Democracy and Public Health at Rocky Flats: The Examples of Edward A. Martell and Carl J. Johnson

TORTURED SCIENCEHealth Studi€s, Ethics, and

Nuclear Weapons in theUnited States

Compiled and Edited by:Dianne Quigley, A-y LowrndD, and Steve Wing

Collaboratiue lnitiatiue t'or Reseo rch Ethicsand Enuironmental l lealth (CIREEH)

Crit ical Approaches in the Health Social Sciences SeriesSeries Editor: RAY Fl ELLING

Baywood Publ ishing Cornpany, Inc,AMIrYItlui"EW YORI{

http:/ idx. doi.orgl l0 .2190/TO RC4

CHAPTER 4

Democracy and Public Heatth atRocky Flats: The Examples of

Edward A. Martell andCarl J. Johnson

LeRoy Nloore

A fundamental contradiction exists between rlenrocr.acy erncl the practice ofbuilding nuclear weapons. This truth is strikingly eviclerrt in the history ofpublic health science as played out at the Rocky Flats nuclear bornb facrorynear Denver, Colorado, where over a period of neady 40 years tlre fissionableplutonium "pit" for every nuclear weapon in the U.S, arsenal rvas manufacturecl,

This chapter, written to counter the art of clenial, explores two versions gfpublic health science: one oriented to the "nuclear establishment," the other topublic service. The former includes personnel affiliatecl r,vith the inclustry arrtlwith government agencies that at least implicitly give priority to tfie influstry.The latter comes to focus here on two individuals, the late Eclward A. Marteli,a radiochemist with the National Center for Atmospheric Research (FJCAR),a private nonprofit research body located in Boulder. Clolorado, ancl the lateCarl J. Johnson, MD, who for several years was the chief purblic health officrerfor Jefferson County, where Rocky Flats is located. Manetl was the first to alcrtthe public to dangers at Rocky Flats about rvhich insicler scierrtists remainerjsiient. Johnson became a lightning rod for efforts to cr,rrb abuses resulting frgmoperations at Rocky Flats.

69

70 i TORTURED SCIENCE

I. EDWARD MARTELL:PUBLIC SERVICE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

Martell's Revelation

On the afternoon of May 11, 1969, people throughout the Denver area sawsmoke billowing from a building at the Rocky Flats nuclear bomb factory locatedat the base of the mountains 16 miles northwest of central Denver. The fire,soon labeled the most expensive industrial fire to date in U.S. history, caught theattention of NCAR radiochemist Ed Martell. He feared that the strong windsconilnon at Rocky Flats had carried potentially lethal particles of plutoniumtoward unsuspecting people in the Denver area. So he asked Rocky Flats officialsto sample off-site soil for plutonium. When they declined, he and colleagueStuart E. Poet took their own samples. At various locations east of the facilitythey found plutonium deposits in the top centimeter (0.39 inch) of soil up to400 times average background concentrations from global fallout I I ].

In February 1910, Martell and Poet met with officials from Rocky Flats andthe Colorado Department of Health (CDH) l2l to discuss their findings. Plantofficials insisted that what they found didn't come from the May 1969 fire. Amore likely source was either a fire that occulred on September 11, 1957 [3], orleaks from thousands of dmms of plutonium-laced waste stored outside in theplant's 903 area fiom 1954 until 1968. These two events were the sources of thelargest plutonium releases from Rocky Flats since operations began at the plantin 1953. Thus did the state government and the public learn about the worstaccidents ever at Rocky Flats [4].

In this meeting, a high-ranking Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) official,having learned that fwo of Martell's colleagues worked for the CommerceDepartment and that NCAR was a private research center supported by theNational Science Foundation, let it be known that he would "bring this matter upwith the appropriate officials of the Department of Commerce and the NationalScience Foundation." He said he had "a personal hang-up about one federalagency engaging in activities critical of another federal agency" [5]. This momentcast a dark shadow over Martell 's future career.

Shortly after the meeting, Martell distnbuted a paper that included the fol-iowing observations:

. Anyone who inhales particles of plutonium like those released fromRocky Flats would be "subject to radiation mill ions of times more intensethan from an average naturally occurring radioactive dust particle ofthe same size. . . . Onlv minute amounts in the lung are sufficient to causecancer."

o Neither Rocky Flats officials nor Colorado public health officers hadprovided any data on plutonium in the environment.

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH I 7L

' Whether production should continue at Rocky Flats needs to be resolved

iJJJ##:;i:'::il,**,[T';,T:T$:T,"'*o'qualinedmedicalAEC Response to Martell: Krey

The AEC brought in P. W. k.y, a specialist of their own,, ro sample forplutonium in soil off the Rocky Flats site. He not only confirmecl Martell 's resultsbut also showed that plutonium from Itocky F lats was very tvicle ly cf istributeclthroughout the metro area. When Krey reported his resglts in Heattlr PhJ,sics, hemapped plutonium distribution in a series of amoeba-like isopleths gracled toshow concentrations ranging from higher levels rlear the ltrcility to lower onesfurther out until deposits from Rocky Flats could not be <listinguished frombackground [7] (see Figure l).

Most of Krey's samples consisted of a composite of rrraterial fiorn tlre top ?0centimeters (7.8 inches) of soil. This sarnpling method may have enabled Kleyto estimate the total inventory in soil of plutoniurn reieasecl from Rgcky Flats,but it could not show surface concentrations, since his nretlrod cli luted surfhcedeposits by mixing them with less contaminatecl soil fiorn belorv the surltrce.Also, his istlpleths only approximate reality, since tliey were based on salnplestaken at only twenty-five off-site locations over a vely large are4, rvith Roc.kyFlats plutonium found at only fifteen.

Colorado Sets a Standard for Plutoniurn ln Sotl

In response to revelations of major releast:s of radiation from trLocky Flats,Colorado establ ished the f irst standard anywhere for plutoniurn in soi l , In Japgary1973, it mandated that land where plutoniurn contarnination exceeds 0,2 elis-integrations per minute per gram of soil (dpnri'g) is "unfit fbr resitientiai gse, sub-division development, or commercial and iudustrial Llses" tS]. Less than trvrrmonths later, the state increased by tenfold the arnournt of plrrtorriunr to rvlicfiexposure was allowed, from 0.2 to 2.0 dpr"nlg. At the same tirne, the state litteciits prohibition against residential, comlnercial, or industrial rrses in ilreas toocontaminated to meet the standard; hereafter it r,vould merely require "specialtechniques" for constmction in such areas, suclt as plowing plutoniurl uncler [9].Thus, the standard was completely gutted of its original provisions tbr publichealth. In 1975, Martel l cr i t ic ized the state standard for being ar least twentyt imes too high and not protective of publ ic health [0]. Nonethcless,, the reviscclstandard remains in effect todav.

J

The State's Misleading Soil Sampllng Practice

In February 1974, the Rocky Flats site more than tripled in size by- the aclditionof 4,550 acres eleven months after the establishment of- the state's '2,0 dprnig

72 / TORTURED SCIENCE

Figure 1 " Soi l sampling sites in north central Colorado are designated by X.The f irst of the adjacent pair of numbers to the site represents the site number.

The second (fol lowing the slash) represents the Rocky Flats plutonium inmil l l icuries per square ki lometer (mCi/kmz) measured at the site (one mil l icurie

is 1/1 000th of a curie). The heavy irregular l ines of the isopleths ref lect theisoconcentrat ion contours of Rocky Flats plutonium in the soi l expressed as

mCi/kmz. The concentr ic circles ref lect the radial distances from the center ofthe Rocky Flats plant. From Krey, "Remote Plutonium Contamination and Total

lnventories from Rocky Flats," Health Physics, 30, February 1976, p. 210,reprinted with permission.

standard for plutonium in off-site soil. The site's boundary on the predominantlydownwind, down gradient east side was moved out to Indiana Street. In enforcingits new standard for areas east of the enlarged site, the CDH employed from theoutset a sampling method that thwarted its ability to locate places where theplutonium concentration exceeded the standard. Rather than analyzing specificsamples for their radiation content, the CDH divided the area to be sampled

II

f " " \ \, l l lt t tI lEermetto '?gd ,l#of k ins I

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH I 73

into large sectors, then calculated the average plutonirm concentration in eachsector by compositing all the soil collected frorn fwenty-Ilve samples taken fromwithin that sector I l]. This approach may show average distribution in largeareas, but it dilutes particular points with high readings by averaging them withlower ones, rnaking identification of hot spots impossible.

The CDH's soil sampling also misrepresented reality in that over time itcollected sarnples to increasingly greater depth, thereby diluring the materialmeasured and giving the impression that the quantity of plutonium in the soil wassteadily decreasing. An internal study criticized this practice and cclncludedthat plutonium concentrations in soil around Rocky Flats had changed little fiom1970 until l99l l l2l. For public health assessrnents, the CDH eventually adoptedthe practice of compositing samples taken frorn the tc,p quarter-inch of soilwithin a given area. The words of German analyst Ljlrich Beck are apt. o'Whoeverlimits pollution has also concurred in it." Standards for "pennissible" exposure"may indeed prevent the very worst from happening, but they are at the sarne timc'blank checks'to poison nature and hurnankind a bit" [13].

