Democratic Soldiering in Romania: FromNorms through Policy to Reality

Marian Zulean

1. Introduction

Romanian society has experienced a dramatic pace of changeover the last two decades. Before 1989, Romania was aCommunist country, a member of the Warsaw Pact with one ofthe fiercest dictatorial regimes; it had a well defineddefence doctrine, a conscript army of about 300,000 soldiersand an integrated national defence industry. Today, Romaniais a member of both NATO and the EU, making an activecontribution to international security, whose peacekeepingtroops are spread worldwide from Afghanistan to the Balkans;it has an all-volunteer army with a flexible force of 75,000soldiers and 15,000 civilians, and its security sector hasexperienced a profound transformation.

The pace of reform was dramatic in Romania, not only interms of downsizing the military and setting up mechanismsfor the democratic control of the armed forces, but also interms of the strategic thinking and the vision of the roleof the military in a democratic society. Despite the factthat the reform process originated from a domestic impulse,the role of Western assistance, particularly NATO’s opendoor policy, was instrumental in encouraging and guidingefforts to build an image of a democratically integratedmilitary in Romania.

The issue of civilian control of the military was high onthe reform agenda during the transition period. Both theWestern institutions that assisted the Romanian transitionas well as the domestic political forces demanded democraticnorms for civil-military relations and institutions. Theadoption of these norms in Romania was due to both publicsupport, particularly a desire to return to the country’sformer Western identity and get rid of a set of threats, aswell as to Western assistance. However, the consolidation ofdemocracy and the internalization of norms is a longprocess, which needs further research. No study until now

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has assessed if and how the individual militaryorganizations internalized the norms of democratic control.They have focused mostly on the “supply side”, how the normswere institutionalized and legalized, whether curricula orregulations are in place, or whether the militaryorganizations adopted the norms.

The main goal of this study is to analyze how thedemocratic norms of civilian control have been designed andimplemented in Romania, to describe the mechanisms ofdemocratic control, and to explain how the norms wereinternalized by the soldiers. The chapter consists of threeparts.

The first part describes the contextual variables thatexplain how the democratic pattern of civil-militaryrelations was designed and implemented, meaning theparticular features of Romanian political culture andnational tradition, security perception, the type ofgovernance as well as the role of external factors in thedesign of the norms and institutions.

The second part of the paper describes the way in whichthe normative image of democratic soldiering is constructedand described in the strategic documents and militaryeducation system, and aimed at in the related socializationprocess.

The third part explains the ways in which the democraticnorms were internalized by soldiers in Romania. In order toinvestigate this level of the democratization process anempirical study was carried out at a defence academy and intwo fighting units1.

2. Building up the Image of a Democratic Soldier: The Contextual Features of Romania

The image of the democratic soldier has only beenconstructed in the last two decades in Romania, followingthe fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Describing thisprocess for Romania is a difficult task. It is like hitting1 The empirical study was carried out in 2008 within the National

Defence Academy “Carol I”, 2nd Infantry Battalion and 495 SpecialForces Battalion, Bucharest. A set of 24 semi-structured interviewswas conducted but only 17 of them (11 officers) were valid aftertranscription.

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the ground running because the process of military reformwas at the core of the general process of democratization.Before 1989, Romania was one of the most feareddictatorships and, despite the fact that the military wasconsidered the “people’s army” in official statements, inreality the civil-military pattern was very close to whatHuntington defined as “subjective civilian control”.Therefore the main challenges to building a top-downdemocratic pattern were: the political culture, the type ofgovernance, which was in transformation itself, theprofessionalization of the military and Western assistance.How all these independent variables describe and explain theideal type of the democratic soldier in Romania is the mainquestion which the following analysis would like to answer.

2.1. Political culture and national traditions

Some studies on post-Communist transitions within the path-dependency theory argue that it is necessary to explain theinfluence of the prior heritage on the path of East Europeantransitions in order to understand the democratizationprocesses (Zulean 2006: 207-208).This section, therefore,traces the influence of the cultural and political heritageon the way in which the norms of the democratic soldier wereset up in the Romanian case.

The political modernization of Romania started with theearly unification of two Romanian principalities in 1859,the election of a Romanian “Principe”, followed immediately bya German King, Carol I Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and thegaining of independence in 1877. The modernization processtriggered not only a process of democratization andwesternization but also a conservative reaction to theimport of Western norms, which is known in the Romanianliterature as the “theory of the forms without content”.This has been a constant point of dispute in the recenthistory of Romania, with reverberations in the post-Communist transition. Unfortunately, the firstdemocratization process was ended by the “Royal” and“Military” dictatorships during the Second World War and along period of Communist dictatorship.

Emerging norms of democratic control of the armed forceswere introduced by the first Constitution in 1866, whichestablished Romania as a constitutional monarchy. Later on,

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the Constitution of 1923 developed these norms and improvedthe quality of democratic control. Thus, a Supreme Councilof National Defence (CSAT in Romanian) was established in1924 as a permanent political body in charge of nationaldefence issues. The prime minister, minister of defence aswell as the Crown Prince were among the main members of theCSAT. The parliamentary commissions and the Supreme Court ofAccounting had important responsibilities in exertingpolitical control. However, a new Constitution -in 1938-imposed a non-democratic regime, under the rule of Carol the2nd. The king’s authoritarian rule was followed by theSecond World War military dictatorship and the Communistregime that lasted for about half a century.

After WW II, the Communist regime dismantled the “Royal”professional military and established the political controlof the Workers Party (re-named Romanian Communist Party)over the military after 1947. Members of the Communist Partywith a working class background replaced the professionalofficers. After 1965, Ceausescu adopted a more independentsecurity policy within the Communist Pact, but he tightenedhis grip on the country even more with the help of thesecret service, the Department of State Security(Securitatea). Until 1989, the 4th Directorate of Securitatea(counterintelligence) together with the Communist chain ofcommand were the two most important instruments controllingthe military. The military doctrine also switched to a more“national” orientation (“the struggle of the entirepeople”). Ceausescu feared a Russian intervention followingRomania’s opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in1968.

Under Ceausescu’s regime, the military was under a sortof “subjective” civilian control. Although the conscriptmilitary was placed at the core of defence policy, manyofficers and soldiers actually performed tasks inagriculture and industry. This policy led to a de-professionalization of the military. However, the soldierswere the decisive factor in overthrowing Ceausescu in the1989 “revolution” and supporting the new regime. This had aspecial meaning for the adoption of democratic norms ofcivilian control later on.

Reviewing Romanian history, one might wonder if itstumultuous past and the previous patterns of a proto-democratic society, military and royal dictatorships, or the

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Communist regime created different layers or ideologieswithin contemporary society and the military itself. Thereis not enough research and literature available to give acomprehensive answer to this question. The military doctrineof “the struggle of the entire people” had the mostimportant influence, both on military mindsets andcivilians. That doctrine had both positive and negativeeffects on the transition to come. Among the positiveeffects were the solidarity of, and the trust in, themilitary as a nation-builder.

The public opinion barometers of the last two decadesshow that the military has been one of the most trustedinstitutions, alongside the Church. About 70% of the publichas “great” or “very great” trust in the military.Therefore, public support was a constant resource of reform.

