DAVID HUME AND MIRACLES

__________________

A Research PaperPresented toDr. Ted Cabal

The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

__________________

In Partial Fulfillmentof the Requirements for 28520

__________________

byParks Miller Edwards

Box 406April 25, 2015

DAVID HUME AND MIRACLES

Introduction The discussion of whether or not miracles are possible

does not find expression in the average person’s mind on a daily basis; it can be viewed as a mere theoretical discussion, however, this looks over the fact that it remains a very practical matter.1 It is practical because it has implications for one’s larger view of reality and this in turn informs how a person lives on a day to day basis. Since the question of miracles is a worldview question as a whole, both skeptics and believers alike should be challenged with serious reflection on such a question. In Christianity, the possibility of the miraculous is central; The apostle Paul lays this out in 1 Corinthians 15 where he speaks of the necessity of Jesus’ resurrection for the Christian faith: “Now if Christ has been proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain” (1 Cor. 15:12-14). In this text, it isrevealed that the question of miracles is essential for the Christian faith since it stands or falls on the miracle of Jesus’

1 R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, “Has God Acted in History?,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 276.

2

resurrection.2 Thus, a skeptical attitude towards the miraculous is one to which Christians should be prepared to give a defense against as well as to challenge the underlying worldview. In addition, those who find themselves on the skeptical side of the fence should be open for critical reflection.

In considering the possibility of the miraculous, this paper will examine David Hume’s classic argument against miracles. Hume is somewhat revered by many of those who claim a naturalistic worldview and he himself believed he had come up with an argument “of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.”3 On account of these two factors, Hume’s status and his confidence in his position, his argument was chosen as the guide for reflection on the question of miracles. The overarching question this paper seeks to address is “Does David Hume’s argument against miracles undermine the Christian faith?” The thesis which will be defended is that Hume’s argumentfails as a legitimate attack on the possibility of miracles and that Christian theism gives a reasonable defense of the miraculous. The paper will proceed with a brief explanation of Hume’s argument in which two key points will be brought into focus. Next, there will be a critique of Hume’s argument,

2 Paul Copan, When God Goes To Starbucks: A Guide to Everyday Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2008), 54; Colin Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984), 214. Brownwrites, “It is inconceivable that Christianity would ever have come into existence without the resurrection of Jesus.”

3 David Hume, “Of Miracles,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 30.

3

following the points laid out in the first section. In this critique, working definitions of both the terms “natural laws” and “miracles” will be provided. After all the above has been accomplished there will be a conclusion driving home the implications of miracles both for the Christian and the skeptic.

Explanation of Hume’s ArgumentIt is important when one looks at a particular thinker in

history to take note of the context in which the person’s ideas developed. This is vital for a proper understanding of Hume’s argument against miracles; Hume’s purpose was to undermine any notion that miracles could somehow be historically valuable for supporting the Christian faith. His argument was formulated as part of the larger discussion between John Locke and the English deists. This debate was essentially about “whether Christianity could be demonstrated to be true by appealing to history, and in particular the historicity of Jesus’ miracles and resurrection.”4

Thus, Hume’s argument is one posed directly against the Christianfaith, demonstrating the need for believers to be able to “make adefense” (1 Peter 3:15).5 This is seen in the fact that Hume gavea hypothetical example of Queen Elizabeth rising from the dead which was deliberately intended to sound like arguments for

4 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 80.5 David Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Philosophy: A Historical Survey with Essential

Readings, 9th ed. (New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2015), 237. “I amthe better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason.”

4

Jesus’ resurrection made by Christian apologists in his day.6 In doing so, Hume was mocking the apologetic defense of Jesus’ resurrection.

Hume argues that “a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature” and he believes that the laws of nature are established by “a firm and unalterable experience”. He sets up miracles and the laws of nature against one another and judges both on the basis of probability. The laws of nature are things which each person experiences every day and as such, they can expect them toalways happen. However, miracles are not part of man’s everyday experience; they are rare events, anomalies, and as such are to be doubted.7 A person’s “uniform experience” of the regularity ofthe laws of nature and the rarity of miracles form “a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence ofany miracle.” He ties this framework of probability to human testimony to the miraculous, claiming that there can never be anyadequate human testimony to miraculous events.8 Hume rests the authority of human testimony on experience and he argues that man’s experience is against the miraculous and in favor of the

6 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 88–89. “Hume’s example was deliberately constructed to stress and even exaggerate the arguments used to support the public verifiability of Jesus’ death and resurrection.”

