DECEMBAR 2009 - UBCG

DECEMBAR 2009godina 2, broj 8

BANKARBroj 8. decembar 2009.

IZDAVAÈUdruženje banaka i finansijskih institucijaCrne Gore, Novaka Miloševa bb/3 PodgoricaTel: +382 20 232-028 www.ubcg.info

TIRAŽ: 600 primjerakaÈasopis izlazi kvartalno.

Rješenjem Ministarstva kulture, sporta i medija èasopis Bankar je upisan u Evidenciju medija - štampani mediji 17. marta 2008,pod rednim brojem 641.

REDAKCIJSKI ODBORglavni i odgovorni urednikMirko Radonjiæ

Milija Vlahoviæ, Prof. dr Aleksandar Živkoviæ,dr Nikola Fabris, dr Saša Popoviæ, dr Evangelos Markopoulos, mr Nebojša Ðokoviæ

urednikPeko Nikoliædizajn i prelomNikola Latkoviæfinalna priprema tekstova i korekturaMarko Nikoliæfotografijewww.photos.com i fotodokumentacija UBCGprevodTanja Luburiæ, Jelena Pralas, Vesna Radunoviæ, Nada Stojoviæ i Milena Ljumoviæštampa Grafotisak, Grude, BIH

Prilozi- tekstovi se dostavljaju u elektronskom oblikuna e-mail adrese: [email protected],[email protected], na disketi ili cd-u; maksimalna dužina tekstado 25.000 karaktera.- reklame po normativima UBCG na e-mail: [email protected]

Sadržaj / Contents

Dr Nikola FabrisNAŠ PRODUŽETAK RECESIJE I U 2010. GODINIOur Continuation of Recession in 2010

Prof. dr Saša PopoviæPREDMET ZA ONOGA KOJI ZNA DA ČITASubject Matter for Him Who Knows to Read

EBFNOVI PODAROV MODELNew Poddar Model

Roger KeiserPOVEĆANA ULOGATh e Increasing Role

Sam SillingtonOD KONFLIKTA DO MIRA, OD TERORIZMA DO ORGANIZOVANOG KRIMINALAFrom Confl ict to Peace, from Terrorism to Organised Crime

Giovanni GentiliSREDSTVA ZA MJERENJE I UPRAVLJANJETools for Measurement and Management

mr Enesa BektešiKAKO SA GUBICIMA I NENAPLATIVIM POTRAŽIVANJIMAHow to Manage the Losses and Bad Debts

mr Miloš RajkoviæGREŠKE U KORACIMAWrong Steps

mr Marko OtaševiæINKUBATORI I START-UP PREDUZEĆAIncubators & Enterprise Start-Ups

mr Milo IvanèeviæTEK TRAGOVIMerely Traces

Lidija MartinoviæUTICAJ NA INSTITUCIONALNE INVESTITORECrisis Eff ects on Institutional Investors

Novica RadoviæVELIKI IZAZOVI, A TEŠKA RJEŠENJAMajor Challenges, Hard Solutions

Marijana AdžiæPOVJERENJE JE DOBRO, ALI SU KONTROLA I NADZOR JOŠ BOLJIConfi dence is Good, but Control and Supervision are Even Better

Doc. dr Ðorðije RakoèeviæSTANDARDIZACIJA RADI LAKŠEG POSLAStandardization Because of Easier Job

Nenad JevriæOD “DOĐI ZA PLATU” DO “UPLAĆENA TI JE PLATA”From “Come to Pick Up the Salary” To “Your Salary Has Been Paid”

Miodrag KirsanovNJEGOŠEV ZLATNI PERUNNjegoš’s Golden Perun

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BANKARÈasopis Udruženja banakai finansijskih institucija Crne GoreBroj 8. decembar 2009.

IMPRESUM

decembar 2009 | :Bankar

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INTERVJU - DR NIKOLA FABRIS, GLAVNI EKONOMISTA CBCG

Naš produžetak recesije i u 2010.godini U svijetu blagi oporavak (ima mnogo signala). Kod nas

- sve zavisi od turizma, metalnog sektora i gradnje au-toputa. U svakom slučaju, za Crnu Goru je realno oče-kivati da će se BDP kretati u rasponu od minus dva do plus dva odsto. Prvi talas panike - povlačenje depozi-ta - prošao je brzo; drugi talas - koji je pogodio realni sektor - zaustavljen je rast broja preduzeća, kasnila su izmirenja kreditnih obaveza... što je uticalo na pogor-šanje kvaliteta aktive u bankama, na smanjenje nivoa depozita, na rast gubitaka... čime je potenciran prob-lem i inače nedovoljnog nivoa bankarskog kapitala. Kroz „antikrizne“ mjere u privredni sistem smo „upum-pali“ preko četiri odsto BDP. Biće banaka sa profi tom, ali i onih sa gubicima, a bankarski sistem Crne Gore će 2009. godinu završiti sa gubitkom.

I pored svega, mora se konstatovati da je u godi-ni koja se završava, bankarski sektor u Crnoj Gori stabilizovan.

Neophodne su mnoge izmjene Zakona o bankama, a zakonom o Centralnoj banci (koji je na usaglaša-vanju), uz njezinu ustavnu odgovornost za fi nansijsku stabilnost, neophodno je razraditi mjere i instrumente za sprovođenje te odgovornosti. Centralna banka od ranije podržava aranžman sa MMF-om, zbog višestru-kih koristi - to su najjeftinija sredstva, tim aranžmanom otvara se prostor za razvojne kredite Svjetske banke, kao i za kreditne linije za makroprilagođavanje EU, za besplatnu tehničku pomoć MMF...

Dokapitalizacija bankarskog sektora - neki su već „pojeli“ dio tog novog kapitala, te stoga sprovodimo stresno testiranje svih banaka u Crnoj Gori.

Iz poznatih razloga, bilo bi poželjno da u narednom periodu opadaju i aktivne i pasivne kamate.

Banke između dvije krajnosti - od prelakog do pre-teškog odobravanja kredita; bilo je i nepoštovanja obaveznih rješenja CBCG.

Dvije solucije - sredstva međunarodnih fi nansijskih institucija, sa garancijom crnogorske Vlade - prebaciti sa banaka koje neće na one koje hoće, ili formirati dr-žavnu razvojnu banku (instituciju)

:B Proteklu godinu obilježila je svjetska ekonomska kriza koja nije zaobišla ni Crnu Goru. Već postoje, istina pojedinačna mišljenja, da kriza polako prolazi. Kakva je Vaša ocjena?Kada je u pitanju globalni nivo, onda postoji mno-go signala koji sugerišu da postoje dobre šanse za blagi oporavak u 2010. godini. U Crnu Goru kri-za je došla sa zakašnjenjem, tako da se ne može u potpunosti isključiti i produženo trajanje recesije u 2010. godini. Sljedeća godina nosi brojne izazove i mnogo neizvjesnosti. Na kretanje nivoa aktivnosti, pored kretanja na globalnom nivou, dominantno će uticati nekolike grane. Na prvom mjestu turi-zam kao strateška grana, koja utiče na kretanje u velikom broju drugih. U ovom trenutku ne posto-je signali koji bi ukazivali na pogoršanje stanja u

december 2009 | :Bankar3

INTERVIEW - NIKOLA FABRIS, PHD

Our continuationof recession in 2010A slight global recovery (numerous indications). In our co-untry – everything depends on tourism, the metal industry, and the highway construction. In any case, it is reasonab-le to expect Montenegro’s GDP growth will range between minus two and plus two percents. The fi rst wave of panic - bank run – passed very quickly; the second wave - which hit the real economy – interrupted the growth of numerous companies, resulted in overdue servicing of credit obliga-tions… which resulted in deterioration of asset quality, the lowering of deposit levels, increased losses…thus empha-sizing the existing problem of insuffi cient banking capital. Through anti-crisis measures we injected over four per-cent of GDP into the economy. There will be some banks that will make profi t, but there will also be the ones running losses, and the overall banking system of Montenegro will end 2009 with loss.

Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the banking system has been stabilized in the year that is going to end soon.

Numerous amendments to the Banking Law are necessa-ry, and the Central Bank Law (currently under considera-tion) requires the working out of measures and instruments for the enforcement of the Central Bank’s accountabili-ty for the fi nancial system stability. The Central Bank has supported the arrangement with the IMF due to its multi-ple benefi ts - these being the lowest-cost funds, enabling access to World Bank development loans, as well as credit line for EU macroeconomic adjustments, the IMF technical assistance….

The banking sector recapitalization – some have already “eaten” some of this fresh capital, and that is why we per-form stress testing in all banks in Montenegro.

For the already know reasons it would be preferable if both lending and deposits rates declined.

Banks go to two extremes – from the most fl exible to the most rigorous lending terms; there was also certain inobservance of mandatory orders of the Central Bank.

Two solutions – funds from international fi nancial instituti-ons, under the Montenegrin Government guarantee - move them from banks that do not want them to those who want them or set up the state development bank (institution)

:B The year behind us was marked by the global fi nancial year which did not bypass Montenegro. There are already some, although individual, opinions that the crisis is nearing its end. What is your assessment of the situation?Viewed at the global level, there are numerous indi-cations suggesting that there are good chances for a slight recovery in 2010. Montenegro felt the crisis with lagged eff ects, so the continuation of recession through 2010 cannot be ruled out. Th e next year will bring numerous challenges and great uncertainties. In addition to the global trends, several industries will aff ect the economic activity developments. Th is is primarily tourism, as the strategic industry, which generates numerous multiplication eff ects. Th ere are

CHIEF ECONOMIST OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF MONTENEGRO

ci, kada se pokazalo da su banke stabilne i da su devedesete nepovratno otišle u prošlost. Drugi talas problema se mani-festovao kada je globalna fi nansijska kriza pogodila realni sektor i uticala je na rast broja preduzeća i građana koji su počeli da kasne sa izmirivanjem svojih obaveza. Ovo je uti-calo na pogoršanje kvaliteta aktive, smanjenje nivoa depozita i rast gubitaka. Time je dodatno potenciran problem nedo-voljnog nivoa kapitala, što je bilo prisutno i prije krize.

Što se tiče „antikriznih“ mjera, one su započele usva-janjem Zakona o zaštiti bankarskog sistema i setom mjera koji je donio ovaj zakon. CBCG je u 2009. godini ukinula opšte rezervacije, dva puta je smanjivala efektivnu stopu obavezne rezerve, omogućila da se 25% obavezne rezerve izdvoji u državne zapise, promijenili smo odluku o klasifi -kaciji aktive u cilju smanjivanja nivoa rezervacija, usvojili olakšice za restrukturiranje kredita i dr. Kao rezultat ovih mjera, u privredni sistem smo „upumpali“ preko 4% pro-cijenjenog BDP-a iz 2009.

:B Da li već sada možete da date preliminarne ocjene i rezultate rada crnogorskih banaka i napravite poređenje sa 2008. godinom?S obzirom na to da su pojedine banke trenutno u fazi „čišćen-ja“ bilansa u ovom trenutku nije moguće dati konačnu oci-jenu i sprovesti poređenje sa 2008. godinom. Ono što je izvjesno to je da će biti banaka sa profi tom, a i banaka sa gubitkom, ali da će bankarski sistem i kao cjelina završiti 2009. godinu sa gubitkom.

:B Koji su najveći izazovi za bankarski sektor u 2010. godini i šta nedostaje u legislativi da bismo sa sigurnošću mogli da kažemo da smo dostigli nivo usaglašenosti sa propisima EU?Bankarski sistem će se suočiti sa dosta izazova u 2010. go-dini, iako možemo konstatovati da je u 2009. godini stabi-lizovano stanje u bankarskom sistemu. Ključni izazov će se odnositi na zaustavljanje pogoršanja kvaliteta aktive, kao i obezbjeđenje dovoljnog nivoa kapitala srazmjernog nivou preduzetih rizika. Veliki izazov će se odnositi i na pokretanje kreditne aktivnosti, zaustavljanje opadanja nivoa depozita privrede, kao i na poboljšanje upravljanja rizicima.

Što se tiče potrebnih izmjena, neophodno ih je unijeti u Zakon o bankama, a kao najznačajnije mogu se navesti sl-jedeće: defi nisanje ovlašćenja Centralne banke, koja obez-bjeđuju efi kasnije sprovođenje mjera za poboljšanje stanja u bankama, sa posebnim naglaskom na uvođenje i sprovođenje privremene uprave; usklađivanje kriterijuma i postupka za ocjenu podobnosti i fi nansijske snage potencijalnih akcio-nara banaka sa novom direktivom EU; preciznije defi nisanje povezanih lica; i detaljnije razrade odredbi o korporativnom upravljanju u bankama, uključujući i potpunije defi nisanje uslova za izbor članova odbora direktora banaka.

:B Aranžman sa MMF-om - da ili ne? Da li bi bilo sada preuranjeno ili je čekanje gora varijanta?Stav CBCG po tom pitanju je već duže vrijeme nepromijen-jen. Mi podržavamo aranžman, jer smatramo da on nosi vi-šestruke koristi. U pitanju su najjeft inija sredstva dostupna na fi nansijskom tržištu, a otvorio bi se prostor za razvojne kre-dite Svjetske banke, kao i kreditne linije za makroprilagođa-vanje EU, dobili bismo besplatnu tehničku pomoć MMF-a

obalsti turizma. Od velikog značaja će biti kretanja u meta-lskoj industriji. Nivo aktivnosti u ovom sektoru će zavisiti i od kretanja cijena bazičnih metala na svjetskim berzama, ali i od restrukturiranja kompanija iz ove oblasti. Ukoliko se krene gradnjom autoputa, ona bi mogla pokrenuti i građe-vinarstvo i metalsku industriju, a pozitivni multiplikativni efekti bi se osjetili i u velikom broju drugih grana, koje nisu direktno povezane.

U sljedećoj godini treba očekivati opadanje nivoa agregatne tražnje kao rezultat niže i javne i privatne potrošnje (očekuje se rast nezaposlenosti). Ovo prilagođavanje potrošnje real-nim mogućnostima je apsolutno nužno. Ne treba izgubiti iz vida ni brojne druge rizike poput visokog broja nelikvidnih preduzeća, niskog nivoa diverzifi kovanosti naše privrede, rasta kredita koji kasne sa otplatom, opadanja priliva SDI, visokog stepena uvozne zavisnosti privrede i dr.

Stoga smatram da je realno očekivati da će se naš BDP u 2010. godini kretati u rasponu od -2% do +2%.

:B Možete li, ukratko, da sumirate posljedice krize na crnogorski bankarski i fi nansijski sistem i mjere koje su CBCG i Vlada preduzele na ublažavanju njenih posljedica?Kriza se u prvom trenutku manifestovala u formi paničnog povlačenja depozita zbog straha da bi se mogle ponoviti de-vedesete. Ovaj talas panike je prošao nakon nekoliko mjese-


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:B Više puta ste naglasili da je postignuta veoma dobra saradnja sa Udruženjem banaka Crne Gore. Kako komentarišete taj odnos u periodu od nastanka krize i koji su to oblici saradnje koji su obilježili godinu na izmaku?

Mi smo uveli praksu da prije izmjene svake značajni-je regulative održimo sastanak u udruženju banaka i zajednički sagledamo prednosti i eventualne nedo-statke predložene regulative. Takođe, periodično se sastajemo i da zajednički razmatramo tekuću situaci-ju i potrebu za eventualnim donošenjem korektivnih mjera. Iz ugla CBCG smatramo da je ta saradnja vrlo uspješna.

INTERVJU - NIKOLA FABRIS, GLAVNI EKONOMISTA CBCG


no indications of any worsening in the tourism industry at the moment. Developments in the metal industry will be of great importance. Th e activity level in this industry will also depend on the movement of prices of basic metals in the world stock markets, but also on the restructuring of metal companies. If the highway construction starts, it co-uld drive construction industry and metal industry, and positive multiplication eff ects would be felt in many other indirectly related industries.

Th e aggregate demand downturn should be expected in the year to come due to the lowering of both public and pri-vate spending (unemployment increase is expected). Th is real adjustment of spending is absolutely necessary. Other numerous risks should not be ignored, such as a number of companies lacking liquidity, a low level of the econo-my diversifi cation, increasing past due loans, reduced FDI infl ows, a high level of the economy’s dependence on im-ports, and the like.

Due to the aforesaid, I believe that it is reasonable to ex-pect the GDP ranging between -2% and +2%.

:B Could you gives the summary of the crisis impact on the Montenegrin banking and fi nancial system and the measures that the Central Bank of Montenegro and the Government have taken to alleviate the crisis consequences? Th e crisis originally manifested in the form of a panic bank run due to the inherent fear of the repeated 1990`s scenario. Th is panic wave passed aft er few months when the banks proved to be stable and that 1990`s have passed once and for all. Th e second wave hit the real economy and resulted in an increasing number of delinquent corporate and retail borrowers. Th is in turn resulted in deterioration of assets quality, lowered deposits, and increased losses. Th is additi-onally emphasized the problem of insuffi cient capital level existing even before the crisis.

As for the anti-crisis measures, they were launched with the passing of the Law on the Measure for the Prevention of the Banking System and a set of measures passed on the basis of this law. In 2009, the Central Bank of Montenegro cancelled the general provisions, reduced the eff ective re-serve requirement rate twice, allowed 25% of reserve requi-rements to be held in T-bills, amended the decision on asset classifi cation with a view to reducing provisioning, passed loan restructuring facilities, and the like. Th e result of the aforesaid measures was the injection of over 4% of the es-timated GDP for 2009 into the economy.

:B Could you give us some preliminary assessments and results of the Montenegrin banks and compare it with the year 2008?Considering the fact that some banks are currently in the phase of “cleaning” of their balance sheets, it is not possib-le to give any fi nal assessment or comparison with 2008 at the moment. What is defi nite is that there will be profi table banks and banks that will run loss, but the overall banking system will report loss at the end of 2009.

:B Which are the greatest challenges to the banking sector in 2010 and what the existing legislation needs to allow us to say

that it has reached the level of compliance with EU regulations?Th e banking system will face numerous challenges in 2010, although we may say that the banking system has stabilized in 2009. Th e crucial challenge will be to put an end to asset quality deterioration, as well as to provide suffi cient capital proportionate to the level of assumed risks. One of the big challenges will be the inducing of lending activity, the pre-vention of further withdrawal of corporate deposits, as well as the improvement of risk management.

As for the required amendments to the Banking Law, the most important would be the following: the defi nition of the Central Bank powers to allow more effi cient enforcement of measures for the improvement of bank conditions, with a particular emphasis on the introduction and enforcement of interim administration; harmonization of the criteria and procedures for eligibility and fi nancial strength assessment of potential bank shareholders with the new EU directive; a more precise defi nition of related parties; a detailed de-velopment of corporate governance provisions, including detailed requirements for the selection of members of the board of directors.

:B Arrangement with IMF – yes or no? Has it been premature so far or waiting represents worse option?CBM position with respect to this issue has remained unchan-ged for long period. We support the arrangement since we think that it brings multiple benefi ts. Th ese are the cheapest funds available at the fi nancial market, and the room would be opened for development loans granted by the World Bank, as well as for the credit lines for macro adjustment to EU, and we would obtain IMF technical assistance that would facilitate necessary structural adjustments and enhance the credibility of the economic policy. An illustrative example may be the case of Serbia, which has recently improved its credit rating through the arrangement with IMF.

:B Several banks in Montenegro reported loss as of 30 September 2009. What were the main causes for that – increase in provisions, credit activity decline or something else?Loss reported by certain banks was primarily the result of the decline in credit activities and deterioration of the quality of loan portfolio which resulted in the increase in

:B You have pointed out several times that very good cooperation with the Association of Montenegrin Banks has been reached. What is your comment with respect to this relationship in period that preceded crisis and what are these forms of cooperation in the year that is going to end soon?

We have introduced the practice of meeting with the Bankers Association before passing important regula-tion to review the advantages and possible disadvan-tages of the proposed regulation. In addition, we meet periodically and mutually discuss current situation and need for possible passing of corrective measures. From the CBM aspect, we think that this cooperation is very successful.

INTERVIEW - NIKOLA FABRIS


koja bi nam olakšala neophodna strukturna prilagođavanja i ojačao bi se kredibilitet ekonomske politike. Slikovit prim-jer može biti i slučaj Srbije, koja je nedavno kroz aranžman sa MMF-om uspjela da poboljša kreditni rejting.

:B Nekoliko banaka u Crnoj Gori je iskazalo gubitak na 30. 09. 2009. godine. Šta su osnovni uzroci - povećanje rezervacija, pad kreditne aktivnosti ili nešto treće?Gubitak koji su iskazale pojedine banke rezultat je, prije svega, pada kreditne aktivnosti i pogoršanja kvaliteta kre-ditnog portfolija, što je dovelo do povećanja rezervacija za kreditne gubitke, koje imaju negativan efekat na profi ta-bilnost banke.

:B Početkom godine ste naglasili da je nedovoljna kapitalizovanost najveći nedostatak u našem bankarskom sistemu. Kakva je situacija sada?Crnogorski bankarski sistem je najmanje kapitalizovan u regionu. Nivo kapitala na nivou bankarskog sistema nije adekvatan nivou rizika, koji je preuzet. Tu su i problemi sa lošom aktivom naših banaka. Stoga već duže vremena insistiramo na neophodnosti dokapitalizacije bankarskog sistema. Jedan broj banaka je već sproveo dokapitalizaciju, ali gubici registrovani u ovoj godini su „pojeli“ dio tog ka-pitala. Trenutno sprovodimo stresno testiranje svih bana-ka u sistemu i kada dobijemo rezultate znaćemo koliko je potrebno dodatnog kapitala i za koje banke.

:B Građani, a i privreda, često se žale na visinu aktivnih kamatnih stopa na kredite, ali su zadovoljni kamatnim stopama na štednju, pogotovo dugoročnu. Koliko su takve kamatne stope realne, održive i kakve su posljedice na budući razvoj crnogorske ekonomije?Izvjesno je da su u ovom trenutku i aktivne i pasivne ka-matne stope previsoke. Ukoliko pasivna kamatna stopa iznosi sedam ili osam odsto, onda je jasno da aktivna ka-matna stopa mora biti dvocifrena. Međutim, tada se otva-ra pitanje koji je to projekat koji može biti profi tabilan uz dvocifrenu kamatnu stopu. Takođe, treba imati u vidu da

u svijetu fi nansija važi zakon da, što je viša kamatna stopa, to je projekat rizičniji. Stoga visoke aktivne kamatne sto-pe znače da se mali broj fi rmi, koje bi se i kvalifi kovale za kreditnu podršku, usuđuju da uzmu kredite, a da sa druge strane one koji uzmu kredite, postaju rizične, te se otvara i dilema da li će moći u budućnosti da izmire tolike obave-ze. Ovo vrlo negativno utiče na privredni razvoj i poželjno bi bilo da u narednom periodu opadaju i pasivne i aktivne kamatne stope.

:B Očekuje se donošenje novog zakona o Centralnoj banci, koji bi bio usaglašen sa Ustavom. Koje su novine u odnosu na stari zakon?U ovom trenutku nemoguće je odgovoriti šta će biti sve novine, imajući u vidu da je zakon o Centalnoj banci u fazi usaglašavanja. On će svakako donijeti novine u pogledu ciljeva CBCG, s obzirom na to da je nova ustavna odgo-vornost CBCG fi nansijska stabilnost. Da bi se ova odgo-vornost mogla realizovati neophodno je razraditi mjere i instrumente i dati ovlašćenja CBCG kako bi mogla uspješ-no da sprovede ovu odgovornost.

Zakonom će se vjerovatno otvoriti mogućnosti za spro-vođenje operacija na otvorenom tržištu, otvoriće se mogu-ćnost za obavljanje funkcije zajmodavca u krajnjoj instanci. Da bi ovo bilo moguće, biće neophodno i dokapitalizovati CBCG iz sredstava izdvojenih rezervi.

:B Kreditna podrška malim i srednjim preduzećima je izostala u onom obimu koji se očekivao kada je, uz garanciju Vlade, sklopljen aranžman sa Evropskom investicionom bankom. Banke se žale da nema dobrih projekata. Kakav je Vaš komentar?Smatram da je pogrešno prisiljavati banke da po svaku ci-jenu kreditiraju preduzeća. Ipak, stiče se utisak da su banke otišle iz jedne krajnosti - kada su prelako odobravale kre-dite, u drugu krajnost - kada preteško odobravaju kredite. Naravno, na ovo je uticala i loša praksa jednog broja pre-duzeća i građana koji su prezentovanjem lažnih podataka pokazivali svoj bonitet mnogo boljim nego što jeste, a kada se ekonomska situacija pogoršala oni nisu bili u mogućnosti da isplaćuju ranije preuzete obaveze.

Isto tako, imamo situaciju da jedna grupa banaka koja je u prethodnom periodu uvodila lošu praksu - koje nije-su poštovale naša rješenja i koje su ulagale napore da pro-nađu načine da izigraju propise i naše mjere - sada nemaju kreditnu aktivnost. Tu je i druga grupa banaka, koje i dalje imaju značajnu kreditnu aktivnost.

Takođe, treba imati u vidu da mala kreditna podrška nije samo problem Crne Gore, već je taj problem prisutan i u okruženju i u EU. Sve to navodi na zaključak da globalna fi nansijska kriza još nije prošla, odnosno da su njene posl-jedice i dalje i te kako vidljive.

U postojećim uslovima kada imate raspoloživa kreditna sredstva od međunarodnih fi nansijskih institucija, za koje je Vlada dala garanciju, a neke banke ne žele da ih povuku, moguća su samo dva rješenja. Jedno je da sredstva prebaci-te sa onih banaka koje neće da ih povuku na one koje hoće, a drugo da formirate državnu razvojnu banku (instituciju) koja bi povukla ova sredstva. Ipak, treba imati u vidu da su i vrlo rigorozni uslovi međunarodnih fi nansijskih institu-cija kumovali ovakvoj situaciji ■

:B Kako ocjenjujete odnose CBCG sa drugim centralnim bankama u regionu, da li postoje zajedničke aktivnosti u pogledu prekogranične kontrole banaka koje posluju u više zemalja regiona?

CBCG ima izuzetno dobru saradnju sa centralnim bankama regiona. Ona se manifestuje kroz zajednič-ke stručne skupove, razmjenu iskustava, međusobnu tehničku pomoć, neformalna druženja kroz sportske igre centralnih banaka regiona, lične kontakte i dr. Prekogranična kontrola banaka realizuje se u skladu sa zaključenim bilateralnim memorandumima o ra-zumijevanju i saradnji. U novije vrijeme, od eskalaci-je globalne fi nansijske krize, aktuelna međunarodna supervizorska saradnja odvija se putem supervizor-skih koledža, koji okupljaju supervizore iz svih ze-malja u kojima matična banka ima subsidijarna lica (npr. za HYPO grupu, OTP grupu, NLB grupu).


6

INTERVJU - NIKOLA FABRIS, GLAVNI EKONOMISTA CBCG

loan loss provisions having negative eff ect on the profi ta-bility of the bank.

:B You have pointed out at the beginning of the year that insuffi cient capitalisation was the biggest drawback in our banking system. What is the current situation?Montenegrin banking system is the least capitalised in the region. Th e level of capital at the banking system level is not adequate to the level of the assumed risk. Th ere are also problems with poor asset quality of our banks. Th erefore, we have been insisting for long time on the need to reca-pitalise the banking system. A number of banks have alre-ady performed recapitalisation, but the losses reported in this year, have “eaten” a portion of that capital. Currently, we are conducting stress testing of all banks in the system and once we obtain the results, we will know how much additional capital is needed and which banks will need ad-ditional capital.

:B Citizens, and economy as well, often complain on the amount of lending interest rates on loans, but they are satisfi ed with interest rates on savings, particularly long term. To what extent are these interest rates realistic, sustainable and what are the consequences on future development of Montenegrin economy?It is evident that lending and deposit interest rates are too high at this moment. If deposit interest rates amount to se-ven or eight per cent, it is clear that lending rate must also be two-digit. However, this raises a question on which pro-ject may be profi table with two-digit interest rate. In addi-tion, it should be born in mind that the law in the world of fi nance on “the higher interest rate the more risky project is” prevails. Th erefore, high lending interest rates mean that a small number of companies even if they qualify for cre-

dit support would dare to take the loans and, on the other hand, those companies which loans become risky, so there is another dilemma on whether they would be able to servi-ce those obligations. Th is negatively infl uences on the eco-nomic development and a decline in lending and deposit interest rates in the following period is desirable.

:B Passing of the new Central Bank Law is expecting, which would be harmonised with the Constitution. What are the novelties in relation to the old law?It is not possible to answer on what will be the novelties, taking into account that the Central Bank Law is currently under consideration. It will defi nitely bring novelties with respect to the CBM objectives, since the new constitutional responsibility of the CBM is the fi nancial stability. In order to enforce this responsibility, the measures and instruments should be developed and give powers to CBM to enforce this responsibility in a successful manner.

Th e Law will very likely open the possibility for carrying out the activities at open market, and for performing the function of the lender in last resort. To accomplish all of this, CBM should be also recapitalised from the funds of allocated reserves.

:B Credit support to small and medium enterprises was not in the expected extent when, with the Government guarantee, the arrangement was made with the European Investment Bank. Banks are complaining that there are no good projects. Your comment?I think that it is not good to force the banks to grant loans at any cost to the companies. However, impression is made that the banks have moved from one end – where they granted loans too easy, to another end – where it was too diffi cult to grant loans. Surely, poor practice of a number of compa-nies and citizens has left its infl uence: they presented false data showing their credit capacity much better than it was, and when the economic situation deteriorated, they were not able to service previously taken liabilities.

Simultaneously, we have the situation that one group of banks that introduced poor practice previously and that did not respect our orders and made eff orts to circumvent the regulations and our measures - do not have any credit activity now. Th ere is also the second group of banks that still have signifi cant credit activity.

In addition, it should be born mind, that small credit sup-port is not the problem only in Montenegro, since the same problem is evident in the region and in the EU. It all leads to the conclusion that global fi nancial crisis is not over yet, i.e. its consequences are still visible.

In the existing conditions, when there are available cre-dit facilities from the international fi nancial institutions, for which the Government has given the guarantee, and where some banks still do not want to draw them, only two soluti-ons are possible. One of them is to transfer the funds from those banks that do not want them to those that want tho-se funds, and the second solution is to establish state de-velopment bank (institution) that would draw these funds. However, it should be born in mind that very rigorous con-ditions of the international fi nancial institutions have con-tributed to this situation ■

:B How do you assess CBM relationships with other central banks in the region? Are there any mutual activities with respect to cross-border supervisors of the banks operating in several countries of the region?

CBM has extremely good cooperation with the regional central banks. It refl ects through mu-tual professional meetings, exchange of expe-rience, mutual technical assistance, informal meetings through sports games of the regional central banks, personal contacts, and the like. Cross-border supervision of banks is realised in accordance with the signed bilateral memo-randa of understanding. Current internatio-nal supervisory cooperation, since the escala-tion of global fi nancial crisis, is going through the supervisory colleges, that gather supervi-sors from all countries in which parent bank has its subsidiaries (e.g. for HYPO group, OTP group, NLB group).


INTERVIEW - NIKOLA FABRIS


1 Primjer naveden prema Nancy B. King: Stock Market Investing Made E-Z, Made E-Z Products, 2000

Prof. dr Saša PopovićEkonomski fakultet


8

BERZANSKI IZVJEŠTAJI

Berzanski izvještaj nudi kratak, ali sadržajan pregled osnovnih informacija koje se tiču posmatrane akcije.

U štampanim medijima koji publikuju pregled berzanskih podataka, izvještaji o akcijama sadrže informacije koje se odnose na aktivnosti prethodnog radnog dana berzi. Tipičan berzanski izvještaj Th e Wall Street Journal-a o trgovini akcijama izgleda kao što slijedi1:

Njega čini dvanaest kolona, koje se logički mogu po-dijeliti u šest djelova:1 cjenovni opseg date akcije tokom protekle 52 nedjelje, po-

smatrano u odnosu na dan na koji se izvještaj odnosi,2 skraćeno ime kompanije i njen tiker simbol,3 iznos dividende po akciji i dividendni prinos u

procentima,4 PE odnos, tj. odnos „cijena-zarada“,5 broj akcija kojima se trgovalo na dan na koji se odnosi

izvještaj,6 cjenovni opseg date akcije tokom izvještajnog dana.

Najveæa i najniža cijena akcije u poslednjih godinu danaPrva i druga kolona ovog izvještaja pokazuju najveću i najmanju cijenu po akciji tokom protekle 52 ne-djelje, odnosno tokom godine dana, unazad od dana izvještavanja.

Podaci navedni u markiranim kolonama koje se od-nose na 52 nedjelje mijenjaju se nedjeljno, uzimajući u obzir nove high i low cijene iz upravo protekle nedje-lje, a izbacujući iz izvještaja podatke iz nedjelje koja je „najstarija“, odnosno one koja se dogodila prije godinu dana. Kolona 52 weeks ne uključuje nove high i low ci-jene ukoliko se dogode na dan izvještavanja. Umjesto toga, novi nivoi high i low cijena će se naći u odjeljku 6 izvještaja (Hi, Lo, Close, Net Chg), dok će se pored Hi ili Lo u dijelu 52 weeks, u zavisnosti koja od njih probije dosadašnji nivo, pojaviti strelica sa lijeve stra-ne aktuelne 52 weeks Hi ili Lo cijene, koja ukazuje da se proboj dosadašnje cijene dogodio. Tek dan nakon izvještajnog, nove high i low cijene će se pojaviti u ko-loni 52 weeks, a strelica se uklanja.

Značaj berzanskih podataka sadržanih u koloni 52 we-eks ogleda se u tome što:

investitorima koriste za otkrivanje trenda cijene, ■ukazuju na kupovne ili prodajne okolnosti i ■koriste se za analizu varijabilnosti cijene date akcije. ■

Otkrivanje trenda cijene. Upoređujući podatke iz kolo-ne 52 weeks sa podacima u koloni Close može se steći gruba slika trenda cijene date akcije. Na ovaj način mo-žemo utvrditi da li se cijena generalno kreće na gore ili na dolje, odnosno da li trenutno ima rastući ili opadaju-ći trend. Ukoliko je cijena akcije na dan izvještavanja (Close) bliža najvišoj cijeni dostignutoj tokom perioda od godine dana (52 weeks Hi), to ukazuje da data cije-na trenutno ima rastući trend. S druge strane, ukoliko je ona bliža najnižoj cijeni koju je akcija „iskusila“ to-kom perioda od 52 nedjelje, očigledno je da ta cijena trenutno ima opadajući trend.

Kupovne ili prodajne okolnosti. Ovdje treba imati u vidu poziciju onoga koji posmatra izvještaj. Ukoliko se radi o potencijalnom kupcu akcije, upoređivanje aktuelne cijene (Close) sa najvećom i najnižom cijenom u vre-menskom okviru od 52 nedjelje, odluka o kupovini za-visi od konstelacije ovih cijena. Kada je aktuelna cijena

Predmetza onogakoji zna da čita

52 weeks Yld. Vol NetHi Lo Stock Sym Div % PE 100s Hi Lo Close Chg

16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

1 2 3 4 5 6


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

1 Example stated according to Nancy B. King: Stock Market Investing Made E-Z, Made E-Z Products, 2000

Prof. Saša Popović, PhDFaculty of Economics


STOCK MARKET REPORTS

Stock market report off ers a brief but comprehensive overview of basic information concerning the obser-

ved share. Printed media, which publish review of market data, market share reports contain information relating to the activities of the previous day on the stock market. A ty-pical stock report of Th e Wall Street Journal on share tra-ding is as follows1:

It consists of twelve columns, which can be logically divi-ded into six parts:1 a price range of a specifi c share over the past 52 weeks,

compared to the day which the report refers to,2 abbreviated name of the company and its ticker

symbol,3 the amount of dividends per share and dividend yield in

percentage,4 PE ratio, i.e., relation “price-earnings”,5 the number of shares traded on the day which the report

refers to,6 a price range of a given share during the reporting day.

The highest and lowest prices of shares in the last yearTh e fi rst and the second columns of this report show the highest and lowest price per share over the past 52 weeks, i.e., during the year, back from the reporting day.

Th e data outlined in the marked columns relating to the 52 weeks are changing weekly, taking into account the new high and low prices from the last week, but excluding data from the reports of the “oldest” week, that is, the week from a year ago. Th e column 52 weeks does not include the new high and low prices if they occur on the day of reporting. Instead, the new levels of high and low prices will be inclu-ded in the Section 6 of the report (Hi, Lo, Close, Net Chg), while in addition to Hi or Lo in the Section 52 weeks, depen-ding on which of them breaks the previous level, the arrow will appear on the left side of the current 52 weeks Hi or Lo price, which indicates that the breakdown of the previous price has occurred. Only a day aft er reporting, the new high and low prices will appear in the column 52 weeks and the arrow is removed. Th e importance of stock market data contained in the co-lumn 52 weeks is refl ected in the fact that:

investors use them to detect price trends, ■they indicate the purchase or sale circumstances, and ■they are used to analyze the variability of the given sha- ■re price.

Discovering price trends. By comparing the data from the column 52 weeks with the data in the column Close, a rou-gh picture of the given share price trend is obtained. In this way we can determine whether the price generally moves up or down, that is, whether it currently has ascending or descending trend. If the share price on the day of repor-ting (Close) is closer to the highest price reached during the period of one year (52 weeks Hi), this then indicates the given price’s rising trend. On the other hand, if it is clo-ser to the lowest price that the share has “experienced” du-ring the period of 52 weeks, then the given price’s declining trend is obvious.

Purchase or sale circumstances. Here we should bear in mind the position of one who is observing the report. If we are talking about a potential share buyer, comparison of the cur-rent price (Close) with the highest and lowest price in the time frame of 52 weeks, the decision to purchase depends on the constellation of these prices. When the current price

Subject matterfor him whoknows to read


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

1 2 3 4 5 6


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125


10blizu najvećoj cijeni zabilježenoj u vremenu od godinu dana (oprez: nije u pitanju kalendarska godina, tj. pe-riod od januara do decembra), vjerovatno da će cije-na narednih dana opadati. Zato je, generalno, predlog da se sačeka s kupovinom, kako bismo akciju kupili jeft inije. Normalno, pošto se radi o pretpostavljenom budućem kretanju, sa sigurnošću ne možemo utvrdi-ti budući tok cijene. Moguće je da potencijalni kupac ipak odluči da akciju kupi po aktuelnoj cijeni, ukoliko vjeruje da će cijena akcije i dalje rasti. Ukoliko je aktu-elna cijena blizu najnižoj cijeni zabilježenoj u protek-le 52 nedjelje, za očekivati je da cijena akcije krene na gore, što čini dobru kupovnu okolnost.

S aspekta potencijalnog prodavca akcije, prema gornjem pregledu, jasno je da akciju valja prodati kada se nje-na aktuelna cijena približi najvećoj zabilježenoj cijeni u protekle 52 nedjelje, posebno ako su namjere inves-titora spekulativne prirode. S druge strane, ukoliko je aktuelna cijena akcije blizu najnižoj cijeni zabilježenoj u vremenskom okviru od 52 nedjelje, predlog je da se sačeka s prodajom, jer je vjerovatnije da će cijena akcije ponovo porasti, nego nastaviti dalji pad.

Varijabilnost cijene akcije. Podaci sadržani u koloni 52 weeks mogu biti od koristi pri utvrđivanju varijabilnos-ti cijene akcije, odnosno učestalosti i postojanosti cje-novnih promjena. Vrijedi naglasiti da su procentualne promjene između high i low cijena u periodu od godi-nu dana slikovitije od promjena iskazanih u apsolutnim iznosima, tj. u novčanim jedinicama.

Naziv akcije i njen tiker simbolDrugi dio berzanskog izvještaja, kojeg čine naredne dvije kolone, odnosi se na identifi kaciju date akcije u izvještaju. U berzanskim izvještajima akcije su razvrs-tane po abecednom redu naziva kompanije. Kolona Stock rezervisana je za naziv kompanije, iz kojeg su obično, zbog uštede prostora, izostavljene riječi kom-panija ili korporacija, koje se često nalaze u nazivima fi rmi. Ukoliko u koloni ima dovoljno prostora, upisuje se puno ime kompanije, što je rijedak slučaj, dok se u svim drugim slučajevima koristi njeno skraćeno ime. Međutim, skraćivanje imena može da oteža prepozna-vanje kompanije, pa je dodata kolona Sym, u kojoj se nalazi jedinstveni tiker simbol za svaku akciju.

Po pravilu, skraćeno ime kompanije u izvještaju ne odgovara njenom tiker simbolu. Često različiti fi nan-sijski servisi koriste različite skraćenice za iste kom-panije. Zato, jedinstveni berzanski tiker simbol služi za tačnu identifi kaciju kompanije. Prilikom davanja naloga za trgovinu od strane brokera, na nalogu mora biti unešen tiker simbol date akcije, jer ne smije biti nedoumice koje akcije broker želi da kupi ili proda. Zato je tiker simbol jedinstvena šifra po kojoj se ak-cije razlikuju.

Dividenda i dividendni prinosTreći dio berzanskog izvještaja čine njegova peta i šesta kolona, koje se odnose na podatke vezane za dividendu.

U navedenom fi nansijskom izvještaju dividende su na-značene u novčanim jedinicama (dolari ili centi) po akciji. U koloni Div naznačena je godišnja dividenda po akciji. Ukoliko se isplata dividende vrši kvartal-no, kao što je to čest slučaj u USA, onda se navedeni iznos godišnje dividende dijeli sa četiri, kako bi se do-bio kvartalni iznos. Ukoliko nema podataka u koloni Div, to govori da kompanija ne isplaćuje dividendu (ovo ne znači da se radi o lošoj kompaniji jer kom-panije nekada vrše stopostotno reinvestiranje neto profi ta, bez isplate dividende). Broj .34 u koloni Div govori da će kompanija akcionarima na svaku akci-ju koju posjeduju isplatiti 34 centa dividende, na go-dišnjem nivou. Navedeni iznos predstavlja ocijenjeni iznos dividende na godišnjem nivou, po akciji. Iako se radi o ocjeni dividende na godišnjem nivou, njen stvarni iznos se vrlo rijetko i vrlo malo mijenja u od-nosu na ocijenjeni, jednostavno zato što je ocjena ba-zirana na poslednjoj isplaćenoj kvartalnoj dividendi. Kako (u USA) Odbor direktora kompanije o dividendi odlučuje kvartalno, ona se akcionarima isplaćuje po isteku svakog kvartala tokom fi skalne godine. Otuda se ocjena dividende na godišnjem nivou malo ili ni-malo ne razlikuje od ocijenjenog iznosa. Pored toga, izuzetno je važno za kompaniju da nove kvartalne di-vidende ne smanjuje u odnosu na prethodne, kako to ne bi uticalo na atraktivnost akcija i povjerenje u me-nadžerski tim kompanije.

Kompanije se nekada odlučuju za isplatu dividen-de ne u novcu, već novim akcijama (stock dividend).


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

potencijalni kupac potencijalni prodavac

Aktuelna cijena je blizu 52 weeks High

ne kupovati, èekati prodati

Aktuelna cijena je blizu 52 weeks Low

kupiti ne prodavati, èekati




is close to the highest price recorded during the period of one year (caution: this is not a calendar year, i.e., the period from January to December), it is likely that the price will decline during the following days. Th erefore, in general, it is suggested to wait and not to buy in order to buy it cheaper. Normally, since this implies the assumed movement in the future, we can not determine the future course of the price with certainty. It is possible that a potential buyer decide to buy a share at the current price if the buyer believes that the share price will continue to grow. If the current price is near the lowest price recorded in the previous 52 weeks, the sha-re price is expected to go up which indicates the existence of favorable purchase circumstances.

From the aspect of the potential seller of the share, according to the above shown graph, it is clear that the share should be sold when its current price gets close to the highest re-corded price in the past 52 weeks, especially if the investors’ intentions are of speculative nature. On the other hand, if the current share price is close to the lowest price recorded within the period of 52 weeks, the proposal is to wait and not to sell, because it is more likely that the share price will rise again than it will continue to fall.

Share price variability. Data contained in the column 52 we-eks may be useful in determining the share price variability, i.e., frequency and persistence of price changes. It should be mentioned here that changes of percentages between high and low prices within the period of one year are more descriptive than the changes expressed in absolute amounts, ie. in monetary units.

Name of the share and its ticker symbol Th e second part of the stock market report, which consists of the following two columns, refers to the identifi cation of a given share in the report. In the stock market reports sha-res are sorted alphabetically by company name. Th e column Stock is reserved for the name of the company, from which, due to saving space, the words company or corporation are usually omitted, which are oft en found in a company’s name. If the column has enough space, a full name of the company is inserted, which is a rare case, while in all other cases, its abbreviated name is used. However, shortening the name may impede the recognition of the company, and therefore the column Sym is added, which contains a unique ticker symbol for each share.

As a rule, the abbreviated name of the company in the re-port does not match its ticker symbol. Oft en diff erent fi -nancial services use diff erent abbreviations for the same company. Th erefore, a unique stock ticker symbol is used for accurate identifi cation of the company. When the bro-ker is giving orders to trade, the order must contain a tic-ker symbol of the given share, because there must be no doubts about what shares a broker wants to buy or sell. Th erefore, the ticker symbol is a unique code by which shares diff er.

Dividend and dividend yieldTh e third part of the stock market report consists of its fi ft h and sixth columns which refer to data on dividend.

In the above mentioned fi nancial report dividends are specifi ed in monetary units (dollars or cents) per share. Th e column Div contains the annual dividend per share. If the payment of dividends is conducted quarterly, as is oft en the case in the USA, then the specifi ed annual amo-unt of dividends is divided by four to obtain a quarterly amount. If there is no data in the column Div, it means that the company does not pay dividends (this does not mean that it is a bad company, because companies some-times perform one hundred percent reinvestment of net profi t, without the payment of dividends). Number 34 in the column Div means that the company will pay 34 cents of a dividend to shareholders for every share they own on annual basis. Th e specifi ed amount represents the esti-mated amount of a dividend per share at the annual level. Although this is an estimation concerning a dividend at the annual level, its real amount changes very rarely and it changes very little in relation to the estimated value, sim-ply because the estimation is based on the last paid quar-terly dividend. Since (in the USA) the Board of Directors of a company decides quarterly about dividends, they are paid to the shareholders following the end of each quar-ter during the fi scal year. Th at is why the estimated divi-dend at the annual level diff ers little or does not diff er at all from the estimated amount. In addition, it is very im-portant for the company not to reduce the new quarterly dividend compared to the previous ones, so as it does not aff ect the attractiveness of shares and confi dence in the company’s management team.

Companies sometimes decide not to pay dividends in cash, but in new shares (stock dividend). Th e reason for


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

Potential buyer Potential seller

Current price is close to 52 weeks High

Not buy, wait Sell

Current price is close to 52 weeks Low

Buy Not sell, wait


12Razlog tome je potreba da se održi kontinuitet u is-plati divdende, uz istovremeno očuvanje cjelokupnog neto profi ta u cilju reinvestiranja. Ukoliko, recimo, kompanija objavi da će dividenda u akcijama izno-siti 5%, to znači da svaki akcionar te kompanije na svakih 100 akcija koje posjeduje dobija 5 novih akci-ja. Očigledno da se na ovaj način ukupan broj akcija kompanije povećava za 5%, tako što svaki akcionar, proporcionalno, dobija 5% novih akcija. Na ovaj na-čin, proporcionalno učešće pojedinih akcionara u ukupnom akcijskom kapitalu kompanije se ne mije-nja, mada cijena akcije na tržištu proporcionalno (za 5%) opada. Ukoliko kompanija u budućnosti bude is-plaćivala dividende u gotovini (cash dividend), akcio-nari će, zbog većeg broja akcija koje posjeduju imati više zarade od dividendi. Normalno, kada se isplata divdende namjerava obaviti u vidu novih akcija, ta informacija čini sastavni dio berzanskog izvještaja i ona je označena odnosnim simbolom pored iznosa dividende.

Kolona Yld predstavlja podatak o godišnjem divi-dendnom prinosu, za svaku akciju čija kompanija is-plaćuje dividende. U slučaju da kompanija nije isplatila dividendu, ova kolona u berzanskom izvještaju ostaje prazna. Prinosom se u ovom slučaju smatra samo divi-dendni prinos i on se izračunava kao procentualni od-nos isplaćene dividende u odnosu na cijenu akcije na zatvaranju prethodnog dana (Close kolona u izvješta-ju), pomnoženo sa 100 da bi se dobio procenat. Dakle, godišnja dividenda (0.34) podijeljena sa closing price za datu akciju (10.187) i pomnoženo sa 100 daje 3.3%. Formula glasi:

Kako se, prema navedenoj formuli, cijena na zatvara-nju svakog dana mijenja, dok dividenda ostaje ista, lo-gično je da dolazi i do promjene tekućeg dividendnog prinosa (current yield). Kako je između prinosa i cijene na zatvaranju obrnuta proporcija, zaključujemo da u slučaju rasta cijene, dolazi do pada prinosa, i obrnuto. Međutim, kada se želi izračunati stvarni prinos za akci-ju koja se već nalazi u posjedu pojedinca ili institucije, onda se dividendni prinos izračunava kao odnos go-dišnje dividende i cijene po kojoj je ta akcija kupljena. Ovo je realniji podatak za investitora, jer iznos plaćen za akciju ostaje konstantan tokom perioda posjedova-nja akcije, tako da do promjene u prinosu dolazi samo kao posledica promjena u isplaćenim dividendama. S obzirom na to da u ovom slučaju samo dividenda vari-ra iz perioda u period, te da je ona u brojiocu izraza za prinos, jasno je da između prinosa i dividende postoji proporcionalan odnos, tj. kada dividenda raste, raste i stopa prinosa, i obrnuto. U skladu sa navedenim, po-trebno je razlikovati tekući dividendni prinos na akciju, koji je naveden u fi nansijskom izvještaju (Yld % kolo-na) od prinosa na investiciju (akciju u posjedu), koju investitor sam izračunava u odnosu na cijenu po kojoj je kupio date akcije.

Odnos cijena-zarada (PE)

Ovo je jedan o najčešćih pokazatelja performansi poje-dinih akcija. Dovodi u odnos tekuću cijenu akcije (clo-sing price) i zarade po akciji (earnings per share, EPS) koje ta kompanija ostvaruje, kako bi omogućio kom-paraciju ovih odnosa sa srodnim preduzećima ili pri-vrednom granom kojoj preduzeće pripada.

PE odnos se može izračunati i na osnovu agregatnih veličina, gdje se u brojiocu izraza nalazi tekuća tržišna kapitalizacija kompanije, a u imeniocu zarade kompani-je (neto profi t) iskazan u apsolutnom izrazu:

Normalno, i jedan i drugi način izračunavnja P-E od-nosa mora dati istu vrijednost.

PE odnos je pogodan za procjenu da li je akcija korekt-no valorizovana na tržištu. Svaka privredna djelatnost ima svoj PE odnos, tako da je moguće upoređivati PE odnose različite kompanije unutar iste djelatnosti, kao i svaku od njih sa djelatnošću u cjelini. U PE odnosu zarade (earnings) predstavljaju neto profi t kompanije i nikako ih ne treba poistovjećivati sa zaradama investito-ra po osnovu dividendi. Dividende i dividendni prinos jesu oblik zarade investitora u akcije, ali u kontekstu PE odnosa, zaradama se smatra neto profi t kompanije, koji je posljedica redovne privredne djelatnosti kompanije. Ukoliko kompanija ostvaruje gubitak, onda nema za-rada i u tom slučaju se u PE koloni nalazi oznaka dd. Takođe, PE odnos se izračunava samo za obične akcije, a u izvještajima o drugim tipovima hartija od vrijed-nosti ova kolona je prazna.

Kao što je navedeno, za izračunavanje PE odnosa koriste se tekuća cijena akcije i zarade po akciji. Za te-kuću cijenu akcije uzima se closing price iz berzanskog izvještaja. Kako se closing price mijenja svakog dana, jas-no je da se i PE odnos mijenja dnevno. S druge strane, zarade po akciji se mijenjaju svaka tri mjeseca, odnos-no kvartalno, jer su kompanije u razvijenim zemljama obavezne da po isteku svakog kvartala izvještavaju o osnovnim parametrima svog poslovanja i pretstavlja-ju najave za naredni kvartal. Svakodnevni berzanski izvještaji ne sadrže podatke o zaradama po akciji date kompanije. Ovi podaci se objavljuju u drugim specija-


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

Yld(%) = (Div / Close) * 100




that is to preserve continuity in the payment of dividend, while preserving the overall net profi t for the purpose of reinvestment. If, for example, the company announces that the dividend in shares will amount to 5%, this me-ans that each shareholder of the company will receive 5 new shares for every 100 shares s/he owns. It is obvious that in this way the total number of shares of the compa-ny increases by 5% because each shareholder gets propor-tionally 5% of new shares. In this way, the proportional participation of individual shareholders in the company’s total equity does not change, although the market price of shares proportionally declines (5%). If a company pays dividends in cash (cash dividend) in future shareholders will have more profi t than dividends because of a greater number of shares. Normally, when payment of dividends is intended to be conducted in a form of new shares that information makes an integral part of the stock market report and it is marked with a respective symbol next to the amount of dividend.

Column Yld represents a data on the annual dividend yield for every share whose company is paying dividends. In the event that the company has not paid a dividend, this co-lumn of the stock report remains empty. Yield in this case is considered only a dividend yield and it is calculated as the percentage ratio of dividends paid to the closing price of the share on the previous day (Close column in the re-port), multiplied by 100 to obtain percentage. Th erefore, the annual dividend (0.34) divided by the closing price for the given share (10.187) and multiplied by 100 gives 3.3%. Th e formula reads as follows:

Since according to the above stated formula the closing price changes every day while the dividend remains the same, it is logical that the current dividend yield chan-ges (current yield). As the proportion between the yield and closing price is reversed, we can conclude that in the case of increase of prices the yield falls, and vice ver-sa. However, when we want to calculate the actual yield for a share that is already in possession of an individual or an institution then the dividend yield is calculated as the ratio of annual dividends and the price at which the share was purchased. Th is is a more realistic data for the investor, because the amount paid for a share remains unchanged during the period of possession of the sha-re, and thus the change in yield occurs only as a result of changes in dividends paid. Considering the fact that in this case only the dividend varies from period to period, and that it is contained in the numerator of the yield ex-pression, it is clear that between the yield and the divi-dend there is a proportional relationship, i.e., when the dividend grows, the yield rate grows too, and vice ver-sa. In accordance with the above mentioned, it is neces-sary to distinguish the current dividend yield per share listed in the fi nancial report (Yld % column) from the yield per investment (possessed share) that the investor calculates on its own in relation to the price at which he bought the shares.

Price-earnings ratio (PE)

Th is is one of the most common indicators of performance of individual shares. It brings into relation the current sha-re price (closing price) and earnings per share (earnings per share, EPS), which the company realizes in order to enable the comparison of these relations with the related compa-nies or industries where the company belongs.

PE ratio can also be calculated on the basis of aggregate va-lues, where the numerator of the expression contains the current market capitalization of the company while deno-minator contains the company’s earnings (net profi t) ex-pressed in absolute terms:

Normally, both ways of calculation of the P-E ratio must result with the same value.

Th e PE ratio is suitable to estimate whether the stock is correctly valued in the market. Each business activity has its own PE ratio, so it is possible to compare the PE ratios of diff erent companies within the same industry, and each of them with the industry in general. In the PE ratio ear-nings are net profi ts of the company and they should cer-tainly not be identifi ed with the investor’s earnings based on dividends. Dividends and dividend yields are a form of the investor’s earnings in shares, but in the context of the PE relations earnings refer to a net profi t of the company, which is a consequence of a regular economic activity of the company. If a company makes loss, then there are no earnings, in this case the PE column will contain the sym-bol dd. Also, the PE ratio is calculated only for ordinary shares, and in the reports on other types of securities this column is empty.

As it was already mentioned, in order to calculate the PE ratio the current share price and earnings per share are used. For the current share price the closing price from the stock market report is taken. As the closing price changes every day, it is clear that the PE ratio changes on daily basis. On the other hand, earnings per share are changing every three months or quarterly, as companies in developed countries are obliged following the end of each quarter to report on basic parameters of their operations and to represent an-nouncements for the next quarter. Daily stock reports do not contain information on earnings per share of a given


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

Yld(%) = (Div / Close) * 100


14lizovanim fi nansijskim publikacijama i na taj način su dostupni javnosti. Ukoliko je investitor posebno zain-teresovan za podatak o zaradama kompanije po akciji, može ih na godišnjem nivou izračunati iz berzanskog izvještaja kada aktuelne cijene na zatvaranju podijeli sa PE odnosom iz istog izvještaja. Za akciju Huff y kom-panije, prema gornjem izvještaju, zarade po akciji na godišnjem nivou iznose 0,31 cent (10.187/33=0.31).

Obim trgovine

Ova kolona u berzanskom izvještaju pokazuje broj ak-cija date kompanije kojima se trgovalo tog dana. Naziv kolone Vol 100s ukazuje na to da navedeni broj u kolo-ni treba pomnožiti sa 100 u namjeri da se dobije tačan broj akcija koje su bile predmet trgovine. Tako, prema navedenom primjeru, trgovano je sa 41.500 akcija kom-panije Huff y dana na koji se izvještaj odnosi. Razlog izo-stavljanja dvije nule iz kolone rezervisane za broj akcija jeste to što se na taj način štedi prostor i što se akcije najčešće trguju u parnim lotovima, tj. parnim svežnje-vima (round lot) od po 100 akcija, a rjeđe u neparnim lotovima (odd lot), kod kojih je broj komada akcija manji od 100. Otuda je jasno da u berzanskim izvještajima fi -guriraju samo parni lotovi, što znači da ukoliko je neka transakcija obuhvatala samo npr. 75 akcija, ona se neće naći u izvještaju. Tako, broj 415 u koloni Vol 100s po-kazuje da je trgovano sa 41.500 akcija, mada stvarni broj akcija može biti 41.575, gdje nije uključen neparni lot od 75 akcija. Važno je primijetiti da se ovdje radi o obavljenim transakcijama s navedenim akcijama, te da nemamo podatak koliko je ostalo nerealizovanih nalo-ga za kupovinu i prodaju tih akcija.