Martell and the Public

Martell 's revelations after the 1969 fire sparked public awareness and uction,"Nobody knew anything about Rocky Flats until his study," said Judy Danielson,a physical therapist recently returned from doing hunranitarian work in Vietnaln.She used Martell 's work to organrze people to go door-to-door in areas eest ofRocky Flats asking residents if they could collect a scoop of dirt lrclrn their yarclsto test for radiation content. They labeled these samples with nilrne$ and aelclressesand took them to public meetings of candidates fbr Congress in 1972, askingthose running for office to get the samples analyzed and to explairr what they'ddo about Rocky Flats p 4]. This attracted media attention and helpe d rniike ltockyFlats an issue that candidates for public office coulcl not ignore,

In 1974, Danielson, a Quaker, and Pam Solo, a nlrn tionr the sociallv activeSisters of Loretto, were hired to share a stafTposition at the Denver office of theAmerican Friends Service Cornrnittee (AFSC). Their i 'ocus: nriclear weilponsproduction at Rocky Flats. Thus began what by the encl of the decade hadblossomed into a national and global movernent of resistance to nuclear rveilpc)ns,The Rocky Flats Action Group, an umbrella bocly that grew out ol'the AI.-SCactivities, labeled Rocky Flats a "local hazard and a global threat." The "localhazard" was the public health and environmental danger Marlell hacl cxposed, the"global threat" the nuclear holocaust rvhose possibility haurntecl hirn. Observingbornb tests in the South Pacific as an Amry radiation health specialist rnarlchim, he said, "quite a pacifist. If you appreciate the effects of tirernlonrrolearexplosions, you aren't going to be disposed toward the nril itary ancl wrlrs ssthe means of settl ing national affairs" [14, p, 162J. The t{ocky l;lats nrovemcntthus articulated and elaborated Martell 's twin concerns.


Back in 1970, Martell had called for a "thorough assessment" of plutoniumhealth effects at Rocky Flats. This never happened. But pressure from those hehad energized led to the creation, in late 1974, of the Lamm-Wirth Task Force onRocky Flats by newly elected Governor Dick Lamm and Congressman TimWirth, whose district included Rocky Flats. In 1915, the Task Force recom-mended that Rocky Flats be closed and its work be relocated [5].

The government's response was to form the Rocky Flats MonitoringCommittee, probably the first citizen oversight group created for a nuclearweapons facilif anywhere. Pam Solo, who says she was the only "advers ary"appointed to this body, reported that they met on a regular basis, toured theRocky Flats buildings, saw everything, were dazzled with technology, andwere treated like VIPs. "The language and euphemisms that they used-anuclear excursion, as though it was a trip up the Colorado River. You kind ofkil l off the language." She pressed them: "The Task Force says shut it downand convert it. How are we going to move on this? They would all look at melike I had pulled their pants down." Those meetings, she said, left her "totallynumb and sick" [16].

Meanwhile, through the early and mid- I 970s, Martell was in considerabledemand as a speaker on radiation issues. Toward the end of the decade he cutback on this activity out of frustration "with the media and others whose claimsexceeded the scientific evidence" U4, p. 182]. Science could be used, but it couldalso be abused. In 1986-87, when the DOE wanted to incinerate plutonium-lacedwaste at Rocky Flats, Martell supported a small group of scientists who workeddirectly with local people to defeat this plan.

Needless to Soy, the DOE was in no rush to shut down Rocky Flats. After theLamm-Wirth recommendation fourteen contentious years would pass-years ofrepeated workshops, vigils, large demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience-before production was halted in 1989 because it could not be done withoutviolating federal environmental laws. The change of the Rocky Flats missionfrom production to cleanup was finally made in 1992 [7].

ALPHA RADIATION:NATURAL BACKGROUND AND GLOBAL FALLOUT

According to Martell, alpha particles released by plutonium taken into thebody don't distribute uniformly in an organ as assumed by those "who persist inusing the average whole organ dose as the measure of cancer risk" for settingexposure standards. Instead, within the body, alpha particles clump in "hotspots"where their energy is concentrated at levels 100 to I 000 times their averageorgan concentrations. Also, by means of alpha recoil, they subdivide into a cloudof smaller particles, thereby enhancing their microdistribution and intensifyingthe potential for harm to surrounding cells, possibly inducing cancer or creatingconditions for other ailments [ 8]. Martell pointed out that "plutonium in fallout


from nuclear tests is now present at measurable levels in all hurnarn organs."While the amottnt is very small, it "will certainly contribute ro the ir"ritiationand progression of malignancy in the general popularion," particularly whenradiation from other sources is added [8, ch.7, pp. 7-8]. He estimatecl that 80percent of all cancers are radiation induced, most of them "attributable to lit'etimeexposures to natural background radiation" [9].Those who iglore the nclvsrserole of naturally occurring radiation, he noted, fincl it easy to allsr,r, aclditionalexposure from human-made sources. Internal alpha ernittcrs, fionr natural rrs rvellas unnatural sources , "may be the principal agent of racliation-induced cancer"as well as the major contributing factor in arteriosclerosis ancl resgltant carclio-vascular disease 1201. The record from Rocky Flats trncl other plutgniutll*processing sites suggests increased incidence of coronaries among plutgniurrrworkers [2 I ]"

Effects of Radiation on Plutonium workers

In 1975, Karl Z. Morgan, for 29 years heacl of health physics et DOE,'sOak Ridge Lab and a major figure in establishing racliatign exposure stlnrlgr<ls,proposed reducing the maximum allowable lifetinre plutonium bocly burdenfor nuclear workers 200-fold 1221. Martell noted that rhis "1r,ell justifiedrecomlnendation" was ignored by standard-setting agencies, b6t snid thtrthe thought Morgan had nevertheless overlooked data that indicate that theworker standard should be reduced by a factor not of 200 bur of 1000 or rno1e Il B,ch. 6, p. 381.

In early 1994, encouraged by the openness initiative of then-Energy See reraryHazel O'Leary, Martell wrote to her specifically about plgtonililfl workers:

[A] complete, objective, independent follow-up of the modical hisrories anclbody burdens of plutonium . worksrs is long ovcrdue ancl woglcl shedconsiderable light on the full rnagnitudc of plutoniurn canoer risks. , . . [lt is]exceedingly important to have the best possible assessment of plutonitrrlcancer risks before cleanup of plutonium contaminated sitss at Rocky Flatsand elsewhere. " . . For more than 40 years, assessmcnt of the health risks gfradionuclides has been controlled by a vcstcd interest establishment tlrnthas contrived to minimize or ignore adverse effccts of all sources of hr.rrrranexposure to ioniz:lrrg radiatitln [23].

All such research, Martell 's letter concluded, should be removed frclrrr thenuclear establishment. O'Leary rnadeno reply. Now, two clecades later, the plightof former workers at facilit ies like Rocky Flats whose health was destroyeclby on-the-job exposures has becoffle a national disgrace,, rnainly because maly ofthem cannot get promised compensation 1241.


Martell: A Whistleblower

When Martell died in 1995, chemist Niels Schonbeck of Denver's MetroState College called him a "whistleblower" who, despite three decades of originalradiochemical research at NCAR, was never named a Senior Scientist [25]. In theearly 1980s, perhaps because of the aforementioned intervention of an AECofficial, his research group was broken up and he lost his lab; he kept his jobonly due to the support of colleagues 1261. Not long before his death, he saidhe didn't realize when h. joined NCAR in 1962 that "the point was, if there'ssomething disturbing going on, look the other way. . . . I worry about all futuregenerations, because we're not studying radiation-induced health effects, notobjectively, not thoroughly" 1271.

II . CARL JOHNSON: AGAINST THE TIDE

Innovative Dust Sampling StopsResidential Development

In September 1973, Carl Johnson became Director of the Health Departmentof Jefferson County, which, with a population of about 250,000, was then thesecond-most populous counfy in Colorado. His involvement with Rocky Flatsbegan in December 1974 when Jefferson Counfy Commissioner Joanne Patersonsought his opinion on whether the commissioners should permit a new housingdevelopment on land just east of Rocky Flats. The CDH had already approvedthe project, despite their having found plutonium in surface soil there up to seventimes the state standard (they would require plowing prior to construction). "Ifshe had not called me," Johnson later said, "the land would have been developedand there'd be about 10,000 people living there" [28]. He was not deterred bythe CDH's prior approval, having already seen "gross errors" in other CDH work1291. The coun{ commissioners gave Johnson the go-ahead to do a "validationsurvey of plutonium around the plant" with t'wo soil-science specialists from theU.S. Geological Survey. Johnson and his USGS colleagues developed a protocolfor the study and got concurrence from scientists with CDH and the ColoradoSchool of Mines. The samples would be split and analyzed by two labs, one atthe CDFI. the other at Rocky Flats t301.

