Cybercrime Supplement: Mobile Market - APWG

Cybercrime Supplement: Mobile Market April 2013

1 An APWG Industry Advisory

http://www.apwg.org ● [email protected] PMB 246, 405 Waltham Street, Lexington MA USA 02421

Mobile Threats and the Underground Marketplace

Principal Investigators and Correspondent Authors Jart Armin & Andrey Komarov

Contributing Researchers Mila Parkour, Raoul Chiesa, Bryn Thompson, Will Rogofsky

Panel & Review Dr. Ray Genoe (UCD), Robert McArdle (Trend Micro),Dave Piscitello (ICANN), Foy

Shiver (APWG), Edgardo Montes de Oca (Montimage), Peter Cassidy (APWG)

APWG Mobile Fraud web site http://ecrimeresearch.org/wirelessdevice/Fraud/

Table of Contents Introduction 2

Underground cybercrime services 2

Pay by Install – Fake Mobile Browsers 3

1) Opera Mini 3

2) Fake social network applications 5

3) Fake Skype apps 6

Subscription Services 8

1) ZipWap.ru 8

2) Load‐WAP 9

3) StimulPremium 12

4) Supporting Infrastructures 13

Mobile Banking Malware 15

1) Flooders (Skype, ICQ SMS) 15

2) SMS Stealers 18

3) SMS Spam/Spoofing 21

4) Mobile Intrusion 24

Smishing & Phishing 27

Bulletproof Hosting Providers 28

Published April 25, 2013

ISBN # 978‐0‐9836249‐9‐8

Disclaimer: PLEASE NOTE: The APWG and its cooperating investigators, researchers, and service

providers have provided this study as a public service, based upon aggregated professional experience

and personal opinion. We offer no warranty as to the completeness, accuracy, or pertinence of these data

and recommendations with respect to any particular company’s operations, or with respect to any

particular form of criminal attack. This report contains the research and opinions of the authors. Please

see the APWG web site – apwg.org – for more information.




Introduction

Underground cybercrime services A thriving underground economy exists in the mobile market where cybercriminals

adapt tried and tested techniques, used to exploit PC users, as well as a growing

number of innovative techniques developed specifically for the rapidly expanding

portable device arena.

Russian cybercriminals, known for their technological skills and expertise, have been

quick to take advantage of less savvy or ill‐prepared mobile users and to exploit

vulnerabilities, some of which are device specific and inherent.

This supplement expands on the white paper entitled Mobile Threats and the

Underground Marketplace. It presents background information and additional detail to

the issues raised. It does not intend to cover all known exploits in the mobile market

but to provide a snapshot of some of the techniques currently favored by the most

successful of cybercriminal enterprises in, mainly, Eastern Europe and the Russian

Federation. In a global market, though, some exploits have the ability to ensnare a

wider audience and bigger targets.




Pay by Install – Fake Mobile Browsers

Unscrupulous operators launch targeted attacks on unsuspecting mobile users via

affiliate agents engaged in commission‐based programs. Agents may be fully aware of

the intended operation, but many remain unaware, that installs contain malicious

programs that send users to fake browsers. One of the most popular mobile browsers

in the Russian Federation has recently been the target of successful attacks.

1) Opera Mini Once downloaded this service distributes several variants of mobile malware (illegal

SMS and mobile content subscriptions) under Opera Mini landing pages.

Figure 1: Fake Opera‐Mini application distributing malware on mobile traffic (WAP, WEB)

An example of this operation exists on: SmsPurple.ru (94.75.199.211, AS16265 –

NL/Leaseweb B.v.)

domain: SMSPURPLE.RU

nserver: dns1.yandex.net.

nserver: dns2.yandex.net.

state: REGISTERED, DELEGATED, UNVERIFIED

person: Private Person

registrar: NAUNET-REG-RIPN

admin-contact: https://client.naunet.ru/c/whoiscontact

created: 2011.12.02




paid-till: 2013.12.02

free-date: 2014.01.02

source: TCI

Recent investigations found around 130 WEB‐sites spreading fake mobile browsers

using Opera Software brand in .RU and .COM domain name zones.