Najveæa i najniža cijena, cijena na zatvaranju berze i neto promjena cijene

Kolona Hi predstavlja najveću cijenu po kojoj je nave-dena akcija trgovana tog dana. Kolona Lo predstavlja najnižu cijenu zabilježenu pri transakcijama tom har-tijom od vrijednosti na navedeni dan. Izračunavanjem razlike između ove dvije cijene dobijamo dnevni interval varijacije cijene za svaku akciju navedenu u izvještaju. Close je cijena po kojoj je obavljena poslednja transak-cija datom akcijom dana na koji se odnosi izvještaj. Kada analiziramo kolonu Close valja primijetiti da to uvijek ne mora zaista biti sami kraj radnog dana berze,

već da se za closing price može uzeti poslednja cijena po kojoj se trgovalo tog dana, ukoliko poslije toga nije bilo drugih traknsakcija datom akcijom. Često postoje zabune kada se smatra da je jučerašnja cijena na zatva-ranju berze (closing price) obavezno cijena na otvaranju berze (opening price) narednog dana. To ne mora uvi-jek biti slučaj, jednostavno zato što se raspoloženje o kupovini ili prodaji akcije mijenja u zavisnosti od toga kakve informacije pristižu na tržište.

Kolona Net Chg predstavlja neto promjenu između dvije uzastopne cijene na zatvaranju (closing price). Ova promjena izražava se u apsolutnim iznosima (novča-nim jedinicama), ali i u procentima. Tako, prema našem primjeru, ukoliko posjedujemo 100 akcija kompanije Huff y, izgubili smo na vrijednosti ukupno 12,5 dolara. Oznake + i – ukazuju na smjer promjene koja se do-godila tekućeg u odnosu na prethodni dan. Konačno, ukoliko je kolona Net Chg prazna ili se u njoj nalaze tri tačke (...), to znači da nije došlo do promjene, od-nosno da je cijena na zatvaranju prethodnog dana ista kao i cijena na zatvaranju tekućeg dana, tako da je neto promjena jednaka nuli ■


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125




company. Th ese data are published in other specialized fi -nancial publications and thus available to the public. If the investor is particularly interested in information about the company’s earnings per share, the investor can calculate it at the annual level from the stock report when the current closing prices are divided by PE ratio from the same report. As for a share of the Huff y company according to the abo-ve mentioned report, earnings per share at the annual level amount to 0.31 cent (10.187/33 = 0.31).

Volume of trade

Th is column of the stock market report shows the number of shares of a given company traded on that day. Name of the column Vol 100s indicates that the number listed

in the column should be multiplied by 100 in order to get the exact number of shares that were the subject of trade. Th us, according to the above mentioned example, 41,500 shares of the company Huff y were traded on the day which the report refers to. Th e reason for omitting two zeros from the column reserved for the number of shares is that in this way the space is saved and that the shares are usually traded in round lots of 100 shares, and less frequently in odd lots where the number of pieces of shares is under 100. Hence it is clear that in stock re-ports only round lots are presented, which means that if a transaction included only for example 75 shares, it will not be included in the report. Th us, the number 415 in the column Vol 100s shows that 41,500 shares were tra-ded, although the actual number of shares may be 41,575, where the odd lot of 75 shares is not included. It is im-portant to mention here that the above mentioned refers to these shares transactions and that we do not have the information how many orders for purchase and sale of these shares remained unrealized.

The highest and lowest price, the closing stock market price and net price change

Th e column Hi represents the highest price at which the listed share was traded on that day. Column Lo is the lowest price recorded concerning those securities transactions on that day. By calculating the diff erence between these two prices, we will receive a daily price variation interval for each share specifi ed in the report. Close is the price at which the last transaction with the given share was per-formed on a date which the report refers to. When ana-lyzing the Close column it should be noted that it does not really have to be the end of the stock market day, but that the closing price can be the last price at which it was traded that day, provided that there was no other transac-tions with that share aft er that. Th ere is oft en confusion when it is considered that the yesterday’s closing price must be the opening price on the next day. It isn’t always the case, simply because the mood to buy or sell shares changes depending on what kind of information is co-ming to the market.

Th e column Net Chg represents the net change betwe-en two consecutive closing prices. Th is change is expres-sed in absolute amounts (monetary units), but also in percentage. Th us, according to our example, if we have 100 shares of the Huff y Company we have lost the total value of $12.5. Symbols + and - indicate the direction of changes that occurred on the current compared to the previous day. Finally, if a column Net Chg is empty or it contains three dots (...), this means that there has been no change, or that the closing price on the previous day is the same as the closing price of the current day and the net change equals zero ■


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125


16.75 8.125 Huffy HUF .34 3.3 33 415 10.437 10.12 10.187 -.125

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18

REFORMA PDV NA FINANSIJSKE USLUGE

NOVI PODAROVMODELSatja Podar, koji je kreirao teoretski model 1990-ih sa ciljem primjene PDV-a na fi nansij-ske usluge sada je sačinio izvještaj o ’Kreiranju i uticaju opcije za poreski sistem za primjenu PDV-a na fi nansijske usluge’ koji danas obja-vljuje Ernst & Young (E&Y) na zahtjev Evropske bankarske federacije (EBF)

EBF je pozvala priznate eksperte iz ove oblasti iz re-vizorske i konsultantske kuće Ernst & Young da

obavi istraživanje o mogućim varijantama sistema koji će fi nansijskim institucijama omogućiti da slobodno odlučuju o primjeni PDV-a na fi nansijske usluge.

„1990-ih godina nismo podržali Podarov model zato što je bio previše tehnički napredan. Nakon deset godina smatrali smo da bi bilo zanimljivo da zamolimo gdina Podara da iznova razmotri moguće modalitete opcije oporezivanja predviđene u predloženoj Direktivi Evropske komisije“, rekao je Gvido Ravoet (Guido Ravoet), Generalni sekretar EBF-a.

Od 2006. EU je zaista radila na trofaznoj (three-pillar) re-formi primjene PDV-a na fi nansijske usluge. Reforma prven-stveno obuhvata ažuriranje defi nicija izuzetih fi nansijskih usluga, sa ciljem povećavanja pravne sigurnosti. Pored toga, dva dodatna rješenja imaju za cilj da riješe ekonomske pore-mećaje prouzrokovane blokiranjem ulaznog PDV-a imanent-nog kod oslobađanja od oporezivanja, što dovodi do serijskog nadovezivanja poreza.

Jedan od ova dva rješenja sastojao bi se od opcije oporezi-vanja što bi omogućilo da se PDV dodaje na fi nansijske uslu-ge, čime bi se dozvolio povraćaj svih troškova povezanih sa PDV-om.

Ovo rješenje spriječilo bi uplivavanje neopozivog PDV-a u lanac snabdijevanja, čime bi se umanjile negativne pos-ljedice sistema izuzeća od poreza.

Za sada, države članice imaju pravo izbora na ociju opore-zivanja. Prijedlog je da se ova sloboda izbora prebaci sa država članica na fi nansijske institucije. Međutim, za sada je Evropska komisija ostavila brojna pitanja bez odgovora.

Izvještaj predstavlja detaljnu analizu mogućih kombinacija za opciju oporezivanja i bavi se svim otvorenim pitanjima.

„Od svih mogućih kombinacija, evropske banke i da-lje su za veoma direktan sistem koji će se primjenjivati u zavis-nosti od transakcije do transakcije, ali mi bismo bili spremni da podržimo nulto tarifi ranje B2B transakcija u sveobuhvatnijem i radikalnijem prevazilaženju načina na koji se PDV primjen-juje na fi nansijske usluge”, rekao je Gvido Ravoet.


REFORM OF THE VAT TO FINANCIAL SERVICES

NEW PODDAR MODELSatya Poddar, who designed in the 1990s a theoretical model aimed at applying VAT to fi nancial services is back with a report on ‘Design and Impact of the Option to Tax System for Application of VAT to fi nancial services’, published today by Ernst & Young (E&Y) at the request of the European Banking Federation (EBF)

The EBF invited the recognised industry expert from the audit and consulting fi rm Ernst & Young to con-

duct a study investigating into the possible variants of a system providing fi nancial institutions with discretion to apply VAT on fi nancial services.

“In the 90s, we had not supported the Poddar model, because it was technically too sophisticated. Ten years on, we thought it interesting to ask Mr Poddar to have a fresh look at the possible modalities of an option to tax as envisaged in the European Commission’s propo-sed Directive”, said Guido Ravoet, Secretary General of the EBF.

Since 2006, the EU has indeed been working on a thre-e-pillar reform of the VAT treatment of fi nancial services. Th e reform fi rst includes an update of the defi nitions of exempt fi nancial services, aimed at increasing legal cer-tainty. In addition, two complementary solutions aim to address the economic distortions caused by the blockage of input VAT inherent to the exemption, which leads to cascading of the tax.

One of these two solutions would consist of an option to tax, which would allow VAT to be added to fi nancial services, thus permitting the recovery of any related VAT expenses.

This solution would prevent irrevocable VAT from fl owing into the supply chain, thus reducing the negative consequences of the exemption system.

So far, Member States have the discretion to take up the option to tax. Th e proposal is to move this discretion from the Member States to the fi nancial institutions. So far the European Commission has however left a number of qu-estions unanswered.

Th e Report is a thorough analysis of the possible com-binations for an option to tax, addressing all the open questions.

“Amid the possible combinations, European banks re-main in favour of a very straight-forward system to be ap-plied on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but we would be ready to support zero-rating of B2B transactions in a wider and more radical overhaul of the way VAT is applied to fi nancial services”, Guido Ravoet said.

SADAŠNJI SISTEMI ZA OPCIJU OPOREZIVANJAModel opcije oporezivanja je ključan ukoliko se želi postići ovaj cilj. Trenutno je diskreciono pravo na korišćenje ove opcije dato državama članicama, ali bez uniformnih pravila za sprovođenje i ovo je dovelo do situacije da je 6 dražava članica – Austrija, Belgija, Njemačka, Francuska, Letonija i Estonija – uvelo ovu opciju, pri čemu svaka ima različite modele po pitanju opsega i primjene. Postojeći prijedlog Komisije je da se diskreciono pravo na prihvatanje opcije prebaci sa država članica na fi nansijske institucije. Pored toga, opseg će se proširiti tako da obuhvati sve fi nansijske usluge oslobođene od poreza, uključujući osiguranje. Mnoga od pitanja koja se tiču modela opcije ostala su otvorena, uključujući i to da , kada se opcija jednom prihvati, da li se može primjenjivati u zavisnosti od transakcije ili se mora primijeniti na kategorije transakcija ili na sve transakcije? Da li treba obuhvatiti usluge B2B i ako treba, po kojoj osno-vi? Da li usluge po osnovu marže, kao i eksplicitne usluge za koje se plaćaju naknade treba da budu obuhvaćene, i uko-liko treba, kako se marža treba defi nisati i utvrditi? I kako će ovaj sistem raditi prekogranično? Ovo su glavna pitanja analizirana u ovom izvještaju.

Iako većina od ovih šest postojećih modela zahtijeva pri-mjenu opcije oporezivanja na usluge marže, kao i one koje se plaćaju po određenim naknadama, nijedan nema speci-fi čna pravila za utvrđivanje poreske osnovice na koju će se obračunati PDV. Jednostavno rečeno, svaki model koji, na primjer, oporezuje bruto kamatu ne može adekvatno odgo-varati osim ako njegova upotreba nije ograničena, samim izborom ili konstrukcijom modela, na poslovne klijente koji se oporezuju i imaju potpun povraćaj poreza. Ukoliko se pravo izbora primjene ili neprimjenjivanja opcije dozvo-li na nivou transakcije, kao što je to slučaj sa njemačkim modelom, prihvatanje će najvjerovatnije biti ograničeno jer će poslovni klijenti koji su djelimično ili potpuno oslo-bođeni od poreza imati veliku averziju prema napaćivan-ju PDV-a, pogotovo ukoliko se primijeni na bruto tokove a ne na maržu, ma kako ona bila defi nisana. Primjetno je da većina postojećih modela zahtijeva da se opcija primje-

njuje ili na sve transakcije u određenoj kategoriji ili na sve transakcije, uključujući tržište krajnjih korisnika („busi-ness-to-customer“ ’B2C’), a ne u zavisnosti od transakcije do transakcije. Kod nekih modela stopa prihvatanja je ve-oma niska, naročito kada su oporezovane bruto naknade i kada je opcija neopoziva. Važno je postaviti pitanje da li bi te države članice, kada su već donijele takvu politiku, bile spremne da se vrate na fl eksibilniji model. Druga karakte-ristika postojećih modela je da se ova opcija u praksi pri-mjenjuje uglavnom na domaće transakcije i da ne postoji dosljedno tretiranje prekograničnih tokova. Uz defi niciju dogovarajuće poreske osnovice, dosljedan prekogranični tretman identifi kovan je kao važan cilj opcije oporezivanja u PDV sistemu Jedinstvenog tržišta.

ALTERNATIVNI PRISTUPI U TRETIRANJU FINANSIJSKIH USLUGAPored analizirajućih faktora relevantnih za optimalno mo-deliranje opcije oporezivanja u PDV sistemu jedinstvenog tržišta, izvještaj takođe razmatra alternativna rješenja usvo-jena u drugim PDV jurisdikcijama. On analizira:

različite modele za smanjivanje stavki oslobođenih od ▷oporezivanja prvenstveno oporezivanjem nekih ili svih eksplicitnih naknada, ograničavajući izuzeća na transak-cione marže - u Signapuru, Australiji, Novom Zelandu, Južnoj Africi i Indiji. metode za efi kasno nulto tarifi ranje B2B proizvoda i uslu- ▷ga radi oslobađanja od ulaznog oporezivanja fi nansijskih usluga koje se pružaju PDV registrovanim preduzećima – u Singapuru, Novom Zelandu i Kvebeku, iumanjeni poresko kreditni sistem u Australiji koji omogu- ▷ćava 75% povraćaja na ulazne usluge (u skladu sa defi nici-jom) koje čine fi nansijske usluge oslobođene od poreza.

Izvještaj takođe analizira teoretsku osnovu za model potpu-nog oporezivanja za fi nansijske usluge. Iako nijedna PDV jursidikcija nije još usvojila ovaj model, on je po mnogo čemu logično krajnje rješenje s obzirom da je osnovni problem isključivanje fi nansijskih usluga iz regularnog PDV sistema

Prijedlozi Komisije za reformu PDV-a na fi nansijske usluge sadržavao je tri osnovna elementa – nacrt direktive i propisa koji propisuju jasne, ažurirane defi nicije usluga koje su oslobođene PDV-a i pojašnjavaju i proširuju postojeće izuzetke od oporezivanja iz Direktive 2006/112/EEC obuhvatajući aranžmane podjele troškova i opciju oporezivanja („Option to Tax“ ’O2T’). Uključivanje dva dodatna elementa je jasno priznavanje da je sistem oslobađanja od poreza imao imanentne mane i slabosti koje proces redefi nisanja neće u potpunosti riješiti, naročito ekonomske poremećaje prouzrokovane blokiranjem ulaznog poreza u lancu snabdijevanja poslovnih djelatnosti („business-to-business supply chain“ – ’B2B’), što dovodi do problema serijskog nadovezivanja i pristrasnog internog povjeravanja poslova.

Opcija oporezivanja namjerava da umanji negativne posljedice sistema oslobađanja od poreza fi nansijskih usluga podsticanjem nesmetanog protoka PDV-a na takve usluge do krajnjeg potrošača. Ova opcija je najkorisnija u slučajevima kad je vertikalna integracija neizvodljiva ili neefi kasna i gdje su usluge interne podrške poslovanju koje nisu oslobođene od poreza (poslovni procesi i IT) eksternalizovani spoljnim pružaocima usluga


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Završni pregled

CURRENT SYSTEMS FOR O2TTh e design of the O2T is critical if this object is to be achie-ved. At present the discretion to use the option is given to Member States but without uniform rules for implementa-tion, and this has led to a situation where 6 Member States – Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Latvia and Estonia – have introduced it, each with diff erent models in terms of scope and application. Th e Commission‘s present pro-posal is to move the discretion to take up the option from the Member States to the fi nancial institution. Also, its co-verage is to be extended to all exempt fi nancial services, including insurance. Many of the design questions relating to the option have been left open, including whether, once taken up, it can be applied on a transaction by transaction basis, or must be applied to categories of transactions or to all transactions, whether B2C services should be inclu-ded, and if so on what basis, whether the margin services as well as explicit fee services should be included, and if so how the margin should be defi ned and identifi ed, and how the system should work cross-border. Th ese are the main questions analyzed in this report.

Although most of the six existing models require the O2T to be applied to margin services as well as those remune-rated by explicit fees, none have a specifi c rule for deter-mining the taxable base on which VAT is to be charged. In simple terms, any model which, for example, taxes gross in-terest cannot produce a satisfactory answer unless its use is restricted, by choice or design, to business customers who are taxable and fully recover the tax. If discretion to apply the option or not is allowed at transaction level, as in the German model, take-up is likely to be limited, as partly or fully exempt business customers will have a strong aversion to VAT being charged, especially if applied to gross fl ows rather than to the margin however defi ned. It is notable that the majority of the existing models require the option to be applied either to all transactions within a given category, or to all transactions including B2C, rather than allowing the option to be exercised per transaction. Under some of these models the take-up is very low, especially when gross fees are

taxed and the option is irrevocable. It must be relevant to ask whether, having made that policy decision, those Member States would be prepared to go back to a more fl exible mo-del. Another feature of the current models is that the option is applied in practice mostly to domestic transactions and that there is no consistent treatment of cross border fl ows. Next to the defi nition of a proper taxable base, a consistent cross border treatment has been identifi ed as an important objective of the O2T in the Single Market VAT system.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICESAs well as analyzing factors relevant to the optimal design of the O2T in the Single Market VAT system, the report also looks at alternative solutions adopted in other VAT juris-dictions. It examines:

the various models for narrowing the exemption mainly ▷by taxing some or all explicit fees, confi ning the exem-ption to margin transactions -- in Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India,the methods for eff ectively zero rating B2B supplies to ▷free up input tax on fi nancial services supplied to VAT registered businesses – in Singapore, New Zealand and Québec, andthe reduced tax credit system in Australia, allowing 75% ▷recovery on input services (as defi ned) used to make sup-plies of exempt fi nancial services.

Th e report also examines the theoretical basis for a full taxa-tion model for fi nancial services. While no VAT jurisdiction has adopted this model as yet, it is in many ways the logi-cal ultimate answer, given that the essential problem is the exclusion of fi nancial services from the normal operation of the VAT system -- the lack of taxation. Again the main diffi culty conceptually is identifying the taxable base for charging the tax for margin supplies. Th e report examines the cash fl ow method for full taxation, and the TCA variant which suspends the collection or crediting of tax on cash infl ows and outfl ows through the operation of a tax suspen-

The Commission‘s proposals for the reform of the VAT treatment of fi nancial services contained three main elements -- a draft directive and regulation providing clear up-to-date defi nitions of exempt services and clarifying and extending existing exemptions in Directive 2006 / 112 / EEC covering respectively cost sharing arrangements and the option to tax (‘O2T’). The inclusion of the two additional elements is a clear recognition that the exemption system has inherent fl aws and weaknesses which the redefi nition process will not fully resolve, in particular the economic distortions caused by blockage of input tax in the B2B supply chain, leading to the problem of cascading and the bias to „in-sourcing“.

The O2T is intended to reduce the negative consequences of the exemption system for fi nancial services, by encouraging the friction-free fl ow through of the VAT on such services to the fi nal consumer. It is likely to be particularly helpful in cases where vertical integration is not feasible or effi cient, and where nonexempt back-offi ce services (business process and IT) are outsourced to third-party service providers


Executive SummaryREFORM OF THE VAT TO FINANCIAL SERVICES

– neoporezivanje. I ovdje je osnovni konceptualni problem utvrđivanje poreske osnovice za naplatu poreza na proizvode i usluge po osnovu marže. Izvještaj analizira metod novča-nog toka za potpuno oporezivanje i TCA (tax credit amount) varijantu koja obustavlja prikupljanje ili kreditiranje poreza na novčane prilive i odlive kroz privremeni poreski račun na kojem se kamata naplaćuje po stopi koja odražava čistu vremensku vrijednost novca. TCA varijanta uveliko olakša-va probleme u implementaciji i administraciji modela pot-punog oporezivanja (i omogućuje odgovarajuće uzimanje u obzir promjene stope PDV-a). Izvještaj upućuje da bi nulto tarifi ranje B2B transakcija bio logičan dalji korak jer bi se time izbjegla obaveza mjerenja vrijednosti roba i usluga za ove korisnike. Ovdje postoji interes da se B2B transakcije tretiraju u skladu sa opcijom oporezivanja.

ALTERNATIVNE VARIJANTE OPCIJE OPOREZIVANJA (O2T) Izvještaj predlaže četiri varijante modela O2T, istovremeno upućujući da one svakako nisu iscrpne i da su druge kom-binacije moguće. Varijante su sljedeće:

Varijanta A: Ova opcija obuhvata samo izričite naknade, ▷bez namjere oporezivanja proizvoda i usluga po osnovu marže. Fakturisanje bi bilo obavezno, a opcija bi se mogla fl eksibilno sprovoditi na bazi individualnih transakcija, po kategoriji ili na sve transakcije kada se jednom prihvati.Varinata B: Ova opcija primjenjivala bi se i na naknade ▷i na transakcione marže. Bila bi neophodna jedinstvena metodologija za utvrđivanje i obračun marže, kako je de-taljno dato u izvještaju.Varijanta C: Ova opcija bila bi slična Varijanti B, ali fi - ▷nansijske institucije bi imale opciju da plate porez na svoj preostali promet na portfolio osnovi. Varijanta D: Ona bi bila slična Varijanti C, ali B2B marže bile ▷bi nulto tarifi rane (izričite naknade ostale bi oporezive).

RAZMATRANJE MOGUĆNOSTI ZA TRANSAKCIONE MARŽEIzvještaj malo detaljnije analizira moguće metode za utvrđi-vanje poreske osnovice za osnovne vrste prihoda po osno-vu marže koje prijavljuju fi nansijske institucije. Ovo su ka-matna marža, prihod od deviznog poslovanja i prihod od hartija od vrijednosti koje se drže za trgovanje. U zaključku se navodi da je za usluge intermedijacije koje se pružaju za-jmoprimaocima i deponentima odgovarajuća mjera koja se može primijeniti kamata koja se naplaćuje na kredite s jedne strane i isplaćuje deponentima s druge strane, gdje se prebi-janje u svakom od slučajeva vrši sa čistim troškovima sred-stava. Odgovarajuće defi nicije mogu se naći za druge vrste marže, na primjer u skladu sa modelom koji je predložio Evropski sud pravde u slučaju FNBC (First National Bank of Chicago) za defi nisanje devizne marže. Izvještaj zaključuje da su adekvatne informacije za određivanje cijena, u princi-pu, dostupne u fi nansijskim institucijama za potrebe utvrđi-vanja njihove marže na transakcije i da se ovo može izvršiti na istorijskoj osnovi. Dok obračunata prosječna marža ne bi bila tačna mjera stvarne marže na individalne transakci-je, ona bi omogućila agregatnu maržu koja bi se uniformno primjenjivala na sve pojedinačne transakcije. Stoga bi ona bila pogodna tamo gdje je primjena opcije ograničena na B2B transakcije gdje se ne može nametnuti porez, i za ob-računavanje poreza na portfolio osnovi za B2B transakcije.

Veća preciznost u obračunu marže mogla bi se vremenom uvesti kako se sistemi za obračun razvijaju.

PROCJENEIzvještaj daje zaključak da sve moguće varijante uključuju neki stepen kompromisa u smislu ispunjavanja cilja da se smanje imanentni poremećaji prouzrokovani sistemom izu-zimanja od poreza. On predlaže da izbor, koji je isto toliko politički koliko i tehnički, treba da uzme u obzir sljedeće osnovne faktore:a) Opseg opcije treba da obuhvati sve fi nansijske usluge

izuzete od poreza, uključujući usluge osiguranja, a ne da primjenjuje restriktivnije modele koje sada koriste neke države članice (uglavnom iz istorijskih razloga).

b) Primjenjivanje opcije na izričite naknade je po mnogo čemu najlakši i najmanje kontroverzan način. Mogućnosti su dobro defi nisane i mogu se lako utvrditi i ne postoje problemi prilikom fakturisanja poreza. Upravo ove ka-rakteristike su te koje čine ovu varijantu privlačnom za većinu banaka. Međutim, čak iako se uvede na potpuno obaveznoj osnovi (i na B2B i na B2C), opcija bi imala ograničeni uticaj na problem ekonomskih poremeća-ja prouzrokovanih sistemom izuzeća jer, uz određene izuzetke, izričite naknade nisu osnovna aktivnost bana-ka. One uglavnom obuhvataju brokeražu i upravljanje sredstvima.

c) Finansijske institucije zaista određuju cijene za svoje pro-izvode primjenom marži ili spreda na referentnu međun-bankrasku kamatnu stopu ili devizne kurseve. One prim-jenjuju razrađene sisteme za obračun ovih marži i, zauzvrat, za mjerenje profi tablnosti pojedinačnih poslovnih jedinica. Međutim, korišćenje ovih koncepta za primjenu PDV-a mora postepeno evoluirati. IT i informacioni sistemi ba-naka moraju se prilagoditi kako bi bili u skladu sa zathje-vima fakturisanja PDV-a. Većina fi nansisjskih institucija su takođe zabrinute po pitanju saopštavanja svojih marži svojim klijentima. Izvještaj zaključuje da iako se prihvatljiva i izvodljiva metodologija za defi nisanje marže za potrebe poreza može naži, nadležni organi morali bi dozvoliti fl ek-sibilnost pojedinačnim bankama da razviju odgovarajuće aproksimacije zasnovane na istorijskim podacima.

d) Kada se opcija prihvati, izbor između fl eksibilnosti na bazi individalne transakcije i obavezne primjene (ili na bazi individualne transakcije ili za sve transakcije, i ili ograni-čene na B2B ili proširenjem i na B2C ) je pitanje od vital-nog značaja. Dok potpuna fl eksibilnost zvuči primamlji-


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sion account in which interest is charged at a rate refl ecting the pure time value of money. Th e TCA variant greatly ea-ses problems of implementation and administration of a full taxation model (as well as allowing proper consideration of changes in the VAT rate). Th e report notes that a zero ra-ting of B2B transactions would be a logical further step as it would avoid having to measure the value of the supply for these customers. Th ere are resonances here for the tre-atment of B2B transactions under the O2T.

ALTERNATIVE VARIANTS OF O2TTh e report puts forward four variants for the O2T model, while noting that they are by no means exhaustive and other combinations would be possible. Th e variants are as follows:

Variant A: Th e option covers explicit fees only, with no ▷attempt to tax margin supplies. Invoicing would be man-datory, and the option could be exercised fl exibly on a per transaction basis, per category, or applied to all transac-tions once taken up.Variant B: Th e option would be applicable to both fees ▷and margin transactions. A uniform methodology would be needed to identify and calculate the margin, which is considered in detail in the report.Variant C: Th e option would be similar to Variant B, but ▷fi nancial institutions would have the option to pay tax on their residual turnover on a portfolio basis.Variant D: Th is would be similar to Variant C, but B2B ▷margins would be zero rated (explicit fees would rema-in taxable).

CONSIDERATION FOR MARGIN TRANSACTIONSTh e report analyzes in some detail possible methods for determining the tax base for the main types of margin re-venues reported by fi nancial institutions. Th ese are interest margin, forex trading income and income from securities held for trading. It concludes that for the intermediation services rendered to borrowers and depositors, the proper measure of consideration is the interest charged on loans on the one hand and paid on deposits on the other, off set in each case against the pure cost of funds. Appropriate defi ni-tions can be found for the other types of margin, following, for example, the model proposed by the European Court of Justice in FNBC for defi ning FOREX margins. Th e report concludes that appropriate pricing information is, in prin-ciple, available within fi nancial institutions for determining their margin on transactions, and that this could be done on an historical basis. While the computed average margin would not be an accurate measure of the actual margin for individual transactions, it would allow the aggregate margin to be spread in a uniform manner across individual transac-tions. It would, therefore, be suitable where the application of the option is limited to B2B transactions where the tax does not stick, and for computing the tax on the portfolio basis for B2C transactions. Greater precision in the calcu-lation of the margin could be introduced over time as sys-tems for doing so are developed.

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONTh e report concludes all possible variants involve some degree of compromise in terms of meeting the objective to

reduce the inherent distortions caused by the exemption system. It suggests that the choice, which is as much po-litical as technical, should take into account the following main factors:

a) Th e coverage of the option should include all exempt fi -nancial services including insurance, rather than follow the more restrictive models used by some Member States currently (largely for historical reasons).

b) Applying the option to explicit fees only is in many ways the easiest and least controversial course. Th e considera-tion is well defi ned and readily identifi able, and there are no problems in invoicing the tax. It is these features that make this an attractive variant to many banks. However, even if introduced on a fully mandatory basis (to both B2B and B2C), it would have a limited impact on the problem of the economic distortions caused by the exemption sys-tem, since, with some exceptions, explicit fees are not the mainstream business of banks. Th ey cover mainly broke-rage and asset management.

c) Financial institutions do set prices for their products and services by applying margins or spreads to benchmark in-ter-bank interest rates or exchange rates. Th ey maintain elaborate systems to compute these margins and, in turn, to measure the profi tability of individual business units. However, the use of these concepts for applying the VAT

has to evolve gradually. Th e IT and information systems of banks need to be adapted to meet the VAT invoicing requirements. It is also the case that most fi nancial insti-tutions remain concerned about disclosure of their mar-gins to their customers. Th e report concludes that while an acceptable and workable methodology for defi ning the margin for tax purposes can be option on their revenues, the trade-off for this could be the extension of the option to B2C transactions on a portfolio basis. Alternatively, B2C transactions could remain exempt, as in the New Zealand model. found, the authorities would need to grant fl exibility to individual banks to develop suitable approximations based on historical data.

d) Th e choice between per transaction fl exibility and man-datory application once the option is taken up (either on per transaction or all transaction basis, and either con-fi ned to B2B or extended also to B2C) is a critical issue. While full fl exibility sounds appealing, it is noteworthy that only a minority of the six countries implementing



vo, značajno je primijetiti da je samo manji broj od ovih šest zemalja koje primjenjuju opciju odabrao ovaj pravac. Kod fl eksibilne primjene, njeno prihvatanje bi u velikoj mjeri bilo ograničeno na transakcije koje obuhvataju kli-jente koji se potpuno oporezuju. Obavezna primjena op-cije oporezivanja na sve transakcije bi obeshrabrila nje-no prihvatanje s obzirom na averziju prema naplaćivanu PDV-a sektora koji je potpuno ili djelimično izuzet od oporezivanja. Svaki model koji bi podrazumijevao oba-veznu primjenu na krajnje korisnike uvećao bi problem prihvatanja i još bi bio politički osjetljivo pitanje. Da bi se pojednostavilo usklađivanje, PDV na B2C transakcije mogao bi se obračunati na portfolio osnovi, prije nego primjenjivanjem na individualne transakcione marže.

e) Kada se donese odluka da se transakcione marže uključe u opseg opcije u skladu sa odgovarajućom metodologijom aproksimacije, dosta toga logičnog ide u prilog omoguća-vanju nultog tarifi ranja B2B transkacija marže kako bi se pojednostavila administracija i za fi nansijske institucije i za PDV nadležne organe. Ne bi bilo potrebe da se ob-računava marža za B2B transakcije i briga o saopštavan-ju marže klijentima bi nestala. Stoga bi ovo trebala biti najpogodnija opcija sa stanovišta fi nansijskih institucija. Ukoliko su vlade zabrinute za negativan uticaj ove opci-je na njihove prihode, kompromis za ovo bi moglo biti proširivanje opcije na B2C transakcije na portfolio osno-vi. Alternativno, B2C transakcije bi mogle ostati izuzete, kao što je to slučaj kod modela Novog Zelanda.

O2T u svom sadašnjem obliku omogućava drža-vama članicama diskreciono pravo upotre-

be ove opcije, mada na nivou Zajednice ne postoje jasno propisana pravila za njenu detaljnu primjenu. Kao rezultat toga, u šest država članica koje su inkorporirale tu opciju u domaće zakonodavstvo dešava se da se u praksi ova opcija na različite načine tumači i primjenjuje. Austrija ograniča-va ovu opciju samo na dva tipa fi nansijskih transkacija i to na odobravanje kredita za kupovinu oporezivih proizvoda kao i određenih proizoda i usluga koji se tiču transakcija sa kreditnim karticama. Njemačka dopušta potpuno diskre-ciono pravo primjene ove opcije na nivou transakcije, ali je ograničava na oporezive klijente. Belgija nalaže njenu pri-mjenu na sve vrste klijenata (B2B i B2C), ali je ograničava na transakcije uplate i isplate. Estonija je takođe primjenjuje na sličan način na sve vrste klijenata i nalaže njenu primje-nu na sve kategorije usluga onog trenutka kad opcija počne da se primjenjuje. Litvanija takođe slijedi pristup kategorije usluge, ali je ograničava na B2B usluge. Francuska ograniča-va njenu primjenu na primjer samo na određene fi nansijske usluge, isključujući na primjer devizne transakcije i kama-te, ali nalaže njenu primjenu (onda kada opcija počne da se primjenjuje) na sve transakcije koje ona obuhvata nezavis-no od statusa klijenta. Ne postoje opšta pravila za tretman prekograničnih usluga ili za obračun poreske osnovice za transakcine marže.

Ovakva situacija je očigledno neusaklađena sa uslovima jedinstvenog tržišta jer može izazvati konkurentska od-stupanja i gubitak neutralnosti. Uopšteno govoreći takođe postoje dokazi da je prihvaćenost ove opcije u sadašnjem obliku na niskom nivou i da se čak smanjuje iz različitih razloga između ostalog i zbog kompleksnosti administracije i sistemskih troškova. U onim državama članicama u koji-ma fl eksibilnost njene primjene na pojedinačne transakcije nije dozvoljena postoji otpor djelimično izuzetih i krajnjih korisnika. To znači da ova opcija kao odgovor na kaskadna i druga odstupanja koja nastaju kao rezultat sistema izuzeća, ima ograničenu djelotvornost.

Ova opcija mora imati detaljna i usaglašena pravila u vezi sa obuhvatom i njenom praktičnom primjenom osim ako se ne povuče u cjelini. Kao što je i sadržano u Predlogu, premještanje diskrecionog ovlašćenja za primjenu opcije sa

nivoa država članica na pružaoca fi nansijske usluge je prvi neophodan korak za izradu tih pravila.

Što se tiče obuhvata već postoji jasna opredijeljenost ka usaglašavanju pravila za osiguranje i osiguravajuće posred-ničke transakcije sa pravilima za fi nansijske usluge, a to bi značilo proširenje O2T na osiguranje. Iako šest država članica manje ili više ograničavaju obuhvat ove opcije (tj. na određe-ne fi nansijske usluge) čini se da za to ne postoji usaglašenog obrazloženja. U principu, opcija bi trebalo da obuhvati sve izuzete fi nansijske usluge uključujući i osiguranje. Marže po osnovu usluga i eksplicitni troškovi trebalo bi da budu po-krivene ovom opcijom primjenom usaglašene metodologi-je koju smo pomenuli u prethodnom tekstu, a odnosi se na obračun marže. Iako bi ograničavanje opcije na eksplicitne troškove bilo administrativno vrlo jednostavno, time se ne bi riješili problemi kaskadiranja i gubitka fi skalne neutralnosti s obzirom da su osnovne bankarske usluge prihvatanje depo-zita i kreditne aktivnosti usluge koje uključuju maržu.

Druge projektovane karakteristike reformisane opcije O2T su možda manje jasne i biće predmet daljih razmatranja koja će uslijediti prije nego što se postigne bilo kakva vrsta koncenzusa. Glavna pitanja koja treba razriješiti su sljedeća:

(a) Pojedinačne transakcije nasuprot obaveznoj primjeni: Kada se opcija jednom prihvati, obavezna primjena se po kategoriji usluge odnosi na sve B2B usluge i sve B2B i B2C usluge. Što se tiče pojedinačnih transakcija ovaj pristup daje maksimalnu fl eksibilnost. Baš zbog toga se može lakše pro-dati kako fi nansijskim institucijama koje će se instiktivno opredijeliti najprije za ono što im pruža mogućnost izbo-ra, tako i državama članicama. Međutim, pitanje je da li bi se sadašnjih šest država članica koje imaju O2T složilo sa uvođenjem ove izmjene u svoju sadašnju manje fl eksibilnu primjenu. Sa aspekta politike takođe postoje jasni nedostaci i mane – oavkva situacija može rezultirati smanjenjem pri-hoda, upravljanje može biti teže i kompleksnije, prekogra-nična primjena postaje problematična (ili čak nemoguća) i svakako teško je djelotvorno vršiti praćenje i nadgledanje.

Primjena na sve B2B usluge (ili na šire kategorije usluga) onda kada se opcija prihvati ima neke stvarne prednosti – upravljanje je olakšano pružaocu usluga, lakša je primjena na prekogranične usluge (jer će oporezivi primalac znati da li je povraćaj poreza primjenjiv u slučaju njegovog konkretnog

Zaključak


24


the option have chosen to follow this route. Under the fl exible application, its take-up would largely be limited to transactions involving fully taxable customers. A man-datory application of the O2T to all transactions would discourage its take-up, given the aversion of the fully or partly exempt sector to a VAT charge. Any model invol-ving mandatory application to fi nal consumers would magnify the take-up problem, and, in addition, be poli-tically sensitive. Th e VAT on B2C transactions could be accounted for on a portfolio basis, rather than applying to individual margin transactions, in order to simplify compliance.

e) Once the decision is taken to include margin transac-tions within the scope of the option under a suitable

approximation methodology, there is a great deal to be said logically for allowing B2B margin transacti-ons to be zero rated to simplify administration both for the fi nancial institutions and the VAT authorities. Th ere would be no need to compute the margin for B2B transactions and the concerns about disclosure of the margin to customers would disappear, It should thus be the most preferred option from the perspective of fi nancial institutions. If the governments are concer-ned about the negative impact of the option on their revenues, the trade-off for this could be the extension of the option to B2C transactions on a portfolio basis. Alternatively, B2C transactions could remain exempt, as in the New Zealand model.


ConclusionTh e O2T in its present form allows Member States the discre-tion to permit use, and there are no clear rules prescribed at Community level for its detailed application. As a result, in the six Member States that have introduced the option into their national law, there is, in practice widespread di-vergence as to both its coverage and manner of application. Austria restricts the option to only two types of fi nancial transactions, i.e. the granting of credit where it is to enab-le the purchase of a taxable supply and certain supplies in connection with credit card transactions. Germany allows complete discretion to apply the option at transaction le-vel, but restricts it to taxable customers. Belgium requires its application to all types of customer (B2B and B2C), but restricts it to payment and receipt transactions. Estonia ap-plies it likewise to all types of customer and requires its ap-plication, once the option is taken, to categories of service. Lithuania also follows the category of service approach, but restricts it to B2B supplies. France restricts its application to certain fi nancial services only, for example, excluding forex transactions and interest, but requires its application (once the option is exercised) to all transactions covered by it, and irrespective of the status of the customer. Th ere are no common rules for dealing with cross-border supplies, or for calculating the tax base for the margin transactions.

Th is situation is obviously incompatible with the requ-irements of the single market in as much as it may cause competitive distortions and loss of neutrality. Th ere is also evidence that, in general, take-up of the option in its pre-sent form is low and if anything decreasing for a variety of reasons, including administrative complexity and systems costs. In those Member States where the fl exibility of its ap-plication on a transaction by transaction basis is not allowed, there is resistance from partly exempt and fi nal consumer customers. Th is means that as an answer to the problem of cascading and other distortions arising from the exemption system, it is of limited eff ectiveness.

Unless the option is withdrawn altogether, it must have detailed and consistent rules regarding both coverage and practical application. Moving the discretion to apply the op-tion from the Member States to the supplier of the fi nancial service, as the Proposal suggests, is a necessary fi rst step for the development of these rules.

As regards coverage, there is already a clear commitment to bring the rules for insurance and insurance interme-diary transactions into line with those for fi nancial servi-ces, and this would mean extending the O2T to insurance. Although the six Member States restrict coverage of the option to a greater or lesser extent (i.e., to specifi ed fi nan-cial services), there appears to be no consistent rationale for this. In principle, the coverage of the option should be to all exempt fi nancial services, including insurance. Margin services as well as explicit fees should be within the scope of the option, using a consistent methodology on the lines we have put forward above to calculate the margin. While confi ning the option to explicit fees would be administra-tively simple, it would not really address the problems of cascading and loss of fi scal neutrality, given that the core banking services of taking deposits and borrowing and len-ding are margin services.

Th e other design features of the reformed O2T are per-haps less clear cut and are bound to be the subject of further debate before any sort of consensus emerges. Th e main is-sues to be resolved are as follows:

(a) Transaction–by-transaction basis versus mandatory application: Once the option is taken, the possibilities for mandatory application include per category of service, all B2B supplies, and all B2B and B2C supplies. Transaction-by-transaction approach gives the maximum fl exibility. For this reason it is likely to be the easier sell to both the fi nan-cial institutions, whose fi rst instinct would be to favor giving them choice, and the Member states. However, whether the majority of the present six member states with O2T would agree with having to make this change to their present less fl exible application is questionable. Th ere are also some clear disadvantages and drawbacks from policy standpoint- it is likely to be all downside to the revenue, it may be more dif-fi cult and complex to administer, and it makes cross border application problematic (or even impossible) and certainly diffi cult to monitor and police eff ectively.

Application to all B2B supplies (or to broad categories of services) once the option is taken has some real advan-tages – easier to administer for the supplier, ease of ap-plicability to cross border supplies (because the taxable recipient will know whether in the case of his particular


pružaoca usluga umjesto da donosi odluku po transakciji) i donekle porast prihoda (u slučaju djelimično izuzetih kli-jenata u skladu sa PDV-om primjenjivim na tu teritoriju ili u slučaju povraćaja poreza). Ali, otpor djelimično izuzetih klijenata može dovesti to toga da se opcija ne prihvati, jer ti klijenti mogu odlučiti da „trguju negdje drugo”. Najveća prednost primjene opcije na B2C usluge jeste stvaranje urav-noteženog povećanja prihoda, što bi opet zahtijevalo pre-bacivanje opterećenja PDV-a na krajnju potrošnju. Ovo je u suštini političko pitanje.

Ako se opcija u teoriji ili praksi ograniči na B2B usluge može se postaviti pitanje zašto za te usluge ne bi postojala nulta stopa. Ne postoje ekonomske koristi niti ubjedljiivi politički argumenti da se privrednim subjektima naloži da obračunavaju i fakturišu porez, koji bi se onda manje ili više u cjelosti pripisao klijentima privrednih subjekata. Nulta sto-pa B2B usluga bila bi najjednostavniji i najsigurniji način za smanjenje kaskadiranja poreza i ne-neutralnosti u primje-ni poreza. Sa stanovišta fi nansijskih institucija ovo bi ima-lo značajnu prednost jer im se ne bi nalagalo da prikazuju svoju maržu klijentima (defi nisanje B2B za te potrebe bilo bi pitanje politike o kome treba odlučiti – moglo bi se defi ni-sati kao na Novom Zelandu kao transakcije sa institucijama sa oporezivim prometom u iznosu većem od 75%). Postoji bojazan da nulta stopa fi nansijskih usluga može postaviti nepoželjan presedan za ostale usluge. Međutim, fi nansijske usluge su već predmet posebnih pravila zbog poteškoća u primjeni poreza na njih po uobičajenim pravilima. I zaista, ukoliko bi primjena poreza na njih bila tehnički izvodljiva, ne bi bilo potrebe za njihovim izuzimanjem ili za razmat-ranjem alternativa kao što su O2T ili nulta stopa.

Modeli Singapura i Novog Zelanda pružaju alternativni ob-lik nulte stope na fi nansijske usluge. U okviru ovih modela eksplicitni troškovi su uopšteno govoreći oporezivi, a nul-ta stopa je onda ograničena na B2B usluge koje uključuju maržu. Takav pristup bi se mogao strukturirati kao druga varijanta O2T-a. Finansijske institucije koje bi primjenjiva-le ovu opciju morale bi da plaćaju porez na sve ekplicitne troškove, ali bi mi onda bila dozvoljena nulta stopa poreza na sve B2B usluge koje uključuju maržu. Usluge B2C koje uključuju maržu bi stoga mogle ostati izuzete ili oporezive na osnovu ukupnog portfolija u okviru ove varijante (slično Varijanti D o kojoj je bilo riječi u prethodnom odjeljku).

(b) Kako bi opcija trebalo da se primjenjuje na prekogra-nične usluge: Načelno bi trebalo biti moguće pronaći ade-kvatno rješenje za ovo pitanje (osnovna pravila za tretman prekograničnih usluga i fakturisanje i pružanje informaci-ja za ovo) putem uobičajene primjene pravila koja se od-nose na mjesto pružanja usluge (u skladu sa izmjenama i dopunama koje stupaju na snagu 1.januara 2010. godine) i primjenu povraćaja poreza.

(c) Da li bi opcija trebalo da bude opoziva: u praksi neo-poziva opcija ne bi omogućila pružaocu fi nansijskih uslu-ga da odgovori na izmjene na tržištu, te ovo samo po sebi ne bi podstaklo njeno prihvatanje. Zato bi trebalo dozvoliti opozivost opcije nakon perioda primjene.

(d) Kako bi opciju trebalo primjenjivati u praksi: To pitanje nije u domenu ove studije. Međutim, ali potpu-ni modeli oporezivanja razvijeni na Novom Zelandu, u Australiji i Singapuru obezbjeđuju mehanizam primjene opcije na opšte osiguranje ■ (nastavak u narednom broju)

priredio mr. Nebojša Đoković


26

BANKE KAO PORESKI POSREDNICI

POVEĆANA ULOGAIako se to ne smatra jednim od razloga koji su doveli do fi nansijske krize, oporezuvanje se postepeno smatra jednim od glavnih elemenata debate koja je uzrokovana krizom

Roger Kaiserekspert EBF

Kriza je dovela do toga da država interveniše u mnogim fi nansij-

skim institucijama kroz dokapitali-zaciju ili garantne šeme, u veličini i obimu koji nije imao presedana u istoriji. Oni su uticali na državne budžete, na potrebe da vlade i vla-dine agencije zaštite državne priho-de, značajno odbijajući izbjegava-nje poreza. Oporezivanje je postalo glavni element debate, uz zvučne

riječi kao što su “transparentnost”, “dobro upravljanje”, “unaprijeđena saradnja” i “nekooperativne poreske zemlje”. Prema tome, od fi nansijskih posrednika se traži da postupaju i da se ponašaju kao kooperativni i odgovorni “poreski posrednici”. Sa stanovišta donosioca politike, napori koji se traže od banaka predstavljaju zakonsku kontra ravnotežu u odno-su na državnu pomoć koja je dobi-

jena. Međutim, pitanje je gdje će se povući krajnja linija.

Postoji međunarodni trend koji motiviše dobro upravljanje u ob-lasti poreza koji se sada se prenosi i na domaću politiku. Počevši mnogo prije nego što se sama kriza pojavila, Organizacija za ekonomsku sarad-nju i razvoj (OECD) je u velikoj mje-ri bila uključena tokom poslednjih nekoliko godina u proces suočava-



BANKS AS TAX INTERMEDIARIES

THE INCREASING ROLEAlthough it is not to be considered as one of the reasons that have lead to the fi nancial crisis, taxation has been gradually positioned as one of the key elements of the debate prompted by the crisis

Roger KaiserEBF expert

The turmoil has lead to State inter-ventions in many fi nancial insti-

tutions through capital injections or guarantee schemes, in size and sco-pe that have no precedent in history. Th ey have aff ected States’ budgets, pressing the need for Governments and intergovernmental bodies to pro-tect States’ revenues, notably by co-untering tax evasion. Taxation has become a key element of the debate,

with buzz words like: „transparency“, „good governance“, „enhanced coo-peration“ and „non-cooperative tax jurisdictions“. Accordingly, fi nancial intermediaries are increasingly requ-ested to act and behave as cooperative and accountable „tax intermediaries“. From a policy-makers’ perspective, the eff orts required from banks are a legitimate counterbalance to the State aids that have been granted. It

is however questionable where the bottom line should be drawn.

Th ere is an international trend which encourages good governance in the tax area and is now fi ltering throu-gh into domestic policies. Starting well before the beginning of the cri-sis, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been deeply involved, over the last few years, in the pro-

supplier whether the reverse charge is applicable, rather than having to make this decision per transaction), and some upside to the revenue (in the case of partly exempt customers subject to territorial VAT or the reverse charge). But the resistance of partly exempt customers may disco-urage take up of the option, as these customers may well decide to “shop elsewhere”. Application to B2C supplies has the major advantage of producing a balancing upside to the revenue, but would involve shift ing the burden of VAT explicitly to fi nal consumption. Th is is essentially a political issue.

If the option is to be limited to B2B supplies by design or in practice, one wonders why such supplies should not be zero-rated. Th ere are no economic benefi ts or convin-cing policy arguments for requiring businesses to calculate and invoice the tax, which would then be more or less ful-ly creditable to the business customers. Zero-rating of B2B supplies would be the simplest and surest way of reducing tax cascading and nonneutralities in the application of tax. From the point of view of fi nancial institutions, this would have the major advantage of not requiring the disclosure of their margin to their customers (Th e defi nition of B2B for this purpose would be a policy question to be decided - it could be defi ned, as in New Zealand, as transactions with institutions with taxable turnover in excess of 75%). Th ere is a concern that zero-rating of fi nancial services could set an undesirable precedent for other supplies. However, fi nancial services are already subject to special rules because of dif-fi culties in applying the tax to them under the normal ru-les. Indeed, if it were technically feasible to apply the tax to them, there would be no need for exempting them or consi-

dering alternatives such as O2T and zero-rating. Singapore and New Zealand models provide an alternate form of ze-ro-rating of fi nancial services. Under these models, expli-cit fees are generally taxable, and zero-rating is then limited to B2B margin services. Th is approach could be structured as another variant of O2T. Financial institutions exercising the option would be required to pay tax on all explicit fees on a mandatory basis, but would then be allowed to zero-rate all B2B margin services. B2C margin services could remain exempt, or made taxable on an aggregate portfolio basis under this variant (similar to Variant D discussed in an earlier section).

(b) How the option should apply to cross-border sup-plies: In principle it should be possible to fi nd an adequate solution to this issue (basic rules for the treatment of cross-border supplies and the invoicing and information require-ments for this) through the normal application of the place of supply rules (as amended, eff ective from January 1, 2010) and the application of the reverse charge.

(c) Whether the option should be revocable: In practice an irrevocable option would not allow a fi nancial services supplier to respond to changes in the market place, and this in itself would discourage take-up. Th us, the fl exibili-ty of revocation of the option aft er a period of application should be allowed.

(d) How the option should apply to insurance: Th is ques-tion is outside the scope of this study, but the full taxation models developed in New Zealand, Australia and Singapore provide a mechanism for the application of the option to general insurance ■ (to be continued in next issue)

arranged by: Nebojša Đoković


Kao nikada ranije, opo-rezivanje treba da se posmatra kao ključan element bankarskih aktiv-nosti. Vlade žele da ban-ke imaju veću ulogu kod identifi kacije poreskih ob-veznika i izračunavanja i naplate poreza. S obzirom na razvoj krize, za opora-vak bankarskog sektora je važno da se uspostavi pri-hvatljiv sistem. Procedure i zahtjevi se moraju pripre-miti tako da ne ugrožava-ju održivost bankarskog poslovanja, bilo lokalno diskriminacijom između banaka prema njihovom mjestu uspostavljanja, ili globalno namećući po-većanje troškova i cijena koje se ne mogu priuštiti. Poslije emotivnih reakci-ja koje je izazvala kriza, vrijeme je za angažman u konstruktivni dijalog između poreskih organa vlasti i banaka koje treba da se okrenu ka boljem za-jediničkom razumijeva-nju. Potrebno je pripremiti adekvatna rješenja za za-štitu prihoda države dok se s druge strane obezbjeđuje rast bankarskog sektora.


28nja sa izazovima međunarodne ne-usaglašenosti sa domaćim poreskim zakonom i potrebom za pojačanom vezom između poreskih organa, po-reskih obveznika i poreskih posredni-ka. Ovaj proces je iskristalisan 2006. godine objavom Seulske Deklaracije, i dvije godine kasnije u Cape Town Communiqué. OECD je sproveo stu-diju o unaprijeđenoj saradnji između banaka i poreskih organa 2009. go-dine i zahtijevao od Evropske fede-racije banaka (EBF) da dostavi svoje komentare. Konačan izvještaj je ob-javljen u aprilu u kojem se značajno naglašava potreba da poreski organi bolje razumiju bankarsko poslovan-je i operativne aktivnosti. OECD je veoma dobro prihvatio spremnost EBF-a da pomogne unapređenju dobrog upravljanja u bankama u oblasti poreza i unapređenju za-jedničkog razumijevanja između banaka i poreskih organa.

Ovaj međunarodni trend se naroči-to usredsredio na takozvane “poreske rajeve”, kojima je posebnu pažnju po-svetila grupa G20 i OECD. EBF osu-đuje poresku pronevjeru, a razvio je konzistentan i uravnotežen stav o nekooperativnim poreskim zem-ljama, u skladu sa propisima koje je defi nisala međunarodna zajednica, naime u skladu sa pravilima propi-sanim članom 26 Konvencije OECD o poreskom modelu.

Transparentnost u oblasti opore-zivanja se razlikuje od modela regu-latornog i fi nansijskog izvještavanja koje se fokusira na aktivu i pasivu i rizike koji su povezani sa njima, uključujući aspekte solventnosti i likvidnosti, jer teži objelodanjivan-ju identiteta klijenata i relevantnim podacima o klijentu. EBF je već do-šla do konzistentne poruke koja je uravnotežena između pitanja zaštite prihoda države i pitanja o tome da se izbjegnu nepodesni, neefi kasni i neuspješni administrativni zahtjevi, kao i pitanja o zaštiti opravdanih in-teresa klijenata uključujući i pravo na diskreciju i privatnost. Stav EBF-a je da transparentnost ne zahtijeva masivna objelodanjivanja, koja su ekstremno skupa za banke i kon-traproduktivna sa stanovišta borbe protiv poreske pronevjere.

Konkretan slučaj ove nove politike prema pojačanoj transparentnosti i unaprijeđenoj saradnji je postojeći

prijedlog za pregled Direktive EU o porezima na štednju. Danas postoji pojačani impuls koji podržava usva-janje predložene revizije, čiji je cilj povećanje opsega Direktive u po-gledu ciljnog prihoda kao i korisni-ka, uključujući dubinsku analizu pravnih lica. Pored toga, prijedlozi su iznijeti 2009. godine za vrijeme Republike Češke kao predsjedavaju-ćeg i Švedske kao predsjedavajućeg uz potencijalno ogromne posledice na ulaganja, administrativne troš-kove i povećani rizik obaveza zbog neusaglašenosti sa novim zahtjevi-ma. EBF je u velikoj mjeri uključen u proces konsultacija naročito preko ad hoc ekspertske grupe Evropske komisije, i permanentno je zausta-vio prijedlog za pregled poreza na štednju, na osnovu uravnoteženih argumenata smatrajući da su pred-loženi zahtjevi previše složeni, pre-više teški i nesrazmjerni.

Drugi slučaj dolazi iz Sjedinjenih Država, gdje je administracija pred-sjednika Obame povećala napore da kontroliše otkrivenu štetu i oja-ča određene pravne nedostatke u prekograničnoj oblasti zadržavanja. Nedavno je iznijet prijedlog za iz-mjenu i dopunu Sporazuma o kvali-fi kovanom posredniku (QIA), koji je donešen prije nekih desetak godina i čija je namjera bila da pojednosta-vi zadržavanje obaveze izvještavanja za plaćanja prihoda koji originalno dolazi iz SAD vlasnicima računa putem posrednika koji ne dolaze is SAD. Dostavljeni prijedlozi pokazuju monolitički pristup koji su usvojili poreski organi vlasti u nekim veli-kim zemljama ne razmatrajući po-slovnu realnost bankarstva i mogu-ćnost štetnog ekonomskog uticaja. Ekperti EBF-a vjeruju da bi, ako se implementiraju, predložena pravila u osnovi pojačala opseg aranžmana kvalifi kovanih posrednika, ekspo-nencijalno povećala teret kvalifi -kovanih posrednika u pogledu za-htijevane funkcionalnosti sistema i administrativnih resursa, opsega eksterne revizije i troškova uprav-ljanja rizikom. Ovo bi nesumnjivodovelo do toga da postojeći kvali-fi kovani posrednici budu prisiljeni da se odreknu statusa kvalifi kova-nog posrednika i aktivnosti u SAD uz mogući štetan uticaj na tržišta kapitala u SAD ■

BANKE KAO PORESKI POSREDNICI


BANKS AS TAX INTERMEDIARIES

cess of dealing with the challenges of international non-compliance with domestic tax law and the need for enhanced relationship between tax authorities, tax payers and tax in-termediaries. Th is process has been crystallized in 2006 around the Seoul Declaration and two years later in the Cape Town Communiqué. In 2009, the OECD conducted a study on en-hanced cooperation between banks and tax authorities and requested the European Banking Federation to give a feedback. A fi nal report was issued in April, which notably emphasizes the need for tax authorities to better understand the banking business and their operational activities. Th e EBF willingness to help promote banks’ good governance in the tax fi eld and help enhance the mutual understan-ding between banks and tax authorities was well received by the OECD.

Th is international trend has a parti-cular focus on so-called „tax havens“, which have been specifi cally targeted by the G20 group of nations and the OECD. Th e EBF condemns tax fraud and has developed a consistent and balanced position about non-coope-rative tax jurisdictions, in line with principles defi ned by the internati-onal community, namely with rules articulated around Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.

Transparency in the fi eld of taxa-tion diff ers from the regulatory and fi nancial reporting approach, which focuses on assets and liabilities and the associated risks, including solvability and liquidity aspects, as it is geared towards disclosure of the identity of banks’ clients and the relevant client data. For a while now, the EBF has come up with a consistent message, balanced between concern for pro-tecting the revenue of the State and concern for avoiding undue, unwor-kable and ineffi cient administrative requirements, as well as concern for protecting the clients’ justifi ed inte-rests, including right to discretion and privacy. It is notably the EBF’s view that transparency does not require massive disclosures, which are extre-mely costly for banks and counter-productive from the perspective of combating tax fraud.

A concrete example of this new po-licy towards enhanced transparency and cooperation is the existing pro-

posal for a review of the EU Savings Tax Directive. Th ere is today, an in-creasing momentum supporting the adoption of the proposed revision, which is aimed at increasing the sco-pe of the Directive in terms of targe-ted income as well as benefi ciaries, including a look-through approach for legal entities. Furthermore, pro-posals have been put forward in 2009 under the Czech Presidency and the Swedish Presidency, with potentially enormous ramifi cations in terms of investment, administrative burden and increased risk of liability, due to non-compliance with the new requirements. Th e EBF has been deeply involved in the consultation process, notably via the the European Commission’s Ad Hoc Expert Group, and has perma-nently pushed back the Savings Tax Review proposals, based on balan-ced arguments considering that the proposed requirements are far too complex, overly burdensome and disproportionate.

