Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare

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2011 74: 341 originally published online 9 November 2011Social Psychology QuarterlyNick Berigan and Kyle Irwin

Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare

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Culture, Cooperation, andthe General Welfare

Nick Berigan1 and Kyle Irwin2

Abstract

Solutions to social dilemmas require cooperation. Given that there are commonly multiple ave-nues for cooperation, sometimes social dilemmas require coordination of strategies in additionto sufficient cooperation to be successful. This study examines one social dilemma where suchcoordination is necessary: supporting the general welfare. Using World Values Survey datafrom 33 nations, we compare active membership in charitable organizations versus attitudestoward government welfare programs as examples of two different types of cooperation. Weargue that culture influences the form of cooperation a group adopts via the amount of trustit generates. Specifically, individualist cultures promote relatively high levels of trust, whichproduce first-order cooperation (here, involvement in charitable organizations). Collectivistcultures generate relatively low trust levels, facilitating second-order cooperation (here, greatersupport for government welfare programs). Findings support our arguments and thus suggestthat culture, mediated by trust, shapes individuals’ perceptions about creating and sustainingpublic goods.

Keywords

social dilemmas, culture, trust, cooperation, coordination

In many situations individuals must workin concert to produce collectively benefi-

cial goods. A fundamental problem occurs

when each individual has an incentive to

not contribute to the collective effort, and

thus profit from everyone else’s contribu-

tions (Olson 1965). If each decides to free

ride (i.e., make no contribution), then the

public good is not produced and no onebenefits. Thus, a social dilemma occurs

when individual and collective interests

are at odds and can only be resolved if indi-

viduals cooperate (Dawes 1980; Kollock

1998a).

There are multiple means to solve

many real-world social dilemmas. One

example is recycling (Diekmann andPreisendorfer 1998). The decision to recycle

constitutes a social dilemma because, due tothe costs, each individual has an incentive

to free ride (not recycle). Yet if each pursued

this course, all would suffer the consequen-

ces (a dirty and unsustainable environ-

ment). A successful resolution to the

dilemma requires cooperation, but there

may be a number of ways to achieve this

goal. For instance, cooperation could entailtaking recyclables to a center, supporting

1University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA2Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:Nick Berigan, University of South Carolina, Sloan

College 222, 911 Pickens Street, Columbia, SC

29208Email: [email protected]

Social Psychology Quarterly74(4) 341–360

� American Sociological Association 2011DOI: 10.1177/0190272511422451

http://spq.sagepub.com



legislation for a local curbside program,

and/or rewarding those who recycle or pun-

ishing those who do not.

Given that there are multiple forms of

cooperation, a key issue is coordinating

actions to efficiently provide a solution.Coordination entails that individuals

reach a general consensus regarding a pre-

ferred strategy for solving the dilemma

(Schelling 1960). If members pursue dis-

parate cooperative strategies, there may

be insufficient support necessary to

ensure success for any of them. For exam-

ple, if some cooperate by only taking theirrecyclables to a center, while others only

sponsor legislation for a curbside pro-

gram, it is possible that neither solution

reaches a critical mass of support. That

is, fewer individuals will actually recycle,

and there will not be enough backing to

create curbside programs, even if some

individuals are willing to use either mea-sure. Thus, even though the group shares

the same collective goal, efforts fail due to

a lack of coordination. This article asks:

what factors influence how group mem-

bers coordinate their efforts or select

a strategy to efficiently and successfully

solve social dilemmas?

We argue that culture influences indi-viduals’ conceptions about cooperation,

thereby shaping their understanding of

how to solve collective action problems.

Specifically, culture is a coordinating mech-

anism that promotes certain cooperative

strategies over others. Building on prior

cross-national research, we generate predic-

tions related to preferences for cooperativebehavior. Following Yamagishi and

Yamagishi (1994), we suggest that individu-

alist cultures promote cooperation via vol-

untary contributions. Collectivist societies,

on the other hand, foster support for

enforcement mechanisms that induce coop-

eration from all group members.