On the other hand, the same doctrine became an obstacleto military thinking in the early 1990s because the Romanianmindset was focused on self-defence and followed a purelynational orientation. Despite the population’s strongsupport for joining NATO, sending troops abroad under NATOcommand was considered a wrong decision, and as beingcontrary to the Romanian tradition. Even though Romania hadparticipated in peacekeeping operations since the early1990s, it was only after joining NATO that the NationalSecurity Strategy (2006) openly proclaimed power projectionas an important mission for the Romanian military.

Another important factor in the defence reform which wasclosely related to the “struggle of the entire people” wasthe dominant threat perception. The historical legacy andperception of external threats are two inter-relatedvariables which are very important in the Balkans. Thepublic opinion barometers, produced by the Paul LazarsfeldSociety in 1992 and 1996, showed the development of threatperceptions in Eastern Europe.

How did the Romanian public perceive the threat of war?In 1992, the Romanian public was obsessed by: (1) a Russianthreat (more than 60% of population); (2) a war with anunspecified neighbouring country; and (3) the danger ofminorities as infidel citizens. This can be explained bothby the influence of Ceausescu’s previous obsessivepropaganda, the historically grown perceptions of Russia asthe main enemy as well as by claims of Russia’s involvement

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in the Romanian revolution and Trans-Dniester (Zulean1999/2000: 147-151).

Inter-ethnic strife, such as the street fighting betweenRomanians and ethnic Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures in March1990, also contributed to the above mentioned threatperception. In general, the perception of external dangersdecreased from 1992 to 1996, and the trend continued in theyears to follow. The solution to counter the threatobsession was proposed in 1994 in the form of a cooperativestrategy under the aegis of the Partnership for Peace andNATO. Joining NATO was considered a sort of panacea to solvenot only the country’s security concerns but also itsprosperity problem. During the last 15 years, a constanthigh percentage of 75-80% of the Romanian public hassupported NATO membership, the highest level of supportamong East Europeans.

To sum up, the major issues in reforming the defencesystem and setting up democratic soldiering norms were thefollowing: (1) The need to re-invent the democratictradition and establish democratic norms for soldiering; (2)The restructuring of an over-dimensioned and mostly de-professionalized military; (3) The problem of a weak civilsociety and a lack of civilians with security expertise.Therefore, the reform had to follow a dual track: on thepolitical side, new norms and institutions of democraticcontrol were established; while on the military side, theprocess of professionalization was launched.

2.2. Building up the norms and institutions of democratic civil-military relations

Starting from the shortcomings presented above, an intenseprocess of building democratic civil-military relations waslaunched immediately after December 1989. This section willdescribe in detail: (1) the process of how the norms ofdemocratic civil-military relations were set up; (2) theinstitutions involved; and (3) the most important mechanismsof civilian control of the military in the Romaniandemocracy.

The basic norms of democratic civil-military relationswere enshrined in the first post-Communist Constitution(1991), which was the product of a long-debated

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constitutional process2. Although that Constitution wasmodified in 2003, its basic provisions and philosophyregarding the separation of powers and the roles of themilitary remained. According to the Constitution, Romania isa semi-presidential republic, where the President is theCommander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the president ofthe Supreme Council for National Defence (SCND). Parliamentis in charge of declaring the state of war, reviewing thereports of the SCND, issuing laws, asking the Government orindividual ministers questions. Moreover, the Commissions onDefence, Public Order and National Security are responsiblefor thorough control of the military, while the Governmentensures the implementation of any policy.

Article 55 states the rights and obligations of thecitizens to defend Romania, but the next paragraphstipulates that a regular law could specify how militaryduties should be accomplished. This provided the opportunityfor the professionalization of the armed forces and theadoption of an all-volunteer force structure for themilitary, which began in January 2007.

The Law on National Defence no. 45/ 1994 complements theConstitution and defines the fundamental principles ofnational defence, the structure of the system of nationaldefence, and the public authorities’ attributions in thefield of defence.

According to the Constitution, all three public powers,Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, have responsibilitiesin the monitoring and oversight of the military (Diaconescu,Şerban, and Pavel 1996). Of all these forms of democraticcontrol, Parliament’s oversight role is the most complexone. Parliament issues laws on national defence, decides onmilitary deployments abroad and grants over-fly rights tofriendly airplanes. Parliament exerts its authority byreceiving reports on the military’s activities and throughthe mediation of its commissions for defence, public orderand national security. The role of the commissions is veryimportant in promoting laws on national defence andsecurity, and also in approving the defence budget.2 The National Salvation Front set up a Committee to issue a new

Constitution on 22 December 1989. A special body, Adunarea Constituanta,was established in March 1990 with the main mission of drafting aConstitution in 18 months. On 21 November 1991, Adunarea Constituantavoted for the new Constitution and it was adopted on 8 December 1991following a public referendum (Muraru et al. 1993: 249-250).

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Parliament also calls upon government officials, as well asthe Minister of National Defence, to answer specificquestions regarding Romania’s national security and approvesthe defence budgets.

The President represents the Romanian State and is theguarantor of the country’s independence, unity andterritorial integrity. He is the Supreme Commander andpresident of the Supreme Council of National Defence (SCND),a position that confers upon him a major influence on issuesof national security, such as the declaration of the stateof mobilization, emergency or siege. In the case ofaggression, the President has the responsibility to ward offdanger. The SCND organizes and coordinates all activitiesrelated to national defence and security. Decisions withinthis agency are taken by a group of ten persons led by thePresident of Romania.

The Prime Minister is the vice-president of the SCND andthe head of Civil Protection. He leads the Government’sexecutive activities and implements the defence policythrough the mediation of the Minister of Defence. TheGovernment ensures the implementation of foreign andsecurity policy in compliance with its GovernmentalProgramme, which has been accepted by Parliament. TheGeneral Staff is part of the Ministry of Defence and issubordinated to the civilian Minister of Defence.

The Judiciary too has an important role in the control ofthe military. The Constitutional Court is an institutionthat guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution and treatsthe army like any other institution: It verifies theconstitutionality of the normative documents related todefence. The Accounting Court is responsible for controllingthe expenditure of public money, and there is an Ombudsmanwho plays an important role in defending the citizens’rights and liberties.

An important insight into how the institutions work inpractice can be drawn from an analysis of the norms thatdescribe their interactions during a state of war, emergencyor crisis. There were serious debates and arguments relatedto the Emergency Ordinance (EO) no. 1/1999 on the state ofsiege and the state of emergency, which were adopted withina few hours, after repeated postponement, under the pressureof the coal miners’ revolt of January 1999. The shortcomingsof the regulations were corrected in 2004, when a Law no.

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453 to approve the EO regarding the state of siege andemergency was passed by Parliament. According to its Article7 “some attributions of the public administration could beaccomplished by military authorities during the state ofsiege and emergency” but these measures are temporary andend when the danger is over (Article 16).

Another conclusion on how the institutions work inpractice can be drawn from the experiences of sending troopsabroad. Law no. 42/2004 on the participation of armed forcesin missions abroad establishes in article 2 that legitimatemissions abroad should be for the purpose of: collectivedefence, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, coalitions,common exercises, individual missions and ceremonies. Themechanism of approval is as follows: the Prime Ministerproposes and the President approves, after consulting theSCND, the sending of troops abroad. Afterwards, thePresident has to inform Parliament within 5 days of takingthe decision. If the international mission is not covered byan international treaty, Parliament’s role is merely toapprove the President’s proposal.

