Political – administrative relations in Romania

Abstract

Political- administrative relations represent one of the most important issues for the students and practitioner of public administration. At stake is the democratic character of a polity, the degree to which partisan or bureaucratic interests or values are influencing the processof policy design and implementation. Each democratic countrydeveloped in time patterns for the political-administrative relations, pattern consisting both of formal and informal rules and that are specific for each country. With a long history of patronage and lack of professionalism Romania failed to establish a clear and stable pattern and what is more important failed to adapt a model consistent with thoseof democratic country. The formal settings resemble rules and practices influenced by those of European Union member states but implementation failed almost completely. Due to the importance of the subject matter, immediate attention should be paid by the political and administrative elite andby the academics in order to reach to a desirable and practical solution.

Bureaucracy from historical perspective

According to one of the simplest and at the same time most known definition “when two peoples are joining to role a stone that neither could have moved alone” we may speak about “public administration” (Simon, Thompson, Smithburg, 2000, p.3). That is to say that the primary role of any administrative system is to coordinate joint efforts of groups of individuals in order to achieve collective objectives. Another conclusion would be that public administration is a phenomenon that accompanied the human kind from its very early stage of development. Administrative history is not a very developed field but we still have evidences of developed and well structured bureaucracies in many ancient countries. Indeed if we are

looking at the numerous monumental constructions that were done by our ancestors we may easily understand that a sophisticated bureaucracy was needed to coordinate their fulfillment. The Great Chinese Wall, the pyramids of Egypt or the amazing constructions found in Central and South America are few examples among very many undertakings that are extraordinary even for our modern times.

In his attempt to offer a scientific explanation to thegeneses of the human civilizations, Arnold J. Toynbee explores several possible theories related to the causes that determined certain ancient populations to abandon what presumably was a comfortable even if primitive way of livingand started to develop sophisticated forms of social organization that obviously demanded greater efforts and burdens whilst others preferred to keep the archaic forms ofliving. In other words, the question is what determined primitive societies to undertake a shift “in the direction taken by mimesis and imitation…or from a static condition toa dynamic one” (1946, vol.1, pp. 48-49). In primitive societies mimesis is oriented towards the past, towards traditions whereas in “societies in process of civilization mimesis is directed towards creative personalities who command a following because they are pioneers” (idem, p.49).We must add that this transition that took place with approximately 6000 years before represented one of the most important milestones in the history of mankind, a radical progress from primitive societies to superior forms of social life.

Throughout history there were several theories trying to explain the differences between the rhythms of development of various populations, . “…some special qualityin the group of people that made the transition or in some special features in the environment in which transition has taken place or in some interaction between the two” (idem, p. 51). Both race and environment are rejected by Toynbee. Instead he described a dramatic climate change created by the movement of the “rain belt” from the actual tropical regions to north. This forced the populations that lived in those areas to react.

Toynbee is mentioning three different types of responses to the climate changes. Some groups followed the “rain belt” and reach in the actual northern Africa, in Europe or in southern Asia. Others migrated to south and are representingthe current primitive tribes living in equatorial zones. Butthe most important groups took the difficult “ordeal” and moved to areas with harsh living condition and created evolved societies. The first of these societies were situated on the sides of large rivers like Nile, Tigris, Euphrates or the Yellow River. In order to create living conditions these populations developed sophisticated water management systems that allowed them to transform areas covered by marshes in comfortable places for living. What Toynbee did not said was that for those complicated construction projects a well-organized administrative systemwas needed.

Among the examples of ancient administrative systems Farazmand is mentioning the long tradition of the Iranian bureaucracy that can be traced back to 6000 B.C. when the ancient city of Susa “began political life”. Later (approximately 3000 B.C.) it became the capital of the “of one of the oldest empire of antiquities”. A federation of five “powerful kingdoms”, the empire of Elam had three distinct administrative layers, and while the component kingdoms were enjoying autonomy, clear rules and sophisticated intergovernmental relations were in place in asetting that is very much reminding of a modern administration. The system developed in Elam was inherited by the empires and kingdoms that conquered the region duringthe centuries. The Persians, the Medes, the Sasanides and the Otomans benefited by the achievements of this ancient administrative system and in some of the cases even developed it in a very consistent manner. According to Farazmand “Bureaucracy of the Persian Empire was a formidable institution of administration and government, andit was both efficient and effective. The organizational and administrative principles developed under the Persian Achaemenid Empire had a significant influence on the Roman administration and were almost totally adopted by the

Islamic, the Ottoman and later by the Iranian Safavid rulers. Evidence of the influence of these principles can befound in almost every contemporary government in the Midle/Near East, as the Persian Achaemenid legacy affected the entire region. Further professionalization of bureaucracy took place under the Achaemenid Empire with various principles that seemed to have remained significant throughout the duration of the Persian’s rule. These included: 1) recruitment based on merit and knowledge, 2) prior experience, 3) long term apprenticeship training, 4) adherence to certain professional rules set by the establishment, 5) constant eagerness and attempt to improve professional performance and 6) acceptance by the professional association... ”. (Farazmand, 2001, p.33-44).

Another important achievement of the Persian Empire wasthe development of legislation that according to Farazmand had all the characteristics of a modern system of laws: “...Darius Universal Ordinance of Law and codes were significant measures that were applied equally throughout the empire. The Universal Law of Darius recognized no statusof favoritism and was enforced by Persian administrators andPersian judges who, according to Herodotus and other sources, never failed to serve universal justice. And as stated in the Bible: “The laws of Medes and Persians never changes. Darius borrowed from the Babylonian law of Hamurabi, but his universal law was distinctive in several ways: Unlike the previous laws, Darius law’s were both comprehensive and universal; they covered almost every aspect of political, social, economic, legal, military and administrative systems and, and the laws applied universallythroughout the entire empire ”. (idem., p.53). One may be reluctant at the performances of some regimes that collapsedor were conquered by other nations, as it was the case with the Persian Empire. Moreover, among the causes that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire many authors are citing the poor condition of its administration. Another observation is that Farazmand is paying little attention, ifany, to the role of religion in the social life of a state (the Persian Empire) were the emperor was viewed as a

character very close to a god. Nevertheless it is obvious that a well developed administrative system existed in the ancient Elam, Median and Persian Empire (Yoffee, 2004, pp102-109). We insisted on the case of the former because itvery closely resembles the process of the “routinization of charisma” described by Weber as a process that was crucial to the development of the modern states. Cyrus the Great, a character of a modest origin, managed to get in power and transformed the small Persian state in a great empire, but it was his son, Darius, who employed in the newly created empire complex systems of legislation and administration (Bell, in Strauss, Leo, 1987, pp., 94-96).

