíäàðòàìè ãëîáàëèçàöèè, äðåâíÿÿ ýòèêà ìîæåò îáåñïå÷èòüíîâóþ è ìíîãîîáåùàþùóþ òî÷êó çðåíèÿ ñ òåì, ÷òîáû çàíîâî ïðîäóìàòüïîëèòè÷åñêóþ äåÿòåëüíîñòü, à òàêæå õàðàêòåð è êà÷åñòâà ïîëèòèêà.Òàêàÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòü ìîæåò äàëåå ñïîñîáñòâîâàòü ðåôîðìèðîâàíèþ èëè,ïî êðàéíåé ìåðå, ñåðüåçíîìó âçãëÿäó íà ñòàíäàðòû ïîëèòè÷åñêîé êàðüå-ðû â äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîì ìèðå. Â ýòîé ïåðñïåêòèâå ìîðàëüíîå îáó÷åíèåïðèîáðåòàåò ïåðâîñòåïåííóþ âàæíîñòü.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: ìîðàëüíîå îáðàçîâàíèå,òåîðèè äîáðîäåòåëè, äðåâ-íèå ôèëîñîôèè, ïîëèòèêà, ïîëèòèê, ãëîáàëèçàöèÿ

IntroductionThe current mess of international politics is not a secret to anyone. I mention

economic recession, free market economy run wild, cultural and religiousextremism, violence in all its forms, inequality and poverty, etc. Furthermore,the unwillingness and/or incapacity of politicians to resolve such persistentnational problems, inflated into reaching international proportions, have led tothe “democratic default.” By that, I underline the insufficiency of democraticmechanisms and ideals to sustain national states ruled by acceptance (and notonly by tolerance) and reason. Hand in hand goes democracies’ “human default,”inasmuch as the citizens of any contemporary advanced state becomeincreasingly estranged from common pursuits, from public or political eventsand, of course, from each other. Individualism is no longer a private attitude. Ithas invaded the political scene and threatens in a certain degree to disintegrateor at least weaken the national and international fabric.

The causes and conditions of such a sad state of affairs are various andcomplex. As a philosopher, I draw attention to one significant point: Theyconcern measurable factors, like economic growth or level of aptitudes, butthey hardly insist on personal qualities (an altogether different matter fromqualifications). Persons, particularly public figures and politicians, are invariablysubjected to public or legal scrutiny, at times adulated and at times debased.Statistics, polls, but also standard agencies increase the pressure for individualperformance. They remain silent in regard to personal accomplishments (exceptif they are liable to influence the issues in the desirable way).

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The post-Enlightenment societies have never seriously debated on the moralcharacter of the people in power or of the aspirants to a position of authority.The Enlightenment has shifted the standards from the personalaccomplishments of the persons involved in politics to the mechanisms of powerand the rule of law. The rationality behind this choice runs as follows: Personsare subject to temptation, fraud, disloyalty and all possible vices; thereforethey are unreliable and untrustworthy in occupying public functions andforemost in governing without the guidance and control of rational laws andsound institutions. Transitioning to a kind of guardians and executives,politicians are supposed to increase their performance as any other managerdoes nowadays.

On the other hand, the ancients asked squarely the question: How does aperson qualify for becoming a politician? Is it a career and, if so, what is theappropriate training? If, argues Plato with perspicacity, a political career amountsto a vocation, it is needs a substantial learning in order to act rightly. Thenatural predisposition to do well is not enough. It needs nurturing by theappropriate training. Otherwise, all things are muddled and we cannotdistinguish right and wrong.

Sadly, the Platonic question still remains unanswered. Its relevance cannotbe ignored. As a matter of fact, it tickles our democratic sensibility. All thingsbeing equal, Plato addressed his question to his fellow citizens, candidates to apolitical career or seasoned politicians in democratic Athens. Then as today,people of all walks of life had the possibility, at least in principle, to lettemporarily aside their steady jobs and get involved in politics. Nonetheless,they were regarded as career seekers. Politics was generally considered to bethe arena par excellence for fame and glory. The question of money was then,like today, a painful thorn to the democratic institutions. In sum, the Atheniansconsidered political career a kind of profession, requiring specific personalqualities acquired after training. Such training was first established by thesophists.

I shall address the issue by examining the following topics:1. Does a politician need specific qualities?2. Specificity of moral training.3. The steps of the training.4. The goal.I purposefully avoid the word “education”, because it refers to a theoretical

learning. On the other hand, training purports to apply learning wherenecessary, i.e. to transform attitude and conduct instead of simply acquiring astock of knowledge.

Does a politician need specific qualities?

Common sense says that every job needs a set of skills, be it scientificknowledge, artistic training, manual expertise, or whatever comes with thejob. However, getting involved in politics is considered the affair of everybodywithout further discussion. The democratic ideal, even in its truncated presentday form, i.e. representative democracy, entails that the rulers and the ruled,being equal in status in the face of the law, are not distinguished from each

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other by a qualitative difference. Such a difference would introduce an essentialdisparity among the two poles of democracy. If the rulers are supposed toexhibit specific skills or qualities, then, goes the argument, the pool ofcandidates gets dangerously smaller than the body of the electorate. Therefore,democracy is perfidiously transformed into a meritocracy or an aristocracy ofsome sort. This is inacceptable. In all good republican logic, the ignorance andincompetence of candidates has never been a standard of elimination, let aloneof failure to get elected. The argument goes unchallenged from election toelection around the globe, in fear of upsetting democratic sensibilities, whilstthe disputant may be accused of undermining the rule of law and justice.

I argue for the fallacy of the argument on the grounds that we focus on theneed for politicians to acquire certain skills, which is rightly rejected as creatinga caste of administrators, instead of looking for intellectual and emotionalmaturity. Moral standards may easily be observed. They provide widelyaccepted evaluationstandards, which may determine in a large measure theissue of a candidate’s political destiny. These qualities are not abstract idealsand, foremost, they concern and distinguish persons individually and notcollectively. What does it mean for a government to fight corruption andembezzlement if its members do not incarnate in more or less publiclynoticeable ways probity, morality, uprightness and sincerity? It is too easy forthe adversary to object that such an attitude best describes hypocrites leavingunchallenged the blueprint of serious public personalities. However, as thepaper will make clear, morality is not easy to fake. First, it is at work when theneed is most urgent, in crisis and difficult decisions, when, normally, masksfall apart. Then, public opinion is a keen observer. It is not easily deceived forlong. Besides, morality has the advantage of continuity and invariability. Itdoes not come and go with occasional interests and personal, corporate, familyor party advantages. Last, morality, as will be exposed in length in this paper,is not a nebulous, ambiguous set of rules or maxims. It is a very concretealthough highly personal conduct resulting from specific training and both thetraining and the result are real facts. The simple truth is that whoever aspiresto a political career has to undergo a specific moral training that will providehim/her with the necessary awareness, will and ability to act according to his/her intentions. This training is not limited in time, but persists and continuesindefinitely; in other words it is permanent.

Ancient philosophers around Eurasia were familiar with the issue. In broadlines and running the risk of simplifying, we may advance that ethics havebeen construed to meet the tasks of a public figure. To mention only themainstream of classical antiquity in Greece and China, this figure has beeneither the politician (Plato and Aristotle), or the civil servant (Confucius andhis school), or again the ruler (Daoism).

Plato asks directly the question at the Protagoras and takes it up again atthe Republic. In Greek antiquity the philosophical inquiry was initiated by thesophists’ claim to teach the art of conducting public affairs, meaning, as Platopointedly remarks, how to become a politician. Is being a politician a careerdemanding specific skills, in the same way, for example, as the shoe makerneeds to know how to make shoes or the bronze sculptor how to cast a statue?In the Republic, Plato thoroughly examines moral knowledge or wisdom.

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Dialectic is the basis of the training. The student progresses step by step,starting by learning, examining and comprehending visible empirical things.Then he/she continues by contemplating the invisible objects of the nous,intellect, until he/she sees in a direct intuition the Idea of the supreme good.This transcendent experience guides by its authenticity and compelling forceall his/her actions thereafter and guarantees that his/her conduct is constantlyand entirely virtuous.

The allegory of the cave expresses beautifully the double movement towardsthe good and back towards its implementation among humans. Coming backamong his ex-fellow prisoners, the seer, now a free man, assumesunquestionably the leading role. His vision and direct experience of the trueand the good enables him to know with certainty what is good for the communityand how to implement it in the best possible way. Implementation of virtue toreal society as well as virtuous living is not a mystery for the Platonic student.The method of attaining the vision of the supreme good is paved with stepsunder the guidance of an experienced teacher. The vision is in itself sooverwhelming that it transforms all inner inconsistencies and psychologicalweaknesses that have previously impeded virtuous conduct.

A lofty ideal as the vision of the Idea of the supreme good can hardly squeezein a curriculum. It may remain omnipresent as an ideal, perhaps not alwaystaken at its face value. It exercises a real attraction and, most importantly,provides the standard of all moral effort.

Plato summarized the debate in his famous statement that if the philosophersdo not rule or the kings do not philosophize, public affairs will go utterly wrong.He implied that virtue is the only true qualification of a politician. Rejecting thesophist propensity to specialized and exclusive knowledge –in Plato’s terms“special skills”-, he advocated in a coherent although a little eccentric way, thatthe possession of the good and true is the only reliable and enduring way toconduct public affairs. Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that Plato’s philosopherking is adept of virtue in the sense that he constantly practices virtue andcontemplates the essences of things, the Ideas. He thus perfects his moralnature. Virtue is not a one- time affair, but a constant cultivation that irradiateswisdom and goodwill.

The same line of thought is taken up by a more down to earth philosopher,namely Aristotle. Without delving in his theory of virtue, let us mention theclosing section of his Nichomacheian Ethics: Ethics are the condition of politics;therefore, one must first study ethics, the science of virtue and vice, and thenapproach the science of politics. Accordingly, the politician or the aspirant topublic life needs to study and cultivate morality before engaging in public affairs.

It is all too clear that for ancient Greek philosophers morality is thefundamental prerequisite of politics. Conversely, nobody is entitled to engagein politics without having first cultivated his character in earnest. Theshortcomings of the Athenian democracy were all too evident to thephilosophers. They found the remedy in the education (paideia) of thepoliticians, an education not in varied skills, but in wisdom and ethics. Theirconsistent and continuous pleading and arguing may have given poor resultsin actual politics. Nevertheless, it has raised a yet untried issue to a questionthat has given rise to too many answers.

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The ancient Greek mental framework of moral philosophy was shared byother contemporary Eurasian civilizations and cultures. Focusing on our otherpole of discussion, ancient Chinese intellectuals came to much the sameconclusions with their Greek counterparts. Confucius believed that the ancientkings, like Yao and Shun, were the summit and live incarnation of virtue. Hefound their conduct entirely wise and good. Their unique objective had beento provide material goods and spiritual guidance to the people in order toestablish prosperity, peace and moral integrity in the kingdom. The reason oftheir success was to be found in the cultivation of virtue beginning with theirown persons. For Confucius self- cultivation is the crucial difference betweenthe rule of the sage kings and that of later rulers. Even his beloved idol, theDuke of Zhou, had not proved the equal of Yao and Shun in respect to moralconduct. As for his contemporary rulers, Confucius despaired about theirwillingness to practice virtue let alone incarnate it.

One of the classical Confucian texts, the Great Learning (Da Xue) expressesin a key-passage the interconnectedness of moral cultivation and public career.“The ancients, who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom,first ordered well their states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulatedtheir families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons.Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectifytheir hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincerein their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge” (Great Learning,2). In order to demonstrate that conditionality between ruling and virtue is notonly necessary but also sufficient, the text runs the argument in the converseorder: “Things being investigated, their knowledge became complete. Theirknowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere,their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons werecultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Theirfamilies being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states beingrightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy” (GreatLearning, 4). In recent years Western scholars have severely criticized thesepassages. They have pointed out that it is naïve to believe that running a stateis like running a family. It creates a paternalistic model in which the rulergoverns autocratically as a pater familias. Governing a state is definitely acomplex business in the fifth century BC as well as now. The complexity variesbut the challenges remain. Particularly, different rules and conducts apply tostate and to family circles respectively. The state is governed by laws andinstitutions. In family, conduct and red lines are matters of habit and personalidiosyncrasies. Such arguments are, naturally, inspired by our Westerndemocratic traditions. Chinese politics have always taken pride in comparingto a well-run household. The ruler looks after the interests of his subjects withbenevolence and diligence –at least in theory- as a father looks after the interestsof his family. However, the Great Learning’s statement can be read in a moresophisticated way. First, let’s remember that the whole text goes back topersonal cultivation and wisdom, the family circle being the intermediate semi-private or semi-public stage between personal cultivation and state politics.The two extremes connect personal morality and leadership in a cause andeffect necessity. The cause of good leadership is personal wisdom and virtue

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and, conversely, the result of personal accomplishment is public peace andprosperity. The method of passing from the private level of accomplishment tothe public level of good and efficient governance is the subject matter of a laterdevelopment. The present text gives only a succinct outline of the method.

Now, what lessons can we draw for a contemporary politician? The firstlesson is, without doubt, that morality and governance are inseparable.Furthermore, they stand in a relation of cause and effect with each other. Virtueis the condition of good governance and, conversely, politicians need to perfecttheir moral nature (Plato and Aristotle) or their moral conduct (Confucians) inorder to be qualified to govern.

The second lesson is the absolute trust of the intellectuals in the power andinfluence of virtue on the public scene. In fact, they are persuaded that virtuecommands such a compelling force that it can sweep away and wash out alldisintegrating forces within society. At this point, let’s remember Confucius’remarks about the auspicious and integrating influence of virtue. “To learnand at due times to repeat what one has learnt, is that not after all a pleasure?That friends should come to one from afar, is this not after all delightful?” (Analects,1.1). Virtue exercises a beneficent influence to the surroundings working as apole of attraction for people near and far. It irradiates goodwill leading peopleto gather around it, as friends come from afar to share the pleasures ofknowledge with each other. In government, virtue irradiates peace and stabilitybeing, by its very practice, the best advertisement and guarantee of a powerfulstate. Personal integrity of politicians and civil servants on a permanent basis -not just the time of an election round- combined with sound institutions mayattract other states to associate in order to create common projects.