7 Ibid., 99; Copan, When God Goes To Starbucks: A Guide to Everyday Apologetics, 62. Ernst Troeltsch was a German theologian who developed the “doctrine of analogy” in the nineteenth century. He argued that we recognize things by comparing them with our experience of life and how we perceive things to generally work. There must be “analogies” between our past and present. Thus, one’s present understanding of the world is the frame of reference for interpreting the past. Brown and Copan both argue that Hume’s ideas anticipatethe “doctrine of analogy”.

8 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 237. “Therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.”

5

laws of nature. His understanding of human testimony is based on his notion of causality; confidence is not placed in human testimony on the basis of any “necessity” of a connection betweensuch testimony and events in reality. Rather, confidence is placed in any human testimony on our “habit” or “custom” of seeing connections between it and events. On the side of human testimony, there is simply a “habit” of association between such testimony and reality.9 On the side of the laws of nature there is “a firm and unalterable experience” which “has established these laws”; thus, when human testimony to miracles and the laws of nature conflict, “a wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.” In order for human testimony to the miraculous to be true, the falsehood of the testimony must be more miraculous than the miracle claim itself.10 For the sake of clarity, it must be mentioned that there is a third point in Hume’s argument: miracle claims in religions cancel each other out, if one is true, they are all false. However, for lack of space this point will not be addressed in the current paper. Humeconcludes his argument by saying that no rational person can believe in the Christian faith except there be “a miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.”11 In sum, Hume’s

9 Ibid., 221–222.10 Ibid., 234–235. “The plain consequence is…, ‘That no human

testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, whichit endeavors to establish…”

11 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 1997, 44.6

argument was not intended to prove that miracles are impossible, only that miracles have never happened historically. Yet because of his definition of a miracle as “a violation of the laws of nature” this indicates their impossibility.12

Critique of Hume’s ArgumentIt must be noted that the Christian apologist, in speaking

about the miraculous, must assume two things which Hume puts forth in his argument. These are: (1) A regularity of events which miracles stand out from and (2) The validity of human testimony and the necessity to evaluate the witness’ character. Miracles are rare events because they are supposed to be; the Christian apologist does not need to shy away from making this clear. The rarity of miracles is not a weakness in the case for the miraculous since miracles are by definition rare.13

Additionally it is important to understand that Hume’s argument comes in both a “hard” and a “soft” form.14 The “hard” form of the argument is developed precisely from Hume’s definition of a miracle as “a violation of the laws of nature” and natural law as that which is “firm and unalterable.” If miracles are violations of what is “firm and unalterable” then clearly this means they can never occur. The “soft” form of his

12 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 91.13 Norman L. Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist

(Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2004), 208. Turek and Geisler explain that it is illegitimate to “punish” a miracle for being a rare event since this is precisely what makes a miracle what it is supposed to be.

14 Norman L. Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 75–76.

7

argument does not rule miracles out entirely, but says that rational people should never believe in them since there can never be good evidence for their occurrence.15 It says that miracles are rare events and that the laws of nature are regular events. Hume then assumes that there is always greater evidence for that which happens regularly than there is for rare events. Thus, rational people will always believe that for which there isgreater evidence meaning they should never believe the miraculoushas occurred.16 This paper will seek to address both the claims of the “hard” and “soft” form in the next section.

Two Key Points of Hume’s Argument Explained and Critiqued

Hume’s argument against miracles contains two key points: (1) A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature (2) There has never been any adequate testimony to the miraculous

The First Point in Hume’s ArgumentLike many apologetic dialogues, a discussion of Hume’s

argument against miracles must begin with clarifying terms. What exactly is a miracle? The first point in Hume’s argument is that a miracle is “a

violation of the laws of nature”. It is not altogether clear where he comes up with this definition, but it is the driving force behindhis argument against miracles and it assumes a naturalistic

15 Ibid., 75. “He argues not for the impossibility of miracles but forthe incredibility of accepting miracles.” Emphasis his.

16 Richard Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 65. Purtill argues that Hume gives both a question begging argument (hard form) and an argument claiming there can never be sufficient evidence toshow a miracle has occurred (soft form).

8

worldview. To start with, taking Geisler’s insight about the “soft” and “hard” form of Hume’s argument, it is easy to see thatHume’s definition of miracles begs the question. That is, it assumes what he is trying to prove, namely that accounts of the miraculous should never be believed.17 Whether or not one understands Hume’s argument in the “hard” or “soft” form, the fact he says a miraculous event “has never been observed in any age or country” is the thrust behind both. Hume is begging the question and saying that there could never be any evidence for the miraculous.18 To simply declare from the start of the discussion that miracles cannot happen by definition does nothingto support his case against miracles. At this point, Hume has notmade an argument, he has made an assertion driven by his naturalistic worldview.19 In order to have a fruitful dialogue, one must consider what type of question is being asked about miracles. This question is not a scientific question, but a historical question; it is also a question which touches on one’slarger worldview.20 Thus, to discuss it in terms of science is

17 Copan, When God Goes To Starbucks: A Guide to Everyday Apologetics, 55; WinfriedCorduan, “Miracles,” in To Everyone An Answer: A Comprehensive Case For The Christian Worldview, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 172; Vincent E. Barry, Practical Logic (New York, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 246–247.