The bureaucratic character is less present in the ancient Greek or Roman city-states. Recruitment for officialposition was more often a process that was carried out either by election or as it was the case in some period in Athens by random selection. Professionalism was to some degree a condition but the requirements were elusive and unstable. Economic and legal training, compulsory for any other types of bureaucracy were absent in the ancient city-states. But the most important characteristic that differentiate these administrative systems from the bureaucratic ones including the ideal model developed by Weber is the absence of a rational, impersonal and stable system of laws. Legislation was thought to be of divine origin and its main objective was to ensure the allegiance of the citizens toward some superior values that were praising either the Gods or the city itself. Both in theory and in practical life individuals were considered completelysubordinate to state. Aristotle is very clear on this: “any individual outside the state is either god of beast” (Politics, p.12). The idea of ensuring equality among citizens was only marginal in the legislation of the ancientcity-states (Argyriades, pp.62-67).In the case of the Roman state, the rapid expansion of its territory created a pressure toward the development of an adequate administrative system. The process was more consistent after Cezar established the Empire. Emperors felt

the need to concentrate power in their hands and for this purpose several attempts to organize a hierarchical administration and a stable legislation were undertaken in various moments of the Roman history. But this type of organization was valid more in theory than in practice. Manytimes the sovereigns were those who ignored the administrative hierarchy and preferred to work directly withofficials placed in lower layers of the system. In the mean time, despite the legislation that was in place, the will ofthe emperor was considered to be of superior nature.

The Empire of Byzantium represented a superior stage from the point of view of bureaucratic organization. Many ofthe characteristics that we found in the case of the WesternRoman Empire were maintained. But a stronger emphasis was placed on the professionalization of the officials and the structures benefited by a higher degree of stability. According to Argyriades the Byzantine bureaucracy played an important role in keeping the stability, the unity and continuity of the country (idem., pp.67-75).Forms of bureaucracy, sometimes with a high degree of development are to be find very often in the history of Chinese Empire. Even in periods that are labeled “feudal” bysome authors (Eberhard) the local nobilities employed persons of humble origin that carried out tasks of bureaucratic nature. At the side of the emperor there were officials that were actually holding the real power. They were usually selected among intellectuals like the groups of“legalist” during the Han dynasty, or “literates” in periodscloser to our times. But these type of Chinese bureaucracy had a peculiar characteristic that was remarked by many authors (Eberhard, Hall&Ikkenberry). Instead of being a toolfor administering and controlling the entire territory of the empire, they were mostly dealing with the problems of the imperial court. Kamenka regarded the Chinese post Han dynasty state as being highly bureaucratized (1989, p.10), but Hall&Ikkenberry noted that the Chinese bureaucracy prevented in reality the emperors of having a strong controlover the entire territory of their empire (1998, p.57).

Although, as presented above, developed administrative systems existed in various parts of the world and in different historical periods, the modern administrative systems are a creation of Western Europe. Evolving from a state of chaos and violence the monarchs assumed the task ofensuring the public order. They had three means that were developed over time: a legislative system based on equity, impersonality and universality, an administrative system based on trained officials to implement the legislation and a permanent army to support the state institutions. Thus, approximately at the end of the XVIII century most of the Western European countries had developed complex and efficient legislative and administrative systems also labeled as public bureaucracies. The term appears to have a French origin. Heady (2001, p.71-75) is exploring the different meanings and definition of the concept. First, bureaucracy is seen “in terms of an organization’s basic structural characteristics”. Robert Hall quoted by Heady (p.72) identified six characteristics of bureaucratic organizations: “1. a well-defined hierarchy of authority; 2.a division of labor based on functional specialization; 3. asystem of rules covering the rights and duties of positionalincumbents; 4. a system of procedures for dealing with work situation; 5. impersonality of interpersonal relationship; 6. selection for employment and promotion based on technicalcompetence”.The second approach is linked to certain patterns of behavior. Critics of the ideal bureaucratic model designed by Weber are referring to the absence of any consideration for human behavior, values and skills is a major weakness ofthe weberian theory. In a famous book, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1963), the French sociologist Michel Crozier is analyzing how characteristics of bureaucracy may affect entire societies. Thus he tries in his study to analyze “themalady of bureaucracy…the maladaptation, the inadequacies, or to use Merton’s expression ‘the dysfunction’s that necessarily develop in human organization” (Heady, p.73). Among this dysfunctions Crozier is including lack of efficiency and weakness, having a chapter named “The paradox

of the weakness of an omnipotent central power” in which he is describing the way in which over bureaucratization may result in the lack of ability of a public authority to manage a human community (pp.224-227).

Bureaucracy is not always considered to produce negative behavior patterns. Authors like Friedrich are mentioning characteristics as objectivity, precision, consistency and discretion (Heady, p.72). Peter Blau cited by Heady is referring to bureaucracy “in terms of achievement of purpose, as an ‘organization that maximize efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency” (p.73).

As mentioned above, bureaucracy has an evolution throughout the medieval and post-medieval era being used by monarchs as a mean to administer their country and to createan unique public authority. The process was more or less completed at the end of the XVIII century (Guizot, Davis). According to the principal-agent theory that will be described later, the principal or the leader was unquestionable the monarch, at least in theory, and the bureaucrats were agents, that is to say subordinates. In practice, many times skillful ministers in service of various kings manage to control the relation with their supposed superiors. But during the XIX century important developments occurred in the principal-agent relation that was described above: the political power was gradually transferred from the monarchs to parliaments as representatives of the people. But the majorities in these parliaments is changing according to the results of the elections. This evolution led to the appearance and development of an issue that is more and more important in the study and practice of public administration: the politico-administrative relations.

