Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

Devolution and the political representationof business interests in the UK

Andrew Wooda,*, David Vallerb, Nick Phelpsc,Mike Racod, Pete Shirlowe

aDepartment of Geography, University of Oklahoma, 100 East Boyd Street,

SEC 680, Norman, Oklahoma 73019-1007, USAbDepartment of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK

cSchool of Geography, University of Southampton, Southampton S017 1BJ, UKdDepartment of Geography, University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AB, UK

eSchool of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of Ulster, Coleraine BT52 1SA, UK

Abstract

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and thedeveloping regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of theinstitutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotlandwhile Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases.

Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weakand the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited.

Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize

partnership forms of governance. Accordingly, the political representation of businessinterests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findingsfrom a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the

political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. Ithighlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. Whilesome of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in

the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK.Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: amwood@ou.edu (A. Wood).

0962-6298/$ - see front matter � 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.09.018

294 A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution ofpolitical power and democratic authority.

� 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Devolution; Governance; United Kingdom; Business organizations

Introduction

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland andthe establishment of regional development agencies (RDAs) and chambers orassemblies in England, has been presented as a significant shift in the institutionalstructure of economic governance. In England the RDAs have been positioned so asto ‘‘provide effective, properly coordinated regional economic development andregeneration’’ (DETR, 1997) and, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair,‘‘help strengthen the building blocks for economic growth in all regions’’ (DTLR,2002a: 5). In Scotland the Scottish Parliament was similarly placed to encourage‘‘vigorous sustainable growth in the Scottish economy’’ (Dewar, 1997). In the wordsof the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, ‘‘as we set about our task to moderniseBritain’s economic performance, to bring it up to and above the average in Europe,to help improve the competitiveness of our firms, to boost entrepreneurial spirit, wedo so with the regions to the fore’’ (DETR, 1997 emphasis added). The recentGovernment White Paper ‘‘Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the EnglishRegions’’ continues the case for building ‘‘on the success of devolution elsewhere inthe UK to give English regions greater power to govern themselves, to tailor servicesbetter to regional needs, and to deliver greater prosperity and opportunity for all’’(DTLR, 2002b: 4).

Academic work describing and analyzing these developments has tended to focuson changes in the formal structure and functions of governing institutions and thechanging relationship between levels of government (Hazell, 2000; Mitchell, 2002;Sandford, 2002). These are clearly important questions for political geographers anda literature has begun to emerge on the place of devolution and regionalization in themore general territorial restructuring of the state. Discussion of the relativesignificance of particular territorial ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ of governance underpins muchof the recent debate around New Regionalism (Jones, 2001; Jones & MacLeod,1999), the hollowing out of the nation–state (Jessop, 1994), the emergence of the city-region (Deas & Ward, 2000; Harding, 2000; Jonas & Ward, 2002) as well as a moregeneric interest in rescaling and its politics (Brenner, 1998; Jonas, 1994; MacLeod &Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 1997). These literatures tend to examine the questionof rescaling in terms of the relationship between changing economic geographies andthe nature and territorial form of the state, expressed through its changing allocationof functions and responsibilities between levels or scales of government.Considerably less attention has been paid to the manner in which these changes

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have impacted on the political organization of interests beyond the state (althoughsee Raco, 2003a, 2003b and O’Brien, Pike, & Tomaney, 2004). This gap is especiallynoteworthy in relation to the political mobilization of business interests, given theexplicit link between devolution and the competitiveness agenda in the UK, and theparticular salience of business in the new institutional arrangements (DETR, 1997;DTLR, 2002a; Thompson, 1996).

The changing allocation of state functions and powers between territorial levels orscales is central to the devolution and regionalization processes currently unfoldingin the UK. Yet examination of the state and particular state institutions can only goso far in explaining the rescaling of political activities. Rather than examining thestate as a uniform and determinate actor the argument in this paper is that the natureof state forms and activities, including their territorial dimensions, is betterunderstood via a focus on the relationship between social interests and statestructures. Jessop makes this argument explicit in claiming that the state itself, ‘‘hasno power – it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutionalcapacities and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is thepower of forces acting in and through the state’ (Jessop, 1990: 269–270). Such a viewdirects attention to the relations between particular social interests and statestructures and, more particularly, the strategies adopted by certain social interestsand forces in seeking to shape and influence the exercise of state power. Despite thewidely recognized structural power of business and business interests, the ways inwhich devolution has reshaped the political strategies, modes of representation and,more particularly, the scalar form of business representation remain neglected asareas of study.

In part, this simply reflects the institutionally weak nature of the politicalrepresentation of business interests in the UK. Historically this weakness has beenparticularly evident at sub-national and especially regional scales. Compared tomany of its European counterparts, the institutional foundation for politicalrepresentation has been thoroughly underdeveloped (Grant, 1989). Grant identifiesat least three reasons for this. First, business organizations in the UK are fragmentedalong several lines (Grant, 1993: 104–105). These include the traditional divisions ofsize, sector and territory. While these are by no means unique to the UK context thedivision between manufacturing capital in the old industrial regions and financecapital in London and the South East is particularly marked. Second, and morespecific to the UK case, business organizations lack conditions of public law statusand obligatory membership that have generated significant financial, personnel andpolitical resources in other European contexts (Grant, 1993: 104). Third, and morespecific again, the ‘leading’ business organization in the UK – the Confederation ofBritish Industry (CBI) – has been constrained by the breadth of its membership, anelaborate structure of standing and special committees, a tendency to lowestcommon denominator policies, and a generally reactive rather than proactivecharacter (Grant, 1993: 105 and 111).