We test our arguments by examining howculture influences choices in a large-scale

social dilemma: supporting the general

welfare. In supporting the general welfare,

cooperative behavior can take at least two

forms: contributing directly to the cause

(i.e., joining and participating in charitable

organizations) and/or supporting a system

that regulates all group members’ contribu-tions (i.e., supporting government programs

that redistribute wealth). Each of these

forms of cooperation can forge a separate

path to successful collective action, thereby

strengthening the general welfare. As dis-

cussed in greater detail in the following, we

suggest that individualist societies pro-

mote a preference for membership incharitable organizations while collectiv-

ist societies produce preferences for

government redistribution programs.

Multilevel modeling of data from 33 coun-

tries taken from the World Values Survey

(World Values Survey Association 2009)

supports our arguments.

The remainder of this article is struc-tured as follows. We first provide back-

ground information on cooperation in

social dilemmas, as well as on individual-

ist and collectivist cultures. Then, we

present the theoretical argument, fol-

lowed by a discussion of our methods,

including information on the World

Values Survey, multilevel modeling, andthe variables of interest. Thereafter, we

give our results, consider alternative

explanations, and discuss implications of

the findings.

BACKGROUND

Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

According to Hardin (1982:17), the object

of a collective interest, or public good,

must meet two criteria: jointness of supply

and impossibility of exclusion. Jointness of

supply refers to the idea that when one

individual benefits from the public good,

others are not hindered from also benefit-ting. Impossibility of exclusion means that

all members of the group have equal

access to the public good.

342 Social Psychology Quarterly 74(4)



The current work focuses on actors’

choices about how best to support the gen-

eral welfare. We define the general welfare

as individuals’ ability to acquire and main-

tain basic resources such as education,

decent housing, and access to medicalcare (Rothstein 2001). When the general

welfare is adequately supported, there

are numerous positive group-level conse-

quences, including lower crime rates

(Agrawal and Goyal 2001) and greater

group stability (Simon 1991). Importantly,

any one person’s use of these positive side

effects does not hinder others’ benefit (i.e.,they are joint in supply), and they are

enjoyed by all members of society regardless

of how much they contributed to the general

welfare (i.e., they are nonexcludable). As

with all social dilemmas, promotion of the

general welfare involves a choice: at the

extremes, individuals either contribute to

the greater good (i.e., cooperate) or freeride on others’ contributions.

Similar to other social dilemmas, coop-

erating to support the general welfare is

possible through various means. We

examine two forms of cooperation: first

and second order (Heckathorn 1989,

1993; Oliver 1980). Individuals cooperate

at the first order when they contributedirectly to the collective effort (by taking

their recyclables to a center). Second-

order cooperation refers to the enforce-

ment mechanism of first-order coopera-

tion, either directly (by publicly embar-

rassing someone who does not recycle) or

indirectly (by supporting legislation that

punishes those who do not recycle).While some prior research denotes sec-

ond-order cooperation as the act of sanc-

tioning itself (e.g., Fehr and Gachter

2002), other work suggests that support

for external enforcement mechanisms

either proscribing (e.g., preventing tax

fraud) or prescribing (e.g., allocating

money to the less fortunate) behaviorserves as second-order cooperation. For

example, Rothstein (2001) used support

for government welfare programs as an

instantiation of cooperation, and Horne

(2000) argued that support for legislation

serves as an alternative means to sanction

free riders. Similarly, Yamagishi (1986)

found that when given the opportunity,individuals used private resources to

install a sanctioning system that would

automatically punish those who contrib-

uted little to a public good. Consistent

with this prior research, we use support

for government welfare systems as an

external enforcement mechanism that

oversees the maintenance of the generalwelfare via legal authority, thus meeting

the criteria for second-order cooperation.

First- and second-order cooperation may

each yield successful collective action. If

individuals focus their efforts on different

forms of cooperation, however, the group

may still not achieve its collective goal.

For example, charities may be inadequatelyfinanced and there may be insufficient sup-

port for government programs if there is

indecision as to which means is better.

Thus, some degree of coordination is neces-

sary so that enough of those involved agree

on the best way to solve the problem. We

argue that culture is a mechanism for coor-

dinating efforts around first- or second-order cooperation. That is, important cul-

tural factors, such as group structure and

social relationships, influence the emer-

gence of trust. Subsequently, trust deter-

mines whether individuals display a prefer-

ence for cooperating at the first or second

level. In the following section we discuss in

more detail how culture shapes preferencesfor cooperative strategies.