Another case comes from the United States, where the Obama Administration has stepped up eff orts to curb perceived abuses and shore up certain loopholes in the cross-bor-der US withholding arena. Recently, proposals have been put forward to amend the Qualifi ed Intermediary Agreements (QIA), which were put in place about a decade ago and were intended to simplify withholding and reporting obligations for payments of US source income made to account hol-ders through non-US intermediaries. Th e proposals which are currently put forward demonstrate the monolithic approach adopted by tax authorities in some major countries without any consideration for the operational re-ality of the banking business and for the potential for detrimental econo-mic eff ects. EBF experts believe that, if implemented, the proposed rules would fundamentally alter the scope of the QI arrangements, exponentially increase the burdens placed on QIs in terms of required system functionality and administrative resource require-ments, external audit scope and cost and the management of risk. Th is wo-uld inevitably result in many existing QIs being compelled to renounce their QI status and their US activities, with a potentially harmful impact on the US capital markets ■

As never before, taxation is to be considered as a crucial element in banking activities. Governments want banks to play an in-creasing role in the identi-fi cation of taxpayers and the calculation and col-lection of taxes. Given the sequels of the crisis, it is vital for the recovery of the banking industry that an acceptable system is put in place. Th e procedures and requirements must be de-signed in a way that does not endanger the viabili-ty of the banking business, either locally, by discrimi-nating between banks ac-cording to their place of establishment, or global-ly, by imposing an unaff or-dable increase of costs and prices. Aft er the emotional reactions provoked by the crisis, it is time to engage in a constructive dialogue between tax authorities and banks, which should be oriented towards a bet-ter mutual understanding. Adequate solutions sho-uld be envisaged in order to protect States’ revenue, whilst ensuring the growth of the banking sector.

“… Što je veća posvećenost ljudskih resursa aktivnostima prikupljanja sredstava, veći su izgledi da će određena politič-ka grupa postati kriminalna grupa……mafi ja, kao i trijade osnovani sa političkim ciljem, koji su postali nešto sasvim drugo.” W. A. Tupman 1998

ISTORIJSKI KONTEKSTTerorističke organizacije u Sjevernoj Irskoj se uglavnom dijele na dva dijela: lojalističke paravojne organizacije, UDA (Ulster Defence Association/Alstersko odbrambeno udruženje) ili republikanske paravojne organizacije, PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army/Privremena irska od-brambena armija). Lojalističke paravojne organizacije se, poput republikanskih paravojnih organizacija dijele na male i zasebne frakcije, koje, za razliku od militaristički struktu-riranih glavnih organizacija, slabije poštuju pravila angažo-vanja i fi nansiranja svojih aktivnosti.

Ne ulazeći u ideologije ovih organizacija, ovaj dokument će se fokusirati na aktivnosti ovih organizacija na prikup-ljanju sredstava, čime im je omogućeno da fi nansiraju ku-povinu vatrenog oružja i eksploziva za ispunjenje njihove terorističke uloge. Takođe se daje uvid u ono što se dešavalo od 1998. godine, kadaje započeo mirovni proces u Sjevernoj irskoj i kada su se terorističke/paravojne organizacije našle pod političkim pritiskom da se rasformiraju i uzdrže od te-rorističkih aktivnosti.

FINANSIRANJEFinansiranje je za obje organizacije bilo neophodno iz tri razloga. Omogućilo im je da se pobrinu za blagostanje svojih članova i porodica, da vode političke kampanje i što je najvažnije, da održe dugotrajanu i agresivnu vojnu kam-panju nasilja.

Obje organizacije su koristile svoje pozicije u lokalnim zajednicama kao izvor za prikupljanje sredstava, kroz klu-bove, muzičke večeri i crne taksije (londonska taksi vozila kojima je bila ograničena ruta kroz lojalističke ili repub-likanske zone, u njihovu korist). U graničnim zonama su sofi sticiraniji vidovi prikupljanja sredstava, fokusirani na pronevjere preko farmerskih grantova i subvencija i kri-jumčarenje goriva i alkohola.

Lojalističke paravojne organizacije su takođe prikupljale sredstva putem ucjena vlasnika gradilišta, nudeći im zašti-tu od provala i nanošenja štete. Ukoliko vlasnik gradilišta

Od konfl ikta do mira,od terorizma do organizovanog kriminalaTranzicija od konfl ikta do mira u Sjevernoj Irskoj je potez koji je pozdravljen kako politički, tako i društveno, ne samo u Sjevernoj Irskoj, već i susjednim zemljama Republici Irskoj i Velikoj Britaniji. Iako se na tranziciju gleda kao na pozitivan razvoj, ova situacija utiče i na same teroriste, kao i na organe za sprovođenje zakona, kako se opisuje u ovom dokumentu

Sam SittlingtonCFE


30

TERORIZAM

“… Th e greater the devotion of manpower resources to fundraising activities, the greater the likelihood a political group will become an organised crime group…… both the mafi a and the triads started out with political aims, but be-came something quite diff erent.” W A Tupman 1998

HISTORICAL CONTEXTTerrorist organisations in Northern are predominantly

divided into two parts: Loyalists Paramilitaries, UDA (Ulster Defence Association) or Republican Paramilitaries, PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army). Th e Loyalist

Paramilitaries organisations like the Republican Paramilitaries divided themselves into smaller and separate factions who unlike the militarily structured mainstream organisations were less likely to adhere to rules of engagement and fun-ding of their activities.

Without going into the ideologies of these organisati-ons this paper will concentrate on the activities of these organisations in raising funds that allowed them to fi nan-ce the purchase of fi rearms and explosives to fulfi l their terrorist roles. It will also provide an insight into what has happened since 1998 when the Peace process commenced in Northern Ireland and the Terrorist/Paramilitary orga-nisations were under Political pressure to disband and re-frain from their terrorist activities.

FUNDINGFunding for both organisations was necessary for three reasons. It allowed them to cater for the welfare of its members and families, it allowed them to follow a cam-paign of political activity and most importantly it allowed them to sustain a long and aggressive military campaign of violence.

Both organisations used their positions in local commu-nities as a source of raising funds through drinking clubs, musical evenings, collections and black taxis (London cabs that were restricted to routes through Loyalist or Republican areas for their own benefi t). In the border are-as more sophisticated ideas of funding centred on frauds through farming grant subsidies and smuggling activities of fuel and alcohol.

Loyalist paramilitaries also concentrated funding throu-gh extortion of owners of building sites with the provi-so of off ering security for the sites to provide protection

From confl ict to peace from terrorism to organised crime

The transition from confl ict to peace in Northern Ireland is a welcome move both politically and socially not just in Northern Ireland but also for those land borders of Republic of Ireland and United Kingdom of which Northern Ireland sits. However the transition is seen as a positive development this situation does have ramifi cations for the Terrorists themselves and ultimately for Law Enforcement as this document will show

Sam SittlingtonCFE


TERRORISM

ne bi platio, njegova gradilišta bivala bi zapaljena, ili bi ubi-jali preduzimače.

Lojalističke paravojne organizacije nisu bili toliko or-ganizovane, disciplinovane, niti sofi sticirane kao PIRA, a često bi razbojnički elementi vršili nekažnjene pljačke ili prodavali drogu da bi napunili sopstvene džepove, a ne da bi fi nansirali aktivnosti organizacije. U mnogim slučajevi-ma, ovo je rezultiralo internim svađama, u kojima je mno-go ljudi nastradalo u velikim oružanim borbama, kao i u manjim pucnjavama.

S druge strane, republikanske paravojne organizacije su dobijale sredstva od Irsko-američkih simpatizera u SAD-u, u sklopu NORAID-a, što im je omogućilo kupovinu ispo-ruka oružja i eksploziva iz Libije, ranih osamdesetih godi-na. “ Novac je krv IRA-e, bez adekvatnih fi nansija, njihove aktivnosti bi bile ozbiljno ugrožene. Sa dodatnim novcem, IRA bi proširila sve svoje aktivnosti”. Sean O’Callaghan, bi-vši Zapovjednik Južne komande IRA-e.

Republikanci su, takođe, imali svoje razbojničke elemente u Irskoj armiji nacionalnog oslobođenja, koja je fi nansirana pljačkama pošta, kao i od strane trgovaca oružjem. Ovi čla-novi nisu bili protiv dogovora sa lojalističkim paravojnim organizacijama za izdvajanje oblasti u Sjevernoj Irskoj za trgovinu drogom i iznuđivanje. U nekim slučajevima sum-nja se da su sarađivali u organizovanju ubistava sopstvenih članova, da bi dobili više novca za sebe.

Statistika pokazuje da:71% krijumčarskih grupa imaju paravojne veze ■86% republikanskih grupa je bilo uključeno u akcizne ■pronevjere67% osoba u paravojnim grupama bilo je uključeno u ■pronevjere vezane za socijalnu pomoćlojalističke paravojne organizacije odgovorne su za 66% ■trafi kinga i prodaje droge £1m godišnji je gubitak vlade kroz pronevjeru farmer- ■skih grantova 85% iznude povezano je sa prikupljanjem sredstava od ■strane lojalista.

Sljedeće pitanje je: šta se dogodilo kada su se sve terorističke organizacije pridružile mirovnom procesu? Šta se dogodilo sa uticajnim ljudima koji su ih kontrolisali i šta se dogodilo sa običnim članovima?

Ukratko, lideri organizacija su postali glasnogovornici svojih političkih krila organizacije. Neki su ušli u vladu i sa sobom donijeli i svoju hijerarhiju. Ostali lideri su kon-trolisali grupe lokalnih zajednica i imali su pristup veli-kim iznosima novca iz programa fi nansiranih grantovima Evropske unije.

Teroristi ili predstavnici zajednice, kako se sada zovu, bili su u mogućnosti da pregovaraju o socijalnom, ekonomskom i političkom okruženju, koje bi odgovaralo njihovim članovi-ma. Strukture u redovima organizacija su ostale iste, ali se sada one nisu nazivale terorističkim ili paravojnim organizacijama. Obični članovi, koji nisu znali ništa pametnije da urade, ofor-mili su kriminalističke grupe. Pljačke, iznude, droga, kidna-povanje, zelenašenje, falsifi kovana roba, šverc goriva, cigareta i pronevjere PDV-a, nisu prestali, već su se povećali.

Organizovane kriminalističke grupe mogu se defi nisati na sljedeći način:

Sastoje se od najmanje tri osobe ■ Dugotrajna kriminalna aktivnost ■

Motivisane profi tom ili moći ■ Počinjeni ozbiljni kriminalni prekršaji ■

Kao rezultat organizovane kriminalne aktivnosti, desilo se nekoliko veoma poznatih slučajeva:

Pljačka Northern Bank u Belfastu, u Sjevernoj Irskoj, kada je ukradeno 26 miliona funti gotovine, a porodice zaposlenih u banci su držane kao taoci da bi pljačka bila uspješna.

Operacija krijumčarenje oružja koja se odvijala između Floride u Sjedinjenim državama i Velike Britanije i Irske, za potrebe kriminalnih grupa i njihovih kriminalnih aktiv-nosti van njihovih organizacija.

Pljačke novca u tranzitu prilikom punjenja automata za podizanje gotovine, iznosile su na stotine hiljada fun-ti sterlinga.

Svi ovi zločini su bili organizovani sa vojnom preciznošću i imali su sva oblilježja prethodnih struktura paravojnih or-ganizacija. Kao rezultat mirovnog procesa, ove terorističke organizacije su postale nove grupe organizovanog kriminala. Stoga, ovo mijenja način razmišljanja organa za sprovođenje zakona u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Kriminal više nije isti kao teroristički kriminal, već su se razvile nove forme organizovanog kriminala.

Obavezanost ka borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala treba da bude konstantna. Upotreba ekspertize fi nansijskih istražitelja i fi nansijskih istraga usmjerena na bankovne ra-čune i sredstva putem Izvještaja o sumnjivim aktivnostima, kao i putem obavještajnih aktivnosti. Upotreba zakonodav-stva u bori protiv pranja novca i otklanjanju mogućnosti za kriminal putem podizanja svijesti javnosti, grupa zajednica i partnerskih grupa, treba da bude visoko na listi prioriteta organa za sprovođenje zakona.

Kako bi mogli da se borimo protiv organizovanog krimi-nala, potrebna nam je podrška zajednice. Potrebno je da po-punimo vakum koji je nastao tokom konfl ikta i povratimo povjerenje onih poštenih građana u zajednici. Partnerstvo ne postoji samo između organa za sprovođenje zakona, već i sa zajednicom, poslovnom zajednicom, javnim i privatnim sektorom i ostalim vladinim sektorima. U zajedničkom je interesu da se i pojedinačno, kao i zajednički borimo protiv organizovanog kriminala.

Iskustvo u Sjevernoj Irskoj je pokazalo potrebu da se raz-motri razvoj kriminala u tranzicionom kontekstu. Politički i ekonomski faktori su doprinijeli promjeni prirode organizo-vanog kriminala u Sjevernoj Irskoj, počevši od 1998. godine. Paramilitaristi su iskoristili nove fi zičke i socijalne prostore koji su se otvorili nakon mirovnog procesa. Međutim, tran-zicija je takođe svjedok razvoja kriminala koji vrše oni oični vojnici koji su nekada bili posvećeni teroristričkim ideolo-gijama, a koji su sada organizovani po sopstvenim grupama organizovanog kriminala. Isto tako, ovo je učinilo od Sjeverne Irske sigurnu zonu za spoljašnje kriminalne grupe i pojedina-ce, koji sada ne moraju da se takmiče sa nemilosrdnim para-vojnim organizacijama,kao što je to io slučaj ranije.

Model Sjeverne Irske, koji sam prethodno opisao, ne mora da bude jedinstven za Sjevernu Irsku. Može se uklopiti i u bilo koju drugu zemlju u kojoj se terorističke organizacije pripremaju za povlačenje iz konfl ikta i idu ka mirnom rje-šenju. Ukoliko do toga dođe, kod pregovaranja se mora naći prostor za obične članove, ili će se oni, bojim se, pretvori-ti u nove teroriste, odnosno organizovane kriminalističke grupe, kao u slučaju Sjeverne Irske ■


32

TERORIZAM

against burglary and criminal damage. If site owners did not pay up their sites were oft en burned or site contrac-tors murdered.

Loyalist paramilitaries were not as organised, discipli-ned or as sophisticated as PIRA and oft en rogue elements would carry out non-sanctioned robberies or drug dea-ling activities to line their own pockets rather than for the benefi t of the organisations activities. On many occasions this resulted in internal feuding which left many dead aft er major gun battles and tit for tat shootings.

On the other hand Republican paramilitaries enjoyed funds from Irish/American sympathisers in USA under NORAID that enabled the purchase of shipments of arms and explosives from Libya in early 1980’s. “ Money is the life blood of the IRA, without adequate fi nances its acti-vities are severely hampered. With more money the IRA would extend all its activities”. Sean O’Callaghan former Offi cer Commanding Southern Command IRA.

Th e Republicans too had their rogue elements in Irish National Liberation Army which was funded by robbe-ries of Post Offi ces and gun dealers. Th ese members were not averse to making deals with Loyalist Paramilitaries in carving out areas of Northern Ireland for drug dea-ling and extortion activities. In some cases it is suspec-ted that they collaborated in the setting up some of their own members for assassination to make more money for themselves.

Statistics showed that:71% of smuggling groups have paramilitary links ■86% of Republican groups are involved in excise fraud ■67% of individuals in paramilitary groups are involved ■in benefi t fraudLoyalist paramilitaries are responsible for 66% of drug ■traffi cking and dealing£1m annual loss to Government through farming grant ■fraud85% of extortion is associated to Loyalist fundraising ■

Th e next question is what happened when all the Terrorist organisations signed up to the peace process? What hap-pened to the infl uential fi gures that controlled them and what happened to the foot soldiers?

In short the leaders of the organisations became the spo-kespersons for their Political wings of the organisations. Some went into Government and brought their hierarchy with them. Other leaders controlled local community gro-ups an also had access to the vast amounts of money from European Union grant funded schemes.

Terrorists or (community representatives as they were now called) were able to negotiate social, economical and political environments to suit their members. Th e struc-tures within the ranks of the organisations remained but were now no longer called terrorist or paramilitary or-ganisations. For the foot soldiers who did not know any better they had formed themselves into criminal gangs. Robbery, extortion, drugs, kidnapping, loan sharking, co-unterfeit goods, fuel smuggling, cigarette smuggling and VAT fraud did not diminish but increased. Organised crime groups can be defi ned in the following way:

It contains at least three people ■Prolonged criminal activity ■

Motivated by profi t or power ■Serious criminal off ences committed ■

As a result of this organised criminal activity some very high profi le cases have emerged:

A robbery at the Northern Bank in Belfast, Northern Ireland when £26m in cash was stolen and families of bank staff held hostage in order that the crime could be successful.

Gun smuggling operation between Florida in United States and UK and Ireland for the use by criminal gangs in their criminal activities outside of their organisations.

Cash in transit robberies while ATM cash machines are being replenished netting hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling.

All of these crimes were organised with military preci-sion and had all the hallmarks of the previous structures contained within paramilitary organisations. As a result of the peace process these terrorist organisations have beco-me the new organised crime groups. Th is therefore chan-ges the thinking of law enforcement in tackling organised crime. Th e crime does not remain as a terrorist crime as before but new organised crime evolves.

Th e commitment to tackle organised crime should re-main constant. Utilising the expertise of fi nancial investi-gators and fi nancial investigation to target bank accounts and assets through Suspicious Activity Reports and intel-ligence. Using the legislation to target money laundering and removing the opportunity for crime through public awareness, community groups and partnership groups should be high on the law enforcement agenda.

In order to fight organised crime we need the help and support of the community. We need to fi ll the va-cuum created through confl ict and gain the trust of tho-se honourable citizens in the community. Partnership is not only between law enforcement agencies it is with the community it is with the business community, the public and private sector and other Government departments. It is in all our interests to separately and collectively tackle organised crime.

Th e experience in Northern Ireland demonstrates the need to appreciate the development of crime in a transi-tional context. Political policy and economic factors have contributed to the changing nature of organised crime in Northern Ireland since 1998. Paramilitaries have taken advantage of new physical and social spaces, which have opened up following the peace process. However the tran-sition has also seen the development of crimes perpetrated by those foot soldiers once committed to terrorist ideolo-gies now organised into their own organised crime groups. It has also opened up Northern Ireland as a safe zone for outside criminal gangs and individuals who don’t have to compete with the ruthless paramilitary organisations as they would have previously.

But the Northern Ireland model as I have discussed above does not have to be unique to Northern Ireland. It could fi t into any Country were Terrorist organisati-ons are preparing to withdraw from confl ict to a peaceful solution. If that happens there has to be an outlet for the foot soldiers in the negotiations or I am afraid they will, as in the Northern Ireland case suggests, turn to the new terrorists, that of organised crime gangs ■


TERRORISM

Sredstvaza mjerenjei upravljanje

Likvidnost je sposobnost fi nansijske institucije da ispoštuje sve obaveze gotovinskog plaćanja kako dospijevaju i sposobnost da se obezbijedi da će fi nansiranje biti dostupno da podrži rast budućih kreditnih linija. Likvidnost predstavlja ’’sirovinu’’ banaka: njihova sposobnost da ispune obaveze u kratkom roku kako dospijevaju predstavlja primarni element na kojem se zasniva reputacija. Efi kasno upravljanje rizikom likvidnosti obezbjeđuje da će banka biti u mogućnosti da izdrži nedostatke likvidnosti koje je teško kontrolisati jer na njih utiču egzogeni događaji, kao to su aktivnosti ostalih fi nansijskih institucija. Kriza hipotekarnog tržišta je naglasila važnost rizika likvidnosti poslije dekade u kojoj je fi nansiranje bilo gotovo uvijek moguće po relativno niskim troškovima. Zbog oštrih promijenjenih tržišnih uslova koji su počeli sredinom 2007. godine, mnoge banke su iznenada bile nesposobne da primijene čak osnovne principe upravljanja rizikom likvidnosti koji je izgledao nevažan u vrijeme kada je bilo dovoljno likvidnosti. To se pokazalo katastrofalnim, jer ne postoji zaista efi kasna zaštita od rizika likvidnosti i stoga njegovo upravljanje treba uvijek da bude proaktivno

Giovanni Gentiliekspert ATTFrisk menadžer u Evropskoj investicionoj banci

PRIRODA RIZIKA LIKVIDNOSTIRizik likvidnosti ima ’’specijalne’’ karakteristike. Prije sve-ga, likvidnost uvijek presuši kada je potrebna i stoga pred-stavlja onu vrstu rizika koje će najvjerovatnije stvoriti “do-mino efekte” koji se šire na očigledno stabilne institucije ili fi nansijske proizvode. Odmah poslije stečaja Lehman Brothers-a u septembru 2008. godine, jedan od najvećih fon-dova tržišta novca u SAD, Fond primarnih rezervi (Reserve Primary Fund), je bio pretrpan zahtjevima za ranu isplatu deponenata1. Opšti strah od moguće propasti većine bana-ka je izazvao praktnično zamrzavanje odobravanja kredita (odnosno obezbjeđivanja likvidnosti) svima, osim Vladi SAD u obliku državnih obveznica.

Rizik likvidnosti takođe pokazuje veoma visok stepen in-terakcije sa kreditnim i tržišnim rizicima, uz razvoj opšteg makroekonomskog okruženja (trendovi deviznih kurseva i infl acije) i, na kraju, uz lokalnu ekonomsku dinamiku (npr. tražnja povlačenja kredita i depozita kod agrobanaka, priliv stranih investicija u određenoj zemlji, itd.). U tom smislu, za rizik likvidnosti se obično kaže da je ’’posljedični rizik’’ jer tenzije likvidnosti često potiču iz očigledno nepovezanih tržišnih događaja (izvlačenje iz očiglednog upućivanja na nedavnu hipotekarnu krizu, mogli bismo napomenuti kao primjere LTCM krizu iz 1998. godine – povezanu sa deval-vacijom rublje – ili Azijsku krizu iz 1997.).

Među specifi čnostima rizika likvidnosti, druga tačka in-teresovanja je ta da se postavlja pitanje da li regulatorni ka-

pital može obezbijediti efi kasnu zaštitu od rizika likvidnosti. Na jednoj strani, sigurno da je istinito da što više kapitala banka ima, to je njena sigurnost bolja. Međutim, jedan od razloga zašto banke postoje je ta što obavljaju ’’transformaciju dospijeća’’ između subjekata koji imaju višak likvidnosti (tj. deponenata) i subjekata koji imaju manjak likvidnosti (tj. klijenata koji uzimaju hipotekarne kredite). Kao takve, ban-ke su strukturalno izložene riziku likvidnosti: banka kojom se dobro upravlja sa stanovišta likvidnosti može opstati čak i kada je loše kapitalizovana. S druge strane, dobro kapitali-zovana banka će brzo propasti ako se njenom likvidnošću loše upravlja ili ako pretrpi odliv depozita.

U stvari, do danas, Bazelski komitet za superviziju ba-naka ne propisuje regulatorni zahtjev za kapitalom koji je potreban za zaštitu od rizika likvidnosti.

Međutim, poslije krize tržišta nekretnina, Bazelski komitet je pregledao svoje preporuke o dobroj praksi za upravljanje likvidnosti u bankarskim organizacijama uz smjernice koje su značajno proširene u određenom broju oblasti2, kao što su: • Mjerenje likvidnosti: adekvatna kvantifi kacija ne-usklađenosti koja proizilazi iz veličine i dospijeća aktive u odnosu na pasivu i vanbilansne obaveze. Neusklađenosti likvidnosti (takođe poznati kao ’gapovi likvidnosti’) treba takođe da podliježu redovnom stresnom testiranju. • Upravljanje fi nansiranjem likvidnosti: na strani pa-sive, banka treba da se postara da ima lak pristup dodatnim sredstvima i da diversifi kuje izvore fi nansiranja.

1 Fond primarnih rezervi je dostavio izvještaj da je uložio 785 miliona USD u kratkoročne komercijalne zapise Lehman-a prije nego što je u toj banci otvoren stečaj. 2 Bazelski komitet za superviziju banaka: “Principi za dobro upravljanje rizikom likvidnosti i supervizija rizika likvidnosti ” - Sept. 2008 – www.bis.org


36

RIZIK LIKVIDNOSTI

Tools forMeasurementand ManagementLiquidity is the ability of a fi nancial institution to honor all cash payment commitments as they fall due and the ability to ensure that funding will be available to support the growth of future loan disbursements. Liquidity is the “raw material” of banks: their ability to meet near-term obligations as they come due is the primary element on which their reputation lies. Effective liquidity risk management helps ensure that a bank will be able to withstand liquidity shortages, which are diffi cult to control as they are infl uenced by exogenous events, such as the actions of other fi nancial institutions. The “sub-prime” market crisis has highlighted the importance of liquidity risk, after a decade during which funding had almost always been readily available at a relatively low cost. Due to the sharp reversal in market conditions began in mid-2007, many banks have suddenly found themselves incapable of applying even basic principles of liquidity risk management that used to appear un-important when liquidity was abundant. This has proven to be disastrous, because liquidity risk cannot really be effectively hedged, and therefore its management should always be proactive

Giovanni GentiliATTF expertALM Risk offi cer in European Investment Bank

THE NATURE OF LIQUIDITY RISKLiquidity Risk has “special” characteristics. First of all, liqui-dity usually dries up exactly when it is needed, and therefore it is the type of risk that most likely creates “domino eff ects” that extend to apparently safe institutions or fi nancial pro-ducts. Immediately aft er Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008, one of the biggest U.S. money market funds, the Reserve Primary Fund, started being fl ooded with requests for early redemptions by depositors1. Th e generali-zed fear that more banks might fail, caused a virtual freezing of lending (i.e.: providing liquidity) to anyone else except the U.S. Government, in the form of Treasury Bills.

Liquidity risk exhibits also a very high degree of interac-tion with credit and market risks, with the evolution of the general macro-economic environment (trends in exchan-ge rates and infl ation) and, last but not least, with the local economic dynamics (e.g.: demand for loans and deposit withdrawals in rural banks, infl ow of foreign investments in a given country, etc.). In this sense, liquidity risk is oft en said to be a “consequential risk”, because liquidity tensions oft en stem from apparently unrelated market events (ab-stracting from the obvious reference to the recent sub-pri-me crisis, we could mention as examples the LTCM crisis in 1998 - related to the Russian Ruble devaluation - or the Asian crisis in 1997).

Among the specifi cities of liquidity risk, another point of interest is that it is really questionable whether regulatory

capital may provide an eff ective protection against liquidity risk. On one hand, it is certainly true that the more capital a bank is holding, the better is from a safety point of view. However, one of the reasons why banks exist is exactly to perform a “maturity transformation” between subjects that have an excess of liquidity (i.e. depositors) and subjects that have a shortage of liquidity (i.e. clients who take a mortga-ge loan). As such, banks are structurally exposed to liqui-dity risk: a bank that is well managed from a liquidity point of view can survive even if it is poorly capitalized. On the other hand, a well capitalized bank will quickly go bust if its liquidity is poorly managed or if it suff ers from a run on its deposits.

As a matter of fact, to date, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision does not impose any regulatory capital require-ment that caters for protection from liquidity risk.

However, following the “sub-prime” market turmoil, the Basel Committee has deeply reviewed its recommendati-ons on sound practices for managing liquidity in banking organizations, with guidance signifi cantly expanded in a number of key areas2, such as: • Liquidity measurement: an adequate quantifi cation of the mismatches that derive from the size and maturity of asset vs. liabilities and off -balance sheet commitments. Liquidity mismatches (also known as “liquidity gaps”) sho-uld also be subject to a regular stress testing.

1 Reserve Primary Fund is reported to have invested US$ 785 million in short term Lehman commercial paper prior the bank went bankrupt.2 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision: “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” - Sep 2008 – www.bis.org


LIQUIDITY RISK

• Upravljanje likvidnosti aktive: postoji razmjena između troškova održavanja likvidnih resursa i rizika od postojanja nedovoljne likvidnosti. Troškovi održavanja likvidnosti uk-ljučuju troškove mogućnosti da banka ne može da dođe do maksimalno profi tabilnih ulaganja (na primjer, krediti kli-jentima ili dugoročni sertifi kati o depozitima). Banke treba da uspostave strategije za ublažavanje mogućnosti troškova održavanja likvidnih sredstava. • Planiranje likvidnosti u vanrednim slučajevima krize: banke i uopštenije – fi nansijske institucije treba da obezbije-de pristup aranžmanima u hitnim slučajevima i proaktivno uspostave strategije za mobilizaciju gotovine iz nelikvidne aktive. • Politike i procedure za rizik likvidnosti: dobro uspostavljena i usaglašena dokumenta treba da identi-fi kuju odgovornosti, limite, sredstva i metodologije za mjerenje i upravljanje rizikom likvidnosti. Poteno je raz-motriti kako treba držati likvidnost (na primjer, u goto-vini ili u utrživim hartijama od vrijednosti), optimalni iznos likvidnosti koji treba držati i pokretače koji treba da su spremni za akciju. Nezavistan nadzor centralizovane jedinice za upravljanje rizikom treba da se formalizuje u politikama.

Sredstva i koncepti koji se tiču mjerenja rizika likvidnosti, vanrednog planiranja likvidnosti u periodu krize i politiku rizika likvidnosti su dati dalje u tekstu.

MJERENJE LIKVIDNOSTI Koefi cijenti bilansa stanja - Počevši od najosnovnijeg pri-stupa, mnoge banke koriste koefi cijente bilansa stanja kao sredstvo za strateško planiranje i formulisanje limita i ope-rativnih pravila. Analitičari iz rejting agencija, regulatori i investitori cijene koefi cijente jer oni dozvoljavaju upoređi-vanje nivoa likvidnosti između različitih institucija i izra-čunavanje prosječnih cifara na nivou opšteg bankarskog sektora. Važan aspekt je da koefi cijenti ne treba da se po-smatraju kao statičke cifre: ono što je važno za koefi cijente nije njihova apsolutna vrijednost na određeni dan sastav-ljanja bilansa stanja, već njihov razvoj u vremenu. Značajno pogoršanje vrijednosti jednog od koefi cijenata vremenom može ukazati na problem i pokrenuti dalju istragu.

Postoji skoro beskonačna serija koefi cijenata koji se mogu izračunati za mjerenje stava likvidnosti jedne banke. Evo nekih od primjera:

Na strani aktive, Koefi cijent pozicije gotovine se izračunava dijeljenjem raspoložive gotovine i depozita po viđenju kod ostalih institucija sa ukupnom aktivom banke: on se kreće između 0 i 1, i - ekvivalentno tome – veći koefi cijent na-ravno ukazuje da banka ima jaču poziciju da kratkoročno izdrži tenzije likvidnosti3.

Na strani pasive, Koefi cijent depozita se izračunava dijeljen-jem ukupnih depozita stanovništva sa ukupnom aktivom banke. Pošto depoziti fi zičkih lica obično predstavljaju sta-bilan izvor fi nansiranja, koji je neelastičan na kretanje ka-

matnih stopa, što je veći koefi cijent depozita to je niži opa-ženi rizik likvidnosti.

Postoji mnogo varijanti osnovnog koefi cijenta depozita. Naročito, zbog činjenice da većinu stabilnih depozita čine ’’depoziti po viđenju’’ a ne oročeni depoziti, koefi cijent se često izračunava uzimajući u obzir samo depozite po viđen-ju. Razlog je jer oročene depozite obično koriste fi zička lica kao investicioni proizvod i stoga – čak iako imaju duže ugo-vorno dospijeće od depozita po viđenju – osjetljiviji su na kretanja kamatne stope. U stvari, kada se poveća opšti nivo tržišnih stopa, klijenti će smatrati da je atraktivnije povući oročene depozite i uložiti ih u alternativnu aktivu kao što su sredstva tržišta novca.

Dalje prečišćavanje koefi cijenta depozita je takozvani Neelastični koefi cijent depozita. On se izračunava uzima-jući u obzir samo stabilni dio (osnovni saldo) depozita po viđenju, koji se smatra invarijansom u pogledu kretanja ka-matnih stopa i sezonskih faktora.

Osnovni saldo depozita se može izračunati putem statis-tičke analize; metoda koju banke često koriste je pristup “dupliranih portfolija”4.

Među ’’miješanim’’ koefi cijentima likvidnosti, koji kombi-nuju aktivu i pasivu, možemo pomenuti Koefi cijent kredita u odnosu na depozite. Ekvivalentno tome, visoka vrijednost ovog koefi cijenta ukazuje na potencijalne probleme sa ne-likvidnošću, jer u ovom slučaju banka je u situaciji da drži mnogo nelikvidnih sredstava (kredita) u svom bilansu stanja u poređenju sa obimom stabilnog fi nansiranja.

Jedno zajedničko pitanja koefi cijenta kredita u odnosu na depozite je da ne uzima u obzir sastav kredita i depozita. Što se tiče depozita, bilo bi podesno fokusirati se na njihov osnovni saldo, a ne na njihov ukupan iznos kako bi se samo razmotrio stabilan dio depozita kao zaista dugoročan izvor fi nansiranja. Takođe, u slučaju kredita, detaljnija analiza bi bila korisna: na primjer, struktura dospijeća kredita i stepen standardizacije garancija će uticati na mogućnost prodaje cijelih portfolija kredita odobrenih ostalim fi nansijskim in-stitucijama putem sekjuritizacije, mobilizujući stoga aktivu iz očigledno gustih sredstava.

GAPOVI LIKVIDNOSTIOsnovni element koji je potreban analitičaru da bi izračunao koefi cijent je bilans stanja banke; koefi cijenti su u stvari po-pularni tačno zbog ograničenih potrebnih podataka i zbog činjenice da njihovo izračunavanje nije teško. Međutim, postoje neki problemi u ovom pristupu:

3 Dopuna koefi cijentau pozicije gorovine predstavlja koefi cijent ’’kredita u odnosu na aktivu’’ koji se deviniše kao krediti podijeljeni sa ukupnom aktivom. On ukazuje na mjeru u kojoj je institucija ’’zaključana’’ u visoka nelikvidna ulaganja kao što su krediti. Ekvivalentno tomeo, što je veći koefi cijent kredita u odnosu na aktivu, niža je likvidnost institucije.

4 Tretman identifi kacije i procjene osnovnog salda je van opsega ovog članka. Korisne reference se mogu pronaći kod: Matz, L and P. Neu (2006), Liquidity Risk: Measurement and Management, Wiley


38

RIZIK LIKVIDNOSTI

• Funding liquidity management: on the liability side, the bank should ensure to have an easy access to additional funds and diversify funding sources. • Asset liquidity management: there is a trade-off betwe-en the cost of maintaining liquid resources and the risk of having an insuffi cient liquidity. Th e costs of maintaining liquidity include the opportunity costs of not being able to maximize more profi table investments (for example, client loans or longer term certifi cates of deposit). Banks should put in place strategies for minimizing the opportunity cost of maintaining liquid assets. • Liquidity crisis contingency planning: banks and - more in general - fi nancial institutions should ensure to have access to emergency facilities and put pro-actively in place strategies for mobilizing cash from non-liquid assets. • Liquidity risk policies and procedures: well establis-hed and agreed documents should identify responsibilities, limits, tools and methodologies for liquidity risk measure-ment and management. Consideration is to be given to how liquidity should be held (for example, in cash or marketable securities), the optimal amount of liquidity that should be maintained, and the triggers that should prompt an action. Th e independent oversight of a centralized Risk Management unit should be formalized in the policies.

In what follows we will highlight some tools and concepts that pertain to liquidity measurement, liquidity crisis con-tingency planning and liquidity risk policy.

LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT Balance sheet ratios - Starting from a very basic approach, many banks use balance sheet ratios as a tool for strategic planning, and for formulating limits and operating rules. Ratios are appreciated by analysts from rating agencies, regu-lators and investors, because they allow comparing liquidity levels between diff erent institutions and calculating average fi gures at a general banking sector level. An important aspect is that ratios should not be looked at as static fi gures: what counts about ratios is not their absolute value as of a certain balance sheet date, but rather their evolution over time. A signifi cant worsening in the value of one ratio over time may signal a problem and stimulate further investigation.

Th ere is an almost endless series of ratios that can be cal-culated to gauge the liquidity posture of one bank. We give some examples here below.

On the asset side, the Cash Position Ratio is calculated dividing available cash and demand deposits at other insti-tutions by the total assets of the bank: it ranges between 0 and 1 and - all else equal - a bigger ratio implies of course that the bank is in a stronger position to withstand liquidi-ty tensions in the short term3.

On the liability side, the Deposit Ratio is calculated dividing total deposits by retail clients by the total assets of the bank. As deposits by retail clients normally represent a stable so-urce of funding, which is highly un-elastic to interest rate

movements, the higher the Deposit Ratio, the lower is the perceived liquidity risk.

Th ere are many variants of the basic Deposit Ratio. In parti-cular, due to the fact that the most stable deposits are those “at sight” rather than the “term” deposits, the ratio is oft en calculated taking into account only deposits “at sight”. Th e reason is that term deposits are usually used by retail clients as an investment product and therefore – albeit having a lon-ger contractual maturity than deposits “at sight”– are more sensitive to interest rate movements. As a matter of fact, when the general level of market rates increases, clients will fi nd more attractive to withdraw their term deposits and invest in alternative assets such as money market funds.

A further refi nement of the Deposit Ratio is the so-cal-led Un-elastic Deposit Ratio. It is calculated by taking into account only the stable portion (“core balance”) of deposits “at sight”, that appears to be invariant with respect to inte-rest rate movements and seasonal factors.

Th e core balance of deposits can be calculated by means of statistical analysis; one method oft en used in banks is the approach of the “replicating portfolios”4.

Among “mixed” liquidity ratios, that combine assets and liabilities, we can mention the Loan to Deposit Ratio. All else equal, a high value for this ratio signals a potential illiquidity problem, because in this case a bank is in a situation where it holds many illiquid assets (loans) on its balance sheet as compared to the volume of its stable funding.

One common issue with the loan-to-deposit ratio is that it does not take into account the composition of loans and deposits. For what concerns deposits, it might be prudent to focus on their core balance rather than their total amo-unt, in order to consider only the stable portion of deposit as a truly long-lasting source of funding. Also in the case of loans a more detailed analysis would be useful: for in-stance, the maturity structure of the loans and the degree of standardization of the related guarantees will infl uence the possibility of selling entire portfolios of loan to other fi -nancial institutions trough securitization, thus mobilizing liquidity from apparently sticky assets.

LIQUIDITY GAPSTh e essential element that an analyst needs to calculate a ratio is the balance sheet of the bank; ratios are actually popular exactly because of their limited data pre-requisites and because of the fact that their computation is not diffi -cult. However, there are some problems with this approach:

3 A complement to the cash position ratio is represented by the “Loans to Asset” ratio, defi ned as loans divided by total assets. It indicates the extent to which an institution is “locked” into highly illiquid investments as loans. All else equal, the higher the Loans to Asset ratio, the lower the institution‘s liquidity.

4 Th e treatment of core balance identifi cation and estimation is outside of the scope of this article. Useful references can be found in: Matz, L and P. Neu (2006), Liquidity Risk: Measurement and Management, Wiley


LIQUIDITY RISK

Koefi cijentima strukturalno nedostaje vremenska dimen- ▷zija likvidnosti: oni mogu samo obezbijediti statičko po-smatranje situacije likvidnosti u jednoj banci i zaista nije-su korisni za planiranje nedostataka ili viška likvidnosti.Na izračunavanje koefi cijenata uveliko utiču računovod- ▷stvena pravila: ovo može ugroziti uporedivost različitih banaka i različitih zemalja.Ako je izračunavanje koefi cijenata ograničeno na bilansne ▷cifre, potencijalno značajan uticaj likvidnosti vanbilansnih stavki (npr.: obaveze velikih korporacija po osnovu kre-dita) se zanemaruje.Limiti i operativni propisi na osnovu koefi cijenata mogu ▷zanemariti realnu utrživost hartija od vrijednosti koja se drže u svrhe likvidnosti (npr.: kratkoročne obveznice).

Jedini pristup mjerenja koji opredjeljuje određeno dinamič-ko posmatranje likvidnosti jedne banke je Gap likvidnos-ti (ili predviđanje toka gotovine). Nažalost, ako se uporedi sa pristupom zasnovanim na koefi cijentima, priprema de-taljnog plana budućih tokova gotovine uključuje nekoliko složenih inputa iz mnogih sektora banke i zahtijeva uspos-tavljenje nevažnih pretpostavki.

Prema metodi gapa likvidnosti, svi očekivani tokovi go-tovine iz bilansnih i vanbilansnih stavki se kvantifi kuju i razvrstavaju u vremenske periode (kolone) unaprijed od-ređene od strane banke. Gapovi likvidnosti predstavljaju razlike, na sve buduće datume, između neotplaćene aktive i pasive, u pogledu njihovog profi la likvidnosti ali bez obzi-ra na njihovo ponovno određivanje cijene kamatne stope5. Tabela 1 pokazuje primjer gapa likvidnosti izračunatog u periodu od jedne godine.

U odnosu na svaku vremensku kolonu, negativni kumu-lativni gapovi likvidnosti ukazuju na višak aktive nad pa-sivom i stoga na defi cit likvidnosti (postoje sredstva koja treba fi nansirati obavezama). Drugim riječima, marginalni gap likvidnosti za svaki vremenski period predstavlja neto iznos aktive i pasive koja dospijeva u određenoj koloni. U vezi sa Tabelom 1, na primjer, marginalni gap likvidnosti = 30 ukazuje da između jednog dana i sedmog dana postoji 30 aktive više od pasive koja dospijeva, stvarajući stoga veće prilive likvidnosti za banku.

Rizik likvidnosti se javlja kada je kumulativni gap lik-vidnosti negativan, tj. kada postoji nedostatak sredstava u budućnosti koji će zahtijevati prikupljanje novog fi nansi-ranja ili likvidiranje raposložive aktive. Naravno, negativni

kumulativni gap ne znači da je banka insolventna.To jedi-no znači da će banka morati da produži svoje fi nansiranje ili likvidira imovinu u određenom vremenskom periodu u budućnosti ako želi da opstane.

U stvari, koncept koji se često pominje paralelno sa ku-mulativnim gapom likvidnosti je takoznvani “period opstan-ka”, koji predstavlja prvu kolonu u kojoj se dešava negativni kumulativni gap likvidnosti (pogledati grafi kon 1 o periodu opstanka na osnovu primjera datih u tabeli 1).

Uprkos tome što je konceptualno jednostavna, konstrukci-ja analize gapa likvidnosti zahtijeva nekoliko pretpostavki.

Jedna od prvih tačaka je to da li budući tokovi gotovine treba da se planiraju na ’’diskontinuiran’’ način (tj. uzima-jući u obzir samo postojeće operacije) ili na osnovu ’’kon-tinuiranog’’ okvira (tj. uvođenjem u analizu projekcija odobravanja novih kredita, integrisanjem programa fi nan-siranja i pretpostavki o fi nansiranju obnavljanja dospjeća, inegrisanjem moguće diskrecione prodaje aktive, itd.). “Diskontinuirani” pristup je naravno lakše implementirati ali pruža informacije koje su manje korisne od potpunog ’’kontinuiranog’’ pristupa.

Drugi važni aspekti koje treba razjasniti prije nego što se analiza uradi se odnose na to kako će se razni tokovi goto-vine predstaviti. Na primjer:

Da li je jednostavno klasifi kovanje dospijeća odgovara- ■juće za banku ili je bolje nastaviti sa analizom na ’’prvog datuma kupovine/prodaje’’ u slučaju kupovnih ili pro-dajnih hartija od vrijednosti? Da li bi, umjesto klasifi kacije vlasničke aktive po njiho- ■vom dospijeću, bilo korisnije predstaviti njihov profi l ’’utrživosti’’ (tj. period u kome se očekuje da će aktiva biti prodata na tržištu bez pravljenja neprihvatljivih troško-va)? U ovom slučaju dodatne pretpostavke o utrživosti se moraju uvesti uz različite vremenske periode i ’’diskonti’’ za različite vrste hartija od vrijednosti. Šta je sa fi nansijskim stavkama koje imaju nesigurne to- ■kove gotovine? (npr. promjenljiva stopa kredita). Da li će oni biti planirani po scenariju terminske kamatne stope ili scenariju konstantne kamatne stope? Šta je sa fi nansijskim stavkama koje imaju nesigurno do- ■spijeće i tok gotovine? (npr. depoziti po viđenju i štednja, aranžmani za produženje, i nepovučene kreditne obave-ze)? Ovo bi stvorilo potrebu za pretpostavke o ponašanju klijenata i partnera.

5 Važno je napomenuti da se izračunavanje gapa likvidnosti razlikuje od takozvanog izračunavanja gapa kamatne stope. Ovo drugo izračunavanje se obavlja kako bi se procijenio potencijalni uticaj na neto prihod od kamata kretanja tržišnih kamatnih stopa i zasniva se na ’’datumu prvog određivanja cijena’’ za svaku stavku (npr., promjenljiva stopa pozajmljivanja), umjesto na ugovorno dospijeće. Za dalje detalje pogledati: Bessis, J. (2002), Risk Management in Banking, Wiley

Saldo Preko noæi

1 sed-mica

2 sed-mice

1 mjesec

3 mjeseca

1 godina

Aktiva 1500 1400 1270 1100 980 830 790

Pasiva 1500 1420 1320 1020 870 790 770

GAP likvidnosti 0 20 50 -80 -110 -40 -20

Amortizacija aktive 0 -100 -130 -170 -120 -150 -40

Amortizacija pasive 0 -80 -100 -300 -150 -80 -20

Marginalni GAP likvidnosti 0 20 30 -130 -30 70 20

Kumulativni GAP likvidnosti 0 20 50 -80 -110 -40 -20

Koeficijent priliva/odliva 1.25 1.30 0.57 0.80 1.88 2.00

Tabela 1

Grafikon 1


40

RIZIK LIKVIDNOSTI

Ratios structurally miss the time dimension of liquidity: ▷they can only provide a static view of the liquidity situa-tion of one bank and aren’t really useful in order to pro-ject liquidity shortages or excesses.Th e calculation of ratios is highly infl uenced by the acco- ▷unting rules: this may jeopardize comparability between diff erent banks and diff erent countries.If the calculation of ratios is limited to on-balance she- ▷et fi gures, the potentially signifi cant liquidity impact of of-balance sheet items (e.g.: large corporate loan com-mitments) is neglected.Limits and operating rules based on ratios may fail to take ▷into account the real marketability of securities held for liquidity purposes (e.g.: short term bonds).

Th e only measurement approach that is apt to give the ne-cessary dynamic view of the liquidity posture of one bank is the Liquidity Gap (or Cash Flow Forecasting) approach. Unfortunately, as compared to the ratio approach, the pre-paration of a detailed plan of future cash fl ows involves se-veral complex inputs from many departments of the bank and requires non trivial assumptions to be put in place.

According to the Liquidity Gap method, all expected cash fl ows from on-balance sheet and off -balance sheet items are quantifi ed and slotted to time buckets pre-defi ned by the bank. Liquidity gaps are the diff erences, at all future dates, between outstanding assets and liabilities, with respect to their liquidity profi le, but irrespective of their interest rate re-pricing schedule5. Table 1 shows an illustrative example of a liquidity gap table calculated over a horizon of one year.

In correspondence of each time bucket, negative cumulati-ve liquidity gaps indicate an excess of assets over liabilities, and therefore a liquidity defi cit (there are assets still out-standing that need to be fi nanced by some liabilities). In other words, the marginal liquidity gap for each time bucket represents the net amount of assets and liabilities that fall due within the bucket. With respect to Table 1, for instance, the marginal liquidity gap = 30 indicates that between day one (the O/N maturity – “overnight”) and day seven (the 1W maturity – “one week”), there are 30 assets in excess of liabilities that fall due, and therefore generate liquidity in-fl ows for the bank.

Liquidity risk arises when the cumulative liquidity gap is negative, i.e. there is a defi cit of funds at some point in time

in the future that will require either raising new funding or liquidating available assets. Of course, a negative cumula-tive liquidity gap does not mean that the bank is insolvent. It only means that the bank will need to rollover its funding or liquidate its assets at a certain future point in time, if it wants to survive.

As a matter of fact, a concept which is oft en mentioned in parallel with the cumulative liquidity gap is the so-cal-led “survival period”, which is the fi rst bucket in which a negative cumulative liquidity gap occurs (see graph 1 for a graphical illustration of the survival period concept based on the example in table 1).

Despite being conceptually simple, the construction of a liquidity gap analysis requires several assumptions.

One fi rst point to clarify is whether the future cash fl ows are to be projected on an “off -going” mode (i.e. taking only

the existing operations into account) or based on an “on-going” framework (i.e. introducing in the ana-lysis also the new loan business projections, integ-rating the funding program and assumptions about the funding rollover maturities, integrating possible discretionary assets sales, etc.). Th e “off -going” ap-proach is of course easier to be implemented, but it provides information that is less useful than a full fl edged “ongoing” approach.

Other important aspects that need to be clarifi ed before the analysis can be put in place are related to how the various cash fl ows are going to be repre-sented. For instance:

Is a simple maturity slotting appropriate for the bank or ■it is preferable to carry on the analysis on a “fi rst call/put date” in case of callable or puttable securities? Rather than slotting treasury assets by their respective ■maturity, would it be useful to represent their “marke-tability” profi le (i.e.: the period over which it is expec-ted that the assets can be sold on the market without incurring un-acceptable losses)? In this case additional assumptions about marketability must be introduced, with diff erentiated horizons and “haircuts” for diff erent types of securities. What about fi nancial items that have uncertain cash ■fl ows? (e.g. fl oating rate loans) Shall they be projected on a forward interest rate scenario or a constant interest rate scenario?

5 It is important to notice that the Liquidity Gap calculation is diff erent from the so-called “Interest Rate Gap” calculation. Th e latter is performed in order to estimate the potential impact on the Net Interest Income of a movement in market interest rates and is based on the “fi rst re-pricing date” for each item (e.g. a fl oating rate borrowing), rather than on its contractual maturity. For further details see: Bessis, J. (2002), Risk Management in Banking, Wiley

Balance O/N 1W 2W 1M 3M 1Y

Assets 1500 1400 1270 1100 980 830 790

Liabilities 1500 1420 1320 1020 870 790 770

Liquidity GAP 0 20 50 -80 -110 -40 -20

Amortization of Assets 0 -100 -130 -170 -120 -150 -40

Amortization of Liabilities 0 -80 -100 -300 -150 -80 -20

Marginal Liquidity GAP 0 20 30 -130 -30 70 20

Cumulative Liquidity GAP 0 20 50 -80 -110 -40 -20

Ratio Inflows / Outflows 1.25 1.30 0.57 0.80 1.88 2.00

Table 1

Graph 1


LIQUIDITY RISK

Uprkos (ili, što je vjerovatnije, zbog) duge liste pretpostavki koje treba utvrditi, ne postoje opšte prihvaćeni standardi za konstrukciju gapa likvidnosti.

Jedan prihvatljiv pristup bi bio da se u izračunavanje gapa uključe obavezni prilivi/odlivi po dospijeću i planirani novi krediti za kompanije (u skladu sa budžetom). Čim se to ura-di, moglo bi se dodati sljedeće:

Potencijalni tok gotovine od diskrecione prodaje vlasnič- ■ke aktive (ili dospijeća tokova gotovine),Realizacija diskrecionog programa fi nansiranja, ■Pravne naplate sredstvima likvidnosti, itd. ■

Upotrebom takvog pristupa bi se vidjelo kako raspoloži-va likvidna aktiva ili pristupačni izvori fi nansiranja mogu ograničiti negativan odliv gotovine iz redovnog bankar-skog poslovanja6.

Umjesto da se zasniva samo na ’’standardnom scenariju poslovanja’’ analiza gapa likvidnosti treba da se sprovodi obično upotrebom nekoliko scenarija (ili ’’stresnih testira-nja’’) koji simulišu profi l likvidnosti po različitim uslovima. Dalje u tekstu je dat spisak serija - iako djelimičan – mogu-ćih scenarija koji se mogu koristiti.

Scenario specifi čan za banku: smanjivanje rejtinga? Kriza ■reputacije? (npr. odliv depozita, ali moguća naplata sred-stvima likvidnosti u slučaju vanrednih situacija) Gubitak glavnog investitora?Opšti tržišni scenario: prekid fi nansijskog tržišta? (npr., ■gubitak utrživosti vlasničke aktive i uticaj na njihovu pre-tpostavljeni profi l likvidnosti, opšti odliv depozita, nedo-stupnost likvidnih sredstava u vanrednim situacijama). Usporavanje makroekonomije? (Uticaj na otplatu kredi-ta). Prirodna katastrofa i industrijska kriza? (Uticaj na otplatu kredita i povećana upotreba odobrenih ali nepo-vučenih kreditnih linija).

PLANIRANJE LIKVIDNOSTI U SLUČAJU KRIZEU periodu krize, likvidnost isparava, i krizni događaji se ne mogu zaista predvidjeti. Ono što je važno je da se unaprijed pripremi formalni dokument koji uključuje ’’plan likvidnos-ti u slučaju nepredvidivih okolnosti’’. Ovaj dokument treba da unaprijed odredi aktivnosti koje ukazuju na manjak lik-vidnosti u hitnim situacijama, a naročito da uspostavi jasne linije odgovornosti i procedure eskalacije koje treba brzo da se pozovu u slučaju krize likvidnosti.

Plan likvidnosti u slučaju vanredne situacije treba da sar-ži jasnu defi niciju o tome šta je ’’kriza likvidnosti’’ i treba da posebno naglasi:

Uloge, odgovornosti i procedure eskalacije koje će se ko- ■ristiti u kriznim situacijama;Imena, mjesto i kontak detalje ’’kriznog tima’’ koji će ■upravljati u kriznom periodu; Fizički centar za vanredne situacije (npr., soba trgovan- ■ja) i centralnu arhivu procedura i kontakata koje treba koristiti; Kanale komunikacije sa supervizorima, centralnim ban- ■kama, pružaocima likvidnosti u hitnim situacijama, po-vjerenicima, drugim ugovornim stranama; Ugovori o sredstvima obezbjeđenja za korišćenje lik- ■vidnih sredstava i kreditnih porfolija kao kolaterala za

pristup sredstvima u slučaju krize. Ako su krediti malih iznosa, grupe kolaterala treba da se strukturišu i treba da se usaglase rokovi o: nivoima prevelike kolateralizacije; ▷nivou kreditnog rizika (ponavljanja klijenata, garanci- ▷ja, itd.);strukturi otplate; ▷prosječnom i maksimalnom sezonstvu kredita ▷

Važan aspekt je da plan bude redovno testiran i da se pe-riodično ažurira kako bi se obezbijedila njegova validnost na kontinuiranoj osnovi.

POLITIKA RIZIKA LIKVIDNOSTIOdbor direktora je odgovoran u krajnjoj instanci za rizik likvidnosti koji preuzima banka i način na koji se tim rizi-kom upravlja. Stoga bi najuže rukovodstvo trebalo da pri-premi jasnu politiku upravljanja likvidnošću koju treba da odobri Odbor direktora. Idealno bi bilo da politika defi niše aspekte rukovođenja, mjerenja i upravljanja.

Sa stanovništa upravljanja, politika rizika likvidnosti treba da ukaže na toleranciju rizika likvidnosti. Na prim-jer, maksimalni nivo gapa likvidnosti po valuti, raznolikost izvora fi nansiranja, itd. Ovo bi trebalo redovno da ažurira i odobri Odbor, npr. na godišnjoj osnovi.

Politikom treba da dodijeli odgovornost za upravljanje likvidnosti i kontrolu rizika likvidnosti u banci. Obično je direktor plasmana i sredstava ili fi nansijski direktor u kraj-njoj instanci odgovoran za upravljanje likvidnošću sa svo-jim zamjenikom, dok su operativne kancelarije odgovorne za upravljanje dnevnom likvidnošću. Sa stanovišta praće-nja, Komitet za upravljanje rizikom (RMC) ili Komitet za upravljanje aktivom/pasivom (ALCO) treba da se redov-no (mjesečno kao minimum) sastaje kako bi identifi kovao i pratio rizike likdivnosti. Učestalost sastanaka treba da se defi niše u politici.

Drugi važan aspekt upravljanja je da politika rizika treba da utvrdi nivo raspodjele (ovlašćenja) i ovlašćenja za potpi-sivanje menadžerima likvidnosti, to je obično funkcija veza-na za veličinu transakcije sa jasnim pravilima za prenošenje na veće nivoe menadžmenta. Pored toga, politika treba da defi niše odgovornosti za praćenje (npr. kršenja limita rizi-ka likvidnosti) i kanale komunikacije koji će se koristiti u slučaju kršenja limita.

Sa stanovišta mjerenja, politika treba da ukaže na opšti metodološki okvir za planiranje budućih tokova gotovine i izračunavanje koefi cijenata likvidnosti, naročito:

identifi kovanjem svih izvora likvidnosti u vanrednim si- ▷tuacijama u pogledu vanbilansnih pozicija; identifi kovanjem relevantnih pravnih lica, fi lijala za- ▷visnih lica;defi nisanjem relevantnih koefi cijenata; ▷defi nisanjem odgovarajućeg vremenskog perioda i učesta- ▷losti mjerenja;navođenjem pretpostavki za modeliranje aktive i ▷pasive;defi nisanjem učestalosti izvještavanja za različite prima- ▷oce kao što je odbor, ALCO, i drugi što zavisi od opse-ga izvještavanja i tržišnih uslova (veća učestalost u vri-jeme stresa).

6 U žargonu upravljanja rizikom, ovo se ponekad naziva “kapacitet kontrateže”


42

RIZIK LIKVIDNOSTI

What about fi nancial items that have uncertain maturity ■and cash fl ow? (E.g. deposit at sight and saving deposits, rollover facilities, and un-drawn loan commitments)? Th is would create the need for assumptions about the behavior of clients and counterparties.

Despite (or, most probably, because of) the long list of as-sumptions that need to be put in place, there aren’t any ge-nerally accepted standards for liquidity gap construction.

One reasonable approach would be to include in the gap calculation the committed infl ows / outfl ows by maturity and the new loans business projections (according to the budget). Once this is done, one could sequentially add:

the potential cash fl ow from discretionary treasury assets ■sales (or maturity cash fl ows)the realization of the discretionary funding program ■the recourse to liquidity facilities, etc. ■

Such an approach would allow seeing how the availability of liquid assets or accessible funding sources may limit the negative cash outfl ow from ordinary banking business6.

Rather than being based only on a “standard operating sce-nario” liquidity gap analysis should be normally conducted under several scenarios (or “stress tests”) that simulate the liquidity profi le under diffi cult conditions. We list below a series - albeit partial - of possible scenarios that could be used.