№ Domain name VirusTotal analytics

1 http://opera‐

ltd.com/opera_mini_android_

download.html ‐ Android

malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/7cecfba862

5f7a0f65edde293d5e2134204f6ba072cfdc61a

5c9ea307e4b77e7/analysis/1360329941/

2 http://opera‐

ltd.com/opera_mini_ios_down

load.html ‐ iOS malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/443555ab3

3050042bd6aa10318a4dfbe665abf1207eb68c

958478adf2c6d31b1/analysis/1360330172/

3 http://operamini‐

sonyericsson.ru/ ‐ Nokia

Symbian malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/e617b1501

07303116153a271e0ff16f81db1b0a06ff9009c6

76a1769048d7497/analysis/1350635477/

4 http://operaminis5230.ru/ ‐

Nokia Symbian malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/e617b1501

07303116153a271e0ff16f81db1b0a06ff9009c6

76a1769048d7497/analysis/1350635477/

5 http://q‐torrent.ru/Opera‐

12.00.exe ‐ Windows Mobile

malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/8d4b28776

5ae33141ec469b7842bf8675fd22912e68bebd

017420f64ff69a028/analysis/1343897094/

6 http://apdat‐

opera.ru/d.php?a=1&nb ‐


https://www.virustotal.com/file/8ad495489

d1e2da878cbe863bcd453ae3a9880667a2679e

27c00dd2038f49d72/analysis/1338910414/

7 http://6‐opera‐

mini.ru/d.php?a=1&nb ‐ Nokia

Symbian malware

https://www.virustotal.com/ru/file/b99fd34

1f12ab56175ee83e04bca17c3b198e49c605151

cc302cc81bf6bf935b/analysis/1338905206/

8 http://1‐

opera.ru/d.php?a=1&nb ‐


https://www.virustotal.com/file/d7926b8ba

1bd67cc121888284492e53d230f26f5686150d

3e2330405ccd5829d/analysis/1338904430/

9 http://www.opera11‐

download.ru/Opera‐

installer.exe ‐ Windows Mobile

malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/d256513b9

2ae88833c4cd73ecc9690e372b24f24ba81fbe6

9284b866ff4c8773/analysis/1335621177/

Android mobiles are targeted with fake acceleration applications.




Figure 2: Fake mobile‐acceleration application on Google Android

The underground cybercriminal economy thrives through a wide scope of

applications as illustrated in the above examples.

2) Fake social network applications Social network applications are at risk from mobile malware. Cybercriminals tend to

target well‐known applications in order to maximize profits.

There are several types of mobile malware variants that fake applications such as

Opera, Jimm, VK, Odn, Skype and Gaydating and may be found in many countries:

Nigeria, Greece, Finland, Romania, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, Australia, Kyrgyzia,

Poland, Chile, Portugal, US, Vietnam, among others.

A typical fake application shows the download progressing to 23% and then makes a

payment to the SMS provider.

In the Russian Federation the popular dating website Vkontakte.ru (VK.com) is

targeted as the following example shows:




Figure 3: Fake social networking application for VK.com

Fake social networking applications operate through malware such as

Java/SMSSend.AY or Trojan/J2ME.Agent.

3) Fake Skype apps Popular mobile applications are targeted by cybercriminals. Fake Skype applications

exploit unsuspecting users by sending expensive and unsolicited SMS messages that

earn the operators vast sums in illicit revenue.

The following table illustrates a sample of recent mobile malware that exploits the

Skype application:

№ Domain name VirusTotal analytics

1 http://skype‐three‐

os.com/skype‐android‐

download.html ‐ Google

Android malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/db379a9b5

c6b69a7ce504d6e9fb32c91c3bc97a950838519

59ae9d3753e0c02d/analysis/1360336864/

2 http://iskyper.ru/uploads/evae

r_video_recorder_for_skype_1.

2.0.17.rar ‐ Windows Mobile

malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/a3b175ecc0

9f36f2dc675da53e6065f06571e5a7a3310c36ff

f22eef4ec9df79/analysis/1360335469/

(evaer_video_recorder_for_skype_1.2.0.17.r

ar)

3 http://games‐goo.ru/skype.exe

‐ Windows Mobile malware

https://www.virustotal.com/file/b73e9bea8

bb4d238c679b35a684163e73bfc19f25fca2252

d005f16cd28931f2/analysis/1349255603/




Figure 4: skype‐three‐os.com (IP: 91.208.16.14)




Subscription Services

In the underground mobile market in the Russian Federation, malware traffic is spread

via key players such as: ZipWap, Phoneconvert, Stimulpremium, Load‐Wap, Wizard‐

mobile, WapSyst. Some require a special invite to become a member, by way of

security, as some similar services are banned due to the abuses.