18 Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” 65.19 Corduan, “Miracles,” 172. “But you may have noticed that this is

really no argument at all. It is nothing more than an expression of a predisposition against miracles at all costs.”

20 Richard Purtill, C.S. Lewis’s Case for the Christian Faith (New York, New York:Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), 59. The testimony of history is precisely the central issue in looking at Jesus’ resurrection which this paper has as its background focus. Additionally, this point about worldviews will be developed further in this paper.

9

not the place to start since miracles are events to which scienceis not designed to provide information.

Since Hume’s statement concerning miracles is really no argument at all, but an assertion, one must proceed to produce working definitions of both “miracles” and “natural laws”. First natural laws will be addressed.

The Concept of Natural Laws

Critique of Hume’s Definition of Natural LawsThe first key point to be made about natural laws is that

they are descriptive accounts of the world and not prescriptive. That is, they do not declare what must always take place in the world;they simply describe what regularly happens if the natural world is left to itself with no outside agent acting to interrupt the flow.21 If one is discussing a miracle, noted above as being a rare event, then it cannot be described in the category of natural law since it does not conform to the regularity of natural law.22 It must be questioned where Hume derives his concept of necessity behind natural laws. In his epistemology, there can be no necessity behind any event because there is no such thing as causality. The notion of causality is simply the result of the “habit” or “custom” of seeing events linked together by “constant and regular conjunction”.23 For Hume,

21 Geisler and Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, 201; Copan, When God Goes To Starbucks: A Guide to Everyday Apologetics, 56.

22 Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (New York, New York: Macmillanand Co LTD, 1970), 26; Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 82.

23 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 233. “It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connection together, and that all the

10

natural laws are the regularly observed events in the course of nature and they do not contain any idea of necessity behind theiroccurrence.24 Brown touches upon this point and says that if Humeis going to be consistent in his epistemology relating to causality, he does not have the right to speak of the laws of nature in terms of necessity.25 Also, since there is no necessitybehind the laws of nature in Hume’s epistemology, this means thatthere can be no distinction between the miraculous and the ordinary. So Hume’s argument appears to leave no place for eitherthe term “miracle” or “laws of nature”.26 Geisler makes the pointthat Hume is right to bring the regularity of natural laws into the discussion on miracles since this forms the basis of our knowledge. When applied to the question of the miraculous, this means that miracles stand out from the basis of our knowledge of events in the world. It does not follow that just because our knowledge base is from regular events that every event must be regular in order to be legitimate.27 This is the mistake Hume makes in his argument since he is saying that because the laws of

inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction.”

24 Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” 67. 25 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 84.26 Ibid., 93. “Laws of nature” are simply “habits of expectation”27 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 81–82. Geisler explains

that people recognize unrepeatable events or “singularities” based upon the regular. Michelangelo’s painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel is an unrepeatable, unique painting. Yet people recognize it as such because they have a “regular” concept of what a painting is like. Similarly, scientists recognize that the cosmological evidence of the universe (the regular) points to an unrepeatable event (the singularity) of the beginning of the space-time universe.

11

nature are “the regular”, there can be no unique events or “singularities” which stand out from them.

Some additional problems with Hume’s view of natural law are related to his assumption of metaphysical naturalism as a worldview. As noted above, Hume’s critique against miracles is driven by his naturalistic worldview, but the credibility of thisworldview must be called to account. To start with, metaphysical naturalism is unable to account for the uniformity of the laws ofnature.28 Hume identified this as the “problem of induction”; on what basis does a person have for thinking that the laws of nature will operate tomorrow the same way they have today? As already noted, his solution was to pose the notion of “custom” or“habit”; we are accustomed to seeing the laws of nature operate in a certain way and on this basis we are entitled to believe they will keep occurring the same way.29 Yet this does not seem to be an adequate solution. What prevents our “custom” or “habit”from changing tomorrow?30 Also, Hume extols the virtue of reason claiming that a rational man should never regard evidence for miracles as valid.31 However, his naturalistic worldview provides

28 Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” 71. “The theistic scientist has a philosophical reason for expecting laws to be discovered in nature: he thinks that such laws are the product of a mind, namely, the mind of God. The nontheistic scientist, however, can have no such assurances.”