The relations between bureaucrats and politicians. Theoretical aspects.

From the classical point of view politicians and bureaucrats represents two totally distinct categories and are having separate roles in the functioning of the state. In the constitutions of the vast majority of the country’s career administrators are just a part of the executive branch of the government. Max Weber, the celebrated author of the “ideal bureaucratic model” is pointing out the necessity of political leadership over the bureaucratic organizations which should give the directions for their functioning: “Thus at the top of a bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic” (Weber, 1947, p.335). Weber is referring to all types of organizations: economic, political parties or armies, but we are using his point of view related to public organizations. Also, an entire set ofAmerican authors at the end of nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century (Woodrow Wilson, Luther Gulick or Frank Goodnow) supported the same opinion regarding the necessity of a complete separation of the political and administrative spheres. In this sense Wilson noted: “Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions....The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics...It is part of political life only as methods of the counting-house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product” (quoted inAberbach, Putnam, Rockman, 1981, p.4). According to Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, this paradigm of total dichotomy between politics and administration correspond to what they are labeling “Image I: Policy/Administration... The earliest theory about the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was in many ways the simplest: politicians make policies, civil servants administer”. (p.4). In other words the authors are referring to this dichotomy by using the concept of “separation of labor” between the two categories of actors: the political field isresponsible with policy formulation and the administrative one with policy implementation.

The paradigm of political – administrative dichotomy raise in principal two questions: a. is it possible? and, b.Is it desirable?

To the first question the answer, according to the mostscholars is “no”. A sharp separation between politics and public administration seems impossible for the majority of the students in public administration. Even Weber was concerned about the potential power that may be accumulated by bureaucratic ranks: „The power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always great, under normal conditions over towering. The political „master” always findhimself, vis-a-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the expert. This holds whether the „master”, whom the bureaucracy serves, is the „people” equipped with the weapons of legislative initiative, referendum, and the right to remove the officials; or a parliament elected on a more aristocratic or more democraticbasis and equipped with the right or de facto power to vote a lack of confidence; or an aristocratic collegiate body, legally or actually based on self-recruitment; or a popularly elected president or an „absolute” or „constitutional” hereditary monarch” (Weber, 1978, pp.991-992).

This passage from Weber’s writings on bureaucracy may suggest that the division of labor that is in accordance with “Image I” was not to be met very often from historical point of view, irrespective of the type of the political regime. A suggested conclusion would be that the bureaucracywas indeed a powerful and indispensable tool for creating modern states, but this modernization was not always a result of the will of the “political master”, but many timesthe steps toward modernization were influenced by some professional guidance coming from the servants of the monarchs.

Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman are presenting a historical evolution of the four images both from practical and theoretical point of view of the above mentioned “division of labor”. According to the first image, that I already presented politicians and bureaucrats are having

totally separates roles: the formers are taking decisions and the latter are putting them in practice.

Image II assumes that both sides participate in policy making but have different approaches. While bureaucrats are driven by “facts and knowledge”, politicians put forward “interests and values”. That is to say, a political leader will favor a decision according to a specific ideology or partisan interest, but career official will try to influencethe turnover using his/her neutral competence (pp.6-9). If this distinctiveness is obvious for anyone some comments, however, have to be made. Throughout history were not few cases when bureaucracy embedded strong ideological values, sometimes of religious nature. England was driven to Protestantism not so much by Henric the VIII, who had far more modest goals, but by his zealous ministers, especially Thomas Cromwell. Closer to our times, Eduard C. Page is citing the case of German socialist minister of finance, Rudolph Hilferding, appointed in 1923, who was virtually excluded from any important decisions by his bureaucrat subordinates long accustomed with conservative type of policies (Page, p.1). The Swedish right wing party that won the election in Sweden in 1976, after more than 40 years of socialist government, realized that most of the leadership positions from the Swedish administrative system were controlled by the Social Democrat Party (Pierre, 2004). Thatis to say, bureaucrats are not always immune to ideology, especially when they have some kind of political affiliation.

On the other hand, in countries like Germany or France legislation allows senior civil servants to be appointed in political position, and obviously they will promote at leastsome bureaucratic values in their new positions.Image III is presenting us both politicians and bureaucrats engaged in policy making and having strong interests in it. Here the styles and attitudes differ. Career officials are more conservatives, more attached to policies and proceduresin place, in other words reluctant to change, to reforms or any other improvements. Politicians on the other hand, especially in pursuit of their electoral or political

programs or some ideologically based objectives are more interested in reforms or in new policies. This view of the authors is supported with the opinions of several famous scholars like Richard Rose or Mattei Dogan. But this type ofapproach changed significantly after the waves of reforms that were undertaken in ‘80’s and ‘90’s. The classical imageof the bureaucrat opposing to any king of change, fighting in trenches to preserve the old policies and procedures suffered serious amendments. As Pollitt and Bouckaert noticed: “Alongside executive politicians, senior civil servants have in almost every case themselves been crucial actors in the reform programs. Indeed, in some countries they have been the prime moving force. This may seem strange– there is a stereotype abroad many countries which depicts senior civil servants – “mandarins” – as instinctively conservative and oppose to change. However, the record showsthat this is not the case. In countries as diverse as New Zeeland, Finland and France, “mandarins” have been active ingenerating reform ideas and pushing for their implementation” (Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2000, p.19). This attitude of the senior bureaucrats may have a number of explanations. One may be the simple pursuit of power.

Most of the persons that are reaching at the top of a hierarchy are ambitious and willing to demonstrate their talents. This cannot be done from the position of simple executant or even more of opponent to any progress. Competition between the leaders of bureaucracy is another aspect that may stimulate them to accomplish more important objectives that to simple run the current affairs of their office. Dunleavy, cited by Pollitt and Bouckaert, elaboratedthe model of “bureau-shaping”, “in which senior officials actually gain from reorganizing their subordinates, both by distancing themselves from certain kinds of operational problems (through decentralization) and by casting themselves more and more in a high-status and intellectuallymore interesting role of institutional design and regulation” (p.19). Other authors pointed that: “Most Western European governments engaged in civil service reformin recent decades. Many reforms were politically and

budgetary motivated, but there are some cases where civil themselves played a major role in introducing reform” (van den Meer, Steen, Wille, 2007, pp.46-47).