1) ZipWap.ru The main monetization scheme of ZipWap.ru is through paid installs both on mobile

and the web.

ZipWap.ru has more than 60 special paid numbers for different countries, including

USA, CA, UK and others.

Figure 5: ZipWap.ru

ZipWap.ru is one of the oldest cybercrime mobile subscription service, in operation

since 2011:

icq 603559347, [email protected]

domain: ZIPWAP.RU

nserver: ns1.reg.ru.

nserver: ns2.reg.ru.

state: REGISTERED, DELEGATED, VERIFIED

person: Private Person

registrar: REGRU-REG-RIPN

admin-contact: http://www.reg.ru/whois/admin_contact

created: 2011.05.29

paid-till: 2013.05.29

free-date: 2013.06.29

source: TCI

ZipWAP is one of the most highly‐technological underground services ‐ it offers DLE,

Wordpress, uCoz integration, custom API and CMS integration on Google Android

and Nokia Symbian platforms. But, fake applications are automatically generated as

part of the package.




The operator charges for the J2ME install and its content, while the user remains

unaware the application is loaded with malware that generates the fake applications.

Figure 6: ZipWap offers highly technological services spiked with fake Android and Symbian

applications

Figure 7: Android is a target

2) Load-WAP One of the largest underground services involved in mobile malware distribution is

“Load‐WAP” with around 1 770 members. This service targets Russia, Belorus,

Kazahstan, Armenia, Moldovia, Estonia, Latvia, Litva and Israel.

Some ‘Load‐WAP’ members earn more than $6,000 per day through the distribution

of malware, illustrating a high‐conversion rate:




Figures 8: Load‐WAP.com

Figure 9: Load‐WAP.com

Domain Name: LOAD-WAP.COM

Registration Date: 08-Nov-2011

Expiration Date: 08-Nov-2013

Status:LOCKED

Name Servers:

ns16.dnsever.com

ns55.dnsever.com

ns86.dnsever.com




Registrant Contact Details:

PrivacyProtect.org

Domain Admin ( )

ID#10760, PO Box 16

Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain o

wner/operator

Nobby Beach

Queensland,QLD 4218

AU

Tel. +45.36946676

Load‐WAP targets Google android applications and pays its agents up to 80% per

install. The service also offers private mobile malware applications for VIP members

on iPhone and iPad, but this is no longer published.

Figure 10: Load‐WAP private VIP services for Apple iOS traffic




Figure 11: Load‐WAP special iOS landing pages for VIP members

3) StimulPremium

Figure 12: Stimulpremium private registration invites

Registration Service Provided By: DOMAIN NAMES REGISTRAR

REG.RU LTD.

Domain Name: STIMULPREMIUM.COM

Registration Date: 26-Apr-2011

Expiration Date: 26-Apr-2013




Status:LOCKED

Name Servers:

ns1.reg.ru

ns2.reg.ru

Registrant Contact Details:

PrivacyProtect.org

Domain Admin ( )

ID#10760, PO Box 16

Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain o

wner/operator

Nobby Beach

Queensland,QLD 4218

AU

Tel. +45.36946676

Figure 13: StimulPremium domain lock for private VIP webmasters

4) Supporting Infrastructures Cybercriminals benefit from the support of “friendly” financial services. Some of the

revenues generated by mobile malware are channeled through Webmoney (WMR) or

by banking transfer through EPESE. EPESE is an anonymous money laundering

service where it is not necessary to open a bank account in order to transfer sums of

money or to receive revenue from other underground partner programs.




Services similar to EPESE are affiliated to famous ‘pharma’ underground programs

such as ‘RX‐Affiliate‐Network’ and are well‐known in some adult webmasters

communities.

Other opportunities to ‘cash out’ illicit sums are provided by services such as EPESE

through special prepaid cards which are sent out anonymously to members.

Figure 14: Prepaid cards sent out anonymously

Figure 15: Money laundering services discussed on adult webmasters communities1

1 http://www.master‐x.com/forum/topics/151109/




Mobile Banking Malware

Mobile banking malware is available in a variety of applications. Malware that diverts

banking funds provides the greatest potential for damage to both the user and

financial institutions. As mobile banking gains in popularity, and becomes readily

available to every banking client, these types of attacks will increase.

One of the most well‐known Trojans, to‐date, targets Android and Blackberry; ZitMo

– “Zeus in the Mobile”, is confined mainly to European countries although it is still

responsible for grabbing millions in euros.