2.3. Professionalization of the military: Changing the military structure, missions and defence planning system

According to the democratic pattern described by Huntingtonas the objective control model, the professionalization ofthe military is the other side of the coin in buildingdemocratic civil-military relations. The military shouldstay away from politics and focus on its own profession. Theprocess of defence reform in Romania followed this conceptin changing the military missions and structure.

The idea of setting up a democratic civil-military systeminvolving the professionalization of the military occurredat the time of the revolution in 1989. The people on thestreets were shouting “The Army is with us!” One of thegenerals who contributed to overthrowing Ceausescu and whofilled the power gap (General Victor Atanase Stanculescu)published his thoughts recently and confessed that he hadhad in mind a sort of transition in the Portuguese style.But, in a few days, the military leadership had handed overpower to the civilian leadership. Here is an excerpt fromthe interview:

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- AMS (historian): “Did you think of a military regime?”- VAS (general): “For a short time, yes! Up until the

things would settle and have a public order. Politicianswould come later…maybe not a military regime but anauthoritarian regime supported by the military…I thought ofa transition period that I might solve in the style ofsimilar situations as in Greece and Portugal…” (Stanculescu2009: 69-70).

As a follow up to the 1989 revolution, a reform processinitiated the de-politicization and downsizing of the ArmedForces. Some immediate actions were involved: the subjectionof the Securitatea to MoD rule as well as the withdrawal ofthe military from use as a free workforce in the nationaleconomy. The former 4th Directorate on Counterintelligencewas dismantled in December 1989, while its personnel weredivided into three categories: people over 52 years of age,who were pensioned off; people with a military backgroundand training, who were sent to their branches, people whohad records of abuse, who were sent to the reserve and weresupposed to be sent to court (Cristescu 2002: 164-173).

As a result of the CFE Treaty, in November 1990, the RAF(Romanian Armed Forces) started the process of downsizingits tank strength from 2850 to 1375, its armoured vehiclestrength from 3102 to 2100, its artillery from 3789 to 1475pieces, and its aircraft from 505 to 430. Beside thesespecific reductions, the size of the armed forces as a wholewas also drastically reduced – from a strength of 320,000 in1989 to 207,000 in 1999 (Zulean 2003: 69).

The Law on the organization and functioning of theMinistry of National Defence (MND) no. 41/1990, amended byLaw no. 389/2001, completed the legislative frameworkregarding the organization of national defence in Romania.

The Romanian Ministry of National Defence and the GeneralStaff were fully re-organized in May 1997 – with changesaffecting both the central structures and the combat forces.These changes were conducted under the PfP’s Planning andReview Process (PARP) with the aim of increasing Romania’sNATO interoperability.

The Chief of the General Staff is also the Chief ofDefence, and Romania’s senior military officer. The GeneralStaff itself was reorganized through the creation of “joint”directorates similar to those in NATO. The General Staff

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published a medium-term planning document called “StrategicVision 2010” concerning the future structure of the RAF.This document envisioned a major shift towards all-volunteerforces by 2005.

Moreover, as part of the second cycle of NATO’sMembership Action Plan (MAP), Romania aimed to reduce thesize of its military to a peacetime strength of 112,000 anda wartime strength of 230,000 (in accordance with theobjective of the Programme FARO 2005/2010 established in1998). Before Romania was invited to join NATO, itestablished a further new force objective: 15,000 civiliansand 75,000 military by 2007.

As one can see, the most dramatic change has affected thestatus and size of the military with the design of a newsystem of human resources. The Concept of Human ResourceManagement was initially elaborated in 1997. It was latercompleted with British and US assistance by establishing aNational Defence Framework Action Plan for 2000-2003 and aLong-Term Framework (to 2010). The Concept of Human ResourceManagement also provided guidelines for the streamlining ofthe RAF’s overloaded officer corps – a structural legacyfrom the Communist period. The previous 30,000-strongofficer corps was halved by the year 2000, with the numberof colonels reduced from 2300 to 630, the number oflieutenant colonels from 5600 to 1800 and the number ofmajors from 7800 to 2200. As a result of this restructuring,more than 11,000 officers and warrant officers left the RAFin 1998 alone. 94 % of these took voluntary retirement, and85 % of them were drawn from the ranks of major, lieutenantcolonel and colonel.

Now that the democratic norms of civilian control andprofessionalizing the military have been established, how dothe mechanisms of control function in practice? The mostimportant mechanism of democratic control is the control ofbudget allocations and the system of planning, budgeting andacquisitions (before 1989, the military budget was a “statesecret”). A new system of planning, programming andbudgeting (PPBES) was designed in 1998 and implemented from2001 (Zulean 2008: 41). Emergency Ordinance no. 52/1998regarding defence planning defined the basic documents ofstrategic planning as: National Security Strategy,Government’s White Paper and National Military Strategy. TheOrdinance was approved by the Law on Romanian National

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Defence Planning no. 63/2000 that defined the role of eachinstitution in defence policy. The goal of this new systemwas to create an integrated concept of human, material andfinancial resources planning and management, which wouldimprove the capability of the Armed Forces to fulfil theiroperational criteria.

A new Law of Defence Planning no. 473 was approved inlate 2004 with the main goal of defining the nationaldefence field better. The basic documents of planning at thenational level are: the National Defence Strategy andGoverning Programme and, at the departmental level,documents such as the White Book of Defence, the MilitaryStrategy, the Directive for defence planning and programmesand operational plans. However, the detailed regulationswhich were meant to define the field more precisely broughtsome confusion and constraints.

Thus, the first “National Security Strategy of Romania”was approved by the Country’s Supreme Defence Council (SCND)in June 1999 and received Parliament’s endorsement. InDecember 2001, President Iliescu passed on the second“National Security Strategy of Romania” to Parliament. Itproposed a vision of the security framework, defined thenational interests and established the main directions ofaction for national security. The latest National SecurityStrategy was proposed in April 2006 by President Basescu,and the SCND approved it without the involvement ofParliament. This Strategy not only provides a classicalguideline for national security and a strategic vision, italso aims to systematically transform the elements ofRomanian power. The main missions include: participation inglobal security efforts, constructing the new European andEuro-Atlantic identity of Romania, developing a new regionalsecurity approach with a focus on the Black Sea area,building a Homeland Security system, providing goodgovernance, strengthening the economy, transforming thesecurity sector and modernizing critical infrastructure.

2.4. The role of Western assistance in building the image of democratic soldieringThe image of the democratic soldier as we know it was anideal type assumed by the Western political regimes andtransferred to the former Communist countries as goodpractice in the process of transition. At a conference in

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the early 1990s that debated the possibility of normstransfer, Joseph Nye, in his capacity as a deputy secretaryof state at the Pentagon, presented not only his view drawnfrom Huntington’s theory, but also the official requirementof the US:

“The proper response is the liberal ‘bargain’ whichdefines specific rights and responsibilities for both themilitary and civilian leadership. The military mustrecognize that it is accountable to the rule of law; itmust remain nonpartisan and respect civilian authority.For their part, civilians must respect the military’sspecial role in society, must provide adequate fundingfor appropriate military roles and missions, and musteducate themselves so that they can interact positivelywith the military” (Nye 1995: 14).