Bank specifi c scenarios: rating downgrade? Reputational ■crisis? (e.g. run on deposits, but possible recourse to emer-gency liquidity facilities) Loss of a major investor?General market scenarios: fi nancial market disruption? ■(E.g. loss of marketability of treasury assets and consequ-ent impact on their assumed liquidity profi le, general run on deposits, unavailability of emergency liquidity facili-ties). Macroeconomic slowdown? (Impact on loans repay-ment). Natural catastrophe and industry crisis? (Impact on loans repayment and increased usage of committed but un-drawn credit lines)

LIQUIDITY CRISIS CONTINGENCY PLANNINGIn a crisis, liquidity evaporates, and crisis events cannot re-ally be forecasted. What is important is to put in place be-forehand a formal document outlining the “liquidity con-tingency plan”. Th is document should clearly pre-defi ne the actions for addressing liquidity shortfalls in emergency si-tuations, and in particular establish clear lines of responsi-bility and escalation procedures that should be rapidly in-voked in case of liquidity crisis.

Th e liquidity contingency plan should contain a clear defi -nition of what “liquidity crisis” is and the specifi cation of:

roles, responsibilities, and escalation procedures to be ■used in situation of crisisnames, location and contact details of the « crisis team» ■that is invested of managing the crisisA physical contingency center (e.g. trading room) and ■a central repository of procedures and contacts that ne-eds to be used.communication channels to supervisors, central banks, ■emergency liquidity providers, correspondents, custo-dians, counterparties

Collateralization agreements to use liquid assets and ■portfolios of loans as collateral for accessing emergency facilities. If the loans have a small size, pools of collateral to be structured and agreed in terms of:over-collateralization levels; ▷credit risk level (repeat customers, guarantees, etc.); ▷repayment structure ▷average and maximum seasoning of the loans; ▷

An important aspect is that the plan should be regularly tested and subject to periodic update to ensure that it is va-lid on an on-going basis.

LIQUIDITY RISK POLICYTh e Board of Directors is ultimately responsible for the liqu-idity risk assumed by the bank and the manner in which this risk is managed. Th erefore a clear liquidity manage-ment policy should be prepared by the top management and approved by the Board of Directors. Ideally, the policy document should defi ne aspects of governance, measure-ment and management.

From the point of view of governance, the liquidity risk policy should outline the liquidity risk tolerance. For exam-ple, the maximum level of liquidity gap by currency, the di-versity of funding sources, etc. Th is should be updated and approved by the Board on a regular basis, for instance yearly.

Th e policy should also allocate the responsibility for liqu-idity management and liquidity risk control in the bank. Usually the fi nal responsible for liquidity management is the Treasurer or the Director of Finance, with an authori-zed substitute, while ongoing day-to-day management of liquidity should be delegated to the operational desks. From the point of view of risk monitoring, the Risk Management Committee (RMC) or the Asset/Liability Management committee (ALCO) should meet to identify and monitor liquidity risks on a regular basis (monthly at a minimum). Th e frequency of meetings should be identifi ed in the po-licy document

Another important aspect of governance that the liqui-dity risk policy should address is the determine the level of delegation (authority) and the signatory powers assigned to the liquidity managers, usually a function of transaction size, with clear rules for escalation to higher levels of ma-nagement. Moreover, the policy should defi ne the monito-ring responsibilities (e.g..: for breaches in liquidity risk li-mits) and the communication channels to be used in case of limit breach.

From the point of view of measurement, the policy docu-ment should address the general methodology framework for projecting future cash fl ows and calculating liquidity ratios, in particular by:

identifying all sources of contingent liquidity related to ▷off -balance sheet positions; identifying the relevant legal entities, branches and ▷subsidiaries;defi ning the relevant ratios; ▷defi ning the appropriate time horizon and measurement ▷frequency;outlining the assumptions for the modeling of assets and ▷liabilities.

6 In risk management jargon, this is sometimes called “counter-balancing capacity”


LIQUIDITY RISK

Sa stanovišta rukovođenja, politika treba prije svega da identifi kuje prihvatljive instrumente na strani aktive koji se mogu lako pretvoriti u gotovinu i na strani pasive da osi-gura dovoljno diversifi kacije izvora fi nansiranja. Naročito, u slučaju aktive:

gotovina bi očigledno uvijek bila dozvoljena, ▷salda sa ostalim bankama: koje su banke ovlašćene i za koje ▷iznose, obično kao funkcija rejtinga i iznosa sopstvenih sredstva,hartije od vrijednosti sa fi ksnim prihodom: moraju se de- ▷fi nisati vrste, maksimalna dospijeća, minimalni rejting i ovlašćeni emitenti.

Važna tačka koju politika treba da obuhvati je da vlasnička aktiva ne bi trebala da ima pravne, regulatorne ili operativne prepreke koje ne mogu dozvoliti polaganje aktive kao kola-terala za dobijanje dodatnog fi nansiranja u slučaju potreba. S druge strane, u slučaju obaveza, politika treba da:

identifi kuje kvalifi kovane druge ugovorne strane u pogledu ▷rejtinga, nivoa sopstvenih sredstva, vlasništva, itd;identifi kuje kvalifi kovane vrste instrumenata; ▷defi niše moguće obezbijeđeno naspram neobezbijeđe- ▷nog fi nansiranja, itd.

Potrebno je jasno navesti za aktivu i za pasivu da li treba da se transakcije ograniče na lokalnu valutu ili se investiranje

i pozajmljivanje može obavljati u stranoj valuti. Ako je to slučaj, politika treba da ukaže na to koje su to dozvoljene valute i koji se limiti primjenjuju.

Čim se identifi kuju kvalifi kovani instrumenti, politika treba da sadrži i kvantitativne smjernice i limite:

limite gapa likvidnosti, koji se mogu izraziti u apso- ▷lutnim iznosima (npr., maksimalni gap koji ne treba da se krši u svakoj vremenskoj koloni), izražene u re-lativnim rokovima (npr., koefi cijent priliva/odliva po koloni) ili moguće izražen u vremenskom periodu (period opstanka);Minimalne i maksimalne limite za držanje gotovine i ▷vlasničke aktive, izražene u apsolutnom broju ili na re-lativnoj osnovi (npr., vlasnička aktiva/(planirani koefi -cijent odliva);Limite za koncentracije dospijeća pozajmica, vrstu i dru- ▷gu ugovornu stranu; Maksimalni procent raspoloživih kreditnih linija koje su ▷dozvoljene menadžeru likvidnosti da pozajmi u toku re-dovnog poslovanja. Neki neiskorišćeni kapaciteti pozaj-mica se trebaju uvijek čuvati; limite za otvorene izloženosti od deviznih transakci- ▷ja (npr., maksimalni % lokalnih potreba za likvidnošću koje se mogu pokriti fi nansiranjem ili držanjem likvidnih sredstava u stranoj valuti ili obrnuto) ■

Kako sa gubicimai nenaplativimpotraživanjima

Prvi problemi u fi nansijskom sektoru, koji su predstavljali i prve znake ekonomske krize koja je još u toku, pojavili su se u drugoj polovini 2007. godine u SAD-u. Jako brzo prenijeti su na razvijene evropske države tako da kriza u jesen 2008. godine prerasta u globalnu fi nansijsku krizu

mr Enesa BektešiHypo Alpe Adria Leasing


44

RIZIK LIKVIDNOSTI

KRIZA I FINANSIJSKI IZVJEŠTAJI

Uticaj krize na fi nansijske izvještaje za 2008. godinu nije došao do izra-

žaja u punoj mjeri jer se na području Crne Gore njeni znaci javljaju od jeseni 2008. godine. Ekspanzija krize na ovom području dešava se u 2009. godini te se

time prenose i njeni efekti na fi nansij-ske izvještaje za ovu godinu.

U doba fi nansijske krize stavka koja u najvećoj mjeri ugrožava rezultat fi nan-sijskih institucija jesu gubici po osno-vu umanjenja vrijednosti i nenaplativa

potraživanja. U skladu sa međunarod-nim računovodstvenim standardom 39, entitet je u obavezi da na kraju svakog izvještajnog perioda provjeri da li su se javili objektivni razlozi za uman-jenje vrijednosti pojedinog ili grupe

defi ning the frequency of reporting for various recipients ▷such as the board, ALCO, etc. which depends on the sco-pe of the reporting and the market conditions (higher frequency in times of stress).

From the point of view of management, the policy docu-ment should fi rst of all identify the acceptable instruments on the asset side that can easily be converted into cash and on the liability side that ensure suffi cient diversifi cation of funding sources. In particular, in the case of assets:

Cash would obviously be always allowed. ▷Balances with other banks: which banks are authorized ▷and for what amounts, typically as a function of rating and amount of its own funds.Fixed income securities: types, maximum maturities, mi- ▷nimum rating and authorized issuers must be defi ned.

An important point that the policy document should ad-dress is that treasury assets shouldn’t have legal, regulatory or operational impediment that may not allow pledging them as collateral to obtain additional funding in case of need.

On the other hand, in the case of liabilities, the policy document should:

Identify eligible counter-parties, in terms of rating, own ▷funds level, ownership, etc. Identify the eligible instrument types ▷

Defi ne the possible secured versus unsecured funding, etc. ▷For both assets and liabilities, it should be clearly stated whether transactions should be limited to local currency or investing and borrowing can also occur in foreign currency. If so, the policy has to address what the allowable currencies are and what limits apply.

Once the eligible instruments are defi ned, the policy do-cument should contain quantitative guidelines and limits:

Limits in terms of liquidity gap, that can be expressed in ▷absolute terms (e.g.: the maximum gap that should not be breached in each time bucket) expressed in relative terms (e.g.: ratio infl ows/outfl ows by time bucket) or possibly expressed in terms of time (survival period).Min. and max. limits for holdings of cash and treasury ▷assets, expressed as an absolute number or on a relati-ve basis (e.g.: treasury assets / projected outfl ows ratio).Limits for concentration of borrowings maturity, type ▷and counterpart Maximum percentage of the available credit lines that ▷the liquidity manager is allowed to borrow in the course of ordinary business. Some unused borrowing capacity should always be maintained.Limits for the open exposure from foreign exchange ▷transactions. (E.g. the max. % of local liquidity needs that can be covered with funding or liquid assets holdings in foreign currencies and vice versa) ■

How to Managethe Lossesand Bad Debts The fi rst problems in the fi nancial sector, also representing the fi rst signs of the ongoing economic crisis, emerged in the USA in the second half of 2007. Those were carried over to the developed European countries very quickly, so that the crisis turned into a global fi nancial crisis in the autumn of 2008

Enesa Bekteši, MScHypo Alpe Adria Leasing

No impact of the crisis was fully ex-pressed in the fi nancial reports for

2008, since its fi rst signals appeared in Montenegro in autumn 2008. Th e crisis in this area expanded in 2009, so that its impact will be refl ected in the fi nancial

reports for the current year. At a time of fi nancial crisis, the re-

sults of fi nancial institutions are mostly threatened by an item that includes the losses originating from a decrease in asset value and bad debts. According

to the international accounting stan-dard 39, at the end of each accounting period, each legal person is obliged to verify possible existence of any objec-tive reason to decrease the value of a particular fi nancial asset or a group of


THE CRISIS AND FINANCIAL REPORTS

LIQUIDITY RISK


46

KRIZA I FINANSIJSKI IZVJEŠTAJI

fi nansijskih sredstava. Ukoliko takvi razlozi postoje pravno lice je - u cilju obezbjeđenja fer prezentacije u fi nan-sijskim izvještajima - u obavezi da iz-vrši umanjenje vrijednosti sredstva ili grupe sredstava.

Umanjenje vrijednosti je neophodno evidentirati u periodu kada se javi jedan ili više indikatora koji su prouzrokovali gubitak i to nakon početnog priznavanja sredstva. U doba fi nansijske krize naj-češće se javlja kombinacija indikatora umanjenja vrijednosti koji vrše uticaj na očekivane buduće novčane tokove zbog značajnih fi nansijskih teškoća izdava-oca ili dužnika, kršenja ugovora kroz kašnjenja u plaćanju kamate i glavnice, vjerovatnoća da će dužnik bankrotira-ti, zbog nepostojanja aktivnog tržišta fi nansijskih sredstava i sl.

Za fi nansijske institucije umanjenje vrijednosti se u najvećoj mjeri odnosi na potraživanja koja se drže do dospi-jeća i koja se vode po amortizovanom trošku. Iznos gubitka predstavlja razli-ku između knjigovodstvene vrijednosti sredstva i sadašnje vrijednosti očekivanih budućih novčanih tokova od konkretnog fi nansijskog sredstva diskontovanih uz primjenu efektivne kamatne stope. Na ovaj način obračunati gubitak, knjiži se direktno kao umanjenje potraživanja ili preko računa ispravke vrijednosti potra-živanja i istovremeno kao trošak otpisa koji će teretiti bilans uspjeha perioda u kome je gubitak nastao.

Moguća je situacija da se u nared-nim obračunskim periodima gubitak po osnovu umanjenja vrijednosti za isto fi nansijsko sredstvo smanji zbog

događaja nakon inicijalnog umanje-nja. Jedan od mogućih je poboljšanje fi -nansijske situacije klijenta. U ovakvim slučajevima moguće je prethodno pri-znati gubitak po osnovu umanjenja, pa ga povratiti ili direktno na račun potraživanja ili preko računa ispravke vrijednosti. Bitno je voditi računa da je dozvoljeno povratiti iznos umanje-nja samo do nivoa sadašnje vrijednosti amortizovanog fi nansijskog sredstva u situaciji kao da umanjenja uopšte nije bilo. Efekti povećanja vrijednosti ostva-reni na ovaj način se takođe knjiže pre-ko bilansa uspjeha.

Nivo kreditnog rizika i karakteristike fi nansijskih sredstava koja se testiraju za umanjenje su bitni u cilju njihovog grupisanja radi procjene kolektivnog umanjenja. U cilju grupisanja fi nan-sijskih sredstava uzimaju se u obzir njihove karakteristike (vrsta sredstva, vrsta kolaterala, grana industrije, geo-grafska lokacija, kašnjenje i ostali rele-vantni faktori). Odabrane karakteristike trebaju da budu relevantne za procjenu budućih novčanih tokova za datu gru-pu fi nansijskih sredstava. Neophodno je u grupi identifi kovati sva fi nansijska sredstva koja individualno zadovolja-vaju uslove za umanjenje vrijednos-ti. Ukoliko nije moguće identifi kovati umanjenje na individualnom potraži-vanju neophodno je testirati umanje-nje na nivou portfolija. Za veliku grupu potraživanja, određeni nivo nenaplati-vosti se obično ocjenjuje kao očekivan. Očekivana umanjenja na nivou port-folija predstavljaju smanjenje ekonom-skih koristi koje će se refl ektovati kroz

bilans uspjeha. Za procjenu umanjenja vrijednosti na nivou grupe obično se oslanjamo na iskustva iz prethodnih perioda koje se koriguje u cilju prila-gođavanja sadašnjim uslovima.

Procjena budućih novčanih tokova za individualno potraživanje se mora bazirati na iskustvu u uslovima koji još uvijek traju i istovremeno na očekiva-nim promjenama u uslovima u budu-ćem periodu za koji se procjena radi. Metodologija i pretpostavke koje su ko-rišćene pri procjeni budućih novčanih tokova se moraju redovno revidirati u cilju smanjenja razlika između proci-jenjenih i ostvarenih gubitaka.

U praksi se može javiti situacija da se od klijenta ne očekuju budući novčani tokovi. U tom slučaju cjelokupan iznos potraživanja predstavlja trošak u periodu u kome se ono ocijeni kao nenaplativo. Ako se radi o kolateralizovanom potra-živanju tada se procjenjuje fer vrijednost kolaterala. Naplata potraživanja obaviće se u ovom slučaju prodajom kolaterala. Razlika između knjigovodstvene vrijed-nosti potraživanja i neto fer vrijednosti kolaterala (fer vrijednost umanjena za troškove prodaje) knjiži se na teret bi-lansa uspjeha.

Ukoliko ne postoji aktivno tržište za prodaju kolaterala neophodno je pred-vidjeti trenutak prodaje i diskontovati vrijednost kolaterala na sadašnju vri-jednost primjenom inicijalne efektivne kamatne stope koja se primjenjuje i u slučaju diskontovanja očekivanih bu-dućih novčanih tokova. Razlika između vrijednosti potraživanja i neto sadašnje vrijednosti kolaterala se takođe knji-ži kroz bilans uspjeha kao umanjenje vrijednosti.

Ukoliko u narednim obračunskim periodima dođe do promjene okol-nosti - kad indikatori koji su ukazivali na umanjenje vrijednosti potraživanja više ne postoje - moguće je izvršiti ob-ratno knjiženje umanjenja i povratiti iznos potraživanja odnosno eliminisa-ti račun ispravke vrijednosti. Iznos do koga je moguće obratno knjiženje je samo nivo knjigovodstvene vrijednos-ti fi nansijskog sredstva kao da umanje-nja nije ni bilo.

Neminovno je da u uslovima fi nan-sijske krize - koja ima za posljedicu ne-mogućnost redovne naplate kao i ne-postojanje aktivnog tržišta - fi nansijski izvještaji budu značajno opterećeni, te da je potreban dug vremenski period za fi nansijski oporavak ■

fi nancial assets. If such reasons exist, in order to ensure a lawful data presenta-tion in the fi nancial reports, the concer-ned legal person will be liable to record the reduced value of its particular asset or a group of assets.

It is necessary to record a decrease in the asset value for a period when one or more indicators that caused the loss appeared, following a prior recognition of the assets. At a time of fi nancial crisis, usually a combination of indicators for a decrease in asset value can be noted, and those aff ect the planned upcoming fi nancial fl ows due to signifi cant fi nan-cial diffi culties of the creditors or deb-tors, defaulting on loan agreements by way of delay in payment of the interest and principal, probability of the debtor’s insolvency, due to non existence of an active fi nancial market, etc.

In case of financial institutions, a decrease in asset value mostly relates to the receivables that are maintained until maturity and reported according to the depreciation charges. Total debt amounts to a diff erence between the book value and current value of assets and future monetary fl ows for the parti-cular fi nancial assets, discounted using an eff ective interest rate. Th e debt cal-culated in this manner is recorded di-rectly as a decrease in the receivables or by correcting the value of account receivable, and at the same time as the cost of write-off to be recorded on the income statement for the period when the loss occurred.

It is possible that a loss resulting from the reduced value of the same fi nancial asset may be less in the following ac-counting period, due to an event that occurred aft er the initial reduction in value. This may, inter alia, relate to an improved fi nancial situation of the client. In such cases, it is possible to re-cognize the loss resulting from such a reduction prior to its recovery, or return it directly to the account receivable or on the account for corrected values. It is important to have in mind that it is permitted to recover the reduced asset value only up to the level of the current value of a depreciated fi nancial asset, as if no reduction has ever taken place. Th e result of an increase in value realized in this manner is also recorded on the income statement.

Th e level of credit risk and charac-teristics of the fi nancial assets that are examined in relation to a reduction

in their value need to be established, which is important for the purpose of grouping, in order to assess an overall reduced value. With a view of grouping them together, the characteristics of fi -nancial assets are taken into considera-tion (type of assets; type of collateral; branch of industry; geographic position; time overdue; and other relevant fac-tors). Th e selected characteristics need to be relevant in order to assess future monetary fl ows for the given group of fi nancial assets. It is necessary to iden-tify all fi nancial assets within a group that individually meet the conditions for a reduction in asset value. If it is not possible to identify a reduction on the level of particular active debts, it is necessary to examine the reduction on the level of the portfolio. In case of a large group of active debts, a particu-lar level of bad debts is usually assessed as expected. An expected reduction on the level of the portfolio stands for a reduced economic benefi t that will be refl ected on the income statement. In order to assess a reduced value on the level of a group, the experiences from the previous periods are usually relied on, and those are adjusted to fi t the cur-rent conditions.

An assessment of future monetary fl ows for an individual claim must be based on the experiences relating to the currently ongoing conditions, and at the same time also on the expected changes under the conditions during a future period of time that the asses-sment refers to. Both the methodology and assumptions used to assess the fu-ture monetary fl ows must be regularly reviewed, in order to reduce the diff e-rence between the assessed and reali-zed losses.

In practice, there may be a situation where the client is expected to gene-rate no future monetary fl ows. In this case, the entire amount of outstanding claims is considered as a cost relating to the period for which it is assessed as uncollectible. In case of a secured claim, a fair value of the collateral is assessed. In this case, the claim will be collected when the collateral is sold. Th e diff eren-ce between the book value of the cla-im and a fair net value of the collateral (fair value reduced by the sale costs) is recorded on the income statement, on the debit side.

If no active market for the sale of the collateral exists, it is necessary to anti-

cipate the moment of this sale and dis-count the value of the collateral down to the current value by applying an initial eff ective interest rate that is also applied when discounting the assumed future monetary fl ows. Th e diff erence between the value of active debts and the current net value of the collateral is also recorded on the income statement as a reduced value.

If the circumstances change during the following accounting periods, that is if the indicators that showed a decre-ase in the value of receivables cease to exist, the reduction in value may be re-corded in reverse, so that the amount of the claim is recovered, that is the acco-unt of value correction eliminated. Th e reverse accounting can go back only to the amount of book value of the fi -nancial assets, as if no reduction ever took place.

Under the conditions of the fi nancial crises, as a consequence of which it is not possible to collect the receivables on regular basis and when no active market exists, the fi nancial reports will inevi-tably record a signifi cant debit, whereas a long period of time will be required for a fi nancial recovery. ■


THE CRISIS AND FINANCIAL REPORTS


Bulevar Sv Petra Cetinjskog 115, 81 000 PodgoricaBulevar Petra Cetinjs g 115, 81 00 odgoricaTel: +382 (0)20 407 90Tel: +382 )20 407 900

Investic ono b nkars voK stodi poslov i VIP banka stvoUpravljanje sr dstvimaKomerc alno ankar tvoE tradingE banki g

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december 2009 | :Bankar

Greškeu koracima

Dilema je da li i u kojoj mjeri poželjno ulaganje u uslovima krize. Vladala je prava pomama za akcijama. Skoro niko nije ulagao u obveznice, investicione fondove, ili otvarao štednju. Crnogorci osobeni, veliki hazarderi. Sadašnji kapitalistički sistem treba da pretrpi radikalne promjene - biće to isti sistem, u kome će dominirati kapital, koji će sada imati i zaštitu države

Mr Miloš RajkovićNLB Montenegrobanka

Pitanje je da li privreda, zasnovana na tokovima kapitala koji su usmjera-

vani isključivo maksimizacijom profi ta, može da bude stabilna, ili je logika tih tokova da periodično dovode do kriza. Kenzijanci kroz svoju teoriju privrednih ciklusa sugerišu da su fi nansijska tržišta nestabilna i podložna špekulativnim ak-tivnostima. U periodima prosperiteta, investitori postaju optimistični, spremni su da drže rizičniju aktivu i povećaju ste-pen svoje zaduženosti. Kako bi investirali svoje aktivnosti, investitori osmišljavaju nove oblike kredita i fi nansijskih instru-menata, a ove špekulativne aktivnosti je teško zaustaviti jer se izvori fi nansiranja mijenjaju. Kada dođe do negativnog šoka, očekivanja postaju pesimistička, dolazi do kontrakcije kredita i krize dugova, fi rmi i pojedinaca.

Svaki problem bilo u kojoj sferi života, predstavlja ujedno i šansu. Veći rizik je i veća mogućnost dobitka. Dilema je da li i u kojoj mjeri poželjno ulaganje u uslo-vima krize.

Period koji se poklapa sa periodom na-duvavanja kriznog balona u SAD, u Crnoj Gori je obilježio vrtoglavi rast vrijednosti hartija od vrijednosti. Ne pridržavajući se ni jednog zdravog ekonomskog principa, Crnogorci su najveći dio svojih ulaganja usmjerili na tržište kapitala. Vrtlog koji je na kraju vodio na dno mnoge je potopio ili onesposobio zauvijek. Stalna trka za pro-fi tom, bez analiza i uključivanja naučnih modela, dovela je do nesrazmjere u inves-tiranju, i posljedično do gubitaka.

Na crnogorskom tržištu kapitalu vlada-

la je prava pomama za akcijama koje su vrtoglavo rasle, dok se promet nepresta-no povećavao. Stanovništvo je tadašnjim zbivanjima na berzi vidjelo način da dođu do brze i lake zarade, zbog čega su bez opreza investirali. Stručnjaci su upozo-ravali da se ulaganja ne vrše na osnovu kuloarskih priča, ili površnih procjena, već da se ide principom manjeg rizika, bez obzira na moguću dobit. Ovo znači da je trebalo kupovati akcije kompanija koje su svojim prethodnim poslovanjem i imovinom ulivale povjerenje i obećava-le buduće dobre rezultate. Doduše, spro-vođenje je bilo otežano jer se kod nas vrijednost akcija nije uvijek zasnivala na ekonomskim pokazateljima i pouzdanim informacijama o budućoj vrijednosti fi rme u čije akcije se ulaže. Najčešče su njihovi bilansi bile nepoznanica, pa se trenutni interes kupaca formirao na osnovu svjes-nog širenja glasina o potencijalnim inves-titorima čija tačna struktura se opet nije mogla utvrditi. Crnogorci su bili imuni na upozorenja pa su novac nemilice ulagali u najrizičnije hartije od vrijednosti, oče-kujući srazmjerno tome enormno visoke prihode. Kreditno zaduživanje po kamat-nim stopama od 20 % bilo je normalno, a sa ciljem da se dobijena sredstva „oplo-de“ na tržištu kapitala i izađe kao dobit-nik. Skoro niko nije ulagao u obveznice, investicione fondove, ili otvarao štednju. Penzioni fondovi, nekretnine i investira-nje u plemenite metale predstavljaju uz već navedene oblike ulaganja koja su manje rizična. Tako su obveznice nosile niži ali siguran prinos. Kupovina zlata je takođe

unosan posao, jer sa početkom krize, nje-gova cijena raste. Prodaja zlata bi treba-la da se poklopi sa početkom oporavka svetske ekonomije. Cijena nekretnina u uslovima krize pada, ali gubitak vrijednos-ti je svakako značajno manji od pada na berzi. Da bi se moglo očekivati očuvanje ili uvećanje vrijednosti novca uloženog u akcije ili fondove, treba znati napraviti procjenu kada je pad vrijednosti hartija od vrijednosti najveći. Ako se posle kupo-vine njihova cijena počne kretati naviše, eto dobre investicije.

Ipak treba napomenuti da u slučaju hiperkrize, nema dovoljno sigurnog ula-ganja. U takvim uslovima novac uložen u obveznice nije siguran, jer država neće imati dovoljno sredstva da isplati povje-rioce. Cijene nekretnina bi drastično pale zbog smanjene kupovne moći, a sredstva koja su eventualno uložena u zlato, opet se ne bi isplatila. Cijena zlata bi pala pa bi se na sekundarnom tržištu moralo prodavati po nižoj cijeni od kupovne. Jedino isplati-vo bilo bi ulaganje u osnovne životne po-trepštine, koje bi nosilo i visok rizik.

Ako se vodimo teorijom privrednih ciklusa na vrhu ekspanzije treba proda-ti sve oblike imovine i obezbijediti keš, iz razloga jer nastupa takozvano čišćen-je tržišta, odnosno vrijednost imovine koja je precijenjena počinje da opada. I obratno, kada se čišćenje tržišta završi, i kriza dotakne dno, treba kupiti potci-jenjene oblike imovine i kroz njihov rast uvećati svoje bogatstvo. Ali pošto je do-sta teško pobijediti tržište i tačno znati kuda će se kretati u narednom periodu


50

FINANSIJSKA TRŽIŠTA

Wrong StepsThe dilemma is whether and up to what extent it is desirable to invest under the conditions of crisis. There was such a frenzied demand for shares. Almost no person invested into bonds, investment funds or savings. Montenegrins are distinctive, large-scale gamblers. The present capitalist system is expected to undergo some radical changes; it will be the same system, dominated by capital, that will now be under the protection of the state

MSc Miloš RajkovićNLB Montenegrobanka

The question is whether an economy, based on the fl ows of capital that are

directed exclusively toward profi t gene-ration, may be stable, or else whether such fl ows have a logic of leading to pe-riodical crisis.

Th e Keynesians, through their theo-ry of economic cycles, suggest that the fi nancial markets are unstable and sus-ceptible to speculative activities. During the periods of prosperity, the investors become more optimistic, ready to hold more risky assets and increase the level of own indebtness. In order to invest into their activities, the investors create new forms of loans and fi nancial instruments, while those speculative activities are hard to stop since the sources of fi nance chan-ge. When a negative shock is encounte-red, the expectations turn pessimistic, while the contraction of loans and the crisis of debt, companies and individual persons occur.

Each problem no matter is which sphere of life at the same time represents an op-portunity. A higher risk is a greater possi-bility to gain. Th e dilemma is whether and up to what extent it is desirable to invest under the conditions of crisis.

Th e period in Montenegro that matches the period when the balloon of the crisis was infl ated in the USA was characteristic for a vertiginous growth of securities. Not adhering to any sound economic princip-le, Montenegrins directed most of their investment funds to the capital market. Many were sunk or disabled forever by the whirlpool that fi nally led to the bottom.

A constant race aft er the profi t, based on no analysis or consideration of scientifi c models, led to an imbalance in investment activities that resulted in losses.

Th e market of Montenegro was charac-terized by a true frenzy for shares that that were dizzily going up, while the turnover recorded a continuous growth. Th e po-pulation assessed the contemporary ac-tivities at the stock market as the way to a fast and easy gain, which is why they invested without any caution. Th e experts warned that no investment should be made on the basis of hear-say, but to follow the principle of a lower risk, regardless of po-tential gains. Th is means that the shares of companies that had gained confi dence during the previous period of time and seemed likely to generate good results in the future should have been purchased. Nevertheless, this was diffi cult to apply in practice since the value of shares in our case was not always based on econo-mic indicators and reliable information on the future value of a company whose shares are invested into. Most oft en, no fi nal outcome could be known, so that the current interest of purchasers was based on a conscious spreading of ru-mors on potential investors whose exact structure could not be established again. Montenegrins were immune to warnings so that they used to invest mercilessly into various securities, expecting to gain in proportion with those enormously high profi ts. It was normal to take loans at an interest rate of 20%, aiming to “fer-tilize” such funds in the capital market

and come out as a winner. Almost no investments were made into bonds, in-vestment funds or savings. Investments into pension funds, real estate or precious metals, besides the foregoing ones, repre-sented a less risky form of investments. So that lower but certain proceeds were generated by bonds. Th e purchasing of gold is also a profi table business, since its price goes up as the crisis start. Th e sale of gold should match the starting point of recovery of the global economy. Th e prices of real estate go down at the time of crisis, although a decrease in proper-ty value is certainly signifi cantly smaller than the fall at the stock market. In order to expect the value of money invested into stocks or funds either to remain stable or increase, one needs to know how to as-sess when the value of the securities rea-ched the lowest point. If their price starts going up aft er the purchase, there goes a good investment.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the case of hyper crisis, no investment is secure enough. Under such circumstan-ces the money invested in bonds is not safe, since the state will not have enough fi nancial resources to pay all creditors out. Real estate prices would record a drastic fall, and a possible investment in gold would not be profi table either. Th e price of gold would go down, so that it could be sold in secondary markets at a price that is lower than the purchase one. It would only be profi table to invest into vital supplies, which would also car-ry a high risk.


FINANCIAL MARKETS

treba se služiti diverzifi kacijom plasma-na te svoju imovinu podijeliti u više raz-ličitih oblika. Osnov ove raspodjele jeste u kombinovanju dva ili više fi nansijskih instrumenata čiji su rizici i prinosi razli-čiti, pa se rizik jednog nadoknađuje kroz ulaganje u ostale oblike imovine. Jasno je da ovo nije jednostavan posao, pa se zato portfolio menadžeri visoko kotiraju kao profesionalci sa usko stručnim znanjima. Obično su ovi eksperti angažovani od stra-ne investicionih fondova koji su najviše i doprinijeli afi rmaciji pristupa veće dis-perzije, odnosno dijeljenja rizika.

No, može se konstatovati da su i u ovom slučaju Crnogorci osobeni, pa su strategi-je koje su primjenjivali bile van domašaja uobičajenih analiza. Ne želeći da se zama-raju slušanjem savjeta, sami su određivali gdje će uložiti novac, a ekspertske procje-ne za njih su bile bacanje novca. Često se dešavalo da čak i veća ulaganja tipa inves-tiranja u komplekse nekretnina, kreiraju sami i na osnovu svoje intuicije.

Danas, kada se podvuče crta, vide se greške, ili što je još lošija varijanta, osjećaju se. Uglavnom trpe građani, koji su po ko zna koji put izigrani, i manje više banke koje zbog loše naplate bilježe slabije po-slovne rezultate.

Period koji je prethodio u Crnoj Gori je obilježen ponašanjem koje odstupa od onog koje je zasnovano na zdravim eko-nomskim principima. Po svom karakte-ru, svi ljudi se mogu svrstati u tri grupe: skloni rizicima, neutralni prema rizici-ma i protivnici rizika. Međutim iako je po nekim anketama najviše ovih zad-njih, ovaj rezultat se ne podudara sa bro-jem Crnogoraca koji su prilikom inves-tiranja preuzeli neopravdan rizik. Da se anketa sprovodila na osnovu ponašanja na našem tlu, rezultati bi upućivali na to da smo veliki hazarderi.

Da bi se objasnila ova devijacija mora se poći malo u prošlost i dotaći ekonomskih doktrina. Još u drugoj polovini dvadesetog vijeka, osjeća se jaka konfrotacija između dvije ekonomske škole - kenzijanaca (fi s-kalizam) i monetarista (liberalizam). Prvi koji zastupaju stav da je država samostal-na u privređivanju, i da treba da fi skalnim mjerama povećava tražnju i na taj način podstiče proizvodnju. Drugi koji kažu da je tržište samo sebi najbolji regulator, a da su pojedinci racionalni, odnosno sami se adaptiraju promjenama.

Ekonomista Adam Smit pisao je o ra-cionalnom ponašanju ljudi. Svaki pojedi-nac kao „homo economicus“ procjenjuje svoje troškove i traži najisplativije rješe-

nje. Pošto je to rješenje najbolje za poje-dinca, najbolje je i za društvo, pa iz toga proizilazi da se država ne smije miješati u privredne aktivnosti. Slobodno tržište je najefi kasniji mehanizam za uspostavlja-nje ravnoteže. Vrijeme je pokazalo da to nije istina a razlozi su sledeći. Prvi je što ne postoji savršeno tržište u smislu da se uslovi poslovanja nikada ne mogu zamrz-nuti u najpovoljnijim položaju, a drugi je da ljudi ipak nisu potpuno racionalna bića. Kejns je još 1935. tvrdio da su ljudske odluke pod uticajem raznih parametara koji su izvan ekonomije, koje je zajednički okarakterisao kao „animal spirit“ odnosno životinjski nagoni. Znači i da se nije desila kriza uzrokovana špekulacijama, može se govoriti o nestalnosti ljudskih postupaka zbog urođene osobine da se nešto predu-zima. Ti postupci su često povjerenje ili pohlepa, poštenje ili korupcija, prividni optimizam. Veći dio današnjih analitičara slaže se da je kriza izazvana neracional-nim ponašanjem, pohlepom, od čijih po-sledica država nije zaštitila sve učesnike u tržišnoj utakmici.

Očekivanja igraju važnu ulogu u po-većanju krhkosti fi nansijskog sistema, a formiraju se u uslovima neizvjesnosti odnosa prinosa i rizika. Na osnovu ovog Kejnsovog učenja, Minski je formulisao hipotezu o fi nansijskoj nestabilnosti, koja se potpuno poklapa sa onim što se desilo u Crnoj Gori.

Faze krize su: iskorak - uslijed dejstva nekog eksternog faktora raste optimizam i povećava se obim investicija; ekspanzi-ja - investitori ostvaruju visoke prinose, a drugi učesnici motivisani visokim pro-fi tima ulaze u igru; euforija - snižavaju se kreditni standardi u cilju maksimizacije profi ta; izlazak obaviještenih - informisa-ni investitori povlače se sa tržišta; panika - cijene hartija od vrijednosti padaju, pa investitori nastoje da se što prije otarase loše aktive. A pod mjehurovima se pod-razumijevaju promjene cijena imovine koje se ne mogu objasniti racionalnim ekonomskim faktorima i koje nisu odr-žive. Špekulativna pomama vodi razvoju optimističkih očekivanja.

Nasuprot ovog je shvatanje efi kasnog tr-žišta, prema kome su pojedinci nezavisni i samostalni investitori, a cijene različitih oblika imovine predstavljaju informaci-je koje su svima poznate. Još 1965. Eugen Fama je postavio hipotezu efi kasnih tržiš-ta, prema kojoj se sve nove informacije koje dolaze na tržište odmah ugrađuju u vrednovanje, ne ostavljajući prostora za natprosječne profi te koji bi bili rezultat


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Following the theory of economic cycles, all sorts of p.roperty should be sold when the demand reaches its peak, in order to generate cash, because the so-called clearing of the marking will come, me-aning that the assessed value of the pro-perty will start going down. And also the other way around, when the clearing of the market ends, and the crises reaches its lowest point, the underestimated forms of property should be purchased and per-sonal wealth increased as the prices go up. However, since it is diffi cult to win against the market and know exactly its movement over the following period of time, the placement should be diversifi ed so that one’s personal property is divided into several diff erent forms. Th is diversi-fi cation is based on a combination of two or more fi nancial instruments associated with various risks and proceeds, so that a risk on one side is recovered through the investments into other forms of assets. Th is is clearly not a simple job, which is why the portfolio managers are highly rated as the professionals who have very specifi c expert knowledge. Such experts are usually engaged by the investment funds that also contributed the most to the recognition of an approach of higher dispersion, which is risk distribution.

However, it may be noted that Montenegrins were special in this re-gard as well, so that their applied strate-gies were beyond any customary analysis. Not wishing to be troubled by listening to advice, they used to decide on their own where to invest their funds, whereas they saw asking for an expert advice as mo-ney wasting. Th ey oft en used to develop even some major investments, like those into real estate, on their own, and based on personal intuition.

Presently, when a line is drawn, the mistakes can be seen, or else, which is an even worse variant, those can be felt. Th e consequences are suff ered mostly by the citizens who were outplayed for who knows how many times, and more or less by the banks which, due to lower collection rates, record weaker business results.

Th e preceding period in Montenegro was characterized by a behavior that deviated from the one based on sound economic principles. By character, all people can be classifi ed into one of the following three groups: those who are inclined to, neutral or against the risks. However, although the results of some surveys confi rmed that the third category was the largest, such

results did not match the actual number of Montenegrins who run an unjustifi ab-le investment risk. Had the survey been conducted on the basis of domestic ex-pectations, the results would have shown that we were major gamblers.

In order to explain this deviation, one needs to go back a little into the past to refer to economic doctrines. Already in the second half of the twentieth century, a strong confrontation could be felt betwe-en two economic schools: the Keynesians (fi scal) and the monetarists (liberal). Th e former ones support the position that a state is independent in economic activi-ties, so that the demand needs to be in-creased by applying fi scal measures, thus encouraging the production. Th e latter ones say that the market is the best self-regulator, while single persons are ratio-nal, meaning that they adapt to changes by themselves.

Adam Smith, an economist, wrote abo-ut rational human behavior. Each person, as homo economicus, assesses personal costs and looks for the most cost effi cient solution. Since such a solution is the best for a single person, it is also the best for the society, which results in a conclusion that the state must not interfere with the economic activities. A free market is the most effi cient mechanism to establish a balance. Th e time has proven this wrong, for the following reasons: fi rst of all there is no perfect market in the sense that the business environment can never be fro-zen at the most favorable stage, and se-condly, human beings are still not com-pletely rational beings. Already back in 1935, Keynes claimed that human decisions were aff ected by various parameters that were outside of the economy, which he commonly characterized as “animal spi-rit”, that is animal instincts. Th is means that even if no speculation-caused crisis occurred, unstable character of human actions can be spoken about due to the innate characteristic of taking steps. Th ose steps mostly include confi dence or gre-ed, annulment or corruption, and appa-rent optimism. Presently, the majority of analyses agree that the crisis was caused by irrational behavior and greed, while the state provided no protection against the consequences for all participants in the market race.

Th e expectations play an important part in relation to an increased fragility of the fi nancial system, and those are formed under the conditions of uncertain rela-tions between the proceeds and risks. On

the basis of Keynes’ teaching, Minsky for-mulated the theses of fi nancial instability, which fully matches up with the situation that occurred in Montenegro.

Th e phases are the following: step for-ward - due to the eff ect of an exterior fac-tor, optimism grows, as well as the scope of investments; expansion – high proce-eds are generated by the investors, whi-le other participants, motivated by high profi ts, enter the game; euphoria – credit standards are lowered in order to genera-te maximum profi ts; well informed parti-cipants go out – well informed investors withdraw from the market; panic – the prices of securities go down, so that the investors seek to get rid of bad assets the soonest possible. Th e bubbles mean that the prices of assets change, which can not be explained by rational economic factors, and which can not be sustained. Speculative frenzy leads to optimistic expectations.

Th e idea of market effi ciency is contra-ry to the foregoing, according to which single persons are independent and self-standing investors, while the prices of va-rious forms of assets represent generally known information. Already back in 1965, Eugene Fama established the hypothesis of effi cient markets, according to which all new pieces of information that come to the market are immediately incorporated into evaluation, so that no room is left for the above average profi ts that would re-sult from the trading activities based on such new information. Accordingly, risk taking is a moral gamble resulting from the guaranteed deposits by the state and salvation of the banks that face problems. One of the most oft en emphasized rea-sons against regulation was that it suff o-cated innovation. However, the previous period of time showed that particular in-novations encouraged single persons to work in their short-term interest, while placing the load of long-term risks on the others, and it was not possible to see the real consequences of complicated fi nan-cial instruments.

What happened in Montenegro? An answer can be found in the so-called be-haviorist approach to the role of actors in this process. Th is describes the free will as illusory, while the entire behavior is determined, that is regulated by the en-vironment and behavior of the majority. Human nature is determined by exterior circumstances and acquired though con-ditioning, meaning an interaction with the surroundings. Th e decisions of single


FINANCIAL MARKETS

trgovanja na temelju tih novih informa-cija. Prema tome, preuzimanje rizika je moralni hazard koji predstavlja poslje-dicu garantovanja depozita od strane dr-žave i spašavanja banaka koje se suoče sa problemima. Jedan od najčešće isticanih razloga protiv regulacije bio je da ona guši inovacije. No protekli period je po-kazao da su pojedine inovacije podsticale pojedince da rade u svom kratkoročnom interesu, opterećujući ostale dugoričnim rizikom, uz nemogućnost da se sagledaju prave posledice kompleksnih fi nansijskih instrumenata.

Šta se desilo u Crnoj Gori? Odgovor se može pronaći u takozvanom bihevio-rističkom pristupu ulozi aktera u ovom procesu. On glasi da je slobodna volja ilu-zorna, te da je cijelo ponašanje determi-nisano, tj. određeno okolinom i ponašan-jem većine. Ljudska priroda je određena spoljnim okolnostima, i stečena je kroz uslovljavanje, odnosno interakcijom sa okruženjem. Pojedinci baziraju svoje od-luke ne samo na svojim procjenama već na osnovu procjena drugih. Ukoliko se svi oko njega ponašaju na istovjetan način, on može da zaključi da je takvo ponašanje ispravno, iako nije uvjeren u to. Ovaj fe-nomen - kada pojedinac vođen ponaša-njem drugih odbacuje svoj sud, neki autori nazivaju informaciona kaskada.

Profesor na Yale univerzitetu Robert Shiller objašnjava ponašanje pojedinaca prilikom nastanka tržišnog balona psi-hološkim razlozima. Vremenom ljudi za-postavljaju sopstvene sigurnosne sumnje, jer razmišljaju da svi ostali ne mogu biti u zabludi. Kvalitet grupne informacije se sa prihvatanjem takvog „nagona krda“ još više pogoršava. Rezultat je kolektivno mišljenje i ekonomski bum, koji se na kra-ju završava razočarenjem i bolnim korek-cijama. Još 1987. nagli pad vrijednosti na tržištima kapitala širom svijeta, izazvao je razne polemike. No kasnije je Shiller objas-nio ovaj fenomen kao samopodržavajući proces u kome investitori ne mare za raci-onalno vrednovanje fi nansijske imovine, nego temelje svoja očekivanja isključivo na opažanju da je vrijednost fi nansijske imovine krenula naniže. Još jedan nega-tivan output ovog gledanja je i to što su investitori neskloni realizaciji kapitalnih gubitaka. To znači da nisu skloni priznati grešku i da će se radije držati loših ula-ganja, nego priznati grešku i reinvestirati kapital u nove hartije od vrijednosti.

Građani Crne Gore su dozvolili da ih vode nadanja i strahovi, prije nego či-njenice. Polazilo se od pretpostavke da se

neće pogriješiti ako se prati instikt većine. Posebna pažnja pridavana je i potezima pojedinaca koji su slovili za ljude od znan-ja. U tu grupu su bili i oni koji nisu pažnju zavređivali iskustvom i imetkom, ali su imali pristup informacijama. Čaršijske priče da je „on“ kupio akcije te fi rme, bile su siguran znak da taj potez treba prati-ti. To je bio put za stvaranje sopstvene strategije investiranja i pretpostavka za uspjeh. Bili su veoma pristrasni, i pred-viđali su događaje na osnovu informa-cija koje su im bile najdostupnije, a koje najčešće nisu bile relevantne za pojedine odluke. Tako, mnogi su pretpostavljali da zbog toga što je neka kompanija veoma poznata, treba kupiti njene akcije. Ovo je pretjerano uprošćavanje donošenja odlu-ke, korišćenjem ograničenih dostupnih podataka. Ovakvo ponašanje u kontek-stu fi nansijskih odluka najčešče navodi investitore na pogrešne izbore. Pošto su se očekivanja u vezi profi ta vremenom pokazala ispravnim, akteri postaju sve optimističniji i sve više su skloni avan-turizmu. Cijeli proces završava se bol-nim triježnjenjem kada se uspon naglo pretvara u pad. Samo pametni, odnos-no u Crnoj Gori obaviješteni investitori, izbjegnu sudbinu većine.

Postavlja se pitanje šta dalje. Globalna ekonomska kriza je pomjerila odnos moći u svijetu, i ta promjena će se odraziti na kako na fi nansijska tržišta i monetarnu politiku, tako i na standard svakog poje-dinca ponaosob. Kriza je donijela i zna-čajne promjene u ponašanju ljudi, pa je interesovanje za sigurne depozitne po-slove poraslo, a potrošnja prilagođena novim okolnostima i bitno smanjena. Iako je na nivou Evropske unije, kao i u Crnoj Gori na snazi program za zaštitu potrošača, jasno je da će ubuduće svako morati voditi više računa o sopstvenim fi nansijama.

Na poslednjem sastanku ekspertske gru-pe za svjetsku ekonomiju - LINK, koja je održana u Bangkoku od 23 - 28.10.2009 preovladavali su optimistički stavovi. Za 2010. prognoziran je rast GDP na svet-skom nivou 2.4 %, dok je za Crnu Goru do 0.8 %. Konstatovano je da je većina zemalja koja je primjenjivala mjere koje obuhvataju tri polja ekonomske politike (monetarnu, fi skalnu i fi nansijsku) uspje-la da obnovi opšte povjerenje, stabilizu-je fi nansijska tržišta, obnovi efektivnu tražnju i ublaži ekonomske i socijalne posledice krize.

Kao dobar pravac predupređenja sličnih situacija u budućnosti mogu se navesti

preporuke koje su date na sastanku ove grupe u oktobru prošle godine: uspostaviti efi kasan i pouzdan sistem međunarodne kordinacije, koji se trenutno može pre-poznati kroz aktivnosti G20-nove svjet-ske vlade; reformisati postojeći sistem fi nansijskog uređenja i nadzora, kako bi unaprijeđeni spriječili propuste koji su se desili u proteklom periodu; snadbijevanje likvidnosti i kompenzacionog fi nansiranja mora biti poboljšano. Pri čemu reforma bi morala biti podržana sa međunarod-nim udruživanjem deviznih rezervi, a u cilju smanjenja uslovljavanja.

Jasno je da sadašnji kapitalistički sistem treba da pretrpi radikalne promjene. Na međunarodnom planu to znači preispitati tržišni fundamentalizam, i reformisati pra-vila fi nansijske sfere. Bankarskom i fi nan-sijskom establišmentu bi odgovaralo da se postojeća zakonska regulativa samo osvje-ži, što naravno ne bi bilo u duhu ključnih reformi za koje se zalaže većina državnih vlada. Reforme treba da obuhvate spre-čavanje kulture neodgovornosti, odnos-no uvođenje individualne odgovornosti, zaštitu investitora od „sivih“ proizvoda i povećanje jasnoće kod trgovanja na tržištu kapitala i konačno jačanje međunarodne saradnje kroz veću kontrolu i poboljšanje fi nansijske stabilnosti. Ipak ako je neka-dašnja ocjena profesora političkih nauka Harolda Laskija tačna - politička moć će uvijek pripadati posjednicima ekonom-ske moći - krajnji ishod ovog remonta već se da naslutiti. Biće to isti sistem, u kome će dominirati kapital, koji će sada imati i zaštitu države.

Ipak nadajmo se da svijest o neophodnim promjenama i dubljoj i krupnijoj raspodjeli planetarne moći narasti, te da će trenutna dominacija na nekim poljima civilizacije ustupiti mjesto ravnopravnosti, jednakosti i zajedničkom prosperitetu.

Privatni kapital ne mora biti vođen isk-ljučivo pohlepom za većim profi tima, već može biti i faktor koji će u fer konkuren-ciji obezbijediti dinamičan i uravnotežen privredni rast koji bi bio na korist svih. Princip individualizacije profi ta, a soci-jalizacije gubitaka koji je pokazao svoju pogubnost, treba konačno izmjestiti u udžbenike, kako bi naredni naraštaji mogli da uče na današnjim greškama.

Ostaje da se nadamo da smo nauči-li važnu lekciju, da se manipulacijom u bilo kom obliku može ostvariti kratko-ročan ekspanzionistički efekat, pa sa tim i ekstra prinos, ali dugoročne posledice kao nemilosrdni arbitar kažnjavaju sve, bez razlike ■


54


persons are not solely based on personal assessments, but also on the assessments of other people. If everyone around a single person behaves exactly in the same man-ner, this person may conclude that such behavior is correct, although not being personally certain about it. Th is pheno-menon, when personal judgment is re-jected by a single person led by the be-havior of other people, is called by some authors an information cascade.

Robert Shiller, Professor at the Yale University, explains that the behavior of a single person when a market ballo-on is created is caused by physiological reasons. In time, people tend to neglect personal safety-related doubts because they believe that all other people can-not be mistaken. Th e quality of group information becomes even worse when this “instinct of a pack“ is accepted. Th is results in a collective opinion and eco-nomic boom, which fi nally ends in di-sappointment and painful corrections. Already back in 1987, a sudden fall of values in the capital markets all over the world caused various polemics. However, later on, Shiller explained this phenome-non as a self-supporting process where the investors did not care for any ratio-nal evaluation of the fi nancial assets, but their expectations were exclusively based on an observation that the value of fi nan-cial assets stated going down. Another negative output of this point of view is that the investors are inclined to no rea-lization of capital losses. Th is means that they are not ready to recognize a mista-ke, and that they would rather hold on to bad investments that recognize the mista-ke and reinvest their capital into other securities. Th e citizens of Montenegro allowed themselves to be led by hopes and fears, rather than the facts. Th e ini-tial assumption was that no mistake co-uld be made by following an instinct of the majority. Special attention was also paid to single persons that were known as knowledgeable people. Th is group also included some people who deserved no attention as a result of personal expe-rience or property, but had an access to information. Th e rumors claiming that “he” purchased the shares of this or that company represented a certain sign that such a move had to be followed. Th is was the way of creating personal investment strategy and the prerequisite for success. People used to be very partial and pre-dicted future events based on the most available information, which most oft en

had no relevance for particular decisions. Accordingly, many people assumed that the shares of a company had to be pur-chased because it was very well-known. Th is is an exaggerated simplifi cation of decision making, by using limited in-formation that is available. In the con-text of fi nancial decisions, such beha-vior most oft en leads the investors to making wrong choices. Since the profi t-related expectations turned to be right in time, the actors became increasingly optimistic and inclined to adventurism. Th e entire process ends in a painful so-bering up, when a rise suddenly turns into a fall. Th e destiny of the majority is avoided only by the clever ones, that is the informed investors.

Th e question is what to do next. Th e global economic crisis changed the re-lations of power in the world, while this change will be refl ected both on the fi -nancial markets and monetary policy, and the standard of each single person. Th e crisis also resulted in signifi cant changes in human behavior, so that an interest in safe transactions increased, while the con-sumption was adjusted to new circum-stances and was signifi cantly reduced. Although in the European Union, same as in Montenegro, a consumer protection program is in force, it is clear that each person will have to pay more attention to personal fi nances in the future.

In the latest meeting of LINK, an ex-pert group for global economy, which was held in Bangkok on 23-28 October 2009, the optimistic positions prevailed. It was forecasted that the GDP would increase by 2.4% on the global level, and by 0.8% in Montenegro. It was noted that the ma-jority of countries that had applied mea-sures in three fi elds of economic policy (monetary, fi scal and fi nancial) managed to regain general confi dence, stabilize the fi nancial markets, restore eff ective demand, and mitigate the economic and social consequences of the crisis.

As a good direction in the prevention of similar situations in the future, the following recommendations given at the meeting of this group in October of the previous year can be noted: to establish an effi cient and reliable system of in-ternational communication, which can currently be recognized through the ac-tivities of G20, a new global government; reform the existing system of fi nancial organization and surveillance, in order to strengthen the prevention of mistakes that occurred during the previous period

of time; the supply to liquidity and com-pensation fi nancing most be improved. Additionally, the reform would have to be supported through an international association of foreign currency reser-ves, aimed to decrease the conditioning.

It is clear that the present capitalist system should undergo some radical changes. On the international level, this means that market fundamentalism sho-uld be reconsidered and the rules of the fi nancial sphere reformed. It would be acceptable to the banking and fi nancial establishment for the current legislation to be only revitalized, which would cer-tainly not be in the spirit of key reforms that are supported by the governments of the majority of states. Th e reform should include the prevention of the culture of irresponsibility, meaning an introduction of individual responsibility, the protection of investors against “gray” products and a higher clarity when trading in the capi-tal market, and fi nally the strengthening of international cooperation through a stronger control and improved fi nancial stability. Nevertheless, if the assessment made by Harold Laski, professor of po-litical sciences, is correct, which is that the political power will always belong to those who posses the economic one, a fi nal outcome of this reparation may al-ready been felt. Th e system will remain the same, dominated by capital which will now be protected by the state.

Still, let is hope that the awareness of necessary changes and a deeper and lar-ger distribution of planetary power will grow, so that the current domination in particular fi elds of civilization will cede its place to the equality, equal opportu-nity and common prosperity.

Private capital does not have to be led exclusively by craving for higher profi ts, but it can also be a factor that will ensu-re, through fair competition, a dynamic and balanced economic growth that wo-uld be benefi cial to all. Th e principle of profi t individualization and loss socializa-tion that demonstrated its fatal character should be fi nally moved to literature, so that the future generations could learn from the present mistakes.

It remains for us only to hope that we learned an important lesson, that only short-term expansionistic eff ects, and accordingly extra proceeds, may be ge-nerated by any form of manipulation, while everyone will be equally punished by long-term consequences, as a merci-less arbiter ■


FINANCIAL MARKETS

Inkubatorii Start-up preduzećaU svim djelovima svijeta, većina novih radnih mjesta nastaje i otvara se u novim i malim preduzećima, koja se razvijaju i rastu, a koja se specijalizuju za proizvodnju novih roba i usluga. Nova i mala preduzeća su od vitalnog značaja za zdravu privredu zemlje. Zbog toga je važno preduzimati aktivnosti na formiranju novih, kao i stimulisanju rasta malih preduzeća, uz što značajniju ulogu biznis inkubatora

Mr Marko OtaševićDirekcija za razvoj malih i srednjih preduzeća

Prve godine rada predstavljaju težak period za start-up preduzeća. Upravljanje rastom i razvijanje novih

vještina u oblastima kao što su računovodstvo, zakoni, propisi i marketing predstavljaju znatan izazov i problem preduzetnicima. Sve to može dovesti do propadanja no-vopokrenutih preduzeća u prvim godinama poslovanja. Najizraženiji razlog propadanja novopokrenutih predu-zeća leži u tome što ona obično moraju „sama proći kroz sve to”, bez ikakve podrške, pružene direktno preduzetni-cima, koja bi im pomogla da zadrže svoj entuzijazam kada se suočavaju sa teškim uslovima i prekomjernim satima rada. U zemljama tranzicije, komplikovana registracija i zamršeni zakonsko-pravni postupci, kao i nedostatak službi za podršku preduzećima, čine ove prve godine po-slovanja posebno teškim.

Istraživanja pokazuju da ovo predstavlja oblast gdje lokal-ne vlasti i institucije mogu dati značajan doprinos razvoju. Pomoć novim i malim preduzećima da prebrode početni period putem okruženja biznis inkubatora predstavlja veli-ku mogućnost za davanje podrške otvaranju novih radnih mjesta i dalji ekonomski razvoj. U toj oblasti pruža se šansa lokalnim agencijama, institucijama, vlastima da pokažu da su voljni da preduzmu konkretne aktivnosti i da podrže preduzetnike. Iskustva pokazuju da ovaj tip pomoći može donijeti stvarnu korist lokalnoj ekonomiji.

Osnovni cilj ovakvog tipa državne institucionalne podrš-ke je formiranje biznis inkubatora kao „oruđa” za unapri-jeđivanje razvoja preduzetništva, koje omogućava razvoj novih preduzeća, otvaranje radnih mjesta i razvoj novih ideja i tehnologija.

BIZNIS INKUBATOR - „DOM MALIH PREDUZEĆA”Biznis inkubator predstavlja „dom” za „uzgajanje” novih i malih preduzeća. Postoji veliki broj podataka iz cijelog svijeta koji pokazuju da mnoga novopokrenuta predu-zeća propadaju u prvim godinama svog rada. Međutim, ona koja opstanu često se nastavljaju širiti i obezbjeđuju većinu radnih mjesta u lokalnoj privredi. Prema tome, od suštinske važnosti je pomoći malim i novim preduzećima da prežive tokom prvih nekoliko godina. Biznis inkubatori su kreirani s namjerom da upravo to rade, obezbjeđujući: niže zakupnine od uobičajenih; kratkoročne ugovore o zakupu koji ne zahtijevaju preuzimanje dugoročnih oba-veza; druge prednosti kao što su npr. komunalije uz niske naknade ili bez ikakve naknade; poslovne savjete i podrš-ku na licu mjesta (npr. u vezi knjigovodstva, zakonsko-pravnih pitanja ili drugih specijalističkih oblasti); osjećaj „zajednice” koja motiviše preduzeća da uspiju.