The institutional weakness of business interest representation in the UK isespecially evident at the regional scale. Historically only the CBI has had a regionalscale of representation and business organizations have tended to be either locally

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based, as in the chambers of commerce movement, or structured at a national scale,in the form of the various trade and professional associations (Bennett, 1998;Coulson, 1999; Millard, 1993). Moreover, research in the early 1990s on the politicalorganization of business interests in the North West of England, stressed the fragileand partial nature of business mobilization and the inability of formal businessorganizations to overcome problems of geographical and institutional fragmentation(Peck, 1995; Peck & Tickell, 1995; Tickell, Peck, & Dicken, 1995). As Peck suggestsmore generally: ‘‘it is by no means clear, on the one hand, that ‘local business’ hasanything approaching a unified political project or even a set of commonly agreedneeds or, on the other hand, that individual business leaders, no matter how wellmeaning and well connected, are willing or able to articulate such a politicalmessage’’ (Peck, 1995: 42). In this context the appeal for business involvement in thenew devolved arrangements clearly prompts important questions concerning therealignment or rescaling of business interest representation and the organizationalcapacity of business to play an effective role in emerging forms of regionalgovernance (Raco, 2003a). Given the centrality of business interests to NewLabour’s political strategy the efficacy of business representation within the newlydevolved arrangements assumes a vital significance.

The objective of this paper is to examine recent changes in the institutionalconfiguration of business representation in the UK. As Jones, Goodwin, Jones, andSimpson (2004: 90) suggest the extent and salience of change is ‘key to understandingthe unfolding dynamics of the devolution process’. We focus attention on the formalarrangements for representation, while recognizing the potential significance ofinformal links between business interests and political institutions and officials. Thepaper is structured into five further sections. The first briefly reviews the establishedliterature on the political representation of business interests and examines moreclosely the concept of the logic of membership versus logic of influence developed byStreeck (1989). This provides a useful way of examining the recursive relationshipbetween business interests and state structures. The second describes the researchobjectives and the methods used to plot the changing political representation ofbusiness interests in the UK. In the third section we describe the various ways inwhich the major representative business organizations have reconfigured the nature,scale and structure of their political activities in response to the devolution process. Inthe fourth section we consider how these changes have played out across Scotland,Wales, Northern Ireland and the English regions arguing that changes in businessrepresentation have tended to reflect the schizophrenic nature of New Labour’sdevolution project. A final section summarizes the nature of changing representa-tional forms in the devolutionary context and argues that business representationcontinues to reflect the overwhelmingly centralized nature of the UK polity.

The logics of business representation

Streeck argues that, ‘‘differentiation of organized interests by subnationalterritories is an almost omnipresent phenomenon. Nevertheless, it has remained

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understudied, due probably to the traditional preoccupation of interest groupresearch with the national level’’ (Streeck, 1989: 61). Developing earlier workwith Schmitter (Schmitter & Streeck, 1981), Streeck provides a useful way of ex-ploring the dynamics of business representation and its scalar dimensions. Streeckargues that in order to effectively mediate between members on the one hand andtheir ‘‘collective interlocutors – state agencies and organizations of contending socialinterests’’ (Streeck, 1989: 59) on the other, interest associations have to strike aneffective balance between the ‘‘logic of membership’’ and the ‘‘logic of influence’’.The logic of membership, ‘‘is governed by the values and interest perceptions ofthe groups and individuals that an association undertakes to represent’’, while thelogic of influence is defined in terms of the ‘‘constraints and opportunities offered toassociations by their institutional environment’’ (p. 59). This is experienced as a ‘‘setof strategic imperatives, rules of political prudence and norms of reciprocalpolitical exchange that collective actors in a given institutional context have to obey’’(p. 59).

The logic of membership/logic of influence framework provides a useful heuristicin examining recent changes in the organization and political representation ofbusiness interests. The membership/influence couplet is also helpful in positioningrecent work on business politics, a literature that exhibits considerable diversity intheoretical approach as well as the methodologies used to study business interests.On one side are studies that seek to explain patterns of representation through thelogics that drive business participation, both individually and collectively. Thetheoretical predilections are diverse, and by no means necessarily compatible withone another, but we would include here rational choice accounts with a heritage inOlson’s work (Olson, 1965), interest based approaches drawing on US frameworkssuch as the growth coalition, regime theory and local dependence (for a review seeHarding, 1999), as well as certain approaches rooted in the social movementstradition (North, Valler, & Wood, 2001; Wood, Valler, & North, 1998). Each ofthese tends to focus on the mechanisms that drive individual and collective behavioror a ‘‘logic of membership’’ type dynamic.

A second set of academic accounts place explanatory emphasis on the politicalconditions within which business organizations operate – or a ‘‘logic of influence’’centered view. The dominant approach here is a neo-Marxist one that emphasizesthe critical role of the state and state agencies in configuring the landscape ofbusiness representation (Peck, 1995). Here explanatory accounts focus on themechanisms by which the state seeks to determine the extent and nature of politicalactivities on the part of business. More recently accounts have drawn on theFoucouldian notion of governmentality, which although critical of the state asa ‘‘unified and determinate’’ actor remain focused on the means by which governingagencies regulate interests and secure consent (Raco & Imrie, 2000: 2189; Raco,2003a). Certain social movement type accounts, focusing on the politicalopportunity structure, also emphasize the structures through which influence ischanneled and processed.