The third point concerns the ideal state produced by virtuous government.For ancient Greeks the state was unambiguously democratic. Plato’s idealrepublic sketches a utopia canvassed on the background of Atheniandemocracy. It corrects malfunctions and shortcomings noticed by thephilosopher from his Socratic years. In the Republic justice, in its highest formemanating from wisdom and virtue, rules supreme. The duties of thephilosophers guardians explain vividly and simply what the duties of the rulersin any regime. It is almost indifferent if the regime is monarchy, aristocracy ordemocracy. Plato insists that the citizens have specific duties according to theirposition in society. Their conduct should be in harmony with their positionand with their duties. It is important to know what to do and how to behavewithin context and according to our station in life. These rules are laid down inthe city-state in a clear and unambiguous way by the philosophers. They arewise and virtuous persons, not by profession, birth or rank, but by personalaccomplishment. The quest for the fittest in any occupation is the true forcemotivating Plato’s visionary state. Perhaps it would not be too far-fetched toadvance its correlation, namely that each and every person has the possibilityand the right to do what he/she comes to realize is the best for his/her abilities.The awareness comes at the end of the appropriate training.

In contemporary context, we can start reforming the standard of politicalleadership by analyzing the effects of virtuous conduct on the public scale. Ahard to fight presumption assumes that virtue acts against or at leastindependently of profit. This is utterly wrong, if we consider the first rule of all

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virtue, namely to work in harmony with public interest. Nowadays, profit istaken in a strictly egotistic meaning, referring to personal gain, to particularinterests and to fractional advantages of all sorts, particularly money. Thepeople’s interests are much broader. They include both personal prosperityand national peace and stability. Happiness may well be the outcome of justiceand sincerity, inasmuch as people are free to exercise their talents and prosperin harmony with other humans and with their surroundings, humans andnatural. For example, a body of representatives numbering a majority trainedin virtuous conduct would spontaneously discuss current political issues in anentirely different perspective. They would try earnestly and steadily to regulatesociety in a way that would minimize strife and dispute and at the same timewould promote harmonious cooperation and long lasting goals. Regulationshave to provide for everybody, not just for corporations, groups, etc. byunderstanding and evaluating the effects on the entire present and futuresociety. It is a very difficult and ambiguous task comporting the risk ofcondemning government to inertia and political timidity. It is a risk to be foughtevery time circumstances demand anticipated action. The tasks and decisionsto be taken and implemented are perceived from different angles, perspectivesare examined and solutions are never a one way issue. Flexibility asks foralternative plans ad infinitum.

The political angle of a virtue trained body politic would not only favor longlasting solutions that promote social, even global, well-being, but would alsobe trained to seek opportunities and change angle whenever the circumstancesrequire it. Ability to weigh circumstances and find appropriate solutionsaccording to the above mentioned goals may demand a more circumstantialapproach. Both Confucius and Aristotle insisted on appropriate conduct, a questthat comports taking in consideration and acting according to the circumstances.Inalterable methods and policies generate stagnation and backwardness.Constancy goes hand in hand with flexibility and as such generates an eye foropportunities, openings, negotiations and constructive diplomatic initiative.

Specificity of moral trainingBefore examining the concrete steps of moral training, two preliminary

points need to be discussed:

Continuity in training

Specificity of moral training. It has been briefly mentioned above that moraltraining is permanent. Socrates admitted that he was getting old yet alwayslearning. In a simple way he expresses the quasi permanency of moral training.The nature of virtue is to get always better, or to strive incessantly for the goodand the true. On the other hand, Confucius expressed the same idea in a famous,perhaps autobiographic saying: “At fifteen I set my heart upon learning. At thirty,I had planted my feet firmly upon the ground. At forty, I no longer suffered fromperplexities. At fifty, I knew what were the biddings of Heaven. At sixty, I heardthem with docile ear. At seventy, I could follow the dictates of my own heart; forwhat I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right” (Analects, II. 4).Confucius retraces the important turn points of his moral progress. It is all tooclear that the knowledge he acquired at fifteen was not of the same nature as

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the one he acquired at the age of seventy. However, the progression to somekind of self- realization that coincides with the “biddings” of Heaven is admittedlythe learning’s purpose. Concomitantly, the wisdom acquired at seventy cannotbe acquired at fifteen or even at thirty. Time and age have their importanceinasmuch as they cumulate study with experience and love of learning withemotional maturity. The lesson to learn is that morality is a subtle combinationof intellectual inquiry and extensive knowledge brought to maturity bycontinuous self-cultivation and experience acquired by age. Age and constancygo hand in hand illustrating vividly the difference between moral and otherforms of training. The first requires knowledge, experience, emotional maturityand incessant investigation in the right and proper measure. Therefore, it isnot a training dispensed at school or at a conventional establishment. It demandspersonal commitment and permanent self-improvement.

Aristotle makes a statement in the same vein when he precedes politics byethics. Previously versed in various skills, politicians are now ready to delve inthe superior knowledge of ethics. Aristotle does not conceive ethics as acurriculum in the same way as children’s education. It requires proper trainingin order to inculcate values and a way of being and acting in human societythat is different by nature from specific skills and various fields of knowledge.Logically, ethics precedes politics, but in real time it accompanies its exercise.First, in the sense that politics must be conducted with ethos and second, inthe sense that morality as such does not have a time limit but is a constantdisposition to act rightly.

The second feature of moral training concerns its nature. It is neithertheoretical knowledge nor practical skill. Aristotle defines it as “disposition”(hexis) to act properly and according to measure. The learning consists in aself- realization when the person gradually transforms his/her characteraccording to the true and the good. As Confucius put it, the virtuous learns inorder to change him/her according to the norm until one day he/she realizesthat he/she acts spontaneously rightly and properly. Then he/she does nothave to think of the norm, just lets him/herself be and act freely.

The first objection coming to mind is the sheer extravagance of time neededin order to attain even the lowest steps of such learning. Nowadays, when timeis the most precious commodity, it is beyond question to spend endless hoursin a perpetual quest. Political careers are usually both short lived and fullyoccupied. The argument is correct when we think in short spans of time, properto individual careers. If we change our point of view and move from individualcareer to statecraft then we admittedly need to take into account the coefficientof time. Stability, peace and harmony are achieved in the long run. It is not amatter of one or two tours of election, not even of one or two generations.Ethical politics will pay in the long run and perhaps will guarantee the statefrom many dangers that may threaten its security and good order. Continuoustraining in a difficult field like ethics also entails large expense. However, it isvery possible that it will pay better than short lived politics as it is usuallypracticed today. The cost is always proportional to the result. If the result is astrong and prosperous state, the cost is worth taking.

The corpus politicus may well participate on a permanent basis to workshopsof study and thinking in order to progress first on a personal basis. In a second

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time they need to implement moral decisions to politics. It is well known thatpoliticians need scientific consultants and advisors in order to cope with thetechnicalities of law and other specialized fields. The law defines what is lawfuland unlawful but says nothing about what is right and wrong. Many lawfuldecisions are morally unacceptable and the largest part of moral issues isentirely ignored by the lawmakers.

The need for a moral advisor brings us to the last distinctive feature ofmoral training, namely the need for a spiritual guide. Confucius did not havesuch a guide. He confesses studying here and there on his own. He was anautodidact and as such he might have felt acutely the need to help his fellowmenby becoming de facto the first teacher in Chinese history. Of course, teachingwas not unknown in ancient China, far from that, but Confucius inauguratedthe era of moral teaching and of studying in order to become a better person.In a similar way, Socrates was the first teacher of ancient Greece, in the sensethat he was the first to teach in order to build the ethos, the moral character ofhis students. Plato’s Academy and later Aristotle’s Lyceum were the firstuniversities of ancient Europe. They aimed not only to educate, but, moreimportantly, to cultivate moral character. If the circumstances called for, theirgraduates should be able to take the lead of the city in an efficient and successfulmanner.

Many centuries after Confucius, the continuators of his ideas, known in theWest as Neo-Confucians, paid the utmost attention to the question of spiritualpreceptor. Imbued by centuries of Buddhism, they were quick to perceive theimportance of guidance by an experienced teacher. As we shall see in the nextchapter, it is very difficult to cultivate morality in private. The guide helps notonly by discussing, encouraging and teaching, but also by checking the sincerityand the profundity of the undertaking. Realization may be a private experience,but its effects are publicly observed and duly noted. The guide helps avoid thepitfalls of false achievements, of self-indulgence and egotistic motives disguisedas virtuous concern.

The use of scientific advisors by contemporary politicians may and, in myopinion, should, be enlarged to include spiritual (not religious) guidance. Thepersons involved have to enjoy public reputation and it is time to start a publicdiscussion on the matter. Moral training cannot be one more acquired skill. Itshould occupy a prominent place in a political career. It is very difficult toprescribe a priori the assets of such persons. One thing is clear: They shouldbe neither political nor religious figures nor in any way involved in institutionsthat may be liable to manipulate or try to exercise influence on politicians. Theadvisor is supposed to disengage politicians from particular interests by showingand inculcating a more comprehensive reality.

The ancient Chinese and Greek pattern of a successful moral person maybe described as at times learning and at times teaching. A politician has a lot tobenefit from such an open disposition to ideas, points of view, arguments,objections and debates. Contemporary political discourse usually consists in astring of half-baked artless statements destined to flatter, persuade, inspirefear or dissuade the citizens. Objections and facts are considered instrumentalin promoting personal points of view instead of guiding to innovative and flexiblesolutions.

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For Confucius and Socrates, emblematic figures of ancient learning, asuccessful politician does not entrench himself in a one-sided logic. Democracyoriginates in discussion, therefore the politician has to listen, learn, at timesdefend and at times change policies. First and foremost he/she must listen tothe people and always take in consideration the interests of the people notonly as a unified body, but equally pay attention and actively promote individualrights and well-being. He/she must invent solutions and policies to conciliatethe interests of the people with those of the individual. Listening to the people,he/she learns invaluable lessons of the real issues at hand. Implementingpolicies, voting new laws and regulations, he/she practices publicly his/hermoral integrity (or the absence of it). Finally, statecraft inspired by, or, at least,lending a sympathetic ear to publicly acclaimed moral values may instill a spiritof authentic belonging to the citizens.

The steps of moral trainingIn regard to moral training, Confucians, Platonists and Aristotelians have

maintained the need for a positive and sustained learning. However, the contentand the method differ from one intellectual tradition to the other. Confuciuscomprehends learning primarily as the study and investigation of the ancients.He is reported to say: “I for my part am not one of those who have innateknowledge. I am simply one who loves the past and who is diligent in investigatingit” (Analects, VII. 19). The interest of the past lies in learning from the exampleof the antique sages. Their actions embody in the most perfect and limpid wayvirtue in its entire splendor. Being entirely wise and good, they can inspirepatterns of conduct, provide authoritative precedent, raise moral standards and,in one word, inspire authentic and almost indisputable examples of virtue. Thework of Confucius is not that of an antiquarian. The past is not blindly followed.It inspires and suggests innovative solutions to contemporary challenges. Itwould be utter nonsense, protests Confucius, to copy ancient rites and customs.We need to study them in order to realize the underlying principle still livingtoday but hidden to normal perception. We must resurrect not the letter butthe spirit of the ancients in order to create a truly great culture.

Ancient Greek learning is an entirely different matter. Both Plato andAristotle distinguish between the knowledge of different skills (technai),assimilated by Aristotle to relative knowledge and true knowledge (episte‰ me‰ ),also named wisdom (sophia). Wisdom is certain and unshakable knowledge ofthe true and the good. Plato defines dialectic as the unique method to attaindirect intuitive knowledge of the good. By training in discussion under theform of a tight dialogue, the student learns to infer the idea of the thing underdiscussion, its very essence and thus, ascend dialectically to more abstractand more quintessential realities. The ascending movement cannot be fullyimplemented without extensive learning from all parties involved in the process.Abstract subject-matters, like geometry and music, arithmetic and astronomy,are necessary complements. They familiarize the student with abstract conceptsproviding a useful instrument to ascend the spiral of epistêmê.

Purportedly, Confucius took four subjects for his teaching: culture, conductof affairs, loyalty to superiors and the keeping of promises (Analects, VII. 24).All four deal with human conduct within society, particularly in the context ofparticipating in a hierarchical relation of superior and inferior, of leader and

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follower, of manager and employee, and, foremost, of ruler and minister/subject.Hierarchy being the root and the model of all human relations, it is importantto know the exact rules of conduct in order to send the right messages andestablish the proper dynamic between the parties involved.

The first step of a recast program of self-cultivation would start from theinvestigation of things. The Great Learning assimilates the extension ofknowledge, identified with self-cultivation, with the investigation of things.Instead of trying to acquire encyclopedic erudition, the trainee tries to penetratethe sense, the meaning or the principle of things. In Confucian context, themost adequate subject-matter would be historical records, actual facts, eveneveryday incidents and persons. The student tries to understand how theancient sages conducted their affairs, how they responded, provoked or simplydealt with facts and persons. By penetrating the motives, they come tounderstand the significance. At this level of comprehension, beyondcircumstantial and factual evidence, the student attains the very gist of reality.He/she thoroughly understands the way things come to fit together in orderto create a significant, therefore worth studying, segment of time-space reality.Becoming familiar with this kind of investigation, he/she plunges deep intothe past in order to understand the present and anticipate the future. In fact,reality is made up of such segments of time-space actions, and whoever knowshow the future is already configured in past-present events, can control in acertain measure future issues. Contrasting with our contemporary belief thatinformation is the key to control events, people, markets, etc.; moral theoriesmaintain that the key to unleash the future lies in knowing the dynamics ofevery concrete situation. Power means to understand clearly and exhaustivelythe trends, the drives and the latent potential of each and every situation. Factsare only the symptoms of a vaster and more complex reality worth investigating.By their occurrence, they bend events towards some yet inconspicuousdirection. Further, every fact comports an opposite side that may remain inlatency, but exercises an equally pervasive influence on future events. Theleader has to be constantly aware of the whole situation and not only of theobvious facts. Decisions also trigger a contrasting scenario. The positive sideis the one expressed by the decision and the mechanisms to support it, whilstthe negative side will eventually bring in prominence undesirable, but notunforeseeable, consequences.