On the other hand, politicians may be often against reforms. Cutting public expenditure may result in loses of votes. Ideological issue may be at stake in case of important changes in the functioning of public institutions.For instance some may be against cutting of welfare funds because of strong left wing beliefs.Image IV: This image is a further evolution in the increasing melting of the roles of politicians and high ranking civil servants. According to the authors this interaction between political and administrative field is more important both from quantitative and qualitative point of view. That is to say more and more politicians or personswith party affiliation are joining the ranks of the bureaucracy and an increasing number of bureaucrats are choosing political careers. On the other hand politicians are more involved in activities formerly belonging to bureaucracy, such as coordinating or even managing public institutions while career civil servants are having an increasing role in policy formulation. Thus former prime minister of UK Harold Wilson employed a limited number of political appointees in the British central government but with a significant power. On the other hand, a French careercivil servant, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, after a distinguished career in civil service, entered in politics and made it until the position of President of France. Also,the number of political employees that President of US may appoint rose with every new mandate at the White House (pp.16-23).

Politico-administrative relations are in general approached from two different perspectives. On the one hand,many scholars and practitioners are referring at the danger of excessive political involvement in the functioning of public institutions either by imposing partisan decisions orpolicies or by employing political appointees. Thus the values and principles of public administration are affected.On the other hand the illegitimate activities of

bureaucracy, like manipulating information or delaying the implementation of policies, that may prevent politician to achieve their goals established in the electoral programs voted by the citizens. From this point of view in the last two decades a new tendency was observed by specialists. New Public Management, it is sad, it is also an attempt to subordinate civil servant to politicians. Rouban is even mentioning an alliance between politicians and citizens against the “evil” civil service: “From the first reform steps of the British civil service in the early 1980s to theprivatization of Italian civil service in 1993 or the reformstance of the French Raffarin’s in 2000s, NPM style have been built upon a series of criticism against a civil service alternatively viewed as ‘social-democrat’, ‘Welfare proactive’ or ‘conservative’. Civil service became the “enemy’ from within” (Rouban, 2007, p.265). To manage these complex relation countries had developed throughout the years pieces of legislation meant both to protect the merit system and ensure the political control over bureaucracy. The patterns are specific for every country and there may besignificant differences between the formal provisions of legislation and situation in practice.

Thus, Nordic countries tend to have a lower level of politicization. In Denmark, although the legislation allows ministers to employ or dismiss civil servants evidences are showing that political appointments are extremely rare. Evenif politicians decide to undertake changes the staff of the public institution the persons that are replacing other career bureaucrats are usually recruited from the same department or from inside of the Civil Service itself. Still, due to the legal provisions that allow ministers to sack the Civil Servant in case they don’t match the professional expectation of the political leader in terms ofpolicy advice and implementation we may state that the political responsiveness of Civil Service it is high in Denmark (Christensen, 2004, 15-36). We may add that the specific character of the Danish political system may play arole in the nature of politico-administrative relation in this country. The majority of governments, at least after WW

II were minority governments. As a result changes in public policies were not radical and potentiality for conflict or divergences between politicians and career civil servants was low.

In the case of Sweden we may also speak about a low level of politicization. Detailed legal arrangements were enacted in order to prevent any political interference in the recruitment and promotion of civil servants. In the central government the percentage of political employees wasnever higher than 4%. Consequently most of the policy decisions are significantly influenced by career bureaucrats. Still responsiveness to political guidance is high, especially due to the long tradition of state of law that is a feature of Swedish public administration. The characteristic of the political life of the country are influencing as well the nature of politico-administrative relations. Sweden had long term governments with dominance of the social democrat party. As a result common values and interests were developed in time between politicians and bureaucrats. Problems occurred when governments changed. In 1932 the Social Democrat party find difficult to work with acivil service accustomed to cooperate with a conservative government. In 1976 the Liberal-Conservative coalition coming in power after 40 years of socialist government facesthe similar problem. So, we may speak about a peculiar form of politicization generated by long periods of cooperation between certain political parties and the top bureaucrats (Pierre, 2004, 41-52).

The German Federal Administration is distinct to the ones we just discussed. First, the federal nature of the state has as a result a second chamber of the Parliament, the Bundesrat. This second chamber may differ from the lowerchamber from the point of view of political composition. TheParliament as a hole is a very active one being labeled by Aberbach as “the strongest Parliament of Europe”. A strong Parliamentary Committees system supported by an experienced and numerous technical staff is providing a large number of policy initiatives, sometimes challenging the Federal Government policies. The tradition of corporatism and neo-

corporatism, although not so strong in the last decades create the need for senior bureaucrats to involve in negotiation with different interest groups. Also, the tradition of governmental coalitions obliges the top civil servants to negotiate with ministers from different parties with different interests. So, the German senior civil servants are acting in a complex environment, Schroter stating that they are “exposed to political heat and need toplace greater emphasis on political skills as opposed to technical expertise”(2004, 61). That is to say that politicization in German federal administration is more a result of the need involve in activities of political naturelike negotiation or building coalition to support public policies. Top bureaucrats are allowed to leave temporary thecivil service and engage in political activities, namely in offering technical expertise for the parliamentary party groups. On the other hand, politicians have the possibility to appoint a number of 136 so called “political civil servants”. However none of the incoming governments dismissed the entire available number (24 state secretaries and 112 department heads) but the tendency is to increase the number of those who are replaced. Schroder government dismissed 57%, far higher than in any case of governmental change (Schroter, 2004, 55-81). France witnessed dramatic changes in the relations between politicians and bureaucrats. Charles de Gaulle was responsible for two important measures with tremendous effects on medium term. In 1945 created ENA (The National School for Public Administration) entrusted with the training of the future senior civil servants. Ironically, although it was created to make the access for lower social categories in the top position of the French administration it ended up by generating a real administrative cast that managed to have a major influence in social and political life of France. In 1958 a new constitution was created with the specific aim to “reject partisan politics and to give pre-eminence to the executive over the parliament” (Rouban, 2004, 83). Politicians and bureaucrats should closely interact in the process of policy formulation. But very soon

the relation became dominated by the civil service that is huge in France (more than 5 million that represent 22% of the population (Rouban). The government ended up to be dominated by senior civil servants, especially members of the grand corps. Notably, “every President of the Republic, with the exception of Francois Mitterand, every Prime Minister and almost every Minister was recruited from their ranks” (Rouban, 84). The model of politico-administrative relations was organized on three important assumptions:

1. “Real political appointment , i.e. appointment explicitly referring to party members are very few….