This diverse body of work has certainly advanced the general understanding ofbusiness politics. Yet in empirical work it is often difficult to arbitrate between these

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accounts, not least because similar empirical patterns and trends in the nature andextent of business representation can be logically explained by theoretically distinctaccounts. In the UK context for example, there is general agreement that businessand business organizations are more politically active than at any point since the latenineteenth century (Tickell & Peck, 1996). On the one hand the fact of enhancedmobilization on the part of business interests can be explained as a growing self-awareness or political consciousness of shared goals and objectives within a businesscommunity – an argument that the logic of membership has ‘‘pushed’’ businessinterests into a more proactive role at a variety of spatial scales. Yet enhancedmobilization can equally be interpreted as the state’s attempt to integrate andmanage business interests within the political process. Such an argument is consistentwith the logic of influence ‘‘pulling’’ business interests into new governance forms. Inshort, the same empirical outcome – greater business mobilization – is consistentwith variant explanatory accounts.

Although the metrics of change in the nature and extent of businessrepresentation are imprecise we argue that there are significant returns to be gainedfrom exploring the direction, extent and scope of changes in the formal structure ofbusiness representation. Attempts to arbitrate between ‘‘logic of membership’’ and‘‘logic of influence’’ accounts depend, at least in the first instance, upon an accurateportrayal of the changing landscape of business representation. How exactly is thepattern of representation changing in the context of devolution? Are new interestsand organizations emerging to reflect the new arrangements or has the existingpattern of business representation become further entrenched? What is the extent ofchange in the scale and pattern of business representation? And to what extent arechanges uniform across the UK territories and regions? This paper draws ona recently completed study of the changing nature and extent of businessrepresentation in order to address these questions. In short, we set out to examinethe extent and nature of the political rescaling of business representation in the UKand use Streek’s logic of membership/logic of influence coupling as an initial entrypoint for interpreting the changes identified.

Devolution and the ‘mapping’ of business interests

We focus in this paper on changes in the formal arrangements for therepresentation of business interests in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and thenine English regions, including London. We recognize, however, that the politicalrepresentation of business interests is liable to take a variety of both formal andinformal forms, including direct lobbying of politicians and state officials as well asless direct pressures exerted through the discursive construction and deployment ofa broad and pervasive ‘‘business interest’’ or ‘‘agenda’’. The character and content ofbusiness agendas and the efficacy of business representation with respect to thedevolved institutions form part of the broader study from which we draw the resultsand arguments presented in this paper.

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The research has three main objectives.

1. To identify and ‘map’ existing and emerging patterns of business representationin the context of the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland and WelshAssemblies and the nine English regions.

2. To examine the relationship between different levels and trajectories of politicaldevolution and the changing extent and form of business representation.

3. To compare the character and content of business agendas articulated aroundthe devolved institutions, and to examine how and to what extent these agendasare realized.

In this paper we focus primarily on the first objective of ‘‘mapping’’ the rela-tionships between business interests, formal business organizations and the newpolicy-making bodies. The maps are topological in form and our goal is to providean interpretation of the institutional arrangements for business representation acrossthe UK that seeks to mediate between logic of membership and logic of influence-type accounts. The second stage of the research principally addresses objectives twoand three and rests on detailed interview-based fieldwork focusing on five casestudies: Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the two English regions of the Eastand Yorkshire and the Humber. We draw upon some of that material here in orderto interpret the changing formal structures of business representation.

The mapping or plotting of business representation involved three elements. First,we used published sources and interviews with key informants to identify the keybusiness representative organizations impinging on regional governance. Existingwork pointed to a set of established bodies including, but not limited to, theConfederation of British Industry (CBI), Institute of Directors (IoD), Federation ofSmall Businesses (FSB), Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) and Chambers ofCommerce (Bennett, 1998; Grant, 1993). Second, we used publicly availableinformation to document the pattern and profile of business representation onregional bodies, such as RDAs and the regional assemblies in England, and thevarious organizations attached to the Scottish Parliament and the Wales andNorthern Ireland Assemblies. Third, we used semi-structured interviews withrepresentatives of business organizations and regional government officers toestablish the arrangements for business involvement in the construction of theregional strategies in England and their equivalents in Scotland, Wales and NorthernIreland. This was an activity common to all the regions and territories and one inwhich business organizations appeared to play a prominent role. Furthermore,studying the process of strategy formation allowed us to move beyond describing theformal or ‘official’ role of business interests and organizations in order to begin togauge the efficacy and impact of business engagement. Triangulating between theaccounts of those representing business organizations and the views of publicofficials, as well as others involved in the process of strategy formation, enabled us toprovide a reasonably measured assessment of the role of business organizationswithin this process. In the next two sections we draw on this material to docu-ment the ways in which business organizations have responded to the process of

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devolution. First, we briefly consider how each of the major business organizationshas dealt with the new context of devolved institutions, drawing out three sets ofsignificant and widespread changes. In the following section we examine how thesechanges have played out across the different regional and national contexts of theUK. Here we seek to assess the consistency of change and determine the form of anyrelationship between the nature and extent of change and the position of regions andterritories along a devolutionary scale.

Devolution and the restructuring of business representation

The Confederation of British Industry (CBI)

Historically the most prominent of the UK business organizations, the CBI alsohas a well established network of regional offices that date to 1946. The organizationhas made a series of limited changes in response to the devolution agenda includingboundary modifications in the North and South East of England to better reflect theterritorial scope of the new regional bodies. In Scotland and Northern Ireland theCBI has retained a key proactive role, establishing the business voice on devolutionin Scotland and maintaining an important policy-making role in Northern Ireland.In the English regions the CBI has broadly retained its position as the primarybusiness voice, especially in those regions where the general framework for businessrepresentation is particularly underdeveloped, such as the South West and the SouthEast. We interpret business representation in these regions as reflecting a basicdefault position of falling back on the only business organization with a longestablished presence and track record at the regional scale.