When we abandon the tyranny of facts, statistics and numbers we abandonat the same time our attention to immediate tasks at hand as the only realitythat matters. Politics, as we have seen time and again, deal with long termissues. Investigating the underlining trends of the situation at hand in order toforesee possible issues and draw appropriate policies operates a self-transformational process. We cease to think and plan according to ourimmediate self-interests, the ones emanating from our restricted attention tofactual reality and immediate gratification. Things now acquire a permanentrelief relating them to all other things along with the perceiver. The newlyperceived unity of things, events and perceiver first occurs in the time line.Trends configured by events create invisible ties that link past, present andfuture to a compact and undivided sequence of events. The perceiver is now inmeasure to detect such ties and act accordingly even by bending and flexing

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them to his/her advantage. Then the unity embraces spatial reality as the trendsreach out to impact or simply to stir other entities, people and, of course, theinvestigator. The importance of the politician’s personal qualities may bemeasured on his/her ability not only to foresee but also to manipulate futureissues. The more he/she has abandoned a self-centered point of view andensuing conduct, the more he/she attains a level of multi-centered perception.Selfishness diminishes leaving the person free or “empty” of ego-centeredthoughts and ambitions. Instead the world, the large context, the multifacetedreality takes the lead. Perception becomes more inclusive in order to embracethe undercurrents of life and strife animating facts and figures. Ultimately,consciousness reaches out to touch further than the immediate tasks the worldat large.

All issues have some global impact and all decisions have to acknowledgetheir utmost consequences. Contextual perception conditions appropriateconduct in the sense that appropriateness is defined by Aristotle as what isharmonious and right for a given situation. The right thing to do is what isproper when we take in consideration all the factors at hand, visible and invisible,facts and consequences, near and far away and then we make plans in view ofthe larger context. The context may be the family, the circle of friends or ofwork, the community, the state and the world. Acting contextually means takingin consideration the different levels of interaction that we may reach by ourinitiative (or response). Although contextualization may seem at first sight tolead to inaction, hesitation, endless deliberation and consultation, it should be,on the contrary, a powerful motive for resolute action. The awareness of theforces at play as clues for future development should give an indisputablestrategic advantage.

Contemplation is the other pole of the training along with the investigationof things. Investigate thyself. Perhaps this is the most difficult part of the trainingand, understandably, few people, particularly successful politicians, are willingto undergo a soul searching in order to become truthful, selfless, sincere,trustworthy and good. At this level, the qualified teacher possesses a widearray of teaching methods according to the temperament of the trainee. He/she has to penetrate the motives and drives of the disciple and accordinglyprescribe the proper exercises. Flaws and advantages have to be duly detectedand worked on. The purpose is to create a balanced personality, able to feel,think and act creatively, harmoniously and contextually. Discussion,introspection, visualization and analytic reflection serve to attain the end.Unremitting effort and unwavering constancy in training are the necessaryaccessories to the endeavor.

The goalUsually at this section figure the political goals that ethics admittedly strive

to achieve, i.e. harmony, peace, stability and prosperity. However, ourdiscussion concerns the politician’s reformed ethos, so I intend to explore itsimprint on his/her conduct. The first goal is certainly to govern by rational andmoral principles. From antiquity until today it has rarely –if ever- happened.Aristotelian virtues are grounded in reason inasmuch as they proceed fromthoughtful deliberation, personal restraint, right measure and sincerity.Prudence, temperance, courage and justice, the four cardinal virtues, bring to

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maturity speculative as well as practical rational procedures. In fact, they expressthe excellence of the rational faculty over, for example, the tempestuousemotions named passions. The excellence of reason is not just a disposition,but the constant ability to act perfectly rationally at any moment. As has beenmentioned earlier, rationality, in ancient Greek philosophy includes emotionalmaturity and instinctive drives well harnessed under the guidance of reason. Arational person is not a cold blooded calculator, aloof and insensitive to thepeople’s plights. The ancients thought such a person to be hard as a rock andinapt to govern or simply guide a human community. The moral training aimsat providing the trainee both with judgment and self-restraint in order to takethe right decisions and implement them accordingly.

Confucius and his school have promoted more interpersonal virtues, namelyhumaneness, appropriateness, propriety and practical understanding. Thesevirtues circumscribe a measured and open conduct, which favors positivefeelings of sincerity and good will. Confucius gives much importance topondering, discussing, deliberating, weighing carefully positive and negativesides of a situation, even prognosticating, before reaching a decision and acting.

A direct consequence of both Confucian and Aristotelian ethics is theincreasing capacity to match intentions, words and deeds. First, our traineedoes not embrace the current idea that the end justifies the means. There is nojust cause served by unjust methods. Each step is an end in itself, therefore ithas to be entirely just, whole, appropriate and measured. Policies that openlypromote one objective and implicitly try to implement it by devious methodsare a dead end. The common justification of such an attitude is that it cannotbe otherwise, but in the ethical perspective this is bluntly blackmail. It is eithera bad plan or a plan badly thought. Moral conduct unifies theory and practiceand proceeds by positive steps. Rationality, humaneness and the rest ofConfucian and Aristotelian virtues have in common the capacity to be entirelypositive in the sense of acting always in a positive way for the common goodand in abandoning negative feelings as unproductive.

Positive feelings, thoughts and actions mean that the politician does notfeel fear and does not govern by fear. Confucius is reported to have said thatthe gentleman obeys to propriety; the low person obeys to fear. Punishmentsare meant to instill fear and dissuade from criminal or unlawful conduct. Thisis an inverted pedagogical method. However, governance by fear does not limititself to punishments. It creates a fearsome and threatening universe, imaginaryenemies, conspiracies, natural disasters, and doomsday and by bringing thepopulation to the brink of panic it can control bodies and minds. People becomenerveless, paralyzed and totally docile. In the perspective of our new politiciansuch methods are entirely inadmissible. Consensus can be achieved withinpluralism whilst peace and stability require the cooperation of different forces,opinions, parties, etc. in order to have some real meaning and long lastingeffects. Difference is not thought as a threat or a negativity, which needs to besuppressed, intimidated or simply neutralized. The accomplishments of ourpolitician make him/her see difference as an opportunity to work on findinginnovative solutions in order to harmonize the old and the new in a new orderof things. He/she is ever vigilant to new challenges knowing that they are thereal motives of progress. His/her intention is not to annihilate them but to use

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them creatively to the common good. He/she does not pretend to accept themin order to undermine them in the first occasion. He/she is trained in the art ofdealing with the unpredictable. The idea is not to continue in an everlastinginertia, but to move forward, not to limit personal expression and aspirations,but to reconcile them steadfastly with the common interest.

A realist and pragmatic view predisposes in finding solutions with positiveresults. Action harmonizes with facts. If we perceive things as we would likethem to be, we only nurture illusion. At personal level, we may have a chanceto go by without major problems, but at a large scale, we head for disaster.Politicians usually choose to flatter their electorate and they call it prudence.Taking as alibi the need to soothe, reassure and, of course, attract popularity,they envelop facts, plans, and policies in vague discourse. They believe thattelling the truth and all the truth may bring panic, unreasonable expectations,perhaps even revolt, protest and all kinds of reactions that they are not preparedor willing to deal with. Therefore, they speak in a vaguely reassuring manner,letting public opinion in a limbo about their real workings and plans. Mostdemocracies suffer from the politicians’ duplicity at least on the verbal level.Instead of informing, they promise, instead of warning, they elude the problem,instead of taking just measures on time; they surrender to futile inertia until itis too late.

Confucius thought that restoring to words their real meaning will save usfrom chaos. The reason is simple. When we know the truth, we know what weshould do in every situation. We don’t end up in confusion or in inertia, becausewe know exactly where we stand and what the situation calls for. This is a veryimportant asset for a politician. He/she is not led by events or by his /herpersonal desire to please, to flatter or to inspire fear and submission. Knowingthe truth means to let aside egotistic aspirations by embracing the cause of thecommon good sincerely, constantly and entirely.

When Socrates insists again and again in asking his interlocutor to come upwith a definition of his sayings, be it justice, virtue, courage or whatever isunder investigation, he expresses a conversant to Confucius’ preoccupationabout truth. However, the definition has a more comprehensive and theoreticalpurpose than just knowing what is right in order to do right. It reveals theessence, the permanent and inalterable nature of the defined, leading, by thatmatter to metaphysics and ontology. Perhaps the scope of the Socratic definitionis too ambitious in order to be of practical use to the politician. Sometimes, wehave the feeling that the discussion forgets the reason it started from and movesto a sphere of abstraction hardly reconcilable with the urgencies of politics.

ConclusionsAncient virtue ethics have more than an antiquarian import. Recast, they

can give us some clues in order to reinvent a new model for politicians. Thismodel is based on personal accomplishments and moral behavior.

It is clear that the politician has to undergo a specific training, which willreadjust his/her priorities and will enable him/her to act accordingly.

The personality of the teacher and the context of the training need furtherelaboration. For obvious reasons the teacher should not partake or representany specific parties or interests. However, his/her person must inspire enoughrespect to serve as advisor. Caution is necessary so as to avoid a guru like

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personality that may entertain relations of spiritual dependence with the trainee.This is not acceptable. The trainee must keep complete freedom of decisionsand responsibility.

Changing model entails changing also model of governance. Two pointshave been clear from previous discussions. First, the model politician governsby encouraging people in their interactive pursuits when they promote harmonyand prosperity. He does not govern by fear and by punishments or byextenuating restrictive measures. Instead of limiting the people’s pursuits, he/she tries to find ways to actively diminish their pursuits’ negative effects.

Second, he/she may be realist and at the same innovative and imaginative.Realism means to know and act according to real data and inform accordinglythe citizens. Imagination and innovation come with the solutions to problems.It is essential to build a society on the will and ability to create, to experimentand to love of progress. It is also important to stir the creative forces of societyto long lasting common ends where all social forces can coexist withoutexclusions or strong disparities.

Is it a utopia? Well, we see where realism has led us.

REFERENCES

Aristotle, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy,2000.

Fung, Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, Princeton University Press, 1983(first published 1953).

Legge, James, The Li Ki, Sacred Books of China, vol. 28, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers,India, 1885.

Plato, Plato: Protagoras, Loeb Classical Library, No 165, Greek and English Edition, 1977.Plato, Plato: The Republic, 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, Greek and English Edition, 2013.Waley, Arthur, The Analects of Confucius, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988.


UDC 37.0 + 316.3 + 378

THE TRENDS OF LEGAL REGULATIONOF EDUCATION IN RUSSIA

À. B. Didikin (Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract. The aim of the paper is the analysis of modern trends of legalsupport of the Russian education system in the conditions of its integration intothe European educational space. The research is devoted to the peculiarities ofthe emergence and implementation of educational relations, providing theguarantees of realization of the right to education in the light of renewal of thelegislative foundations. The author considers new approaches to regulation ofexperimental and innovative activity in the sphere of education, accessibility ofeducation in the educational services market. The contribution of the author isthe substantiation, on the basis of comprehensive analysis of the content of legal

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norms of the new law on education in Russia, of the position about the influenceof the norms of the law on the functioning of the Russian system of educationwith a possible decrease of its competitiveness and the uncertainty of the prospectsof its development.

Key words: education, educational relations; law on education, theeducational credit, responsibility, innovation activity, experimental activities;agreement on education; educational organization.

ÒÅÍÄÅÍÖÈÈ ÏÐÀÂÎÂÎÃÎ ÐÅÃÓËÈÐÎÂÀÍÈßÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß Â ÐÎÑÑÈÈ

À. Á. Äèäèêèí (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Öåëü ñòàòüè – àíàëèç ñîâðåìåííûõ òåíäåíöèé ïðàâîâîãîîáåñïå÷åíèÿ ñèñòåìû ðîññèéñêîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ â óñëîâèÿõ åå èíòåãðàöèèâ åâðîïåéñêîå îáðàçîâàòåëüíîå ïðîñòðàíñòâî. Èññëåäîâàíèå ïîñâÿùåíîîñîáåííîñòÿì âîçíèêíîâåíèÿ è ðåàëèçàöèè îáðàçîâàòåëüíûõ ïðàâîîò-íî-øåíèé, îáåñïå÷åíèÿ ãàðàíòèé ðåàëèçàöèè ïðàâà íà îáðàçîâàíèå â ñâå-òå îáíîâëåíèÿ çàêîíîäàòåëüíîé áàçû. Ðàññìàòðèâàþòñÿ íîâûå ïîäõî-äû ê ðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ýêñïåðèìåíòàëüíîé è èííîâàöèîííîé äåÿòåëüíîñ-òè â ñôåðå îáðàçîâàíèÿ, îáåñïå÷åíèþ äîñòóïíîñòè îáðàçîâàíèÿ íà ðûíêåîáðàçîâàòåëüíûõ óñëóã. Âêëàä àâòîðà: íà îñíîâå êîìïëåêñíîãî àíàëèçàñîäåðæàíèÿ ïðàâîâûõ íîðì íîâîãî çàêîíà îá îáðàçîâàíèè â Ðîññèè îáî-ñíîâàíèå ïîçèöèè î âëèÿíèè íîðì çàêîíà íà ôóíêöèîíèðîâàíèå ðîññèéñ-êîé ñèñòåìû îáðàçîâàíèÿ ñ âîçìîæíûì ñíèæåíèåì åå êîíêóðåíòî-ñïî-ñîáíîñòè è íåîïðåäåëåííîñòüþ ïåðñïåêòèâ åå ðàçâèòèÿ.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáðàçîâàíèå; îáðàçîâàòåëüíûå îòíîøåíèÿ; çàêîíîá îáðàçîâàíèè; îáðàçîâàòåëüíûé êðåäèò; îòâåòñòâåííîñòü; èííîâà-öèîííàÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòü; ýêñïåðèìåíòàëüíàÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòü; äîãîâîð îáîáðàçîâàíèè; îáðàçîâàòåëüíàÿ îðãàíèçàöèÿ.