Prilikom pokretanja novog preduzeća, inkubator sman-juje troškove i rizik, a isto tako pruža potencijalnim pre-duzetnicima i njihovim preduzećima najbolje šanse da prežive. Inkubatori su namijenjeni preduzećima da pre-žive i rastu tokom prvih godina poslovanja. Na taj način, predstavljaju koristan instrument koji svi nivoi vlasti mogu upotrijebiti kako bi podstakli formiranje i preživljavanje novih preduzeća. Biznis inkubator se obično sastoji od velikog broja malih osnovnih jedinica (najčešće između 5 i 50). Po pravilu su te jedinice locirane na istom mjes-tu (najčešće unutar jedne zgrade); poslovne prostorije su ponuđene preduzetnicima pod fl eksibilnim uslovima, uz niske cijene i uz povoljne sporazume o zakupu; obezbi-


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MODELI IZLASKA IZ KRIZE

Incubators& Enterprise Start-UpsIn all parts of the world, new job positions are mostly created and opened in new and small enterprises, which develop and grow specializing in the production of new goods and services. New and small enterprises are of vital importance for a healthy economy of the country. It is therefore important to undertake the activities towards the establishment of new and stimulation of the existing small enterprises, including an increasingly signifi cant role of business incubatorsMarko Otašević, MScDirectorate for the Developmentof Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

Th e fi rst years of business operation represent a diffi cult peri-od for the start-up enterprises. Th e entrepreneurs face a con-siderable challenge and diffi culty while managing the growth and the development of new skills in the area of accounting, legislation, regulatuons and marketing. Th is may all lead the newly established enterprises to collapse in the fi rst years of their business operation. Th e most expressive reason for the collapse of new enterprises is because they “must go throu-gh all of that alone”, since no direct support is provided to the entreprenerurs, which would help them preseve their enthu-siasm when faced with diffi cult conditions and long working hours. In the transiton countries, complicated registration and legal procedures, in addition to a lack of services that support the enterprises, make these fi rst years of business operation especially hard.

Th e research shows that the local authorities and instituti-ons can provide a signifi cant contribution in this area. Th e as-sistance to new and small enterprises to overcome this initial period by means of an environment of business incubators represents a great opportunity to support the opening of new job positions and a further economic development. Th e local agencies, institutions and authorities are off ered an opportu-nity to demonstrate in this area that they are willing to under-take some concrete activities and support the entrepreneurs. Th e experience shows that this type of assitance may generate real benefi ts for the local economy.

Th e main objective of this type of governmental institutio-nal support is to establish business incubators, as the “tools” for improvement and development of entrepreneurial activi-ties, which enables the development of new companies, ope-

ning of new job positions, and also development of new ideas and technologies.

MONTENEGRO BUSINESS INCUBATOR – “THE HOME OF SMALL ENTERPRISES” A business incubator is a “home” where the new and small en-terprises are “grown”. A number of data from all over the world show that many new companies collapse in the fi rst years of their work. Nevertheless, those that survive oft en continue to grow and provide for the majority of job positions in the local economy. Accordingly, helping new and small companies to survive the initial few years is of crucial importance. Business incubators were designed exactly for this purpose, by ensuring the following: lower rents than the customary ones; short-term rental agreements that require no taking over of long-term lia-bilities; other advantages, such as low or no communal fees; business consulting and on-site support (e.g. in bookkeeping, legal issues or other specialized areas); the feeling of having a “community” that motivates the enterprises to be successful.

When a new company is established, the incubator lowers the costs and risk, and it also off ers the potential entrepreneurs and their enterprises the best chances to survive. Th e purpose of incubators is to enable the companies to survive and grow over the initial years of their business operation. Th at way, those represent a useful instrument that can be applied by the autho-rities on all levels in order to encourage the establishment and survival of new companies. A business incubator usually in-cludes a number of small basic units (mostly varying between 5 and 50). As a rule, those units are grouped together in one place (most oft en in the same building); the entrepreneurs are


MODELS FOR COMING OUT OF THE CRISIS

jeđene integralnim službama za davanje podrške putem poslovnih savjeta, obuke i konsultantskih usluga na licu mjesta, po niskim cijenama ili besplatno.

U ekonomijama zemalja u tranziciji, iskustvo pokazuje da se mali lokalni inkubatori, naročito oni podržani osob-ljem i prostorom, koji se lako mogu pronaći s obzirom na veliki broj neiskorišćenih objekata, mogu pokrenuti sa relativno pristupačnom sumom novca. Istraživanja poka-zuju da postoji veliki broj inkubatora širom svijeta koji su uspostavljeni za oko 100.000 € (naravno, veći i sofi sticirani inkubatori, ili inkubatori gdje je potrebno obaviti znatnije radove na gradnji, mogu koštati mnogo više).

Osam neophodnih koraka za uspostavljanje biznis in-kubatora - procjena tržišta novih preduzeća; identifi ko-vanje terena / lokacije; biranje menadžera inkubatora; priprema biznis plana; pravljenje sporazuma o fi nan-siranju; dovršenje uređenja lokacije inkubatora; iden-tifi kovanje stanara – zakupaca inkubatora; potpisivanje ugovora o zakupu.

Različite vrste inkubatora pružaju različite usluge, za-visno od potreba i problema sa kojima se suočavaju lo-kalna preduzeća. Ključni element je obezbjeđenje okru-ženja u kojem preduzeća mogu brzo započeti sa radom i brzo širiti svoje poslovanje. Ovo se postiže tako što se pružaju neke ili sve od navedenih usluga: obezbjeđenje radnog prostora i sniženih zakupnina pod fl eksibilnim uslovima, pri čemu se omogućuje preduzećima da plaćaju mjesečnu zakupninu i da se sele u veće ili manje jedinice unutar inkubatora, ukoliko i kada je to potrebno; obez-bjeđenje poslovnih savjeta i usluga podrške, od planiranja poslovnog poduhvata, savjeta u vezi marketinga, pa do podrške u vezi računovodstva, zakonsko-pravnih pitanja i registracije; obezbjeđenje zajedničkih prostora (sale za sastanke, toaleti, recepcija), osoblja (osoblje na recepciji) i opreme (oprema za sastanke i konferencije, aparati za fotokopiranje i faksovi); obezbjeđenje komunalnih usluga (telefon, voda, plin, kanalizacija) po prihvatljivim cijena-ma i bez visokih taksi za prvo priključivanje.

Uspostavljanje uspješnog inkubatora traži dosta vreme-na i napornog rada. Međutim, postoje neki faktori kod kreiranja inkubatora koji mogu pomoći da se prevaziđu prepreke napredovanju na samom početku. Među njima su: izbjegavanje previše sastanaka – često lokalne vlasti i državni službenici upravljaju centralizovano ili putem čestog obraćanja opštini i ministarstvima. Efi kasan in-kubator ne može raditi na ovaj način. Kako bi se izbjegla praksa „dobijanja odobrenja” poslovni plan i svaki ugo-vor o fi nansiranju mora imati sporazum da će menadžer inkubatora/poslovni savjetnik biti taj koji će donositi odluke. Ukoliko ovo nije dovoljno, treba unaprijed ime-novati nekog „branitelja” interesa koji će rješavati nedo-umice i pomoći da se donesu jasne odluke u momentu kada trebaju biti donesene, a ne nakon što dođe do ne-zadovoljstva preduzeća u inkubatorskom centru. Ovo se podjednako odnosi i na registraciju preduzeća i izdavanje dokumenata – gdje će se na vrijeme osigurati da predu-zeća koja su stanovnici (zakupci) inkubatora mogu ras-ti i sazrijevati. Stoga, osoblje inkubatora mora ugovoriti sa lokalnim vlastima da se uredi jedno posebno mjesto na kojem će se moći obavljati poslovi oko registracije i izdavanja dokumenata; obezbjeđenje fl eksibilnog privat-

nog kapitala – često se sredstva za razvoj mogu obezbi-jediti iz poslovnog sektora ili drugih nezavisnih tijela. Obezbjeđivanje fl eksibilnog fi nansiranja ili davanja gran-tova može biti od vitalne važnosti kako bi se osiguralo da inkubator može pripremiti drugu fazu ili odgovori-ti na potrebe za širenjem nakon početnog sazrijevanja. Uključivanje uspješnih lokalnih preduzetnika i predstav-nika zainteresovanih međunarodnih organizacija u sa-vjetodavni odbor na samom početku, može ovo učiniti lakšim u nekoj kasnijoj fazi razvoja; razvijanje sposob-nosti pružanja savjetodavnih usluga za mala preduzeća - savjetodavne usluge malim preduzećima koje nudi in-kubator predstavljaju fundamentalnu karakteristiku in-kubatora. Može se pokazati teškim imenovanje nekoga

ko bi imao odgovarajuće kvalifi kacije ili iskustva u vezi malih i novopokrenutih preduzeća, ali mora se izbjeći pravljenje kompromisa u ovoj važnoj oblasti. Inkubator će imati malo šansi da uspije ukoliko ne postoji dobra savjetodavna služba.

BIZNIS INKUBATORI U CRNOJ GORIPo svemu sudeći, trenutno znanje i obaviještenost o pojmu biznis inkubatora u Crnoj Gori je relativno sla-bo. Ljudi generalno nisu upoznati sa ovim konceptom. Nedostatak znanja i razumijevanja o tome šta su biznis inkubatori i koje benefi te mogu da donesu start-up biz-nisima je jedan od najvećih razloga što koncept nije u dovoljnoj mjeri zaživio kod nas. I pored toga, trebamo


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off ered business premises under fl exible conditions, in addition to low rents and favorable lease agreements, including integral support services that off er on-site business councelling, training and consulting services, at low prices or free of charge.

Th e economies of transition countries, as learned from the experience, small incubators, especially those supported by staff and business premises that are easy to fi nd considering a large number of structures that are not used, may be initia-ted for a relatively accessible amount of money. According to the research, a great number of incubators all over the world was established for approximately EUR 100,000 per incubator (while larger or more sophisticated incubators, or those that require more substantial construction works, may certainly cost much more).

Eight necessary steps to establish a business incubator: assessment of the market for new companies; area/site identifi cation; selec-tion of an incubator manager; business plan preparation; dra-fi ng of a fi nance agreement; fi nal organizaton of the incubator site; identifi cation of tenants – incubator leaseholders; signing of lease agreements.

Various services are off ered by various types of incubators, depending on the requirements and problems faced by the local companies. Th e key element is to provide for an environment where the companies may start working soon and spread their business activities rapidly. Th is is achieved by providing some or all of the following services: reservation of a working spa-ce and lower rent under fl exible conditions, where a company is able to pay the rent on monthly basis and move to either a

smaller or larger unit within the incubator, if and when requ-ired; provision of business counselling and support services, starting from initial planning of a business project, via marke-ting counselling, and all the way to the support in accounting, legal issues and registration; organization of common areas (conference room, toiletes, reception desk), staff (reception desk staff ) and equipment (equipment for meetings and conferen-ces; photocopy and fax machines); organization of communal services (telephone; water; gas; sewerage system) at accepable prices and requiring no high service connection fees.

It takes a lot of time and hard work to establish a succesful business incubator. However, there are some factors relating to the establishment of an incubator that may be useful in overcoming the initial obstacles to going forward. Th ose, inter alia, include the following: avoiding of too many meetings – lo-cal authorities and civil servants oft en operate in a centralized manner or through frequent contacts with the local governent and the ministries. No effi cent incubator can operate that way. In order to avoide the practice of “obtaining an approval”, eve-ry business plan and fi nance contract must include an agre-ement reading that the decisions will be made by the manager of an incubator or its business advisor. If this is not suffi cent, someone should be apppinted in advance to “defend” the in-terests and address dilemmas, and who will assist in making clear decisions at the moment when those need to be made, and not aft er the companies at the business incubator become dissatisfi ed. Th is equally concerns the registration of compa-nies and issuing of documents, where it will be ensured on time that the companies that are the tenants (leaseholders) at the incubator may grow and mature. Accordingly, the incubator staff must agree with the local authorities to designate a spe-cial place for all activities relating to the registration and issu-ing of documentation; securing of fl exible private capital – de-velopment funds may oft en be supplied by the business sector or other independent bodies. Th e procuring of fl exible fi nan-cing or grants may be of vital importance to allow an incuba-tor to prepare for the following phase respond to the required expansion aft er the inital maturing. By including successful local entrepreneurs and members of interested interntational organizations into the Advosory Board at the very beginning may make this easier in some later phase of the development; development of an ability to provide the advisory services for small enterprises, the services of counselling small enterpises that are off ered by the incubator, represent a fundamental cha-racteristic of a business incubator. It may be diffi cult to appoint someone who would be adequately qualifi ed or experienced in matters relating to small and new enterprises, but making a compromising solution has to be avoided in this important area. Th e chances of an incubator to succeed without a good advisory service will be small.

BUSINESS INCUBATORS IN MONTENEGRO It is likely enough that the current knowledge and informa-

tion about the concept of a business incubator is relatively poor in Montenegro. Th e people are generally not familiar with this concept. Th e lack of knowledge and understanding of the pur-pose of business incubators and the benefi ts that can be gene-rated in such a way for start-up businesses represent the main reasons for not having this concept suffi ciently implemented in the practice of our country. Yet, one has to be aware of the fact that Montenegro already possesses two key factors for the



biti svjesni činjenice da Crna Gora već posjeduje dva ključna elementa za razvoj biznis inkubatora - neisko-rišćenu privrednu i poslovnu nepokretnu imovinu koja se lako može urediti u radni prostor za mala/novopo-krenuta preduzeća. Većina ove nepokretne imovine bi se mogla odmah staviti na raspolaganje. Drugi eleme-nat su slabo iskorišćeni lokalni potencijali.

Drugim riječima, ima dovoljno prostora za aktivnost na svim poslovnim područjima koje bi bile preduzete od strane lokalnih aktera, kako bi se obezbijedilo zem-ljište i nepokretna imovina za inkubatore uz intenziv-no davanje poslovnih savjeta i podrške pojedinačnim preduzećima na licu mjesta.

Orjentacija Vlade Republike Crne Gore na promje-ni privredne strukture već nekoliko godina se sprovo-di primjenom opredjeljenja ka razvoju malih i sredn-jih preduzeća kao dominantnog oblika organizovanja privredne aktivnosti. Ovo opredjeljenje ima uporište u aktuelnim svjetskim procesima, koji preferiraju upra-vo razvoj ovog dijela privrede, koristeći profi tnu efi -kasnost i dokazane prednosti prilagodljivosti malog biznisa dinamičnim i sve zahtjevnijim promjenama u privredi. Jedna od aktivnosti Direkcije za razvoj malih i srednjih preduzeća odnosi se na projekte institucio-nalne podrške crnogorskim preduzećima kroz formi-ranje lokalnih/regionalnih biznis centara, formiranje biznis inkubatora i formiranje klastera

Postoji mnogo vrsta inkubatora i više različitih vrs-ta glavnih partnera ili sponzora koji mogu uspostaviti inkubator. U Velikoj Britaniji su npr. univerziteti, lo-kalne vlasti, nedavno privatizovana državna predu-zeća, organizacije za lokalni ekonomski razvoj i lokal-ne nevladine organizacije, kao i javne kompanije za uređenje zemljišta i izgradnju, na neki način uključeni u razvoj inkubatora. Interes za pokretanje projekta biz-nis inkubatora imaju različite institucije u Crnoj Gori, i one se mogu javiti kao inicijatori realizacije ove ide-je uz podršku međunarodnih organizacija i donatora - Vlada, preduzetnici, preduzeća i biznis asocijacije, Univerzitet, u prvom redu Elektrotehnički, Prirodno-matematički, Mašinski, Ekonomski fakultet kao i Viša računarska škola u Podgorici, gdje postoji koncenta-cija ideja i studenata koji žele da započnu biznis, kon-salting centri.

Rezultati ranijih istraživanja o potrebi za realizacijom projekta biznis inkubatora u Crnoj Gori, koje je inici-rano od strane njemačkog društva za tehničku pomoć i saradnju (GTZ) govori da većina sagovornika smatra da glavni inicijator jednog ovakvog projekta treba da bude država u saradnji sa Univerzitetom i kroz partner-stvo sa privatnim preduzećima i biznis asocijacijama. Naglasak po pitanju potencijalnih inicijatora projekta je na državi jer se smatra da ona treba da ima najviše interesa da kroz pokretanje biznis inkubatora poveća proizvodnju i zaposlenost u Crnoj Gori.

Za naredni period, Direkcija za razvoj malih i sredn-jih preduzeća, u saradnji sa partnerima planira osni-vanje biznis inkubatora u Beranama čime će se stvoriti povoljan institucionalni ambijent za inkubaciju start-up biznisa u beranskoj, ali i drugim opštinama sjeve-ra Crne Gore ■

INVENTIVNOST I BSC BARDirekcija za razvoj malih i srednjih preduzeća i Glavni grad Podgorica formirali su u decembru 2008.god. društvo s ograničenom odgovornošću pod nazivom „Inventivnost“ (http://www.inventivnost.me/). Realizacija projekta se sprovodi uz podršku stranih donatora: SPARK, Peace Child International i kroz Tam program. Partner na projektu je i Narodna Tehnika koja je obezbijedila pros-tor od 120m2, u kome su smještena buduća preduzeća iz oblasti IT tehnologije. S druge strane, Opština je obezbje-dila prostor od 50m2, u kome je smještena administraci-ja društva. Oba prostora su kompletno opremljena kan-celarijskom i kompjuterskom opremom. Osnovni cilj IT inkubatora je formiranje malih timova koji bi razvijali ICT servise čime bi se podligla digitalna kultura u Crnoj Gori i koji bi učestvovali na međunarodnim tenderima za male soft verske projekte. Sredinom 2008. godine raspi-san je Javni poziv za izbor budućih stanara inkubato-ra. Na osnovu kvaliteta pristiglih biznis ideja, testiranja i sprovedenog intervjua sa kandidatima, izabrana su četiri tima koja će raditi na razvoju informacionih tehnologi-ja iz sljedećih oblasti: razvijanje soft vera za izradu web prezentacija, izdavanje informatičkog časopisa, pružanje outsourcing usluga, kriptovanje/zaštita podataka. Svakom timu u okviru projekta biće pružena podrška za obavlja-nje tehničko-administrativnih poslova (računovodstvene usluge, usluge poslovnog sekretara, prostorije za sastanke, zajednička web stranica, zajednički nastupi na sajmovima i izložbama), konsultanska pomoć kao i dodatna obuka i treninzi. U saradnji sa Narodnom Tehnikom u februa-ru 2009. godine počelo se sa edukacijom timova kako bi se isti obučili za poslovanje na svjetskim berzama soft vera.

Uz podršku holandske organizacije SPARK (bivša ATA) formiran je Biznis inkubator u Baru (http://www.bscbar.org/). Osnovni cilj projekta “Razvoj BSC u Opštini Bar” je unaprijeđenje održivog razvoja kroz podržavanje lokalnih ekonomskih i (viših) edukacionih institucija u promovi-sanju preduzetništva i konkretnog pomaganja novoosno-vanim malim i srednjim preduzećima (SMEs). BSC Bar nudi mladim preduzetnicima do 35-te godine života usa-vršavanje, savjetodavne usluge, prostor za rad i pristup mikro-kreditima u cilju osnivanja novih i inovativnih ma-lih i srednjih biznisa. Takođe, BSC organizuje takmičenje za najbolji biznis plan i razne kurseve obuke za aktuelne i potencijalne preduzetnike. Na ovaj način se unaprijeđuje

kapacitet lokalnih partnerskih institucija kroz podršku njihovom razvoju i uvođen-ju novog i inovativnog menadžmenta i IT rješenja, kao i kroz podršku univerzitetima u prilagođavanju sadržaja nastave evrop-skim standardima radi promovisanja pre-duzetničkog duha u društvu.


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INVENTIVENESS AND THE BUSINESS INCUBATOR OF BARIn December 2008, the Directorate for the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and the Capital City of Podgorica established a Limited Liability Company called “Inventivnost“ (http://www.inventivnost.me/). Th e Project implementation is supported by foreign donors: SPARK, Peace Child International, and through the TAM Program. “Narodna Tehnika“ is a Project partner as well, which ensured 120 m2 of business premises to host the fu-ture Companies for IT technology. On the other hand, the local authorties provided for an offi ce space of 50m2, to host the Companies’ administration. Both premises are fully fur-nished with offi ce supplies and computer equipment. Th e main objective of IT incubators is to establish small teams to develop ICT services, resulting in a higher level of digital culture in Montenegro, and which would compete for small soft ware projects at international tenders. By mid-2008, there was a public invitation for the selection of future te-nants of this business incubator. Based on the quality of the provided business ideas, test results and interviews with po-tential cadidates, four teams were selected to work on the development of information technologies in the following areas: development of a soft ware to design web presenta-tions; publishing of IT magazine; provision of outsourcing services; data encryption/protection. Each team within this Project will receive support in the performnce of technical and administrative activities (accounting services; business secretary services; coference room; common web page; com-mon presentations at fairs and exhibitions), consulting sup-port, and additional courses and training. In cooperation with “Narodna Tehnika“, in February 2009, the teams star-ted attending training courses in order to learn how to en-gage in business activities at the global sofrware exhanges.Supported by SPARK, a Dutch organization (the for-mer ATA), a Business Incubator was established in Bar (http://www.bscbar.org/). Th e main goal of the Project “Establishment of a Business incubator in the Municipality of Bar” was to improve its sustainable development throu-gh a support to the local economic and (higher) educatio-nal institutions, the promotion of entrepreneurship, and a concrete support to the newly established small and mediu-m-sized enterprises (SMEs). Th e Business Incubator of Bar off ers to the young entrepreneurs, not older than 35 years, advanced training, consulting services, business premises, and an access to micro credits, for the purpose of establis-hment of new and innovative small and medium-sized en-terprises. Additonally, the Business Incubator of Bar orga-nizes a competition for the best business plan and varous training courses for the current and potential emtreprene-urs. In this manner, the capacity of local partner institu-tions is improved through a support to their development and the introduction of a new and innovative management and IT solutions, and also by supporting the Univeristies to harmonize their curricula with the European standards, in order to promote an enterpreneurial spirit in the society.

development of business incubators, one of those being the unused commercial and business real estate that can be ea-sily reorganized and turned into business premises for the small/newly established enterprises. Most of this real estate could be placed at their disposal right away. Th e other ele-ment includes poorly used local potential.

In other words, there is enough room for the activities to be undertaken in all business areas by local actors, in order to ensure the land and real estate for business incubators, in addition to an intense business counseling and on-site sup-port to individual companies.

Th e orientation of the Government of Montenegro to-wards changing the business structure and development of small and medium-sized enterprises, as a dominant form of organization of economic activities, has been implemented for several years now. Th is orientation is based on the cur-rent global processes that prefer exactly this element of the economy, by using profi t effi ciency and proven advantages of small businesses that are able to adjust to the dynamic and increasingly demanding changes in the economy. One of the activities of the Directorate for the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises relates to the projects of institutional support to Montenegrin companies, through the establishment of local/regional business centers, business incubators and clusters.

Th ere are many types of incubatirs and several types or main partners or sponsors that may establish an incubator. In the Great Britain, for example, the entities that are in some way included into the development of incubators include: the universities, local authorities, recently privatzed public companies, organizations for local economic development and local non-governmental organizations, in addition to the public companies for land organization and construction activities. Various institutions in Montenegro are interested in staring the project of business incubators, those that may intitiate the implementation of this idea, supported by the international and donor organizations; those include: the Government, entrepreneurs and business associations, and the Univeristy of Montenegro, primarily the Faculties of Electric Engineering, Merchanical Engineering and Economy, and the Higher School of Information Technology in Podgorica, with a concentration of ideas and students who wish to start a business or consulting centers.

Th e results of former surveys regarding the requirement to implement the project of business incubators in Montenegro, which was initiated by the German enterprise for technical assistance and cooperation (GTZ), confi rmed that most of the survey participants believed that such a project should be initiated by the state, in cooperation with the University, and in partnership with the private companies and business associations. As for the potential initiatiors, the emphasis was placed on the state, since it was believed that it should have a major interest in increasing the production and employment rates in Montenegro by initiating business incubators.

For the following period of time, the Directorate for the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, in cooperation with its partners, plans to establish a business incubator in Berane, whereby a favorable institutional envi-rinment will be created for the incubation of start-up busi-nesses in the municipality of Berane, but also in other mu-nicipalities of Montenegro ■




62

PREDUZETNIŠTVO U CRNOJ GORI

Da bi mogli govoriti o koristima pre-duzeća za jednu privredu moramo se

prvo osvrnuti na ono što to preduzeće čini korisnim samom sebi, odnosno uspješnim. Osvrćemo se, dakle na esenciju preduzeća. Koliko je potreban kapital toliko je potre-ban neko ko ZNA šta da radi s njim. Traži se preduzetnik!

Za uspješnog preduzetnika su važni: Znanje ■ – tržišta, kupaca, tehnologije ili neke djelatnosti,Sam preduzetnik ■ – iskustvo, strast, upornost, odlučnost, istrajnost i ogro-man rad,Ideja ■ – san, cilj ili neka neiskorišćena tržišna prilika.

■Ove tri odrednice čine piramidu u tri ho-rizontalna sloja. Sama ideja stoji na vrhu piramide i čini manji dio u konačnoj for-muli uspjeha. Znanje i karakter samog pre-duzetnika čine ogromnu većinu. A pri tome znanje čini osnov svega.

Ideja je vrlo važan elemenat u jedna-čini preduzetnika, međutim, ideja nije sve. Ukoliko izostanu upornost i znan-je preduzetnika izostaće i uspjeh. I pri tome nema prečica, ne može na brzi-nu, ne postoji neka univerzalna tajna koja će od nekoga napraviti uspješnog preduzetnika.

PRIVATNIK I PREDUZETNIKTek sa adekvatnim znanjem dobijate kva-litetne ideje kako unaprijediti neku oblast ljudske djelatnosti. Tek ste onda u stan-ju da pravilno sagledate neiskorišćenu tržišnu priliku, da razmišljate o tržištu i

pronalazite nove, bolje, efi kasnije načine da zadovoljite potrebe tržišta, i time da promijenite i unaprijedite stvari!

Međutim, u zavisnosti od toga kakva je ideja, koliko je inovativna i šta se želi njo-me postići, razlikujemo privatnike, predu-zetnike i preduzetnike-inovatore, koji ciljaju globalno tržište, veliku ideju i ogroman san! U SAD-u postoji suptilna razlika u katego-risanju na privatnike i preduzetnike. Ako ste vlasnik zubarske ordinacije, neke man-je zanatske radnje, advokatske kancelarije ili slično, malo će Vam ko reći da ste pre-duzetnik. Pod pojmom preduzetnik, pod-razumijeva se malo više. Ako je Vaša ideja da napravite seriju zubarskih ordinacija, zanatskih radnji ili advokatskih kancelarija na malo širem tržištu ili imate drugačiju vi-ziju onda ste preduzetnik. Ta ideja Vam daje neopipljivi karakter čovjeka koji razmišlja o tržištu i traži nove, bolje, efi kasnije nači-ne da zadovolji to tržište. Preduzetnici su

pokretači i osnovni nosioci promjena i na-pretka ekonomije nekog društva. Obično se procjenjuje da preduzetnici čine oko 5-10% populacije. Zbog konstantnog traženja efi -kasnijeg i boljeg načina poslovanja, oni su izuzetno važni za ekonomiju. Oni su mo-tor promjena, inovacija, efi kasnosti i kon-kurentnosti jedne ekonomije.

Preduzetništvo se dugo kod nas predsta-vljalo u negativnom kontekstu i vezivalo za poslove u zoni sive ekonomije, umjesto pro-mocije uspješnih i očiglednih preduzetničkih primjera koji razaraju okamenjeni duhovni horizont i ohrabruje preduzetničku inici-jativu. Ovdje je veoma važna uloga medi-ja i obrazovnih institucija u prevazilaženju značajnih predrasuda u odnosu na predu-zetništvo i trenutno stanje svijesti kod nas, koje se može okarakterisati kao kognitivna disonanca. Ona predstavlja nesposobnost najvećeg dijela stanovništva, da na osnovu vrijednosti utemeljenih na kolektivizmu i društvenoj svojini kritički prerade nove in-formacije, koje se temelje na individualnoj spremnosti i odgovornosti za preuzimanje rizika u obezbjeđivanju sopstvene egzistencije i aktivno uključivanje u tranzicione proce-se. Takvo stanje se karakterisalo pasivnošću, inertnošću i strahom od promjena koje mogu da ugroze raniju socijalnu sigurnost.

NE MOŽE BEZ VELIKIHZa preduzetnike kao i MSP veoma je važna velika industrija i velike kompanije. Mala i srednja preduzeća ne mogu da rastu u vaku-umu, i rijetko posluju van domašaja velikih kompanija. Oni nastaju kao efi kasan odgovor na potrebe velike industrije. Tako na velikim kompanijama ostaje izbor da li da outsour-

TEK TRAGOVIMala i srednja preduzeća (MSP) se smatraju jednom od vodećih snaga ekonomskog razvoja. Ona stimulišu privatno vlasništvo i preduzetničke sposobnosti, fl eksibilna su, pa se mogu brzo prilagođavati promjenama na tržištu. Takođe generišu zaposlenost, stvaraju diversifi kovanu ekonomsku aktivnost i doprinose izvozu i trgovini i osnovni su činioci razvoja konkurentske ekonomije

mr Milo Ivančević

Čak i velike ekonomije, kao što su ekonomija SAD-a ili Japana, po-čivaju na snazi malih i srednjih preduzeća. Podaci da oko 99 % svih preduzeća kako u SAD-u tako i Japanu ili EU pripadaju grupaciji MSP dovoljno govore o njihovoj važnosti. Ako se tome doda činjenica da doprinose BDP u prosjeku oko 60% i da zapo-šljavaju oko 80 miliona radnika u EU, odnosno dvije trećine radni-ka u privatnom sektoru, nesum-njivo se potvrđuje njihov značaj.

In order to speak about benefi ts of an en-terprise for economy we fi rst must fo-

cus on how that enterprise benefi ts itself, that is to the successful ones. Th erefore we will place focus on essence of the enterpri-se. Insofar as the capital is needed the one who KNOWS how to run it is also needed. Entrepreneur is wanted!

Th e following is important for successful entrepreneur:

Knowledge ■ – about markets, buyers, technology or some activity, Entrepreneur by himself ■ – experience, passion, persistence, determination, per-severance, and enormous work,Idea ■ – dream, goal or some market op-portunity that has not been captured.

Th ese three benchmarks create the pyra-mid in three horizontal layers. Th e very idea stands at the top of the pyramid and makes smaller part in fi nal formula to suc-cess. Knowledge and character of the very entrepreneur make signifi cant majority. And therefore knowledge is the basis of all.

Idea is a very important element in the entrepreneur` s equation, however idea is not all. If persistence and knowledge of entrepreneur are missing the success is missing too. And there are no shortcuts, it cannot be done with a hasty pace, there is no some universal secret that will make someone a successful entrepreneur.

SOLE PROPRIETOR AND ENTREPRENEUROnly with adequate knowledge can you gain the quality ideas about how to promote an area of human activity. Only then are you

able to accurately consider the market op-portunity that has not been captured, think about market and fi nd new, more effi cient ways to meet needs of the market and thus change and improve things!

However, depending on what the idea is like, how innovative it is and what is in-tended to be achieved with it we draw a distinction between sole proprietors, en-trepreneurs and entrepreneurs-innovators targeting global market, big idea and huge dream! In the USA there is a subtle diff e-rence between classifi cation to sole proprie-tors and entrepreneurs. If you own dental practice, some small handicraft shop, law fi rm or similar not many will refer to you as entrepreneur. Th e term entrepreneur has a bit broader meaning. If your idea is to establish a series of dental practices, handicraft shops or law fi rms on a bit lar-ger market or if you have a diff erent vision then you are entrepreneur. Such idea gives you impalpable character of the one who thinks about the market and seeks new, better, more effi cient ways to satisfy mar-ket needs. Entrepreneurs are promoters and main drivers of changes and prog-ress of economy in a society. It is usually estimated that entrepreneurs account for 5-10% of the population. Being in constant pursuit of more effi cient and better ways of doing business they are extremely im-portant for economy. Th ey drive changes, innovations, effi ciency and competitive-ness of the economy.

Entrepreneurship has long been repre-sented in negative terms in our context and linked to the activities in the area of grey economy, instead of promotion of successful

and evident entrepreneurial examples which devastate a petrifi ed spiritual horizon and encourage entrepreneurial initiative. Th e role of media and educational institutions is very important here in overcoming con-siderable prejudice about entrepreneurship and current state of mind in our context which may be characterised as cognitive dissonance. As a result of values groun-ded on collectivism and social ownership it represents inability of the major share of population to critically process new infor-mation that are based on individual readi-ness and responsibility to take risks in pro-viding for one` s own existence and active involvement in transition processes. Such condition is characterised by passiveness, inertness and fear of changes that might threaten earlier social security.

IT WON` T DO WITHOUT THE BIG ONES Big industry and big companies are im-portant for entrepreneurs and SMEs. Small and medium-sized enterprises may not grow in vacuum and rarely do they ope-rate outside the reach of big companies. Th ey emerge as an effi cient response to the needs of big industry. Th erefore, it is up to big companies whether they want to outsource one part of their business ac-tivities or to meet their need for certain goods and services outside their parent company thus allowing smaller competi-tors to satisfy that need. If there is sound market competition it is the interest that wins! If SMEs may meet some need in bet-ter, cheaper and effi cient way it is in the interest of big companies to leave that part of market segment to the smaller players.

MERELY TRACESSmall and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are considered one of the leading divers of economic development. They stimulate private ownership and entrepreneurial capabilities, they are fl exible and can therefore quickly adjust to the changes on the market. In addition, they create employment, generate diversifi ed economic activity and contribute to export and trade being major factors of the development of competitive economy

Milo Ivančević, MASc

Even big economies such as the economy of the USA and Japan are founded on the power of small and medium-sized enterprises. Data reveal that around 99% of all enterprises in both, the USA and Japan are SMEs which clear-ly is a sign of their importance. If one adds the fact that they ac-count for 60% of GDP on avera-ge and employ around 80 million workers in the EU, that is two thirds of workers in private sector their importance is undoubtedly confi rmed.


ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN MONTENEGRO


64suju jedan dio svojih poslovnih aktivnosti, ili da svoju potrebu za određenim dobrima ili uslugama potraže van matičnog predu-zeća i time dozvole manjim kooperantima da zadovolje tu potrebu. Ako postoji zdrava tržišna utakmica, pobjeđuje interes! U slučaju da MSP mogu na bolji, jeft iniji ili efi kasniji način da zadovolje neku potrebu, u interesu je i velikim kompanijama da taj dio tržišnog segmenta prepuste manjim igračima.

Odatle dolazi sledeći problem predu-zetništva u Crnoj Gori. Značajan broj velikih preduzeća je nedavno privatizovan, i nije adekvatno implementirana kultura tržišnog načina razmišljanja. Redovno smo svjedoci jakih sindikalnih borbi, kao i zahtjeva bilo sindikata bilo uprave preduzeća da država učestvuje u njihovim gubicima. Ostala je navika da se stvari rade po automatizmu, koristeći stara rješenja u već, mnogo puta izmijenjenim iz korijena, principima poslo-vanja. U takvoj sredini po strani su interesi za unapređenje poslovanja, fer tenderima i odabir najboljih rješenja. Tako i mala pre-duzeća ne mogu da dobiju mjesto kakvo im sa pravom pripada.

Drugi dio velikih preduzeća još uvijek nije privatizovan. Glavni razlog za privatizaci-ju preostalih državnih preduzeća kao što je

Montenegro Airlines, preduzeća iz oblas-ti zdravstva, školstva, komunalnih predu-zeća itd. jeste što oni u budućnosti mogu da budu pravi izvori i temelji preduzetničkog razvoja. Njihove potrebe će stvoriti mjesto za mnoga MSP. Umjesto toga, svjedoci smo da su ona trenutno pravi primjeri neefi kas-nosti i slijepe inertnosti, bez želje i motiva da unaprijede svoje poslovanje.

Tako su pređašnje godine tranzicije u bi-všim socijalističkim zemljama potvrdile i ar-tikulisale stav, da je tržište mnogo efi kasniji koordinator ekonomskih aktivnosti nego što je to administrativno posredovanje u aktiv-nostima privrednih subjekata. Za efi kasno tržište potrebna je konkurencija, odnosno konkurentna privredna struktura. MSP sva-kako doprinose boljoj i efi kasnijoj tržišnoj utakmici, gdje pobjeđuje najbolji.

RASKID SA PROŠLOŠĆUKarakter i suštinu nužnih promjena u Crnoj Gori možemo da defi nišemo kao – novo preduzetničko društvo ili dru-gim riječima:

Društvo čije su vrijednosti (preduzeće ▷i preduzetništvo) i njihove kombinacije u stalnom procesu kreiranja bogatstva i radnih mjesta,

Društvo koje u potpunosti podstiče i ▷ohrabruje preuzimanje rizika,Društvo koje stvara nova preduzetnič- ▷ka zvanja u svim oblastima, bez dis-kriminacije između “nove” i “stare” ekonomije,Društvo koje identifi kuje nove talente u ▷preduzećima, da što prije uđu u avantu-ru preduzetničkog stvaranja.

Period ekonomske krize najbolje je poka-zao da veliki i glomazni sistemi, kakvi su u Crnoj Gori podržavani dugo vremena, nisu najbolje rješenje. Vrijeme sve bržih promjena zahtijeva kategoričan raskid sa pređašnjim načinima mišljenja i preferi-ra fl eksibilne institucije i kompanije, koje bez obzira na veličinu, mogu da efi kasno izađu u susret sve sofi sticiranijim tržišnim prohtjevima. MSP u takvom sistemu ima-ju prednost, jer uskim određenjem opsega poslovanja, ostavljaju prostora za što bo-lju specijalizaciju. Za sada, preduzetništvo i preduzetnici nemaju adekvatan ambijent koji će im omogućiti da se nesmetano raz-vijaju, i jednog dana, možda i oni postanu velika, internacionalna kompanija. Do tada, o preduzetništvu možemo govoriti samo u tragovima ■■■

PREDUZETNIŠTVO U CRNOJ GORI

FINANSIJSKA KRIZA

Uticaj na institucionalne investitore

Teorije i želje su jedno, a rezultati i realnost uvijek nešto drugo. Tu disproporciju možemo pratiti na svjetskim tržistima kapitala, jer se već neko vrijeme naslućuje izlazak iz ekonomsko-fi nansijske krize. Finansijska tržišta za koja možemo reći da su srce i glavne vene organizma koji se zove ekonomija, počinju da rade i donose novac na periferiju do krajnjih korisnika, u ovom slučaju privrede

mr Lidija Martinović

Danas, u domaćoj i svjetskoj ekonomiji, rizičnost ulaganja je veoma izražena. Poseban problem je

transparentnost informacija, i to kako onih vezanih za sistemsko uređenje ekonomije, tako i informacije o ekonomskoj politici, kreditnoj sposobnosti učesnika u raznim oblicima ekonomskih odnosa i dr. Ako je u osnovi investicione aktivnosti procjena budućih rizi-ka, odnosno informacija o budućnosti, radi smanjenja neizvjesnosti, onda je dovoljno jasno koliko nepozna-vanje informacija o današnjim okolnostima utiče na

investiciono ponašanje, uz sav respekt neizvjesnosti trenutne fi nansijske krize.

U fokusu investitora na svjetskim berzama su obja-ve zvaničnih podataka o rezultatima poslovanja kom-panija. Potvrdu oporavka svjetske privrede investitori će tražiti i u makroekonomskim pokazateljima. Sada je već sasvim izvjesno da će oporavak biti dug i spor i da su sasvim očekivane povremene korekcije tržišta.

Poslije jake recesije berze su se okrenule prema uspo-nu i faza rasta akcija traje. Međutim, pesimizam je i dal-

That is the source of the next entre-preneurship problem in Montenegro. Considerable number of big enterprises has been privatised recently and the cul-ture of market oriented way of thinking has not been adequately fostered. We frequently witness strong trade union struggles and requirements of either the trade union or management of en-terprises that the state share their losses. Th ere has still remained the habit to do things automatically by using old arran-gements in the operational principles that have already been changed radically for many times. Interests for improvement of business, fair tenders and selection of best solutions are set aside in such en-vironment. Th erefore small enterprises may not reach the position they are ri-ghtfully entitled to.

Another share of big enterprises has still not been privatised. Main reason for the privatisation of the remaining state companies such as Montenegro Airlines, enterprises from the area of health, education, utilities etc. is the fact that they can be true sources and foundations of entrepreneurship deve-lopment in the future. Th eir needs will

create room for many SMEs. Instead, we witness their being true examples of ineffi ciency and blind inertness witho-ut any wish or motive to improve their operation.

Th erefore, earlier transition years in for-mer socialist countries confi rmed and ar-ticulated the view that the market is much more effi cient coordinator of economic activities than administrative mediation in activities of business entities. Effi cient market requires competition, that is com-petitive economic structure. SMEs indeed contribute to a better and more effi cient market competition in which it is the best one who wins.

BREAK-UP WITH THE PASTTh e character and essence of necessary changes in Montenegro may be defi ned as – new entrepreneurial society or in other words:

Society whose values (enterprise and ▷entrepreneurship) and their combina-tions are in constant process of creating wealth and jobs, Society that fully stimulates and encou- ▷rages taking risks,

Society that creates new entrepreneurial ▷titles in all areas, without discrimination between “new” and “old” economy, Society that identifi es new talents in en- ▷terprises in order for them to join ad-venture of entrepreneurial creation as soon as possible.

Th e period of economic crisis is the best indicator proving that big and enormo-us systems that have been supported in Montenegro for quite some time are not the best solution. Th e time of increasingly faster changes require decisive break-up with earlier ways of thinking and prefers more fl exible institutions and companies that may meet increasingly sophistica-ted market requirements regardless of the size. SMEs have advantage in such system as they leave room for better specialisation by narrow determination of their scope of operations. So far the-re has not been adequate environment for entrepreneurship and entreprene-urs that would enable them to develop freely and maybe become big, interna-tional company one day. Until that hap-pens we can speak merely about traces of entrepreneurship ■■■


ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN MONTENEGRO

FINANCIAL CRISIS

Crisis Effects on Institutional InvestorsTheories and wishes are one thing, while the results and reality represent always something else. This disproportion can be monitored in global capital markets, since the recovery from economic and fi nancial crisis has been felt for some time. The fi nancial markets, which are the heart and main veins of the organism called economy, have started to operate and make money to the periphery to end users, in this case to the economy

Lidija Martinović, MSc

Nowadays, the investment risk is very signifi cant in domestic and global economy. Specifi c problem

represents the transparency of information concerning both systemic organisation of economy and informa-tion on economic policy, credit capacity of the partici-pants in various forms of economic relations, and the like. If the assessment of future risks, i.e. the informa-tion on future to reduce the uncertainty lies within the investment activities, it is suffi ciently clear how much unawareness of information on current circumstances

infl uence on the investment behaviour, with all respect to uncertainty of the current fi nancial crisis.

Publishing the offi cial data on operating results of the companies is in the focus of the investors at global stock exchanges. Th e investors will look for the confi rmation of recovery of the global economy also in macroecono-mic indicators. It has been already evident that the re-covery will be “long and slow” and that the corrections of market are completely expected.

Aft er strong recession, stock exchanges turned to


66je prisutan. Njemačka agencija za istraživanje „Telos“ je napravila studiju i utvrdila da su penzijski fondovi u Njemačkoj u posljednjoj godini udio akcija u svojim portfeljima smanjili sa 20 na devet odsto, a osigura-vajuća društva, u kojima je prilično zastupljeno životno osiguranje, sa sedam na četiri procenta u jednoj godini. Onda se postavilo pitanje, kako je berza uopšte rasla. Jedino objašnjenje je da su novac investirale banke usl-jed viška likvidnosti.

Sa oporavkom vodećih svjetskih ekonomija i povjeren-je potrošača se polako vraća, investitori su još uzdržani od nekih većih investiranja i sada uglavnom pokuša-vaju da „ulove“ neki kratkoročni trend. Trenutna situ-acija izgleda tako da jedne sedmice berza raste, zatim opet malo padne, tada odjednom porastu akcije bana-ka, koje posle malo padnu, a onda rast zabilježe cijene sirovina. Sve ovo ukazuje da je počeo pozitivni berzan-ski trend. U suštini, ovdje je riječ tek o faktoru likvid-nosti. Ogromne količine kratkoročnog kapitala putuju između valutnih, obvezničkih i djelimično sirovinskih investicija. Kratkoročno spekulisanje je u suštini vrlo naporna stvar za berzanskog investitora, a ponekad i put prema gubicima, što znači da ko želi da spekuliše na kratak rok mora dobro da poznaje kretanje novčanih tokova na svjetskim fi nansijskim tržištima.

Svjetska privreda nalazi se u takozvanoj recesiji „U“ oblika i biće potrebno bar još godinu za njeno preva-zilaženje. Postoji i pesimistička prognoza, prema kojoj se svjetska ekonomija danas nalazi u dugoročnoj dese-togodišnjoj recesiji „L“ oblika. Jedno je sigurno, opora-vak neće biti ni brz, ni jednostavan.

INVESTICIONI FONDOVI I DALJE U PROBLEMUIza nas je godina fi nansijske krize, koja se ponajviše odrazila na tržište kapitala, pa su tako njen uticaj i te kako osjetili investicioni fondovi, ostvarivši negativne prinose na godišnjem nivou. Stručnjaci kažu da nov-ca ima, ali je u cijeloj krizi najveći problem narušeno povjerenje.

Investiranje u akcije i investicione fondove predsta-vlja investicije sa dugoročnim vremenskim horizon-tom, pa kratkoročne korekcije kod dugoročnih inves-titora ne bi smjele da izazivaju strah, jer poslije svake krize dolazi do oporavka tržišta. Kako je dugoročni trend tržišta pozitivan, investitori koje nije uhvatila panika i koji su, po mogućnosti, dodatno investirali za vrijeme krize, na kraju budu nagrađeni za strplji-vost na dugi rok.

Krize su pratilac berzanske trgovine od samog nje-nog nastanka. Do kriza dolazi po pravilu iznenada, na vrhuncu optimističkog tržišta, a posljedice su visoki gubici običnog investitora koji se izražavaju kao pro-pušteni mogući dobitak. Današnja kriza nije prva kri-za, a sigurno neće biti ni posljednja. U svakoj krizi do sada (bilo ih je 17 u posljednjih 80 godina) dolazilo je do velikih kratkoročnih korekcija i dramatičnog pada na tržištu kapitala, koji je probudio strah u ljudima da ne izgube imovinu koju su uložili u akcije ili investici-one fondove. Kod velikog broja ulagača, pa čak i onih sa dugoročnim horizontom ulaganja, preovladala je panična ljudska reakcija, pa su prodavali svoje pozici-

je u akcijama ili investicionim fondovima, tako da su redukovali ili potpuno likvidirali izloženost mogućem daljem gubitku imovine.

Ljudska panika je najveći krivac za veliki pad vrijed-nosti na tržištu kapitala. Uznemireni ulagači prodaju po vrlo niskim cijenama (jer je vrlo mali broj njih koji kupuju) samo zato da bi dobili bilo kakav novac. Iz perspektive dugoročnog ulagača, to po pravilu stvara natprosječne srednjoročne i dugoročne prilike za inves-tiranje. Posmatrajući kroz istoriju, može se primijetiti da u većini slučajeva ulagači imaju tendenciju izloženosti akcijama neposredno prije velikih rasprodaja, te sma-njivanju svojih pozicija u akcijama i udjelima u investi-cione fondove upravo prije naglih uspona na tržištu ka-pitala. Po pravilu bi trebalo biti obrnuto. Tako razmišlja i poznati investitor Warren Buff ett, koji je koristio krize na tržištu kapitala i zarađivao ogromne količine novca. Jedna od njegovih najpoznatijih izjava je:

„Budite bojažljivi kad su drugi pohlepni, i pohlepni kad su drugi bojažljivi“.

Ipak, u praksi je teško pobijediti tržište. Trenutno su bankarski depoziti dobra alternativa za

investiranje, jer je situacija takva da je keš trenutno bo-lji u banci nego u investicijama. Ali, budući trend opa-danja kamatnih stopa je više nego jasan, pa bi možda trebalo oročeni novac iz banke polako i oprezno ulaga-ti u hartije od vrijednosti i fondove. Za trenutnu lošu situaciju u fondovskoj industriji jednim dijelom snose sami fondovi. Rijetko gdje se može dobiti konkretna informacija o fondu i gdje ulaže novac. Zašto bi neko ulagao kada ne zna šta dobija. Potrebno je otvoriti se ljudima, a investitorima koji su u minusu objasniti za-što će na kraju profi tirati.

POZITIVAN TREND KOD PENZIONIH FONDOVATrenutna kriza, male penzije i neizvjesnost koja vla-da oko državnih penzionih fondova, natjeraće ljude da sve više štede za starost. Realno gledano, standard građana je znatno opao tokom protekle godine, jer su u tom razdoblju zarade smanjene. Istovremeno, na hi-ljade radnika su ostale bez radnih mjesta, sa malim ili nikakvim otpremninama i slabim izgledima da ubrzo nađu novi posao.

Generalno posmatrajući penzione fondove, usljed fi -nansijske krize smanjili su se očekivani prihodi od in-vestiranja u akcije, ali i od uplata klijenata penzionog fonda. Očekivani prihodi od investicija u akcije sma-njili su se drastično, pa bi zbog odgovornog upravlja-nja sredstvima velikog broja ljudi ključnu ulogu tre-balo da imaju regulatorna i nadzorna tijela. Pokazalo se da zemlje u kojima regulatorna tijela nisu dopustila rizična ulaganja, penzioni fondovi nisu pretrpjeli veli-ke gubitke. Penzioni fondovi zbog naglašene društvene odgovornosti imaju konzervativni pristup ulaganjima na fi nansijskim tržištima. Tako na primjer, početkom ove godine, u Srbiji je uvedena mjera ograničenja mo-gućnosti njihovog ulaganja u akcije sa 40% na maksi-malno 10% od njihove ukupne imovine. Može se samo zamisliti kakav bi udar bio na imovinu ovih fondova, usljed aktuelne svjetske fi nansijske krize, da je prethod-na uredba ostala na snazi.

FINANSIJSKA KRIZA


FINANCIAL CRISIS

the growth, and the phase of shares growth continu-es. However, pessimism is still present. German rese-arch agency, Telos, prepared a study and determined that pension funds in Germany reduced their share of stocks in their portfolios from 20 to 9 percentages in the last year, while the insurance companies where life insurance was prevailing reduced their share from se-ven to 4 percentages in one year. Th e question is raised on how stock exchange did grow at all. Th e only expla-nation was that the banks invested their money due to liquidity surplus.

Th e confi dence of consumers is returning slowly with the recovery of the leading world economies, but the in-vestors are still restrained from some larger investments, and they are currently trying to “catch” some short-term trend. Th e current situation seems like this: in one week the stock exchanges show growth then they fall, and than, all of sudden, it occurs that shares of a bank increase aft er which they decrease again, and then the raw material prices increase again. Th is point out that positive stock exchange trend has started. In essence, this is the liquidity factor. Enormous quantities of shor-t-term capital travel between currency, bond and part-ly raw material investments. Short-term speculations are essentially very hard thing for a broker and some-times they represent the way to make losses. It means that anyone who wants to speculate short must be very familiar with the movement of cash fl ows in global fi -nancial markets.

Global economy is in so called recession having “U” form and it will take at least a year to overcome it. Th ere is also a pessimistic forecast where global economy no-wadays is facing long-term ten-year recession of “L” form. Th e only thing that is certain is that the recovery will be neither fast nor simple.

INVESTMENT FUNDS STILL HAVE PROBLEMS Th e year of fi nancial crisis is behind us, which mostly refl ected on capital market, so that its infl uence was felt by investment funds reporting negative returns on an-nual basis. Th e experts say that money is there but the largest problem in the crisis is disrupted confi dence.

Th e investment in shares and investment funds re-present the investments with long-term time horizon, so that short-term corrections with long-term investors should not cause fear since market recovery comes af-ter crisis. Since long-term market trend is positive, the investors not caught by panic and those who additio-nally invested during crises would fi nally be rewarded for their patience in long run.

Crises follow stock exchange dealings from its begin-ning. Crisis appears, as a rule, suddenly, at the peak of optimistic market and its consequences are high losses incurred by the ordinary investor that are expressed as unachieved possible income. Current crisis is not the fi rst one and defi nitely will not be the last to emerge. Big short-term corrections and dramatic fall in capital market occurred in every crisis that has happened so far (there were 17 of them in last 80 years), which has awoken fear in people of losing their property which they invested in shares or investment funds. Panic hu-

man reaction prevailed also in large number of investors even in those with long-term horizon of investments, so they sold their positions in shares or investment funds reducing thereby or completely liquidating exposure to possible further loss of assets.

Human panic is greatly responsible for the decline in value at capital market. Upset investors sell their in-vestments at very low prices (since there is small num-ber of those that buy investments) only to get any kind of money. From long-term investor standpoint, this creates, as a rule, medium and long-term opportuni-ties above the average for investments. History-wise, it can be noticed that the investors in majority of cases tend to be exposed to shares directly prior to big sales, and reduce their positions in stocks and shares in in-vestment funds just before immediate growth at capital market. It should be vice versa, as a rule. Warren Buff ett, a famous investor, who has been using crisis in capi-tal markets and making enormous amounts of money thinks in this way. One of his most famous statements is “be fearful when others are greedy and be greedy only when others are fearful”. Yet, it is very diffi cult to beat the market in practice.

Currently, banking deposits are good alternative for investing, since the situation is such that cash is better to be in a bank than be invested in something else. However, future interest rates declining trend is more than clear, so deposited money from the bank could be invested slowly and carefully in securities and funds. Th e funds themselves are partly responsible for currently bad si-tuation in the funds’ sector. It is very seldom to obtain any specifi c information about the fund and where to invest money. Why would someone invest if he does not know what he is getting in return? Everything on how to make profi t should be explained and made public to citizens and investors that are not in defi cit.

PENSION FUNDS HAVE POSITIVE TRENDCurrent crisis, small pensions and uncertainty concer-ning state pension funds will force people to save more and more. Realistically, the standard of citizens signi-fi cantly declined during the last year since earnings decreased in that period. Simultaneously, thousands of workers remained without work, with small or almost no severance pays and very weak prospects to fi nd qu-ickly new job.

Observing pension funds in general, expected inco-me from investing in shares decreased as well as from payments of clients of pension funds. Expected inco-me from investment in shares drastically decreased, so regulatory and supervisory bodies should play key role in the responsible asset management of large num-ber of people. It has been evident that in the countries where regulatory authorities have not allowed risky in-vestments, pension funds have not suff ered big losses. Due to important social responsibility, pension funds have conservative approach of investing in fi nancial markets. For example, at the beginning of this year, the measure of limiting the possibility of their investing in shares from 40% to a maximum of 10% of their total assets was introduced in Serbia. It can be only imagi-


68

FINANSIJSKA KRIZA

Iako je ideja poslovanja privatnih penzionih fondova stalno ulaganje i vješt obrt novca, trenutno su najbo-lje prošli oni koji nisu mnogo eksperimentisali, već su povjeren im novac oročili kod banaka. Cilj ovih fon-dova nije da ulažu u bankarske depozite, ali su na to prinuđeni s obzirom na to da je trenutna situacija na tržištu teška, pogotovo u zemljama koje nisu dovoljno razvijene i kada na tržištu nema dovoljno fi nansijskih instrumenata. Penzione fondove zakon obavezuje da ulažu u sigurno. U periodima krize najsigurnije je ulaganje u državne zapise, pa se od države očekuje da podstakne izdavanje kvalitetnih hartija od vrijednosti, poput opštinskih obveznica u koje bi ovi fondovi naj-radije ulagali novac.

Redovno izvještavanje je jedan od ključnih eleme-nata zaštite članova penzijskih fondova. Na osnovu tih izvještaja kontroliše se da li se imovina fonda ulaže u skladu sa ograničenjima propisanim zakonom.

Nesporno je da su ulagači u penzione fondove bolje prošli od onih koji su ulagali u investicione. Penzioni fondovi koje prati Organizacija za ekonomsku saradnju i razvoj (OECD), čije članice čini 30 uglavnom boga-tih industrijskih zemalja, u prvoj polovini ove godine uspjeli su da značajno nadoknade izgubljenu tržišnu vrijednost tokom 2008. godine, uglavnom na krilima snažnih prinosa na akcije. U posljednjem izvještaju na-vodi se da je nadoknađeno 1.500 milijardi od ukupno 5.400 milijardi dolara izgubljene tržišne vrijednosti. Najbolje prosječne rezultate na području OECD zabi-lježili su fondovi u Norveškoj i Turskoj, ostvarivši no-minalne prinose u visini od preko 10 odsto u poređe-nju sa nominalnim prinosima od četiri odsto, koje su ostvarili fondovi u SAD. Inače, državni penzioni fond Norveške je jedan od najvećih u svijetu. Sredstva ovog fonda koji se još naziva „fondom budućih generacija“, uglavnom se ulažu u vrijednosne hartije inostranih kompanija. Finansijski stručnjaci ove zemlje procjen-juju da se vrijednost ovog fonda u narednih šest-sedam godina može uvećati za blizu tri puta - na više od 1.000 milijardi dolara. Ugledne svjetske kompanije, ulažući u penzijske fondove, pokazuju najviši stepen društve-ne odgovornosti.

KRETANJA U OSIGURANJUGlobalna kriza mijenja navike i velikih i malih investi-tora. Kako je bankarski sektor već neko vrijeme u prob-lemu, najsigurnije su se osjetili oni koji su svoj novac plasirali u polise štednih i životnih osiguranja. Sektor osiguranja prati stanje privrede, gdje je trenutno ote-žana naplata potraživanja, usljed čega je u djelatnos-ti osiguranja zabilježen pad premija. Usljed recesije, došlo je do gubitka prihoda i zbog toga što određeni broj klijenata nije izvršio uplate po osnovu sklopljenih polisa osiguranja.

Finansijska kriza se prije svega osjeti na onim osigu-ranjima koja nisu obavezna. Građani i preduzeća mogu da odluče da sami nose rizike, ali se dešava i obrnuti proces da zbog sveopšte nesigurnosti dođe do rasta imovinskih, osiguranja od odgovornosti, osiguranja od nesrećnog slučaja. U ekonomiji u kojoj mi živimo, osiguranje se smatra luksuznom potrošnjom, pa je za

očekivati da će se u vrijeme fi nansijske nesigurnosti građani prvo odreći tog luksuza. Bez obzira na nago-vore da trošimo više kako bismo podstakli proizvodn-ju, u vrijeme krize, iako nije popularna, štednja je in-stiktivni potez svakoga.