The international community, particularly internationalorganizations such as NATO, OSCE or the EU, were importantagents in supporting, advising and directing Romania’sdefence reform and building the image of the democraticsoldier there. Some bilateral assistance programmes of theUS, the UK, France, Germany and Italy also played importantroles. The requirements of NATO’s PfP Framework, the OSCE’sCode of Conduct (1994) and the Study on NATO Enlargementstated clear criteria for the democratization of civil-military relations and defence reform. The Membership ActionPlan – adopted in 1999 – took a comprehensive and systematicapproach and effected deep changes in the security sector ofRomania.

Some bilateral programmes assured training and educationfor both military and civilian leaders and younger experts.Also, independent think-tanks such as the RAND Corporationor CUBIC from the US, or DCAF in Geneva offered assistance,organized conferences, debates and delivered studies.Individual advisers from the UK, France and Germany attendedthe Defence Planning meetings or helped Romania to prepareplanning documents or reports for NATO. Finally, a lot ofprogrammes and projects prepared Romanian civil society tounderstand and promote such norms. Among them were, the EU’sPHARE or the Stability Pact, PfP Academic Consortium orOSCE. On civil society level, NGOs such as the Soros

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Foundation played an important role in training and helpingRomanian civil society.

Joining the EU was one of the most important objectivesfor Romanian policymakers. According to the White Paper onSecurity and National Defence (2004) “…Romania affirmed itswillingness to further contribute to the development ofESDP”, by statements made during the European Convention andIntergovernmental Conference and by its participation in EUpeace operations (EUPM in Bosnia and Concordia inMacedonia). The provisional closing of the Common Foreignand Security Policy chapter, its participation in the EU-ledPetersberg missions and its commitment to the Headline Goalwere seen as tools for showing Romania’s preparedness tojoin the EU and the convergence of national defencestructure and design with ESDP.

However, the prospects of joining NATO and the EU haddifferent meanings. The construction of ESDP as a processin-the-making during the negotiations and the lack of clearcriteria for the preparedness of the military – such asNATO’s Membership Action Plan – meant that the EU had aweaker influence compared with NATO.

In conclusion, it can be said that the image ofdemocratic soldiering was constructed top-down in theRomanian transition, despite the fact that the reform wastriggered by a domestic impulse, following a bloodyrevolution. The role of Western assistance, particularlyNATO’s open door policy, was instrumental in encouraging andguiding the efforts to build the democratic Romaniansoldier.

As mentioned above, political culture and nationaltradition played a determining role because the Romanianswere keen to return to a Western identity and to continuethe process of modernization and democratization that hadbeen interrupted for so long. The perception of threats,particularly the historically grown perception of theRussian danger in the early 1990s, created a desire to joinNATO as a protector, at any price. That might explain theRomanians’ enthusiasm for Atlanticism. On the other hand,“the struggle of the entire people” doctrine not onlycreated strong prestige for the military, it also stokedarguments against sending troops abroad.

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Although joining NATO and the EU were the strategicobjectives of Romanian politics in 2007, one may wonder ifthe prospects of joining NATO were more instrumental thanthe prospects of joining the EU. The Romanian publicdiscourse tried to carefully balance and manage both, butthe facts presented above prove that the (more concrete)prospects of joining NATO were more important than the EUoption in the context of civilian control of the military.

3. Transfer of the Normative Model into Socializing Practices

The consolidation of democracy and the internalization ofdemocratic norms is a long-term process and does not takeplace automatically. It is therefore necessary to study howthe normative model of democratic soldiering was transferredto the military institutions and their socializing practice.How is the training of recruits, non-commissioned officers,and officers organized in respect of the normative model ofdemocratic civil-military relations? In order to explain andanswer this question, the next part of the chapter describesthe institutions of military training and education, thespectrum of training regarding democratic ideals ofsoldiering, the content of curricula (focusing on democraticvalues and leadership type) and the norms of conflictsettlement, punishment and discipline.

3.1. The system of military education and training

Systematic steps to change the system of military educationwere only taken after 1995 in the form of the Concept ofReforming Military Education. The basic institutions formilitary education included military high schools, post-secondary schools for warrant officers and NCOs, highereducation for command officers (three military academies),technical education, command and staff training, a trainingsystem for experts as well as special centres for learninglanguages or training in peacekeeping and defence planning.

The Military Career Guide (designed in 1997) proposed thenew regulation of career development for officers, NCOs andenlisted sergeants. According to the Career Guide, access toa military career was possible in two ways: direct track –

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through graduation from a military education institution –and indirect track – training graduates from a civilianuniversity or enlisted personnel to become NCOs. Moreover,the career guide established as its goal a 3/1 ratio ofNCOs/commissioned officers.

The basic institutions for direct training of militaryofficers in Romania are: “Henri Coanda” Air Force Academy,the “Mircea cel Batran” Naval Academy and the “Nicolae Balcescu”Land Forces Academy plus the Technical Military Academy.Basic education lasts for 3 years in the Land and AirAcademies, 4 years in the Naval Academy and 5 years in theTechnical Academy, followed by 6 to 9 months of intensivemilitary training in order to become a commissioned officer.Since the basic mission of these institutions is to educatemilitary officers and – secondarily- – to provide a back-upuniversity education, the first 3-4 years are dedicated tocivilian disciplines such as Public Administration,Management, Military Science or Naval Engineering, followedby 6-9 months of intense military training and leadership inSchools of Training (Scoli de Aplicatie) in order to gain themilitary rank of first lieutenant. Similar schools oftraining have to be attended by those graduates from acivilian university who have been invited to join themilitary officer corps through the indirect track. However,the direct track is the rule and the indirect track theexception.

Regardless of their commissioning source, officers whoopt for the long career path have the opportunity tocontinue their military education at the “Carol I NationalDefence University”. “Carol I” is the highest educationinstitution, intended to train the military and civilians atpostgraduate level.

The training and education of NCOs, warrant officers andvolunteer soldiers is another challenging mission. Thistraining is done both through direct and indirect tracks.The new personnel management system considers NCOs as “theoil in running combat units”; they are the backbone of themilitary. Each branch (Land, Air and Navy) has its ownmilitary training school for NCOs and warrant officers.Training lasts 2 years, with initial training of 18 weeks.The NCO is the category of military personnel which isprepared for action both as a fighter and a specialist,which is able to lead, train and motivate their

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subordinates. The all-volunteer soldier is a distinct corpsrecruited on a voluntary basis to function as a basicfighter.

It is informative to study the spectrum of training andeducation in detail: What are the content of non-militaryteaching and the extent of civic education? The NationalSecurity Strategy (2006) introduced new concepts related todemocratic soldiering such as “good governance”, “civiceducation” and “civic patriotism”. It stated that theRomanian citizen is the beneficiary of security policy;therefore he/she has rights and obligations to contribute toits ongoing construction. The role model of the soldierproposed earlier by the Human Resource Directorate is thestarting point for assessing the curricula and theimportance of the democratic norms contained in it. In theopinion of Human Resource specialists, the military officershould be: “a military leader, a specialist, an educator, acitizen in the service of the nation and a fighter”.