The development of the Russian education system is traditionally amongthe most discussed and controversial issues considered by the scientific andpedagogical community, public authorities and the civil society. The ambiguityof the officially declared objectives of the educational policy, the contradictionsof integration of the Russian education system in the international context, thecomplexity of the material budgetary support of educational institutions, andbuilding effective relationships of the subjects of the educational process with

© Didikin A. B., 2013Didikin Anton Borisovich, PhD in jurisprudence, researcher at the Institute of Philosophy

and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, deputy head of theChair of Jurisprudence of the Novosibirsk National Research State University

Äèäèêèí Àíòîí Áîðèñîâè÷, êàíäèäàò þðèäè÷åñêèõ íàóê, íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê Èí-ñòèòóòà ôèëîñîôèè è ïðàâà Ñèáèðñêîãî îòäåëåíèÿ ÐÀÍ, çàìåñòèòåëü çàâåäóþùå-ãî êàôåäðîé ïðàâîâåäåíèÿ Íîâîñèáèðñêîãî íàöèîíàëüíîãî èññëåäîâà-òåëüñêîãîãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà


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the authorities – this circle of questions is becoming especially topical inconnection with the updating of the Russian legislation on education at thepresent time.

In the process of public discussion of the draft law on education in Russiathere were various positions concerning the development prospects of thelegislation on education – from the proposals for the codification of andacceptance of the Educational Code to the proposals to save the existing trendsin legal regulation of Russian education in the sub-legal acts of federal andregional bodies of executive power.

The nature and content of educational relations, which affect the professionalcompetence of each citizen throughout his life, are unified in the currentlegislation in the framework of one of the basic laws. The structure of the newlaw on education provides for legal regulation of the totality of social relationsin the Russian education system. The law sets out the fundamentals of thelegal regulation of the sphere of education in Russia, integrating the generalprovisions, and the provisions regulating the relations in certain subsystemsof education (pre-school, general, secondary professional, higher education).

The law retains the basic principles and standards (including the part of thestate in guaranteeing the realization of the rights in the sphere of education,the right to choose an educational institution and education in accordance withthe inclinations and needs, education in the native language, the legalguarantees of the availability and quality of education, etc.), adheres to theprinciples of universal access and free of charge education in Russia. The stateguarantees General and free access in accordance with the Federal stateeducational standards of the pre-school, primary general, basic general andsecondary general education, secondary vocational education, as well as, on acompetitive basis, the free-of-charge higher education, if this level of educationis obtained for the first time.

The new system of Russian education was developed on the basis of theprovisions of the Constitution of Russia and taking into account the BolognaDeclaration of 1999, as well as the International standard classification ofeducation (ISCED). The law provides for four types of education: general,professional, additional (supplementary education for children and adults,additional professional education); and vocational training, aimed at educationthroughout life (continuous education).

Accordingly, the general education will consist of four levels: pre-school,primary, basic and secondary, and vocational education is of two levels:secondary vocational, higher (the Bachelor Degree program, the SpecialistDegree program and the Master Degree program; training of personnel ofhigher qualification).

The measures of social support of students, stipulated by the currentlegislation in the sphere of education, are elaborated in more detail in the newlaw. Among such measures is the payment of student scholarships.

The new law proposes to pay a state grant in the amount determined byeducational organizations, within the limits of the allocated budgetary fundsfor stipends. This will also take into account the opinion of the Council of thestudents in the educational of organization and of the elected body of the primarytrade union organization (if any). The scholarship will be determined on the

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basis of the total number of students on the full-time form at the expense ofmeans of the Federal budget in the framework of the state tasks and regulationsthat will determine the Government of the Russian Federation for each level ofvocational education and categories of students. The size of such a fund will beincreased by raising the level of inflation.

Educational technologies. One of the main aims of the law on education, asit follows from the content, is to regulate new forms of implementation anddevelopment of educational programs, educational technologies, forms andmethods of training, which are already known to the scientific and pedagogicalcommunity. In particular, the law has the following provisions:

– the credit-modular system of educational process organization and systemof test units;

– the network interaction in the realization of educational programs,including the mechanism of offset of the results of development of individualparts of the educational program in third-party organizations;

– the use of distance educational technologies in the educational process.It is especially important that there is the introduction of credit-modular

system of educational process (which has not been widely implemented in thestate higher education institutions) due to the transition of the Russianeducation from the traditional system of education to the Bologna Declarationof 1999 presupposing the introduction of the national legislation on theeducation system credits [1, p. 3]. The student, studying in a particular program,based on the credit-modular principle, by the end of the semester or academicyear must get a certain number of credits, which is formed not only bysuccessfully passing the final exam or credit, but also due to the developmentof each compulsory or of the selected module in the course of the academicyear. In the European practice, ECTS, The European Credit Transfer System,is one of the most effective systems of academic credits.

The law also provides for legal regulation of experimental and innovativeactivity in the sphere of education. The implementation of innovation activitiesis assumed in the form of implementation of innovative projects (programs) ofthe educational organizations, other actors in the spheres of educationorganizations, as well as their associations.

Experimental work in the law is defined as activities aimed at thedevelopment, testing and implementation of new educational institutions,mechanisms, educational resources, as well as new directions of preparationand specialities.

A substantial part of the new law on education is devoted to the relations onthe market of educational services, in particular of paid education [2]. The lawprovides for the conclusion of the agreement on education in the simple writtenform between the educational institution and the person credited for training(parents or legal representatives of a minor), as well as between educationalorganization, person, be paid to the training, and physical or legal person, whichmust pay tuition entered person.

The agreement on education must contain basic characteristics of theprovision of education (education services), including the type, level and (or)the aims of the educational program, the form of training, the period ofdevelopment of the educational program (duration of studies), specify the full

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cost of educational services and the method of their payment. The increase inthe cost of educational services after the conclusion of such an agreement isnot allowed, except for the cases directly stipulated by the Federal law. Theinformation in the contract on rendering of paid educational services accordingto the information posted on the official website of the educational organizationin the network the Internet on the date of conclusion of the contract.

The law provides educational organizations the right to reduce the cost ofeducational services on the contract for the students who have attained successin their study and (or) scientific activities, as well as for those in need in socialassistance.

Agreement on establishment may not contain conditions that restrict therights or reduce the level of legislative guarantees of the applicants (students).If such conditions are included in the contract, they may not be applied.

The law regulates the peculiarities of the educational credit in the marketof educational services; loan is one of the material guarantees of ensuring theright to education.

According to the law, the citizens, placed in educational organizations, willbe able to get in the Bank or other credit organization an educational loan oftwo types, primary and collateral. The main educational loan will be providedto the persons to pay for education. A related loan to pay for the hotelaccommodation, food and other household needs in the period of study ispossible. Thus, it seems that this type of loan can be obtained also in the casewhen the training is free of charge.

The new law gives the parents of studying minors a number of additionalrights:

– to have information about the course and content of the educationalprocess, as well as the assessments of the progress of their children;

– to protect the rights and legitimate interests of students;– to receive information about all the types of surveys (medical,

psychological, pedagogical) of the students, to give consent to the conduct ofsuch surveys, and to refuse from their carrying out;

– to take part in the management of educational institution;In accordance with the new law, the parents of the students are required to:– ensure that their children receive General education;– to observe the Charter of the educational organizations;– respect the honor and dignity of students and workers of educational

organization.The law contains the norms on the responsibilities of parents, as well as

educational organizations for the implementation of educational programs inaccordance with the curriculum and the schedule of educational process, carriedout not in full volume. Also the educational organization will be responsible forthe life and health of students and workers during the educational process, aswell as for the quality of education of their graduates [3, p. 46-48].

It should be noted that in the law there is represented a substantive definitionof education as a purposeful process of education and training, which is a publicgood and implemented in the interests of the individual, the family, societyand the state. This definition was a result of long discussions during theconsideration of the draft law on education. The law, of course, has preserved

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many of the existing guarantees of realization of the right to education; however,implementation of this law does not focus on real modernization of theeducational system of Russia and increase of its competitiveness in the worldeconomy [4].

REFERENCES

1. Artemyeva I. V., Troshkina T. The modular principle of organization of the educationalprocess in foreign countries // Reforms and the law. – 2011. – N 1. – P. 3–10.

2. Smolin O. N. Education, politics, law. – Moscow, 2009.3. Didikin A. B. Modernization of education and the legal status of educational institutions

(analysis of the draft Law «On education») // Uniform information-educational space isthe basis for innovation development of the university. Collection of materials. -Novosibirsk, SSGA, 2011. – P. 46–48.

4. Volkov A., Livanov D. Rate to the new contents of // the Internet-portal of the newspaper«Vedomosti» 03.09.2012 [http://www.vedomosti.ru].


UDC 159.9 + 378

THE VALUE GUIDES IN EDUCATION AND THEEDUCATIONAL POLICY

A. V. Nalivayko, N. V. Nalivayko (Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract. The main objective of the article is to investigate the essence of theeducational policy, its orientation towards the value-related reference points ofmodern domestic education; to consider the content of the educational policy:how the society and the state provide for the education system, what goals are setbefore it, whose interests are in the basis of organization and management ofeducation. Today it is necessary to understand why the tendencies oftransformation of education into the paid one have ontologically conditioned

© Nalivayko A. V., Nalivayko N. V., 2013Nalivaiko Aleksey Valerievich, candidate of Philosophica Sciences, researcher Research

Institute of Philosophy of Education at the Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University.Íàëèâàéêî Àëåêñåé Âàëåðüåâè÷, êàíäèäàò ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, íàó÷íûé ñîòðóä-

íèê Íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçîâàíèÿ, Íîâîñèáèðñ-êèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò.

E-mail: [email protected] Nina Vasil’evna – Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor. Director of

the Scientific Research Institute of Philosophy of Education, Research Institute ofPhilosophy of Education at the Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University.

Íàëèâàéêî Íèíà Âàñèëüåâíà – äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, âåäóùèéíàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê, Èíñòèòóò ôèëîñîôèè è ïðàâà ÑÎ ÐÀÍ, äèðåêòîð ÍÈÈ ôèëî-ñîôèè îáðàçîâàíèÿ, Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñè-òåò.

Å-mail: [email protected]

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the retreat from the policy of creation of highly moral space for education, havingcaused the development of pragmatic-functional tasks.

Key words: educational policy, education quality management, educationalstandards, the tasks of the state in the educational policy

ÖÅÍÍÎÑÒÍÛÅ ÎÐÈÅÍÒÈÐÛ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß ÈÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÒÅËÜÍÀß ÏÎËÈÒÈÊÀ

À. Â. Íàëèâàéêî, Í. Â. Íàëèâàéêî (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ)

Àííîòàöèÿ. Îñíîâíàÿ öåëü ñòàòüè – èññëåäîâàòü ñóùíîñòüîáðàçî-âàòåëüíîé ïîëèòèêè, åå íàïðàâëåííîñòü íà öåííîñòíûå îðèåíòèðû ñî-âðåìåííîãî îòå÷åñòâåííîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ; ðàññìîòðåòü ñîäåðæàíèå îá-ðàçîâàòåëüíîé ïîëèòèêè, çàêëþ÷àþùååñÿ â òîì, êàê îáùåñòâî è ãîñó-äàðñòâî îáóñòðàèâàþò ñâîþ ñèñòåìó îáðàçîâàíèÿ: êàêèå ñòàâÿò ïåðåäíåé öåëè, ÷üè èíòåðåñû ëåæàò â îñíîâå îðãàíèçàöèè è óïðàâëåíèÿ îáðà-çîâàíèåì. Ñåãîäíÿ íåîáõîäèìî ïîíÿòü, ïî÷åìó òåíäåíöèè ïðåâðàùåíèÿîáðàçîâàíèÿ â ïëàòíîå îíòîëîãè÷åñêè îïðåäåëèëè îòõîä îò ïîëèòèêèñîçäàíèÿ âûñîêîíðàâñòâåííîãî ïðîñòðàíñòâà äëÿ îáðàçîâàíèÿ, îáóñëî-âèâ ðàçâèòèå ïðàãìàòè÷åñêèõ ôóíêöèîíàëüíûõ çàäà÷.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îáðàçîâàòåëüíàÿ ïîëèòèêà, óïðàâëåíèå êà÷åñòâîìîáðàçîâàíèÿ, îáðàçîâàòåëüíûå ñòàíäàðòû, çàäà÷è ãîñóäàðñòâà â îáðà-çîâàòåëüíîé ïîëèòèêå.

The political-legal management of the education system (the educationalpolicy) is the activities of governmental authorities, political parties and civilsociety organizations, directed towards the increase of efficiency of functioningand the development of the education system in order to reach the objectivesof the educational policy according to the purposes and tasks of the developmentof the society and state. The central, pivotal element of this management is themanagement of the education quality, the efficiency of educational activity bymeans of identification and optimization of the interaction of all factors andconditions mediating the educational process for the achievement of the bestresult (educational accomplishments) according to the declared educationalstandards (the standards of educational accomplishments). The stateeducational policy is formed on the basis of the world-outlook and politicalviews, ideas, theories about the essence, role and place of education, upbringingand enlightenment in social development.

Into the sphere of influence of the politics there are included both theeducation system as a whole with its educational relations and functions andits separate structural elements such as the educational standards, requirementsand programs; educational and auxiliary organizations; management bodies;and the legal, professional and public associations connected to this sphere.The educational system provides an opportunity to people to realize their rightto education throughout the entire life (through general education, professional,additional education, vocational training according to the levels: the preschool,

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primary general, main general, secondary general, secondary professional andhigher education, the Bachelor Degree programs, the Master Degree programs,the programs of training of the scientific-pedagogical and medical cadres. As asocial institute, education is organically included into the political-legal andcultural system of society which provide not only stability but also the sociallydirected dynamics of the development of educational relations.