Proizvodi životnog osiguranja predstavljaju dugoroč-nu i kompleksnu investiciju, pa se odluka o ovakvoj in-vesticiji donosi veoma obazrivo. Danas ljudi potpisuju polise životnog osiguranja uglavnom kod kredita za ku-povinu stanova, jer banke insistiraju na životnom osi-guranju korisnika. U periodu krize, stanovništvo nema za osnovne stvari, a kamoli za ulaganja koja treba da donesu rezultat za desetak godina. Njima novac treba sada, pa se osiguravajuće kuće u periodu krize susreću i sa zahtjevima za raskid polisa životnog osiguranja, iako je to najneisplativiji potez koji pojedinci u ovom trenutku mogu napraviti. Za očekivati je da će se stag-nacija životnog osiguranja nastaviti, kao i pad banko-osiguranja zbog smanjenih plasmana banaka.

Primjetan je problem teže naplate usljed slabljenja ekonomske moći fi zičkih i pravnih lica koja se osigu-ravaju, te da raste broj neosiguranih vozila, tj. izbjegava se obavezno osiguranje od autoodgovornosti, što znači da dominiraju obavezna osiguranja. U periodima kri-ze, kada govorimo o osiguranju, postoji tendencija po-većanog prijavljivanja većih iznosa odštetnih zahtjeva i prevara u osiguranju, što naglašava potrebu brižljive regulacije šteta.

Utičući na povećanje cijena rizika i smanjenja inves-ticionih prinosa, fi nansijska kriza uzrokuje potrebu za povećanjem premije osiguranja. U recesionim uslovi-ma to nije moguće, jer se smanjuje profi tabilnost pri datom nivou troškova i smanjuje se kapital, odnosno dolazi do velikog pada tržišne vrijednosti portfelja osi-guravajućih društava.

Uticaj krize na osiguravače je različit. Ugroženiji su, svakako, osiguravači i reosiguravači sa rizičnijim pla-smanima (investicije u sekjuritizovane hartije od vri-jednosti, akcije koje nisu kotirane na berzama, hedž fondovi). Usljed opšte nestabilnosti, tržište osiguranja je često žrtva nelojalne konkurencije, odnosno dam-ping cijena koje nemaju utemeljenje u premijskom sis-temu i cjenovniku. Snižavanjem kriterijuma i spuštan-jem premija ispod svakog nivoa, dovode se u opasnost osnovni kriterijumi poslovanja. Damping cijenama je nemoguće legalno konkurisati, a što se očituje trkom za klijentima i otimanjem osiguranika. Na kraju će is-paštati osiguranici, jer će zbog nižih premija i nakna-da štete biti niža.

U narednom periodu osiguravači mogu očekivati, osim privrednih problema, i niz regulatornih promje-na, što oni koji imaju strane vlasnike primjećuju i kao evropski trend. Usporavanje opšteg ekonomskog rasta će ostaviti posljedice i na sektor osiguranja, pri čemu će osiguravajuće kuće morati da se okrenu konzerva-tivnijim ulaganjima, zbog čega se mogu očekivati manji prinosi na uložena sredstva. Zbog opšte nelikvidnosti privrede i fi nansijskog sistema, prisutno je nepovjere-nje svih učesnika tržišta kapitala u izdavače fi nansij-skih instrumenata na svim segmentima tržišta kapitala i njegove institucije ■


ned what impact it would have on assets of these funds due to current fi nancial crisis if the previous decision remained in force.

Although the idea of activities of private pension funds is to invest constantly and have very good turnover of money, currently the best are those that have not expe-rimented much but they deposited the money entrus-ted to them in banks. Th e objective of these funds was not to invest in banking deposits but they were forced to do so since the current situation at the market is dif-fi cult, particularly in countries that are not developed and where there are insuffi cient fi nancial instruments at the market. Th e law prescribed safe investment for the pension funds. In crisis periods, the safest investments are in treasury bills, so the state is expected to encou-rage issue of qualitative securities like municipal bonds where these funds could invest their money.

Regular reporting also represents one of the key ele-ments of the protection of members of the pension funds. Based on these reports, the compliance of fund’s assets with limits prescribed by the law is controlled.

It is evident that the investors in pension funds did better than those that invested in investment funds. Pension funds monitored by Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) whose members are 30 wealthy industrial countries, succeeded in the fi rst half of this year signifi cantly to compensate for market value that was lost during 2008 mostly from big returns from shares. Th e last report mentioned that USD 1,500 billion was compensated out of total USD 5.400 billion of lost market value. Th e best average results in OECD area was reported by funds in Norway and Turkey ma-king nominal returns of over 10% in relation to nomi-nal returns of 4% that funds in USA made. However, state pension fund of Norway is one of the largest in the world. Th e resources of this fund, which is also called “the fund of future generations”, are mostly invested in securities of foreign companies. Th e fi nancial experts of this country estimate that the value of this fund may increase in next 6-7 years almost three times – to more than USD thousand billion. Respectable world compa-nies have shown the highest degree of social responsi-bility by investing in pension funds.

MOVEMENTS IN INSURANCE Global economic crisis changes the habits of both small and big investors. Since the banking sector has already having problems, those who invested their money in savings and life insurance policies were the safest. Th e insurance sector has been following the development in economy where the collection of claims is currently diffi cult, which resulted in the fall of premiums in the insurance industry. Due to recession, loss of income oc-curred and therefore a certain number of clients have not made payments based on signed insurance policies.

Th e fi nancial crisis is primarily felt in non-compul-sory insurances. Citizens and companies may decide to bear risks by themselves, but also opposite process may happen, so that growth occurs in property, liability and accident insurances due to overall uncertainty. In the economy we are living, the insurance is considered lu-

xury consumption, so it is to expect that in time of fi -nancial uncertainty, citizens will renounce this luxury. Regardless of the pressure that one should spend more so that it would encourage the production, the savings, although not popular during crisis, is an instinct move of everyone.

Life insurance products represent long term and com-plex investments so the decision on such investment should be made very carefully. Nowadays, people sign life insurance policies usually when taking loans for purchase of apartments since the banks insist on life insurance of the users. In crisis period, citizens do not have enough funds to buy basic things and not to men-tion investments that should bring some result in ten years. Th ey do not need money now, so in crisis period the insurance companies are also facing the requests for termination of life insurance policies although it is the worst move that individuals can make at this mo-ment. It is to expect that the life insurance stagnation will continue, as well as decline in banking insurance due to the reduced placements of banks.

Another problem that is evident is more diffi cult col-lection due to weaker economic power of natural and legal persons that are insured, so that the number of uninsured vehicles is growing, i.e. compulsory auto lia-bility insurance is avoided which means that compul-sory insurances are dominant ones. In crisis periods, with respect to insurance, there is trend of increased reporting of higher amounts of claims and frauds in insurance, which emphasises the need of careful regu-lation of claims.

Infl uencing on the increase in prices of risk and decre-ase in investment returns, the fi nancial crisis causes the need to increase insurance premium. Th is is not possible in the recession, since the profi tability decre-ases in given amount of expenses as well as capital, i.e. big fall in market value of portfolio of insurance com-panies occurs.

Th e impact of crisis on insurers is diff erent. Th e most jeopardised are defi nitely insurers and reinsurers with risky placements (investments in securitised securities, non listed shares, hedge funds). Due to general instabi-lity, insurance market is oft en a victim of disloyal com-petition, i.e. dumping prices that do not have grounds in system of premiums and prices. It is impossible to make competition with dumping the prices, which refl ects in trying to get clients and taking over insured persons. Finally, insured persons will suff er since the compensa-tion of damage will be lower due to lower premiums.

Th e insurers can expect in the following period several regulatory changes besides economic problems, which is noticeable by those who are foreign owned and what has become the European trend. Deceleration of gene-ral economic growth will leave its consequences also on the insurance industry whereas the insurance compa-nies will have to turn to conservative investments, which will lead to lower returns on the invested funds. Due to general illiquidity of economy and fi nancial system, mistrust of all participants of the capital market in is-suers of the fi nancial instruments at all parts of capital market and its institutions is evident ■

FINANCIAL CRISIS

Borba protiv terorizma, kao jednog od najopasnijih savremenih oblika kriminala, ujedinila je praktično sve civilizovane države i međunarodne organizacije, s obzirom da opštu opasnost od ove pojave. Ta opasnost se stalno povećava, s obzirom da je tradicionalni koncept terorizma zamijenjen novim, takozvanim „super terorizmom“, koji je primijenjen od strane raznih kultova i vjerskih grupa, uz moguću upotrebu oružja za masovno uništenje

Novica RadovićInvest Banka Montenegro

Veliki izazovi,a teška rješenja

Upravo kada je ovaj tekst završavan, stigla je još jedna surova potvrda aktuelnosti teme koja je u njemu obrađena. Naime, sav civilizovani svijet je potresla vijest o smrti više desetina ne-dužnih putnika u vozu „Nevski ekspres“, koji su teroristi digli u vazduh na pruzi Moskva- Sankt Peterburg.

Postoji veliki broj defi nicija terorizma, a ovdje ćemo po-menuti dvije, za koje smatramo da kompleksno opi-

suju pojavu. Prva je ona koju je dao Kofi Anan, bivši ge-neralni sekretar UN, istakavši da je „terorizam po svojoj prirodi napad na fundamentalne principe prava, poretka, ljudskih prava i mirnog rješavanja sukoba, tj. svih principa na osnovu kojih se zasniva sistem UN-a“. Druga defi nicija koju navodimo, je ona data od strane FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), a glasi: „Terorizam je korišćenje ozbiljnog nasilja protiv lica i imovine, ili prijetnja korišćenjem istog nasilja, sa ciljem da se zastraši i prinudi država, javnost ili dio javnosti, u cilju promovisanja političkih, socijalnih ili ideoloških ciljeva“.

INSTITUCIONALNI OKVIR BORBE PROTIV TERORIZMAZbog generalne opasnosti od terorizma, logično je nasto-janje UN da postane predvodnik borbe protiv ovog savre-menog zla. UN u prvom redu nastoje da putem donošenja odgovarajućih konvencija stvore pravni osnov za izgradnju svjetskog sistema zaštite od terorizma. Daleka prethodnica tih konvencija je Konvencija o sprječavanju i kažnjavanju terorizma koju je Liga naroda pripremila 1937. godine, a di-rektan povod za to je bio atentat na jugoslovenskog kralja Aleksandra 1934. godine u Marselju. Posebno važan akt, koji objedinjuje obaveze iz više dokumenata UN, je Rezolucija Savjeta bezbjednosti br.373 iz oktobra 2001. godine, za čije praćenje je osnovan i posebni komitet za borbu protiv te-rorizma (CTC). Što se Evrope tiče, tu takođe imamo niz re-levantnih dokumenata, kao što su Evropska konvencija o suzbijanju terorizma (ETS br.90) iz 1977. godine, Revidirana Evropska konvencija o suzbijanju terorizma (ETS br.190) iz 2003. godine, Konvencija Savjeta Evrope o sprječavanju te-rorizma (CETS br.196) iz 2005. godine.

MEĐUNARODNI OKVIR SUPROTSTAVLJANJA FINANSIRANJU TERORIZMATerorizmom, kao kompleksnim multidisciplinarnim pita-njem, bavi se više disciplina. Predmet ovog teksta je isključi-vo pitanje fi nansiranja ovog krivičnog djela, odnosno način sprječavanja tog fi nansiranja. A koliko je ovo bitan aspekt za cjelinu problema, ilustruje i izjava bivšeg državnog sek-retara SAD Kolina Pauela da „novac predstavlja kiseonik za terorizam“. Kako presjeći dovod tog kiseonika, je predmet aktivnosti velikog broja relevantnih organa i institucija iz širokog fronta borbe protiv terorizma. UN su 1999. godine donijele Međunarodnu konvenciju za sprječavanje fi nansi-ranja terorizma , kojom se zahtijeva od država članica pre-duzimanje energičnih mjera na sprječavanju i suzbijanju di-rektnog i indirektnog fi nansiranja terorističkih djelatnosti. FATF (Th e Financial Action Task Force), listu od svojih 40 preporuka, koje se odnose na sprječavanje pranja novca, u oktobru 2004. godine proširuje sa osam specijalnih prepo-ruka o fi nansiranju terorizma, a za to se u određenoj mjeri može vezati i deveta posebna preporuka, koja se odnosi na prenošenje preko granice gotovog novca i hartija od vrijed-nosti. Ove preporuke su od strane Evropskog parlamenta i Savjeta Evropske Unije ugrađene u Direktivu 2005/60/EC od 26. oktobra 2005. (tzv. Treću direktivu EU), čime su do-bile dodatni stepen obaveznosti za zemlje članice EU, kao i za sve one zemlje koje su se opredijelile za prihvatanje standarda koji važe u EU. Tom direktivom je izvršeno bit-no proširenje obaveza iz Prve i Druge direktive, koje su se odnosile na ovu problematiku.

NACIONALNI ZAKONSKI OKVIRI I PRAKSA Proširivanjem preporuka FATF-a sa osam specijalnih pre-poruka nastala je obaveza za sve zemlje članice EGMONT


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SPRJEČAVANJE FINANSIRANJA TERORIZMA

The fi ght against terrorism, as one of the most dangerous modern forms of crime, practically united all civilized countries and international organizations, considering a general threat from this phenomenon. This threat continuously increases since the traditional concept of terrorism was replaced with a new one, the so-called “super terrorism” applied by various cults and religious groups, in addition to possible use of weapons for mass destruction

Novica RadovićInvest Banka, Montenegro

Major Challenges,Hard Solutions

Exactly as I was fi nishing this text, there was another cruel confi rmation of how current the theme it addressed was. Namely, the entire civilized world was upset by the news about the death of dozens of innocent passengers on the Nevsky Express train, caused by a terrorist bombing on the railway between Moscow and Saint-Petersburg.

The defi nitions of terrorism are numerous, while only two will be mentioned here, those that, as we believe,

describe this phenomena in a complex manner. Th e fi rst defi nition was formulated by Kofi Anan, the former UN Secretary General, by pointing out that “ the nature of ter-rorism is an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and peaceful resolution of disputes, that is all principles that the UN system is based on”. Th e other defi nition was formulated by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), reading: “Terrorism is the use of serious violence against persons or property or a threat of using such violence to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political, social or ideological objectives“

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISMDue to a general danger of terrorism, the eff ort of the United Nations to lead a fi ght against this contemporary evil is lo-gical. Th e UN primarily endeavors, by adopting relevant conventions, to create the legal basis for the building of a global system of protection against terrorism. An ancient precursor of those conventions was the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, prepared by the League of Nations in 1937, which was directly motivated by the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseille in 1934. An act of special importance that uni-ted the responsibilities from several documents of the United Nations was the Security Council resolution 373 of October 2001, and a special committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), was established to monitor its implementation. As for Europe, it also adopted a num-ber of relevant documents, such as the following: European

Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No. 90) of 1977; Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No.190) of 2003; Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No.196) of 2005.

INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING Terrorism, as a complex multidisciplinary issue, is addressed by several disciplines. Th is text deals exclusively with the is-sue of fi nancing of this criminal act, that is the manner of its prevention. Th e importance of this aspect for the entirety of the problem is also illustrated by the statement made by the former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell saying that “mo-ney is the oxygen for terrorism”. Th e manner in which this oxygen channel can be cut is the objective of the activities carried out by a number of relevant bodies and institutions forming a broad front against terrorism. In 1999, the UN adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism demanding the member states to undertake some energetic measures toward the preven-tion and suppression of both direct and indirect fi nancing of terrorist activities. In 2004, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), extended its list of 40 recommendations re-lating to the money laundering by adding eight special re-commendation on terrorism fi nancing, which may relate to a certain extent also to the ninth special recommendation on the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments. Th ese recommendations were incorporated into the Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the Th ird EU Directive), which made them additional-ly binding for the Member States of the European Union,


PREVENTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING

grupe (svjetske asocijacije fi nansijsko-obavještajnih službi) da u svoj pravni sistem unesu zakonske odredbe o sprječa-vanju fi nansiranja terorizma, što je određeno kao uslov za zadržavanje članstva u toj asocijaciji. Za kandidate za ula-zak u članstvo, među kojima je u tom trenutku bila i Crna Gora (odnosno njena Uprava za sprječavanje pranja novca), to prilagođavanje zakona je bilo čak eliminatorni uslov za ulazak u članstvo. U tom cilju je Crna Gora u martu 2005.godine izvršila dopune svog tadašnjeg Zakona o sprječava-nju pranja novca odredbama koje se odnose na sprječavanje fi nansiranja terorizma, pa je nesmeteno ušla u EGMONT grupu u junu iste godine. Novi crnogorski Zakon o sprje-čavanju pranja novca i fi nansiranja terorizma, iz decembra 2007. godine, usklađen je sa Trećom direktivom EU, što znači da je obuhvatio i inovirane obaveze koje se tiču sprje-čavanja fi nansiranja terorizma.

PRANJE NOVCA I FINANSIRANJE TERORIZMA - ZAŠTO ZAJEDNO?Često se postavlja pitanje zašto su dva, po svom karakteru različita krivična djela, pranje novca i fi nansiranje teroriz-ma, tretirana istim zakonom, a njihovo sprječavanje se vrši putem jedinstvenog sistema (podzakonska akta, programi, procedure, obveznici, nadležni organi...). A primjera koji ukazuju na očiglednu razliku između tih krivičnih djela je puno. Npr.: prije pranja novca je već izvršeno drugo (pre-dikatno) krivično djelo, dok fi nansiranje terorizma pretho-

di izvršenju drugog krivičnog djela; prva faza kod pranja novca je, po pravilu, ubacivanje gotovog novca u bankarske kanale, dok kod fi nansiranja terorizma to nije slučaj, već je logičniji suprotan proces (izvlačenje gotovine kojom se plaćaju teroristi); iako se vrlo često fi nansira iz visokopro-fi tnih kriminalnih djelatnosti (npr.trgovina drogom), te-rorizam se može fi nansirati i novcem iz legalnih poslova (čistim novcem)...

Vidljivo je da su to dva procesa, koji se ipak mogu „su-sresti“ u određenim slučajevima i pomagati jedan drugo-me. Npr. fi nansijeri terorizma svoju potrebu za određenom količinom gotovog novca mogu zadovoljiti „kupovinom“ prljavog keša, čime oni izbjegavaju nelogično podizanje gotovine, a perači novca završavaju posao, odnosno dobi-jaju novac na račun, bez rizičnog direktnog ubacivanja te gotovine. Ova preklapanja u pojedinačnim slučajevima ne utiču na generalni zaključak da se radi o dva suštinski raz-ličita procesa.

Otkuda onda ta veza i jedinstveni pristup borbi protiv ovih krivičnih djela?

Odgovor može biti to što je, u oba slučaja, neophodno kompletno praćenje fi nansijskih tokova, pa je racionalno uspostaviti i koristiti jedinstven sistem u te svrhe. Sistem sprječavanja pranja novca je dobro postavljen i funkcioniše u dužem vremenskom periodu, uz stalno usavršavanje i pri-lagođavanje novim zahtjevima, koji proističu iz permanent-ne inovativnosti koju ispoljavaju kriminalci. Takav sistem, svojim elementima koji se odnose na identifi kaciju, praćenje i analizu klijenata i transakcija može, uz neophodno uva-žavanje specifi čnosti, veoma dobro odgovoriti osnovnom zadatku, a to je blagovremeno uočavanje novčanih tokova koji znače moguće fi nansiranje terorizma.

Kada govorimo o specifi čnostima, koje proističu iz nave-denih razlika između pranja novca i fi nansiranja terorizma, posebno treba istaći sljedeću: određene nelogične transak-cije mogu ukazati na sumnju da se radi o pranju novca, dok kod fi nansiranja terorizma fokus sumnje mora biti usmje-ren na same klijente i veze između njih, za što banke tre-ba da raspolažu određenim prethodnim informacijama, odnosno ulaznim podacima dobijenim od strane onih or-gana koji prate aktivnosti terorističkih organizacija. Ovdje je važno napomenuti da za samo izvršenje krivičnog djela nije potreban neki veliki novac, svakako ne u onom iznosu koji bi, zbog svog obima, bio uočljiv prilikom prolaska kroz bankarske kanale. Međutim, samom izvršenju terorističkog akta prethodi postojanje i aktivnost terorističkih organizaci-ja, čije fi nansiranje se ne može odvijati bez ostavljanja bilo kakvog novčanog traga. Ovo bez obzira na činjenicu da oni te tragove nastoje izbjeći, kad god je to moguće. Poznato je da Al-Qaida, na primjer, često koristi dijamante kao na-čin plaćanja, radi lakšeg transferisanja svojih fondova sa jednog mjesta na drugo, tj. iz jedne u drugu državu. Sve to komplikuje otkrivanje terorističkog novca, pa je donekle ra-zumljiva pesimistička konstatacija Davida Carusa, eksperta za otkrivanje prljavog novca, da je „traženje terorističkog novca u moru transakcija isto što i traženje određene ribi-ce u okeanu“. No, to nije razlog za odustajanje od ovog po-sla, već samo veliki izazov da se na ogroman problem ade-kvatno odgovori i dođe do njegovog rješenja. U tom cilju se posebno važno adaptirati na nove terorističke izazove, odnosno nalaziti adekvatne odgovore na njihove inovacije.


74


as well as for all other countries that decided to adopt the lawful EU standards. Th e obligations stipulated under the First and Second Directive, which regulated this area, were considerably supplemented by that Directive.

NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE By extending the FATF recommendations to include eight special recommendations, all Member States of the EGMONT Group (International Gathering of Financial Intelligence Units) were obliged to include the provisions on the pre-vention of terrorism fi nancing into their respective legal sys-tems, which was specifi ed as the condition for their continu-ed membership of that association. For the membership of candidate countries, including Montenegro at that time (i.e. its Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering), this harmonization of laws was even the decisive requirement. To that end, in March 2005, Montenegro amended its previo-us Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering to include the provisions on the prevention of terrorism fi nancing, so that it regularly joined the EGMONT group in June of the same year. Th e new Montenegrin Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing of December 2007 was harmonized with the Th ird EU Directive, which means that it included the innovated obligations relating to the prevention of terrorism fi nancing.

MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING – WHY TOGETHER?Th e question that is oft en asked is why those two criminal acts that are of diff erent character, money laundering and terrorism fi nancing, are regulated by the same law, while their prevention is carried out by means of a unifi ed sys-tem (secondary legislation, programs, procedures, persons subject to obligations, competent authorities, etc.). And the-re are many examples that point out an obvious diff erence between those criminal acts. For example, money launde-ring is a criminal act that was already committed (predicate crime), while the fi nancing of terrorism precedes a criminal act that will be committed; in the fi rst phase of money laun-dering, as a rule, cash is entered into the banking channels, while this is not the case with terrorism fi nancing where an opposite process is more logical (cash withdrawals to pay the terrorists); although it is oft en funded from high-profi t criminal activities (e.g. drug trade), terrorism can also be funded from legal activities (clean money), etc.

It is obvious that those two processes can nevertheless “meet” in certain cases, and support one another. For exam-ple, the fi nanciers of terrorism may satisfy their require-ments for a certain amount of cash by “purchasing” dirty cash, whereby they avoid illogical cash withdrawals, whi-le the money launderers get the job done, that is have the money transferred to their bank accounts without any risky direct cash deposits. Th ese overlaps in single cases do not aff ect a general conclusion that those two processes are es-sentially diff erent.

Accordingly, where does this connection come from, and also a unifi ed approach to the fi ght against these cri-minal acts?

An answer may be that both cases require full monito-ring of the fi nancial fl ows, so that it is rational to establish and use a unifi ed system for this purpose. Th e system for

the prevention of money laundering is well established and has been functioning for a longer period of time, in addi-tion to continuous improvements and adaptation to new requirements due to the innovations constantly devised by the criminals. Such a system, by means of its compo-nents that relate to identifi cation, surveillance and exami-nation of the clients and their transactions, can respond very well to the main task, which is to notice the fi nancial fl ows that may indicate possible fi nancing of terrorism in a timely manner.

Speaking of the specifi c characteristics that originate from the mentioned diff erences between the money launde-ring and terrorism fi nancing, it should be especially poin-ted out that money laundering may be indicated by and suspected on the basis of particular illogical transactions, while in the case of terrorism fi nancing, the focal point of suspicion must be directed towards the very clients and their mutual relations, which means that the banks need to have some previous information, that is input data pro-vided by the authorities that monitor the activities of ter-rorist organizations. It is important to mention here that no large amount of money is required for the execution of a criminal act itself, by all means not an amount that wo-uld be noticeable while going through the banking chan-nels due to its quantity. However, terrorist organizations exist and operate before a terrorist act is committed, and their funding cannot go by without leaving some fi nancial evidence behind. Th is is based on the fact that whenever possible they try to avoid such evidence. It is known that Al-Qaeda, for example, oft en uses diamonds as a form of payment, in order to transfer its funds easier from one place to the other, i.e. from one country to the other. All of this makes the tracing down of terrorist money more complicated, so that is rather understandable that David Caruso, an expert on the detection of dirty money, made a pessimistic statement when he said that “looking for the terrorist money in a sea of transactions is the same as loo-king for a particular fi sh in an ocean”. Nevertheless, this is no reason for giving up this work, but it is only a ma-jor challenge to provide an adequate response to a huge problem and arrive at its solution. For that purpose, it is especially important to adapt ourselves to new terrorist challenges, i.e. fi nd adequate responses to their innovati-ons. Losing momentum in this fi ght would result in ca-tastrophic consequences, so that it is an additional motif to keep perfecting the system for the fi ght against terro-rism fi nancing.

OBLIGATIONS OF BANKSSince, by law, the banks have very substantial obligations, the text below contains the measures and activities under-taken by those fi nancial institutions in order to prevent the money intended for terrorism fi nancing from passing throu-gh their channels, or else, in case it enters their channels, to be able to detect it and notify the competent authorities accordingly, fully and in a timely manner. Th is obligation to report any suspicious transaction in relation to terrorism primarily originated from the fourth special recommenda-tion of the FATF, while the seventh special recommenda-tion (electronic transfers) also directly relates to the fi nan-cial institutions.



Posustajanje u toj borbi bi imalo katastrofalne posljedice, pa je i to dodatni motiv za usavršavanje sistema borbe protiv fi nansiranja terorizma.

OBAVEZE BANAKAPošto su, po Zakonu, banke jedan od najznačajnijih ob-veznika, daćemo osvrt na mjere i aktivnosti koje predu-zimaju ove fi nansijske institucije, kako novac namijenjen fi nansiranju terorizma ne bi prolazio kroz njihove kanale, odnosno kako bi, u slučaju ulaska u te kanale bio otkriven, a informacija o tome bila, u potpunosti i blagovremeno, dostavljena nadležnim organima. Ta obaveza prijavljivanja sumnjivih transakcija povezanih sa terorizmom je primar-no proistekla iz četvrte specijalne preporuke FATF-a, a direktno na fi nansijske institucije se odnosi i sedma speci-jalna preporuka (elektronski transferi).

A sada nešto o tome kako bi trebalo da izgleda osnovna postavka tog sistema u bankama.

Crnogorski Zakon o sprječavanju pranja novca i fi nan-siranja terorizma suštinski je sličan zakonima drugih drža-va u regionu (Slovenija, Srbija, Hrvatska), pošto su svi oni usaglašeni sa pomenutom Trećom direktivom EU. Ključne odrednice Zakona, koje se odnose na banke, a predstavljaju osnov za uspješno otkrivanje novca namijenjenog teroris-tima i terorističkim organizacijama su: identifi kacija klije-nata prilikom uspostavljanja poslovnog odnosa i prilikom pojedinačnih transakcija većih od propisanog limita; oba-vezna analiza rizika i klasifi kacija klijenata po stepenu rizič-nosti; produbljena analiza za određenu kategoriju klijenata; zabrana poslovanja sa tzv. „kvazi“ bankama (shell banks); primjena liste indikatora sumnjivih transakcija; dostavljanje informacija nadležnom državnom organu, samoinicijativ-no (o sumnjivim transakcijama i određenim gotovinskim transakcijama), i po zahtjevu tog organa; kontinuirano praćenje određenih računa u određenom periodu; privre-meno obustavljanje sumnjivih transakcija; stalno prilagođa-vanja sistema zaštite od sumnjivih klijenata i transakcija i

permanentna obuka zaposlenih u vezi sa tim; poštovanje tajnosti podataka u vezi sa ovom problematikom.

U skladu sa prethodnim zakonskim obavezama, u svom programu protiv pranja novca i fi nansiranja terorizma i pro-cedurama za njegovu realizaciju banke trebaju defi nisati slje-deće aktivnosti, u cilju uvažavanja specifi čnosti otkrivanja novca namijenjenog fi nansiranju terorističkih organizaci-ja, terorista i terorističkuh akata: formirati i stalno ažurirati bazu sa podacima o registrovanim teroristima i terorističkim organizacijama. Ovu bazu treba puniti podacima iz lista sa imenima terorista, koje objavljuju referentne međunarod-ne organizacije i institucije, kao i pojedinačnim podacima koji se dobijaju u komunikaciji sa nadležnim državnim or-ganima; prilikom izrade analize rizika uzeti u obzir sve one elemente koji mogu biti od koristi za otkrivanje terorista i njihovog novca, a prilikom klasifi kacije klijenata po stepe-nu rizičnosti dati adekvatan stepen riziku od fi nansiranja terorizma; kod obavljanja identifi kacije klijenta (prilikom uspostavljanja poslovnog odnosa ili vršenja pojedinačne transakcije iznad limita), obavezno izvršiti pretragu kroz bazu iz tačke 1. Ovo treba obavezno izvršiti za fi zičko lice kada je u pitanju ta kategorija klijenata, a kada je klijent pravno lice, onda se pretraga vrši za ovlašćeno lice i, po-sebno, za stvarnog vlasnika tog pravnog lica. Pažnja se, po međunarodnim preporukama, naročito obraća na nepro-fi tne organizacije, koje su po njima posebno pogodne za fi -nansiranje terorizma (Osma specijalna preporuka FATF-a) ; kod obavljanja transakcija u rizične klijente treba uključiti i one klijente koji imaju transakcije bilo koje vrste sa licima iz baze pod tačkom 1. Na taj način se može otkriti eventualna mreža terorista i njihovih fi nansijera; odmah po identifi ko-vanju klijenta iz tačke 1. i/ili transakcije iz tačke 4. dostaviti o tome informaciju nadležnom državnom organu (Upravi za sprječavanje pranja novca i fi nansiranja terorizma); striktno se pridržavati uputstava nadležnog državnog organa, kako u postupanju sa transakcijama i licima, tako i u strogom poštovanju tajnosti podataka i informacija ■

Očita je suštinska razlika između pranja novca i fi nansiranja terorizma, ali je takođe jasno zašto se za otkri-vanje i sprječavanje oba krivična djela koristi ista infrastruktura. U postupku realizacije programa i procedu-ra koje banke primjenjuju za izvršavanje ove obaveze, logična je potreba uvažavanja određenih specifi čnosti. Ova aktivnost se, uz sve specifi čnosti, odvija u sklopu jedinstvenog fi nansijskog monitoringa. Jedna od ključnih razlika je u tome što za otkrivanje pranja novca startni signal uglavnom ide od obveznika (u ovom slučaju banke) prema nadležnom državnom organu, dok je, kad je fi nansiranje terorizma u pitanju, taj smjer po pra-vilu suprotan, odnosno banka dobija izvan (od organa i institucija) signal o potrebi praćenja transakcija koje obavljaju određena pravna i fi zička lica. Ovo je generalni princip, mada se ne može tretirati kao pravilo bez izuzetka. Razlika se može uočiti i kada je u pitanju prevashodni motiv angažovanja banaka na ovom planu. Kada je u pitanju sprječavanje pranja novca, osnovni ciljevi banke su: izbjegavanje/smanjenje rizika od sank-cija regulatornog tijela, rizika od fi nansijskih gubitaka, kao i posebno važnog reputacionog rizika. S druge stra-ne, kada je u pitanju sprječavanje fi nansiranja terorizma, do izražaja dolazi takozvana društvena odgovornost banke, odnosno potreba aktivnog uključivanja u sistem suprotstavljanja opštoj opasnosti po sigurnost društva i pojedinaca. I na kraju, zašto je ova problematika aktuelna u svakoj zemlji i svakom dijelu planete, bez obzi-ra na blizinu ili udaljenost od najvećih terorističkih žarišta?Odgovor leži u činjenici da se u uslovima pune globalizacije nije moguće izolovati i zaštititi u svom prostoru i okruženju. Otvorenost za protok ljudi i kapita-la i uklanjanje biznis barijera, znači punu integrisanost u sve tokove, pri čemu su sve forme kriminala, pa i te-rorizam kao najopasniji oblik, neizbježan pratilac tog procesa. Odgovor na to svakako ne može biti izolacija, već samo adekvatno i permanentno prihvatanje izazova. Banke, kao najosjetljiviji dio fi nansijskog sistema, tu imaju posebnu ulogu i zadatke, pa se ovaj tekst, u prvom redu odnosi na njih.


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Now a few words about the way in which this sys-tem should be initially set up in banks. Th e Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing of Montenegro is essentially similar to the laws of other countries in the region (Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia), since all of them are harmonized with the Th ird EU Directive. Th e key clauses of the Law that relate to the banks, serving as the basis for a successful detection of money intended for the terrorists and terrorist organizations, include the following: identifi cation of clients on the occasion of es-tablishment of business relations, and also in the case of single transactions that exceed the applicable limit; man-datory risk assessment and classifi cation of clients accor-ding to the level of risk; more detailed analysis for a par-ticular category of clients; ban on doing business with the so-called “quasi” banks (shell banks); utilization of a list of indicators for suspicious transactions; delivery of informa-tion to the competent state authority, self-initiated (about suspicious transactions and specifi c transactions in cash) and at the request of such authority; continuous monito-ring of particular accounts over a specifi ed period of time; temporary suspension of suspicious transactions; conti-nuous adjustment of the protection system against suspi-cious clients and transactions, and constant staff training in relation to that; treating the data relating to this area of activity confi dentially.

In accordance with the foregoing legal obligations, in or-der to consider the specifi cs of detecting the money that is intended for the fi nancing of terrorist organizations, terro-rists and terrorist acts, in their programs for the prevention of money laundering and terrorism fi nancing and the pro-cedures for its implementation, the banks need to identify the following activities: establish and keep updating a data-base of the registered terrorists and terrorist organizations;

this database should be updated based on the lists contai-ning the names of terrorists that are published by relevant international organizations and institutions, in addition to particular data obtained through communication with the competent state authorities; when a risk assessment is pre-pared, all elements that may be useful for the detection of terrorists and their money should be taken into considera-tion, and when the clients are classifi ed according to the le-vel of risk, an adequate level should be allocated to the risk of terrorism fi nancing; on the occasion of client identifi ca-tion (when the business relation is established, or a single transaction above the limit is carried out), the database from point 1 must be searched. In case of natural persons, this procedure is obligatory for this particular category of clients, and in case of legal persons, the search is carried out based on the name of the authorized person or, especially, of the real owner of the concerned company. According to international recommendations, special attention is paid to non-profi t organizations that are, according to them, especially favorable for the fi nancing of terrorism (the ei-ghth special recommendation of FATF); when performing the transactions, the group of risky clients should also in-clude the clients having any kind of transactions with the persons from the database under point 1; in this manner, a network of terrorists and their fi nanciers may possibly be detected; immediately aft er a client from point 1 and/or transaction from point 4 is identifi ed, the competent state authority has to be notifi ed accordingly (Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing); the instructions provided by the competent state authority regarding the procedure to be followed when de-aling with the transactions or persons, and also in relation a strict compliance with the secrecy of data and information, have to be strictly adhered to ■

It is obvious that there is an essential diff erence between the money laundering and terrorism fi nancing, but it is also clear why the same infrastructure is used for the detection and prevention of both criminal acts. It is logical that certain specifi cs need to be recognized in the process of implementation of the program and pro-cedures relating to the execution of this obligation by the banks. Th is activity, including all the specifi cs, deve-lops within a unifi ed fi nancial monitoring. One of the key diff erences is that, in the case of detection of money laundering, an initial signal is mostly given by the reporting party (in this case a bank) to the competent state authority, while in the case of terrorism fi nancing, this as a rule goes in an apposite direction, i.e. the bank is given a signal (from the authorities or institutions) that the transactions carried our by particular natural or legal persons need to be monitored. Th is is a general approach, although it cannot be treated as a rule without an exception. Th e diff erence may be noticed also when speaking about the priority motive of banks to be enga-ged in this activity. Concerning the prevention of money laundering, the main objectives of a bank are the fol-lowing: avoidance/reduction of the risk of being sanctioned by the regulatory body; the risk of fi nancial losses; and especially the risk of reputation. On the other hand, concerning the prevention of terrorism fi nancing, the so-called social responsibility of banks is fully expressed, that is the requirement for an active participation in the system that fi ghts a general threat to the safety of the society and individual persons. And fi nally, why are these problems of current interest in every country and every corner of the planet, regardless of the vicinity of or distance from the largest centers of terrorism? Th e answer lies in the fact that under the conditions of full globa-lization no isolation or protection within one‘s own area and surroundings is possible. A free movement of pe-ople and capital and elimination of business barriers means a full integration into all fl ows, and this process is inevitably accompanied by all forms of crime, and even terrorism as its most dangerous form. No isolation can certainly be a response to this situation, but only an adequate and constant acceptance of the challenge. Th e banks, as the most sensitive component of the fi nancial system, have a special role and tasks there, which is why this text primarily relates to them.



Propusti u radu internih kontrola banaka bili su, između ostalog, faktori koji su uticali na pojavu gubitaka bana-

ka. Pri tome, nepostojanje kontrolne kulture bilo je značajan faktor koji je uticao na loše poslovanje banaka. Slaba kon-trolna kultura obično sadrži dva elementa. Prvi - viši ruko-vodioci propuštaju da naglase značaj jakog sistema internih kontrola kroz njihovo isticanje i praktične akcije. Takođe, ne obezbjeđuju da organizaciona strukura i pojedinačna odgovornost rukovodstva budu jasno utvrđene. Poslovanje pojedinih banaka bilo je povezano sa problemima u dijelu uspostavljanja adekvatnih kontrola, a odnosilo se na po-stojanje organizacione strukture banke gdje odgovornost rukovodilaca nije jasno razgraničena. Kao rezultat nave-denog propusta, pojedini djelovi banke nijesu bili direktno odgovorni nikome od viših rukovodilaca, što je imalo za posljedicu da niko od viših direktora banke nije imao uvid u poslovanje ovih djelova banke kao i načina stvaranja nji-hove dobiti. Ovo se može izbjeći kada postojeće više instan-ce u banci dobijaju izvještaje o radu banke i razgovaraju sa osobljem banke koje obavlja pojedine vrste poslova. Drugi faktor koji je uticao na gubitke banaka, a povezan je sa funk-cionisanjem internih kontrola, je neadekvatna ocjena rizika

sa kojima se svaka banka suočava u svome radu. Na pojavu složenijih proizvoda, koje banka nudi u okviru postojećih poslova, interna kontrola nije na vrijeme reagovala adekvat-nim modelom praćenja tih aktivnosti. Isto tako, ulazak ban-ke u nove vrste poslova često nije praćen realnom cijenom rizika koji se javlja kao posljedica tih poslova.

DIREKTORE, DIREKTORE...U domenu neadekvatnih kontrolnih aktivnosti kao uzroka gubitaka banaka bitno je istaći problem akumuliranja odgo-vornosti jednog direktora. Pri utvrđivanju uzroka gubitaka banaka prouzrokovanih neadekvatnom internom kontrolom, bilo je nekoliko slučajeva da nadzorni organi utvrde da se ove nijesu pridržavale osnovnih principa interne kontrole. Razgraničavanje nadležnosti jedan je od uslova pouzdanog sistema internih kontrola koji je bio najčešći uzrok gubi-taka banaka. Viši direktori imali su ovlašćenja u domenu nadzora nad dvije ili više oblasti poslovanja banke sa sup-rotnim interesima. Razdvajanje nadležnosti ne treba da se graniči samo na situacije kada ista osoba istovremeno vrši nadzor nad prodajom i kupovinom HOV, već i kada ista osoba dozvoljava isplatu sredstava i vrši samu isplatu, ili


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NADZOR NAD INTERNIM KONTROLAMA BANAKA

U tržišnim uslovima povećavaju se rizici sa kojima se suočava banka. U cilju izbjegavanja mogućih gubitaka u poslovanju, banke su u obavezi da vode sisteme interne kontrole. Sistemi interne kontrole obuhvataju kontrolno okruženje i kontrolne postupke, plan i organizaciju, kao i sve metode koje je donijelo rukovodstvo pravnog subjekta radi pomoći da se ostvare upravljački ciljevi i da se, u najvećoj mjeri, obezbijedi ispravno i efi kasno vođenje poslovanja, što uključuje primjenu poslovne politike rukovodstva, očuvanje integriteta sredstava, sprječavanje i otkrivanje zloupotreba i grešaka, tačnost i potpunost računovodstvene evidencije i blagovremenu pripremu pouzdanih fi nansijskih informacija. Interna kontrola ne može garantovati uspjeh u poslovanju, niti može slab menadžment preobratiti u dobar. Kontrolom su obuhvaćeni svi djelovi banke, tj. cjelokupno poslovanje banke

Marijana AdžićFirst Financial Banka AD Podgorica

Povjerenje jedobro, ali su

kontrola i nadzorjoš bolji

Failures in the work of internal controls of banks were, among other things, factors that have cau-

sed the phenomenon of losses in the banks. Th ereby the lack of controlling culture was a signifi cant factor that aff ected weak operation of banks. Poor controlling culture generally contains two elements. Th e fi rst one – senior managers fail to stress importance of a strong internal control system by means of their emphasis and practical actions. In addition, they do not ensure clear defi nition of organisational structure and individual responsibility of management. Operation of certain banks was linked with the problems of putting adequ-ate controls in place and it was related to the existence of organisational structure of the bank where respon-sibility of managers is not clear cut. As a result of the failure mentioned above certain departments of the bank were not directly responsible to any of the senior managers and consequently none of the senior direc-tors had insight into operation of these departments of the bank and the way they generate profi t. Th at may be avoided when the existing higher levels in the bank receive reports on bank operation and discuss with the

bank staff that is engaged in certain types of activities. Another factor that incurred losses in the banks which is linked with functioning of internal controls is ina-dequate risk assessment faced by every bank in their operation. Internal control failed to timely respond with adequate monitoring model for such activities to the emergence of more complex products off ered by the bank as part of existing operations. Additionally, entry of the bank into the new types of activities frequently is not followed by real price of the risk that arises as a consequence of such activities.

DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR...In the fi eld of inadequate control activities that result in losses of the banks it is important to underline the problem of accumulated responsibility of one director. In determining reasons of losses of the banks caused by inadequate internal control there have been several ca-ses of the supervision body claiming that these failed to act upon basic principles of internal control. Separation of powers is one of the requirements for reliable inter-nal control system which was the most frequent reason

Confi dence is Good, But Control and Supervision areEven Better


SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL CONTROL OF BANKS

Risks faced by the bank are on the rise in market conditions. Banks are required to carry out internal control systems in order to avoid potential operational losses. Internal control systems cover controlled environment and control procedures, plan and organisation as well as all the methods approved by the management of a legal entity for the purpose of assisting in achievement of management goals and providing to the highest extent the correct and effi cient management of operations which includes implementation of the business policy of the management, preservation of the integrity of resources, prevention and detection of abuses and errors, accuracy and completeness of accounting records and timely preparation of reliable fi nancial information. Internal control may not guarantee success in operation, neither may the weak management be converted into the good one. Control covers all departments of the bank, that is bank operation in its entirety

Marijana AdžićFirst Financial Bank AD Podgorica

vrši procjenu adekvatnosti kreditne dokumentacije i prati dužnika pošto su krediti njemu odobreni. Neadekvatnost u kontrolnim aktivnostima odražava nepostojanje koordi-nacije poslova kako bi se oni obavljali na očekivan način. Ima slučajeva da direktori nijesu adekvatno reagovali na informacije koje su dobili u obliku periodičnih izvještaja o poslovanju svojih djelova banke.

Interne kontrole u bankama imaju sledeće ciljeve: efi kas-nost i uspješnost operacija u korišćenju sredstava banke i za-štite od gubitka (operacioni ciljevi); pouzdanost i potpunost fi nansijskih i upravljačkih informacija za donošenje odluka (informacioni ciljevi); obezbjeđenje poslovanja usaglašenog sa zakonima i stalim internim propisima i procedurama.

Internu kontrolu u bankama čini pet međusobno pove-zanih elemenata: nadzor direktora i stvaranje kontrolne kul-ture; procjena rizika; kontrolne aktivnosti; informisanost i komuniciranje; monitoring.

Bord direktora rukovodi i nadgleda rad viših direkto-ra banke. On je odgovoran za utvrđivanje širih strategija i glavnih politika banke kao i za odobravanje organizacione strukture cijele banke. On je isključivo odgovoran za obez-bjeđivanje da se adekvatni sistemi kontrole uspostave i da funkcionišu. Bord direktora banke treba da uključi u svoje aktivnosti: povremene razgovore sa direktorima u vezi efi -kasnosti sistema interne kontrole; povremeno izvještavanje o ocjeni internih kontrola urađene od strane direktora, in-ternih i eksternih revizora; periodične napore da direktori banke na odgovarajući način sprovode preporuke i upozo-renja data od strane revizora i supervizorskih organa u vezi nedostataka interne kontrole.

REVIZORSKI KOMITETI - PLUSU mnogim zemljama banke su formirale nezavisne revizor-ske komitete koji pomažu bordu direktora u sprovođenju njegovih nadležnosti. Samo funkcionisanje revizorskog ko-miteta dozvoljava detaljnu procjenu informacija i izvješta-ja. Viši rukovodici su odgovorni za sprovođenje direktiva odobrenih od strane borda direktora banke, uključujući pri tome i primjenu strategije i politike i utvrđivanje efi kasnog sistema interne kontrole.

Procjena rizika u cilju fi nansijskog izvještavanja predsta-vlja identifi kaciju, analizu i upravljanje rizikom koji se od-nosi na pripremu fi nansijskih izvještaja. Sa aspekta interne kontrole procjena rizika mora utvrditi i procijeniti eksterne (ekonomski, industrijski, regulatorni,tehnološki) i interne faktore (složenost organizacione strukture, vrsta poslovnih aktivnosti, stručnost osoblja) koji mogu da nepovoljno utiču na ostvarivanje ciljeva banke. Ona mora da pokriva, osim kreditnog, tržišni, rizik likvidnosti kao i operacioni rizik.

Potrebno je istaći razliku između procjene rizika u kontek-stu ‘’upravljanja rizikom’’ na nivou cjelokupnog poslovanja banke. Proces upravljanja rizikom na nivou banke sastoji se od seta ciljeva (profi tabilnost) i utvrđivanja, procjenji-vanja niza limita u dijelu izloženosti riziku koji je za banku prihvatljiv u ostvarivanju ciljeva. Proces interne kontrole u banci provjerava da li su ciljevi i politike usaglašene i pri-mijenjene, da li se njihova primjena upoređuje sa utvrđe-nim limitima, i da li se odstupanja otklanjaju u skladu sa politikom upravljanja. Procjena rizika može da se ostvari na nivou pojedine vrste posla kojim se banka bavi, ili kroz širok spektar aktivnosti i fi lijala na konsolidovanoj osnovi. On uključuje procjenu rizika koje banka može da kontro-liše i onih koje ne može.

MODELI PROCJENA RIZIKAProcjena rizika je subjektivna aktivnost pa se može govo-riti o klasičnom kvantitativnom modelu ocjene rizika. S obzirom da se rizik može objektivno izmjeriti zahtijeva da


80


for losses of the banks. Senior directors had powers to supervise two or more areas of operations of the bank with confl icted interest. Separation of powers should not be restricted only to the situations in which the same person simultaneously performs supervision of the sale and purchase of securities, but also when the same person approves payment of funds and carries out the payment or conducts assessment of adequacy of credit fi les and monitors the debtor aft er the loans have been granted. Inadequacy of control activities re-fl ects the lack of coordination of activities in order for them to operate as expected. In some cases directors failed to adequately react to the information they re-ceived in the form of periodic reports on operations of their departments of the bank.

Internal control in banks have the following goals: ef-fi ciency and success of operations in utilisation of the bank funds and protection against loss (operational go-als); reliability and completeness of the fi nancial and management information for decision making (infor-mation goals); ensuring compliance of operation with laws and other internal regulations and procedures.

Internal control in banks consists of fi ve mutually lin-ked elements: supervision by the director and creation of the controlling culture; risk assessment; control acti-vities; information and communication; monitoring.

Board of directors runs and monitors the work of se-nior directors of the bank. It is responsible for defi ni-tion of broader strategies and core policies of the bank as well as for approval of the organisational structure of entire bank. It has exclusive responsibility to ensure that effi cient control systems are established and operational. Board of directors of the bank should incorporate the following in its activities: occasional discussions with directors about effi ciency of internal control systems; occasional reporting on assessment of internal controls prepared by directors, internal and external auditors; periodic eff orts invested in order for directors of the bank to adequately implement recommendations and warnings given by auditors and supervisory bodies in relation with the lack of internal controls.

UDIT COMMITTEES - PLUSIn many countries banks established independent au-dit committees which assist the board of directors in exercising its powers. Th e very functioning of audit committee allows for detailed assessment of informa-tion and reports. Senior managers are responsible for implementation of the directives approved by the board of directors of the banks, including implementation of the strategy and policy and determination of the effi -cient internal control system.

Risk assessment aimed at fi nancial reporting repre-sents risk identifi cation, analysis and management which relates to preparation of the fi nancial reports. From the perspective of internal control the risk assessment must defi ne and assess external (economic, industrial, regu-latory, technological) and internal factors (complexi-ty of organisational structure, type of business activi-ties, staff competence) which may unfavourably aff ect achievement of the goals of the bank. In addition to

the credit risk it also must cover market, liquidity and operational risk.

It is necessary to point at the diff erence between risk assessment in the context of “risk management” at the level of comprehensive operation of the bank. Risk ma-nagement process at the level of the bank consists of a set of goals (profi tability) and defi nitions, assessment of a series of limits in part concerning exposure to the risk which is acceptable for the bank in achievement of the goals. Internal control system in the bank serves to verify whether the goals and policies are harmonised and im-plemented, whether their implementation is compared to the limits that have been set and whether deviations are eliminated in line with the management policy. Risk as-sessment may be carried out at the level of an individual type of activity of the bank or through the wide range of activities and branch offi ces on consolidated grounds. It includes assessment of the risks that may be controlled by the bank and those it may not control.

RISK ASSESSMENT MODELSRisk assessment is subjective activity which is why one may discuss traditional quantitative risk assessment mo-del. Since the risk may be objectively measured it requi-res making a decision whether the risk is low, moderate, signifi cantly below the maximum and maximum.

Qualitative risk is in focus here. Quantitative side of the control risk is expressed with the probability ratio which ranges from 0.10 to 1.00.

Qualitative and quantitative side of the risk may be expressed as follows:

Moderate control risk → 0.20-0.70Low control risk → 0.10-0.30Maximum control risk → 1.00Control risk which is signifi cantlybelow the maximum → 0.60-0.95

If the control risk is signifi cantly below the maximum there is a need to carry out detailed checks of internal control system and also to examine greater number of documents in order to determine whether the system operates effi ciently. Accordingly, control procedures must be carried out several times and they must be of a wider scope. Control activities represent a set of policies and procedures applied by the management to achieve its goals. Control activities provide information for ta-king activities that are needed to control risks related to achievement of the goals that have been set.

THREE STEPSControl activities include three steps: defi nition of policies; implementation of the procedure in line with the policies; verifi cation whether the policies are harmonised.

Th ese activities embrace all levels of employees at the bank, also including: reporting to the bank mana-gement, control activities where directors of depart-ments or services of the bank regularly receive reports based on daily, weekly or monthly indicators of bank operation; physical control which relates to restriction of access to the bank assets, including securities; com-pliance with the limits in terms of exposure.



se odluči da li je rizik nizak, skroman, znatno ispod mak-simalnog ili maksimalan.

Ovdje je riječ o kvalitativnom riziku. Kvantitativna stra-na kontrolnog rizika se izražava koefi cijentom vjerovatnoće koji se kreće u rasponu od 0.10 do 1.00.

Kvalitativna i kvantitativna strana rizika se može prikazati :Skromni kontrolni rikik → 0.20-0.70Niski kontrolni rizik → 0.10.-0.30Maksimalni kontrolni rizik → 1.00Kontrolni rizik znatno ispod maksimalnog → 0.60-0.95

Ako je kontrolni rizik znatno ispod maksimalnog, potreb-no je da se obave detaljne provjere sistema interne kontro-le, kao i da se ispita i veći broj dokumenata kako bi se utvr-dilo da sistem efi kasno funkcioniše. Kontrolni postupci, shodno tome, moraju da se obavljaju više puta i moraju biti obimniji. Kontrolne aktivnosti su skup politika i procedura koje uprava koristi za ostvarivanje svojih ciljeva. Kontrolne aktivnosti obezbjeđuju informacije za preduzimanje aktiv-nosti koje su neophodne da bi se kontrolisali rizici vezani za postizanje postavljenih ciljeva.

TRI KORAKAKontrolne aktivnosti uključuju tri koraka: utvrđivanje po-litika; sprovođenje procedure shodno politikama; provjera da li su sve politike usaglašene.

Ove aktivnosti uključuje sve nivoe zaposlenih u banci uključujući pri tome: izvještavanje menadžmenta ban-ke; kontrolne aktivnosti, gdje direktori odjeljenja ili službi banke redovno dobijaju izvještaje zasnovane na dnevnim, sedmičnim ili mjesečnim pokazateljima poslovanja ban-ke; fi zička kontrola, koja se odnosi na ograničenje pristupa imovini banke, uključujući HOV; usaglašenosti sa limitima u pogledu izloženosti.

Komuniciranje između različitih djelova banke obezbjeđuje korisnost informacija. Ono podrazumijeva stvaranje uslova jasnog razumijevanja individualnih uloga i odgovornosti koje se odnose na strukturu i funkcionisanje interne kontrole. U tome cilju viši rukovodioci moraju da uspostave efi kasan način komuniciranja koji će obezbijediti da neophodne in-formacije stignu do odgovarajućih službenika.

Banka mora da ima takvu organizacionu strukturu koja će omogućiti protok informacija u svim pravcima kroz banku. Tok informacija, od nižih ka višima, omogućiće uvid direk-torima banke u tekuće poslovanje banke. Protok informaci-ja na dolje omogućiće da su sa ciljevima i strategijama, kao i ustanovljenim politikama i procedurama, upoznati niži rukovodici banke, odnosno službenici.

BRŽI RAZVOJ - VEĆI ZAHTJEVINajbitniji elemenat rukovođenja bankom jeste uspostavl-janje i održavanje informacionih sistema koji pokrivaju cje-lokupan rad banke. Korišćenje elektronskih informacionih sistema i informacione tehnologije povezano je pri tome sa rizicima koje banka mora uspješno da kontroliše zbog izbje-gavanja prekida u poslovanju i mogućih gubitaka. Kontrola nad funkcionisanjem informacionih sistema i tehnologije mora da uključi kako opštu kontrolu tako i kontrolu koja se odnosi na primjenu. Opšta kontrola odnosi se na kontrolu kompjuterskih sistema i obezbjeđuje njihov nesmetani rad.

Drugi oblik kontrole informacionih sistema odnosi se na primjenu kompjuterskih programa i procedura koje kon-trolišu procese prenosa.

Većina banaka je imala gubitke vezane za probleme u domenu internih kontrola prouzrokovanih činjenicom da nijesu pratile sisteme interne kontrole (monitoring). Ovi sistemi često nijesu posjedovali potreban proces tekućeg praćenja i razdvojeno procjenjivanje nije bilo adekvatno ili nije vršeno adekvatno od strane direktora. Nedostatak nadzora može biti povezan i sa propustom razmatranja i reakcije na dnevne informacije pri rukovođenju i stalnih indicija u vezi poslovanja, kao što je probijanje limita u po-gledu izloženosti riziku. U nekim drugim slučajevima, dje-lovi banke koji su prouzrokovali velike gubitke ukazivali su na povećani rizik kao što je neobično visoka profi tabil-nost na poslovima sa velikim rizikom i snažan rast novih poslovnih aktivnosti koje su prostorno udaljene od sjediš-ta banke. Zahvaljujući neadekvatnoj procjeni rizika, banka nije obezbijedila dovoljan iznos dodatnih sredstava u cilju kontrole ili praćenja visokorizičnih aktivnosti.

Bankarstvo je grana privrede koja ima brz razvoj. Iz toga razloga, banke moraju stalno pratiti i ocjenjivati svoje siste-me internih kontrola u svjetlu promjena unutrašnjih i spo-ljašnjih uslova, i moraju obezbijediti da ovi sistemi obez-bijede njihovu efi kasnost. Praćenje i efi kasnost internih kontrola mora da bude dio dnevnih operacija banke ali ta-kođe mora da uključi posebne periodične ocjene cjelokup-nog procesa interne kontrole. Intezitet u kojem se obavlja praćenje različitih aktivnosti banke uslovljen je prisutnim rizicima sa kojima se suočava banka i prirodom promjena koje se dešavaju u okruženju u kome ona posluje. Zato sva-kodnevno praćenje ima prednosti brzog otkrivanja i mogu-ćnosti vršenja korekcije u sistemu interne kontrole. Nadzor nad poslovanjem banke u nekim slučajevima je efi kasniji kada je sistem interne kontrole integrisan u svakodnevno poslovanje i obezbjeđuje stalne izvještaje na uvid.

Kao sastavni element nadzora nad radom internih kon-trola ističe se interna revizija u banci. Ona ima važnu ulo-gu u svakodnevnom nadzoru nad sistemom internih kon-trola zato što obezbjeđuje nezavisnu ocjenu adekvatnosti i usaglašenosti sa utvrđenim kontrolama. Izvještavajući bord direktora banke ili revizioni komitet banke, interna revizija omogućava nepristrasne informacije radu banke. Za njeno efi kasno djelovanje potrebno je da ona svoje izvještaje do-stavlja najvišim rukovodiocima banke. To obezbjeđuje da izvještaji koje dobiju rukovodici banke budu neizmijenje-ni od strane direktora koji su odgovorni za poslove koji su predmet interne revizije.

Prudencioni organi moraju da insistiraju od svake banke da, shodno svojoj veličini, imaju efi kasan sistem njenog bi-lansnog i vanbilansnog poslovanja kao i da odgovaraju na promjene koje se dešavaju u okruzenju u kome banka po-sluje. Ocjenu adekvatnosti interne kontrole pojedine ban-ke, prudencioni organ daje na osnovu svojih tekućih nad-zornih aktivnosti.