The model proposed for an NCO is: “a fighter, a branchspecialist, a small-group commander, an educator and acitizen with high school education able to be promoted inthe military hierarchy”. In order to be a good citizen, theNCO should be “responsible, knowledgeable of national andinternational culture and legislation, international humanrights law and display a civilized behaviour”.

There are courses to train soldiers in civil-militaryrelations and present them with the model of the democraticsoldier (not clearly defined and taught). Moreover, the factthat some civilian universities have the opportunity toorganize master degree courses in Security Studies with 70%of their students originating from defence and securityinstitutions is another good opportunity to overcome theshortcomings of education in civil-military relations in themilitary academies. For example, the Faculty of Sociology atthe University of Bucharest has established a Master inSecurity Studies degree where students are taught suchcourses as Armed Forces and Society, Public Policy,Political System and National Security, Intelligence andNational Security. In conclusion, the military educationinstitutions have faced a radical change in the last 20years. However, the contents of the curricula are not veryclear regarding the concept of the democratic soldier. Basiceducation on how a democratic soldier should behave, the

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relevant norms and values are taught rather indirectlythrough courses such as Management, Leadership, Sociology,or developed during the daily training of volunteersoldiers.

3.2. The contents of curricula on democratic soldiering

Since one of the main goals of the system of militaryeducation is to produce military leaders, this requirementis currently being operationalized in the curriculum. As aresult, the Military Academy of Land Forces “Nicolae Balcescu”decided that the curriculum should contain a special moduleon leadership with courses such as: Organizations, MilitaryLeadership, Public Relations and Organizational Behaviour.The School of Training for NCOs “Basarab I” also dedicatedthe “Third Module” of training to developing leadershipskills; 36 hours to theory of leadership, 20 hours tocommunication (out of 250 hours of theory) and 147 hours tothe practical skills of commanding a squad.

Leadership is becoming an interesting concept for theRomanian military due to the double openness of the militaryeducation system (1) to the civilian education system and(2) to the NATO and EU acquis. As a basic assumption, it canbe inferred that the autocratic-hierarchical style isdominant, although the Romanian military has started toexperience all spectrums of leadership styles. However, theorganization of the National Defence University faculties asold fashioned “command faculties”, the lack of specificleadership courses as well as the existence of the old basicregulations in command and control (such as AN-2, which hasbeen more or less the same regulation for the last 50 years)make rapid changes appear very unlikely.

Another way to train leaders or to ensure the values andbehaviour of democratic soldiers is through interaction withNATO forces, either during deployments abroad, peacekeepingmissions, or the training of such troops. Two importantissues in training leaders come into play on this level:CIMIC and International Humanitarian Law.

CIMIC is a NATO concept that stands for Civil-MilitaryCooperation. It is defined as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATOCommander and civil actors, including national populationand local authorities, as well as international, national

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and non-governmental organizations and agencies” (NATOMilitary Policy on CMIC-C 411/1). The long-term purpose ofCIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that willsupport the achievement of Alliance objectives inoperations. The Romanian CIMIC concept is similar to NATO’sconcept and was adopted after Romania was admitted as a fullmember. At that time the General Staff established an Officewithin J-5. Moreover, every Brigade or similar unit includesan office or a cell responsible for CIMIC. The “1stTerritorial Army Corps” established a battalion-size CIMICGroup responsible for the education and training of themilitary before operations.

Another issue that became important in the training ofmilitary leaders is International Humanitarian Law, alsoknown as the “Law of War”. The MoD established a Centre forHumanitarian International Law (IHL) with the main goal ofintegrating the provisions of IHL in the education andtraining of the military. The Chief of the General Staff/MoDordered the Centre to elaborate two IHL Handbooks: thefirst, “Handbook DIU-1”, is meant to educate and trainsoldiers deployable in missions abroad in understandinghumanitarian law, while the second, “Handbook DIU-2”, isintended to train soldiers on the status of persons capturedduring military conflicts or international missionsrespectively, in accordance with the provisions ofinternational treaties, national legislation and defenceregulations.

There is therefore no direct mode of inculcationregarding the teaching of democratic and military valueswithin the military. Some values and norms can be learned bythe cadets from courses such as Military History orOrganizations, or from military regulations and practices,but there is no special course.

3.3. Norms of conflict settlement, lawfulness and dispute

Military discipline is the trade mark of soldiering inmodern armies and a professional marker of militaryidentity. However, in a democratic society, discipline as avalue might be in tension with the democratic values of theparent society, particularly when an order may breach humanrights. Therefore it is important to study what habits

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members of the military develop: What counts as a conflictand deviance in military life, and how is the system ofreporting and conflict settlement organized?

One cannot understand the evolution of discipline orpunishment and the institutions of conflict resolutionwithin the Romanian military without taking its historicalheritage into consideration. In particular, the role of themilitary in the 1989 “revolution” is a key for understandingthe post-Communist evolution.

What was the framework of regulations regarding militarydiscipline during the Communist regime? A Code of Conduct onMilitary Discipline from the 1960s stated that “The militaryorder of a superior is a law for subordinates...” and itshould be accomplished “...as ordered, without comment andimmediately”. After 1969, such provisions were changed andincluded in the Penal Code, with the commanding officersbeing accountable for the legality of the order. However,the essence of strict discipline remained.

The military oath is an important aspect of theunderstanding of military discipline everywhere, and Romaniais no exception. The military oath proposed in 1972 containsthe following phrase: “...swear to respect the laws, tofulfil the orders of the Supreme Commander, the requirementsof the military regulations and the orders of my superiors,both during peacetime and wartime”.

With such regulations in place, the soldiers were putunder the state of emergency on December 17th, 1989 andgiven the mission to intervene against the population forpublic order reasons. Although this was not a traditionalmilitary mission, the Ceausescu regime used the military forall kinds of non-traditional tasks, including forced labour.Ceausescu himself declared on December 21st that “...if thearmy and public order units did not fulfil their duty andresponsibility towards their country, it would mean thatthey did not respect the oath.” But the military leadershipand the soldiers decided – after December 22nd – to supportthe people on the streets and to defend the “revolution”rather than the dictator. That was the “original sin” of thepost-Communist transformation of the military.

The evolution of the juridical doctrine on militarydiscipline evolved gradually. The best analysis of thisevolution is presented in a monograph edited under the

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leadership of the former Chief of General Staff, GeneralConstantin Degeratu. In a chapter on the military oath andthe Code of Conduct on Military Discipline, Degeratuconsiders that the provisions that “the order of thesuperior is mandatory and should be accomplished as such,without comment and immediately” tried to make theprovisions of the military oath equivalent to a law. Thecontent of the oath evolved to assume its current form afterthe 1990s: “I... swear to be loyal to my country, Romania/Swear to defend it even with the price of my life/Swear torespect the laws and regulations/So God helps me!” (Degeratu1999: 114).

The current Code of Conduct on Military Discipline (RG-3), which is based on the Constitution, national laws andinternational treaties, is the framework that regulatesmilitary behaviour during wartime and peacetime. Itspecifies the military hierarchy, sources of legitimateauthority, disciplinary responsibility, the system ofpunishment and reporting in case of conflict. The commandantis accountable for discipline, both for prevention andpunishment. Article 61 states that “...when a soldierconsiders that he/she has been punished unlawfully orunfairly he/she has the right to report orally or in writingto the next hierarchical superior and the superior isobliged to analyze and investigate the case” (RG-3).