The state influences the development of education and the entireeducational landscape while taking into account the special features of thesociocultural environment, by creating and developing the culture-congruouseducation system which is able to overcome its closeness and narrowness, tofit into the context of the society, culture and real life. Proceeding from thecurrent Constitution, existing views, taking into account the conditions ofsociocultural space and the past educational experience, the state develops astrategy of the education development, optimal forms and mechanisms of itsrealization in the concrete historical context of the society development,providing a balance of educational traditions and innovations. The legal actsissued by the central governmental authorities fix the main directions of thispolicy. Thereby, the educational policy carries out in relation to education theregulating, perspective-orienting, stimulating, communicative-informational andother functions.

The main directions in the contents of the educational policy are:– the development by the state of the principles and norms by which all the

governmental bodies, individual citizens, public, educational and otherorganizations are guided in their realization of the purposeful activity of creationand development of the education system;

– the directly purposeful activities of the state, governmental bodies,individual citizens, public and other organizations for the creation anddevelopment of the education system;

– the activity of the state, individual citizens, public and other organizations,on the formation and translation of cultural and cultural values to newgenerations.

The state educational policy is formed on the basis of the world-outlookand political views, ideas, theories about the essence, role and place ofeducation, upbringing and enlightenment in social development. Let us notethat the educational policy will be correctly oriented and effective only when itproceeds from the world outlook dominating in the society, from the nationalidea. Meanwhile, some shy attempts of the Russian elite to work out and offerto the society a national idea of the Western, Slavophile, socialist or clericalorientation have not been successful; in recent years these attempts have almostentirely faded away. In our opinion, despite all its urgency, the problem hashung in mid-air, remained unresolved. The reference points existing insociocultural space in no way fulfill the function of unification of the nation, butrather quite the contrary.

It seems productive to offer as a basis of the national idea the prospect ofcreation of a post-industrial, spiritually focused Russian civilization, whichelevates the society and the person over the utilitarian values. Only the change

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of the development vector in favor of non-consumerist, cultural values can saveRussia and the entire technogenic civilization from the global disaster and self-destruction. The national idea built on this basis does not contradict thetraditions of domestic culture and can be acceptable for all the social strata andreligious confessions. Being embodied as a law in a new “National educationaldoctrine of the Russian Federation”, it will turn into an effective national strategyof development of Russian education. Only in this way education can obtainpriority in the policy of the state and change from an instrument of serving themarket and preparing the elite into an independent value as a means ofdevelopment of the person and the society.

Adopted in 2012, the Federal law “On education” regulates today all thepublic relations arising in the educational sphere. In this document there aredefined the basic principles of the state policy and legal regulation of therelations in education, education levels and educational standards throughwhich the prescribed quality of education at each level is reached. The Federaleducational standards of the federal, regional and organizational significanceestablish obligatory requirements to the education of a certain level and (or)profession, specialty and the training direction. The standards carry out notonly the criteria-estimating function but also promote preservation of unity ofthe educational space of the country, creation of an effective monitoring systemof the education quality, attainment of high quality of education, implementationof multilevel education, personality-focused training where the contents ofeducational programs can go beyond the standards.

Educational standards get real implementation in the formation of theeducation content through curricula, programs and educational literature. Themechanisms of regulation of educational relations are also the federal laws,decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, the resolution of thegovernment of the Russian Federation, the international agreements of theRussian Federation concerning education, as well as the regulations of thefederal executive authorities, laws and other regulations of the subjects of theRussian Federation, municipal regulations in education.

Among the principles of educational policy of the modern Russian statefixed in the Law there are: 1) humanistic character of education, priority ofuniversal human values, life and health of the person, free development of thepersonality, upbringing of civic consciousness, diligence, respect for the rightsand freedoms of the person, love for nature, Homeland, family; 2) unity offederal cultural and educational space (http://niv.ru/doc.dictionary/diktionary-01/2-3/htm); 3) universal availability of education, adaptability of theeducational system to the levels of preparation and special features of students;4) secular character of education in the state and municipal educationalinstitutions; 5) freedom and pluralism in education; 6) democratic, state-publicnature of management of education while guaranteeing autonomy ofeducational institutions (http://niv.ru/doc.dictionary/diktionary-01/2-3/htm).

The state has always acted as the main subject of management in the politicalsystem of the Russian society. It provided sociocultural, organizational andmental foundations of the educational process. It defined the basic principlesof educational policy and the direction of their realization, created a system of



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educational activity, providing the sociocultural environment favorable foreducation, defining rules of law and mechanisms of regulation of this activity,forming the process of training and retraining of pedagogical cadres.

During all historical periods the policy of the Russian state has oriented theeducation system to become highly fundamental and mathematical, toharmoniously combine the high levels of the natural-scientific and historic-humanitarian training. Fundamental education in school was synthesized witha wide range of training of specialists, especially engineering and medicalbranches of higher education. The Soviet state did not spare finances for that,made large budgetary contributions to the education system. Thesecharacteristic features and traits of the educational policy of the socialist stateshould be considered as progressive ones; they predetermined that the Sovieteducation system got to occupy 1st — 3d positions in the world in the 60th –80th of the last century.

With the beginning of “perestroika” (1985) education began to be financedaccording to a residual principle. Under the flag of reforming and modernizationthere took place the destruction of creative traditions and positive foundationsin the society and education. Realization of the “freedom and pluralism” idea ineducation led to discrediting of the main objective of education – acquisition ofthorough knowledge and skills, to the loss of manageability of the educationsystem. The crisis conditions of schools started to be manifested more andmore sharply. The quality of training, especially in the small cities and ruralareas, had fallen. Unification and equalization in schools had amplified (pupilsand students did not possess in reality the right of educational choice).

The abrupt and large-scale changes of the sociocultural environmentsignificantly affected the educational policy. In the time period of 1992-1996 anumber of laws had been passed, including the law of the Russian Federation“On education” and the Federal law of the Russian Federation “On the higherand postgraduate professional education”, where a new attitude of state towardeducation was defined and recorded: the support of the processes of self-development in the education system; the education quality control; aspirationto minimize the state intervention (including financial) into the activity ofeducational institutions and some other.

The governmental bodies of education management are facing, at least,four important problems:

– overcoming the crisis of the Soviet educational system;– formation and transmission of spiritual and cultural values;– the problem of financing the education system;– the need of integration of the domestic education system into the world

education system.Let us consider the preliminary results of realization of the new educational

policy, which has been carrying out by means of continuous reforming andpreparation of the new law “On education”. As a social institute, education isincluded organically into the political-legal, ideological and cultural systems ofthe society, being in the subordination- and coordination-type interaction withthem, which provides not only stability but also the socially directed dynamics

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of the development of educational relations. The central, pivotal element ofthis management is the management of the education quality, the efficiency ofeducational activity by means of identification and optimization of the interactionof all factors and conditions mediating the educational process for theachievement of the best result (educational accomplishments) according tothe declared educational standards (the standards of educationalaccomplishments).

An abrupt transition from the socialist to the market relations hasengendered a systemic crisis of the spiritual-moral, labor, ecological and ethnicparts of the society’s culture through the destruction of the former ideals andvalues, corrosion of the ideological integrity of Soviet people. This crisis ofculture could not but cause a crisis of educational policy.

Today the improvement of educational policy should be carried out in thefollowing main directions. It is necessary:

First, to form the national idea on the basis of the purposes of creation of apost-industrial, spiritually focused Russian civilization, elevating the societyand the person over the utilitarian values, to give the status of law to the nationaldoctrine of education and to coordinate all the structural components ofeducational policy (the national doctrine, the law on education, and the targetprogram of the education development) with each other and the national idea.

Second, to change the policy of the state in other spheres (property, taxes,salaries, the mass media functioning, etc.) according to the national educationaldoctrine, taking into account its educational consequences.

Third, to ensure the priority of educational policy and its support byresources, the target support of education in rural areas and small towns, thesupport of the talented children from poor families, informal and spontaneouseducation throughout the entire life, introduction of the universal free highereducation as one of the purposes of the state strategy of educational policy ofRussia.

Fourth, to provide democratization of the education system management,ensuring participation of the entire civil society in it, to overcome the territorial,material-financial, corruption-related, informational and communicativeinequality in education on the entire territory of Russia.

Fifth, to resolve urgently the painful problematic issues of educationalsystem: its mobility and entering into the world educational space, factualavailability of education, its content and quality, personnel policy in educationand the management of educational institutions.

Sixth, to restrict the invasion of market relations and market ideology intothe educational space, to ensure humanitarization, humanization andfundamentalization of education.




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UDC 378 + 37.0

GLOBALIZATION OF EDUCATION AND THE PROBLEMS OFITS COMBINATION WITH THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL

EDUCATIONAL MODELS

M. S. Ashilova (Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan)

Abstract. In this paper, globalization is presented as one of the key problemsof modern education. An essential difference is shown between globalizationand internationalization of education; some negative trends are revealedoccurring in the global processes taking place in modern educations. Inparticular, it is shown that the globalization of education is the subordinationof education to major foreign multinational corporations that impose theireducation standards, communication language, regardless of nationalpeculiarities. In this situation it becomes necessary to cardinally revise theprinciples of modern education. In order to address global issues and confrontnegative trends of globalization it is necessary to create conditions for equaldialogue between cultures and rapprochement of Eastern and Westerneducational systems, to create the ground for a paradigm shift: the technocraticprinciple of learning must be replaced to humanitarian.

Key words: globalization, internationalization, national and regionalmodels of education, westernization.

ÃËÎÁÀËÈÇÀÖÈß ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß È ÏÐÎÁËÅÌÛ ÅÃÎÑÎ×ÅÒÀÍÈß Ñ ÍÀÖÈÎÍÀËÜÍÛÌÈ È ÐÅÃÈÎÍÀËÜÍÛÌÈ

ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÒÅËÜÍÛÌÈ ÌÎÄÅËßÌÈ

Ì. Ñ. Àøèëîâà (Àëìàòà, Ðåñïóáëèêà Êàçàõñòàí)

Ðåçþìå. Â ýòîé ñòàòüå ãëîáàëèçàöèÿ ïðåäñòàâëåíà êàê îäíà èç êëþ-÷åâûõ ïðîáëåì ñîâðåìåííîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ. Ïîêàçàíî ñóùåñòâåííîå ðàçëè-÷èå ìåæäó ãëîáàëèçàöèåé è èíòåðíàöèîíàëèçàöèåé îáðàçîâàíèÿ, ïîêà-çàíû îòðèöàòåëüíûå òåíäåíöèè ãëîáàëüíûõ ïðîöåññîâ, ïðîèñõî-äÿùèå âñîâðåìåííîì îáðàçîâàíèè. Â ÷àñòíîñòè ïîêàçàíî, ÷òî ãëîáàëèçàöèÿîáðàçîâàíèÿ ñóòü ïîä÷èíåíèå îáðàçîâàíèÿ êðóïíåéøèì èíîñòðàííûìòðàíñíàöèîíàëüíûì êîðïîðàöèÿì, êîòîðûå íàâÿçûâàþò ñâîè îáðàçî-âàòåëüíûå ñòàíäàðòû, êîììóíèêàöèîííûé ÿçûê, èãíîðèðóÿ íàöèî-íàëüíûå îñîáåííîñòè. Â ýòîé ñèòóàöèè ñòàíîâèòñÿ íåîáõîäèìî êàðäè-íàëüíî ïåðåñìîòðåòü ïðèíöèïû ñîâðåìåííîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ. ×òîáû ðå-øàòü ãëîáàëüíûå ïðîáëåìû è ïðîòèâîñòîÿòü îòðèöàòåëüíûì

© Àshilova M.S., 2013Ashilova Madina Serikbekovna – the Ablai Khan Kazakh University of InternationalRelations and World Languages (KazUIR& WL).Àøèëîâà Ìàäèíà Ñåðèêáåêîâíà – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü Êàçàõñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà ìåæ-

äóíàðîäíûõ îòíîøåíèé è ìèðîâûõ ÿçûêîâ èìåíè Àáëàé õàíà (ÊàçÓÌÎÈÌß).E-mail: [email protected]

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òåíäåíöèÿì ãëîáàëèçàöèè, íåîáõîäèìî ñîçäàòü óñëîâèÿ äëÿ ðàâíîãî äèà-ëîãà ìåæäó êóëüòóðàìè è ñáëèæåíèÿ Âîñòî÷íûõ è Çàïàäíûõ îáðàçîâà-òåëüíûõ ñèñòåì, ñîçäàòü îñíîâû èçìåíåíèÿ ïàðàäèãìû: òåõíîêðàòè-÷åñêèé ïðèíöèï îáó÷åíèÿ äîëæåí áûòü çàìåíåí ãóìàíè-òàðíûì.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: ãëîáàëèçàöèÿ, èíòåðíàöèîíàëèçàöèÿ, íàöèîíàëü-íûå è ðåãèîíàëüíûå ìîäåëè îáðàçîâàíèÿ, âåñòåðíèçàöèÿ.

Globalization is an objective process in the development of the worldcivilization at the end of XX – beginning of XXI century. It is also due to thescientific-technological revolution that it has acquired a global scale, that theretake place the growing convergence of the global economy and the increasinginternationalization of all aspects of human life. The process of globalizationaffects all spheres of public life (politics, culture, society, etc.), powerfully drawsinto its orbit regions and countries of the world and has an impact on thesituation in the world at present and in the future. Globalization is the deepest,multifactorial process in the modern world, which characterizes thetransformation of relationships and all social relations, which are moving to aglobal agreement and the openness of the world including the field of education.That is why there is no other such problem of social development, which wouldattract so much attention of the scientists – economists, political scientists,sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers and other specialists.

The other opposite approach to this problem is given by A.M. Novikovwhich is considered by him in the context of waging not just an ideological warbut also the so-called ‘illegal war’ or, in other words, a war of destruction ofminds (mind war). ‘These are completely new approaches to the modern typeof wars that are associated with the destruction of the identity of population ofthis or that country. In such wars it is unnecessary to invade the territory ofanother state; you just make a civilizational conversion of its citizens. In theperiod of globalization, where there is a sharp increase in the communicativeand informational connectedness of the world, consciousness ceases to bedeeply hidden, inhered inside of the person, his/her inner being. On thecontrary, the mind turns into a specially created and mass-processed object byfashion, advertisement of different types of design, the phenomenon of the so-called popular culture. There is a struggle for the orientation of people aroundthe world to an allegedly “leading country”, to a kind of new social and culturalMecca. This arrow of consciousness does not act on its own “ it is speciallyconstructed. A great many institutions and the media, the system of art andcorporations work in this orientation. This is nothing more than a speciallyorganized propaganda of American life in the struggle for world leadership. Tokeep the leading position in the system of financial centers, to establish andmaintain the flow of brains such an image of the U.S. is a must” [1].