OTP (One Time Password) has proved to be susceptible to interception. SMS or MTAN

code grabbing precedes the illegal transfer of money; the malware hides incoming

message notification giving cybercriminals the time to make the transfer and to

confirm the transaction through the compromised online account.

Another popular malware blocks incoming calls from the bank call‐center number.

This enables a money‐mule to call the bank instead of the client and to confirm the

transfer details.

Other types of mobile banking malware are examined in more detail:

1) Flooders (Skype, ICQ SMS) Cybercriminals use special tools like Skype Flooders and ICQ SMS flooders which are

useful, too, for ‘smishing’ attacks.

Figure 16: Example of SMS flooder using ICQ for SMS developed by Spay.exe




Figure 17: Skype Flooder by MS‐DOS 3.0 (kod.cc)

During operation “Bliezkrig”, Russian cybercriminals used customised programs to

centrally manage the flooding of calls using Skype VOIP. The program used pre‐

recorded voice calls2.

2 http://blogs.rsa.com/cyber‐gang‐seeks‐botmasters‐to‐wage‐massive‐wave‐of‐trojan‐attacks‐

against‐u‐s‐banks/




Figure 18: Courtesy of YouTube3

Figure 19: Cybercriminal “VorVZakone”, Russian carders ‐ Courtesy of YouTube4

In the same way, Skype‐flooding botnets can be organized from infected machines.

The malware checks the customers’ balance first, then it performs several calls to the

victim.

Sometimes such techniques are combined with ‘Caller‐ID’ spoofing for phishing or

with tools that bypass protection measures.

3 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRswkzFQtxc

4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzHg9fr87lY




2) SMS Stealers In 2012 malware exploiting vulnerabilities in Google Play were uncovered by Russian

analysts.

The malware targeted the leading Russian national bank, Sberbank, creating havoc for

its mobile banking clients and grabbing millions in illicit funds. The malware part of

the Android package was named «sber.apk» consisting of 225,905 bytes and attacked

the md5 hash: F27D43DFEEDFFAC2EC7E4A069B3C95165.

Further analysis resulted in the malware being classified as «SMSStealer.APK» and

identified as designed to infect Android devices. The first step decompresses the

archive and then converts files with the name «classes.dex» to file format «Jar». By

using «Java Decompiler» files can then be converted as required.

Figure 20: File conversion of ‘SMSStealer.apk’

The malware displays an authentic looking interface on the device to request

authorization from the user via a phone number verification process.

Figure 21: Mobile banking malware interface for Russian bank ʺSberbankʺ

Once the phone number is enter and «Do authorization» clicked, the application sends

the system information to a remote server URL «http:// berstaska.com/m/fo125kepro».

5 Group‐IB Forensics Lab: http://www.group‐ib.com/




This data contains the mobile phone number, the name and version of the operating

system, the name of the service provider, the mobile country code and other valuable

personal information.

Interestingly, the malicious domains used to collect the data, “berstaska.com” and

“lekerdeka.com” are well‐known to security experts; they have been used in the past

in connection with the ‘Carberp’ malware.

The domains in more detail:

Domain Name: BERSTASKA.COM

Registrant: N/Amerab mekokayan

([email protected])

sk 8 box18 NY, 334777 US

Tel. +1.3049583484

Creation Date: 26-Oct-2012

Expiration Date: 26-Oct-2013

Domain servers in listed order:dc1.nserver.rudc2.nserver.ru

Domain Name: LEKERDEKA.COM

Registrant: N/ASergey Bezumov

([email protected])

PU BOX 81 l 92 NY ,325236 US

Tel. +1.33873847374

Creation Date: 26-Oct-2012

Expiration Date: 26-Oct-2013

Domain servers in listed order:dc1.nserver.rudc2.nserver.ru

Both domain names linked to nserver.ru NS‐servers and registered anonymously.

Both the MalwareURL database6 and Group‐IB Bot‐Trek™7 confirmed more than

twenty Carberp C&C linked through the DNS of this operator.

At the time of the study network address «berstaska.com» was unavailable.

6 http://www.malwareurl.com/

7 http://www.group‐ib.com/index.php/investigation/44‐link‐bot‐trek




Figure 22: Berstaska.com when active

Figure 23: Malware code snapshot

The malware establishes the function for sending and receiving SMS‐messages using

the following event handler:

Figure 24: Malware event handler

Received messages are processed and stored in the appropriate format in a file called

«messages.txt» and can be sent to the above remote server. Investigating actions are

logged in a file called «alarms.txt».