How Culture Shapes Cooperative

Strategies

Triandis (1972) distinguished two types of

cultures: collectivist and individualist. Acollectivist culture is one in which mem-

bers focus and act on group interests

over individual interests, and the group

Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare 343



is in turn considered responsible for the

individual. In a collectivist culture, people

maintain strong social ties to a densely

connected clique of individuals, with few

ties outside the group. This formation of

cliques leads actors to be uncertain of strang-ers’ intentions (Yamagishi, Cook, and

Watabe 1998; Yamagishi and Yamagishi

1994). On the aggregate level, collectivist cul-

tures are sparsely connected, with the major-

ity of connections occurring within cliques.

Meanwhile, an individualist culture is

one where group members typically focus

and act on their own interests over groupinterests, so each individual is considered

to be responsible for himself or herself. As

a result, those in individualist societies

tend to value individual interests above

group interests. On average, people in

individualist cultures have more non-kin

social ties than those in collectivist cul-

tures (Kashima et al. 1995). This increasein actors’ number of ties taxes their ability

to maintain them, thus resulting in

weaker connections than those in collec-

tivist cultures. On a macro scale, an

increase in actors’ overall number of ties

causes individualist societies to be more

densely connected than collectivist

cultures.Following previous research (e.g.,

Hofstede 2001; Vandello and Cohen 1999),

we conceptualize individualism and collec-

tivism as opposite ends of a continuum.

Therefore, an increase in a nation’s level of

individualism by a given degree decreases

its level of collectivism by the same degree.

Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) theo-rized about the relationship between coop-

eration and collectivism/individualism by

first distinguishing between trust and

assurance. While trust refers to a belief

that others have benign intentions, assur-

ance is an expectation that others will not

act exploitatively for reasons external to the

individual (Yamagishi and Yamagishi1994). The authors summarize this distinc-

tion by stating: ‘‘Trust is based on the

inference of the partner’s personal traits

and intentions, whereas assurance is based

on the knowledge of the incentive structure

surrounding the relationship’’ (132, italics

in the original).

The emergence of either assurance ortrust as the predominant mechanism driv-

ing cooperation is not a random process.

Rather, these means of supporting cooper-

ation emerge from a society’s network

structure. Yamagishi and Yamagishi

(1994) argued that the network structure

of collectivist societies is conducive to the

formation of assurance. The cliquishnature of actors’ social ties makes it easier

to monitor the behavior of others within

their group. Thus, individuals know that

free riding is easily detected and sanc-

tioned. Because of actors’ identifiability

within their clique, first-order cooperation

(i.e., cooperation with the initial collective

endeavor) will increase because individu-als want to maintain ingroup harmony

and avoid punishment. Outside of their

cliques, actors fear others’ intentions

because they do not have the same struc-

tural basis for assurance (i.e., there is no

monitoring and sanctioning system gov-

erning these interactions). Consequently,

fear of exploitation inhibits first-ordercooperation with strangers. If the public

good is considered sufficiently valuable,

actors will seek a means to promote the

public good in a way that eliminates

their fear. One strategy for doing so is

by supporting a sanctioning mechanism

to enforce cooperation. Thus, sanction-

ing systems generate assurance betweenstrangers and allows each other’s actions

to be monitored. In line with this reason-

ing, Irwin (2009) showed that collectivist

societies are more reliant on the govern-

ment and other institutional agencies to

enforce cooperation than individualist

nations.

Unlike collectivist social relations, thenetwork structure in individualist socie-

ties is conducive to the formation of trust




(Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). The

diffuse nature of actors’ social ties causes

individuals to attribute others’ coopera-

tive behavior to benign intentions.

More explicitly, because individuals are

less likely to interact in groups havingmonitoring and sanctioning mechanisms

in place, others’ behavior is not attrib-

uted to these systems. As a result of

increased trust, people feel more confi-

dent in exhibiting benign behavior them-

selves (Parks and Hulbert 1995). In

terms of cooperation, the result of trust

is an increase in first-order cooperationin individualist cultures. Because indi-

vidualist cultures facilitate first-order

cooperative behavior, sanctioning mech-

anisms are less necessary.