Unfortunately, this globalization has taken the character of Americanization,which is due to the leading role of the United States. They occupy the firstplace in the gross domestic product, the formation of information society, theEnglish language is dominant. This Americanization inevitably can lead to theloss of all of the national and the ethnic, which is very undesirable and leads tosuch consequences as the loss of cultural diversity in the modern world

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community. An indisputable fact remains that the basic impulses of globalizationare based on economy. However, the social dimensions of globalization arealso important as they manifest themselves within the systems of politics andculture, the whole system of social relations. In recent years globalization isbeing carefully studied by Chinese scientists. As many of them note, the socialprocesses of globalization generally serve the Western interests. Moreover,they are used to enhance the Westernization of the Orient, to impose Englishlanguage and the way of thinking, the values of the Western culture [2]. Hereits negative aspects and contradictions are more pronounced. Jin Jing notesthat Chinese scientists are exploring the globalization process as a complexissue of a controversial nature. Chinese theorists have come to recognize thatthis process, on one hand, is pushing the countries to self-assertion andintegration and in this sense the process is assessed positively. On the otherhand, the researchers note its very negative consequences which are regardedas challenges to the national identity. China, of course, supports to some extentthe economic and political processes of globalization; however, in terms ofculture and education the scientists see globalization in this context as a‘challenge, which involves a change of the value orientations of people andsociety under the influence of different circumstances’ [3].

Famous economists and cultural experts – Dean Yafei, Tao Fuyuan, WangMeng – believe that during the course of modernization of Chinese society itis necessary to adhere to the strategy of revival and advance development ofChinese science and education allowing for the peculiarities of global scientificand technological development. This approach is the epitome of the traditionalprinciple, reflected in the formula ‘zhongyongsiyung’ – ‘Chinese as the base –Western for application’, where under ‘Chinese’ it refers to the spiritual culturewith its unshakable values, and under ‘Western’ – the scientific andtechnological achievements that need to be pragmatically ‘transplanted toChinese soil’ [4]. According to the authors, only under the conditions ofpreservation of national values, the scientific technological revolution will helpto reduce the distance that separates China from the great powers, only thedevelopment of education will help to transform the high number of populationto the benefit of human resources. In this case, a real opportunity will arise toresolve the problem of radical country modernization – the full development ofits productive forces.

One of the leaders of Chinese Culture Wang Meng, developing the idea ofthe immutability of spiritual traditions, notes that the current globalization,integration, standardization and digital technology implementation trends haveraised a few voices of protest. But this protest tendency has another side –localization, variety, nationality and individualization. People should preservethe values and traditions of their own culture, their own independence withgreat tenacity.

Wang Meng holds the idea of impermissibility of one-way globalization whichcan neutralize the self-value of cultures. All systems of modern society, includingeducation, are permeated to varying degrees by globalization processes whichare the main dominant of the world development.

Scientists recognize that globalization is an objective and inevitable process,progressive in its basis although controversial. Therefore, close attention of

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Chinese humanities experts is focused on the development of education issues,which is one of the mechanisms for preserving the national identity and thedevelopment specifics of the society. At the end of the last century China wasconfronted with the question of how to use all the ‘new’ that came from theWest in the most pragmatic way for its nation while not giving up the traditionalvalues and beliefs accumulated over the long history of Chinese civilization.While resolving this problem, China like many countries in South-East Asiahas developed and adhered to a guiding principle which is expressed by theformula: ‘Think globally, act locally.’ Thus, the aspect of traditional culture andeducation is given the importance of ‘constraints on the negative impact ofglobalization.’

In the conditions of development of the global problems, the last decadehas put forward as an important one the issue of global education in itscombination with the national and regional models. In this regard we shallnote that the global integration that takes place in the world community isincreasingly focused on the humanistic meanings. Humanistic orientation ofeducation means, above all, its openness as a system and integration into asingle global flow. The world education system indicates the transition ofhumanity to the humanism culture of a new type permeating all the structuresof the education system. The ontological aspects of the educational systemsupporting humanistic foundations of a new era are, above all, the values andmeanings expressing the man’s connection with the entire outer world.Fundamentally, new idea in the world today is the inclusion of the human beinginto a continuous learning process. Methodological basis for the developmentof the education system should be the understanding of education as the trainingof the human being for the life in the society where the society is that socialand cultural system which includes the man in its infinite development.Education, therefore, can be considered as a way of being human, as a way ofself-development and evolution.

Held in August 2003, the XXI World Congress of Philosophy ‘Philosophyfacing world problems’ and also philosophical works that appeared in recentyears on the nature of the global problems [5, 6, 7] have shown that the objectivefactors preconditioning the development of the modern education system arelargely global phenomena that have set a number of world problems that cannotbe ignored today. The modern world has become a single entity: there areintegrative processes in all areas of society. Fundamentally, new generalproblems have appeared that are the result of centuries-old quantitative andqualitative changes in the systems of ‘society – nature’ in the social development.Although the society is represented by many dissimilar to each other cultures,nations and states, mankind stands as a whole, as the inhabitants of the planetEarth, where the living conditions are limited by natural parameters (the areassuitable for living; the presence of the necessary life resources and etc.) Globalissues in their essence affect the destinies of all mankind: they require focused,coordinated actions; and the joint efforts of the majority of the global populationare an objective factor of world development and cannot be ignored.

The formation of the humanistic-oriented human consciousness is onlypossible under certain conditions one of which is associated with the perceptionof the world by human community (regardless of nationality, religion,

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civilization, traditions and culture in general) as an integrated single body.Only with such a worldview it is possible today and more importantly tomorrowto resolve major problems of human civilization. This process needs to bemanaged. The existing crisis situations in the international community clearlyindicate that the time if spontaneous development of civilization is over. Thecoming era requires a high degree of control of virtually of all the conceivableprocesses in the ‘nature-society’ system. And in this management a specificrole is attributed to education.

However, there must be a clear distinction between internationalization andglobalization of education, which are interconnected yet fundamentally differentfrom each other [8]. Internationalization is the extension of bilateral andmultilateral relations and contacts between universities and other educationalinstitutions in different countries on the basis of equal and mutually beneficialcooperation. The goal here is the improvement of efficiency of education andresearch work ideally bringing it to the world’s best level, enhanced mobilityof faculty staff and students. During the period of growing interdependenceand expansion of relations between states and nations, usage of the boundlessInternet, mobile phones, global telecommunications, distance education – andthat is not all – the internationalization of higher education has become andsoon will be an objective necessity.

Globalization of education is a qualitatively different phenomenon. There isno equality, there is a subordination of education to the interests of major foreignmultinational corporations that impose their standards of education,communication language, do not consider national peculiarities, push asidenative languages and native indigenous cultures. The starting point ofglobalization is being manifested in the recent concentration of economic andfinancial, and accordingly political power in the hands of a small group of thegiant, mostly American, multinational corporations. They gain a great power;the budget of some of them often exceeds the financial capacity of manycountries of the world (the Microsoft’s budget, for example, exceeds the budgetof even such a large and well-developed country like Russia). This greatlyenhances their competitive capabilities and allows them not only to influencethe economy, politics and even the culture of other countries, but sometimessubject them to their own interests. Typically, multinational corporations usestrong support of their governments which use the process of globalization intheir political and economic interests.

Globalization begins where equal and mutually beneficial cooperation isdenied and power politics begins which means suppression of their competitorsby any permissible and impermissible means. No wonder this new phenomenonin international relations is called the highest and the last stage of imperialism.It is compared to colonialism in the new changed conditions of the informationsociety. The process of globalization which in essence is financial and economicin nature and essentially is guided by the largest transnational corporations isincreasingly undermining the economic and political positions of a number ofstates, damaging their sovereignty and national development and is trying toimpose single standards developed in the brain centers of these corporationson education and culture spheres around the world.

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Globalization processes have questioned ‘the viability of the university as asocial institution. The success of the industrialized countries in various spheresof public life based on knowledge and services needs improvement of highereducation. In the conditions of increasing integration of education whilepreserving the traditional institutions of the educational activity, economicglobalization and the development of technology create a global knowledgeeconomy which involves the internationalization of manufacturers and producedproducts as well as universities and other higher education institutions, theirtraining programs for the purposes of planetary alignment of human life.Globalization is a manifestation of the modern scientific and technologicalrevolution the deep essence of which is in the organic connection of production– science – education, transformation of production in large-scale innovativeprocess as well as in the occurrence of production mode, based on informationtechnologies‘. [9, p. 266]

Therefore, Russian and Kazakhstan teachers, theorists and practitioners,while forming the national models of education, emphasize the need to combinethe so-called soft fusion (Adorno) of global and universal, and particular, specific,national, ethnic. No education can completely abandon the global trends ofspiritual and practical life of society. We should welcome such their combinationwhich will not lead to the disappearance of ethno-national characteristics,aspects of education, training and upbringing. N. N. Berdyaev wrote eloquentlyon this: ‘Man enters humanity through the national identity as a national personnot an abstract person – more, not less than simply a man, they have genericfeatures of a man in general and there are also individual national traits. Onecan desire brotherhood and unity of the Russian, French, British and Germanand all the peoples of the Earth but one cannot wish for the expressions ofnational, ethnic and spiritual types of cultures to disappear from the face of theearth. This dream of man and humanity, abstracted from all national, is a thirstfor simplification of the whole world of values and wealth. Culture has neverbeen and will never be abstractly human, it is always human-specific that isnational, individual to a nation and only in such capacity rising up to commonhumanity’ [10, p. 95–96].

The analysis shows that higher education is in the epicenter of globalization.It is here where the new generation of professionals is formed who will makedecisions on all key issues of politics, economics, finance, ideology, educationand training, social and natural sciences, culture, communication andinformation – those who will build the future society. Largely on them therewill depend the real life implementation of both the positive aspects ofglobalization and also its negative effects. Therefore, it is in the field of highereducation where they have to carefully study the phenomenon of globalizationand its driving forces, its consequences and affect these processes.

‘The process of globalization is advancing and its stop is unlikely, becauseit is accompanied by too many advantageous and convenient practical results.Globalization increases the role of transnational interactions in the world,expanding the scope of communication, but at the same time powerfullyinfluences the characteristics of individual cultures, often simply by suppressingand dissolving them in some American-type superculture. As a result, behind

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the veil of fine words and concepts a simplest type of integration is realized,not synthesizing the best features of integrated systems but suppressing others.It is an aggressive type of integration which can be labeled ‘integration-invasion’.Dramatically changing communication system that provides entry to all levelsof public consciousness creates a qualitatively different type of system unitybased on completely different principles governing the society’ [11, p. 31].

In summary, it should be noted that the education of XXI century will bequalitatively different, due to the increasing socialization function of educationin the modern world. It will carry an integrated, inter-ethnic character. At thesame time, the performed ontological analysis of such phenomena as theinternationalization and globalization of education in the context of humanisticorientation of education shows that there should be a clear distinction betweeninternationalization and globalization of education spheres which areinterconnected yet fundamentally different from each other. Today, in thecontext of globalization and the convergence of Eastern and Westerneducational systems there should take place a paradigm shift: the technocraticprinciple of education is to be followed by the humanitarian one. The leadingparadigm of modern education will be humanizing and humanization of theeducational process leading to the changes in the implicit philosophical andmethodological levels, especially in the subject-object relationships.

REFERENCES:

1.Novikov A. M. Post-industrial education – Moscow : Egves, 2008. – 136 p.2.Yafey Dean, Tao Fuyuan. Economic globalization and China’s modernization //

Chzhesyueyanjiu. – 2002. – N 1. – P. 13–14.3.Tszin Jing. Cool light-edged sword of economic globalization / Jin Jing. – Beyschin:

Zhongguobyanichubanshe, 2002. – P. 253. /in Chinese/4.Chinese philosophy. Encyclopedic Dictionary / hl. Ed. ML Titerenko. – Moscow :

Thought, 1994. – P. 324.5.Andrianov T. V., Uvarov A. Introduction to the global outlook. – M., 2000.6.Gudozhnik G. S., Eliseev V. S. Global challenges in human history. – M., 1989.7.Chumakov A. Philosophy of global problems. – M., 1994.8.Nalivayko N. V., Parshikov V. I. Introduction to vocational education: a philosophical

analysis of the concept. – Novosibirsk : Publishing House of the Russian Academy ofSciences, 2006. – 240 p.

9.Gu Yuanjia. Globalization and China // Zhongguobyanichubanshe. – 1998. – P. 266. /inChinese/

10.Berdyaev N. The fate of Russia / Berdyaev. – M., 1918. – 390 p.11.Asanova W. Philosophy of Education. – Bishkek : Ilim, 2001. – 218 p.


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Part VIINFORMATION

Ðàçäåë VI. ÈÍÔÎÐÌÀÖÈß

UDC 378 + 37.0

REVIEW OF THE BOOK BY BEATRICE O. DIKE“LOVE CAPITAL AND EDUCATION”

L. B. Vertgeym (Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract. In her recently published book Beatrice O. Dike unexpectedlyreconsiders the phenomenon of capitalism. She notes that capitalism asaccumulation of the monetary capital feeds upon the energy of expansion andincreasing, initially put in the person and all living beings. Even according tothe Bible one of the first precepts given to the human being was “to be fruitfuland multiply”. Noting all the ugliness and the deadlock character of the modernmonetary capitalism, the author of the book does not advocate a new Bolshevistrevolution, but calls for another revolution, for another turning around: to turnthe accumulation vector from the Earth to the Heavens, from the accumulationof the material to the accumulation of the spiritual, from the accumulation ofmoney to Love accumulation. Respectively, the author calls for transition fromthe capitalism of money to Love capitalism. Certainly, this transition is to beginin the consciousness of people and, thus, in education. It is from these positionsthat the problems of modern education are analyzed in the book and some freshapproaches to their solution are proposed.