2. Members of the grand corps are acting as brokers between political and administrative power centers…

3. Appointments to higher administrative positions (especially department heads) are made within the innerworld of senior civil service” (Rouban, 84-85).

In other words it was a relation totally dominated by bureaucrats that controlled the recruitment process for almost all the important positions in public administration and dominated the policy formulation according to their specific interests and values.

The situation changed starting with 1974, with the presidency of Valery Giscard d’Estaing. He demanded more support for policies resulted from his electoral program. But the real change came in 1981 with the election of Francois Mitterand. Head of a left wing coalition that included the Communist Party, coalition that in their first years in government rejected even the idea of market economyand they rejected the way the Fifth Republic functioned at that moment. One of their first actions was to dismiss a high number of heads of ministerial departments and also a large number of prefects employing instead persons that werecloser to coalition from ideological point of view. In 1986 the right wing government led by Jacques Chirac tried to do the same, but the number of replacements was smaller as Prime Minister Chirac had to negotiate with President. In other words between 1981 and 1988 the pattern of politico-administrative model in France changed dramatically. Radicalpolitical changes reflected in an aggressive politicization

of the civil service. After 1988 the relations became more balanced. (Rouban, 2004, 81-101). To my opinion bureaucrats are still in a dominant position. Many politicians are recruited from their ranks. Civil servants are huge in number and are capable to influence or even to block political project. One good example is that of Prime Minister Jospin who tried to promote major fiscal reforms inthe year 2000. A strong reaction of the entire French bureaucracy forced him to abandon the project. Also may be mentioned the total failure of the ambitious reform program presented by President Sarkozi. Another important advantage for the French bureaucracy is the extremely complex legislation. Few politicians can ever dream to work with it in a reasonable manner.

The case of United States is different to a large extent to European countries. The American political and administrative systems are characterized by a high level of dispersion of power. Both horizontally, through the “checks and balance mechanism” and vertically, through federalization and local autonomy. A result of the horizontal division of power is that “American civil servicehas two masters: the Congress as well as the President” (Peters, 2004, p.127). If the latter is an obvious head of the American administration, the former has powerful committees that oversee the activity of executive branch. Bureaucracy may find in these committees and in other groupsin Congress support against the potential politicization.

The American parties system is also fragmented and lessorganized and disciplined than the European ones. As a result of the primary election system politicians have stronger ties with voters than with the party hierarchy. Also the interest groups are numerous and developed sophisticated lobby techniques. These characteristics of American society are placing the top bureaucrats in a situation similar to some extent to the one of their German counterparts. Dealing with a large number of political and social actors they have to develop political skills. Moreover, Long in a celebrated essay is developing the concept of administrative power: “The lifeblood of

administration is power. Its attainment, maintenance, increase, dissipation and loss are subject the practitioner and the student can ill afford to neglect” (Long, 2000, p.103). The author is describing the struggle of administrative institution for power, for support. The powerin not coming only from the provisions of the Constitution or from other documents or court decisions but also from complicated social, political and administrative networks.Another distinctiveness of American administrative system isits official politicization. Unlike in European countries were methods are rather subtle and informal in the of US there are legal provisions and long established customs thatallow a certain number of political appointments in federal administration. The President may appoint now over 4000 top bureaucrats and that means almost all managing positions in federal administration. Peters emphasize that political criteria is not the only one that is involved in the selection of presidential staff but also expertise, connection with interest groups or think tanks or with the business environment (p.129).

Another mean for politicization is the creation of Senior Executive Service by Civil Service Reform act (1978).“…in exchange for the opportunities for bonuses and for additional responsibilities, the Act removed some civil service protection. In addition, the President became able to appoint 10% of the general SES. Most of the individuals appointed in these positions were already members of the civil service, but they had to be willing to accept a political appointment and were to be chosen for political reliability. In addition, President and cabinet officers were given more capacity to move senior civil servants around within government and could use in the process appointments to gain control of program or to punish and reward individual members of SES” (Peters, p.131).Evidences are showing that politicization is an ongoing process. There is a tendency to create additional positions subject to political appointment or to transform existing career positions in political ones.

But as Peters is arguing, from a certain point of view the openness in the politicization process in US help to protect the merit system in other areas especially at lower echelons: “The result of the development of administrative system in United States is an almost paradoxical mixture of overt political selection and control and extreme commitmentto merit and depoliticization. On the one hand, almost all top positions in government- at present over 4000 positions -. are held by political appointees. On the other hand, the remaining public employees are selected by a rigorously enforced merit system and are subject numerous restrictions on their political involvement and activities, most notably the Hatch Act…”(p.126).

The politico-administrative relations models presented above tried to offer a view about the main types that were in place in certain countries and certain historical period.The literature in the field (Peters, Heady, Svara) identified a number of theoretical models. Of course none ofthem can be found in practice in pure state. I believe that three basic models may cover the possible concrete situations: 1. A model in which bureaucracy have the prevalence in policy formulation and to a large extent are controlling the recruitment process; 2. A model that is mainly characterized by cooperation, common values, and common interests; 3. And a model in which the relation is dominated by politician both in terms of policy formulation and recruitment.As we could see above France shifted in short time from a situation of almost complete bureaucratic domination to one with a very strong political control. United States have to different approaches functioning in parallel: political typeof recruitment in the case of high ranking civil servants and a strict observance of the merit system for the lower layers. Sweden is probably the best example for the cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats.