29 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 217, 221–222. To be fair, Hume did say that custom was not an “ultimate principle” which perfectly explained the human expectation for regularity. Yet it seems that his notion of “custom” as a solution leaves more desired. A theistic view of natural laws has greater explanatory power.

30 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 80. Geisler argues that Hume is inconsistent in his epistemology and provides no basis for his assertion regarding the certainty of the laws of nature.

31 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 232, 235. Hume argues that “a wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence” and then concludes that the

12

no grounding for reason in the first place. This is because naturalism as a worldview claims that the universe is “closed” toany outside agents. Everything can be and must be explained in terms of natural laws. The difficulty is that human reason depends upon something which is outside of the natural order, thelaws of logic.32 Nash develops a further point: metaphysical naturalism leaves no room for a person to place any trust in their cognitive faculties. He argues, based upon the work of Richard Taylor, that if the sense organs of humans have their biological origins in chance and impersonal, blind forces, then there is no reason to trust them. He gives the example of a trainpassenger in England seeing stones on a hillside arranged in sucha way that they say “THE BRITISH RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES”.Either these stones happened to fall into that arrangement by chance or they were put there by an intelligent mind. If they became settled there by chance, there is no reason for the passenger to think she is entering Wales since there is no intelligence behind their arrangement. If they were placed there by an intelligent mind, she has good reason to believe she is entering Wales. This connects with human cognitive faculties in the sense that one has a reason to trust they are giving reliableinformation about the world only if they have their origin in intelligence. If human cognitive faculties originated in chance

evidence against a miracle is always greater than any possible evidence for a miracle.

32 Ronald H. Nash, “Miracles and Conceptual Systems,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 127. Nash develops this point off of C. S. Lewis’ argument in his book Miracles.

13

and blind, impersonal, mindless forces, there is no reason to believe they can provide any reliable information about the worldto humans.33 A further problem of Hume’s position is that if it were true, progress in science would be impossible; in fact, Hume’s argument turns out to be unscientific. This is the case because scientific progress is based upon exceptions to the presently established understanding of the natural world. Scientific theories are made and tested to confirm their validity. However, when new data comes along disproving one theory, a more adequate theory is sought. Here it is seen that inthe scientific enterprise, the theories established in the past do not prevent new theories from being established in the present.34 This does not mean that there is no grounding for the uniformity of natural laws, only that legitimate exceptions to the present understanding provide fuel for scientific discovery.35 The problem of Hume’s argument undercutting the scientific process is again connected with his position on causality. If there is no necessity inherent in the relationship between cause and effect in events outside of the human mind, then scientific explanations offer no real account of the naturalworld. This is the case because science rests upon the ability togive “objective” explanations of the world. Without necessity in

33 Ibid., 127–130.34 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 80–81. “Hume’s objections

to miracles seem to be unscientific! Exceptions to ‘laws’ have a heuristic (discovery) value; they are goads to progress in our understanding of the universe.”

35 Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” 71. Here, Purtill argues that the “theistic scientist” has a grounding for the uniformity of the laws of nature whereas the “non-theistic scientist” does not.

14

the natural world, one cannot have objectivity in science either.36 It must also be noted that Hume’s definition of miracles as “violations of the laws of nature” does not necessarily support his skepticism. This definition only reveals what conditions are required in order for a miraculous event to occur. Some may see a game of semantics involved in this kind of criticism, but it exposes the importance of definitions and worldviews for the discussion on miracles. If one has a naturalistic worldview and sees miracles as violations of inviolable laws, then Hume’s definition rules out miracles from the start. On the other hand, if one has a theistic worldview andunderstands natural laws as regulative, then Hume’s definition does not lead to such extreme skepticism.37

Proposed Definition of Natural LawsA better way to view natural laws is to understand them

“theistically” rather than “naturalistically”. This is where the discussion focuses on how differing worldviews impact one’s understanding of the miraculous. The concept of understanding natural laws “theistically” has been briefly touched on above. Itsimply means that natural laws have been established by God to bring order into the world He has created; they describe how the

36 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 93. Brown notes that these difficulties with Hume’s notion of causality “draw attention to the inadequacyof Hume’s position as an account of human knowledge.”

37 Ibid., 94. Brown touches upon R.F. Holland’s essay “The Miraculous”where he proposes this understanding, “…the mere definition of a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature is not in itself a disproof of the possibilityof the alleged event occurring. Indeed, it is a definition of what conditions would have to be fulfilled for an event to be regarded as a miracle in this sense of the term.”