Key words: capital, capitalism, Love capital, education, Love, educationalrelations.

© Vertgeym L. B., 2013Vertgeym Lev Borisovich, Docent of the Siberian Independent Institute and the

Novosibirsk State University, Researcher at the Research Institute of Philosophy ofEducation at the Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University.

Âåðòãåéì Ëåâ Áîðèñîâè÷, äîöåíò, Ñèáèðñêèé íåçàâèñèìûé èíñòèòóò, Íîâîñèáèðñ-êèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé óíèâåðñèòåò, íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê, ÍÈÈ ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçî-âàíèÿ, Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò.



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ÎÒÇÛÂ ÍÀ ÊÍÈÃÓ ÁÅÀÒÐÈÑ Î. ÄÀÉÊ«ÊÀÏÈÒÀË ËÞÁÂÈ È ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ»

Ë. Á. Âåðòãåéì (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ)

Ðåçþìå. Â ñâîåé íåäàâíî âûøåäøåé êíèãå Áåàòðèñ Î. Äàéê íåîæè-äàííûì îáðàçîì ïåðåîñìûñëÿåò ÿâëåíèå êàïèòàëèçìà. Îíà îòìå÷àåò,÷òî êàïèòàëèçì êàê íàêîïëåíèå äåíåæíîãî êàïèòàëà ïèòàåòñÿ ýíåð-ãèåé èçíà÷àëüíî çàëîæåííîãî â ÷åëîâåêå è âñåì æèâîì ñòðåìëåíèÿ ê óâå-ëè÷åíèþ, ýêñïàíñèè. Íåäàðîì è ñîãëàñíî Áèáëèè îäíà èç ïåðâûõ çàïîâå-äåé, äàííûõ ÷åëîâåêó, áûëà «ïëîäèòåñü è ðàçìíîæàéòåñü». Îòìå÷àÿ âñ¸óðîäñòâî è òóïèêîâîñòü ñîâðåìåííîãî äåíåæíîãî êàïèòàëèçìà, àâòîðêíèãè íå ðàòóåò çà íîâóþ áîëüøåâèñòñêóþ ðåâîëþöèþ, íî ïðèçûâàåò êèíîé ðåâîëþöèè, ê èíîìó ïîâîðîòó: ïîâåðíóòü âåêòîð íàêîïèòåëüñòâàîò çåìëè ê íåáó, îò íàêîïëåíèÿ ìàòåðèàëüíîãî ê íàêîïëåíèþ äóõîâíîãî,îò íàêîïëåíèÿ äåíåã ê íàêîïëåíèþ Ëþáâè. Ñîîòâåòñòâåííî, àâòîð ïðè-çûâàåò ê ïåðåõîäó îò êàïèòàëèçìà äåíåã ê êàïèòàëèçìó Ëþáâè. Ðàçó-ìååòñÿ, ïåðåõîä íåîáõîäèìî íà÷èíàòü â ñîçíàíèè ëþäåé, à, çíà÷èò, âîáðàçîâàíèè. Èìåííî ñ ýòèõ ïîçèöèé è àíàëèçèðóþòñÿ â êíèãå ïðîáëå-ìû ñîâðåìåííîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ è ïðåäëàãàþòñÿ íåêîòîðûå ñâåæèå ïîäõî-äû ê èõ ðåøåíèþ.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: êàïèòàë, êàïèòàëèçì, êàïèòàë Ëþáâè, îáðàçî-âàíèå, Ëþáîâü, îáðàçîâàòåëüíûå îòíîøåíèÿ.

In our age and time of “developed capitalism” (cf. the concept of “developedsocialism”, which was the official ideology of USSR in its final period ofexistence), which has become the dominant social formation all over the worldand which drives this world more and more rapidly to its self-destruction, herewe see the appearance of a book, which advocates capitalism as a solution tothe problems of not only the educational sphere but also, as it may be inferredafter reading this book, of many other problems in the life of individual personand the humanity as a whole. However, the capitalism of the book is not aboutaccumulating money.

There are many Biblical references in the book, so let us recall the parableabout talents(Matthew, 25:14-30). Indeed, the whole idea of monetary capitalismis based on the literal understanding of this parable: some ideologists of iteven tried to justify capitalism by using this parable as a commandment tomultiply money.

However, the capitalism of Beatrice O. Dike’s book is, indeed, aboutaccumulation of not money but Love. This is, of course, much closer to thetrue spiritual interpretation of the Jesus Christ’s parable about talents. Yes, lifeis about accumulation, about multiplication. “Be fruitful and multiply” was oneof the first commandments given to humans. Our life is given to us as a sort ofinitial capital. The very creation of each human personality out of nothingnessis an act of Love of God. Further in our life we cannot survive, grow and becomeadults without much Love showered on us from our mother, father, relatives,

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teachers, friends, spouses etc. Even the very continuation of our existence toeach subsequent moment is conditioned by the Love of God: as Dante Alighieriexpressed it, “L’amorche move il sole e l’altre stele” (Paradiso XXXIII, 145). Whatis then out task here in this earthly life? According to the talents parable, weare to increase this Love. How? Not by seeking to receive more Love, not by“digging” it “in the ground and hiding” it, as did the “wicked and lazy servant”in the parable, but by giving away more Love, by sharing. As the author of thebook puts it, “the best, most effective way to have more love is, paradox, paradox,to give more love”. (It would be nice if the financially rich people understoodthis idea as applied to their monetary capital: if you desire to have more, sharemore with others, do not spend most on yourself and your own passions, donot be like the main character of A. Pushkin’s “The Miserly Knight”.)

Certainly, this idea is diametrically opposite to the main slogan of the modernglobal consumer society: “get the most for yourself”. By the way, one of theideas voiced during the discussions on the role of education, which have beentaking place in Russia in connection with our educational reforms, is that themission of general education is to train the “qualified consumers”: there isnothing to add to this…

Certainly, as any other living object, the consumer society is also growingand multiplying. The problem is that its end is already within our sight: theEarth does not look like a very large planet anymore, and not very manyhabitable planets are around in the Universe. So, in the end this consumersociety is inevitably going to consume the whole Earth and then itself fordessert. This will be the final chapter of its history. In other words, it is nowmore and more difficult to “change the subject”, when Alice is asking: “whathappens when you come to the beginning again?” (See Chapter VII, “A MadTea-Party” of the Lewis Carrol’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”). In fact,this is a very precise image of the modern capitalism: it all started at the well-known “Boston Tea Party” and by now it has developed into this “Mad Tea-Party”. So, people are having the permanent “tea-time” of consumption, they“have no time to wash things”, but they “keep moving round” our small planetEarth. However, when a young Alice asks the humanity “what are you going todo when all the resources are exhausted?”, the modern politically correctestablishment prefers trying to “change the subject”.

Beatrice O. Dike in her book proposes not a new Bolshevik revolution, notanother attempt of total dismantling of the capitalism, but advocates changingthe vector of direction of this capitalism, some transformation of the“accumulation vector” of this capitalism. She writes:

“The central miss-take of capital-ism is the narrow … focus on economic,material, external, ob-serve-ably ‘body’ issues. That focus is not completely wrongbut too narrow. It omits, neglects or undervalues four other internal dimensionsof human experience: heart (emotion, love), mind (intellect), soul (spirit, gestaltor attitude) and neighbour (people, others).”

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In fact, what Beatrice O. Dike proposes to modern capitalists and all themembers of the consumer society is very similar to the advice of Jesus Christ(Matthew 6:19-20):

“Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust dothcorrupt, and where thieves break through and steal. But lay up for yourselvestreasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and wherethieves do not break through nor steal.”

And the most precious treasure of all is, of course, Love. If so, the majormission of education is to train not the “qualified consumers”, but “qualifiedLovers”. Of course, the word “Lover” is used here not in its modern carnalsense, but as a reference to the person who is trying to love as God wants us tolove: not selfishly, not fleshly, but following and imitating the example of JesusChrist, that is, loving others as yourself and sacrificing yourself for the well-being of others.

And it is not easy. It is the most complex of all sciences and the most difficultof all arts. One need to be trained in it and to learn it for the entire life (continuousand life-long education is necessary!). It is not at all easy to do good to anotherperson. This is the most sophisticated intellectual problem (even though youwill not get Nobel prize for its solving). Recall, for example, “Don Quixote”.Perhaps, it is all about this problem: “how one can help other people (if this ispossible at all)?” Recall how our Kind Knight tried to help a young servant-boy,who was punished by his master; what came out of it; and how our Knight-Errant was cursed by this boy for that help together with all the knight-errantsin the world… Thus, it is necessary to learn how to love. Is it not the mainthing which we are called to learn here during our short life on this smallplanet?

So, Beatrice O. Dike calls for a revolution: to revolve the vector ofaccumulation, so that instead of its directing down to our suffering planet itwould be directed towards Heavens, towards Love. In the words of Emerson,“hitch your wagon to the stars” (but not as it is understood now: “to be numberone Hollywood star”). Beatrice O. Dike suggests everybody to startaccumulating Love and to learn how to do it better and, for those who alreadyhave substantial experience in this field, to start teaching others, first of all,the younger generation.

In her book Beatrice O. Dike observes the sad reality of modern education:

“…Most of those children we label ‘failures’ … arrived in school …bright-eyed… inquisitive, curious, ready to engage actively in learning. Over the nextten or so years, we, responsible adults who organize almost all their learningexperience, manage to knock all that joy of learning out of them. … They havelearned not to love and en-joy learning but to hate and avoid it.”

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Obviously, most of the responsibility for that lies on us, the “responsibleadults”. Our students do not learn how to love learning because we, the teachers,the adults have not quite learned how to love teaching. So, we fail to help thestudents to multiply their initial capital of love for learning, because to do thatwe need to radiate more of our love for teaching. We, the adults, need to behonest with ourselves about our goals: why do we go to a class to teach theyoung students? Are we really motivated by the desire to share with themsomething interesting and beautiful that we have learned about the world, orwe just go the school as a part of routine as a clerk would go every day to his/her office? Perhaps, it would be helpful if we took a minute before entering theclass to reflect about our motivation and goals.

As Beatrice O. Dike puts it:“I may … go to teach my class, performing the physical actions of my

professional duty. But I can do the same physical actions in several differentspirits or attitudes.” “It is a question of motives. It is not simply a matter ofwhat a person says and does, but of motivating reasons for action. We allrecognize that effectiveness in teaching is related in some way to having agenuine concern for children.”

So, it is exactly the teachers among all the professionals who have the mostneed and even obligation to reflect on the issues of meaning, purpose andmotivation.

Another underlying reason of the problem described above may be thatwe, the adults ourselves do not love learning anymore, avoid it. Then how canwe possibly teach our students to do that? Let us think about why it happens tous, the adults. Learning is always directed to the future, enthusiasm in learningis usually connected with the anticipation of good usage of the gainedknowledge. For example, why a young kid would learn to ride bicycle withsuch eagerness, despite all the painful fallings, if he/she would not anticipateall the pleasant experiences of the future riding it? So, the love and eagernessfor learning depends on one’s picture of the future. Now let us be honest: intoday’s culture the person’s mental image of the future is limited to the nextseveral years, several decades at most and fades away somewhere in theretirement years. Even for many religious people their time after death andthe future world have little or no place in their everyday image of the future;they have not developed the real positive anticipation of the future world. Butin this case why to keep learning? In this world one has to master not so manyskills to survive: this world is finite (even the Universe, according to the BigBang theory, is obviously finite), and the learning of this world is finite. It isclear from all this that only such people can keep loving to learn till the verylast minute of their earthly life who look at themselves sub specie aeternitatis.

So Beatrice O. Dike is perfectly right when she writes:

“Changing our education system, if we do not change our mind-sets … willbe like curing the symptoms of our disease without dealing with the cause.”“States of mind are more important and powerful than the systems andstructures of social and political states.”

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Thus, before we may hope to accomplish a successful reform of theeducational system, we need to start reforming our thinking system, our systemof values, goals and motivations. In this a special role and responsibility belongsto the intellectuals, the people professionally working with ideas. And the ideasare very powerful things.

In this respect, the book “Love Capital and Education” is a step in the rightdirection. Of course, not all the details of the proposed revolution toward theLove Capital accumulation are described in the book, but it gives the readeran incentive to join the author in the further development of the concept: notonly theoretically, but in your daily life, in your daily interaction with people.