Beyond the Code of Conduct, which requires a hierarchicalreport, the soldier has other institutions available thatcan investigate a conflict or a case of abuse. First of all,the Corps of Control and Inspection of the Minister ofNational Defense is responsible for conducting inquiries,inspections or controls and investigating petitionsregarding abuse, illegal or disciplinary misconduct of anymilitary unit. Also, there is an Ombudsman. The Ombudsman(Avocatul Poporului) is the public institution in charge ofdefending the rights and liberties of the citizens inconflicts with the public administration, including the MoD.One of the Ombudsman’s deputies is in charge of the militaryservice, justice, police and penitentiaries, and everysoldier may address petitions to report a case of abuse, aviolation of the law or unfair punishment. The Ombudsman isa national institution with regional offices. But there isno office based within the military, only a deputy and asection at the central office in Bucharest.

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Up to now we have seen how the normative model ofdemocratic soldiering is implemented in the militaryinstitutions of Romania and their socializing practices. Anemerging interest in clearly defining the model of thedemocratic soldier and the norms of good governance andcivic education became visible within strategic documentssuch as the National Security Strategy. However, thecontents of the curricula are not very well defined withregard to the democratic soldier.

4. Internalization of Democratic Norms

The previous section has described how the democratic normsof soldiering and institutions of civilian control wereimplemented in Romania and how the system of militaryeducation accepted the indirect career track, doublespecialization for military graduates and changes incurricula to encompass such courses as Leadership,Management and Sociology. Such courses as CIMIC Doctrine orInternational Humanitarian Law were also incorporated in thepractical training of soldiers. However, it was not clear towhat degree the democratic norms and practices are actuallyinternalized by the military. The main goal of the nextsubchapter is to explain how the Romanian militaryunderstands the role-model of the democratic soldier and howthey assess their military culture against the ideal model.“Is their ideal model of the soldier the same as isexpressed in the normative image one finds in thedocuments?”

There is a shortage of studies on how the individualmilitary internalizes the norms of democratic control. Theonly research publicly known that has touched upon thispoint was a cross-national European study that studied theattitudes and values of military cadets and their civilianpeer students (carried out in 2003) to investigate theexistence of a cultural difference between the culture ofthe military organization and the culture of the parentsociety3. 3 The sample involved 180 students, consisting of 89 military cadets

from three military academies and 91 civilian students from threeuniversities (economics, law and political science) based inBucharest. The findings on Romania were published as the chapter

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Among other themes, the study examined the subordinationof the military to the political leadership. Thesubordination of the military to the political elite wasconsidered as being “very important” or “important” by 58%of the civilian students and 48% of the military cadets.Most of the cadets considered the subordination of themilitary to be realized in Romania (61%) while only 47% ofcivilian students consider it to be realized.

Regarding the preference of conscription vs. an allvolunteer force (AVF), a strong difference was observedbetween the civilian and military students. While themilitary students considered that the draft “guarantees anexchange of values and perceptions with society” (65.1%)only 28.6% of civilians agreed. The difference is alsoevident regarding the view that the Romanian armed forcesattract high quality staff; 64.1% of the military studentswere very supportive of this assumption while only 33% ofcivilian students agreed with it.

But the main goal of the empirical study was to comparewhat military cadets and civilian students think so as toinvestigate a potential cultural gap between the militarymind-set and civil society. The sample was not nationallyrelevant, however. Moreover, the cadets had not completedmilitary training nor had they had a chance to internalizethe relevant norms since they only become fully commissionedafter attending the schools of application. Even though thestudy was not statistically relevant, one can get a glimpseof the internalization processes regarding democratic normsof civil-military relations and the concept of a soldier inthe eyes of both military cadets and their civilian peers.

In order to fully answer the question regarding theinternalization of the democratic norms of CMR, a morecomplex empirical study was carried out over the summer andfall of 2008 within the framework of the project “The Imageof the Democratic Soldier”. The interview guide was providedby the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and adapted foruse in the Romanian language by the author. A set ofinterviews was conducted within the National Defence Academy“Carol I” (with senior officers), 2nd Infantry Battalion and495 Special Forces Battalion from Bucharest (mostly with

“Civil-Military Cultural Gap in Romania”, in Military Missions and theirImplications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th, G. Caforio and G. Kummel(Eds), Elsevier (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 2005).

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professional soldiers/ NCOs). Altogether 24 semi-structuredinterviews (11 officers, mostly majors and LTCs, 2lieutenants and 13 NCOs) were conducted, but only 17 of themwere valid after transcription. A majority of the soldiershad had experience of peacekeeping operations abroad. Thefindings of the empirical fieldwork are presented below.4

4.1. Military role-model: Personal motivation, self image and ideals

The first part of the interview was designed to provideinformation on self-images and professional identities amongthe soldiers, to understand the way they represent the role-model and their motivation to choose a military career. Therole-model proposed by the leadership in the human resourcesstrategic documents expect that an officer should be “…amilitary leader, a specialist, an educator, a citizen in theservice of the nation and a fighter” while an NCO should be“… a fighter, a branch specialist, a small group commander,an educator and a citizen”. However, the real role model isnot very clearly connected to the statements in paper. Thislack of a clearly focused training of democratic soldiering– like the German concept of Innere Führung – can be explainedby the departure from the recent past, when Political-Ideological Education was mandatory for the Communistmilitary.

Regarding the mission and objectives of the soldiers,there is a perception among the interviewees that themilitary has adapted to the new challenges; only the way ofdoing the job has changed to peacekeeping. However, some ofthe NCOs are very critical about the peacetimeadministrative jobs: “…we are cleaning toilets...our unitbecame a kolkhoz” (I 14, paratrooper).

The dominant perception regarding the role-model of agood soldier is that of a knowledgeable, disciplined, well educated,good fighter, patriot, good example for society, man of honour and an altruist.4 The interviewees were all male: 44 years old/LTC; 40 years old/ LTC

Communication; 40 years old/Major Land; 44 years old/Commander Air; 47 years old/LTC, Artillery; 39 years old/LTC Artillery; 39 years old/Major Land; 33 years old/Land; 31 years old/ Warrant Officer Infantry; 27 years old/Lieutenant Land; 31 years old/Major Infantry; 33 years old/Master Sergeant Land; 33 years old/Lieutenant Infantry; 30 years old/First Sergeant Reconnaissance; 26 years old/Lieutenant Land, Communication; 28 years old/Lieutenant Land; 33 years old, FirstSergeant, NBC.

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Some of the soldiers favour physical qualities. One LTC seesa good soldier as “…not a Schwarzenegger but an efficientfighter, having a broad worldview” (I 2, LTC), while othersfavour a balanced view of “…a good sportsman, havingintegrity, being aware of his mission, a symbol of Romaniansociety” (I 6, LTC). On the other hand, even though women donot have a long tradition in the military, their male peers(already) stated that they should be treated equally.

The military ethos seems to be a concept on paper, almostunknown in practice to the soldiers. One LTC considered that“...it represents the military spirit and beliefs but wedon’t have a specific training for soldiers” (I 2) whileanother LTC guessed that it might be “…a military folkloreand spirit which characterizes the military system...a setof habits… ceremonies…” (I 6). One lieutenant put itbluntly: “Yes, it is a new word for me…probably it isalready used in our military system but nobody gave me adefinition or I have never talked about that…(I 13, Lt).