A forth model may be mentioned: the adversial one characterized by confrontation or even conflicts. This modeloccurs especially in period of political changes. The Germanbureaucracy confronted the socialist government in 1923.

Probably we may consider this model as a transitional one atthe end every conflict has to have a resolution.

Politico-administrative relations are not always took place in a formalized setting, many times are informal negotiations or are mediated by a third part. As we may observe above in the same legislative framework two totally different approaches may happened.

Politicians have in this type of relation two divergentinterests. On the one hand, they are forced to delegate competences and authority through the bureaucratic rank due to the complexity of the modern societies and administrativesystems. On the other hand, they have to hold bureaucratic institutions accountable and to ensure responsiveness. Career civil servant will want to be more involved in policyformulation and to enjoy stability.

The principal – agent model

The principal – agent model was developed primarily in economics and in business administration as more and large companies needed to develop mechanisms to delegate competences but also means of control over those received the competences. Recently the concept started to be implemented in the study of comparative politics and comparative public administration. As Jan Eric Lane stated: “Polities are social systems that certain actors operate forspecific purposes. Political systems are supported by certain groups of people and sometimes opposed by other groups. Polities give rise for benefits and costs for the human beings involved which can be best stated as principal – agent model. The political community in this model would have two kinds of interests: (1) Peace and security; (2) Control over agents and decent remuneration of them” (Lane, 2008, p.2).

In political science the principal – agent model describes a chain of command and control composed by successive principals and agents. The first principal is thepeople who elect a kind of deliberative and representative

body: a parliament, a council or a board that represent the agent. The people will establish certain task for the parliament by voting an electoral program or a Constitution or by referendum.

The parliament will appoint an executive structure, namely a government. In this relation, the parliament will become principal and the government the agent. We should mention that in practice very often the government exerts a certain level of control over the parliament due to the party structure. Is the case of many European countries, notably Great Britain were because it is the leader of the party that has the majority in the Chamber of Commons is in a superior position in relation with the parliament. Parliaments may have also other categories of agents like regulatory agencies or auditing authorities.

Further the government will delegate some competencies to certain kind of agents: bureaucratic institutions, state authorities in the case of federations or local or regional authorities that may receive grants and in return should implement certain policies. Schools and hospitals also may be labeled as agents once they are financed from the public budget or are carrying out governmental policies. Other types of agents may NGO’s carrying out welfare policies withsubsidies from the government. Or private companies maintaining road infrastructure or managing public companies.Lane is presenting a particular principal – agent model. Theprincipal is a community that is employing a number of agents as guardians to protect their lives and ensure the welfare of the inhabitants. The relation between principal and agent may have, according to Lane, four different outcomes:

1. Subjugation and oppression – the agents conquer a certain community and treat all its values as belongingto them or they install themselves as master of the community and treat the population as slaves or serfs;

2. Mixed citizenship – part of the population receive better treatment than the other part (apartheid);

3. Full citizenship – “the entire population is recognizedas citizens with certain rights”;

4. Rule of law – “the agents are bound by law to respect institutions that guarantee against abuses arbitrariness and secure a large number of rights for the citizens”. (pp. 2-3).

What is our principal concern is the relation between thegovernment (principal) and public administration (agent) because is primarily affect our lives. Bureaucracy may interfere with other actors that may be considered principals in case of parliamentary monitoring committees orpetitions coming from the citizens. But the vast majority ofprincipal – agent type of relation are happening between politicians in government and bureaucrats. Politicians are transferring more and more administrative tasks but also theauthority needed to perform them. If initially career administrator had roles mostly in policy implementation in the last decades increasingly are involved in policy formulation.

The institutional arrangements are very diverse: as permanent secretaries of ministries or other types of publicinstitution, as heads of departments in ministries, as managers of government agencies or quangos or having a special assignment like formulation of a certain policy or conducting program evaluation or policy analysis.The essential problem in the principal – agent is how the former can obtain bureaucratic responsiveness and ensures the accountability of the latter. One of possible negative consequences of the delegation of authority from principal to agent is fewer and weaker means of control. Meyer and O’Toole are stating that agents, organizations or individuals often decide to cheat instead of comply with thedemands of the principal: “The decision to cheat rather thancomply with the spirit of principal’s demand is not different from any other decision. An organization cheats because the perceived utility of cheating is greater than the perceived utility of not cheating”. (Meier, O’Toole, 2006, p.100. The authors identified six factors that either

creates incentives to cheat or lower the cost of cheating within the organization:

- Performance gap – according to Downs is a disjuncture between an organizational expected and actual performance; whether an organization is determined to cheat by the existence of a performance gap depend on the benefits and costs of cheating per se as compared with other options; a solution for the principal to avoid cheating in these situations is to establish an appropriate balance between reward and punishment;

- Prior efforts to bias the score – an organization or anindividual may employ some efforts the will be considered less costly in order to create the impression of performance; the authors are presenting the case of some schools in Texas were teachers preferred to train the students the test for exam rather than the usual curricula; removing the opportunity to cheat, in this case changing the contentof the test often enough may prevent cheating;

- Resource – organizations benefiting of sufficient resources will less willing to cheat; in case of lack of resources sound management will try either to supplement them or to adjust the objectives at the level of resources;

- Task demands - organization that have multiple types ofclients tend to have more difficulties in performing their tasks because additional burdens will place by the variety of demands; the solution would be to organize more homogenous groups of clients;

- Costs of coordination – may depend on the size of organization and the type of activities; adapting the size of organization to the type of activity is one possible solution;

- Organizational norms – some organizational norms may lower the organizational costs for cheating; the authorare presenting the case of students that have some problems like students for special education LEP (Low Profile English) in similar groups that eventually will

be exempted from exam; assessing and adapting professional norms would be an appropriate solution;

Mechanisms of control are also considered important. Laneproposes three different means:

1. Monitoring or surveillance. It is costly and involves the risk of collusion between the monitors and the agents;

2. Risk-sharing contracts: The principal invites agent to become a partner in sharing the final output, which is sometimes feasible;

3. Retaliation: the principal gets rid of the agent and may even try to spoil his/her reputation, if agent failure depends in his/her negligence.