While prior work testing Yamagishi’s

arguments about the relationship

between collectivism/individualism and

trust typically compared Japan and theUnited States (e.g., Kuwabara et al.

2007; Yamagishi 1988), some recent

work broadened this focus. Using a sample

of 30 European nations, Gheorghiu,

Vignoles, and Smith (2009) found that

trust was higher in individualist versus

collectivist countries, suggesting that the

finding generalizes beyond the UnitedStates/Japan comparison. We build on

Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) argu-

ment to propose a cultural explanation

for actors’ cooperative strategies for sup-

porting the general welfare.

THEORY

We argue that individuals’ preferences for

first- or second-order cooperation are, in

part, culturally determined. In the follow-

ing, we detail our theoretical arguments.Figure 1 maps the relations between the

main theoretical concepts.

The first two assumptions (A), as well

as the first derivation (D), are consistent

with previous findings connecting individ-

ualism/collectivism to trust, and subse-

quently to first-order cooperation (e.g.,

Yamagishi 1988). First, as Yamagishi andYamagishi (1994) described, diffuse social

ties in highly individualist cultures promote

interactions with an array of ingroup and

outgroup members. Consequently, individ-

uals are less likely to hold membership in

groups with established sanctioning mecha-

nisms. As such, people in these cultures are

more prone to attribute others’ altruisticbehavior to benign intent or to view others

as trustworthy (see A1). Meanwhile, social

ties in highly collectivist societies are con-

centrated on ingroup members, increasing

the prevalence of monitoring and sanction-

ing within the group. As a result, those in

collectivist cultures will attribute others’

cooperative behavior to monitoring andsanctioning rather than benign intent,

thus decreasing trust. Second, previous

experimental research has consistently

found that individuals are more likely to

voluntarily cooperate as their level of trust

Figure 1. Theoretical Diagram




increases (e.g., Parks and Hulbert 1995)

(see A2). The conjunction of the two assump-

tions thus generates D1.

A1: As the level of individualism increases,trust increases.

A2: As trust increases, first-order coopera-tion increases.

D1: As the level of individualism increases,first-order cooperation increases (A1

and A2).

If promotion of the general welfare is

a public good, then first-order cooperationmust entail that actors’ cooperation is

strictly voluntary, independent of a formal

body enforcing cooperation. Charitable

organizations provide for the less fortu-

nate, and memberships to these organiza-

tions are strictly voluntary. Accordingly,

we looked at memberships to charitable

organizations as an indicator of first-ordercooperation. Hypothesis 1 thus follows

from D1:

Hypothesis 1: As a nation’s individualismscore increases, membership to chari-table organizations increases. (D1)

At first glance, it may appear that join-

ing a charitable organization does not nec-essarily involve trust, and the decision is

therefore not a social dilemma. That is,

there are individuals who cooperate by

their own volition, regardless of their

beliefs about others’ trustworthiness

(see Bogaert, Boone, and Declerk

2008). These individuals, called proso-

cials, will discontinue such behavior ifothers repeatedly exploit their good

intentions (Van Lange and Visser

1999). Accordingly, prosocials’ continued

membership in charitable organizations

requires trust that others join and contrib-

ute to the cause. In addition, Kollock

(1998b) found that individuals who free

ride in social dilemmas often stated thatthey wanted to cooperate but believed

that others would exploit their good will.

Together, these arguments suggest that

trust is a necessary consideration for all

individuals (i.e., cooperators and non-

cooperators) when deciding whether to

first-order cooperate and thus join a chari-table organization.

Importantly, we do not claim that trust

in others is the only consideration in deci-

sions about voluntary membership. For

example, an individual’s beliefs about

whether a charitable organization is

a good steward of resources or if it can suc-

cessfully recruit and maintain memberswill certainly affect his or her likelihood

of joining. We also offer no claims as to

the level of commitment an individual

will have toward any particular charitable

organization in which they join, because

such claims would be out of our theoretical

scope. We simply focus on whether trust in

others influences choices about joiningand participating in a charitable organiza-

tion as a test of the generalizability of

Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) theory.