Yet despite its regional structure, and in parallel to other business organizations,the CBI remains somewhat detached from policy-making at the regional scale. Inmany respects the character of the CBI regional offices and voice remain set by theoverwhelmingly centralized nature of the organization. The key resources, politicallegitimacy, identity and policy-making capacity derive far less from its establishedregional presence than from the concentration of resources and policy capacity in thenational headquarters at Centrepoint in London. Even in Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland where resources, activity and visibility are high, relative to theEnglish regions, the national organization provides key direction in establishing thebusiness voice and providing the logistical support for its transmission. The ongoingcentralism is referenced by the organization itself:

You are assuming that there are different regional CBIs, but the bottom line isthat there is one CBI and it does not matter whether you are in the North Eastor whether you’re in the South West, the CBI as a whole says things – so allthat the regional CBI does is to reinforce the message in the region. I think wehave a strong identity and voice across the country. Most people would not beable to distinguish what a regional CBI was from the national CBI becausethere isn’t a distinction (Senior Policy Advisor, CBI)

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In short the CBI regional structure continues to perform those functions identifiedby Grant and Marsh of ‘‘providing the machinery for consultation with localgovernment and government offices in the region, and (nominating). the industrialrepresentatives on official committees locally’’ (Grant & Marsh, 1977: 92). While thescale and nature of demands placed on regional offices have escalated as devolutionhas progressed, the relatively marginal changes that have taken place have, ifanything, tended to reinforce the dominantly centralized nature of the organization.If the changes mark a rescaling of political representation then it is one that is veryclearly orchestrated by the center rather than by regional bodies reflecting locally orregionally specific concerns and interests.

Chambers of Commerce

In contrast to the CBI the chambers of commerce movement has seenconsiderable organizational change at the regional scale. These changes have tendedto dovetail with an independent move towards a rationalization of the chambermovement in the UK following recommendations contained in the ‘Bennett report’(Bennett, 1991). Regional organizations now exist in each of the UK territoriesgenerating a new scale of organization and representation in the English regionswhile reinforcing the ‘‘national’’ scale in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.However, the nature and significance of these regional organizations is clearlyvariable. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland the regional bodies playa relatively high-profile role in the new arrangements and provide a means oforganizing the long established locally based chambers. Yet elsewhere, especially inthe South of England (but also in the North West of England), regionalorganizations remain limited and embryonic. This variability at the regional scaleresults from a number of different factors. In London, the North East and NorthernIreland existing Chambers (London, the North East Chamber and the NorthernIreland Chamber) already correspond to the regional scale, while in the WestMidlands, ‘‘regional’’ scale representation is effectively dominated by the largestlocal chamber (Birmingham). Elsewhere the larger individual chambers (such asCardiff and Glasgow) often act independently of the regional structure, especiallywhere they identify issues of specific local interest. Indeed the representation ofbusiness interests through the chambers of commerce structure remains a complex,and in many ways contested process. While the regionalization agenda has workedin certain instances to generate or strengthen regional scales of businessrepresentation and political activity, in others traditional centrifugal forces continueto prevail. Here then the variability of regional contexts, in combination with thepath dependence of existing structures, has served to favor dominant chambers incertain English regions while entrenching established divisions elsewhere. In thecase of chambers of commerce, therefore, the dominant theme is the complexityand variability of institutional rescaling, although once again we would emphasizethat political resources and policy capacity continue to concentrate at the nationalscale.

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The Institute of Directors (IoD)

Like the Chambers of Commerce the IoD has worked to establish a regionalnetwork of offices and personnel that sits above the existing branch structure, witha geography that is usually, although not wholly, coterminous with the boundariesof the new regional bodies. While policy-making activity remains centered in theIoD’s national policy unit based in London some of the regional offices areestablishing a more concerted political presence. Lobbying activities have alsobecome more prominent as the IoD works to supplement its traditional focus onlocal business networking.

Again the pattern of representation and activity is somewhat uneven across theUK territories and regions although this is not simply a reflection of thegeographically uneven nature of IoD membership. While membership is heavilyweighted towards London and the South East region, the IoD has no London-wideorganization to represent its members. Instead London members are served by two‘‘local’’ branches (Central London and City of London branch) with a combinedmembership of 10,000 – a number in excess of all other English regions. Here theinterests of London and the national organization are effectively conflated such thatthe national IoD speaks on behalf of its London-centric membership. In this instancethen the representation of ostensibly regional (i.e. London) interests is effecteddirectly through the national organization.

Likewise in the rest of the South East IoD local branches are sufficiently strong tomilitate against a single region-wide organization and the representational functionis largely channeled through the national organization. Beyond London and theSouth East the IoD has, in certain instances, played an important role in con-structing and articulating a business voice, prompting the formation of the in-fluential ‘‘Group of 5’’ in Scotland and serving as the Chair of Business Wales, thenational umbrella group for Welsh business interests. However, more generallythe regional offices remain limited in terms of personnel and resources and are largelyperipheral to the process of constructing policy and strategy at the regional scale.

The Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)

The FSB provides a further example of the ways in which the devolution agendahas been associated with a restructuring of the institutional shape of businessrepresentation. Traditionally based around ‘branches’ and ‘regions’ correspondingto local authority districts and counties, respectively, the FSB has put in placea further tier that is generally coterminous with the territorial scope of the newdevolved institutions. The primary function of the devolved area policy units inScotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London and the regional area policy units inthe other English regions is to lobby the new governing bodies, reflecting anemerging policy orientation that complements the traditional focus on the provisionof member services.

However, to date FSB engagement at the regional scale remains restricted.Furthermore, the FSB is positioned somewhat ‘outside’ rather than simply distanced

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from the new regional arrangements and political forms. Representing small andmicro-sized enterprises the FSB has maintained a certain independence from andeven hostility to other business organizations and more especially government-sponsored business forums. The FSB in Scotland for example, is not part of theinfluential Group of 5, charging that this organization is beholden to big businessand foreign-investors (interview with FSB representative). In Northern Ireland theFSB has similarly been marginal to the consultation procedures around establishingStrategy 2010.