Political-administrative relations in Romania

Romanian bureaucracyIn what follows we will try to analyze the in which

politicians and bureaucrats interact and possible patterns of the decision-making process from the perspective of political-administrative relations. The issue is not an easyone due to the fact that very few data are available. The concept of civil service and an institution to oversee this category of public employees is relatively new in Romania aswe will see below.

One first observation: Romanian bureaucracy is very weak if it ever existed from the perspective of unity, clearly established hierarchies, professionalism and common values. At the unification of the country in 1918, Romania inherited three different types of administrative traditions. Transylvania was between 1699 and 1918 part of Austrian Empire and benefited of a very effective weberian type of administration. Basarabia was until 1918 part of theRussian Empire with the administration imposed by the imperial authorities. The rest of the country known as the Old Kingdom started to build a national bureaucracy only in the second part of the XIX century. The Old Kingdom was divided in two separate countries that were under the

domination of the Ottoman Empire. In 1859 the two countries unified and received a high level of autonomy. Strong reminiscences from the Ottoman administration remained, a tradition of bribery, patronage and lack of professionalism.In 1877 Romania declared its independence and successfully joined the Russian Empire in the war with the Ottoman Empire. Previously, in 1864 were issued the first laws regulating the functioning of Romanian public administration, but these laws paid little attention to the construction of a professional bureaucracy. Only in 1923 a law concerning the statute of the civil servant was enacted.Considering the time when was issued we may considered that it was a modern law but unfortunately it was implemented only for 15 years due to the fact that in 1938 Romania entered in a long period of dictatorships that lasted until 1989.

After 1990 the democratic institutions were progressively reestablished but it took almost ten years until a new law concerning the civil service was issued (law188/1999). The law was drafted with the support of European Commission and has provision establishing the merit system with recruitment based on competition and professionalism, open, transparent and based on merit promotion. The law was amended several times, improvements being made in 2003 and 2006. In 2009 an emergency ordinance virtually eliminate themerit system and although the Constitutional Court declared it as being against the Constitution the negative effects remained in place. In 2010 other amendments reduced the protection of the civil servant leaving way for an increasedpoliticization.

The law issued in 1999 established The National Agency for Civil Servants, NACS and created the conditions for the construction of a professional body of civil servants. The process was slow but progresses were made until the year 2007. The amendments made to the law 188 in 2003 raised the level of protection of the civil servants making their dismissal for political reasons more difficult. As a result more and more bureaucrats that were fired for political motives regain their position in courts. Unfortunately data

related to their number are not available. The amendments made in 2006 improved the career conditions for civil servants and clarified the status of senior civil servants. The attempt was to create a professional and neutral body ofsenior civil servants.

A major role in the progresses that were made in the construction of a professional civil service was the processof accession in European Union. The European Commission provided important funds for the training of civil servants especially for those who were going to manage the future European structural funds or to work in or with European institutions. Also a high number of European experts, many of the civil servants in their countries came to Romania to share their expertise. It was an excellent opportunity for the Romanian public administrator to get in contact with technical expertise from developed administrative systems.

The National Institute for Administration that was created in 2001 was strengthened with European funds. Thousands of civil servants were trained by NIA to improve their technical skills. Among the programs performed by NIA,together with Central Unit for Public Administration Reform and NACS, was the Young Professional Scheme. Designed to promote young skilled professionals in the ranks of Romanianpublic administration, the program offered intensive training in Western European universities and at NIA. Also internships were organized both in European and Romanian public institution.

The Central Unit for Public Administration Reform coordinate with the support of European experts programs like Common Assessment Framework (a program design to help public institutions to implement CAF – a quality assurance program), administrative simplification and decentralization.Probably the most successful story was that of Public PolicyUnit, later the Public Policy Department. Established in 2004 at the level of General Secretariat of the Government, it was meant to coordinate the public policy cycle processesat the level of the central government. In 2005 started, with the support of a European PHARE fund and a team of

Latvian experts, the development of a legislative framework designed regulate the way public policy cycle process is carried out. Aside the UPP from General Secretariat similar units were created in each ministry with the same role to coordinate the design of public policies.

Training and other types of support like manuals or even equipment was offered to civil servants from every ministry.Extremely important was the preparation of the staff that was supposed to administer the post-accession European funds. Seven Management Authorities received intensive training and five of them were fully operational in 2008, asresult from the minutes and reports of their monitoring committees (see the following sites:

1. The management authority for the regional operational program: http://www.inforegio.ro/node/25;

2. The management authority for administrative capacity development: http://www.fonduriadministratie.ro/Arhiva?cat=Comitet%20de%20monitorizare;

3. The management authority for the environment fund: http://www.posmediu.ro/Comitet_de_monitorizare%281557%29.html;

4. The management authority for human resource development: http://www.fseromania.ro/index.php/posdru/monitorizare-pos-dru#rapoarte;

5. The management authority for technical assistance fund:http://www.poat.ro/evenimente_1.html?comitetul_de_monitorizare_poat;

Unfortunately the pace of the reforms and the process of building a professional civil service in Romania slow down beginning with 2007 due to political turmoil that started inthe spring of that year.

Political – administrative relations

Politicization is a major issue for Romanian public administration. Relevant data are missing for multiple reasons. First, a number of civil servants are accepting politicization as an inevitable if not necessary phenomenon.

Second, there are many civil servants that obtained their positions due to some political influence. Third, part of those that get their position on political bases are voluntarily living the job together with their political master. As a consequence analyzing the number of dismissal after a change in government is not relevant. Fourth, most of those subject to politicization are reluctant to offer information about their experience.

Until 1996 elections public employees witnessed a relatively high level of stability. The parties in power were very much connected with the former communist regime and the political leaders as well as the civil servants had similar backgrounds. But in 1996 a right wing coalition won the parliamentary election. The winner of presidential was also a member of that coalition. Claiming that they want to get rid of the communist past the new political leaders started a process of changes in the ranks of public administration, particularly at the top and middle management level. Changing the public administrator that hadconnections with the former communist party and moreover they kept the working patterns and the values inherited fromthe old regime was seen legitimate by a large portion of thepopulation. But the negative side of the story is that no attention was paid to the professional aspects related to public administration. Political criteria were the only employed when people were dismissed and what is worst at theemployment of the new civil servants. This approach that resembles to a high extent the “spoil system” was a major factor that caused the failure of the first right wing government after the revolution.