15

world operates when no outside agent acts upon the world.38 This does not mean that a Christian has a radically different view of how natural laws work when compared to a naturalist. Both Christians and non-Christians are capable of doing the same scientific experiments and discussing the regularities of the natural order. Where they differ is on the origin and function ofthese laws. The distinction between understanding natural laws “theistically” and “naturalistically” is not a call for Christianapologists to abandon a scientific view of natural laws. This would destroy the ability of recognizing miracles in the first place since they are rare events which stand out from natural laws.39 Of course, the discussion of whether or not natural laws should be understood “theistically” or “naturalistically” touchesupon the question of God’s existence. This paper is not directly focused on the debate concerning God’s existence, but it will be argued that, in the case of miracles, a theistic view of natural law is not unreasonable and contains greater explanatory power. In addition, this paper will assume Christian theism over againstother forms of theism.

Thus, in this paper, natural laws will be defined in a theistic sense as regulative

laws which have been put in place by God to give order to His creation. These laws are

not inviolable and it is reasonable to believe in the occurrence of exceptions or

38 Purtill, C.S. Lewis’s Case for the Christian Faith, 60. Purtill cites Lewis in Miracles saying, “The Being who threatens Nature’s claim to omnipotence confirms her in her lawful occasions.”

39 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 93. “For unless miracles stand out in some way from the normal and expected course of events, they would remain indistinguishable from the ordinary. It would not therefore be in the interests of the apologist for miracles to abandon a scientific view of natural processes and the concept of laws.”

16

suspensions of these laws when God acts from outside the physical world. This definition of natural laws provides greater explanatory power than a definition growing out of naturalistic presuppositions.

The Concept of Miracles

Critique of Hume’s Definition of Miracles and Survey of Proposed Definitions

Now that a working definition of “laws of nature” has beenestablished, it is necessary to focus on how to define a “miracle.” One common way most theists define miracles is similarto what has been touched on in the above discussion concerning natural laws. In fact, how one understands the relationship between miracles and natural laws is crucial in the discussion. This has been demonstrated in the above examination of Hume’s argument.40 A miracle is when God makes a temporary exception to the natural order He has established for the purpose of showing He is acting. Purtill argues that miracles are temporary, meaningtheir effects do not last forever; they are exceptions to the regularity of natural law, and they serve the purpose of revealing God in some fashion.41 It must be pointed out that thisdefinition is helpful, but one must question the element of miracles being “temporary” when it comes to discussing Jesus’ resurrection. In the Christian faith, the resurrection is by no means a temporary event. Jesus has been raised and exalted to the

40 Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” 64. “Clearly, no attempt to define a miracle can be deemed satisfactory if it does not seek to clarify the relationship between miracles and laws of nature. Certain long-standing conceptions of miracle falter

41 Ibid., 62–64.17

Father’s right hand for all eternity (Rom. 8:34). Larmer proposesthat miracles be understood as an act of God whereby He “alters the material conditions of the natural world in order to bring about a different outcome”; that is, an outcome which would not have occurred had the natural world been left to itself.42

Swinburne proposes the helpful distinction between “explanations by purpose” and “scientific explanations” when it comes to miracles. He argues that miracles should not be explained in scientific terms but rather, in terms of “agency.”43

However, this does not mean that events which can be explained interms of personal agency can never be explained also in scientific terms. Swinburne’s main point is that events which areexplained in terms of agency are not primarily of “the scientifictype.” As such, these types of events should not be unduly restricted to the scientific mold.44 Miracles are, in fact, events which occur outside of natural law; that is, they do not follow the regular course of nature when the natural world is left to itself. As such, it is reasonable to conclude miracles should not be brought under the dominion of science and natural

42 Robert A. Larmer, “Miracles and the Laws of Nature,” Evangelical Philosophical Society, n.d., 3.

43 Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle, 53. “It is important, against this objection, to make a distinction made by many modern philosophers between a scientific explanation of the occurrence of an event and an explanation of theoccurrence of an event effected by the act of an agent, that is ordinarily a man, in terms of his purpose or intention in producing it, which I will term personal explanation. These are radically different kinds of explanation.”

44 Ibid., 55. He gives the example of how “a movement of my hand may be explained both by my intention to grasp a pen and also by the prior state of my nervous system.” His main point is that “I wish only to claim than an explanation of the former type (agency) could be correct in cases where there was no explanation of the latter type.”