Summary of changes

The changes outlined above suggest some modest reconfiguration in the politicalrepresentation of business interests rather than a step-change in either the extent orform of political engagement. While the pattern is neither simple nor uniform acrossthe UK territories (see below) the most important leitmotif is the ongoing centralismof business representation. Nevertheless, there are a number of changes afoot. Threeaspects to the restructuring of business representation would seem to be especiallynoteworthy. First, is an enhanced emphasis on the representative role and capacities ofexisting organizations. This has been achieved through the addition of staff andresources to lobby the new institutions, monitor developments, generate publicityand generally ‘represent’ the political interests of business. This increase inrepresentative capacities is evident across the range of business organizationsalthough the changes are most pronounced in the case of the CBI and Chambers ofCommerce. While other organizations such as the FSB and the IoD have addedregional lobbying activities their capacities remain modest at best. In this sense thestrengthening of representative capacity has tended to reflect and even reinforce theexisting hierarchy of representative organizations, preserving the lead roles ofthe CBI and Chambers of Commerce in most cases. Rather than encompassing abroadening array and diversity of business partners and stakeholders the devolutionprocess has thus tended to entrench the formal organizations that have historicallyserved to represent business interests in the UK.

The various attempts to strengthen regional capacity might be taken to indicatea relative scalar shift in the focus of representative activities in tune with a moregeneral ‘rescaling’ of economic governance. However, new resources devoted to theregional representation of business interests are not necessarily lodged or controlledat the regional scale. In the case of the CBI for example, additional resources havebeen added to the national office in London in order to service regional lobbying andpolicy-making functions, especially with regard to the English regions. In this sensecapacity for regional representation is not necessarily capacity developed in theregions. Major business organizations, most notably the CBI and IoD, continue toorchestrate the representation of business interests from the national scale ratherthan a string of separate and distinct regional platforms.

A second set of changes involves the restructuring of organizational forms andgeographies via the addition of new regional tiers. This would seem to provide moretangible evidence of a rescaling of business representation. The Institute of Directors,

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the Federation of Small Businesses and the Chambers of Commerce have all addedor expanded a regional layer above that of their traditional local branch structuresand these regions broadly correspond to the boundaries of the new regionalinstitutions. In Scotland and Northern Ireland representational activities werealready well developed and devolution has served to further enhance the existingstructure (Raco, 2003a). In Wales the decentralized structure to economicgovernance has been generally paralleled by a similar reconfiguration of businessorganizations designed to provide a ‘scalar match’ between political institutions andrepresentational capacities and forms.

Accordingly, the new regional arrangements have tended to further institutionalcomplexity rather than displace or rationalize previous organizational forms andgeographies. The scalar dimensions of political representation have thus becomeincreasingly complex; a development that would seem to square rather poorly withthe traditional claims of business for more streamlined and efficient administrativestructures. The addition of a regional tier to the Chambers of Commerce structure inEngland illustrates some of the complexities and contradictions of governancerescaling. Commentators tend to define devolution as the decentralization ofdecision-making and political authority, i.e. the shift of power and resources fromnational to sub-national scales. Yet from a local or sub-regional perspective, theestablishment of regional institutions and organizations can mark a centralizingtendency, aggregating the expression of local interests rooted in particular labormarkets or sub-regions, and thereby tending to undermine the distinctiveness andpurchase of specific sub-regional issues and questions. This ‘‘washing out’’ or‘‘filtering’’ of local concerns at the regional scale creates tensions that are commonlyreproduced within, rather than transcended by, regional-scale bodies. In both theNorth West and South West of England strong centrifugal forces within theseregions have clearly hampered the development of a strong and unified regionalbusiness voice. Again the restructuring of formal institutional forms fails to providethe necessary prima facie evidence of a coherent rescaling of business representationin order to give political expression to well established, if previously latent, ‘regional’interests and identities.

A third set of changes involves the development of collective vehicles for businessrepresentation. This has occurred via the establishment of formal ‘‘umbrella type’’organizations but also less formally through the social networks that surround thenew institutions. In Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and six of the nine Englishregions umbrella groups now serve to coordinate representational activities (Table1). These organizations are perhaps the clearest expression of change in the nature ofbusiness representation in the UK and a rescaling of political engagement. However,whether these groups represent a qualitative shift in the nature and locus of businessrepresentation or simply a better and more effective coordination of existing businessvoices remains to be seen. The examples of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland –where political activity is most palpable – suggest that business organizations arecoordinating their activities in order to develop a common ‘‘front’’ but at the sametime holding back from pursuing a full merger of resources and interests indeveloping a unified and singular business agenda. Indeed the failed merger of the

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London Chamber with the London First business organization suggests thatcollaboration rather than union is likely to remain the norm.

Devolution and the (somewhat) variable geographies of business representation

The uneven development of umbrella business organizations would seem toprovide the clearest indicator of a variable geography to the formal structure ofbusiness representation and engagement. A logic of membership type argumentmight suggest that such variability allows business organizations to better reflect theregionally specific form of the interests and concerns that animate the politicalorganization and representation of business. Greater activity in certain regionswould thus reflect the distinct nature and resonance of business concerns rooted,perhaps, in the variable economic fortunes and prospects of the regions andterritories. Yet such an interpretation would be misleading. As we have arguedabove, it is centrally or nationally orchestrated processes that have driven the majorchanges in institutional configuration. This is much less a ‘‘bottom-up’’ than a ‘‘top-down’’ process whereby the template for representation is established nationally andthen modified to suit variable local and regional conditions.