It is also important to note that

Assumptions 1 and 2 suggest a mediation

effect. That is, we contend that individual-

ism influences trust, which then affects

membership in charitable organizations.Accordingly, our argument is supported

only if we find that trust mediates the

individualism–charity relationship. Our

analyses therefore test for both main and

mediation effects.

Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994)

asserted that a decrease in trust is associ-

ated with an increase in individuals’ desirefor an enforcement mechanism to oversee

cooperation. Enforcement mechanisms

are thus indicative of the assurance that

individuals seek in the absence of trust.

That is, if people believe that others are

untrustworthy, and therefore unable to

support a collective good by their own free

will, they will rely on external mechanismsto ensure cooperation. For example, Irwin




(2009) found that people in collectivist

nations were more reliant on and more

trusting of external sanctioning authorities

such as the police in maintaining social

order than their individualist counter-

parts. Likewise, Yamagishi (1988) foundthat those low in trust were more likely to

support a sanctioning system compared to

high trusters. Accordingly, Assumption 3

and Derivation 2 are as follows:

A3: As trust increases, second-order coop-eration decreases.

D2: As the level of individualism increases,second-order cooperation decreases.

Derivation 2 incorporates individualism

and second-order cooperation. Together,

Derivations 1 and 2 provide a cultural

explanation for individuals’ perceptionsabout how best to solve social dilemmas.

Derivation 1 argues that individualism

facilitates first-order cooperation as a solu-

tion to social dilemmas. Conversely,

Derivation 2 suggests that collectivism

facilitates second-order cooperation. It is

important at this point to mention that first-

and second-order cooperation are not mutu-ally exclusive. An individual’s cooperation

at the first order does not mean that he or

she never cooperates at the second order,

and vice versa. We predict differences in

rates of first- and second-order cooperation

at the collective level, however.

If the general welfare is a public good,

then second-order cooperation entails sup-porting a formal, legitimate enforcement

mechanism that oversees efforts to pro-

mote the general welfare. Here we take

the government to be that enforcing insti-

tution and support for the government’s

role in redistributing wealth to be an indi-

cator of second-order cooperation. Using

support for government redistribution ofwealth as second-order cooperation is sim-

ilar to previous work. For example,

Rothstein (2001) used support for public

education and universal health care pro-

grams as instantiations of cooperation in

promoting the public good. Stemming

from Derivation 2, Hypothesis 2 is as

follows:

Hypothesis 2: As a nation’s individualismscore increases, support for govern-ment welfare programs decreases.

As before, Assumptions 1 and 3 contend

that trust serves as the mechanism

between the level of individualism and

second-order cooperation. Thus, support

for our argument requires that we find

a mediating relationship of trust between

individualism and belief in governmentresponsibility. Our analyses for

Hypothesis 2 thus test for main and media-

tion effects.

METHOD

Sample and Data

Our sample comes from the 2005 wave of

the World Values Survey (WVS), a cross-

cultural data set including information

from 57 countries. The survey asked up

to 253 questions to a total of 82,992

respondents. Of the nations included in

the data set, 45 were rated on Hofstede’s(2001) individualism scale, which we

used as our primary independent mea-

sure. Hofstede’s scale rated each nation’s

level of individualism/collectivism based

on survey data concerning individual ver-

sus collective interests. Of these 45 coun-

tries, 33 were asked about all of the con-

trol variables included in our analyses(variables are described in the following).

Thus, we limited our analyses to the 33

nations in Table 1.

Cross-cultural research testing the

arguments about individualism/collectiv-

ism often described Japan as a prototypical

collectivist culture and the United States

as a prototypical individualist culture




(see Kuwabara et al. 2007; Macy and Sato

2002; Yamagishi 1988).1 This previous

research treated collectivist and individu-

alist cultures as a dichotomy. We instead

assume that there is a continuum between

pure individualism and pure collectivismand thus verify that the effects are not

simply a product of comparison between

any two specific nations. We used

Hofstede’s (2001) individualism scale to

rate each nation’s level of individualism.