18

law.45 Yet Swinburne seems to leave open the conception of a miracle being a violation of natural law even with this distinction between “explanations by purpose” and “scientific explanations.”46 C.S. Lewis’ understanding was that miracles are not “violations” of natural law, but “interventions” in the normal course of nature by a “higher power outside of nature.”47 This understanding is connected with the view of natural laws being “descriptive” and serving a regulative function in the world.48

Defining miracles relates to how one understands the question as to the historical possibility of miracles. Miracles are events describing God’s “personal activity” and as such one has an awareness of God which is “intuitive rather than inferential”. This is the same way in which one is aware of the “self”; it is a different kind of knowledge. As such, the essenceof miracles is about “their historical significance and extensionand not at all to their scientific illegality.” Overall, the miracle question is not scientific, but historical.49 This insight touches upon the context of Hume’s argument against

45 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 177. Brown cites Ninian Smart in hisbook Philosophers and Religious Truth arguing that since miracles are “non-repeatableevents” they do not follow the scientific standard of “repeatable” experiments. As such “they are not sufficient to warrant modification in the laws of nature as we know them.”

46 Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle, 55. “…we can explain the occurrence of an event without subsuming it under laws of nature, and hence that an eventcould be brought about by an agent, e.g. a god, even if it is a violation of alaw of nature.”

47 Purtill, C.S. Lewis’s Case for the Christian Faith, 60.48 Geisler and Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, 201.49 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 185. Brown cites philosopher Ian

Ramsey’s lecture given at Oxford “Miracles: An Exercise in Logical Mapwork”.19

miracles which was against the historical possibility of the miraculous. Brown helpfully points out that if one only posits a miracle as a legitimate explanation when there is an absence of anatural or scientific explanation, this creates a “God-of-the-gaps” position. The miraculous explanation will be pushed to the side as soon as a natural explanation arrives on the scene.50 Theabove discussion reveals that it is legitimate to explain miracles in terms of agency instead of relegating them to the realm scientific impossibility. To engage in such thinking shows that one is operating from naturalistic presuppositions. It also shows that a miracle must be described as an occasion whereby Godeither “violates” or “alters the material conditions” of the natural order. As a result then, Hume’s definition of miracles, based on his naturalistic worldview, fails to give an accurate description of the concept of miracle.

Proposed Definition of Miracles There are many proposed definitions of a miracle and as

such there is an “in-house” debate among theists as to which definition is the most appropriate. It does not seem altogether clear what the difference is between God “violating” the natural order or “altering the material conditions” of His creation. Regardless, whichever path one desires to take, the main issue isabout whether or not the world is “closed” to God’s activity.51 Since theism as a worldview is more coherent and has much greater

50 Ibid., 291. “If God is to be found only in the gaps of our natural knowledge, he progressively dies the death of a thousand explanations, as science gradually fills those gaps.”

51 Nash, “Miracles and Conceptual Systems,” 124.20

explanatory power than naturalism, the position in this paper is that the world is open to God’s causal influence. Thus, the working definition for miracles in this paper is miracles are

purposeful acts of God upon the natural order.

The Second Point in Hume’s ArgumentNow that the first point in Hume’s argument has been

addressed, it is necessary to turn to his second point: there has

never been any adequate testimony to the miraculous.52

Critique of Hume’s Second PointThis second point in Hume’s argument works off the

assumption that events which are observed on a regular basis always have more evidence to support them than do rare events; Geisler describes this as “the repeatability principle”.53 On thesurface, Hume’s point appears to make sense because the more people witness an event, the more information they have about such an event. However, if one considers that people experience rare events on a daily basis and that the history of the world isfilled with unrepeatable events, this argument falls on its face.For example, consider the event of a golfer who makes a hole in one. Just because it is a rare event does not mean it lacks good evidence: A hole in one can be witnessed by multiple golfers at once, it could be videotaped, and it could be performed by a

52 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 234–235. “The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), ‘That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavorsto establish.”

53 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 77; Geisler and Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, 205–206.

21

golfer with considerable skill. Also, there have been rare eventsin history, like the speed and the magnitude of Alexander the Great’s conquest of much of the known world. In accordance with his naturalistic worldview, Hume believes in the rare event of life’s origins from non-life. This is an unrepeatable event whichcan in no way be reproduced in a laboratory by the scientific method. Thus, if Hume’s assertion was correct, that the evidence for regular events is always greater than the evidence for rare events, his own worldview and history lose credibility.54

Additionally, Hume commits the error of “adding” evidence instead of “weighing” evidence; that is, he pulls together the total amount of evidence for regular events and pits it against rare events. He does not consider the rare events (i.e. miracles)on a case-by-case basis to determine how much genuine evidence they contain. Rather, he discredits them beforehand and refuses to acknowledge that they have any evidence to support them. This is Hume’s reasoning when it comes to the possibility of a resurrection from the dead:

“It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: Because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observedto happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would notmerit the appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts toa proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor

54 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 82–85.”If the naturalist pushes his arguments far enough to eliminate miracles, by implication he thereby eliminates the grounds for his own beliefs about numerous other matters. If he qualifies his arguments so as to include all the natural and scientific data he wishes, then he reopens the door for miracles.”