The interception of SMS used in the authentication process is a useful tool in the hands

of cybercriminals who are intent on committing banking fraud. Banks and financial

institutions in many countries, including the US and Canada, use One Time Password

tokens sent via SMS as part of the mobile banking process. Clearly an attacker

intercepting these could complete fraudulent transactions.




Another new mobile malware in‐the‐wild that focuses on banking fraud is called

‘Perkele Lite’. It costs $7 000 for a configured file or $12 000 for preparing and placing

it on Google Play WEB‐site.

‘Perkele Lite’ comes with its own C&C interface as well as exclusive functions that

design the application to appear the same as the legit banking applications.

The ‘Perkele Lite’ malware has designs for the most popular banks in the UK, AU,

AUS and US.

3) SMS Spam/Spoofing Cybercriminals use dedicated servers or Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to gain

maximum advantage when sending spam via a wide range of mobile numbers. Others

tools such as text randomization, URL shortening engines and timeouts provide

additional options for the spammers.




Figure 25: SMS spamming tool by klychev with text randomization option

Figure 26: Famous SMS spamming tool used Mail.ru Agent features for SMS sending

Some of the private tools are written for the Clickatell API8 and gateway in order to

generate SMS spoofing techniques which cybercriminals use to carry out fraud.

SMS spam services use API’s to spoof mobile phone numbers. Any random mobile

number can be used.

8 http://www.clickatell.com/clickatell‐products/online‐products/sms‐gateway‐developers‐central/?cid=37767




Figure 27: Mobile number spoofing via customized APIs

OS vulnerabilities facilitate the potential for mobile devices compromise and increase

the opportunity for SMS spoofing.

Figure 28: Example of a ‘smishing’ attack sample aided by the internal functions of a

compromised mobile device

One known ‘smishing’ vulnerability was tested across a number of Android‐based

smartphones: Google Galaxy Nexus, Google Nexus S, Samsung Galaxy SIII, HTC One

X, HTC Inspire, and Xiaomi MI‐One. It was found that the internal SEND_SMS

function could be hijacked to carry out ‘smishing’ attacks9.

9 Smishing Vulnerability in Multiple Android Platforms (including Gingerbread, Ice Cream

Sandwich, and Jelly Bean) ‐ http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/smishing.html




Figure 29: Capability leak results of eight Android‐based smartphones ‐ SEND_SMS10

4) Mobile Intrusion Smartphone geo‐location vulnerabilities enable cybercriminals to target crowded

places such as shopping centers, parks, business centers, etc,. Using customised

Bluetooth devices and Near Field Communication (NFC) to “pair” with smartphones

in the locality, fraudsters can distribute malware or execute AT (attention) commands

on the smartphones of unsuspecting users. Some are used to send SMS to paid

numbers or to carry out ‘smishing’ attacks.

One method involves placing a customised Bluetooth device and antenna in a vehicle

parked in the locality. Once “paired” with a targeted device the smartphone is

controlled remotely through a 4G modem and the external IP through proprietary

software packages such as ‘TeamViewer’.

Figure 30: Cybercriminals using Bluetooth device and antenna to ʺpairʺ with smartphones in

crowded places

10 Systematic Detection of Capability Leaks in Stock Android Smartphones

(http://www.cs.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/pubs/NDSS12_WOODPECKER.pdf)




There are many penetration testing tools used to spread malware and to exploit remote

mobile devices. Hackers use devices such as Nokia N800 customised with Linux

Maemo or linux binary compatibility or Nexus 7 on Google Android.

Figure 31: Pwn Pad – a commercial grade penetration tablet11

Some devices have been developed especially for hackers, for example ‘PwnPad’.

Well‐known vulnerabilities are exploited by similar types of tools based on the

following attack vectors:

OBEX (Object Exchange) through Bluetooth in the same wireless environment;

Rogue AP & Evil Twin for IEEE 802.11 Wi‐Fi networks (Rogue DHCP, DNS

spoofing).

A popular medium used to distribute malware is via ‘guest networks’ or public

applications. Devices that work autonomously, for example, customised Kismet

drones12, or modern APs can be programmed for wireless interception and spoofing.

11 http://pwnieexpress.com/collections/pwn‐pad/products/pwnpad

12 http://www.dd‐wrt.com/wiki/index.php/Kismet_Server/Drone




Figure 32: Sniffing in action

Fake geo‐location and geo‐coding applications for smartphones facilitate spying,

detection and intrusion into the personal lives of users. When using such services it is

possible to obtain the location of a smartphone simply by sending SMS to the mobile

number.