The elections held at the end of 2000 results offered acomfortable parliamentary majority to the Social Democrat Party. The new political leaders applied the same policy in the field of civil servants. The justification was the poor performance of the former government. According to the press11.000 public officials were changed with persons that were members or have close affiliation with the party in power. Because at that moment the Law for Civil Servant status was in place, new techniques like changing the name and the

internal structure of public institutions or changing the requirements for certain positions so that the person that was currently employed was no longer compatible. The positive aspect is that due to the negotiation with EuropeanCommission for the accession in EU gradually the legislationwas improved by amendments to the Civil Service Law and by adopting a new law that established ethical standards for the public sector. Also, starting with the 1998 when European Commission accepted to initiate negotiation with Romania for accession in EU, EC issued yearly reports about the progresses made but also about the problems that still need attention.

Public administration reform and the professionalization and depoliticization of the civil service were permanent topics and although progresses were gradually reported the prevalent image is a negative one. The 2001 report mentioned: “All ministries have been re-structured - but this has been the result of a change in government rather than of a programme of strategic reform. Certain positions have disappeared while others have had their responsibilities changed. This has led to the removal of many civil servants, either through resignations or through redundancies. This process has seriously undermined the stability of the civil service at all levels of public administration. The number of secretaries of state (political appointees) has been significantly increased. Most of them have taken over the responsibilities that were held by director generals (career civil servants)”(p.18). The European Commision report on the years 2002-2004 are marking the achievement made in the field of civil service. The 2003 report is praising the amendment to the Civil Service. Still problems were noticed, especially the poor implementation of the law.

The elections held at the end of 2004 brought again a change in government. A right wing coalition took power withan ambitious reform program. The pressure upon civil servicewas not so high as after the previous elections. The major reason was the perspective accession in EU. The EC report on2005 is placing a lot of criticism related to civil service

reform but there ar no references to politicization. As mentioned situation worsened in 2007 after the coalition in government broked and minority government with the same prime minister was installed. The new government was subjectto many political pressures and a fairly large number of replacements of civil servants took place.The revision of the Constitution in 2003 and the requirements imposed by Romania’s membership in European Union create a problem that was unexpected for the majority of citizens as well as politicians: an overwhelming number of elections. If we analyze the period between 2007 and 2009we find out that we had: elections for European Parliament in 2007, local elections in June 2008, parliamentary elections in November 2008, and presidential elections at the end of 2009. Public administration and the civil servicewere heavily affected by these never ending elections. The antecedents raised for every member of the civil service andin the case of every election questions like: what will happen with me? I will still hold my position after election? Who will be my next master and how will he treat me?

In 2009 most if not all of these question received negative answers for many civil servants. The new governmentwas eager to appoint persons with political affiliation in all the management position from Romanian public administration. They went as far as to issue a piece of legislation, Emergency Ordinance 37/2009 that specifically cancelled the merit system and gave unrestricted way for political appointments. A year later an amendment to the Civil Service Statute established milder condition for accession management positions. As Andrei et. all stated: “The third period begins in 2009 and continues to present. During this period, we believe that there was a decline in the de-politicization of the civil service. This is the period in which the government changed a series of laws which guaranteed, even if only theoretically, political neutrality of the civil servants. Through the new legislation adopted by the government, the legal framework for changing the managerial staff in public administration

institutions on political grounds was ensured. During this period, Emergency Government Ordinance no. 37/2009 has been adopted. It regards some measures to improve public administration. It is a legal document that reopens after nearly ten years the possibility of appointing leaders of decentralized public services based on political reasons. This is a document that initiated a process of mass rapid change of the managers of the decentralized public services with the change of the government structure”(Andrei et. all., 2012, p.16). The consequences will be dire for the current government and especially for the Romanian citizens.The low rate of absorbtion of the European funds, the poor quality of legislation and the impression, real or not, of ageneralized corruption will undermine the position of the government and, what is far more important, will affect the future of Romanian citizens. The reforms in Romanian public administration were stopped in the last two years, hopefullyfor a short period.

Conclusion

Establishing a pattern for the Romanian political-administrative relation is a difficult task. One major difficulty results from the fragmented character of Romanianbureaucracy. The historical conditions did not allow the establishment of a civil service with a minimum of common traits and values. On the other hand, the Romanian politicalclass is also in its childhood after more than sixty years of dictatorships. After six years of cohabitation due to thefact that both politicians and bureaucrats had common background in the ranks of communist administration, many politicians including two Prime Ministers being former clerks in the central apparatus of the communist regime, the1996 elections brought a right wing coalition in power that engaged in a radical change of the civil servants. Claiming the necessity to separate from the communist past a large number of public employees, particularly at the management level were replaced with persons with connection to the new

political leadership. Unfortunately political criteria were the only used for selecting the new civil servants. The lackof professionalism of the newly employed public managers wasone of the causes for a severe defeat in the 2000 election. The Social Democrat Party formed the new government and in the year that followed undertook another massive replacementin the ranks of civil service. Official data are not available but the press reported that around 11.000 persons were dismissed. The pattern of changing in government after each election followed by an important turnover in the civilservice ranks was to be found in 2004 and 2008. Due to the EU accession process the politicization was less radical after the 2004 election but became even more severe after those of 2008. In April 2009, for the first time after 1990,a Romanian government officially canceled the merit system.

Concluding, politicization is still a problematic issuein Romania. Each changing in government is followed by important replacement among the top and middle managers of the administrative institutions. Although Romania has since 1999 a Civil Service Statute that was improved several time,no clear rules were observed and no clear distinction between what administrative positions should be assigned to political sphere and what should be left to professional career bureaucrats. Unless this issue will be solved by a political agreement between the important political parties,Romanian administration will have difficulties to adapt to the new requirements raised by the membership in European Union.

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