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äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Êàçàõñòàí)êàíäèäàò ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, äîöåíò (Ìîñêâà)äîêòîð áèîëîãè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, ðåêòîð ÍÃÏÓäîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Ñàíêò-Ïåòåðáóðã)äîêòîð ôèçèêî-ìàòåìàòè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ÷ë.-êîð. ÐÀÎäîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð,àêàäåìèê ÐÀÎ(Ñàíêò-Ïåòåðáóðã)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîðåêòîð ïî íàóêå ÍÃÏÓäîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóêäîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (×åõèÿ)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Êðàñíîÿðñê)

äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Ïñêîâ)äîêòîð ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ïðîðåêòîð ïî ó÷åáíîéðàáîòå (çàî÷íîå îáðàçîâàíèå) ÍÃÏÓäîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, çàì. ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Êîìèòåòàïî îáðàçîâàíèþ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé Äóìû ÐÔ (Ìîñêâà)àêàäåìèê ÐÀÍ, ïðåçèäåíò ÐÔÎ(Ìîñêâà)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, äèðåêòîðÈíñòèòóòà ôèëîñîôèè è ïðàâà ÑÎ ÐÀÍäîêòîð ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð,àêàäåìèê ÀÏÑÍ (Ìîñêâà)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Áàðíàóë)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (×åõèÿ)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Ìîñêâà)äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð (Êðàñíîÿðñê)

Ê. Ê. ÁåãàëèíîâàÅ. Â. ÁðûçãàëèíàÀ. Ä. Ãåðàñ¸âÀ. À. ÃðÿêàëîâÀ. Æ. ÆàôÿðîâÀ. À. Êîðîëüêîâ

Á. Î. ÌàéåðÂ. È. ÏàíàðèíÍ. ÏåëöîâàÈ. À. ÏôàíåíøòèëüÍ. Ñ. ÐûáàêîâÍ. À. Ðÿïèñîâ

Î. Í. Ñìîëèí

Â. Ñ. Ñò¸ïèíÂ. Â. Öåëèùåâ

ß. Ñ. Òóðáîâñêîé

Å. Â. ÓøàêîâàÀ. ÕîãåíîâàÀ. Í. ×óìàêîâÍ. Ì. ×óðèíîâ

ÔÈËÎÑÎÔÈß ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß 6 2013

Êàðëîâ óíèâåðñèòåò,Ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò

Íîâîñèáèðñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò

Èíñòèòóò ôèëîñîôèè è ïðàâà ÑÎ ÐÀÍ

íàó÷íûé æóðíàë (ñïåöèàëüíûé âûïóñê)

Ðåäàêöèîííàÿ êîëëåãèÿ

Í. Â. Íàëèâàéêîãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð,

äîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõíàóê, ïðîôåññîð,äèðåêòîð ÍÈÈ

ÔÎ ÍÃÏÓ

Â. È. Ïàðøèêîâçàìåñòèòåëü ãëàâíîãî

ðåäàêòîðà, äîêòîðôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê,

ïðîôåññîð

Ò. Ñ. Êîñåíêîó÷åíûé ñåêðåòàðüæóðíàëà, êàíäèäàòôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê

Ó÷ðåäèòåëè:ÔÃÁÎÓ ÂÏÎ«Íîâîñèáèðñêèéãîñóäàðñòâåííûéïåäàãîãè÷åñêèéóíèâåðñèòåò»,Íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâà-òåëüñêèé èíñòèòóòôèëîñîôèèîáðàçîâàíèÿ

Èíñòèòóòôèëîñîôèè è ïðàâàÑÎ ÐÀÍ

ÆóðíàëçàðåãèñòðèðîâàíÔåäåðàëüíîéñëóæáîé ïî íàäçîðóâ ñôåðå ñâÿçè,èíôîðìàöèîííûõòåõíîëîãèé èìàññîâûõêîììóíèêàöèéÏÈ ¹ 77-12553îò 26 àïðåëÿ 2002 ã.© ÍÈÈ ÔÎ ÍÃÏÓ, 2013

Âñå ïðàâà çàùèùåíû

ÑÎÄÅÐÆÀÍÈÅ

Ðàçäåë I. ÈÍÔÎÐÌÀÖÈÎÍÍÛÅ ÒÅÕÍÎËÎÃÈÈÂ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÈ

Ñàáî È. (Èëèíîéñ, ÑØÀ). Èíòåðíåò-îáðàçîâàíèåè ìíîãîçàäà÷íîñòü ................................................................ 3

Ñàíòè À. (Ðèî-äå-Æàíåéðî, Áðàçèëèÿ). Ôèëîñîôèÿ îáðàçîâàíèÿ â ýïîõó òåõíîëîãè÷åñêîé âîñïðîèçâîäèìîñòè: îáðàçíàÿ ãðàìîòíîñòüêàê ãðàìîòíîñòü íàøåãî âðåìåíè ...................................... 9

Ðàçäåë II. ÏÑÈÕÎËÎÃÎ-ÏÅÄÀÃÎÃÈ×ÅÑÊÈÅ ÀÑÏÅÊÒÛÏÐÎÁËÅÌ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈß

Ïåëüöîâà Í. (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ Ðåñïóáëèêà). Ôèëîñîôèÿâîîáðàæåíèÿ ........................................................................ 15

Âåðòãåéì Ë. Á. (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ). Ýìîöèèâ ïðåïîäàâàíèè ìàòåìàòèêè ............................................. 24

Áåãàëèíîâ À. Ñ. (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ). Î íåêîòîðûõàñïåêòàõ âîñïèòàíèÿ ñòóäåí÷åñêîé ìîëîäåæè âñîâðåìåííûõ óñëîâèÿõ ....................................................... 30

191

Æóðíàë âêëþ÷åí âÏåðå÷åíü âåäóùèõðåöåíçèðóåìûõ íà-ó÷íûõ èçäàíèé èæóðíàëîâ, ðåêîìåí-äóåìûõ ÂÀÊ äëÿïóáëèêàöèè îñíîâ-íûõ íàó÷íûõðåçóëüòàòîâäèññåðòàöèé íà ñî-èñêàíèå ó÷åíûõñòåïåíåé êàíäèäàòàè äîêòîðà íàóê;

Æóðíàë ðàçìåùåí âÍàó÷íîé ýëåêòðîí-íîé áèáëèîòåêå èâêëþ÷åí â áàçóäàííûõ «Ðîññèéñêèéèíäåêñ íàó÷íîãîöèòèðîâàíèÿ»(ÐÈÍÖ)

Ïåðåâîä÷èêË. Á. Âåðòãåéì

Îïåðàòîðýëåêòðîííîé

âåðñòêèÞ. Â. Ïóøêàð¸â

Àäðåñ ðåäàêöèè:630126, Íîâîñèáèðñê,

óë. Âèëþéñêàÿ, 28ò. 244-16-71

Ïîäïèñàíî â ïå÷àòü10.06.13

Ôîðìàò 70õ108/16Ïå÷àòü îôñåòíàÿ.Áóìàãà îôñåòíàÿ.Óñë.-ïå÷. 18.0 ë.Ó÷.-èçä. 18.5 ë.Òèðàæ 1000 ýêç.Öåíà ñâîáîäíàÿÇàêàç ¹ 87.

ÈçäàòåëüñòâîÑÎ ÐÀÍ630090Íîâîñèáèðñê,Ìîðñêîéïðîñïåêò, 2

Publishing HouseKREACE, Ltd.

Namesti 14, rijna140 00 Prague, 5

Czech Republic

Ðàçäåë III. ÊÎÍÊÐÅÒÍÛÅ ÏÐÎÁËÅÌÛÂ ÑÎÂÐÅÌÅÍÍÎÌ ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÒÅËÜÍÎÌ

ÏÐÎÑÒÐÀÍÑÒÂÅÕîãåíîâà À. (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ Ðåñïóáëèêà). Ê âîïðîñó

î âðåìåííîì òåëå. ................................................................ 37Õàóçåð Ì. (Ïðàãà,×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà). Ýìàíñèïàíöèÿ

èç êîíñåíñóñà. Ââåäåíèå â ïåäàãîãèêó èíàêîìûñëèÿ ... 41Òèõà Ì. (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ Ðåñïóáëèêà). Öåëè ýêîíîìè÷åñ-

êîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ è öåëü ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè .. 49Ôèëüî À. Ë., Ìåíäîíñà Ñ. (Êàìïèíàñ, Áðàçèëèÿ).

Ê âîïðîñó îá àâòîíîìèè ñòóäåíòà â «Íîâîéïåäàãîãèêå» Äæ. Äüþè ......................................................... 57

Êóýëüÿð Ð. Õ. (Ìåõèêî, Ìåêñèêà). «Óêàçàíèå ïóòè»â ôèëîñîôèè Áóáåðà: îáðàçîâàíèå, îñíîâàííîåíà îòíîøåíèè ÿ – òû ............................................................ 69

Ðàçäåë IV. ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ È ÊÓËÜÒÓÐÀ:ÌÎÐÀËÜÍÛÉ ÀÑÏÅÊÒ

Îëåéíèêîâà Î. Ä., Ñàïðûãèí Á. Â. (Íîâîñèáèðñê,Ðîññèÿ). Àêñèîëîãè÷åñêàÿ êîãåðåíòíîñòü ðûíî÷íîéïàðàäèãìû îáðàçîâàíèÿ è ïîòðåáèòåëüñêîãî îáùåñòâà ... 81

Äàéê Á. (Ëèâåðïóëü, Âåëèêîáðèòàíèÿ). Ðàçìûøëåíèÿ îïðîöåññå ôèëîñîôñêîãî èññëåäîâàíèÿ öåííîñòíûõìîòèâàöèé â ïîçíàâàòåëüíîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè ïîäðîñòêîâ .. 87

Ýëèîïóëîñ Ï. (Ïåëîïîííåñ, Ãðåöèÿ). Ìîðàëüíûåöåííîñòè è îáðàçîâàíèå â íåîýëëèíñêîì ïðîñâåùåíèè .. 97

Õîðñòåìêå Ê. (Éîõàííåñáóðã, ÞÀÐ). Èíäèãåíèçàöèÿ,èíòåðíàöèîíàëè-çàöèÿ è “òðàíñêóëüòóðíîñòü”: ïîäõîäûê ïåðåäà÷å è ïðåîáðàçîâàíèþ â îáðàçîâàíèè ................ 103

Æåðíîñåíêî È. À., Óøàêîâà Å. Â. (Áàðíàóë, Ðîññèÿ),Ìàìûåâ Ä. È. (ñ. Îíãóäàé, Ðåñïóáëèêà Àëòàé).Âçàèìîñâÿçü òðàäèöèé è ñîâðåìåííîñòè âîðãàíèçàöèè êóëüòóðîòâîð÷åñêèõ øêîë ......................... 121

Áåê Ì. Ê. (Áåéòñâèëë, ÑØÀ). Îáðàçîâàíèå ðàäèëþáâè ê ìóäðîñòè: äðåâíèå ãðåêè ................................... 130

Ðàçäåë V. ÎÁÐÀÇÎÂÀÍÈÅ Â ÓÑËÎÂÈßÕ ÃËÎÁÀËÈÇÀÖÈÈ:ÏÎËÈÒÈÊÈ È ÏÐÀÂÀ (èñòîðèÿ è ñîâðåìåííîñòü)

Áåíåòàòó Ì. (Àôèíû, Ãðåöèÿ). Íóæäàåòñÿ ëè ïîëèòèê âïàéäåéå? Êîíòåêñòóàëèçèðîâàííàÿ òî÷êà çðåíèÿ(íåî)Êîíôóöèàíñêîé è Ïëàòîíîâîé ýòèêè .................... 150

Äèäèêèí À. Á. (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ). Òåíäåíöèèïðàâîâîãî ðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ îáðàçîâàíèÿ â Ðîññèè .......... 165

Íàëèâàéêî À. Â., Íàëèâàéêî Í. Â. (Íîâîñèáèðñê,Ðîññèÿ). Öåííîñòíûå îðèåíòèðû îáðàçîâàíèÿè îáðàçîâàòåëüíàÿ ïîëèòèêà ............................................. 170

Àøèëîâà Ì. Ñ. (Àëìà-Àòà, Ðåñïóáëèêà Êàçàõñòàí).Ãëîáàëèçàöèÿ îáðàçîâàíèÿ è ïðîáëåìû åãîñî÷åòàíèÿ ñ íàöèîíàëüíûìè è ðåãèîíàëüíûìèîáðàçîâàòåëüíûìè ìîäåëÿìè ........................................... 176

Ðàçäåë V. ÈÍÔÎÐÌÀÖÈßÂåðòãåéì Ë. Á. (Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ðîññèÿ). Îòçûâ î êíèãå

Áåàòðèñ Î. Äàéê «Êàïèòàë ëþáâè è îáðàçîâàíèå» ....... 183

Editor-in-chiefDoctor of Philosophical Sciences N. V. Nalivayko

The Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of SciencesPublishers introduces a journal for the professionals from a broadspectrum of humanitarian disciplines: teachers, psychologists,sociologists, philosophers, post-graduate students and the studentsof the institutions of higher education.

The journal was founded in 2002. The founders of the journal arethe Research Institute of Philosophy of Education at Novosibirsk StatePedagogical University and the Institute of Philosophy and Law ofthe Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The version of the journal in English is published once a year withthe assistance of Charles University (Prague, the Czech Republic;Pedagogical Department; editor – Prof. N. Pelcova).

Ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîðäîêòîð ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê Í. Â. Íàëèâàéêî

Èçäàòåëüñòâî ÑÎ ÐÀÍ ïðåäñòàâëÿåò æóðíàë äëÿ ïðîôåññèîíà-ëîâ øèðîêîãî ãóìàíèòàðíîãî ïðîôèëÿ: ïåäàãîãîâ, ïñèõîëîãîâ,ñîöèîëîãîâ, ôèëîñîôîâ, àñïèðàíòîâ è ñòóäåíòîâ âóçîâ.

Æóðíàë îñíîâàí â 2002 ã. Ó÷ðåäèòåëü – Íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëü-ñêèé èíñòèòóò ôèëîñîôèè îáðàçîâàíèÿ Íîâîñèáèðñêîãî ãîñóäàð-ñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà è Èíñòèòóò ôèëîñîôèèè ïðàâà Ñèáèðñêîãî îòäåëåíèÿ Ðîññèéñêîé Àêàäåìèè íàóê.

Âåðñèÿ æóðíàëà íà àíãëèéñêîì ÿçûêå èçäàåòñÿ ðàç â ãîä ïðèñîäåéñòâèè Ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Êàðëîâà óíèâåðñèòå-òà (Ïðàãà, ×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà), îòâåòñòâåííûé ðåäàêòîð ïðî-ôåññîð Í. Ïåëüöîâà.

Ïîäïèñàòüñÿ íà æóðíàë âû ñìîæåòå â Èçäàòåëüñòâå ÑÎ ÐÀÍ.Òåë./Ôàêñ: (383) 330-17-58; Ôàêñ: (383) 333-37-55Àäðåñ Èçäàòåëüñòâà ÑÎ ÐÀÍ: Ðîññèÿ,630090, à/ÿ 187, Íîâîñèáèðñê, Ìîðñêîé ïðîñïåêò, 2.

Ñòàòüè âûñûëàòü:e-mail: [email protected]ñàéò: www. phil-ed.ruÀäðåñ: Ðîññèÿ, 630126, Íîâîñèáèðñê,ÔÃÁÎÓ ÂÏÎ ÍÃÏÓ, óë. Âèëþéñêàÿ, 28, òåë. (383) 244-16-71.

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