By the same token, the soldiers do not perceivethemselves as being very well connected with a particulartradition. Some respondents associate military traditionwith the tradition of their military branch. Thus, an LTC (I1) invoked General Mochulski, an Alpine troop hero duringWWII, while a paratrooper invoked General Bastan, thefounder of the post-WWII Special Forces (I 6).

The actual style of command and leadership seems to be ofgreater interest for the majority of the soldiers. The idealcommander should have personal managerial skills, a capacityfor empathy, should be a good professional which makes himrespected by his subordinates. One LTC commented that “…theauthoritarian style is specific of the military but somebranches such as the Air Force can also adopt aparticipatory one” (I 3).

The military do not consider themselves as “guardians” ofcertain values, but they consider “the Armed Forces” as theguarantor of the national identity, independence andnational security of the Romanian state. This was quoted assuch by many officers.

In summary, it can be stated that the role-model of thesoldier in Romanian democracy might be well designed onpaper, but is not very well explained to, and internalizedby, the soldiers themselves. The concept of military ethos

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is unknown, although some democratic values are transmittedin the socialization process.

4.2. Acceptance of the armed forces in society

The Army is one of the most trusted institutions in Romania.A public opinion barometer showed that – between 1996 and2006 – the military was one of the most trustedinstitutions, alongside the Church. About 70% of the publictrust the military. Even if this trend is declining, itstill means that the image of the soldier is very good andthat Romanian civil society has a high esteem of themilitary.

Surprisingly, the respondents mentioned a contradictionbetween the trust measured by the opinion polls and the waythe military is presented in the media. Some explain thecontradiction as a recent image created by the media thatthe military earn high salaries while the public understandsthe roles and responsibilities of the armed forces less andless. A lieutenant of the Land Forces considers that:

“…there were so many public shows on certain TV channelsin which the reporters tried to underline the negativeaspects of the military…that the military are very wellpaid and, except for the missions abroad forpeacekeeping, they do nothing…”(I 5).

Otherwise, debates about the ideal soldier are very rare andonly became an issue in connection with Romania’s efforts tojoin NATO. The interviewees therefore think that civilsociety hardly understands the military because of the lawthat suspended the conscript army. They believe that, due tomisunderstandings, there are many stereotypes and prejudicesin the minds of civilians such as the ones related to highsalaries. An LTC from NDU considers that “… Our image isgetting worse within civil society … civil society doesn’tunderstand our role properly. They only think that we earnsome good money…” (I 5, LTC). However, there are somepositive stereotypes as well, namely that the military isvery well organized, clean and punctual.

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4.3. Democratic ways of organizing the military

How do the armed forces deal with the tension betweendemocratic norms and functional military necessities? Sincethe Army is regarded as an authoritarian organization, oneof the constant concerns after the revolution of 1989focused on the democratic way of organizing the military. Asthe Army was the driving force of the “revolution”, a groupof young officers founded the Action Committee forDemocratization of the Army, the so-called CADA, in theearly 1990s. This proposed a set of changes, including someproposals for regulating military life anew.

As shown before, discipline is the trademark of modernarmies and military identity. Therefore the new normsregarding the way in which tensions and conflicts are to beregulated and internalized should be very clear. Generallyspeaking, the respondents claimed that conflicts andtensions among soldiers are very well regulated by themilitary codes of conduct. “…conflict resolution andproblem-solving are very well regulated by military codessuch as RG-7…” (I 6). However, some respondents stated thatconflict settlement should be more transparent anddemocratic, beyond the military code. They did not elaborateon this, but it seems that the Commandant has (maybe too)extensive powers to judge and settle conflicts.

“Practically you should report any problem to theCommandant, it is normal. You have a problem? You shouldgo to your boss who is in charge of representing yourinterests…” (I 2).

When it comes to the issue of protecting individual rightsand liberties in the army, the soldiers believe that theyare really respected. However, they are aware of the factthat some liberties and rights are restricted due to thespecificity of military life.

One such right is the right to be involved in politics.Of course, soldiers can vote but as members of the militarythey cannot campaign or stand as a candidate for anypolitical office. They therefore see politics and themilitary as opposing concepts. The majority of theinterviewees agreed with the statement that “A soldier hasto serve his nation and should not care about politics”.

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“We are not political partisans. All our actions are non-political. We only have to be informed but I think mustnot practice politics because it is not our job.” (I 3)

Courses such as civic education were not judged as veryimportant. The respondents do not see lessons in civiceducation as a requirement for their military life; theyadvocate rather that the Army should recruit volunteers whoare already educated in the spirit of civic culture.

It can be concluded that the soldiers assumed thelimitations of their personal rights in the military to benormal. “…Of course, our rights have some restrictions, weall entered the military system aware of that… I think mybasic rights are protected…” said an LTC. (I 7)It is not evident if the changes proposed by the newregulations are internalized by the soldiers. However, thegeneral norm of civilian control of the military was fullyconfirmed by all respondents and seen as part of theirunderstanding of professionalism.

4.4. Out-of-area missions

The military doctrine of the Ceausescu regime – The struggleof the entire people –was based on the assumption thatRomania had never attacked a neighbour and had, in thecourse of history, only waged wars to defend itsterritories. However, when NATO and its Partnership forPeace opened the doors for the former Communist countriesthey asked the candidate countries to show their willingnessto participate in out-of-area missions. That triggereddebates in Romania in the early 1990s about the peacekeepingmissions. Our research asked about the legitimization ofout-of-area missions and the perception of both the militaryand civil society regarding such missions.The opinions of the members of the military were diverse,ranging from some stating that the missions abroad were anopportunity for Romania to contribute to global peace toothers claiming that they would favour a better balancebetween foreign missions and domestic ones. Thus one LTCconsiders that “…being a NATO member you have to executewhatever NATO decides…today you cannot rely on self-defence,you cannot live alone…of course, it is related to theprocess of globalization…” (I 1).

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On the other hand, some soldiers mentioned that it is awin-lose situation: the more you invest in missions abroadthe less you get for the military units at home.

“I have the feeling that we have two armies: one thatfights in the missions abroad, well trained and equipped,and another one that does what it always did, trainingmore or less, depending on the funds allocated by theGovernment” (I 6).

The strategic culture of Romania changed over time,developing from a critical approach to sending troops abroadto an enthusiastic approach to sending troops topeacekeeping missions and even joining the “Alliance of theWilling” that invaded Iraq. The politicians were mostly morecritical than the military about sending troops abroad. Thecriticism of the military was mostly related to the rationalallocation of resources, but they tended to favour missionsabroad to increase Romania’s chances of joining NATO and theEU.

To sum up, it can be stated that the role-model of thedemocratic soldier designed in the strategic or educationdocuments has not been internalized by all soldiers.Concepts such as military ethos or civic education are notvery well understood. On the other hand, even though themilitary is one of the most trusted institutions in Romania,this does not correlate directly with the impressionssoldiers have of their relationship with society. Somesoldiers claimed that stereotypes were spread by the mediaand a bias was noticeable of presenting the military asearning a lot of money without doing much for their country.