Koliko god da djeluju, interne kontrole imaju ograniče-nu ulogu u sprječavanju kriminalnih radnji i nepravilnosti, iako se konstantno radi na njihovoj stalnoj implementaciji. Dakle, nadzor nad jakom internom kontrolom u bankama sa nezavisnom eksternom revizijom su osnovne karatkeristike solidnog upravljanja jedne fi nansijske organizacije ■


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Communication between diff erent departments of the bank ensures usefulness of information. Th at im-plies creation of conditions for clear understanding of individual roles and responsibilities that relate to the structure and operation of internal control. To that end, senior managers need to establish effi cient way of com-munication that will ensure that necessary information reach relevant employees.

Th e bank must have such organisational structure that will enable fl ow of information in all directions through the bank. Th e bottom-up fl ow of information will enable insight to the bank directors into the current bank operation. Th e top-down fl ow of information will ensure that lower level bank managers and employees are familiar with the goals and strategies and defi ned policies and procedures.

FASTER DEVELOPMENT – HIGHER DEMANDSTh e most important element of bank management is establishment and maintenance of information systems that cover complete operation of the bank. Th e use of electronic information systems and information tech-nology is therefore linked with the risks that must be successfully controlled by the bank in order to avoid suspension of operation and potential losses. Control of operation of information systems and technology must incorporate both, the general control and con-trol related to application. General control refers to the control of computer systems and ensures their unin-terrupted operation. Th e second form of the control of information systems refers to application of computer programmes and procedures which control the trans-fer processes.

Th e majority of banks incurred losses related to the problems in the fi eld of internal controls caused by the fact that they failed to monitor internal control system (monitoring). Th ese systems frequently had no neces-sary process of ongoing monitoring and separated as-sessment was not adequate or was not adequately per-formed by the director.

Th e lack of supervision may be linked with the failure to consider and react to the daily information in ma-nagement and with the continuous indications related to operations such as going beyond the limit in terms of risk exposure. In some other cases departments of the bank that caused major losses indicated increased risk such as unusually high profi tability in high risk operations and powerful growth of new business acti-vities that are in terms of space distant from the head offi ce of the bank. As a result of inadequate risk asses-sment the bank failed to provide suffi cient amount of additional funds for control and monitoring of high risk activities.

Banking is industry of economy which grows quic-kly. For that reason banks must constantly monitor and assess their internal control systems in light of chan-ges in internal and external conditions and they must ensure that these systems provide for their effi ciency. Monitoring and effi ciency of internal controls must be part of daily bank operations, but it also need to inclu-de special periodic assessments of entire internal con-

trol process. Intensity of monitoring diff erent activities of the bank is conditioned by existing risks faced by the bank and nature of changes happening in the en-vironment in which it operates. Th erefore monitoring on a daily basis has its advantages in quick detection and possibility to carry out adjustment in the internal control system. Supervision of bank operation in some cases is more effi cient if the internal control system is integrated in every day operation and if it provides con-stant reports for insight.

Integral part of supervision of internal control opera-tion is internal audit in the bank. It plays signifi cant role in every day supervision of internal control sys-tems as it ensures independent assessment of adequ-acy and compliance with the controls that have been established. By reporting to the board of directors of the bank or to the audit committee of the bank inter-nal audit ensures impartial information about the bank operation. Its effi cient operation requires delivery of reports to the top managers of the bank. Th is ensures that reports received by managers of the bank are not modifi ed by directors who are responsible for opera-tions that are subject to internal audit. Prudential bo-dies must insist that each bank depending on their size have effi cient system of balance sheet and off -balance sheet operations and must respond to the changes hap-pening in the environment in which the bank opera-tes. Prudential body gives assessment of adequacy of internal control of an individual bank on the basis of its ongoing supervisory activities.

Insofar as they act internal controls play restricted role in prevention of criminal activities and irregulari-ties even though the work has constantly been done on their implementation. Th erefore, supervision of power-ful internal control in banks and independent external audit are basic features of solid management of a fi nan-cial organisation ■




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RADNA DOKUMENTACIJA INTERNOG REVIZORA IZ UGLA PRAKSE

Uobičajena stručna akta u kojima se utvrđuje standardna radna dokumentacija su Priručnik za rad interne revizije i Smjernice za rad internih revizora, u kojima je defi ni-san proces rada interne revizije i način oblikovanja radne dokumentacije.

Osnovna obilježja i obim revizorske dokumentacije zavisi od djelatnosti organizacije, revidiranog područja i predmeta revizije, procijenjenih poslovnih i revizijskih rizika, ciljeva, zadataka, obima i svrhe revizije, očekivanja korisnika izvještaja i same interne revizije, obaveza prema upravi, odboru za reviziju, menadžmentu i sl.

PROCES RADA INTERNE REVIZIJEMeđunarodnim standardima i Smjernicama za stručno obavljanje interne revizije utvrđen je proces rada inter-ne revizije u četiri faze: planiranje interne revizije, ispi-tivanje i procjena podataka, izvještavanje o rezultatima i praćenje.

Sam process rada revizije obuhvata sve metode, po-stupke, sredstva, načine i oblike sprovođenja revizije po-moću kojih se dolazi do realnog, objektivnog i stručnog nalaza revizije. Radna dokumentacija pomaže revizoru u boljem sprovođenju svih faza procesa rada revizije i pri-mjenjivanju utvrđenih standarda, smjernica i profesio-nalnih pravila pri:

planiranju rada interne revizije, ▷ispitivanju i procjeni primjerenosti i efi kasnosti sistema ▷internih kontrola,sprovedenim revizijskim postupcima, dobijenim poda- ▷cima i donesenim zaključcima,provjeri, ispitivanju i testiranju, ▷izvještavanju i prezentovanju, i ▷praćenju dogovorenih aktivnosti. ▷

Interna revizija mora da obuhvati ispitivanje i ocjenu prim-jerenosti i efi kasnosti sistema internih kontrola, poslovnih rizika i da ocjenu poslovanja. Radnu dokumentaciju čine svi raspoloživi dokumenti, izvještaji, informacije, podaci, rezultati, analize, planovi, programi, testovi, hodogrami,

šeme, obrasci i drugo, korišćeni prilikom sprovođenja re-vizije i izvođenja dokaza, nalaza i pisanja izvještaja.Revizori tokom revizije izrađuju sve važne dokumente i prikupljaju dokumentaciju bitnu za sprovođenje revizije, utvrđivanje dokaza, nalaza i izradu izvještaja:

planove revizije i program rada revizijskog tima i pri- ▷padajuću dokumentaciju,planove za sprovođenje revizijskih postupaka i kontrolne ▷testove, upitnike, dijagrame, hodograme, šeme i sl.,dokumentaciju o sprovedenim testovima i rezultate, ▷ocjene i procjene djelovanja sistema internih kontrola, poslovanja, rizika te rezultata sprovedenih analitičkih revizijskih postupaka i drugo,razne analize i informacije koje su pripremili revizori ▷tokom sprovođenja revizije,dokumentaciju o provjerama načina poslovanja, poslovnih ▷transakcija, poslovnih postupaka, o provjeri salda i sl..korespodenciju sa korisnikom izvještaja i menadžmentom ▷revidiranog područja, zapisnike, bilješke i podsjetnike o sastancima i razgovorima sa menadžmentom, revizorovo dopisivanje i izjave menadžmenta i osoblja i sl., dokumente i podatke o radu revizora, revizorskim po- ▷stupcima i nadzoru nad radom svakog člana tima,dokumente i podatke o sprovedenim kontrolama revi- ▷diranog područja,zapisnike i bilješke o razgovorima sa menadžmentom i ▷osobljem revidiranog područja, pisma upravi i korisniku izvještaja o stanju i uočenim ▷problemima, zaključke o značajnim pitanjima i njihovom rješavan- ▷ju itd.

Plan sprovođenja revizije sadrži odgovornosti i zadužen-ja pojedinih članova tima: odgovornog revizora, revizora i stručnog radnika sa detaljno utvrđenim nacrtom zada-taka koje treba izvršiti u pojedinoj fazi rada. Odgovorni revizor zadužen je za planiranje i sprovođenje svih plani-ranih ciljeva i zadataka revizije, oblikovanje dokumentaci-je, raznih programa, testova, obrazaca, šema, hodograma i

Osnovni zadatak internog revizora je da utvrdi i izradi radnu dokumentaciju. Radnu dokumentaciju treba što više standardizovati kako bi što bolje poslužila sprovođenju revizije. Ona mora da sadrži sve relevantne revizorske dokaze do kojih se dolazi sprovođenjem svih faza procesa rada i revizorskih postupaka. Revizorski dokazi predstavljaju vezu između predmeta revizije i glavnih nalaza iznijetih u revizorskom izvještaju

Doc. dr Đorđije Rakočevićpredsjednik Instituta internih revizora Crne Gore (IIRCG).

Standardizacijaradi lakšeg posla


OPERATING DOCUMENTATION OF AN INTERNAL AUDITOR FROM THE ANGLE OF PRACTICE

Standard operating documentation is normally establis-hed by professional regulations that include an Operating Manual for Internal Auditors and Operating Instructions for Internal Auditors, specifying the procedures for con-ducting an internal audit and preparation of operating documentation.

Th e main characteristics and scope of audit documen-tation depends on the activity of an organization, the fi eld and object of auditing, assessed business and audit risks, ob-jectives, tasks, scope and purpose of auditing, expectations of the users of auditor’s report and the internal audit itself, responsibilities to the administration offi ce, audit commit-tee, management, etc.

THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL AUDITING Th e process of internal auditing is regulated under the in-ternational standards and guidelines for the professional performance of internal auditing, including the following four phases: internal audit planning; data examination and evaluation; reporting of fi ndings; and monitoring.

Th e audit process itself includes all methods, procedu-res, means, manners and forms of conducting an audit in order to arrive to realistic, objective and professional audit fi ndings. Operating documentation assists the auditor to conduct all phases in the process of auditing in a higher-quality manner, and apply the established standards, guide-lines and professional rules on the occasion of:

Internal audit planning; ▷Testing and evaluation of relevance and effi ciency of in- ▷ternal control systems;Evaluation of conducted audit procedures, resulting ▷fi ndings and conclusions drawn;Verifi cation, examination and testing; ▷Reporting and presentation; and ▷Monitoring of agreed activities. ▷An internal audit must include an examination and eva-

luation of relevance and effi ciency of the system of inter-nal controls and business risks, and present an evaluation of operating transactions. Operating documentation con-

sists of all available documents, reports, information, data, fi ndings, analysis, plans, programs, tests, hodograms, sche-mes, forms and other information used while performing an audit, formulating audit evidence and fi ndings, and draft ing a report.

While performing an audit, the auditors prepare all im-portant documents and collect the essential documentation to conduct an audit, establish evidence and fi ndings, and prepare a report:

Audit plans and work program for the audit team, inclu- ▷ding the related documentation;Implementation plans for audit procedures and control tests, ▷questionnaires, diagrams, hodograms, schemes, etc;Documentation on the performed tests and fi ndings, eva- ▷luations and assessments relating to the functioning of the system of internal controls, business activity, risks, outco-mes of the performed audit analysis, and other;Various analysis and information prepared by the audi- ▷tors while conducting the audit;Documentation on verifi cation of business activity methods, ▷operating transactions, operating procedures, balance checking, etc;Correspondence with the report user and the managing team ▷of the audited entity, minutes, notes and reminders, and me-etings with the management team, audit correspondence, and statements by the management and the staff , etc.; Documents and data on the auditor’s work, audit procedures ▷and supervision over the work of each team member;Documents and data on the conducted controls in the ▷audited area of activity;Minutes and notes of discussions with the management ▷team and staff members of the audited entity; Communication on the situation and observed issues de- ▷livered to the management and the report user; Conclusion on signifi cant issues and their resolution, etc. ▷An audit implementation plan includes the responsibili-

ties and obligations of particular team members including the responsible auditor, auditor and an expert person, ac-cording to a detailed work plan for each phase of the work.

The main task of an internal auditor is to establish and prepare operating documentation. Operating documentation needs to be maximally standardized in order to serve the purpose of conducting an audit as well as possible. It has to include all relevant audit evidence that is collected through implementation of all phases of the work process and audit procedures. Audit evidence represents a connection between the object of an audit and the main fi ndings noted in an audit report.

Docent Đorđije Rakočević, Ph.D.President of the Institute of Internal Auditors of Montenegro (IIA of MNE)

Standardization Because of Easier Job


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drugih potrebnih radnji za svaku reviziju. Revizor obavlja sve poslove i zadatke koje mu povjeri odgovorni revizor i zajedno sa njim oblikuje radnu dokumentaciju, a struč-ni radnik pomaže revizorima, naročito u fazi ispitivanja i ocjene informacija i procjeni poslovanja te sprovođenja testova. Na početku rada odgovorni revizor snima stanje i vrši popis svih poslova koji će se obavljati u poslovnom području koje je predmet revizije kako bi se što bolje pri-premio za rad na terenu i upoznao sa poslovnim aktiv-nostima revidiranog područja. To može podrazumijevati i razgovore sa menadžmentom i osobljem.

U fazi pripreme revizije odgovorni revizor utvrđuje glavne poslovne rizike u revidiranom području sa sta-novišta revizije. Revidirano područje dijeli se na glavne aktivnosti, o čemu se sastavlja popis aktivnosti revidira-nog područja i daje procjena rizika za svako od njih. Za utvrđivanje procjene rizika i glavnih područja revizorove aktivnosti mogu se koristiti sve raspoložive informacije, analize, poslovni i drugi izvještaji, planovi, programi, pro-jekti, podaci i normtivni akti kao i drugi izvori koji su na raspolaganju revizoru.

Defi nisanje ciljeva, zadataka, obima i svrhe revizije po-trebno je radi bolje komunikacije sa korisnikom izvješta-ja i menadžmentom revidiranog područja te kako bi re-vizija bila sprovedena u skladu sa standardima, ciljevima i zadacima interne revizije i očekivanjima korisnika i in-terne revizije.

Nakon utvrđivanja zadatka revizije potrebno je utvr-diti ciljeve revizije. Ciljevi moraju proizilaziti iz procjene poslovnih rizika koju je napravio menadžment i revizori sa stanovišta sprovođenja revizije. Ciljevi revizije moraju da olakšaju revizoru sprovođenje revizije i razumijevanje poslovnih rizika, upućujući na značajne aktivnosti koje treba revidirati te pribaviti dokaze za glavne nalaze, a po potrebi i za proširenje zadatka revizije. Budući da ponekad zbog veličine revidiranog područja revizori ne mogu da izvrše reviziju poslovanja potrebno je podijeliti poslovne aktivnosti prema poslovnim rizicima. Zbog toga se glavni cilj dijeli na više ciljeva i podciljeva zavisno od različitosti u poslovanju i obilježjima poslovanja revidiranog područ-ja i procijenjenih rizika.

Za sprovođenje revizije bitno je utvrditi rizike za svaki pojedini detaljni cilj za koji će se sprovesti testovi i proc-jenjivati djelovanje sistema internih kontrola, poslovnih rizika i ocjena poslovanja. Podciljeve treba utvrditi de-taljno prema utvrđenim glavnim ciljevima i vezati ih za sprovedene testove i nalaze. Obim revizije sadrži glavne aktivnosti revizije, a uključuje ciljeve revizije, vrstu i obim revizijskih postupaka, vrijeme trajanja revizije i odgova-rajuće djelatnosti koje nijesu uključene u reviziju, ali od-ređuju granicu revizije. U defi nisanju svrhe sprovođenja revizije treba navesti razloge te ciljeve i zadatke koji se žele postići kako bi korisnik izvještaja mogao shvatiti ukupno sprovedenu revizorsku aktivnost, glavne revizorske nala-ze te zaključke, preporuke i predloge.

REVIZIJSKI DOKAZIRevizijska načela značajna za rad interne revizije su: načelo profesionalne etike, nezavisnosti, stručnos-ti i kompetentnosti, dokumentovanosti i objektivnog izvještavanja. Za utvrđivanje revizijskih dokaza i obli-

kovanje i defi nisanje radne dokumentacije bitno je na-čelo dokumentovanosti.

Profesionalni standardi i kodeks naglašavaju važnost dokaza interne revizije kao osnove za utvrđivanje nala-za i zaključaka o ocjeni poslovnih rizika i stanju sistema internih kontrola. Prema standardima revizori treba da prikupe dovoljno dokaznih činjenica kroz inspekcije, po-smatranje, istraživanje i potvrđivanje, da bi se stvorila ra-zumna osnova za izražavanje mišljenja.

Revizor za sve nalaze mora imati odgovarajuće revizor-ske dokaze. Dokazi se prikupljaju u svakoj fazi rada inter-ne revizije. Do njih se dolazi sprovođenjem odgovarajućih revizorskih postupaka i korišćenjem radne dokumentacije, koja mora da sadrži sve dokaze. Dokazi treba da su veza između predmeta revizije i revizijskih nalaza koji su sad-ržani u izvještaju.

Najveći dio aktivnosti potrebnih za prikupljanje doka-za odvija se na terenu za vrijeme terenskog rada. Dokazi se mogu prikupljati na više načina, kao na primjer: tes-tiranjem načina djelovanja sistema unternih kontrola, testiranjem promjene poslovne politike, procedura i po-stupaka, intervjuisanjem menadžmenta i osoblja, pregle-dom i analizom dokumentacije i dokumenata, pregledom poslovnih izvještaja, ispitivanjem načina rada i podrške informacionog sistema, transakcija itd. Revizor mora na terenu da sprovede odgovarajuće postupke i aktivnosti i da izradi radnu dokumentaciju i pribavi dokaze kako bi mogao da utvrdi nalaze.

Relevantni dokazi koji se iznose u radnoj dokumentaciji moraju biti pouzdani, potpuni i tačni. Svaki utvrđeni do-kaz mora proći tri provjere: provjeru dovoljnosti, pouzda-nosti i primjerenosti. Revizor mora uvijek da se koristiti standardnom random dokumentacijom.


Th e responsible auditor is responsible for the planning and implementation of all planned objectives and tasks of the audit, preparation of documentation, various programs, tests, forms, schemes, hodograms, and other necessary ac-tivities for each audit. Th e auditor carries out all tasks and assignments given by the responsible auditor and provides assistance in the preparation of operating documentation by the responsible auditor, while the expert staff member assists the auditors, especially in the phase of testing and evaluation of information, assessment of business activity, and conducting of tests. At the beginning of the work, the responsible auditor surveys the situation and draws up a list of all activities to be conducted in the area of business ope-rations that will be audited, in order to be prepared as well as possible for the fi eldwork and become familiar with the business activities of the audited entity. Th is may also include interviewing of the management and staff members.

In the phase of audit preparation, an auditor identifi es the main business risks in the audited area of activity from an audit perspective. Th e audited area of activity is divided into the main activities, and a list of activities is prepared for each component of the audited area of activity, including the related risk assessment. For the purpose of risk assessment and identifi cation of main areas of audit activity, an audi-tor may use all available information, analysis, business and other reports, plans, programs, projects, data and normative regulations, in addition to other available sources.

It is necessary to identify the objectives, extent and pur-pose of an audit, for the purpose of a higher-quality com-munication with the user of a report and management of the audited entity, so that the audit is conducted in accordance with the standards, objectives and tasks of internal audit and the expectations of the user and internal audit.

When the tasks of an audit have been identifi ed, it is ne-cessary to identify its objectives. Th e objectives must origi-nate from an assessment of business risks prepared by the management team and the auditors, from the perspective of audit conducting. Th e objectives of an audit have to fa-cilitate its conducting by the auditor and understanding of business risks, by referring to the signifi cant activities that need to be audited and evidence for fi nal fi ndings that need to be obtained, and also in order to expand the au-diting tasks, as required. Since the auditors are sometimes not able to audit the business operations because of the size of the audited area of activity, it is necessary to divide the business activities according to business risks. For this re-ason the main objective is divided into several objectives and sub-objectives, depending on the variety and charac-teristics of business operations of the audited entity, and the assessed risks.

For the purpose of conducting of an audit, it is important to identify the risks for each detailed objective that will be subject to testing and evaluation of the eff ects of a system of internal controls, business risks and assessment of operating transactions. Th e sub-objectives need to be identifi ed in de-tail, according to the established main objectives, and tied to the conducted tests and fi ndings. Th e scope of an audit contains the main audit activities, including the objectives of the audit, type and extent of audit procedures, duration of the audit, and the related activities that are not included into the audit but do set its boundaries. When identifying

the purpose for conducting an audit, the reasons, objectives and tasks that are desired to be achieved need to be speci-fi ed, so that the user of a report may understand an overall procedure of the conducted audit, the main audit fi ndings, recommendations and suggestions.

AUDIT EVIDENCETh e auditing principles of importance for the performan-ce of an internal audit include the principles of professional ethics, independence, professionalism and competence, do-cumentary material, and objective reporting. Th e principle of documentary material is important for the establishment of audit evidence, and formulation and identifi cation of work documentation. Th e importance of internal audit evidence is emphasized by the applicable standards and code, being fundamental to the establishment of fi ndings and conclusi-ons on the assessment of business risks and the condition of a system of internal controls. According to the applicable stan-dards, auditors need to collect suffi cient evidence, by means of inspection, monitoring, research and verifi cation, in order to establish reasonable basis to express an opinion.

All fi ndings of an auditor must be supported by relevant audit evidence for. Evidence is collected in each phase of the internal audit work. Th ose are collected by means of imple-mentation of the corresponding audit procedures and by using the operating documentation that must include all evidence. Evidence need to represent a connection between the ob-ject of an audit and the audit fi ndings contained in a report.

Most of the activities necessary for the collection of evidence are performed during the fi eldwork. Evidence may be collec-ted in several ways, such as by means of: testing the eff ect of a system of internal controls; testing a change in the business policy, procedures and practices; interviewing the management and staff members; reviews and analysis of documentation and documents; review of business reports; testing of operating procedures and support to information system, transactions, etc. An auditor must conduct the corresponding on-site pro-cedures and activities, prepare an operating documentation, and collect evidence in order to establish the fi ndings.

Relevant evidence that is presented in the operating do-cumentation must be reliable, complete and accurate. Each piece of evidence that is confi rmed must be verifi ed throu-gh three phases, including the verifi cation of suffi ciency, reliability and compatibility. An auditor must always use a standard operating documentation.

THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF OPERATING DOCUMENTATION IN THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL AUDITOperating documentation needs to include all conducted audit activities, in addition to the required documentation and documents, either collected or prepared by the audi-tor. It is of an exceptional importance because it contains all practices and audit procedures, confi rmed evidence and audit fi ndings, in addition to the conclusions, recommen-dations, suggestions and agreed activities. Th is may be in paper form, recorded on tapes, discs, fl oppy discs, photos, fi lms, or other media. Th e operating documentation inclu-des all important documentation relating to the area of au-dit activity: information and data on operating transactions, tests conducted, analysis of business operation, normative regulations, scheme of organization and business processes,



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ULOGA I ZNAČAJ RADNE DOKUMENTACIJE U PROCESU INTERNE REVIZIJERadna dokumentacija treba da obuhvati sve sprovedene aktivnosti revizije te potrebnu dokumentaciju i dokumente koje je pribavio ili izradio revizor. Ona ima izuzetnu važnost jer su u njoj zabilježeni svi postupci i revizijske procedure, utvrđeni dokazi i nalazi revizije te zaključci, preporuke, predlozi i dogovorene aktivnosti. Ona može biti na papiru, trakama, diskovima, disketama, fotografi jama, fi lmovima ili na drugim medijima. U radnu dokumentaciju uključuje se sva važna dokumentacija koja se odnosi na područje revi-zije: informacije i podaci o poslovanju, sprovedeni testovi, analize poslovanja, normativna akta, šeme organizacije i poslovnih procesa, razni izvještaji i informacije, analize, po-daci, planovi, projekti koji se odnose na revidirano područ-je te sprovedeni testovi, način formiranja uzorka, zapisnici o održanim sastancima sa menadžmentom i korisnicima izvještaja, nalazi i zaključci doneseni za vrijeme revizije i drugo. Navedena radna dokumentacija nema istu važnost i ne treba je na isti način vrednovati pri sprovođenju revi-zije. Kriteriji za utvrđivanje potrebnog kvaliteta radne do-kumentacije mogu biti: relevantnost, opsežnost, logičnost, organizovanost, jasnoća, dobro predstavljanje, dosljednost, upućivanje na drugi material, povjerljivost, ekonomičnost, potpunost, ažurnost, preglednost i čitljivost.

Za sprovođenje revizije potrebno je ostvariti, između ostalog, i povezanost revizijskih postupaka, revizijskih dokaza i revizijskih ciljeva, što se može postići radnom dokumentacijom. Ako ne postoje određeni standardi za oblikovanje, defi nisanje i korišćenje radne dokumentaci-je, može biti doveden u pitanje kvalitet rada i sprovođen-ja interne revizije.

Za sprovođenje revizije interni revizori se koriste svim dokumentima i raspoloživom dokumentacijom koja bliže opisuje i reguliše poslovanje. To su na primjer:

zakonski propisi koji regulišu poslovanje revidiranog ▷područja,akta i odluke organizacije: normativna akta, odluke, ▷zaključci, rješenja, uputstva, poslovni planovi, poslov-ni izvještaji uprave i menadžmenta, razni projekti, budžeti i sl.,informacije i podaci o zakonskim uslovima poslovan- ▷ja, stanju u okruženju u kojem revidirano područje posluje,sva raspoloživa dokumentacija i važeća dokumenta o po- ▷slovnoj i fi nansijskoj politici u revidiranom području,razne analize o poslovanju u revidiranom području, ▷izvještaji, informacije, podaci, dokumenta, planovi, programi i poslovni pkazatelji,važni dokumenti, npr. ugovori, normativna akta, uput- ▷stva, odluke, rješenja, projekti, programi, procedure i postupci,podaci o korisniku izvještaja i području revizije, organiza- ▷cione šeme, opisi radnih mjesta i segregacija dužnosti,procjene poslovnih rizika za poslovnu godinu u kojoj ▷se sprovodi revizija,prethodni revizorski izvještaji i stalna radna dokumen- ▷tacija koja se odnosi na prethodne revizije istog ili slič-nog područja revizije te razgovori sa revizorima koji su ranije obavljali reviziju poslovanja, i

standardna dokumentacija ranije korišćena u sličnim ▷ili istim revizijama, a naročito ciljevi i zadaci revizije i testovi.

Svi dokumenti koji čine radnu dokumentaciju moraju imati referentni znak radi lakše identifi kacije i kasnije radi nji-hovog razvrstavanja, povezivanja i odlaganja. Ujednačeni način izrade standardne dokumentacije i njeno odlaganje omogućuje lako povezivanje i sistematizovanje svih nave-denih dokumenata. Standardni način oblikovanja revizo-rove radne dokumentacije, kao što su programi revizije, ciljevi, testovi, razni upitnici, nalazi, zaključci i preporuke mogu pobljšati rad revizije i pomoći svim učesnicima u sprovođenju revizije.

Revizorska radna dokumentacija defi niše se kao stalna i tekuća. Stalna revizorska dokumentacija odlaže se poseb-no i može poslužiti u budućim revizijama, dok je tekuća samo za potrebe tekuće revizije. Stalna revizijska doku-mentacija uglavnom sadrži dokumente i podatke trajne važnosti i odlaže se u arhivi revizije.

Nakon završetka revizije sva dokumentacija mora se pre-gledati, nepotrebna odstraniti, kako bi se prilikom sledeće revizije revizoru olakšao posao.

RADNA DOKUMENTACIJA U FAZI PLANIRANJA INTERNE REVIZIJEInterni revizori moraju planirati svaku reviziju kako bi bila izvedena u skladu sa ciljevima i zadacima revizije, očeki-vanjima interne revizije i korisnika izvještaja. Za svaku po-jedinačnu reviziju revizori moraju pripremiti pisani plan revizije koji odobrava rukovodilac interne revizije.

Prilikom planiranja revizije revizori moraju da raz-motre sve bitne faktore koji mogu da utiču na sprovođen-je revizije:

ciljeve pojedinih aktivnosti organizacije te ugrađene ▷kontrolne postupke,područja značajnih rizika koji se odnose na pojedine ▷aktivnosti organizacije te mogućnosti održavanja rizi-ka na prihvatljivom nivou,primjerenost i efi kasnost upravljanja rizicima i sistema ▷kontrole pojedinih aktivnosti organizacije.

Prilikom planiranja revizije mora se voditi računa o načelu razumnih troškova, tj. da očekivani rezultati revizije budu u skladu sa troškovima sprovođenja revizije. Planiranje in-terne revizije obuhvata i oblikovanje odgovarajuće radne dokumentacije. Radnom dokumentacijom treba utvrditi način sprovođenja ciljeva, zadataka i aktivnosti revizora i drugih učesnika u sprovođenju svih faza rada:

rukovodilac interne revizije defi niše zadatak revizije, ▷imenuje tim za sprovođenje revizije: odgovornog re-vizora, revizora i stručno lice,odgovorni revizor utvrđuje svrhu i obim, glavni cilj, ▷ciljeve i podciljeve revizije i piše program rada revi-zorskog tima,članovi tima prikupljaju potrebna dokumenta, informa- ▷cije, podatke, zakone, normativna akta, uputstva i sl. i upoznaju se sa poslovnim aktivnostima i djelatnostima revidiranog područja,revizori zajedno sa stručnim licem procjenjuju poslov- ▷ne i revizihjske rizike, pri čemu se koriste i procjenom poslovnih rizika menadžmenta,


various reports and information, analysis, data, plans, pro-jects relating to the audited area of activity and conducted tests, sampling procedures, minutes of meeting held with the management team and users of the report, fi ndings and conclusions reached during the audit, etc. All elements of the foregoing operating documentation are not equally signifi -cant and should not be evaluated in the same manner during the performance of an audit. Th e required quality of ope-rating documentation may be established according to the following criteria: relevance, range, logical quality, organi-zational quality, clarity, adequate presentation, consistency, reference to other material, confi dentiality, cost-effi ciency, completeness, accuracy, easy to review and readable.

In order to conduct an audit, it is necessary, inter alia, to establish a coherence of audit practices, audit evidence and audit objectives, which can be accomplished by means of operating documentation. Without having specifi c standards for the preparation, identifi cation and use of operating do-cumentation, the quality of work and implementation of an internal audit may be threatened.

For the purpose of conducting an audit, internal auditors use all documents and available documentation whereby the operating transactions are regulated and described in more detail. Inter alia, those include the following:

Legal regulations regulating business operation in the ▷audited fi eld;Documents and decisions of the organization: norma- ▷tive acts, ordinances, conclusions, normative acts, deci-sions, instructions, business plans, operating reports of the administration and management, various projects budgets, etc;Information and data on legal requirements for business ▷operation, situation in the business environment of the audited entity;All available documentation and valid documents on ▷business and fi nancial policy relating to the audited area of activity;Various analysis of business operation in the audited area ▷of activity, reports, information, data, documents, plans, programs and business indicators; Signifi cant documents, such as the contracts, norma- ▷tive acts, instructions, ordinances, decisions, projects, programs, procedures and practices;Information on the user of a report and the audited area ▷of activity, organization charts, job descriptions, and al-location of duties;Assessments of business risks for the current business ▷year when the audit is conducted;Previous auditor’s reports and permanent operating do- ▷cumentation that relates to previous auditing of the same or similar area of activity, and minutes of the discussions with previous auditors who the business operation was previously audited by; andStandard documentation that was previously used for ▷similar or the same audits, and especially the objectives and tasks of the audit, in addition to tests.

All documents constituting the operating documentation must bear a reference sign, for the purpose of easier iden-tifi cation and subsequent classifi cation, binding and fi ling. A uniform manner of the preparation of standard docu-

mentation and its fi ling makes it easy to correlate and sys-tematize all the foregoing documents. A standard manner of preparation of the auditor’s operating documentation, such as audit programs, objectives, tests, various question-naires, fi ndings, conclusions and recommendations may improve the auditing work and assist all participants while conducting an audit.

Th e operating documentation for an audit can be divi-ded into permanent and current audit fi les. Permanent au-dit fi les are fi led separately and may be used for the purpo-se of future audits, while the current audit fi les can be used only for the current audit. Permanent audit fi les normally include the documents and data of lasting value, and are fi led in audit records.

Following the conclusion of an audit, all documentation must be reviewed, and the unnecessary one put away, to make the auditor’s work easier during the following audit.

OPERATING DOCUMENTATION IN THE PLANNING PHASE ON AN INTERNAL AUDIT Internal auditors must plan each audit so that it is conducted according to the audit objectives and tasks, and the expecta-tions of both the internal audit and the user of a report. Th e auditors must prepare a written plan for each audit, subject to approval by the responsible internal auditor.

When planning an audit, the auditors must consider all es-sential factors that may eff ect the conducting of an audit:

Objectives of particular activities of the organization in ▷addition to built-in control procedures;Areas of signifi cant risk relating to specifi c activities of ▷the organization, in addition to possibilities for the ma-intenance of risk on an acceptable level;Adequacy and effi ciency of risk management and control ▷systems for particular activities of the organization.On the occasion of audit planning, attention has to be

paid to the principle of reasonable costs, so that the expec-ted audit fi ndings are in harmony with the costs of audit conducting. Forming of the corresponding operating docu-mentation is also included into the planning of an internal audit. Th e operating documentation needs to identify the method for implementation of objectives, tasks and activi-ties of the auditor and other participants while conducting all phases of the work:

Th e head of internal audit identifi es the audit task and ▷appoints a team to conduct the audit: responsible audi-tor, auditor and expert person;Responsible auditor identifi es the purpose and scope of an ▷audit, the main audit objective, other objectives and sub-objectives, and prepares a work plan for the audit team;Team members collect necessary documents, information, ▷data, laws, normative acts, instructions, and similar, and familiarize themselves with the business activities and activities of the audited entity;Together with an expert person, the auditors assess busi- ▷ness and audit risks, also using the management’s asses-sment of business risks;As a part of the work plan, the required resources for the ▷conducting of an audit are anticipated: work force (man/day); necessary time period for the conducting of parti-cular phases; necessary technical support on the ground; costs of auditing, etc;



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u okviru programa rada planiraju se potrebni resursi za ▷sprovođenje revizije: radna snaga (čovjek/dan), vrijeme potrebno za sprovođenje pojedinih faza, nužna tehnička podrška na terenu, troškovi sprovođenja revizije i sl., izrađuje se plan i način komunikacije svih učesnika u ▷sprovođenju revizije (sa korisnikom izvještaja i me-nadžmentom revidiranog područja) te saopštavanja rezultata revizije, idefi niše se dinamika ukupnog rada i završetka revizi- ▷je te kako će se, kada i kome saopštiti rezultati i način prećenja dogovorenih aktivnosti.

Prije početnog sastanka odgovorni revizor šalje nacrt za-datka revizije korisniku izvještaja i menadžmentu revidi-ranog područja, u kojem objašnjava svrhu, obim i ciljeve revizije. Svrha tog dokumenta je da pruži dodatna ob-razloženja kako bi se već na početku smanjila rasprava o nebitnim stvarima.

Odgovorni revizor zadužen je za organizovanje sasta-naka sa menadžmentom revidiranog područja i korisni-kom izvještaja. Svaki sastanak mora biti koncipiran tako da se vodi računa o osnovnim ciljevima i zadacima revi-zije, rokovima početka i završetka revizije, o sprovođenju glavnih aktivnosti članova tima te obezbjeđivanju uslova za rad tima. O održanim sastancima članovi tima pišu za-pisnike na obrascu koji je za to namijenjen, a koji se kasnije idlaže u radnu dokumentaciju.

Članovi tima mogu održavati svoje posebne sastanke na kojima se informišu o realizaciji zadataka revizije. Sastanci omogućavaju bolju komunikaciju i usklađivanje mišljenja i aktivnosti članova tima.

RADNA DOKUMENTACIJA U FAZI ISPITIVANJA I OCJENE INFORMACIJAU fazi ispitivanja i ocjene informacija interni revizori moraju identifi kovati, analizirati, ocijeniti i dokumento-vati sve raspoložive informacije koje mogu poslužiti kao podloga za donošenje revizijskih dokaza i nalaza te defi -nisanje rezultata revizije. U postupku ispitivanja i ocjene informacija revizori, takođe, moraju doći do potrebnih, dovoljnih, pouzdanih, tačnih i korisnih informacija koje će pomoći u sprovođenju i ostvarivanju postavljenih ci-ljeva revizije.

Tokom sprovođenja revizije revizor je obavezan da pri-kupi, analizira, tumači i dokumentuje informacije i podat-ke sa kojima podupire dokaze, nalaze i rezultate revizije. Ispitivanje i procjena informacija i podataka pretposta-vlja sledeće:

podatke treba prikupiti o svim pitanjima koja se odnose ▷na ciljeve revizije i obim rada,podaci moraju biti dovoljni, mjerodavni, pouzdani i korisni, ▷kako bi bili valjani za revizijski nalaz i preporuke,revizijski postupci, koji uključuju primjerene tehnike ▷testiranja i uzimanje uzoraka, moraju se odabrati una-prijed, gdje god je to moguće, a mogu se proširivati ili mijenjati ako okolnosti to traže, iprocess prikupljanja, analiziranja, tumačenja i doku- ▷mentovanja podataka treba nadgledati kako bi se dobi-lo garancija da je zadržana revizorova objektivnost i da su ispunjeni ciljevi revizije.Ispitivanje informacija obuhvata analitičke revizorske

postupke pomoću kojih se dolazi do potrebnih procjena i dokaza. Oni služe revizoru da na efi kasan i svrsishodan način procijeni neki podatak ili informaciju prikupljene tokom revizije na bazi upoređenja npr. sa planskim veliči-nama ili očekivanjima. Takođe, oni mogu pomoći revizoru pri otkrivanju određenih rezultata, podataka i stanja koja bi mogla zahtijevati naknadne revizijske postupke.

Interni revizor treba da uzme u obzir ove faktore pri određivanju obima u kojem će se primijeniti analitički revizorski postupci:

značaj područja koje se ispituje, ▷primjerenost sistema internih kontrola, ▷dostupnost i pouzdanost fi nansijskih i nefi nansijskih ▷podataka,tačnost kojom se mogu predvidjeti rezultati analitičkih ▷revizijskih postupaka,dostupnost i uporedivost podataka vezanih za djelatnost ▷u kojoj organizacija posluje,obim u kojem drugi revizorski postupci daju podršku ▷rezultatima revizije.

Ciljevi revizijskog ispitivanja treba da odražavaju rizike kontrole i upravljanja aktivnostima koje su predmet ispiti-vanja internog revizora. Obim revizorskog ispitivanja treba da je takav da omogući ostvarivanje postavljenih ciljeva. Do revizijskih nalaza dolazi se u fazi ispitivanja i ocjene informacija, odnosno između onoga “što jest” i onoga “što bi trebalo da bude”. Postoji li razlika ili ne, interni revizor ima osnovu na kojoj će izraditi svoj izvještaj. Kada stanje udovoljava kriterijumima, poželjno je u izvještaju navesti da je posao obavljen na zadovoljavajući način.

Prilikom ispitivanja i procjene informacija vrlo je važno utvrditi testove za provjeravanje podciljeva revizije, procje-nu poslovanja i stanja revidiranog područja. Za izvođenje svakog pojedinog testa revizor se koristi standardnom do-kumentacijom oblikovanom u vidu obrazaca koje priprema odgovorni revizor, a ispunjava revizor koji sprovodi test. Obrazac za izvođenje testova izrađen je na jednoj stranici i sadrži: glavni cilj, ciljeve i detaljne ciljeve te test kojim se izvršilo testiranje, zatim siže nalaza na bazi sprovedenog testa, zaključke, preporuke, reakcije menadžmenta i pri-hvatanje dogovorene akcije. Revizori izrađuju popis rele-vantnih testova na osnovi kojih se utvrđuje da je revizija sprovedena na struci utemeljenim standardima i praksi, na efi kasan i konstruktivan način te da su nalazi pouzda-ni i tačni i da se mogu navesti u izvještaju.


Preparation of a plan and method for the maintenance ▷of communication among all participants in the audit procedure (with the user of an auditor’s report and the management of the audited entity), and also communi-cation of audit fi ndings; andPreparation of a schedule for the overall work and com- ▷pletion of the audit, when and who the audit fi ndings will be submitted to, and a method to monitor the ag-reed activities.

Prior to the initial meeting, the responsible auditor submits a draft audit plan to the user of the auditor’s report and the management of the audited area, explaining the purpo-se, scope and objectives of the audit. Th e purpose of that document is to provide additional explanations, so that a discussion on irrelevant issues would be minimized alrea-dy at the beginning.

Th e responsible auditor is responsible for the organiza-tion of meetings with the management of the audited en-tity and the user of auditor’s report. Each meeting has to be designed so that attention is paid to the main objectives and tasks, time limits for the beginning and end of the au-dit, implementation of main activities by the team mem-bers, and ensuring the conditions for the team’s work. Team members keep minutes of the meetings held using the ap-plicable form, to be subsequently enclosed with the opera-ting documentation.

Team members may hold internal briefi ngs relating to implementation of the audit task. Th ose meetings provide for a higher-quality of communication and coordination of opinions and fi ndings of the team members.

OPERATING DOCUMENTATION IN THE PHASE OF TESTING AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATIONIn the phase of testing and evaluation of information, in-ternal auditors must identify, analyze, evaluate and docu-ment all available information that may serve as the basis for the adoption of audit evidence and fi ndings and the es-tablishment of audit outcomes. In the process of testing and evaluation of information, auditors must also acquire the required, suffi cient, reliable, accurate and useful informa-tion that will support the implementation and accomplis-hment of the established audit objectives.

When conducting an audit, the auditor is obliges to col-lect, analyze, interpret and document the information and data used to support the audit evidence, fi ndings and out-comes. Th e testing and evaluation of information and data presumes the following:

Data need to be collected about all issues relating to the ▷audit objectives and scope of work;The data must be sufficient, competent, reliable and ▷useful, in order to be valid for audit findings and recommendations;Audit procedures, including the appropriate testing and ▷sampling techniques, must be selected in advance, whene-ver and wherever possible, and those may be extended or modifi ed if so required under the circumstances; andTh e process of data collection, analyzing, interpretation and ▷documenting needs to be monitored in order to provide a guarantee that the auditor maintained an objective attitude and that the objectives of the audit were satisfi ed.

Information testing includes analytic procedures conduc-ted by the auditor for the purpose of reaching the required assessments and evidence. Th ose are used by the auditor to evaluate effi ciently and rationally some data or information collected during the audit, by comparing those, for example, to the planned values or expectations. Also, those may assist the auditor in discovering particular results, data or conditi-ons that may require additional auditing procedures.

An internal auditor needs to take all those factors into consideration to determine on the scope of application of analytic auditing procedures:

Th e importance of investigated area of activity; ▷Adequacy of the system of internal controls; ▷Availability and reliability of fi nancial and non-fi nan- ▷cial data;Level of accuracy when anticipating the results of analy- ▷tic auditing procedures;Availability and comparability of data relating to the busi- ▷ness activity of the organization;Level of support to the audit fi ndings by other auditing ▷procedures.

Th e audit objectives need to refl ect the risks of control and management of activities that are audited by the internal auditor. Th e scope of audit testing should be of the kind that allows for accomplishment of the stated objectives. Audit fi ndings are established in the phase of information testing and evaluation, i.e. when comparing “what is” with “what it should be”. Whether showing a diff erence or not, an internal auditor will have the basis for the preparation of a report. When the situation satisfi es the criteria, it is desi-rable to state in a report that the work was performed in a satisfactory manner.

On the occasion of testing and evaluation of information, it is very important to identify specifi c tests for the audit sub-objectives, evaluation of business operation and the status of audited area of activity. Each test is conducted by the auditor using the standard documentation in the form prepared by the responsible auditor, which is fi lled in by the auditor that carries out the test. Th e test form will be one page long, to include the following: the main objective, ob-jectives and detailed objectives, the applied test, summary fi ndings based on the conducted test, conclusions, recom-mendations, reactions of the management, and the accep-tance of an agreed action. Auditors list the relevant tests to confi rm that the audit was conducted according to profes-sional standards and practices, effi ciently and constructi-vely, and that the fi ndings are reliable and correct and can be stated in a report.

OPERATING DOCUMENTATION IN THE PHASE OF REPORTING An auditor’s report is a document containing the main fi n-dings and outcomes of an audit, conclusions, recommen-dations and proposals, in addition to the agreed activities that should be implemented by the management following the completion of an audit.

Th e responsible auditor prepares an auditor’s report in-cluding the objectives, tasks, scope and purpose of the au-dit, the method of auditing, and the main fi ndings, conclu-sions, recommendations and the agreed activities. A report



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RADNA DOKUMENTACIJA U FAZI IZVJEŠTAVANJAIzvještaj o izvršenoj reviziji je dokumenat o glavnim na-lazima i rezultatima revizije, zaključcima, preporukama i predlozima te dogovorenim aktivnostima koje menadžment treba da sprovede poslije izvršene revizije.

Odgovorni revizor priprema revizorski izvještaj koji sad-rži ciljeve, zadatke, obim i svrhu revizije, način sprovođen-ja revizijskog ispitivanja te glavne nalaze, zaključke, pred-loge i dogovorene aktivnosti. Izvještaj mora biti napisan i strukturiran tako da pruži dovoljnu pouzdanost i garanciju da se menadžment u njega može pouzdati. Rukovodilac revizije podnosi izvještaj upravi.

Uz svaki sprovedeni test, koji ima svoj obrazac, navo-di se nalaz revizije i taj je nalaz dio radne dokumentaci-je. Svi nalazi revizije moraju se bazirati na pouzdanim i tačnim podacima i sprovedenim testovima, i moraju biti potkrijepljeni dokazima i činjenicama, argumento-vani brojkama itd. Svi oni moraju biti u radnoj doku-mentaciji revizora.

Nalazi su bitan dio izvještaja u kojem se iznose bitne činjenice o funkcionisanju sistema internih kontrola, o rizicima u poslovanju, sprovođenju poslovne politike, procedurama i postupcima, primjeni zakona, akata orga-nizacije i ostalog. U izvještaju nije potrebno iznositi sve nalaze, nego samo one koji su bitni. Nalazi u izvještaju mogu obuhvatiti i preduzete aktivnosti menadžmenta u uklanjanju uočenih nedostataka tokom obavljanja revi-zije te obrazloženje pojedinih nalaza. Manje važni nalazi ili činjenice mogu se saopštiti menadžmentu revidiranog područja usmeno ili neformalnim dopisom.

RADNA DOKUMENTACIJA U FAZI PRAĆENJA SPROVOĐENJA NALAZA, ZAKLJUČAKA, PREPORUKA I PREDLOGA REVIZIJEPraćenje sprovođenja nalaza, zaključaka, preporuka i pred-loga revizije te dogovorenih aktivnosti obuhvata sve po-slove nadgledanja, posmatranja i ispitivanja te izvještavan-je uprave i odbora za reviziju. Na kraju svakog izvještaja navode se dogovorene aktivnosti sa rokovima za njihovu primjenu i odgovorna lica. Praćenje dogovorenih aktiv-nosti nakon prihvatanja revizorovog izvještaja defi niše se kao proces kojim interni revizor utvrđuje primjerenost, efi kasnost i pravovremenost aktivnosti i radnji koje pre-duzima menadžment i uprava.

Ako je rizik nepreduzimanja korektivnih mjera i aktiv-nosti, prema mišljenju rukovodioca odjeljenja interne re-vizije, neprihvatljiv za organizaciju u cjelini, potrebno je obavijstiti upravu.

Vrstu, oblik, obim i način praćenja utvrđuje rukovodi-lac interne revizije. On treba da utvrdi i održava sistem praćenja dogovorenih aktivnosti o preduzetim mjerama i postupcima. Interni revizori moraju pratiti i preduzi-manje odgovarajućih mjera i aktivnosti u skladu sa na-lazima, zaključcima, preporukama i predlozima navede-nim u izvještaju.

Faktori koje treba uzeti u obzir pri određivanju primje-renog postupka praćenja su: važnost nalaza u izvještaju, količina uloženog napora i trošak potreban za korekciju stanja, rizici koji mogu nastati ako korektivna akcija ne uspije, složenost korektivne radnje i potrebno vrijeme.Rukovodilac interne revizije odgovoran je za donošen-je plana praćenja dogovorenih aktivnosti. Nadgledanje

sprovođenja dogovorenih aktivnosti obavljaju interni revizori. Menadžment revidiranog područja treba da dostavlja izvještaj o sprovođenju aktivnosti u skladu sa izvještajem sve dok se stanje ne popravi. Revizori mo-raju da se na adekvatan način uvjere da su radnje pre-duzete na bayi nalaza dovoljne i da popravljaju stanje. Obim uvida utvrđuje odgovorni revizor ili rukovodi-lac revizije. Interni revizori moraju ponekad ponovo da obiđu revidirano područje i da obave uvid u spro-vođenje aktivnosti.

Neki nalazi u izvještaju mogu biti tako značajni da zahti-jevaju preduzimanje hitnih mjera i aktivnosti menadžmen-ta i uprave. Međutim, ponekad rukovodilac revizije može da ocijeni da usmena ili pisana reakcija menadžmenta ili uprave pokazuje kako je već preduzeta aktivnost do-voljna obzirom na relativnu važnost revizijskih nalaza. U takvim slučajevima praćenje se može sprovoditi kao dio sledeće revizije.

U sprovođenju dogovorenih aktivnosti podnose se izvještaji upravi, odboru za reviziju i korisniku izvještaja, kada je to potrebno.

ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJAUtvrđivanje i izrada radne dokumentacije stručan je po-sao i zadatak interne revizije. Interni revizori moraju što više standardizovati radnu dokumentaciju, koja im može pomoći u sprovođenju revizije. Osnovne zaključke i obim revizorske dokumentacije zavise od djelatnosti organiza-cije, predmeta revizije, procijenjenih poslova i revizijskih rizika, ciljeva, zadataka, obima i vrste revizije, očekivanja korisnika izvještaja i same interne revizije, obaveza prema upravi, odboru za reviziju, menadžmentu i sl.

Radna dokumentacija i proces rada interne revizije u organizaciji utvrđuju se u aktima i stručnim dokumen-tima interne revizije: Priručniku za rad interne revizije i Smjernicama za rad interne revizije. U tim stručnim do-kumentima utvrđene su sve aktivnosti revizije i potrebna standardna radna dokumentacija.

Proces rada obuhvata sve aktivnosti interne revizije, od procjene poslovnih i revizijskih rizika, preko planiran-ja interne revizije, defi nisanja ciljeva, zadataka i obima interne revizije, do prikupljanja podataka, informacija, analiza i dokumenata te rezultata drugih stručnih službi i njihove provjere.

Ako ne postoje standardi za oblikovanje, defi nisanje i korišćenje dokumentacije, može se dovesti u pitanje kva-litet revizije. Radna dokumentacija pomaže revizoru pri boljem sprovođenju revizije i primjenjivanju utvrđenih standarda, smjernica i profesionalnih pravila te odgova-rajuće prakse procesa rada interne revizije. Ona obuhvata sve sprovedene aktivnosti revizije i potrebnu dokumen-taciju i dokumente koje je izradio revizor, kojii služe kao potpora za utvrđene dokaze, nalaze, zaključke, preporuke, predloge i dogovorene aktivnosti.

Dokumentacija može biti različitog oblika, npr. na pa-piru, diskovima, disketama, fi lmovima ili drugim mediji-ma. Rukovodilac interne revizije treba da utvrdi način po-stupanja sa svim vrstama revizijske radne dokumentacije, kao i o njihovom odlaganju, korišćenju i čuvanju. Uslovi čuvanja moraju biti u skladu sa aktima organizacije i za-konskim odredbama, gdje je to potrebno ■


must be written and structured so that it off ers suffi cient reliability and guarantees for the management to rely on it. Th e report is submitted to the management by the head of the auditing team.

Each conducted test, presented on a separate form, in-cludes audit fi ndings that constitute a part of the opera-ting documentation. All audit fi ndings must be based on reliable and accurate data and conducted testing, and must be supported by evidence, facts and fi gures, etc. All of those must be included into the auditor’s operating documentation.

Th e fi ndings constitute a signifi cant component of the report that includes all essential facts relating to the functi-oning of a system of internal controls, operating risks, im-plementation of business policies, procedures and practices, law application, organization acts, and other. It is not neces-sary to include all fi nding in a report, but only the essential ones. Th e fi ndings entered into a report may also include the activities undertaken by the management to eliminate the observed shortcomings in the course of auditing, and also the rational for specifi c fi ndings. Less signifi cant fi n-dings and facts may be communicated to the management of the audited entity orally or by means of an informal writ-ten communication.

OPERATING DOCUMENTATION IN THE MONITORING PHASE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS Monitoring of implementation of the audit fi ndings, conclu-sions, recommendations and proposals, in addition to the agreed activities, includes all activities of monitoring, super-vision, and testing, and also reporting to the management and audit committee. At the end, each report includes the agreed activities, implementation schedules and responsib-le persons. Monitoring of the agreed activities following an approval of the auditor’s report is defi ned as a process when an internal auditor identifi es the adequacy, effi ciency and timely character of the activities and actions that carried out by the management and administration.

If the risk of taking no corrective measures and activities is assessed as unacceptable for the organization as a whole by the head of internal audit unit, the management needs to be notifi ed.

Th e type, form, and manner of monitoring are set by the head of internal audit that establishes and maintains a sys-tem for the purpose of monitoring the undertaken measu-res and activities. Internal auditors must also monitor the undertaking of appropriate measures and activities in ac-cordance with the fi ndings, conclusions, recommendations and proposals from the auditor’s report.

When identifying an appropriate monitoring procedure, the following factors need to be taken into account: signi-fi cance of the reported fi ndings; the required level of eff ort and costs to remedy the situation; risks that may arise for a failure to remedy the situation; complexity of corrective action; and the required time. Th e head of internal audit is responsible for the preparation of a plan to monitor the agreed activities. Implementation of the agreed activities is supervised by internal auditors. Th e audited entity’s mana-gement needs to report on the implementation of activities as specifi ed by the report until the situation is improved.

Th e auditors have to adequately confi rm that the measures undertaken based on the fi ndings are suffi cient to improve the situation. Th e scope of inspection is identifi ed by the responsible auditor or the head of audit. Occasionally, in-ternal auditors have to revisit the audited entity and review the implementation of activities.

A report may include particular fi ndings that are so im-portant that an urgent undertaking of measures and acti-vities by the management and administration is required. Nevertheless, internal audit head may assess that it is con-fi rmed by either an oral or written response of the manage-ment or administration that the activities that were already undertaken were suffi cient, considering relative importance of audit fi ndings. In such cased, monitoring may be imple-mented as a part of the following audit.

In the process of implementation of the agreed activities, reports are submitted to the management, audit committee and the user of auditor’s report, as required.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTIdentifi cation and preparation of operating documentation is a professional task that is carried out by internal audit. Internal auditors must maximally standardize the operating documentation so that it can assist them in conducting an audit. Th e main conclusions and scope of audit documen-tation depend on the organization’s activity, audit objecti-ves, assessed activities, audit risks, goals and tasks, scope and type of audit, expectations of the audit user and the internal audit itself, responsibilities to administration, au-dit committee, management, etc.

Operating documentation and the process of conducting internal audit of an organization are specifi ed in the fol-lowing documents and specifi c documents for an internal audit: Operating Manual for Internal Audit and Operating Instructions for Internal Audit. All auditing activities and the required standard operating documentation are regu-lated by those professional documents.

Th e work process includes all internal audit activities, starting from an assessment of operating and audit risks, via internal audit planning, identifi cation of objectives, tasks and scope of internal audit, and up to the collection of data, information, analysis and documents, and the fi ndings of other expert services and their verifi cation.

Without having specifi c standards for the preparation, identifi cation and use of documentation, the quality of in-ternal audit may be threatened. Operating documentation assists an auditor in conducting a higher-quality audit and using the applicable standards, guidelines and professional rules, in addition to the corresponding work practices of internal audit. It includes all the conducted auditing acti-vities, necessary documentation, and documents prepared by the auditor, in order to support the established eviden-ce, fi ndings, conclusions, recommendations, proposals and agreed activities.

Th is documentation may be prepared in various forms, such as in paper form, on discs, fl oppy discs, fi lms or other media. Th e head of internal audit has to set a method of using all types of operating documentation for an audit, in-cluding its fi ling, application and storing. Th e storing con-ditions must be in accordance with the regulations of the organization and according to the law, as required ■


Ovo nije samo kartica. Ovo je Vaša privilegija.

WWW.AMERICANEXPRESS.COM/MONTENEGROCALL CENTAR: +382 19894

SAMO U CRNOGORSKOJ KOMERCIJALNOJ BANCI

Pozivamo Vas da otkrijete svijet privilegija koji nudi samo CKB American Express® Gold kreditna kartica. Uživajte u putovanjima, jer Vam je sa Gold karticom besplatno obezbjeđen najviši nivo zaštite, a prilikom podnošenja zahtijeva za vizu ne razmišljajte o putnom zdravstvenom osiguranju. Kao korisnik Gold kartice odmah ćete dobijati vrijedne Gold nagrade, a dio posebne ponude je American Express Selects® program koji Vam omogućava specijalne popuste i pogodnosti u ekskluzivnim hotelima, restoranima i prodavnicama u Crnoj Gori i inostranstvu. Sami odredite limit trošenja, kupujte ono što želite kada hoćete.

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96

VREMENA NAŠA

Od “Dođi za platu”do “Uplaćena ti je plata”(put od 850.000.000.000.000.000 dinara do 1 eura)

Nenad JevrićUprava za sprječavanje pranja novca

GODINA 1989. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija - državna tvorevina od šest socijalističkih re-publika - Crna Gora, Srbija, Makedonija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Slovenija i Hrvatska i od dvije socijalističke autonomne pokra-jine - Vojvodina i Kosovo. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija - u njoj Služba društvenog knjigovodstva Jugoslavije i Narodna banka Jugoslavije. U Socijalističkoj Republici Crnoj Gori Služba društvenog knjigovodstva za njenu teritoriju i Narodna banka Crne Gore. Slično za sve ostale soci-jalističke članice. Osam Službi društvenog knjigovodstva objedinjenih u devetu, fe-deralnu, Službu društvenog knjigovodstva Jugoslavije. Osam Narodnih banaka objedin-jenih u devetu, federalnu, Narodnu Banku Jugoslavije. U svakom većem gradu Filijala službe društvenog knjigovodstva, u svakom manjem gradu Ekspozitura službe društve-nog knjigovodstva a u svakoj, ili skoro svakoj, varošici - Poslovnica službe društvenog knji-govodstva. U svakom gradu, gradiću, varo-šici i selu tadašnje Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije govorio se, i razumio, srpsko-hrvatski jezik. Slovenci su mogli go-voriti, i govorili su, slovenački jezik, Mađari mađarski, Makedonci makedonski, Albanci albanski. Ali svi, baš svi, razumjeli su srpsko-hrvatski. Svi uzrasti i sve strukture lako su razumjele jednu riječ – DINAR.