This project began in the spring of 1975, using Johnson's innovative method ofsampling respirable dust. Dust samples taken at 25 locations showed plutoniumconcentrations, ofl average, 44 times greater than what had been measured atthe same locations in previous surveys using whole-soil samples collected to avariety of depths. Several of the readings exceeded previous ones by 100 timesor more, one by 285 times t3l]. Readings were l0 to 40 times greater than whatMartell and Poet had found in the top centimeter of soil 1321. When the CounfyCommissioners saw Johnson's results in September 1975, they vetoed residential


development on the land in question. Later that year, Marcus Church, owner ofthe land, sued the Energy Research and Developnrent Aclministration (ERDA,predecessor to the DOE) and its Rocky Flats contractors, Dow Chemical andRockwell International, for damages.

Meanwhile, Johnson, having stopped a housing developnrent on colltaminatedland, suddenly met resistance. Though the principal parties had been cpnsultedbeforehand and had accepted the dust-sarnpling protocol Johnson ancl his USGScolleagues had developed, as soon as their results becarne kno'',vn, officials atthe ERDA, EPA, CDH, and Rockwell began to criticize their sampling methcd,and the CDH and Rocky Flats labs attnouncecJ they r,voulcl no longer analyeesamples taken by Johnson's group.The negativitv r,vourlcl affbct all Johnson'sfuture work related to Rocky Flats. Martell, to the contrary, Fiaw Jolnsqrr'ssampling rnethod as a stroke of genius "that shoulcln't be overlookerl jn arydiscussion of off-site risk and health studies" [33].

When Johnson and his colleagues repor-ted their rvork in .9C1CNCE, theyfaulted the Colorado plutonium-in-soil standarcl for rnaking ho provision furwhat to do if additional plutonium gets cleposited atop what is alreacly prescnt,and for allowing those who build where plutoniuirl contanrinatiorr exceeds t5estandard to plow it under; in their view, l-r-rtr"rre activity iike garrlening or con-struction could bring it back to the surftrce. A "rnore realistic" standard fgr-plutonium in surface soi1, they said, wor,rld be basecl "or) tfie respirabrle-clustfraction because the very srnall particles in thjs fraction havc the grearest potenti6lfor suspension and inhalation" 1341.

Johnson Proposes a New Standardfor Plutonium in Soil

In October 1975 Johnson forrnally proposed that fbr purpo$€s of rrsses.sipghealth risk, the state set a new standard based on plutonir.rm in respirable dust qrrthe surface of the soil t35]. "The coarser materials which are not inhaled andretained," he pointed out, "have no bearing orr the actual hazarrl to health lurilserve only to dilute the atnount of radioactivity found by analysis, anil may yie lcla spurious low concentration of plutonium that is misleacling" [36]

The CDH did not welcotne Johnson's proposal. To resolve the issue, theColorado Land Use Commission brought in Ka rl Z. Ir,{organ. fbrrner chair of theinternal dose committee of both the National Council on Radiation Protectionand Measurements and the International Commission on Racliologicnl Protectiorrand recently retired from the DOE's Oak Ridge Lab. Morgar) wes askecl rvherherfor assessing the public health risk from plutonium in surface scril it was better-to follow Johnson in using dust sarnples or the CDI-I in collecting rvhole-soilsamples. Morgan sided with Johnson, in favor of using samples linitecl to "rherespirable port ion, less than 5 microns dust lratt icles." fnrploying Jolnson'smethod, he realized, wottld make the state's 2,A clprn/g plutoniunr stanclard


far more protective, since, for samples taken at the same location, Johnson'smethod shows concentrations 40 or more times greater than the CDH whole-soilapproach. He added a cautionary note that it would be best to apply the 2.0 dpm/gstandard as a limit not for plutonium alone but for the sum of all radionuclidesin the environment 1371, Colorado officials, having gotten from Morgan theadvice they sought, chose to ignore it.

Shortly after his visit, Morgan wrote .Iohnson: "The situation is muchworse than I had suspected. . . . I am amazed that the State of Colorado . . . hasnot been out front from the beginning, collecting this type of data, pointingout the envirorunental hazard and doing all it could to ameliorate theproblem" [38].

Enlarged Sun ey of Plutonium inSurface Respirable Dust

Johnson's group soon followed up their plutonium sampling done on landnear Rocky Flats with a much larger survey in which they collected dustsamples from 72 locations along the compass coordinates and in areas of knownor suspected contamination out as far as 32 kilometers, or about 18 miles,from Rocky Flats. Krey had said that at about this distance out, Rocky Flatsplutonium could not readily be distinguished from background; Johnson's group,however, found plutonium at this extremiry in varying amounts up to as highas l7 times background. Their highest reading was 3,390 times background, ata point just east of the site boundary. Values generally decreased with samplestaken further to the east and southeast, displaying a nonuniform pattern ofdistribution t391.

Cesium, Strontium, and theCriticality Question

In doing this larger survey, Johnson's group found cesium-131 at four offsitelocations with concentrations considerably higher than plutonium sampled atthe same places. The presence of cesium suggested the likelihood of "a significantfission reaction," or "criticalify," of plutonium at the plant. If so, other fissionproducts, such as strontium-9O and iodine- 13 l, should also be found. Johnsonwanted off-site soil sampled for these radionuclides and "a review of incidents"on site "to determine the source of the cesillm" t39].

When Johnson learned that an explosion had accompanied the 1957 fire, hesuspected it was a fission reaction. He thus countered the Rocky Flats orthodoxythat there had never been a criticality at the site. He soon had results fromeight more samples that also showed cesium, with fwo frorn widely separatedlocations east of the site giving readings of 30 and 3l times background respec-tively [40]. The CDH, ignoring Johnson's findings, declared that there was noproof that cesium found locally had come from Rocky Flats t41]. Johnson later


saw reports uncovered in the discovery proceedings of the Church case thatreferred to elevated levels of both cesium and strontium in soil at the site 1421.The issue of strontium remains contentious at Rocky Flats t43].

Another Innovation: Isopleths and Census Tracts

To assess adverse health effects among residents of oflsite areas shown byKrey to be contaminated with plutonium fi'om Rocky lllats, Johnson introclucedinto the field of epidemiology an important innovirtion. Rather than determinehis area of study by drawing concentric circles arouncl the prlint-sorrrce of thecontaminant (i.e., Rocky Flats), he defined his snrcly area by the pattern ofwind-blown distribution of plutonium fi-orn the source as indicate,l by lfu.ey'sisopleths [aa]. Comparing l975leukemia ancl lung cancer death certificetes fbrresidents of contaminated census tracts near Rocky frlats ancl in Golclel withdeath certificates from noncontaminated tracts elsewhere, he fbuncl a signifi-cantly higher incidence of death llom these two causes in the forrner areas bycomparison with the latter [45]. Again ernploying the isopleth approach butfocusing on different census tracts, he found an excess of binh defects in theCiry of Arvada f4q. The method of combining isopleths with censlis tracts hewould soon use for a cancer incidence study for the Denver rnetro irrea- his bestknown but also most controversial project.

Interlude: The 1957 Fire

Based on previously secret documents uncoverccl by clisc:over) procceclingsin the Church landowner lawsuit fi led in 1975, Johnson conclutJetl that aclversehealth effects he had documented probablv resulted frorn exposure ro plutoniunrreleased during the 1957 fire. He learned the foliorving:

' The fire and explosion totally destroyed the bank of 620 large (2' x 2,)fi lters that existed to protect the public, allowing plutoniurn parricles toescape unimpeded.

o These filters had not been chartged since operations bcgan fbgr-apd-a-halfyears earlier, so they were caked with plutoniLlm,

o The smokestack radiation monitr:rs were not operational t1c;rn the timethe fire began until seven days later"

' Production resumed befbre either filters or rnonitors were restored.' When stack monitors were turned back on eight days after tlre fire.

the guidelines for stack emissions were exceeded bv 16.000 tinros f orthat duy.

' Soil samples were collected after the fire at only three erfflsite locati[r1s,High levels of "possible enriched uraniurnr" were ltorrnd nt twu witlelv


separated schools. The only sample analyzed for plutonium (taken onChurch properfy) registered 225 times background.

o The amount of plutonium released, while unknown, was large.' No effort was made to survey the extent of contamination in off-site

downwind are as 1471.

Is It Safe to Live Near Rocky Flats?

In 1978, Johnson began a study that raised quite forcefully the questionwhether residing near Rocky Flats was more dangerous than living furtheraway from the site. Funded by a grant from the National Cancer Institute,Johnson adapted Krey's isopleths for an epidemiological investigation ofcancer incidence (not death rates) in Denver-area census tracts known to becontaminated with Rocky Flats plutonium compared with those contam-inated only from global fallout. He made no attempt to estimate dose. Itwas the first attempt anywhere at a comprehensive analysis of the effect onan off-site population of carcinogens released from a nuclear weapons pro-duction facility [48].