№ Filename Data, bytes Hash, md5

1 android_update_40842.apk 68 171 D9F0A7BB2A7E2A5EEAA25147D107EBFD

2 android_update_40842_2.apk 103 671 1177F1D0A86B0DD1DB9C5695B447C797

3 android_update_40842_3.apk 102 550 18A8DDB1E628D0A1373BE7CA866752AD

4 android_update_40842_4.apk 101 818 94751366328D6C59F50F016066D47825

5 browser_update.apk 73 767 93E0376B5AAB8E8D57ABFF04EB7D24B0

6 critical_update.apk 107 770 F40FEBAB1DEB5EE7A4F0C3C09B369355

7 skype.apk 120 353 758FDBEF4087835B257504C9601B4C76




Smishing & Phishing

Scam text messages provide an easy conduit for cybercriminals to commit fraud. The

variety of scam SMS is wide, innovative and never seemingly lost for new approaches

that appear believable to the mobile user.

The sheer quantity of SMS mailing providers facilitates the task for the fraudster.

Figure 33: Fraudsters can choose from a wide choice of SMS mailing provider

Cybercriminals can also choose from a number of widely available SMS‐ICQ transport

services offering software that can be used to support anonymous ‘smishing’ attacks.

ʺHello, you will find our fotos here wap.b0olt6jwxfq3.pz9l.ru/, download and then call

me, don’t tell to anyone please!ʺ

This link leads to: http://updateqp.com/, followed by a download to the following

malware by link: http://filevk.com/l/bu/browser_update/u/7643/Browser_Update.jar.

The download will only successfully complete on the following smartphones:

ʺMozilla/5.0 (SymbianOS/9.4; U; Series60/5.0 Nokia5800d‐1/21.0.025; Profile/MIDP‐2.1

Configuration/CLDC‐1.1 ) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/413ʺ.




Bulletproof Hosting Providers

The infrastructures that support online services are the same for all devices whether

that is a desktop PC, laptop or mobile phone. Therefore, the principle that ‘everything

is hosted somewhere’ also applies. Equally, ‘bulletproof hosting providers’ exist for

smartphone services in the same way that they exist for other cybercriminal activities.

In some cases these may be the very same providers.

In Section 4 Smishing we looked at a smishing attack that leads to a download link.

Now we look in detail at the domains and hosting providers behind the attack.

Both of the domain names behind the download were delegated to the same IP of a

bulletproof hosting provider:

$ host filevk.com filevk.com has address 91.202.63.148

$ host updateqp.com updateqp.com has address 91.202.63.148

Virgin Islands, British Road Town Akrino Inc

inetnum: 91.202.60.0 - 91.202.63.255

netname: AKRINO-NET

descr: Akrino Inc

country: VG

org: ORG-AI38-RIPE

admin-c: IVM27-RIPE

tech-c: IVM27-RIPE

status: ASSIGNED PI

mnt-by: RIPE-NCC-END-MNT

mnt-by: MNT-AKRINO

mnt-lower: RIPE-NCC-END-MNT

mnt-routes: MNT-AKRINO

mnt-domains: MNT-AKRINO

source: RIPE # Filtered

organisation: ORG-AI38-RIPE

org-name: Akrino Inc

org-type: OTHER

address: Akrino Inc.

address: P.O.Box 146 Trident Chambers

address: Road Town, Tortola

address: BVI

mnt-ref: MNT-AKRINO




mnt-by: MNT-AKRINO


person: Igoren V Murzak

address: Akrino Inc

address: P.O.Box 146 Trident Chambers

address: Road Town, Tortola

address: BVI

phone: +1 914 5952753

nic-hdl: IVM27-RIPE

mnt-by: MNT-AKRINO


route: 91.202.63.0/24

descr: AKRINO BLOCK #4

origin: AS44571

mnt-by: MNT-AKRINO


More than 421 malicious mobile websites use this address. (examples: 39mobi.com

42mobi.com 56file.com 72mobi.com).

The WAP‐site details:

$ host wap.b0olt6jwxfq3.pz9l.ru wap.b0olt6jwxfq3.pz9l.ru has address 192.34.59.25 (United States New York City Digital Ocean Inc.).

Cybercrime Supplement: Mobile Market - APWG

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Transcript of Cybercrime Supplement: Mobile Market - APWG