22

can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.”55

Notice how Hume “adds” together the amount of deaths and pits them against the few reports of resurrections.56 A rational person does not simply judge the credibility of events on odds orprobability. Rather, “a wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence”57; if a rare event boasts good quality evidence to support it, a reasonable person should believe it occurred. It is not simply about quantity of evidence, but quality ofevidence.58 George Campbell argued that Hume was trying to apply “numerical computation” to a historical question of miracles.59 Such an approach is not the way history is done; historians look at all the facts of any given testimony, testing and weighing theevidence, and then come to a conclusion. This is precisely the way to examine the testimony of the New Testament writers to Jesus’ resurrection on the third day.60

Hume’s argument against testimony to the miraculous is on account of his naturalistic presuppositions. This is an importantpoint which will be emphasized because it reveals just how much

55 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 234.56 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 78–79. “It is simply

adding up the evidence of all other occasions where people have died and have not been raised and using it to overwhelm any possible evidence that some person who died was brought back to life.”

57 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 232.58 Geisler, “Miracles and the Modern Mind,” 79.59 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 90.60 William Lane Craig, “The Empty Tomb of Jesus,” in In Defense of Miracles:

A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 247–61; Gary R. Habermas, “The Resurrection Apperances of Jesus,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 262–75.

23

one’s worldview impacts their view of miraculous events.61 Hume’sview of the inviolability of the laws of nature flows from his belief that the world is a closed system; that is, there is no outside influence able to act upon the world. This is not a scientific conclusion, but a philosophical one.62 To address thisphilosophically: on what basis can Hume dismiss the testimony of those claiming to have witnessed a miracle in light of the fact there is no such thing as “necessity” outside of the individual? If there is no necessity in reality outside of the human mind, then Hume can make no absolute judgments against any person’s testimony to the miraculous. Here again, one sees how Hume’s skepticism towards causality is inconsistent with his argument against miracles. Additionally, since the miracle question is fundamentally a historical one, it must be said that historians bring their own views to the facts of any given event; that is, all facts are “theory laden” both for the believer and the skeptic.63 If one looks at history with a naturalistic worldview,testimony to miracles will always be ruled out from the start. However, this is not an honest way to conduct historical

61 Geisler and Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, 202–203; Brown,Miracles and the Critical Mind, 281; Corduan, “Miracles,” 169. Turek and Geisler givean example of how Ron Nash traveled to Russia to speak to educators there about God. He gave a simple illustration of two cardboard boxes explaining that they believed the universe was like a closed box. On the other hand, he believed the universe was like an open box whereby God could “reach into our universe and perform what we call miracles.” This turned out to be “a profoundillustration to the Russians” who had simply believed naturalism without really thinking about theism. Also, Brown notes that “the basic difference between the believer and the skeptic was then, as it is now, a difference between frames of reference and frameworks of belief.”

62 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 92. “At bottom Hume rejects all historical testimony wherever it conflicts with his understanding of the lawsof nature. His view of what is scientifically possible always wins out, however impressive the historical testimony might be.”

63 Ibid., 284.24

research. The credibility of a worldview is determined by its ability to provide the best explanation for the facts of life.64 If one views the question of miracles through a worldview which is not credible, the wrong conclusion will result.

In addition to Hume’s worldview presuppositions, he also attacks testimony to miracles on the nature of the witnesses. Some of his critiques are that testimony to miracles is “observedchiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations” and that people have a natural propensity to want the miraculous to be true. This is especially the case with reference to religion: “But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder,there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretentions to authority.”65 These arguments reveal that Hume rules out anyone’s testimony as being valid on account of the fact they are not a part of his culture. Those who have not been educated in a Western university or grownup in a major cultural center before the 16th century are negatedfrom the start. In addition, he lumps all religious people into one boat, claiming they are all prone to accept reports of the miraculous unquestioningly. This is far from the case since many religious people are skeptical towards miracle claims; skeptical in the sense that they take the time to weigh the evidence for the claim before accepting its validity.66 Also, just because

64 Ibid., 96. “…in the case of the resurrection of Jesus, the historical credibility of the event turns not only on our evaluation of the resurrection narratives but also on the interpretation that we place on the existence of the early church after the crucifixion of Jesus.”

65 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 236.66 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 97.

25

there are those who accept a miracle testimony without thinking does not invalidate claims which have the support of good evidence.67 One only has to consider the example of Thomas in thegospels who was skeptical that Jesus had been raised from the dead (Jn. 20:24-29). Thus, Hume’s critique against verbal testimony to miracles does not stand; he demands that those testifying to the miraculous should share his own worldview, culture, and education which by nature rules out the miraculous from the start.