Johnson framed his study with a review of plutonium's toxicity and thehistory of its releases from Rocky Flats, especially from the 1957 fire. Hemodified Krey's isopleths to reflect his own more extensive sampling (he hadcollected three times as many samples within a much smaller area), producing"three study areas with populations in the same order of size" 1491. His resultant"approximate but useful" figures divided the Denver Standard MetropolitanStatist ical Area (1970 populat ion: 1,019,131) into four areas t501.

For each of these areas, he determined the cancer incidence among Anglosfor 1 969 through 197 I, corrected for ?g€, raee, sex, and ethnicity t5 1 ]. Comparing thecancer data with the contamination data, he found a coffespondence between zones ofincreased cancer and zones of increased contamination. Cancer incidence in Area IV,his noncontaminated control area, was essentially identical to the rest of the state.Area I, nearest Rocky Flats, showed 16 percent more cancer incidence than Area IVand 8.5 percent more than Area II, the urban center 152). The incidence for Area IIwas 10 percent above Area IV; Area III was 6 percent greater than Area IV.Incidence of cancers of "radiosensitive organs" (those found in excess amongHiroshima and Nagasaki survivors) was higher near Rocky Flats. Overall, he "founda higher incidence of all cancer in areas contaminated with plutonium, compared tothe unexposed area" t53] (see Figure 2).

Johnson first presented his findings in a paper dated February 9,1979. What hehad to say was big news in the Denver area. The CDH, DOE, NRC, and EPAproduced critiques, all answered point by point by Johnson. The essence of theCDH critique showed up in a May I l, 1979, Denver Post editorial. A decadelater a Post reporter revealed that the DOE had given its contractor, Rockwell, a

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH I 8L

ROCKY IUTTS

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Figure 2. Car l Johnson studied cancer incidence for 1 969- lg7l amongAnglos in three areas downwind of Rocky Flats defined by levels of

plutonium contamination in mil l icuries per square ki lorneter (rnCi/krne)as compared to the uncontaminated control area. See the textabove for cancer incidence rate for each area. From Johnson,

"Cancer Incidence in an Area Contaminated with Ftadionucl ides Neara Nuclear Instal lat ion," Ambio, 10,4, October 198' l , p.1TT and Tabte B

(copyright Royal Swedish Academy of $ciences,repr inted by permission of Al len Press Publ ishing Services).

bonus for persuading the Posl to publish the editorial cltrestioning Johnson t541,Through 1979 and 1980 Johnson used criticisnrs of his stucly to continue revisinghis paper, even as he presented it at several natir:nal and international scientificgathenngs. In October 1981, after extensive peer review, the finished stldy waspublished in Ambio, the journal of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciencest55]. Subsequently, reports of the study and replies to crirics appeared in otherpublications [56].


In 1982, Rockwell gave a citizen review group its report listing eightnegative reviews of Johnson's study. It fell to Johnson to inform the group thatall the critics cited by Rockwell were linked to nuclear agencies, that he hadalready responded in detail to their criticisms, and that Rockwell had failedto cite any of the numerous positive reviews his study had received from otherspecial ists [5 7].

The Rocky Flats Advisory Notice

Johnson's study clearly disturbed people associated with the nuclear estab-lishment. But it also troubled those who wanted unimpeded development in theburgeoning suburbs moving closer and closer to the Rocky Flats site. Perhaps thebiggest threat to real estate interests came in March 1979 when the federalDeparlment of Housing and Urban Development required anyone seeking federalmortgage insurance on properry being bought within 10 miles of Rocky Flats tosign the "Rocky Flats Advisory Notice." The notice referred to "varying amountsof plutonium contamination of the soil" and said an "Emergency Response Plan"would be implemented in the event of "an accidental release of radioactivematerials" from Rocky Flats. Shortly after Ronald Reagan took office in January1981 the Advisory Notice requirement was abandoned.

Johnson Loses His Job

In May 198 l, five months prior to publication of his cancer incidence studyin a prestigious journal, Johnson lost his position as Director of the JeffersonCounty Health Department. He had worked for two bodies, the Counfy Com-missioners and the County Board of Health, the latter appointed by the former.Though his Rocky Flats work had often been opposed by the President of theBoard of Health (a wealthy individual who owned 20 acres of land within amile of the Rocky Flats site), he always had the support of amajority of both theBoard of Health and the Commissioners, The makeup of the Board of Healthbegan to change, however, after the election in 1980 of a realtor as a CountyCommissioner. In April 1981 a reconstituted Board of Health held a secretmeeting at which they voted to ask Johnson to resign. He requested a hearing,which occuffed on May 15, 1981. The Board's attorney advised them that theydid not need to state a reason for discharging a health officer who seryed "atthe pleasure of the Board." When the Board, by a vote of three to two, gaveJohnson the choice of being fired (and losing all accrued benefits) or of resigningimmediately, he resigned t58]. Martell, on hearing this news, called Johnsonthe "only man in the Denver public health community who is concerned aboutpublic health" t591.


Johnson Goes to Court to Save His Job

Within days of his termination, an ad hoc Citizens llealth Csmmittee per-suaded Johnson to file suit in the Jefferson County Courr ro seek reinstatementto the position from which he had been terminated. This group thought theHealth Board had violated Johnson's rights and flouted due process by fail ingto reveal their own conflicts of interest. When the case r,r,ent to trial, one of thethree Health Board members who hacl votecl against Jclhnson saicl that, i1 hisview, a health officer "could be fired for the color of his tie" if the ljoard clicln'tlike it t60]. The judge ruled that since Johnson served ar the pleasure of theBoard, he could not be reinstated.

The case was appealed to the State Suprerne Court, rvhic:h gn April 1g, lgB3,in a unanimous decision, annulled the County Cclurt verdict and renranded thecase fbr retrial. The Supreme Court also disqualifie<t the original juclge for sayingthat "it would be a disaster if Johnson gets his position back."

Meanwhile, in December 1984, before Johnson's case coulcl be retried, theChurch lawsuit was settled. The owners of the lancl near Rocky Ftats on whichJohnson had prevented residential development were paicl $9 rniil ion, ancl itwas mandated that the contested land coulcl be usecl clnly for open space or anindustrial park. One week after announcement of this settlenrent, the Jeffbr$onCounty Commissioners offered to settle rvith Johnson for S I 50,000. FIe lcceptecl[61]. By this time he had become the chief public health officer for the Stateof South Dakota.

Crurnp and Johnson

Johnson was gone frorn Colorado, but not forgotten. J'he DOE paicl KennethS. Crump and colleagues $70,000 (a hefty surl at the tinre) to refute Jshnson'scancer-incidence study. Using the same data that Johnson hacl usecl, Clrnrp anclcolleagues replicated his findings. When they examinecl clata from a clecadelater (197 9 through I 98 I ), they found a reduced cancer incidence in Are a Inearest Rocky Flats (the opposite, they said, of what one would expect), with thehighest incidence now in Area II, the urban sore. They aclyancecl t5e thesisthat the cancer incidence levels in both 1969*71 and 1979*Bl had norhing rr)do with Rocky Flats but were due to the "urban efl'ect" measurecl by tlistrtncefrom the state capitol building in Denver. They found no e,u,idence of ooa re lationbetween environmental exposure to plutoniunr fiorn Rocky Flats ancl cancerinciden ce" 162].

Johnson, in a published response, pointed out that Crump ancl colleagueswere able to claim less cancer for areas rlear Rocky Flats only by setting 4siclcrhis isopleth approach in f'avor of divicling the Denver region into six sectorsradiating out from the state capitol building in downtown Denver. l-he soctor ontheir map containing the Rocky Flats area also inclurcles the sizeilble unexpcrseil


4

01 ?3 4mi les

01 2 34 5 6km

Figure 3. Crump divided the Denver area into six sectors radiat ing outwardfrom the state capitol building, then analyzed data from these sectors

to demonstrate the "urban effect" on cancer incidence patterns.The f igure above superimposes Crump's sectors on Johnson's map,showing that the city of Boulder is included in the sector that containsRocky Flats; this results in gross undercounting of cancer incidence

attr ibuted to Rocky Flats. For Crump's sectors, see Crump et al. ,"Statistical analyses of cancer incidence patterns in the Denver metropolitan

area in relat ion to the Rocky Flats plant," Report of research done underDOE contract #DE AC04-76EV01013, Subcontract 81 15006 from theLovelace Inhalat ion Toxicology Research Inst i tute, Albuquerque, NM,

August 20, 1984, p. 80. The image above is f rom an unpubl ishedpaper by Johnson, "Rocky Flats Revisited: Fol low-up Studies,"

Apr i l 1988, p. 15.

lsoplelhs in mGr ol plutonium pel km'

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC HEAL]'H I 85

upwind cify of Boulder (1970 population 66,870). This results in greatly under-counting cancer incidence related to Rocky Flats per se (see Figure 3),

When, on the other hand, Crump et al. used Johnson's isopleth approach theygot the same results he had for 1969-71, while tbr 1979-81 they furind, as noted,a decline of cancer incidence in the area nearest Rocky Flats. Johnson attributeclthis reduction to the very large in-migration into Area I through the 1970s. signifi-cantly diluting the contaminated population he ha<l cclunted in his earlier sturclyt63]. Despite Johnson's carefirl rebuttal, governm€rlt agencies ignorecl what hewrote and continued to tout the Crump study as a clefinitive refiitation of Johnssn.