In relation to previous research, the

Hofstede scale rates Japan as 46, which

is near the center of the scale, thus notmaking it a ‘‘prototypical’’ collectivist cul-

ture. Recently, Gheorghiu et al. (2009)

broadened the spectrum to 30 European

nations. Here we build off of this prior

work and incorporate an even larger array

of cultural variation into our analysis.

Variables

Independent variable. A country’s level

of individualism or collectivism is deter-

mined by the Hofstede scale, which was

created from survey data collected in

more than 70 countries. The index ranges

from 0 (most collectivistic) to 100 (most

individualistic) and has been used exten-

sively in cross-cultural research (Allikand Realo 2004). The index includes 50

scores, which correspond with either single

nations or groups of nations (e.g., one score

that corresponds with several nations in

the Middle East). We use the Hofstede

scale as a level-2 measure of individual-

ism/collectivism. Table 1 includes each

nation’s individualism score.

Mediating variable. As stated before,

fully testing our argument requires thatwe show that trust mediates the relation-

ship between level of individualism and

first- and second-order cooperation. We

measured trust with the survey question

‘‘Generally speaking, would you say that

most people can be trusted or that you

need to be very careful in dealing with peo-

ple?’’ This question has been used in numer-

ous studies and is considered the standardtrust measure (see Alesina and La Ferrara

2002; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Paxton 2007;

Putnam 2000). Respondents’ answers were

recorded dichotomously, either ‘‘need to be

very careful’’ = 0 or ‘‘most people can be

trusted’’ = 1.

Table 1. Countries and Individualism ScoreIncluded in the Analyses

Country n Individualism

Argentina 1,002 46Australia 1,421 90Brazil 1,500 38Bulgaria 1,001 30Canada 2,164 80Chile 1,000 23China 2,015 20Colombia 3,025 13Egypt 3,051 38Finland 1,014 63Ghana 1,534 20Guatemala 1,000 6India 2,001 48Indonesia 2,015 14Iran 2,667 41Italy 1,012 76Japan 1,096 46Mexico 1,560 30Morocco 1,200 46Norway 1,025 69Peru 1,500 16Poland 1,000 60Romania 1,776 30South Africa 2,988 65South Korea 1,200 18Spain 1,200 51Sweden 1,003 71Switzerland 1,241 68Taiwan 1,227 17Thailand 1,534 20Turkey 1,346 37United States 1,249 91Uruguay 1,000 36Total 50,567

Note: n = sample size for that nation.

1Exceptions include Chen and Li (2005), whocompared China to Australia, and Parks and Vu(1994), who compared Vietnam to the UnitedStates.




Dependent variables. To test Hypothe-

sis 1, we looked at membership in charit-able or humanitarian organizations.

Respondents in Guatemala did not receive

this question, thus we have 32 level-2

units in this test rather than 33.

Respondents answered that they are

either active members, inactive members,

or not members. We coded active members

as 1, and both inactive and non-memberswere coded as 0. We combined inactive

members and non-members into one

response variable because first-order

cooperation entails that one contribute to

the initial public good. Non-contributions

are regarded as free riding, regardless of

affiliation with the organization.2

We tested Hypothesis 2 by examiningthe perceived responsibility of the govern-

ment to oversee efforts to promote the gen-

eral welfare. Respondents rated on a 10-

point scale whether ‘‘The government

should take more responsibility to ensure

that everyone is provided for’’ = 1 or

‘‘People should take more responsibility

to provide for themselves’’ = 10. Wereverse coded the responses so that belief

in government responsibility was at the

high end of the scale.3

Level-1 control variables. We used the

following eight level-1 control variables

in our analyses to account for individual

differences within countries. Previous

research has linked the following varia-

bles to trust and/or cooperation: sex

(Kuwabara 2005; Simpson 2003), age(Irwin 2009), and religiosity (Batson and

Ventis 1982). We coded respondents’ sex

(0 for males, 1 for females) and religiosity

(0 for nonreligious or atheist, 1 for reli-

gious) dichotomously. We also controlled

for education in our models by including

the age that the respondent completedhis or her schooling. We used age com-

pleted education rather than highest level

of education to account for possible incom-

parability in educational systems between

nations. Two more level-1 variables con-

trol for respondents’ ability to contribute

to a charitable organization and/or receive

government benefits: social class (measuredon a 5-point scale from lower class = 1 to

upper class = 5) and employment status

(measured dichotomously, with 0 represent-

ing unemployed and 1 representing

employed). We used social class as a proxy

for income to account for incomparability

of standards of living between nations.