ConclusionThis paper has sought to examine David Hume’s argument

against miracles in light of the fact that the concept of miracleis central in the Christian faith. This is so because the core ofChristianity is Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. Two points of Hume’s argument were addressed: (1) A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature and (2) There has never been any adequate testimony to the miraculous. It has been demonstrated that Hume’sdefinition of a miracle is invalid on account of the fact that itis ruled by his naturalistic presuppositions. He teaches that thelaws of nature are inviolable and absolute all the while his epistemology leaves no room for such a concept. His understandingof causality as simply a “habit of the mind” or “custom” destroys

67 David K. Clark, “Miracles in the World Religions,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 206. “The lust for the sensational does not entail the falsehood, or even the improbability, of any particular miracle narrative. It merely represents a potential undercutting defeater for any particular miracle claim and invites us to exercise special caution in assessing that claim.”

26

any idea of necessity outside of one’s individual perceptions.68 The metaphysical naturalism behind Hume’s definition of miracles and natural laws was shown to be invalid: it cannot account for human reason and provides no basis from which humans can trust their cognitive faculties give any meaningful information about the world. Rather, the laws of nature are descriptive and not prescriptive; they are regulative and describe the normal course of nature when it is not acted upon by an outside being. As such, they do not preclude exceptions to them from occurring. Once the reality of worldviews is addressed, it makes sense to say that the world is not closed to God’s activity. He is the one who created and who sustains the natural world and thus, He can interact with it in His saving purposes. In conjunction with this, miracles are purposive acts of God upon the created order. Hume’s argument against valid testimony to miracles fails because he hasbad criteria for witnesses: they must share his education and worldview. Also, he makes a false assertion about religious people saying that they are prone to accepting the miraculous even when they know there is not good evidence for such events. These criteria are unrealistic and misrepresent those who hold religious convictions since many are skeptical and do look for good evidence. This is also not how the Christian faith characterizes those who profess Christ (Jn. 20:24-29). In the end, understanding how worldviews impact one’s view of miracles is key to critiquing Hume’s argument; it is also a part of the

68 Hume, “Of Miracles,” 2015, 221–222.27

journey towards a defense and proclamation of the testimony to Jesus’ resurrection.

As noted, Hume’s argument was directed against the idea that miracles could serve as valid historical testimony to the Christian faith.69 Yet in doing history, no one person escapes their own worldview and how they interpret the facts of history. The conclusion of this paper is that naturalism fails to account for reality and so one cannot view the historical testimony to Jesus’ resurrection through this lens. This paper has been chiefly concerned with the philosophical side to the question of miracles; this has been done to defend the credibility of believing in the miracle of Jesus’ resurrection. Philosophically,it has been demonstrated that Christian theism provides greater explanatory power for the question of miracles. The other side tothe question relates to the historical evidence for Jesus’ resurrection which is another topic, worthy of study.

69 Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, 80.28

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barry, Vincent E. Practical Logic. New York, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976.

Brown, Colin. Miracles and the Critical Mind. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984.

Clark, David K. “Miracles in the World Religions.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, 199–213. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Copan, Paul. When God Goes To Starbucks: A Guide to Everyday Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2008.

Corduan, Winfried. “Miracles.” In To Everyone An Answer: A Comprehensive Case For The Christian Worldview, edited by Francis J. Beckwith, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland, 160–79. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004.

Craig, William Lane. “The Empty Tomb of Jesus.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, 247–61. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Geisler, Norman L. “Miracles and the Modern Mind.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, 73–85. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

29

Geisler, Norman L., and Frank Turek. I Don’t Have Enough Faith toBe an Atheist. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2004.

Geivett, R. Douglas, and Gary R. Habermas. “Has God Acted in History?” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case forGod’s Action in History. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Habermas, Gary R. “The Resurrection Apperances of Jesus.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action inHistory, 262–75. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Hume, David. “Of Miracles.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

———. “Of Miracles.” In Philosophy: A Historical Survey with Essential Readings, 9th ed., 232–38. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2015.

In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehenseive Case for God’s Action inHistory, n.d.

Larmer, Robert A. “Miracles and the Laws of Nature.” Evangelical Philosophical Society, Miracles: An Argument, n.d.

Nash, Ronald H. “Miracles and Conceptual Systems.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, 115–31. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Purtill, Richard. C.S. Lewis’s Case for the Christian Faith. New York, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981.

———. “Defining Miracles.” In In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, 61–72. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Swinburne, Richard. The Concept of Miracle. New York, New York: Macmillan and Co LTD, 1970.

30

31