The Staging of the Church Case:The CDH Shows Its Hand

Though the 1984 settlement of the Church lawsuit had confinrrecl Jolulson'rioriginal position that housing should not be allowecl on the contalninatecl lancl,in other respects the case played or,rt in ways not fbvorabie to Johnsop, f:ir.st, inhis words, according to the settlement, the plaintifl.s (landowners) were paicl$9 rniltrion "in exchange for a court hearing staged fur the juclge an{ the pressby the attorneys and witnesses for the defenclarrts, Iriothing wa$ to be hearcl ti6mthe experts for the plaintiffs fincluding Johnson], and there was to be no crossexamination of defendants' witnesses" t64].

With Johnson effectively gagged, Stanley W. Ferguson of the CI)LI, citingCrump, pointedly dismissed Johnson's cancer incidence stucly, then stated theposition of CDH: "There is no scientifically valid eviclence of the creatiol orintensification of any health effects as the result of the existence ancl operationsof the Rocky Flats Plant, or by the existence of any nraterials frorrr the R6ckyFlats Flant on soi ls outside of the plant" t65J. Also. reversing thsir earl ierstatement that plutonium on Church land exceedecl the state's 2 clprn/g stanclarclby up to seven times, the CDH now gave the landowners a certificate stating thatplutoniuln contamination on their land did not exceed the standard"

From Johnson's unheard testimonv:

Bascd on my education, training, and cxpcrience as a rncdical cloctor, arrrlmy understanding of how the body rvorks, anil of the eff-ects of igpizingradiation on the human body, and based orr rny stuclies of the raclioactivcernissions of the Rocky Flats Plant and the arca-wide ooiltarninntion of t5t:Denver area from those releases, ancl my sttldics of cancer rnortaiity andcancer incidence in contaminated areas, and having considcrcd othcr possi[:lccauses, i t is my opinion, within a reasonable dcgrcc of rnedioal probabil i ty,

:Xili il:iffi'J';Tl':, " -, T:J;,'i.-r,l "' kv F- I at s P I a n t h *ve c a' s e d a n

Johnson called for a standard tbr plutonium in surf'ace respirable clust of'0.4 dpm/$, evacuation of all residential areas within four rniles of the p!arrt site


and no new housing within ten miles-due to contamination already present orlikely to be added later t661.

The Public Betrayed: Secrecy Prevails

In settling the Church case, the DOE and the contractors gained control of allinternal documents reviewed in the case and had them sealed, thereby deprivingthe public of access to crucial information regarding contaminants releasedfrom Rocky Flats lI4, pp. 200-201]. This was repeated with a vengeance after theJune 1989 FBI raid of Rocky Flats; federal authorities used the subsequent grandj,,.y investigation to gather evidence of wrongdoing and then sealed the record1671. In both instances, the court allowed the Rocky Flats operators to withholdfrom the public data about the nature and extent of contamination on and offthe site" In October 2A06, the DOE announced completion of the Rocky Flats"cleanup" without this information being available. There seems a conspiracyof silence, whether unconscious or otherwise, befween those who contaminatedthe land and those who prefer not to know that it's contaminated. Neither isinterested in the truth. Johnson, at least, stood against this collective denial, aswell as and as long as he could.

Context: Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis

In the 1970s and 80s, at just the time Martell and Johnson were most activein efforts to protect public health, others were developing the tools of riskassessment and cost-benefit analysis. These tools enable U.S. decision-makersto deal with threats to public health and environmental integrity without undulyimpeding enterprises like the nuclear industry. Incorporation of these toolsinto the decision-making process is based on the assumption that scientists canunderstand the impact of human activities on ecological and human systems wellenough to predict harm and to estimate risk. The resultant risk-based regulatoryregime that now prevails in the United States puts a price on human health andecological well-being without really knowing what that price is. It presupposesthat some level of harm is acceptable without asking those affected whether itis acceptable to them. Abstract and abstruse formulations of risk are employed toconsign some to disease, deformify, and premature death, whether soon or in thewholly unknown long term.

Persistence of Johnson's Question: Varied Answers

D ose-Reconstruction P roj ect

In response to the June 1989 FBI raid on Rocky Flats to collect evidence ofalleged lawbreaking, DOE funded the CDH to manage a dose-reconstructionstudy for Rocky Flats. The goal was to determine the history of contaminant


releases and to estimate doses that people off-site may have received in orderto decide whether further study was waffanted. Colorado Governor Roy Romerappointed a l2-mernber oversight Health Advisory Panel that included, besidesprominent scientists and local people, fwo officials frorn CDH (one would chairthe panel) and one each from DOE and CDC. Such a panel woulcl not stray furfrom the risk assessment orthodoxy that typically inforrns studies of this sort.

The nine-year study (1990-1999) estimated that total off"site pluronium releasesfor the production years, 1952-1989, ranged from 4.8 to 51.3 curies t6S]. Onecurie is the quantify of any radioactive material that unclergoes 37 billion disilte-grations or releases of radiation per second. Thus, accor<ling to the fbregpingestimate, plutonium released from Rocky Flats to the off-site envirorlrnent emitsbefween 176.6 bill ion and 1.9 tri l l ion bursts of alpha rarliation each secpnd, After24,110 years (the half-l itb of plutonium-239), the nulnlrer of alpha bursts persecond will be reduced by half. The material remains in the environrnent in t5eform of particles too srnall to see, but not too small to be inhaled or ingested.

Periodic meetings to involve the public in the study were tairly well attencled,though often held when most working people could not attend. The nreetingscould be informative, tedious, and contentious. Technical specialists ancl theengaged public interacted intensely in efforts to reconstruct rnajor accidents andcontaminant releases, But when it came to estimating risk, the abstractions ofthe "experts" left me, and I suspect others, rvith the sense of being recluced to aspectator. The study's final report session had sornething of the feel of a triumphalcelebration, as if those affected were expected to rejoice:rt learning that, thoughas much as 5 1.3 curies of plutonium may have been released off-site, risks wereinconsequential and furlher studies were not warranted, It r,vas a bit unlen,iRg,

The CDH calls the dose-reconstruction study a "health strrdy," brrt it was npsuch thing" Indeed, it concluded that an actural health study was ngt warrantecl.The only situation in which a dose-reconstruction study rvould poinr to the needfor direct health study would be where there is an indisputable coffespondencebetween known large releases of a particular contaminant and its known physicaleffects. An example is large releases of radioactive iocline frorn the DOE'sHanford facilify matched by the high incidence in the area of chilclhsocl thyroi{cancer, a cancer attributed solely to the presence of iodine in a single Organ [69].Plutonium released from Rocky Flats can cerlainly cause cancer in exposeclpeople, but any cancer caused by plutoninm can also havc other cilLtses.

The CDH has generally interpreted the study as providing scierrtif ic con-firmation of the absence of adverse health effccts. lJnknorvn to outsiders, sr)tnemembers of the Health Advisory Pane I wanted additional research on plutonir;rnin water as it affects downstreanr communities, a proposal vetoed by the panel'sCDI-I chair. Others thought the final report should ernphasize in the srrongestmanner possible that the Denver-area population had beerr subject to the riskof a major cataclysm due to careless operation of the piant. Specifically, lrad the1969 fire breached the roof of the building r,r,here it ragecl, Denver alnrost

88 I TORTURED SCIENCE

certainly would have faced evacuation ll4, ch. 8]. Because the final report down-played this matter, David Albright, a prestigious independent scientist who hadbeen a very active member of the panel, refused to sign on to it [70].

The study concluded that the largest single plutonium release was from the1957 fire and that the person likely to have received the highest exposure wasa laborer working outdoors in the direct path of the plume of plutonium-ladensmoke from that fire (see Figure 4). The researchers produced a dose calculatorthat could be used by persons present in the Denver area at the time of the fireto estimate their dose according to their location. By the time the calculator wasfinished, however, the CDH had in effect dissolved the oversight panel by thesimple expedient of convening no more meetings. The calculator thus wasnever made available, and affected people were denied the chance to learnof the dose they may have received back in 1957. Might they have learned ofdangers like those to which Johnson and Martell had pointed but that theCDH had denied?