Table 1

The collective forms of business representation

Umbrella organization Members

Scotland Group of 5 (1999) CBI Scotland, Association of Scottish

Chambers of Commerce, IoD Scotland,

Scottish Council for Development and

Industry, Scottish Financial Enterprise

Wales Business Wales (1999) CBI Wales, IoD Wales, FSB Wales,

Chamber Wales, sector associations

Northern

Ireland

Northern Ireland BusinessAlliance (1998)

CBI Northern Ireland, IoD NI, NI

Chamber of Commerce and Industry,

NI Centre for Competitiveness

London London Business Board (1999) CBI, London First, LCCI

South West None

South East None

East East of England Business Group(1999)

CBI, East of England Chambers, IoD,

FSB, sector associations

West Midlands West Midlands Business PolicyGroup (1998)

CBI, West Midlands Regional Chamber,

EEF, C consultees

East Midlands East Midlands Business Forum (1998) CBI, East Midlands Chambers, IOD,

FSB, EEF

Yorkshire and

the Humber

None

North West Emergent ‘‘Group of 5’’ (followingprevious Business Leadership

Team, 1989)

CBI, NW Chambers, IOD, FSB,

Business Leadership Team

North East Northern Business Forum (1996) CBI, NE Chamber, IoD, EEF,

House Builders Federation

306 A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

However, the geographic variability in the extent of representational activities andtheir degree of organization appears to be more than random ‘noise’ arounda uniform pattern. Despite an overarching centralism there is evidence from ourresearch materials, and the examination of business representation in the regionalstrategies in particular, that business interests and organizations tend to be moreanimated and organized in those regions and territories where devolution is eithermost advanced, i.e. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, or, in the case ofEngland, where devolution is most likely to proceed to the next stage, in the form ofelected regional assemblies (Raco, 2003a; Tomaney, 2002). In short, in the regionswhere devolution is most consequential or likely to become so, business interests aremore mobilized, at least in terms of their collective forms of representation.

In Scotland, where devolution is clearly most advanced, business organizationshave generally expanded their activities, developed a more collaborative andcoordinated representative form and engaged in a limited re-branding in order toestablish a more specifically Scottish identity (Raco, 2003a). However, this is not toargue that business representation has been thoroughly and effectively rescaled in thesense of constructing a new or more vital scale of political representation thatsimultaneously undermines existing scales. In many cases the networks of politicalinfluence in constructing and articulating a ‘‘Scottish’’ business agenda continue torun through Whitehall and Brussels (Raco, 2003a: 87). In Northern Ireland themobilization of business interests continues to reflect the exceptional conditions ofthat particular UK region. Business organizations remain prominent in seeking toestablish a stable set of political arrangements as a means of attracting inwardinvestment on the one hand, and providing a secure environment for indigenousfirms on the other. Wales represents an intermediate case along the devolutionaryscale. Business representation has been historically weak, reflecting the importanceof nationalized industry after 1945 and, more recently, the growth of foreign directinvestment. The legacy is one of a limited ‘‘domestic’’ business sector. But even herebusiness organizations have developed a collective representative form – BusinessWales – and a generally more proactive role in relation to the new institutions.

Devolution in England is clearly less advanced than in Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland (although the latter case is complicated by the long period of directrule from London). The regional dynamics of the devolution project are alsosomewhat uneven – London, for example, has had a directly elected regionalassembly and mayor since 1999. Any attempt to locate the English regions alonga comparative scale of devolution is likely to prove somewhat contentious. However,in June 2003 it was announced that three of the eight English regions beyondLondon – the North East, North West, and Yorkshire and Humber (see Fig. 1) –would hold referendums on establishing elected regional assemblies. On this basis wecan position these three English regions as rather more advanced along a de-volutionary trajectory than the five remaining regions (exclusive of London). Theseare also the places in which popular identification with the region is most developedand where polling indicates the highest levels of support for regional government(The Guardian March 29 2002; Jeffrey, 2003; John, Musson, & Tickell, 2002;Tomaney, 2002).

307A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

In two of these regions – the North East and North West – business organizationshave developed collective vehicles that seek to construct and articulate a commonbusiness agenda (see Table 1); while in Yorkshire and Humber the Chambers ofCommerce organization and the CBI have enhanced their representational activities

Fig. 1. UK regions.

308 A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

at the regional scale. In this sense business interests are relatively more engaged withthe new regional institutions and more organized in terms of their collective voice.Yet we would be hard pressed to interpret these developments as productive ofa specific or distinctive ‘regional business agenda’. Indeed business organizationshave tended to agitate around questions of institutional form and policy processrather than specific substantive issues. The walkout of business representatives fromthe Regional Chamber in the North West region (as well as fractious divisions withinthe West Midlands) appears to have centered on questions concerning the policyprocess and personnel rather than the substance of policy or political decision-making.