Finally, we controlled for respondents’ confi-dence in their governments to perform its

duties (scaled from 1 = none at all to 4 =

a great deal), because a lack of faith in the

government may artificially create a greater

demand for private charitable activity.

None of the variables specifically pertain

to our argument, and thus we limit our dis-

cussion of them in the results section. Table2 presents descriptive statistics for the eight

control variables.4

Level-2 control variables. We selected

the following six level-2 variables. Some

of the variables address theoretical or

pragmatic concerns (e.g., actors’ ability to

cooperate or monitor others), while others

control for contextual factors between

each nation. None of these variables spe-

cifically pertain to our argument, andthus we limit our discussion of them in

the results.

2The World Values Survey (WVS) did not dis-tinguish between secular and nonsecular chari-ties. However, Ruiter and Dirk de Graaf (2006)found that people who volunteer for nonsecularcharitable organizations are more likely to volun-teer for secular organizations than those who donot.

3Admittedly, a better measure would haveasked attitudes toward the actions their govern-ment takes to provide for the general welfare.Unfortunately, such a measure was unavailable.

4Because racial identities vary widely acrossthe 33 nations included in our analyses, we con-trolled for race at the country level via racial het-erogeneity (see the discussion of level-2 controls).




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� Population density. Some workshows a trend toward decliningtrust as population density rises(Pew Research Center 2007). Wecalculated population density bytaking the ratio of each nation toits land area in squared kilometers(Central Intelligence Agency2011).

� Gross domestic product (GDP).GDP indicates citizens’ ability tomake or receive help from charita-ble contributions, as well as theirgovernment’s ability to providewelfare programs. We recordedthese values in billions of U.S. dol-lars (Central Intelligence Agency2011).

� History of a communist regime.Research suggests that trust islower in countries that have beenpreviously governed by a communistregime compared to those havingnever been ruled by communists(see Markova 2004; Mishler andRose 1997; Sztompka 1996).Therefore, we created a dummy var-iable where 0 represents no historyof a communist government and 1represents previous or current com-munist regime.

� Racial heterogeneity. Previousresearch provided mixed resultsregarding the effects of racial het-erogeneity on trust in society, thussuggesting a complex relationshipbetween the two (Gheorghiu et al.2009). To control for its effects, weused Alesina and La Ferrara’s(2002) racial heterogeneity scale.The scale ranges from 0 to 1, withthe value representing the probabil-ity that two individuals randomlyselected from the population will befrom different ethnic groups. A scoreof 0 signifies that there is only oneethnic group in a nation, whilea score of 1 signifies that every mem-ber of the population is from a differ-ent ethnicity.

� Religiosity. In addition to eachrespondent’s religiosity, we con-trolled for the religiosity of eachnation. We obtained this value by cal-culating the mean of each nation’sindividual religiosity measure.

� Ratio of males to females. We addressthe gender-cooperation relationshipat the macro level by controlling forthe number of males for every onefemale in the population (CentralIntelligence Agency 2011).

� Literacy. A nation’s literacy rateis indicative of the strength of itseducational system. Each nation’svalue corresponds with the percentageof citizens age 15 and older who canread and write (Central IntelligenceAgency 2011).

Analytic Strategy

We used multilevel modeling (MLM) to

conduct analyses with the statistical pro-

gram HLM 6.0 (Bryk and Raudenbush

2004). MLM simultaneously tests for

relationships across multiple levels ofanalysis. These methods require that

the data are nested: all of the lower-level

units are contained within one or more

higher-level units. Here the level-1 unit

is the respondent, and the level-2 unit is

the nation. All of the respondents in the

sample are contained in that all of the

respondents are citizens of the nations.Thus, MLM is appropriate for testing

our hypotheses.