Calls for Further Studies

Despite the conclusion that there is no need for further health studies, severallrave disagreed. In 1982, Martell said that the plutonium in the soil east of RockyFlats "involves risks that are sufficiently serious that only epidemiological studiesof the next several generations of people living in that area can really find outwhat is going on" Ull. In 1996, nurses at the University of Colorado conducted acolrlrnunity needs assessment and concluded that community-based epidemio-logical studies should occur in areas affected by Rocky Flats 1721.

Also in 1996, Boston Universify epidemiologist Richard W. Clapp foundexcessive incidence of lung and bone cancers in areas near Rocky Flats andconcluded that "the most recent data are indicative of an ongoing health effectand support the need for surveillance of the incidence of cancer and other diseaseson a continuing basis in the exposed communities" 1131.

The programs that Clapp and others proposed have never taken place. Indeed,there has never been any direct health study or medical monitoring of peoplewho live in areas contaminated with plutonium released from Rocky Flats U4).Hence, no one really knows the actual health effects of living in such areas.

Alternate Assessments of frisk in Off-Site Areas

In 1998, the Colorado Cenffal Cancer Registry of the CDH issued a reportthat purports to show that people who live near Rocky Flats have no higherincidence of cancer than those who live elsewhere in the Denver area 17 51.German radiation specialist Bernd Franke criticized this report as seriouslyflawed: "It appears that the study design was chosen to calm people down, forpublic relations pLlrposes, rather than for any real scientific reason" 176f.


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Figure 4. Trajectory of the plume of plutoniurn-laden smoke fromthe September 1 1 , 1957, f ire at Rocky Flats as calculated in the dose

reconstruction study. Note that the map covers only the area defined for thisstudy and thus presents no estimate for how far the plum6 travelecJ,From Historical Public Exposure Studies on nocky Ftats, Colorado

Department of Publ ic Health and Environment, August 1ggg, p. 19.

On February 14,2A06, the jury in a class action case heard in the t-ecleral collrrin Denver found Dow and Rockwell, the fbrrner operators of Rocky Flats, liaiblefor harming the property of people who livecl in areas shor,vn by Krey to becontaminated with plutoniwn released from Roc,ky Flats and by irnplicntionendangering their health 1771. The jury assessed penalties o1'$554 rrrilliorr, J'his

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suggests that when essentially uninformed people are presented evidence of akind with which Johnson was very familiar, along with countervailing arguments,they are likely to reach conclusions approximating Johnson's views regardingthe dangers posed by Rocky Flats. The huge sum of mon ey, d record-breakingamount, awarded as compensation by the jury to the properfy holders in thespecified off-site contaminated area may never reach those affected, since theverdict was overturned by the Appeals Court in March 2010.

Johnson's Legacy

The Rocky Flats work for which Johnson was celebrated and vilified and forwhich he was forced from office was done in the final six years and five monthsof his seven years and eight months term as Director of Public Health forJefferson County. Since the termination of his very brief tenure, no one remotelylike him has occupied an official position related to public health vis-d-vis RockyFlats-no county official, no state official, ilo federal official. Johnson stands aloneas an untiring advocate for people with public health concerns, whether inside oroutside the facilify" Though he made himself available to concerned individualsand grollps (he met with a study group I organized in 1979), the primary arcna ofhis work was with personnel from government agencies, especially the DOEand CDH. His Rocky Flats work is densely documented in the many articles andreports he prepared as well as in his voluminous coffespondence [78].

By the time Johnson died on December 29, 1988, he was a much-published,internationally respected practitioner and specialist on radiation health effects.At the urging of former Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, he did the first-everstudy of downwinders from the Nevada Test Site U9). He was in considerabledemand abroad as well as elsewhere in the United States. But in Colorado hewas in eclipse, dismissed by nuclear technocrats as well as by promoters ofurban sprawl. Indeed, the constant criticisms of his cancer incidence study bynuclear establishment figures gave boosters of urban development a rationalefor ignoring his warnings"

On December 18, 1988, less than fwo weeks before he died, Johnson pub-lished in the I{ew York Times an op-ed called "Rocky Flats: Death, Inc." Herecounted his years with Jefferson Counfy, explaining various studies he haddone and how, "as a result of the buildup of enormous political pressures byvested interests," he was forced from office. He concluded that if people are"to be properly protected, all studies of nuclear contamination and associatedhealth effects should be conducted primarily by independent scientists who areinsulated from cynical retaliation."

The Denver Post published a tribute to the deceased Johnson headlined"Doctor warned of Rocky Flats danger" six days after the FBI raided RockyFlats on June 6, 1989, to collect evidence of environmental crimes allegedlycommitted at the faciliry. The article came close to saying that Carl Johnson

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH I 9I

was right all along. An anonymous Rocky Flats insider said Johnson "wasn'tas off-base as we used to say he was," while a CDH official praised him as a"workhorse," but said he presented some of his results in ways that "overstatedreality"o' For many, the fact that the FBI was investigating Rocky Flats confirmedthat Johnson knew what he was talking about.

III" coNcLUSIoN: PROPER HEALTH PROTECTIONJohnson and Martell blew the whistle on Rocky Flats, They delved ilto the

details of radiation health effects to understand in the most thorough way possiblewhat "proper" protection of public health would entail. They rernind us that anypurportedly "safe" dose of radiation may be the one that will tip the scales againstus. They warn that our fate may be sealed20 or 30 years before symptoms appear"They were exemplars of caution on behalf of the unassuming public, But therules by which they worked were not the rules by which others plaverl the game.There is a striking difference between public health as service to the public andpublic health as obeisance to the nuclear indr"rstry ancl the economy of denial,

The tale told here is one of systemic failure of the U.S. system of repres€ntativedemocr&cY, by means of which, purportedly, the well-being of'the public isserved by elected representatives and the bureaucrats ancl technocrats gp anddown the governmental chain of command rvho are charged with irnplenrentingthe will of the people. The system fails because of the funclanrentirl conllictbefween the democracy professed on the orte hand and denietl on tfie other.Nuclear weapons that supposedly protect our derrlocracy clestroy il, becausc. toexist, they require secrecy and centralized decision-rnaking rvhich irr turn allolvdeceit, damage, and denial.

Martell, in discoveting that plutonium had been released fronr Rgcky Flatsto the off-site environment, exposed darnage that led to the unraveling ol'some ofthe deceit. He and the public learned for the flrst time about previclusly unknownmajor accidents. But an AEC ottcial, practiced perhaps in the art of {p1ial, madcsure that Martell would pay for what he'cl done. tvlartell kept his job becauseof the support of colleagues, but the loss of his lab ancl of funding fi:r researchhobbled his career in ways that are beyond measure.

Johnson, who did lose his job, seems clearly to have {al len vict im not to rhelords of the nuclear priesthood but rnerely to the greed ancl corruption o{' localgovernment. But this is only half the story. The Colorado Departnrent of l leiilthhad already tried to marginalize him by rejecting his innovative clust sanrplingmethod that, as Karl Morgan pointed out, was up to 40 times more protectivethan the method they employed. Undeterred, Johnson proceecled rvitfu a series ofreports culminating in his major study that showed a correspondence betrveenzones of cancer incidence and zones of contamination fi 'onr Rocky Flats, TheDOE, in a fit of denial, hired Crurnp to refute Johnson and then burietJ Jc-rhnson'sown rebuttal in a repetitious tide of deceit that can orrly leacl to lp()re of the


very kind of damage Johnson was exposing. The CDH, not to be outdone, afterJohnson was gagged in a federal courtrooffi, cited Crump to dismiss Johnson, onlylater to have him in mind when they produced their PR piece asserting that livingnear Rocky Flats is no riskier than living anywhere else in the metro area. Somewithin the CDH undoubtedly viewed Johnson as an impediment to economicdevelopment, like the realtor who became a Jefftrson County Commissioner sohe could ax Johnson. This sort of distorted cost-benefit calculation is not simplyan instance of comrpt local or regional politics; it's a characteristic blindnessof the culture, essential to the economy of denial.

In the dead end of this failed system, one has two responsibilities: first, tocreate a public record for those who will come after and, second, to articulate asclearly as possible a positive alternative to the failed system. The present namativecontributes to the essential public record. It can be supplemented by my accountof the inadequate "cleanup" at Rocky Flats t80]. The second responsibiliry,pointing to an alternative, can here be alluded to only in outline. To deal withradiation health effects in and around facilities like Rocky Flats, we need tobegin anew and to implement what can most appropriately be called "ecologicaldemocraey." By this term I mean direct democracy informed by the awarenessthat we are inseparable from the ecology in which we live and move andhave our being. For any human action likely to affect public health or environ-mental integrity, insofar as possible, affected parties must participate directlyin decisions about the action. Otherwise, they are forced to endure the resultsof decisions made by others, which is what has happened at Rocky Flats,where the range of public participation has been limited at best to spectatoractivities and at worst to disdainful dismissal. In the practice of ecologicaldemocrdey, the only role for representative democracy is to ensure that voiceis given to parties who cannot be present-that is, to the very young, the veryold, the infirm, the unborn, plus the whole spectrum of nonhuman creaturesthat inhabited the land long before we arrived and will be there long after wehave passed.