At the tail end of the devolutionary scale business interests in the South East andthe South West of England are relatively poorly organized. The figures below arederived from the ‘mapping’ exercise and plot the arrangements for businessconsultation and input on the development of the Regional Strategy (Benneworth,2000). The plots for the South East and South West (Figs. 2 and 3) indicate a diffuseform of business representation and the absence of formal coordinating mechanismsfor structuring business engagement. Comparison with similar figures for the NorthEast and North West is particularly striking (Figs. 4 and 5). In part this diffuse formof mobilization reflects a more general ambivalence in the south of England towardsthe emergence of regional structures of government (see John et al., 2002). Indeedthe South East is the only case in which a region-wide umbrella group for busi-ness interests, the South East ‘‘Business Agenda Group’’, was established but

South East of EnglandDevelopment Agency

SEEDA)(

9 buisness members from aboard of 15

CBI South and South East1 representative on RDAboard; RES consutee;member of the RDAChairman’s advisory“

Group”

EEF South

OtherIndividualBusinesses

Federationof SmallBusinesses

Sub-regional TECs& business links

NFU

South EastChambers of Commerceand Industry

Other sub-regionalChambers of

Commerce inc.Thames Valley

Chamber

IoDbranches

Other Sectoral Associations,including: S.E. Tourist BoardBritish Air Transport AssociationHousebuilders FederationBritish Printing IndustriesFederationFreight Transport Association

Buisness voice in LocalEconomic Partnerships(LEPs)LEPs played key role in organising sub-regional conultation

Individual buisnessesrepresented on RDAboard advisorycommittees including:BP, BT, Railtrack,Natwest, Mars,Gatwick Airport

KEY:

CONSULTATION

CONSULTATIONMORE THAN

RELATION

Fig. 2. Business representation in the regional economic strategy – South East.

309A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

SOUTH WEST REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

8 business members from board of 13

CBI South West 1 RDA board member; 3 reps on RDA board advisory subgroup; RES consultee

FreightTransport

Association

South West Chambers of Commerce

Local / sub-regional Chambers of Commerce

IoD NFUBusinessin the Community

Individual businesses (represented on Advisory subgroups to RDA board) inc. BT / SW Electricityand Railtrack

South West Tourism(pre 2000 called West Country Tourism Board) 1 RDA board member

Business Voice in Sub-regional / LocalPartnerships including: SWEL / Private Sector Steering Group

Other individual businesses e.g. SW Water / Clarke, Wilmott & Clark / Western Power

Other Sectoral AssociationsBristol & Western Manufacturers Association FSBHBFRICSSouth West Construction Network Country Landowners Association Civil Engineering Association

KEY:

CONSULTATION

KEY BUSINESSCONSULTATION

MORE THAN CONSULTATIONRELATION

Fig. 3. Business representation in the regional economic strategy – South West.

KEY:

CONSULTATION

KEY BUSINESS CONSULTATION

MORE THAN CONSULTATIONRELATION

RES TASK GROUP

NE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE1 RDA board member

CBI NORTH EAST 1 RDA board member

JohnArmstrongEx NDC

SubregionalTECs

ONE NORTH EAST (Regional Development Agency)

7 Members from board of 14 with business or business related

background

House builders Federation

EEFNORTHERN

IoDNORTHERN

NorthernBusinessForum(2 RDA boardmembers)

Individual businesses, inc.Nissan / Proctor + Gamble / ICI / Electrolux / Black & Decker / Express Engineering / Ford Engineering / GT Comp / UK Land Estates / Villa Soft Drinks / Patterson Ford / Seeward Machines / Northumbria Water / House of Hardy

Other key sectoral associationsNFU, FSB, Teeside Chemical Initiative, Northern Offshore Federation, Enterprise Agencies

Business element of sub regional partnerships e.g. Teeside Tomorrow

Bank of England Regional Agent

Other individual businesses, inc.Boots, Teeside Airport, Stagecoach, Universal Building Society, Style Precision Components

Other sectoral business associationsRICS / Engineering CITB / Chartered Institute of Marketing / Freight Transport Association Business in the

Community

Fig. 4. Business representation in the regional economic strategy – North East.

310 A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

subsequently dissolved (in early 1999), effectively returning the region toa fragmented institutional configuration for business representation. Poll resultsalso indicate that regional support for further devolution is weakest in the SouthEast region (along with the East of England) (The Guardian March 29 2002).

In summary, variability in the extent and organizational strength of businessrepresentation appears to parallel the level to which governmental powers have beendevolved to the regional tier. Business interests are most animated in the territoriesof Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales and in these three cases the principalrepresentative organizations have sought, formally and informally, to developconsistency of voice. In England, modest variation in organizational patterns at theregional scale broadly anticipates the possible further devolution of powers.

Conclusions

Our examination of the changing political representation of business interests inthe newly devolved (and devolving) UK context has generated a complex set ofresults. Certain developments suggest a significant rescaling of representation inwhich the devolution of political power and authority to the territories and regionsof the UK is matched by a similar scalar reconfiguration of business interests. Indiscussing the role of trade unions in the newly devolved arrangements O’Brien et al.

KEY:

CONSULTATION

KEY BUSINESS CONSULTATION

MORE THAN CONSULTATIONRELATION

NorthWestChambersIOD North West

(branches pre 2000)

FSB

NORTH WEST DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

7 of 13 board members from business or business-

related background

INWARD

Embryonic “GROUP OF FIVE” Business Associations (Also provided steering support to MWBLT lead on RES consultation)

North West Business Leadership Team 4 staff, 21 members & 4 life presidents. 2 RDA board members. Led on consultation with business in relation to RES

CBI NORTH WEST 1 RDA board member; RES consultee

Sub regional Chambers of Commerce

Individual businesses organised into 21 sectoral groups including: Aerospace / Chemicals / Biotechnology / Culture & Tourism / Utilities / Automotive sectors + EEF sectoral association representation

Individualbusinesses

NORTH WEST AEROSPACE ALLIANCE(from April 1999)

EEF NW

Sub-regional TECs Business Voice in Local Partnerships

Other key sectoral associationsNFUCumbria + NW TouristBoardAssociation of British Healthcare Industries Freight Transport Association (Northern) Chartered Institute of Housing House builders federation

Bank of England Agency for North West

MIDAS (Greater Manchester Inward Investment Agency)

Fig. 5. Business representation in the regional economic strategy – North West.