Regarding the limitations on their individual freedom, itwas judged an accepted matter of choice. The general norm ofcivilian control of the military was fully embraced by allrespondents.

5. Conclusions

Romania has experienced a dramatic and radical process ofsocial and political change in the last two decades. Itsucceeded in building a democratic regime and a functioningmarket economy to join Western institutions and alliances

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such as the European Union and NATO. One of the mostimportant issues during the transition has been theconstruction of a democratic pattern of civil-militaryrelations and an image of a democratic soldier whounderstands democratic mechanisms and acts accordingly.

Based on the rich empirical data presented above, I wantto finally assess the relationship between the military andits parent society. In order to do so, I will first sum upthe main findings. The first part of the chapter describedhow the democratic pattern of civil-military relations wasdesigned and implemented in Romania and how the image ofdemocratic soldiering was (re-)constructed after half acentury of dictatorships. A set of intervening variablesexplains the success of these efforts.

Among them, political culture and national traditionplayed a determining role because the Romanians were keen toreturn to a Western identity, to continue the process ofmodernization and democratization. In the longue dureetimeframe, the perception was that Romania’s process ofdemocratization and modernization had been interrupted bythree dictatorships (Royal, Military and Communist), andthat Romania was a Latin lake surrounded by a Slavic ocean;therefore its desire and destiny were to rejoin Westerninstitutions and culture.

By the same token, the perception of threats –particularly the historically grown perception of theRussian danger – created a desire to join NATO as aprotector, at any price. That might explain the enthusiasmof the Romanians for Atlanticism as well as theirwillingness to accept any norms and requirements coming fromthe West.

On the other hand, the legacy of the former defencedoctrine – “struggle of the entire people” – created strongesteem for the military and fuelled arguments againstsending troops abroad.

Starting with the shortcomings of the old system, theprocess of democratization included the erection ofdemocratic controls on the armed forces as central reforms.Structural reforms followed a dual track: on the one hand, aset of norms and institutions of democratic control over themilitary were set up within the general process of thedemocratization of society while, on the other hand, the

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military withdrew suddenly and consciously from politicallife. The military’s role, missions and system of defenceplanning were changed and focused on gaining theprofessionalism needed to join NATO.

The role of Western assistance, particularly NATO’s opendoor policy, was instrumental in encouraging and guidingefforts to build up the military in a democratic Romania.Establishing democratic civil-military relations was part ofthe conditionality for all the countries which wanted tojoin NATO and the EU. The idea like the one presented byJoseph Nye that the military must recognize that it isaccountable to respect the rule of law, remain nonpartisanand respect the civilian authorities, while civilians shouldalso respect the military and provide them with adequatefunding helped in the construction of a clear image of whata democratic soldier means. The norms included in the OSCE’sCode of Conduct, the Study of NATO Enlargement or NATO’sMembership Action Plans contributed to further developmentsin this respect. The main conclusion at this level is thatthe concept of democratic soldiering was constructed top-down in Romania, despite the fact that the reform wastriggered by a domestic impulse, after a bloody revolution.

The second level of our investigation described the wayin which the normative image of the military in democracy ispresented in strategic documents and the education systemand how it is transferred through the socialization processin the military. For this purpose, the system of educationand training of the military as well as the content of thecurricula were analyzed.

An ideal type of soldier, both commissioned and non-commissioned, could be reconstructed from a study of thestrategic documents and Human Resource concepts, comprisingelements regarding good citizenship as well as civic virtuesparticular to soldiers. Cadets in the military academieshave more opportunities to learn about democratic norms andsoldiering from their social sciences curriculum. However,there are no direct links between the training of soldiersand the ideal type. Some values and norms can be learnt bythe cadets from such courses as Military History orSociology of Organizations or from military regulations andpractices, but there are no special courses on the role andconcept of the soldier in democracy.

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The analysis of the norms of conflict settlement,lawfulness and disputes is another way of looking at the wayin which democratic soldiering is put into practice.Regarding this issue, a set of institutions was set up inorder to provide the soldiers with more instruments ofappeal. Thus, in addition to the reformed Code of Conduct onMilitary Discipline, an MoD Corps of Control and Inspectionas well as a special section of the Ombudsmen areinstruments that allow soldiers to appeal if an orderbreaches or violates human rights.

The third part of the chapter responded to the questionof to what extent the democratic norms are internalized bythe military. Here, regarding the issue of the role-model ofa democratic soldier, the answer is that it might be a welldesigned concept on paper but it is obviously not very wellexplained to, and internalized by, Romanian soldiers. Theconcept of a military ethos is unknown, but some democraticvalues are transmitted in the practical socializationprocess. A surprising finding was that, despite the factthat civic education and military ethos are almost unknownas concepts, the soldiers we talked to fully subscribed tothe norms of the political neutrality of the Army andcivilian control by elected politicians.

With regard to the acceptance of the military in society,if we look beyond the high esteem enjoyed by the army inopinion polls and the public support for reforms, thesoldiers claimed to experience a misunderstanding of theirrole in society. They claimed that their hard life and theirearnings were represented in distorted terms in public.

In conclusion of the empirical study, a slightdiscrepancy can be noticed between the ideal type of thedemocratic soldier as drawn up in the strategic documentsand the real type. The author did not meet a perfect soldierwho fully understood the norms and habits of the military ina democracy. As one of the interviewees put it “theory istheory, but the practice kills us all!”

There is a lack of clear civic education on democraticaspects of soldiering. This can be explained by the practiceof the recent past when political-ideological education(meaning in fact propaganda!) was a mandatory course ofCommunist indoctrination. It seems that, due to thisexperience, the decision-makers are “throwing the baby outwith the bath water”, are afraid to propose special courses

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on democratic civil-military relations, or teach democraticvalues because it might look like a politically colourededucation.

Despite these shortcomings, it can be said that the basicnorms of democratic soldiering do take effect in thesocialization process and are internalized by a majority ofthe soldiers. There were no events that would suggest thatthe military was prone to launch a coup – the main reasonfor concern in a democracy. The empirical study revealedrather a perception among soldiers that politicians do notrespect their part of the contract, do not provide properfunding, do not understand defence policy, or are seen asaliens to society. This is a serious problem for thestability of civil-military relations in a democracy.

As a final conclusion, the democratic norms of civil-military relations have been put into place in Romania; aconcept of democratic soldiering was constructed top-down,mainly with Western assistance, and the system of educationdefines a clear ideal type of soldiering. But in practice,training on such issues is missing from the curricula.Therefore, the norms are roughly internalized, but soldiersdo not understand their rights or democratic norms too well.And yet the fact that the image of the soldier in Romaniandemocracy was constructed top-down does not mean that it hasno bottom-up support. In fact, that is the explanation forthe actual success in the transfer of norms: a combinationof the top-down policy and support from the public in takingall the recommended actions for reform in order to join NATOand the EU and to return to a Western way of life.

However, the process of the full internalization ofdemocratic norms and mechanisms is a long process that needscontinuous attention even in consolidated democracies. Asone saying puts it: “In order to get a British lawn you needsome seeds of green grass and 500 years of Britishexperience.” So, from a constructivist point of view,democratic institution-building was a useful paradigm toguide social and political change in Romania, but it willtake years to consolidate democracy and internalize thenorms of democratic rule. The Armed Forces are no exceptionin this respect.

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