GODINA 1989.U svakom preduzeću, školi, bolnici, ban-ci i u svakoj ustanovi, blagajnik je svakog prvog u mjesecu sa torbom punom naloga (virmana) i druge obavezne dokumentacije odlazio u fi lijalu, ekspozituru ili poslovnicu Službe društvenog knjigovodstva, kod svog kontrolora, da mu pregleda svu dokumen-taciju, ovjeri ček i odobri isplatu. Potom kod likvidatora da ček „obradi“, i kod blagajnika da torbu napuni Dinara sa željenim apoens-kim strukturama. Po povratku, telefonom ili preko glasnika, pozivao je zaposlene – Dođi za platu. Ispred blagajničke kancelarije bili su dugi redovi, čekalo se da hitre i vješte ruke izbroje i razvrstaju dinare. Neki su ih pako-

vali u koverte, a neki su ih onako, direktno, „davali na ruke“. I tako svakog prvog u mjese-cu, u svakom preduzeću, školi, bolnici, ban-ci i svakoj ustanovi svekolike Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Svi su voljeli, čekali i razumjeli Dinar.

GODINA 2009. I SFRJ, i Služba društvenog knjigovodstva Jugoslavije, i Narodna banka Jugoslavije su istorijske kategorije. Od osam socijalističkih federalnih članica nastalo je sedam nezavisnih suverenih država sa sedam Centralnih od-nosno Narodnih banaka i sa sedam valuta, od kojih je najcjenjenija, najsavremenija i najevropskija EURO. Euro, jedna od rijetkih riječi koja se razumije i shvata na svim pros-torima bivše SFRJ. Najveća sličnost sa 1989. godinom ogleda se u tome što godina i dalje ima dvanaest mjeseci i što svaki mjesec po-činje prvim. A jedna od najvećih razlika je u tome što su ondašnji blagajnici, kontrolori i likvidatori uglavnom otišli u penziju. Filijale, ekspoziture i poslovnice Službe društvenog knjigovodstva sa ondašnjim dinarom u is-toriju. Za sva ona preduzeća, škole, bolni-ce, banke, ustanove i za zaposlene u njima, prvi u mjesecu nije više ono što je bio i nije kao što je nekad bio. Više na stolu ne zvo-ni fi ksni telefon i ne čije se blagajnikov glas „Dođi da uzmeš platu“. Sada zaposlenom u džepu zvoni mobilni telefon sa zvukom SMS poruke „ Uplaćeno Vam je 500 Eura, ili 50.000 Dinara, ili 1.000 Konvertibilnih maraka, ili 3.500 Kuna, ili 30.500 Denara ili 120.000 Tolara. Vaša Banka“. Sada zaposle-ni ne prekida svoje radne obaveze čekajući u redu ispred blagajnikove kancelarije, već dok uveče šeta i odmara se od posla, usput sa karticom svrati do bankomata svoje ban-ke i podigne svoja primanja. To čak može uraditi u bilo kom gradu i u bilo koje doba dana, za vrijeme odmora, vikenda ili pak službenog putovanja.

I JOŠ JEDNOM TREBA VRATITI SJEĆANJE NA 1989. GODINU.

„Subotičanka“ iz Subotice vrši plaćanje Solani „Bajo Sekulić“ u Ulcinju. Blagajnik

sa virmanom odlazi u Službu društvenog knjigovodstva, Filijala Subotica. Svom, i samo svom, referentu-kontroloru podno-si na uvid virman, koji kontrolor verifi -kuje i dozvoljava plaćanja. „Subotičanka“ na svom računu i ne mora imati dovoljno dinara (sredstava), ni njena deponentska banka, takođe, na svom obračunskom ili funkcionalnom računu ne mora imati do-voljno dinara (sredstava), ali - plaćanje se izvršava. Sredstva Solani u Ulcinju mogu biti doznačena poštom, poštanskom po-šiljkom, putem zbirnog aviza odobrenja i čekaju se desetak dana. Ako je plaćanje hitno, sredstva mogu biti doznačena putem telefona ili teleksa, takođe zbirnim avizom odobrenja uz korišćenje specijalnih šifara, i naknadnu dostavu originalne dokumen-tacije. Sva tri načina po strogo utvrđenim principima i pravilima uz upotrebu nam-jenskih obračunskih računa.


THE TIMES OF OURS

From “Come to Pick up the Salary”To “Your Salary Has Been Paid”(the path running from from 850,000,000,000,000.000 Dinars to EUR 1)

Nenad JevrićAdministration for the Prevention of Money Laundering

THE YEAR 1989Th e Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – national entity composed of six socialist Republics – Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia and two socialist autonomous districts – Vojvodina and Kosovo. Th e Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – with the Social Accounting Service of Yugoslavia and National Bank of Yugoslavia. Th e Social Accounting Service for the territory of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro and National Bank of Montenegro. Th e similar goes for all the other socialist members. Eight Social Accounting Services integrated in the ninth one, the Federal Social Accounting Service of Yugoslavia. Eight National Banks integrated in the ninth, Federal National Bank of Yugoslavia. Branch offi ce of the Social Accounting Service in every ma-jor city, fi eld offi ce of the Social Accounting

Service in every smaller city and outlet of the Social Accounting Service in every or nearly every town. Serbo-Croatian was spoken and understood in every city, small city, town and village of former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Slovenes could speak and they did speak Slovene, Hungarians spoke Hungarian, Macedonians spoke Macedonian, Albanians spoke Albanian. But everyone, truly every-one understood Serbo-Croatian. People of all ages and all structures understood one word – DINAR.

THE YEAR 1989On every fi rst day of the month in every enterprise, school, hospital, bank and in every institution the treasurer went to the branch office, field office or outlet of the Social Accounting Service with the bag full of orders (for remittance) and other required documents to see the controller who would check the documents, verify the cheque and approve the payment. Th at would be followed by visit to the liquidator who would “process” the cheque and visit to the cash keeper in or-der to fi ll the bag with Dinars of necessary denomination structures. Aft er return he/she would call the employees either by pho-ne or loudspeaker saying – come to pick up the salary. Long lines were waiting in front of the treasurer’s offi ce, they were waiting for the swift and skilful hands to count and classify dinars. Some packed them in enve-lopes, others gave them just like that, directly “in hands”. And so it happened on every fi rst day of the month in every enterprise, school, hospital, bank and every institution throughout the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Everyone loved, waited and understood Dinar.

THE YEAR 2009 SFRY, Social Accounting Service of Yugoslavia and National Bank of Yugoslavia belong to the categories of history. Seven independent sovereign states were born from eight so-cialist federal members with seven Central or National Banks and seven currencies of which EURO is the most appreciated, mo-

dern and European one. Euro, one of rare words understood and grasped in all areas of former SFRY. Major similarity with the year 1989 is refl ected in the year still having twelve months and every month beginning with the fi rst day. Whereas one of major dif-ferences is the fact that former treasurers, controllers and liquidators mainly got reti-red. Branch offi ces, fi eld offi ces and outlets of the Social Accounting Service with Dinar existent at the time have vanished into his-tory. Th e fi rst day of the month for all those enterprises, schools, hospitals, banks, institu-tions and their employees is not what it used to be and like it used to be. Fixed telephone is not ringing on the table any longer and the there is no sign of the treasurer’s voice saying “Come to pick up the salary”. Now the cell phone is ringing in the employee’s pocket with the SMS sound “Th e amount of EUR 500 has been paid to your account or 50,000 Dinars or 1,000 Convertible Marks or 3,500 Kunas or 30,500 Denars or 120,000 Tolars. Sincerely, the Bank”. Employee does not in-terrupt tasks at work to stand in the line in front of the treasurer’s offi ce, instead he/she stops by the ATM while taking walk in the evening and resting from work and withdraws the salary. It can be done in any city and at any time of the day, during holiday, week-end or even on business trip.

AND MEMORY OF THE YEAR 1989 SHOULD BE REFRESHED ONCE AGAIN.

„Subotičanka“ from Subotica makes pay-ment to “Bajo Sekulić” Salt Pans in Ulcinj. Treasurer goes to the Social Accounting Service with the remittance order, branch of-fi ce in Subotica. He/she submits remittance order for insight of his/her and only his/her offi cer in charge – controller which is then verifi ed by the controller and approved for payment. „Subotičanka“does not need to have suffi cient amount of Dinars (funds) on its account, neither does its deposito-ry bank need to have suffi cient amount of Dinars (funds) on its clearing or functional accounts, but – the payment is made. Funds may be remitted to the Salt Pans in Ulcinj by


98TITOGRAD

1.12.1989. GODINE. Dan isplate ličnih dohodaka. Blagajnik ban-ke „Progres-banka“, čiji je žiro račun 20100-620-21, blagajnik preduzeća „Naprijed“, čiji je žiro račun 20100-601-21, blagajnik Osnovne škole „Bratstvo-jedinstvo“ čiji je žiro-račun 20100-603-21, sa hrpom doku-mentacije odlaze u Službu društvenog knji-govodstva, Filijala Titograd. Svako kod svog kontrolora, podnoseći mu dokumentaci-ju na uvid. Kada je preventivni kontrolor Službe dk izvršio kontrolu dokumentacije, kada je konstatovao da su podnešeni na-lozi za uplatu svih poreza i doprinosa, vrši njihovu verifi kaciju, a blagajnik sa čekom odlazi na šalter blagajne u Službi, puni torbu dinarima i, nakon povratka, iz svoje kancelarije vrši isplatu plata po priprem-ljenim spiskovima. Naravno, uz obavezan poziv „ Dođi za platu“.

GODINA 1999. Umjesto SFRJ sada je Savezna Republika Jugoslavija, umjesto SDK sada ZOP - Zavod za obračun i plaćanja. „Subotičanka“ iz Subotice opet plaća Solani „Bajo Sekulić“ u Ulcinju. Može kao i 1989. godine - poštom, putem zbirnog aviza odobrenja, telefonom ili te-leksom. Skoro na istovjetan način kao i pri-je 10 godina. Ali - ovaj put može i TK pu-tem (telekomunikacionim putem), pri čemu sredstva na račun Solane pristižu najkasni-je u roku od pola sata od momenta podno-šenja naloga.

PODGORICA1.12.1999. GODINE.

I opet dan isplate ličnih dohodaka. „Subotičanka“ ne može više da plaća Solani u Ulcinju. Ne može zato što je platni pro-met između Srbije i Crne Gore prekinut. Prekinut - jer je Crna Gora, pored dinara, kao ravnopravno platežno sredstvo uvela i njemačku marku. Blagajnik „Progres-

banke“, čiji je žiro-račun sada 55100-620-21, blagajnik preduzeća „Naprijed“, čiji je žiro-račun sada 55100-601-21, blagajnik Osnovne škole „Bratstvo-jedinstvo“, čiji je žiro-račun račun sada 55100-603-21, sa manjom hrpom dokumentacije odlaze u ZOP, Filijala Podgorica, takođe kod svog kontrolora. On prvo provjerava da li na računu imaju dovoljno sredstava, da li de-ponentska banka na svom obračunskom računu ima dovoljno sredstava, a nakon toga, pregleda, kontroliše i verifi kuje svu dokumentaciju, dozvoljava isplatu i blagaj-nik na blagajni ZOP-a podiže plate, ali ovaj put u NJEMAČKIM MARKAMA. I opet telefonski poziv „Dođi za platu“. Koverat znatno tanji, ali sa stabilnom, konverti-bilnom valutom. Ko je želio, svoju platu mogao je dobiti u znatno debljoj koverti, ali u dinarima.

GODINA 2009. Republika Crna Gora, samostalna suve-rena nezavisna država, u njoj Centralna banka Crne Gore i Euro, jedino platežno sredstvo i jedina valuta. Služba društvenog knjigovodstva, Služba platnog prometa, Zavod za obračun i plaćanja i Narodna banka, zajedno sa nekadašnjim platežnim sredstvima dinarom, konvertibilnim di-narom i njemačkom markom, su u isto-rijskom arhivu.

PODGORICA1.12.2009. GODINE.

Opet dan isplate ličnih dohodaka. Blagajnik iz „Progres-banke“ čiji je račun 590-1-80 ne ide nikuda, blagajnik preduzeća „Naprijed“ sa računom 590-2355-84 iz svoje kancelarije elektronskim platnim prometom, koji mu je omogućila „Progres-banka“, vrši sva ne-ophodna plaćanja vezana za lične dohotke. Osnovna škola „Bratstvo-jedinstvo“ prei-menovana je u Osnovnu školu „Evropa“ i njen blagajnik u Državni trezor predaje

platne spiskove. Dok profesori drže nasta-vu, dok doktori operišu, dok drugi zapo-sleni obavljaju svoje poslove, odmaraju se ili službeno putuju, umjesto telefonskog poziva „Dođi za platu“ stiže SMS poru-ka „Uplaćena Vam je plata, Vaša Progres-banka“. I to nije sve. Ko ima račun kod banke, svoj lični ili poslovni, a na računu ima dovoljno eura, uz pomoć svog mo-bilnog telefona ili personalnog računara, iz kuće ili kancelarije, iz auta ili aviona, iz zemlje ili inostranstva, može platiti račun za struju, telefon ili bilo koji drugi račun. Može i mimo radnog vremena, prije spa-vanja, ili pak u toku noći ako ima loš san. Dok se naspava i ujutro rasani, svi računi su izmireni.

I SVI ZNAMO KAKO JE SAD2009. GODINE.

Iako je godina ekonomske krize, ipak je go-dina velikih napredaka i dostignuća. Ali svi ne znamo šta je bilo od 1989. godine pa do 2009. godine. Ne znamo svi da je u decem-bru 1993. godine plata iznosila preko sto mi-lijardi dinara, da je jaje koštalo nekoliko stotina miliona dinara, da se za te silne di-narske milijarde na ulici moglo kupiti samo nekoliko desetina njemačkih maraka. Ne znamo svi da je prvog januara 1994. godine denominacijom od 1.000.000.000 (slovima jedna milijarda) dinara postao 1 dinar, da je 24.01.1994. godine, takođe denominacijom, od 13.000.000 (slovima trinaest miliona) di-nara nastao jedan novi dinar, konvertibilni, jednak jednoj njemačkoj marci. I još dosta toga ne znamo ili smo zaboravili – sve de-nominacije dinara, uvođenje konvertibilnog dinara, uvođenje njemačke marke, uvođenje eura, dvovalutne platne sisteme, platni pro-met i modalitete plaćanja u režimu SDK-a, u režimu SPP-a, u režimu ZOP-a, migracija platnog prometa u komercijalne banke itd...(saznajmo ili se podsjetimo u sljedeæim broje-vima Bankara)

VREMENA NAŠA


THE TIMES OF OURS

mail, post delivery, through collective advi-ce note on approvals and they are waited for ten days. If the payment is urgent the funds may be remitted by telephone or telex, also with the advice note on approvals with the use of special codes and subsequent delivery of original documents. All three ways follow strictly defi ned principles and rules with the use of designated clearing accounts.

TITOGRAD01 DECEMBER 1989

Th e salary pay day. Treasurer of the “Progress Bank” whose gyro account number is 20100-620-21, treasurer of the enterprise „Naprijed“ whose gyro account number is 20100-601-21, treasurer of elementary school „Bratstvo-jedinstvo“ whose gyro account number is 20100-603-21 head towards the Social Accounting Service, Titograd branch offi ce with a bunch of documents. Everyone visits their controllers and submits documents for insight. Once the preventive controller of the Social Accounting Service has completed control of the docu-ments, once he/she has stated that orders for the payment of all taxes and contributions have been submitted, he/she performs their verifi cation and the treasurer goes to the co-unter of the pay desk at the Service with the cheque, fi lls the bag with Dinars and aft er having returned to the offi ce he/she pays sa-laries on the basis of the pay sheets that have been prepared. Naturally, with inevitable call “Come to pick up the salary”.

THE YEAR 1999Th e Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has now replaced the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, instead of the Social Accounting Service now there is the Clearing and Payment Bureau. “Subotičanka“ from Subotica still makes payments to „Bajo Sekulić“ Salt Pans in Ulcinj. It may be done like in 1989 – by mail, collective advice note on approvals, telephone or telex. Nearly the same like 10 years ago. But – this time it may be done by TC means (telecommunication means) whe-re funds reach the Salt Pans bank account at the latest half an hour aft er the moment of submission of the order.

PODGORICA01 DECEMBER 1999

And again it is the salary pay day. „Subotičanka“ cannot make payments to the Salt Pans in Ulcinj any more. It cannot do so because the payment operations between Serbia and Montenegro stopped. It stopped because Montenegro in-troduced German Mark as another equal legal tender in addition to Dinar. Treasurer of the “Progress Bank” whose gyro account

now is 55100-620-21, treasurer of the enter-prise „Naprijed“ whose gyro account now is 55100-601-21, treasurer of elementary school „Bratstvo-jedinstvo“ whose bank account now is 55100-603-21 head towards the Clearing and Payment Agency, Podgorica branch offi ce, with smaller bunch of documents to see their con-troller. He/she fi rst checks whether there are suffi cient funds in their bank account, whether the depository bank has suffi cient funds on its clearing account and aft er that checks, con-trols and verifi es all the documents, approves the payment and treasurer withdraws salaries at the pay desk of the Clearing and Payment Bureau, but in GERMAN MARKS this time. And another phone call saying “Come to pick up the salary”. Th e envelope is considerably thinner, but with the stable, convertible cur-rency inside. Anyone who wanted could re-ceive their salary in considerably thicker en-velope, but in Dinars.

THE YEAR 2009Th e Republic of Montenegro, an indepen-dent, sovereign state with the Central Bank of Montenegro and Euro, the only legal tender and the only currency. Th e Social Accounting Service, Payment Operations Service, Clearing and Payment Bureau and National Bank, to-gether with former legal tender Dinar, con-vertible Dinar and German Mark are in his-torical archive.

PODGORICA01 DECEMBER 2009

Another salary pay day. Treasurer from the „Progress Bank “ whose account number is 590-1-80 does not go anywhere, treasurer of the enterprise „Naprijed“ whose account number is 590-2355-84 makes all the ne-cessary payments related to the salaries by electronic payment operation from the offi -ce which was made possible by the „Progress Bank“. Elementary school „Bratstvo-jedinstvo“ was renamed to become elementary school „Europe“and its treasurer submits pay sheets

to the State Treasury. While professors teach, doctors perform surgeries, other employees perform their tasks, take rest or go on business trips, the SMS saying “Your salary has been paid. Sincerely, the Progress Bank” is recei-ved instead of the phone call “Come to pick up the salary”. And that’s not all. Anyone ha-ving bank account, either personal or corpo-rate, with suffi cient amount of Euro in it and with assistance of their cell phone or personal computer may pay electricity, phone or any other bill from home or offi ce, from the car or plane, from the country or abroad. Th ey may do so outside working hours, before bedtime or even during the night if they cannot sleep well. By the time they get enough sleep and wake up all the bills have been settled.

AND WE ALL KNOW HOW IT IS NOWIN 2009

Despite being the year of economic crisis, this is still the year of major progress and achievements. But not everyone knows how it was from 1989 until 2009. Not all of us know that in December 1993 the salary amounted to over one hundred billion Dinars, that the price of an egg equalled few hundred million Dinars, that merely few do-zens of German Marks could have been bought in the street for these enormous billions of Dinars. Not all of us know that that on 01 January 1994 the denomination of 1,000,000,000 dinars (one billion) turned to 1 dinar, that on 24 January 1994 the denomination of 13,000,000 (thirteen billion) turned to one new Dinar, the convertib-le one, equal to one German Mark. And there is a plenty of what we do not know or what we have forgotten – all Dinar denominations, in-troduction of convertible Dinar, introduction of German Mark, introduction of Euro, two-cur-rency payment systems, payment operation and modalities of payment in the Social Accounting Service regime, Payment Operations System regime, Clearing and Payment Bureau regime, migration of payment operations to commercial banks etc. (let’s find out or remember that in next issues of the Banker).

NJ egoš je, iako samouk, spadao je u najobrazovanije vladare i državnike svoga vremena. Održavao je veze

sa mnogim poznatim ličnostima svoga doba, a shvatajući značaj znanja stranih jezika naučio je i odlično vladao fran-cuskim, italijanskim, a koristio se njemačkim jezikom.

Pod ruskim uticajem vodio je politiku prema Austriji i Turskoj, a 1837. izvršio je reformu državne uprave, u okviru koje je osnovano „kaznačejstvo“, a za prvog državnog kazna-čeja imenovao Dimitrija Milakovića, svojeg dugogodišnjeg sekretara i odanog prijatelja. Kaznačej je radio po pravilima koja je donio Njegoš, a za te potrebe čuvanja novca nabav-ljena je odgovarajuća gvozdena kasa.

Vladika se u proljeće 1850. razboljeo i u 38. godini života umro od tuberkuloze, 31. oktobra 1851. Sahranjen je najprije u Cetinjskom manastiru, a zatim su njegovi zemni ostaci, po zaživotnoj volji, prenijeti u kapelicu na Lovćenu, koju je on podigao 1845. godine.

Za kratko vrijeme svojega života i dvadsetojednogodišnje vladavine u svojoj ličnosti, sjedinio je pravoslavnog mitro-polita, državnika, pjesnika i fi lozofa čijem su se stasu divili svi ljudi koje je srijetao.

Njegova želja je bila da od Crne Gore napravi modernu evropsku državu ali ga je prerana smrt u tome spriječila.

Nažalost, jedna nedovoljno dokumentovana pa čak i Njegoševim najbližim prijateljima nepoznata, neostvare-na državotvoračka želja, bila je kovanje novca kao izraza potreba i simbola suverenosti i ekonomske nezavisnosti Crne Gore.

Ljuba Nenadović je zabilježio anegdotu iz Napulja čiji su akteri bili vladika crnogorski, Petar II Petrović Njegoš,

decembar 2009 | :BankarIZ PROŠLOSTI

Njegošev zlatni perunU kući Toma Markova i Ivane Proroković na Njegušima, 1813. godine, kao drugi po redu sin rođen je Radivoje Petrović. Rade je školu učio u manastiru Savina kod učitelja Josipa Tropovića, a poslije mu je za učitelja određen Sima Milutinović Sarajlija.Nakon smrti Petra I Petrovića Njegoša 1830. godine, po njegovoj izričitoj volji i testamentu, sedamnaestogodišnji Rade Petrović je zavladičen i nastavio je da vlada kao Petar II Petrović. Ovim činom je preuzeo vlast u Crnoj Gori. Za mitropolita je rukopoložen u Rusiji 1833. godine, od koje je u toku svoje vladavine dobijao značajnu fi nansijsku pomoć.U oktobru 1831. formirao je Praviteljstvujušći (upravljajući) senat crnogorski i brdski, Gvardiju (neka vrsta policije od 156 članova) i Perjanike (tjelesna garda od osam članova), a 1833. uveo je plaćanje poreza. Od novčane pomoći koju je dobio od Rusije, Vladika je 1833. kupio štampariju. Prvu svjetovnu školu otvorio je 1834. u Cetinjskom manastiru.Osnovao je prvi zatvor u Crnoj Gori, a prostorija u Cetinjskom manastiru koja je poslužila u te svrhe po svom prvom „gostu“ nazvana je Guvernadurica. Na samom početku svoje vladavine Njegoš je, pod plaštom nedokazanih optužbi za izdaju (održavanje veza sa predstavnicima Austrije), odlukom Senata ukinuo titulu guvernadura 1832. godine, a posljednjeg, Vukala Jovanovog Radonjića (Njeguši, oko 1770. - Kotor, 1832) je utamničio, a nakon što se ovaj razbolio, protjerao ga je iz Crne Gore sa svim članovima njegove porodice.Organizovao je sudove, izdejstvovao povećanje pomoći od Rusije, a 1838. godine sazidao je svoju rezidenciju, kasnije nazvanu Biljardu,. i u njoj smjestio Senat.

Miodrag KirsanovCBCG

Njegoševa kasa, danas bi je nazvali državni trezor

100

A lthough self-educated, Njegoš belonged to the most educated rulers and statesmen of his time. He maintai-

ned the relations with numerous prominent persons of that time, and realizing the importance of foreign languages, he had an excellent command of French and Italian, and an acceptable command of German language.

His policy toward Austria and Turkey was under the in-fl uence of Russia, while in 1837 he completed a reform of the state administration when an Account Offi ce called “kaznačejstvo“ was established; Dimitrij Milaković, who had been his personal secretary and a loyal friend for many years, was appointed the fi rst Head of the Account Offi ce. Th e Head of the Account Offi ce worked following the ru-les passed by Njegoš, while a suitable iron strong-box was procured to safe keep the money.

In the spring of 1850, the Bishop fell ill at the age of 38 and died of tuberculosis on 31 October 1851. He was fi rst buried at the monastery of Cetinje, whereas his relics, according to his earlier expressed will, were transferred to a small chapel on top of Mount Lovćen that he had built in 1845.

During his short life and a twenty one year long reign, an Orthodox Metropolitan, statesman, poet and philoso-pher were embodied in this one personality whose fi gure was admired by every person he met.

It was his wish to trans-form Montenegro into a modern European sta-te, but he was preven-ted from doing so by his premature death.

Unfortunately, there was an unfulfi lled wish of this statesman that was not suffi ciently do-cumented and was even unknown to Njegoš’s clo-sest friends, which con-cerned money printing as an expression of need and a symbol of the so-vereignty and indepen-dence of Montenegro.

Ljuba Nenadović recorded an anecdote from Naples, with the Ruler of Montenegro, Petar II Petrović Njegoš, who stayed for some time in Italy, and Baron Carl Mayer de Rothschild as the main characters. In March 1851, when they were having dinner at Baron de Rothschild’s, the Ruler of Montenegro attracted, as usually, the attention of all attende-


Njegoš’s Golden PerunRadivoje Petrović was born as the second son of Tomo Markov and Ivana Proroković in the village of Njeguši in 1813. Rade went to school at the Monastery of Savina, taught by his teacher Josip Tropović, while Sima Milutinović Sarajlija was later on designated as his tutor.When Petar I Petrović Njegoš died in 1830, following his explicit will and testament, seven year old Rade Petrović was appointed Bishop and continued to rule as Petar II Petrović. By virtue of this act he assumed the authority to rule Montenegro. In 1833 he was ordained as Metropolitan in Russia, where from he continued to receive signifi cant fi nancial assistance through the period of his rule. In October 1831, he established the Governing Senate of Montenegro and the Mountain Region, Guardia (some kind of a police force made up of 156 members), and the Grenadiers (his guards unit called Perjanici, consisting of 8 members), while the payment of taxes was introduced in 1833. The Bishop used the fi nancial assistance from Russia to purchase a printing press in 1833. The fi rst worldly school was opened at the Monastery of Cetinje in 1834. He opened the fi rst prison in Montenegro, a dungeon in the monastery of Cetinje, which was named Gubernatrial after its fi rst “guest”. At the very beginning of his rule, concealed behind an unproven accusation of treason (because of the maintenance of relations with Austrian representatives), following the Senate’s decision, Njegoš cancelled the title of gubernator, and imprisoned Vukolaj (Jovan) Radonjic, the last gubernator of Montenegro (Njeguši, around 1770 - Kotor, 1832), who was subsequently banned from Montenegro when he fell ill, together with all members of his family. He organized courts, mediated a higher level of assistance by Russia, while his palace, later on called Biljarda, where the Senate was seated, was built in 1838.

Miodrag KirsanovCentral Bank of Montenegro

Dimitrij Milakoviæ

FROM THE PAST

koji je boravio u Italiji, i baron Karl Majer Rotšild. Kada su u martu 1851. bili na večeri kod barona Rotšilda, vladika crno-gorski je po običaju bio zaokupio pažnju svih prisutnih pričama o Crnoj Gori i njenim ljepotama. Jedino je domaćin bio ravnodu-šan na te priče i upitao Njegoša: „Zašto ne kujete novce u Crnoj Gori?”. Vladika crnogorski je odgovorio: „Kad bi se moglo od kamenja kovati, ja bih odavno počeo kovati”. Mnogi smatraju da je pitanje barona Rotšilda bilo

presudno da se vladika crnogorski zamisli i naruči izradu klišea. Poslije ovog događaja nama dostupni istorijski izvo-ri ništa ne govore o Njegoševom novcu ili ideji za njegovo kovanje sve do pojave knjige dr Lazara Tomanovića (1867-1932) „Petar II Petrović Njegoš kao vladalac“, objavljene 1906. u koju je naknadno unesen jedan kraći tekst koji govori o zlatnom Perunu: „Kada je ovaj posljednji tabak već bio složen i prelomljen našla se u Biljardi skrinjica sa natpisom: „A bordo brig Uredan Sig-r Marko Gopcevich Londra u škrinjici kalup od čelika na kome je, s jedne stra-ne u lovorovom vijencu izrezan natpis ZLATNI PERUN 2 TALIRA, a iznad natpisa iz stisnute ruke strijele u dva pravca sijevaju; na drugoj strani natpis: Crna Gora 1851., a oko natpisa zmija se savila”.

Ćutanje o kalupima traje sve do 1918. godine kada go-spodin Stevo L. Lopičić u prvom broju „Zetskog glas-nika“, od 7. januara za 1933. godinu, objavljuje članak „Njegošev zlatni Perun“. On iznosi tvrdnju o postojanju Peruna: “Godine 1851. Vladika Rade, crnogorski Mitropolit i Gospodar, dao je izraditi kliše za pravljenje simboličnog i od vrijednosti zlatnog novca kome je dao ime „Zlatni Perun“. Po pričanju istoričara Živka Dragovića, vladika Rade je iskovao prije smrti samo 32 komada ovog novca, koje je razdijelio kao poklon, uspomene radi, svojim najboljim saradnicima i prijateljima u Crnoj Gori i prijateljima u inostranstvu”. Svi autori koji su pisali o Perunu slažu se u jednom, a to je da je veoma mala vjerovatnoća da bi svi otkovani komadi nestali ili bili izgubljeni.

Lopičić dalje piše da je 1909. godine, kao šef Administrativnog odjeljenja Ministarstva fi nansija Knjaževine Crne Gore, bio član komisije za poništavanje klišea do tada izdatih crnogorskih poštanskih maraka. Klišei su bili dijelom u trezorima Glavne državne blagajne, a dijelom, ona najsta-rija, u riznici Cetinjskog manastira. Među ovim potonjima nalazio se i jedan aparat poput decimala, to je on privu-kao pažnju komisije, te je prethodno kao nepoznata stvar od iste bio ispitan. „Na debeloj i teškoj gvozdenoj polu-zi od jednog metra dužine, i pola metra širine, zaliven je stajao jedan debeli gvozdeni direk, visok jedan metar na jednom kraju, dok paralelno na drugom kraju stajala su prikovana dva pokretna gvozdena komada koja se pri vrhu spajaju, i na njima prikovana jedna gvozdena obla i izdubljena kapa, te dvije velike oble bronze, koje u vezi sa ovim aparatom stajahu. Na prvom direku stajao je je-dan izrađen kliše, a na drugom, u onoj izdubljenoj kapi, o kojoj je riječ, drugi kliše”.


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es telling them about Montenegro and its beauties. Only the host was indiff erent to hear those stories and asked Njegoš: “Why don’t you coin the money in Montenegro?” Th e Ruler of Montenegro responded: “Had it been possible to coin the money out of stone, I would have started doing that long time ago”. It is generally believed that the question of Baron de Rothschild was decisive for the Ruler of Montenegro to start considering this idea and order a mould to be made. Aft er this event, no historical sources that were available to us contained any information about Njegoš’s money or an idea for its forging until the publishing of the book “Petar II Petrović Njegoš, as a Ruler“ by dr. Lazar Tomanović (1867-1932) in 1906, where a brief text about the golden Perun was subsequently added: “When the last page of this book had already been folded and prepared for printing, a small chest was found in Biljarda, with a label reading: “A bordo brig Uredan Sig-r Marko Gopcevich Londra“; the chest contained an iron mould with an inscription inside of a laurel wreath reading “GOLDEN PERUN 2 THALERS“ on one side; above this inscription there was an image of a fi sted hand with ar-rows fl aming in two directions; the other side of the mould read “Montenegro 1851”, with a snake around it”.

Th e mould had not been mentioned until 1918, when Mr. Stevo L. Lopičić, in the fi rst edition of the journal “Zetski glas-nik” (Zeta Herald) of 7 January 1933, published an article titled “Njegoš’s Golden Perun”. He claimed that the Perun had existed: “In 1851, Bishop Rade, the Metropolitan and Ruler of Montenegro, ordered a mould to be made for the manufacture of a symbolic and valuable golden coin that was called the “Golden Perun”. According to Živko Dragović, a historian, Bishop Rade had had only 32 coins of this kind made before he died; he gave them to his closest associates, and to his friends in Montenegro and abroad, as presents, for the sake of remembering“. All authors who wrote about the Perun agreed about one thing, which was that the possibility that all coins that had been forged could either disappear or be lost was very small.

Further on, Lopičić wrote that in 1909, as the Head of Administrative Department of the Ministry of Finance of the Principality of Montenegro, he was a member of the Commission tasked to cancel the moulds for Montenegrin stamps that had been printed that far. Th e moulds were partly kept at safe deposits of the National Treasury, and partly, the oldest ones, at the Treasury of the Monastery of Cetinje. Th e latter one contained a device looking like a decimal, which attracted the attention of the Commission that examined it as an unknown object. “A thick iron pole was affi xed to a thick and heavy iron bar, one meter long and half a meter wide; one end of this iron pole was rising one meter high, while at the other end there were two mo-vable iron pieces coming together at the top and carrying an attached round and hollow iron cap, in addition to two large round brass object that were connected to this device. Th e fi rst pole contained a manufactured mould, while the other one, which carried a hollow cap that was mentioned before, contained another mould”.

Th is rather modest description shows that those were ob-viously the parts of a forging press used to coin the money, of the kind that used to be manufactured and operated un-til the beginning of the 19th century. Further on Lopičić wrote: “Since the size of this mould was no bigger than the size of half a dinar at the present


FROM THE PAST

Iz ovog dosta šturog opisa očigled-no je da je riječ o djelovima pre-se za kovanje novca kakve su se proizvodile i koristile do početka XX vijeka.

Dalje Lopičić navodi: „Kako taj kliše nije veće zapremine od dana-šnjeg pola dinara, a na njemu su sva slova bila sitno ispisana, nijesmo mogli slobodnim okom pročitati da znamo šta je taj kliše - te prije negoli ga je kovač čekićem udario radi poništenja, na crkvenom vos-ku izvadili smo otisak ovog klišea i sa jednog i drugog kraja koji je pokazao ovu sliku - s jedne stra-

ne: aždaja u krugu, u sredini natpis Crna Gora i malo niže 1851. godina brojevima označena, sa druge strane vijenac, a pri vrhu istoga ruka koja drži strelicu. U sredini napisano stoji Zlatni Perun a sa naznačenom vrijednosti - brojem 2 i slovima talira”. Na kraju Lopičić konstatuje: “Velika je šteta što se taj kliše nije sačuvao”.

I zaista je šteta nemjerljiva, ali je gospodin Lopičić uradio jednu veoma plemenitu stvar kada je tadašnjem direktoru Narodnog muzeja Crne Gore, Ristu Dragićeviću, pokazao i ponudio na prodaju otisak klišea u vosku koji je on na svoju ruku napravio i na na parčetu papira ostavio zabil-ješku: „Radi uspomene s originala klišea. Cetinje 9/V 1909. god. St. L. Lopičić”.

Pavle Novaković, autor izvanredne monografi je o Perperu zapaža da je „ovaj Lopičićev tekst ostao bez reakcija u ta-dašnjoj istorijskoj, kulturnoj i naučnoj javnosti, jer kako objasniti da do proljeća 1947. godine, znači narednih 14 go-dina, niko nije bio zainteresovan za sudbinu otiska u vosku tog Njegoševog novca“.

Pomenuti aparat (ili djelove prese) odnesen je 1916. ili 1917. godine i, najvjerovatnije, pretopljen za vojne potrebe austrougarske vojske, zajedno sa crkvenim zvonima, ruči-cama sa vrata od kancelarija i privatnih kuća, desetinama čuvenih istorijskih topova i sl. Tako je nestao i aparat kojim je trebalo da bude iskovan Perun, a kojim su kovane prve crnogorske medalje kako pretpostavlja Novaković.

Imena autora grafi čkog rješenja i gravera klišea nijesu poznata. Iz jednog pisma Ljube Nenadovića saznajemo da je Njegoš sam išao u Vatikan, „gdje se novci kuju“, u pratnji jednog tamošnjeg crtača, koji je nacrtao Obilića medalju. Nju je trebao da radi najpoznatiji napolitanski čelikorezac, nakon čega je poslata berlinskoj akademiji na procjenu.

Risto Dragićević je smatrao da je napuljski čelikorezac Nikolo Karvara, upravnik rimske Ceke, autor medalje i kli-šea za Obilića medalju autor i klišea za Perun.

Bez obzira na to ko je tehnički autor grafi čkog prikaza, sa velikom vjerovatnoćom možemo tvrditi da idejno rješenje dao lično Njegoš, jer njegov zlatni Perun gotovo i da nema numizmatičkog pandana, a veoma slikovito govori o njego-vom shvatanja vremena i svijeta u kojem je živio i stvarao.

Na aversu se nalazi lovorov vijenac – prva kruna – sim-bol duhovne i svjetovne vlasti, a između njegovih grana na vrhu, đe se kod većine kovanica stoji kruna ili krst, nala-zi se božja ruka koja drži nebo iz kojega sijevaju munje. U sredini je ćirilicom napisano ЗЛАТНЫИ ПЕРУНЫ, a sa

naznačenom vrijednošću - brojem 2 i slovima ТАЛИРА. Slično rješenje natpisa ranije je viđeno na reversu srebrene rublje iz 1816. godine.

Ime Perun Njegoš je najvjerovatnije uzeo nošen roman-tičnim shvatanjem sveslovenstva, znajući da je kao vrhov-ni bog još u sjećanju svih Slovena, a po svojim moćima i atrubutima ravnopravan grčkom Zevsu, rimskom Jupiteru, nordijskom Toru. Njegovo ime ostalo je kod naroda sačuva-no u obliku ličnog imena Perun/Perunika, naziva mnogih toponima i hidronima.

Odnos prema taliru 1:2 po Novakoviću je uzet zato što „u vrijeme, kada je nastao kliše Zlatnog peruna, svi krupni srebrnjaci su imali zajedničko ime talir. Ovu monetu od 60 krajcera u Italiji su zvali scudo, u Španiji real, u Engleskoj kruna i bijela škuda u Francuskoj. Od kraja XV vijeka u Tirolu je kovana srebrna moneta pod imenom “Guldengroschen”. Važio je kao srebrni “zlatnik”, a težio je “1 uncu i 2 lota”, ili 25,781 gram. Od 1525. godine, po mjestu kovanja Joahimstalu, ovaj “Guldengroschen” dobija ime talir“. Sadržaj srebra u njemu u raznim zemljama bio je različit. Godine 1857. ute-meljen je monetarni savez južnonjemačkih zemalja, koji je za talir utvrdio jedinstvenu težinu sa sadržajem čistog srebra od 16,67 gr. Novčanom reformom 1871-1873. vrijed-nost mu je izjednačena sa 3 zlatne marke. Od toga doba počelo je njegovo povlačenje iz prometa. Konačna demo-netanizacija talira nastupila je 1907. Naziv, malo izmijenjen, zadržao se u nazivu novca mnogih zemalja: skandinavske zemlje - daaler, riksdaler. Holandija - daalder, Italija - tal-lero, Amerika - dollar.

Na reversu se nalazu zmija u krugu, najvjerovatnije urobo-ros – zmija savijena u krug sa repom pred ustima, simbol cikličnog vremena, vječnosti i nedjeljivog, samodrživog karaktera i prirode, simbolišući u sebi zatvoren ciklus. Taj simbol obuhvata ujedno ideje kretanja, kontinuiteta, i sa-mooplodnje, predstavlja, dakle, vječno ponavljanje. Kružni oblik slike može se i drukčije tumačiti: ona predstavlja spa-janje htonskog svijeta, koji simboliše zmija, s nebeskim svi-jetom ili suncem koji simboliše kružnica. Takvo tumače-


Petar II Petroviæ Njegoš

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time, and all the letters it contained were very small, we could not read the inscription with the naked eye to know what it said; therefore, before it was hammered down by a blacksmith, so that it could be cancelled, we had applied some candle wax to this mould, at both ends, and the fol-lowing picture was shown there: from one side, there was an encircled dragon with an inscription in the center rea-ding “Montenegro”, and a number denoting the year of 1851 that was placed slightly under it; on the other side, there was a wreath and a hand holding an arrow close to its top. In the center, there was an inscription reading “Golden Perun”, with an indicated value – number 2, and the word Th aler, in writing”.

Finally, Lopičić noted: “It is very unfortunate that this mould was not preserved”.

And the damage caused is immeasurable indeed, but Mr. Lopičić did a very noble thing when he presented and of-fered to sell a reprint of the mould cast in wax that he had personally made to the director of the National Museum of Montenegro, Risto Dragović, at the time; he left the fol-lowing note on a piece of paper: “In remembrance of the original mould. Cetnje 9/V 1909, St.L.Lopičić”.

Pavle Novaković, the author of an extraordinary mono-graphy about the Perper, noticed that “this text of Lopičić provoked no reaction of the historians, cultural public and scientists at that time, or how else it could be explained that until 1947, meaning over the following 14 years, no person was interested in the destiny of the mould for Njegoš’s mo-ney that was made of wax”.

Th e foregoing device (or the parts of a forging press) was taken away in 1916 or 1917, and most probably re-casted for military purposes of the Austro-Hungarian Army, in addition to the church bells, door handles found at of-fi ces and private houses, dozens of historically famous canons, etc.

Th at was the end of a device that should have been used to forge the Perun, and which was used to forge the fi rst Montenegrin medals, as Novaković assumed.

Th e names of the graphic design author and mould engraver are not known. A letter written by Ljuba Nenadović reveals that Njegoš personally went to Vatican where “the money is forged”, accompanied by a lo-cal draft sman who had drawn the Obilićs’s medal. Th e medal was to be forged by the most famous steel engraver of Naples, and subsequently delive-red to the Academy of Berlin for evaluation.

Risto Dragićević believed that the steel engraver Niccolo Carvara, who headed the Roman Guild, designed both mo-ulds, for the Obilićs’s medal and the Perun.

Regardless of who designed the gra-phic representation, it can be claimed with a high level of cer-tainty that its con-ceptual design was prepared by Njegoš in person, since a numismatic match for his Golden Perun could hardly be found elsewhere, since it depicted very picturesquely his understanding of the time and world in which he lived and worked.

Th e face showed a laurel wreath, the fi rst crown, a symbol of spiritual and worldly power, while among its branches, at the top, where a crown or a cross could be seen on most co-ins, there was a hand of God holding the heaven fi lled with lightning. In the center, there was a Cyrillic inscription rea-ding GOLDEN PERUNS, with an indicated value, number 2, and the word THALER, in writing. A similar solution for an inscription had been previously seen on the reverse side of the Ruble dating from 1816.

Most probably, Njegoš chose the name Perun carried by the romantic understanding of Pan-Slavism, knowing that this was the name of the supreme God that still lived in the memories of all Slaves, and who was also equally powerful and had all the attributes of Zeus, the Greek God, Jupiter, the Roman God, and Th or, the Norse God. Th e people preser-ved his name as a personal name, that is Perun or Perunika, and also in numerous toponyms and hydronyms.

Th e Perun to the Th aler ratio was 1:2, which, according to Novaković, was because “at the time when the mould of the Golden Perun was designed, all large silver coins were commonly called the Th aler. Th is coin was worth 60 kre-uzers, and was called the Scudo in Italy, the Real in Spain, the Crown in England, and the White Scudo in France. Since the end of the 15th century, the silver money called “Guldengroschen” was coined in Tirol. It was regarded as a silver “gold coin” weighing “1 ounce and 2 lots”, i.e. 25.781 grams. Since 1525, aft er Joahimstal, the place where it was coi-ned, this “Guldengroschen”, was named the Th aler“. It contai-ned various percentages of silver, depending on the country where it was coined. In 1857, a monetary alliance of the states of South Germany was founded, and established a uniform weight for the Th aler that had to contain 16.67 grams of pure silver each. Following a monetary reform in 1871-1873, its va-

december 2009 | :Bankar

Plaketa Pape Gregora XIII koji je reformisao kalendar

Petar II Petroviæ Njegoš

105FROM THE PAST

nje potvrđuju neke slike na kojima je uroboros pola crn, a pola bijel. On može značiti i spajanje dva suprotna princi-pa, tj. zemlje i neba, dobra i zla, dana i noći, kineskog yanga i yina i svih vrijednosti što ih te suprotnosti sadrže, a koji su Njegošu veoma dobro bili poznati i o kojima je pisao u svojoj Luči mikrokozma. U sredini kruga ćirilicom je ispi-sano ЦРНА ГОРА 1851. Po Novakoviću „zmija na novcu (ili, kako kaže Lopičić, aždaja) je, takođe, klasičan motiv još na rimskim i grčkim kovanicama. U ovom slučaju vladika Rade je htio da simbolički prikaže Crnu Goru, stiješnjenu između Turske i Austrije“.

Možda je u Vatikanu Njegoš vidio papsku medalju Grgura XIII (iz 1582.), reformatora kalendara, koja mu je djelimično dala ideju za grafi čko rješenje reversa Peruna i korišćenje uroborosa kao simbola cikličnosti vremena. Inače, za ovu

medalju mnogi kažu da sadrži satanističke simbole.

Pristalicama ideje o Njegošu kao masonu svakako idu u prilog

njegovo očigledno dobro po-znavanje gnostičkog učenja i shvatanja svijeta, mnogi pri-jatelji širom Evrope koji su stvarno bili masoni i mno-gi koji na eksponatima u Biljardi prepoznaju ma-sonske i rozenkrojcerske simbole. Da i njima damo za pravo poslužićemo se sli-kom gnostičkog uroborosa iz 2. vijeka koji je pronađen

u Aleksandriji. Unutar zmije na grčkom piše „En to Pan“ ili

„jedno je sve“. Ovim primjerom se potvrđuje povezanost Pana sa svepri-

sutnim Bogom i Svijetlom. Međutim, Njegoš je i bez masona znao da je Pan isto što i Faun u Rimu, odnosno Veles kod Slovena i koji je suprotnost Perunu sa kojim se stalno bori. O tome go-vori mit o njihovoj stalnoj borbi: Veles kao zmija gmiže uz stablo Svjetskog Drveta (tako su Sloveni nekad do-življavali svijet) da bi preuzeo nebo, dok ga Perun gađa gromovima (navodno tako nastaju gromovi) i kad ga pobijedi, Perun pušta kišu na zemlju u znak trijumfa nad demonom. Ukratko, to bi bila borba našeg aversa i reversa, ispričana jezikom simbola, nakon koje je tre-bala da padne simbolična kiša potpune slobode i neza-visnosti koju Njegoš nije doživio.

Zbog vladavine Austrije Primorjem i direktne upuće-nost Crne Gore na trgovinsku razmjenu sa njom, u doba Njegoševe vladavine fl orin je bio osnovna obračunska jedinica, a u opticaju su bile i druge valute susjednih zemalja ali u znatno manjoj mjeri. Identična situacija će se nastaviti sve do 1910. godine kada je kralj Nikola donio Zakon o državnom novcu Kraljevine Crne Gore kojim je i zvanično ustanovljen Perper kao državna va-luta (uz nekoliko kovanja koja su mu prethodila).

Pavle Novaković zapaža da „Lazar Tomanović pominje škrinjicu i u škrinjici kalup od čelika, a Lopičić pomin-je “aparat” za kovanje i u njemu kliše za otkivanje. Dok Tomanović piše da je škrinjica pohranjena u Biljardi,

aparat sa klišeima, koji opisuje Lopičić, pronađen je u riznici Cetinjskog manastira. Ako je ova pretpostavka tačna, sudbina klišea iz škrinjice sa adresom bankara Marka Gopčevića iz Londona je zagonetna, kao i nje-gova ličnost. Teško je vjerovati da se poslije njenog pro-nalaska čovjek obrazovanja dr Laza Tomanovića mo-gao nehajno odnositi prema tom otkriću. Nije mnogo vjerovatno da je neko izvadio kliše iz skrinjice i stavio u “aparat”, koji pominje Lopičić, i da su tamo stajali od 1896. do 1909. godine. Ovo tim prije što je njihovo čuvanje bilo lakše i sigurnije u skrinjici u kojoj su do Tomanovićevog pronalaska stojali čitavih 45 godina, to jest od 1851. do 1896. Godine“.

Povodom stote godišnjice Njegoševe smrti (1951.) i stogodišnjice Njegoševog novca nije došlo do njegovog kovanja ali je to urađeno prilikom obilježavanja stope-desetogodišnjice „Gorskog vijenca”. Zoran Zeković na-vodi da je „Njegošev novac iz crvenog voska uz inicijati-vu pripreme za kovanje i realizaciju koju je izvršio pok. ing. Frano Vicković (rođeni Baranin i osnivač kovnice u Majdanpeku) i uz umjetničko rješenje u gipsu koje je izradio akademski slikar Dragiša Andrić“.

Prema otisku, koji je napravio i sačuvao Stevo Lopičić i ideji Rista Dragićevića, „Zlatara Majdanpek” i „Plavljanka Dub Beograd” iskovale su Zlatni perun u 10.000 pri-mjeraka, težine 1,2 grama zlata čistoće 900/1000. Pavle Novaković smatra da sa „tehničke strane ovim prim-jercima nema zamjerke, ali, da bi perun bio jednak vrijednosti 2 talira, težina je morala biti bar 3 grama. Realizatori ove ideje su težinu najvjerovatnije odredili prema veličini prečnika otiska i na tu dimenziju pri-mijenili savremene standarde za težinu, zaboravljajući da ti standardi nijesu važili u XIX vijeku te da je koli-čina zlata morala biti po vrijednosti ekvivalent količini srebra u 2 talira“.

Ovom umjetničkom rješenju sa naše strane prvo mo-žemo zamjeriti nerealno prenenijet oblik vijenca koji je vjerovatno nastao zbog veoma lošeg stanja voštanog otis-ka. Drugo odstupanje od originalnog klišea je očigled-no kod razlike u obliku glave i jezika uroborosa koji nije račvast i ne prelazi preko repa već se ispred njega savija prema gore i zbog toga ne pravi puni krug.


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IZ PROŠLOSTI

lue was established to equal 3 golden marks. Th is is when its withdrawal from the circulation started. Th e Th aler was no longer in circulation in 1907. Many countries preserved its name, slightly modifi ed, in the names of their respecti-ve currencies: Scandinavian countries (Daaler, Riksdaler); Holland (Daalder); Italy (Tallero); America (Dollar).

Th ere is a picture of an encircled snake on its reverse side, most probably the Uroboros, a snake curled into a circle with its tail in front of its mouth, which is the symbol of time cy-cles, the eternity and indivisibility, self-sustaining character and nature, which also symbolizes a self-closed cycle. Th is symbol also encompasses the ideas of movement, continuity and self-reproduction, and therefore represents a never en-ding repetition. Th e circular shape of the picture can also be interpreted diff erently: it represents a link between the hto-nic world, symbolized by the snake, and the heavenly world or the sun, which is symbolized by the circle. Such interpre-tation is confi rmed by some pictures showing the Uroboros being half black and half white. Th is may represent a link between two opposite principles, such as the earth and the sky, good and evil, day and night, the Chinese yang and yin, including all the values that those opposites contain, which Njegoš was very well familiar with and wrote about in his book “Th e Light of Microcosm”. In the center of the circle, there is a Cyrillic inscription reading: MONTENEGRO 1951. According to Novaković “a snake on the coin (or, a dragon, as Lopičić says) is also a classical motif that could be seen on Roman and Greek coins. In this case, Bishop Rade wanted to make a symbolic presentation of Montenegro, squeezed between Turkey and Austria“.

It is possible that in Vatican Njegoš saw the medal of Pope Gregory XIII (of 1582), who instituted calendar reform, which partly gave him an idea for a graphic design of the reverse side of the Perun, and also to use the Uroboros as a symbol of the cyclical nature of time. Otherwise, many people say that this medal contains some satanic symbols.

Th e followers of the idea that Njegoš was a freemason may certainly base their claims on his obviously thorough knowledge of Gnoistic teachings and comprehension of the world, his numerous friends all over Europe who were really freemasons, and the freemason and Rosencrantz symbols on the exhibits displayed at Biljarda, as recognized

by a number of people. Th e picture of Gnostic Uroboros dating from

the 2nd century, which was dis-covered in Alexandria, may

be referred to in support of their assertions. A snake

encircles an inscription in Greek language re-

ading “En to Pan“ or “One is All“.

This exam-ple confi rms the connec-tion betwe-e n P a n , t h e o m -nipresent God, and the Light.

Nevertheless, Njegoš needed no freemasons to know that the Greek Pan was the same as the Roman Faun or the Slavic Veles, who was an opposite to and constantly fi ghting against Perun. Th ere is a myth about their constant fi ght: Veles, as a snake, is crawling up the world tree (as the Slaves used to see the world before) in order to take over the heaven, while Perun is shooting lightning at him (allegedly, this is the ori-gin of lightning); when he wins, Perun lets the rain fall down on the Earth, as a sign of triumph against the devil. Briefl y stated, this would be the fi ght shown on the face and rever-se side of our coin, told in a language of symbols, following which a symbolic rain of absolute freedom and independen-ce, that Njegoš did not live to see, should have come down.

Due to the Austrian reign on the coast, and because of a direct ongoing trade between Montenegro and the co-ast, fl orin was the main accounting unit during the time of Njegoš’s reign, while other currencies of the neighboring countries were also in circulation, although much less. An identical situation continued all the way until 1910, when King Nikola passed the Law on the National Currency of the Kingdom of Montenegro, whereby the Perper was of-fi cially established as the national currency (in addition to several previously forged coins).

Pavle Novaković noted that “Lazar Tomanović mentio-ned a small chest containing a mould, cast in iron, while Lopičić mentioned a forging “device” containing a mould. While Tomanović wrote that the chest was stored in Biljarda, the devise containing a mould, as described by Lopičić, was found in the treasury of the monastery of Cetinje. If this as-sumption is correct, the destiny of the mould from the chest that contained the address of Marko Gopčević, a banker from London, remains mysterious, the same as his perso-nality. It is hard to believe that aft er it had been found, an educated man like Dr. Laza Tomanović could have been so indiff erent toward such a discovery. It is not very likely that the mould was taken out of the chest and placed into the “device” that was mentioned by Lopičić, in order to remain there from 1896 to 1909, the sooner so since it was easier to protect it in the chest where it had remained for the entire period of 45 years before it was discovered by Tomanović, which was from 1851 to 1896“.

No money was forged on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Njegoš’s death (1951) and the one hundredth anniversary of his money, but it was done to celebrate the one hundred and fi ft ieth anniversary of the “Wreath of the Mountain”. Zoran Zeković noted that “Njegoš’s money that was imprinted in red wax following an initiative to be prepa-red for the forging and actual coining, that was implemented by the late engineer Frano Vicković (who was born in Bar and founded the forging works of Majdanpek), was artistically designed in plaster by Dragiša Andrić, an academic painter“.

Following the mould that was made and preserved by Stevo Lopičić, and the idea of Risto Dragićević, the gold forging works of Majdanpek and the Company „Plavljanka Dub Beograd” forged 10,000 pieces of the Golden Perun, each coin weighing 1.2 grams of 900/1000 gold. Pavle Novaković believes that „technically speaking, those reproductions were beyond reproach, although, for the Perun to equal the value of 2 Th alers, it would have to weigh at least 3 grams. Th e implementers of this idea most probably established this weigh by measuring the diameter of its imprint and apply-

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Pavle Novaković smatra da „pošto niko od Njegoševih savremenika nije zabilježio kovanje Peruna, a nije po-znat nijedan sačuvani primjerak, nije ni došlo do ko-vanja ovog novca“.

Nameće se zaključak da je nemoguće da neko napravi kliše ili dva a da ne isproba svoje djelo, naročito kada je na Cetinje bila dopremljena presa. Možda nije otko-van zlatni ali je vjerovatno otkovan neki primjerak u srebru ili olovu. Teško je bilo odoljeti velikoj Njegoševoj radoznalosti.

Ostaje nam nada da će se jednog dana u eri elektronskih komu-nikacija na nekoj aukciji ili muzejskoj postavci poja-viti Zlatni perun u svom punom sjaju i sve nas obradovati, a ako neko u svojoj kolekciji pre-pozna predmet koji je predmet naše pri-če neka se slobodno javi redakciji ■

ing the modern weight standards, while they forgot that the same standards did not apply in the 19th century and that the quantity of gold had to equal, in terms of its value, the quantity of silver in a coin of 2 Th alers“.

From our point of view, this artistic solution can primarily be reproached because the reproduced form of the wreath is unrealistic, which was most probably due to a very bad condition of the wax imprint. Another obvious deviation from the original mould concerns the form of the head and tongue of the Uroboros, since the tongue does not fork to go over the tail, but it bends upward in front of the tail, which is why no full circle is formed.

Pavle Novaković believes that “since the coining of the Perun was recorded by no contemporary of Njegoš, and not a single coin was preserved, this money could not be coined”.

A self-imposed conclusion is that it could not be possible that someone made a mould or two without testing his work, especially when a printing press was brought to Cetinje. Perhaps no gold coin was forged, but a few coins were pro-

bably forged in silver or lead. A great curiosity of Njegoš was hard to resist.

We remain hopeful that one day, in this era of electronic commu-

nication, at some auction or a museum exhibition, a Golden

Perun will appear in full splendor and make us all happy. Should anyone recognize the object of our story in his or her collection, please feel free to contact our editorial staff ■


Zlatni perun koji je iskovala Zlatara Majdanpek Zlatni perun koji je iskovala Zlatara Majdanpek

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IZ PROŠLOSTI / FROM THE PAST

Atlasmont Banka AD PodgoricaCrnogorska komercijalna banka AD PodgoricaErste Bank AD PodgoricaFirst Financial Bank AD PodgoricaHipotekarna Banka AD PodgoricaHypo-Alpe-Adria Bank AD PodgoricaInvest Banka Montenegro AD PodgoricaKomercijalna Banka AD BudvaNLB Montenegro bankaPodgorička banka AD PodgoricaPrva banka Crne Gore 1901.

Srećna Nova godi na i Božićni pr aznici!Marry Christmas & Happ y New Year!

DECEMBAR 2009 - UBCG

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