Public health science deserves to align itself with ecological democracybecause its primary intent is to sustain ecological well-being and to work withand for people rather than against them and without them. The problems forJohnson and Martell were not that they lacked independence but, as Johnsonmade clear, that they were vulnerable to "cynical retaliation" from those whodeny harmful effects even as they foster harmful ends. All science serves someinterest. Ecological democracy entails a shift in decision-making power that putsscience irrevocably in the service of people and planet"

NOTESI " Martell, E. A" 1995. Interviewed by Niels Schonbeck for the Health Advisory

Panel as part of the Rocky Flats Dose Reconstruct ion Study,2l Febmary 1995,p.25.


In this same interview Martell pointed out that P. W. Krey (see note 7 below)measured plutonium at the east boundary of the Rocky Flats site at 1,500 timesbackground.

2. On July l, 1994, CDH changed its name to Colorado Department of Public Healthand Environment" Throughout this article this agency is referred to as CDH.

3" Within one month in 1957 a major disaster occurred at a production facility ineach of the only three countries then known to be making nuclear bombs, theU. S., Br i ta in and the USSR. ht tp: l lwww.rockyf latsnuclearguardianship. orglI eroy-m oo relpapers -by- I eroy-mo r e-phd-2 I

4, Aftcr the l95l f ire, AEC off icials told the Denver Prtst that i t "resulrecl in nospread of radioactive contamination of any consequence." Atomic Plant Firc Causes$50,000 Loss , Denver Post, 12 September, p. 1, 1957. Avaiable onl ine atwww. ro ckyfl atsnuc I e arguard cnship. org/s ite-m ap .htm I

5. Metzger,P. lgT2.TheAtomicEstabl ishmenl. NewYork: SirnonandSchuster, p.259"6. Martell, E. A. 24 February 1970. Plutonium contamination in the Denter area.

Press release of the Colorado Committee for Environmental Intbrmation, Boulder,Colorado. See also Poet, S. 8. , and Martel l , E. A. 1972. Plutonium 239 andAmericium24l contamination in the Denver area, Health Phvsics 23:537 "

7. kty, P" W. February 1976. Remote plutonium contamination and total invcn-tories from Rocky Flats, Health Physics 30. See also Ktcy, P" W.. and l-Iardy, E" P.I August 1970. Plutonium in soil around the Rocky llat,s plant, [IASL-235, NcwYork: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Health and Safery Laboratory.

8. Cleere, R. L. 24 January 1973. Public notice of plutonium contamination in t lrE areaof the Dow Chemical Rocky Flats Plant, signed R. L. Clcere, Exscutive Director,CDH.

9. Amendment to the State of Colorado Rules and Regulations Penaining to Radi-ation Control, Subpart RH 4,21.1, adopted Colorado State Board of Health, 21March 1973.

10. Martell, E" A. January 1975. Basic consideration,s in the. qs,ies.tntent qf lhe csnt:errisks and standards for internal alpha enitters. Statement presented at tlre publichearings on plutonium standards, US EPA, Denver, pp. l7,ZA.

11. Love, J. June 1994. Roclgt lTlats Soil Plutonium 239+240 Survey lrom t970 to 1991,Denver: CDH.

12" Jones, R. H,, and Zhang, Y. l9 September 1991, Spatial und temporctl unuly.sis aJ'the Roclqt Flats soil plutonium data. Denver: CDLI.

13" Beck, U. 1992. Risk SocieQ: Tov,ards e neh| moderrtitl,, trans. Mark Ritter. London;Sage. p. 64"

14. Ackland, L. 1999. Making a Real Killing: Rocky Flcrts und the Nuclear West,Albuquerque: Univcrsiry of Ncw Mexico Press, p. 169,

15. Lamm-Wirth Task Force on Rocky Flats. October 1975. Finul Report.16. Solo, Pam. Interviewed by L.Moore. Newton, I\ ,1A. 23 Septernber 1996.17. For rnore on local activism, see Moore, L. ct al. 1992, Cit izen's Guide tct Roc:ryu l}7ats.

Boulder: Rocky Mountain Peace Ccntcr, pp. 52-54; arrd Ackland , L, lvfaking a ]lealKi l l ing, chaps.9, 10, and 13.

18" Martell, Edward A. l{arural radionuclides antl life. (vnpublished manuscript), chap" 4.


19. Martell, Edward A. Chap .7 , p. I I . Martell viewed naturally occurring radiation as thelikely source of the energy necessary forthe evolution of l ife. See Martell, E. A. I gg2.Radionuclide-induced evolution of DNA and the origin of life, Journal of MotecularEvolution 35:346-355 "

20. Martell, E. A. 1975. Tobacco radioactivify and cancer in smokers. American Scientist63:409-410.

21. Martell, E. A. Interviewed by Robert Del Tredici,22 July 1982.22" Morgan, K. Z. 1975. Suggested reduction of permissible exposure to plutonium

and other transuranium elements, American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal567 -57 5.

23. Martcll, E. A. to Energy secretaryH. o'Leary,9 February 1994.24. Denver journalist Laura Frank has covered this issue extensively for former

Rocky Flats workers but also for workers at other DOE facilities" http:llwww.zoominfo.com/people/Frank Laura 393007209.aspx

25"26.27"

Schonbeck, N. Obituary for Martell. Delivcred l9 July 1995.Medrud, N. (Martell's NCAR colleaguc). Interviewed by Moore. 3 June 2005.Martell, E. A" Interviewed by Niels Schonbeck for the Health Advisory Panel aspart of the Rocky Flats Dose Reconstruction Study.2l February 1995. On an explicitthreat to Martell and colleagues by an AEC offrcial, see note 5.Johnson, C" Interviewed by Robert Del Tredici, 20 July 1982.Some errors are cited in Johnson, C., and Holland, J. R. 1985. Polit icization of PublicHealth, Presented at the U.S. Conference of Local Health Officers, and the AmericanPublic Health Association, Washington, DC, 18 November 1985, p. 8.Johnson, C. (no date). The public health impact of the Rocky Flats nuclear weaponsplant in the Denver Area: A case history with recommendations.Johnson, C. I 2 September 1 97 5. Survey of land proposed for residential development eastof Rocky Flats, for plutonium 239 contamination of respirable dust on the surface of thesoil and proposal of a new standard to define the potential airborne-plutonium-particlehazard in terrns of concentration of plutonium in respirable dust. Report to the JeffersonCounty Commissioners and the Colorado State Health Department.Martell, E. A. Interviewed by Robert Del Tredici, 22 July 1982.Martel l , E. A. Interviewed by Niels Schonbeck,2l February 1995.Johnson, C", Tidball, R, R., and Severson, R. C. 6 August I976. Plutoniumhazardin respirable dust on the surface soil. Science 193:488-490. Johnson et al. answeredcriticisms regarding dust particle size made by John A. Hayden of Rockwell inSCIENCE 196 (June 3, 1977):1126.Johnson, C., to Colorado Board of Health, "Proposal of a new interim standard todefine thc potcntial airborne-plutonium particle hazard in terms of concentrationof plutonium in rcspirable dust on the surface of the land," l4 October 197 5. ForJohnson's detai led response to EPA on sampling methods and related matters, seehis "Crit ique of the EPA's 'Proposcd Fcderal Radiation Protection Guidance onDose Limits For Persons Exposed to Transuranium Elements In The Environment. "'l4 October 1 97 5.

36. Johnson, C. 2l January 1976. "Remarks to the State Board of Health concerning aproposed new interim standard for contamination of soil with plutonium." See Hazle,A. J., and Johnson, C. 20 January 1976. "Joint statement of some alternatives to

28.29.

30.

31,

32.33.34.

35.


the State Board of Health concerning the proposal for a new interim standard forplutonium based on the respirable dust on the surface of the grorrncl."

37. Morgan, K. Z. 2I January 1976, Transcript of Presentation, Cslorado Land UseCommission Meeting, pp. 12-13.

38. Morgan,K.Z. to C. Johnson. 30 January 1976,39. Report to the Jefferson County Board of Hcalth. 31 March 1917.40. Johnson, C., to A. Robbins, Executive Director of CDH , 17 May lg71 .4l " Johnson, C. to A. Robbins. 5 October 1971. Refers ro ir 27 Septombcr tg77 CDH

report on this matter.42. Johnson, C. (no date). The public health inrpact of the ttocltry Flats nnclc,ar weapuns

plant in the Denvcr Area, p. 10. Refers to Murray, R. L,, "Cianuna analysis otplutonium-contarninated soil at Rocky Flats." Unpublishecl report. E.S, J76-77-lc)1,Rocky Flats Plant. 10 January 1977; and Anon., Rocky Flats Epvironprental lvlol i-toring Results, Dow Chemical Corp., Rocky Flats Plant, Gollen, hTay lg7(),

43. Strontium as a contested issue rcappcared in January 2005 when fbrmer FBI agentJon Lipsky, who had led the June 1989 FBI raid of Rocky Flats, annorrrtced at d newsconference in Denver that he had secn docurnentatiorr of lrigh lcvels of strontiurncontamination at the site. For more on thc stronti i lm issue. see McKinley, W,, irn,JBalkany, C. 2004. The ambushetl grand ju.t'7,; f{ou, the Justice Depurtntant t:ctvt:ret!up government nuclear crimes and how'v,e cuught tkem recl hanclect. Ncw York:Apex, pp. 122, 187, 194-196.