311A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

(2004) suggest that ‘‘an emergent strategic terrain of activity is opening up at theregional and sub-national levels amongst established and new institutions within theexisting multi-layered governance structures operating at the supra-national,national and local scales’’ (p. 66). Business interests and organizations areparticularly well positioned to capitalize on these changes given their structuralsignificance on the one hand and the prominent place of business and businessorganizations within New Labour’s political strategy on the other (Monbiot, 2000;Thompson, 1996). Yet as O’Brien et al. go on to argue in the case of the tradeunions, ‘‘while such regional ‘institutional spaces’ have opened up there is nonecessary nor inevitable link to substantive trade union engagement and influence’’(p. 66). Despite the privileged place of business interests within the devolution andregionalization agenda, their role and efficacy is similarly open to question. Whetherthe rescaling of formal business representation marks a genuine shift on the part ofbusiness interests towards organizational forms designed to advance previouslylatent regional business interests, and thus reflecting a strengthened logic ofmembership, or whether the process is predominantly a reshuffling of organizationalform which reflects the historically dominant logic of influence is the central questionwe have sought to address in this paper.

The weight of evidence clearly favors the latter interpretation. While our resultsindicate some ambivalence on the part of business interests to the new regionalinstitutions, as well as to the devolution project more generally, the activities andformal structures of business organizations have been reconfigured in order to moreclosely match the territorial and functional scope of the new governing institutions.As new institutions have developed and new channels of influence have emergedbusiness organizations have responded to their ‘‘collective interlocutors’’ in seekinga scalar match of organizational forms. On these grounds the mobilization andengagement of business interests is driven primarily by changes in state form ratherthan a more autonomous process of interest mobilization along logic of membershiplines.

Indeed, and with the important exception of the development of ‘umbrellaorganizations’ (Table 1), the response of UK business and business organizations tothe devolution process has been markedly uniform across the UK regions andterritories. Moreover we find that the emergence in England of a regional tier withinthe Chambers of Commerce movement, the FSB and the IoD is best interpreted asa cautious response to devolution and the emergence of new channels of influencerather than a more fundamental rescaling of business representation in order toarticulate a set of specifically ‘regional’ business interests and identities. Indeed it iscommon to find regional-scale organizations and interests voicing a standardnational position developed at head office even if articulated via a regional moniker.

Advocates for the further devolution of political power in the UK commonlyreference the specific character and requirements of regional constituencies and theassociated need to develop policies that address specific ‘regional’ problems andissues. The government itself views the prospect of elected regional assemblies inEngland in just such terms, with The Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Bill seen as‘‘giving the regions their own democratic voice’’ thereby enabling them ‘‘to provide

312 A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

solutions that meet the needs of individual regions and communities’’ (Deputy PrimeMinister John Prescott, ODPM press release 2002/0367, 14 November 2002).Devolution is thereby positioned as a response to a mix of cultural and economicdemands for greater regional autonomy on the part of the historic nations in the caseof Scotland and Wales and to a concern with the persistence of a North–Southeconomic divide in the case of England. John et al. (2002) have argued that thestructure and specifications of the newly devolved institutions tend to reflect theneeds and demands of the (now) less prosperous industrial heartlands. Yetthe traditional weakness of business representation at the regional scale, relativeto UK-wide activity on the one hand and more localized activities on the other,suggests that the expansion of political activity in Scotland, Wales and NorthernIreland and the development of activities in the North East, North West andYorkshire and Humber is best interpreted as a defensive response to devolution, andthe associated development of new channels of influence, rather than as a means ofgiving voice to the regionally specific concerns and interests of individual members.

Advocates of devolution are liable to point to the participation of businessinterests and organizations in the new fora as healthy evidence of regional anddevolved institutions creating the ‘new institutional spaces’ required for theexpression of agendas and interests that are sensitive to supposedly long-standingregional concerns. Yet the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with a verydifferent interpretation – one that continues to reflect the historically dominant logicof influence vis-a-vis that of membership. Our examination of the role of businessorganizations within the devolutionary process finds little evidence that businessinterests and organizations have begun to reflect regionally specific issues andconcerns or to construct and articulate a ‘regional’ business voice. Instead, thegeneral uniformity of changes across the regions and territories support aninterpretation that emphasizes the historic centralism of the UK economy, politicalpower and state authority. Rather than developing regional autonomy and a stringof separate regional platforms from which to influence policy and decision-making,business interests and organizations remain, in very large part, locked into a systemof political representation that overwhelmingly focuses on the center. Indeed ourfindings indicate that the position of business interests and organizations within thedevolution project references an underlying and endemic centralism that not onlymirrors the schizophrenic nature of New Labour’s devolution agenda, but is alsolikely to pose a significant check on the further devolution of political power anddemocratic authority.

Recent work on devolution in the UK, and on decentralization more broadly, hasinterpreted the emergence of new institutions of local and regional governance asa sign of a general rescaling of political power and authority. The argument in thispaper is that a focus on the relationship between social interests and state structures,and particularly the ways in which social interests respond to and shape the exerciseof state power, can provide a different window on the process of state restructuringand a different metric for measuring the rescaling of political power. Examination ofthe changing position of business organizations within the newly devolving contextof the UK reveals the dominant role of state agencies and interests in directly and

313A. Wood et al. / Political Geography 24 (2005) 293–315

indirectly shaping and orchestrating the engagement of business interests in thepolitical process and references the continuing centralism of the UK polity. This, inturn, suggests a rather more circumspect assessment of the extent and salience of thechanges associated with devolution

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on research funded by the UK Economic and Social ResearchCouncil. The project – Devolution and the Politics of Business Representation (GrantL219252040) – is part of the Devolution and Constitutional Change ResearchProgramme. The support of the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged.

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