44^ Johnson, C. interviewed by Del Tredici, R. 20 Jul1, lgB2.45, Johnson, C. 1977, Leukemia death rates of residents of areas contalninatcrl rv, i th

plutonium. Proceedings of the l05th Annual Mceting of thc Arnerican Pr"rbrl ic t lcalthAssociat ion, Washington, DC, I November 1917; Johnson. C. 1971. Eval t rat iun of rhchazard to residents of areas contaminated with plutonium, PrrJcteetlingli rtf'tke ttr,thInternational Congress of the International Radiation Prrstection As,socirttion,Irnris,24-30 Apri l 1977. 1:243-246; and Johnson, c", to Jcft i ;rson county f3oarcl oflHeal*r,20 November lgll . "Report on death rate s f-rorn lurng Gancer in thc e'ig5t e L,n$ris tracrsncar Rocky Flats and in Golden. and in ninetsen ccnsus trrtcts at thc sorlt l , ctrcl t l tJefferson Counfy.

46- Johnson, C., to Jefferson County Board of Flealth. 3l March i 97E. "Report on ratcsof congenital malformations in an area contanrinatecl with plutoniurlr."

47 . Johnson, C.26 September 1980. Comtncnts on thc l9-{7 f i re at the l locky F' lars Pl t rnt ,Jefferson County, Colorado. Johnson. C. 17 Scptcrnbcrr 1980. i \ casg history t i f adisaster at the plant which could serve as a rnodel for a future disasrcr cri)crgcrlcvresponse plan cxercise"

48. Johnson, C. 1982. E,nvironmental and health effccts of thc nuclear industry trndnuclear weapons: a current evaluation. Ecology o.f Diseuse I(23):135- l52.

49. Johnson , C., to S. Ferguson of CDH, 2 May lg7g.50. Johnson, C. October 1981. Cancer incidcnce in an arca contaminatscl r .v i t l r radig-

nucl ides near a nuclear instal lar ion. Ambio I 0(a): I 78,51. Johnson restricted his study to Anglos bcc:ause the populntion of st iburban arcirs

nearest Rocky Flats was at thc t imc predominantly Anglo.52. In a 2 May 1979,letter to S" Ferguson of CI)H. .Iohnson explaincd t lrat the Arcg I

census tracts closest to Rocky Flats had a very srtrall populrttion \r,l:c-n operatir:ns


began at the plant but later grew rapidly from in-migration. Many residents of thisatea thus had not lived there long enough to develop Rocky Flats-induced cancers by1969-7l. Including these newcomers in his calculations meant that he understatedactual cancer incidence for Area I compared to Area IV.

53 " Johnson, C" 198 I . Cancer incidenc e, Ambio l0(4): I 8 l .54. Obmascik, M. Rockwell won bonuses despite errors. Denver Post, 7 January

I 990"55. Johnson, C. 1981. Cancer incidence. Ambio l0(a): f i6-182; see also Johnson, C. l gBZ.

Rocky Flats revis i red. Ambio I l (6) :317-379.56. Places of presentation and/or publication are referenced in Johnson,C., and Holland,

J. R. "Polit icization of Public Health," notes 13-22.57 . Johnson, C., to J. W. Spensley, Executive Director, Rocky Flats Blue Ribbon

Citizens'Committee.2l January 1983. Comment on the Safety Analyses and RiskAssessment Report for the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant, prepared by RockwellInternational. Novemb er 1982 "

58" Johnson, C., and Holland, J. R. Politicization of Pubtic Health. This documentprovides details regarding Johnson's termination. I personally was present when theBoard of Health forced him to resign.

59. Lange, T" They fired Dr. Johnson" Wesnvord 28 May 198160. Citizens Health Committee. January-March 1982. Citizens Healthwatch.61. Johnson, C., and Holland, J. R. Politicization of Public Health, p. 44.62" Crump, K, S" et al" 1987 . Cancer incidence patterns in thc Denver Metropolitan

Area in relation to the Rocky Flats Plant. American Journal o.f Epidemiology 126(l):127-135. See also Crump K. S. et aI .20 August 1984. Stat ist ical analyses of cancerincidence patterns in the Denver metropolitan area in relation to the Rocky Flatsplant. Report of research done under DOE contract #DE AC04-7 6EV0 I 01 3,Subcontract 81 1 5006 from the Lovelace Inhalation Toxicology Research Institutc.Albuquerque, NM.

63.

64.65

Johnson, C. 1987. Cancer incidence patterns in the Denver Metropolitan Area inrelation to the Rocky Flats Plant" Americun Journal of Epidemiology 126(1):153.Johnson, C" Two Landmark Radiation Cases, p" 14.Affidavit of S. W" Ferguson in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.Civil Action No" 75-1162. l5 February 1985. See Johnson, C., ro Colorado StateBoard of Health. 2l August 1985. The role of CDH in the decision of Judge Matschin the Rocky Flats case"

66. Johnson, C. (no date). The public health impact of the Rocky Flats nuclear weaponsplant in the Denver Area: A case history with recommendations.

67. See Moore, L. [80] January-February 2005. Rocky Flats: The bait-and-switchcleanup. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientisfs, p. 55. http:lAos.sagepub.com/content6l l l l50fu11 and McKinley, W., and Balkany,C. The Ambushed Grand Jury, chap. 13.

68. Summary of Findings, Historical Public Exposures Studies on Rocky Flats. August1999. Health Advisory Panel and CDPHE.

69. Connor, T. 1997 . Burdens of proof: Science and public accountabitity in the fietdof environmental epidemiolog,t, with a focus on low dose radiation communie healthstudies. Columbia, SC: Energy Rescarch Foundation.

70. Personal communication with D. Albright, Washington, DC, 30 March20A4.

DEMOCMCY AND PUBLIC HEALTH I 97

71" Martel l , E" A. Interviewed by Robert Del Tredici, 1982.72. Brown, N. J. et al. 1996. Rocky Flats communiQ needs assessment final report.

Denver: UCHSC School of Nursing, p, 46,73. Clapp, R. W. Report submitted 13 November 1996 for plaintiff s counsel in Cook

vs. Dow Chemical and Rockw,ell International, United States District Court, Districtof Colorado.

74. An example of what is needed but has never been avaiiable for Rocky Flats isthe Fernald Medical Monitoring Program established at DOE's Fernald uraniumprocessing faci l i ty near Cincinnati, Ohio. Created as a result of a class actionlawsuit, this program, which ended in 2007, provided comprehensive monitoringof thc health of about 9,500 individuals over a period of I 8 years. The monitoringrelieved some individuals of worry while for others it provided an early warningof problems in need of attention. http:llwww.genrnecl,uc.edu/frnrnp/ A program ofthis sort should have been set up by the federal government for all DOE nuclearweapons faci l i t ies"

76. Colorado Central Cancer Registry. 1998. Ratios of crrrrcer incidence in ten ureesaround Rocky Flats, Colorado compared to the remaincler o/'Metropslitatt l)ent,er',1980-89 with updatefor selected areas, 1990-95, CDPIU,

76. Franke, B. of Institut fur Energie-und Umweltforschung, I-Icidclberg, to Cl. Balkany.Esq. 2 December 2002. A copy of this letter is in my posssssion.

77. Civil Action No. 90-cv-0018l(JLK), Cook v.r. f)ovt, Chemical & Rot:kvt,ell [nter-national,U.S. Distr ict Court, Distr ict of Colorado, l4 Febnrary 2006.

78. The papers of both C. Johnson and E. Martel l are archivcd at thc Univcrsity rrfColorado, Boulder"

19. Johnson , C, 1984, Cancer incidence in an area of radioact ive fa l lout downwinclf rom the Nevada Test Si te. Journt t l o. /" the Anter ican h{edicsl Associat ior t251:230-236.

80, Moore, L. January/February 2005" Rocky Flats: The bait ancl srvirch clerrnup,Bulletin af the Atornic Scientists. http:/ibos.sagepub.conVcontent/6 | i I /50. full Socalso Moore, L. 28 March 2010. People ancl p lutoniurn don' I rn ix.http://www.roclgrflatsnuclearguardianship.ory' leroy-rnoorc/papcrs-by-lcroy-lr)ore-phd-2/

Democracy and Public Health at Rocky Flats: The Examples of Edward A. Martell and Carl J. Johnson

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