Our analyses include 33 countries, thus

giving us 32 initial level-2 degrees of free-

dom. With each additional level-2 control

variable included in the model, we forfeit

a degree of freedom. As such, we were

forced to carefully choose level-2 controlsto avoid overspecification, or committing

a Type II error. We used bivariate regres-

sions to test the relationships between

each level-2 variable and both dependent




variables.5 Only those variables having

a significant relationship with a depen-

dent measure are included in the final

analyses. Table 3 lists the results of the

regression outcomes for charitable partic-

ipation and belief in government responsi-

bility. We also include bivariate regres-

sion results for trust, which is ourprimary mechanism for cross-cultural

variation in preferences for first- and sec-

ond-order cooperation. Results indicate

that of the level-2 controls, only religiosity

has a significant relationship with trust.

For charitable participation and beliefs

about government responsibility, the

only significant level-2 control is racialheterogeneity. Accordingly, to preserve

degrees of freedom, our final models will

include only these controls at the second

level.

RESULTS

Individualism/Collectivism and Trust

Building on prior work (Gheorghiu et al.

2009; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994),

we suggested that increases in individual-

ism would lead to higher trust levels.

Because the variable is coded dichoto-

mously, we used a hierarchical logistic

model to test for a relationship. The

unconditional model was significant (lj =

.993, p\ .001), suggesting that multilevel

modeling is appropriate. At level 2, we

controlled for collective religiosity, which

was the only significant variable in thelevel-2 bivariate regressions. Table 4 lists

the results of the full fixed effects model

(s2 = 1.0037, t2 = .1378, lj = .982). The find-

ings indicated significant positive rela-

tionships at level 1 for the control varia-

bles age finished education, social class,

and employment status and a significant

negative relationship of collective religiosityat level 2. Each of these relationships was

significant at the p \ .001 level except for

employment status (p = .007). None of the

other control variables were significant.

As Table 4 indicates, the level-2 effect of

the Hofstede index score on aggregated

trust was both positive and significant

(OR = 1.019, p = .005). That is, the modelpredicts that for every gain of one point

on Hofstede’s individualism index, the

national rate of those who generally find

others trustworthy increased by 1.92 per-

cent. For example, the full model predicts

that the rate of trust is 163.77 percent

higher in Sweden (individualism score =

71) than in Thailand (individualism score =20). The significant and positive relationship

Table 3. Level-2 Effects on Aggregated Dependent Variables

Aggregate trust Charitable participation Government responsibility

b SE b SE b SE

Population density .000 .000 2.000 .000 .000 .001GDP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000Communism .010 .061 2.023 .022 2.591 .446Racial heterogeneity 2.111 .116 .103* .042 22.048* .850Religiosity 2.534*** .134 2.037 .049 .792 .980Male/female ratio .042 .848 .151 .315 21.059 6.215Literacy 2.058 .189 .067 .072 22.025 1.383

Note: Estimated coefficients (b) and standard errors (SE).*p = .05. **p = .01. ***p \ .001.

5Multilevel modeling (MLM) aggregates level-1 dependent measures. Thus, we focus on nationalaverages for these variables in our bivariateregressions.




between individualism and trust lends initial

support for our theory (i.e., the results sup-

port Assumption 1) and indicates that the

pattern holds across the 33 countriesincluded in our analyses. We now turn to

the hypothesis tests.

Hypothesis 1: Individualism/Collectivism and Charitable

Affiliations

We used a hierarchical logistic model to

test the relationship between individual-

ism and membership using only active

members. Model 1 provides a test of our

first hypothesis. In Model 2 we concen-

trate on trust as a mediator between indi-

vidualism score and membership in chari-

table organizations.The unconditional model was signifi-

cant (lj = .973, p \ .001), suggesting

that multilevel modeling is appropriate.

At level 2, we controlled for racial hetero-

geneity (this was the only level-2 control

with a significant effect on charitable

participation). Model 1 (s2 = .9517, t2 =

.2460) indicates a significant positiverelationship for the following level-1 con-

trol variables: trust, sex, age, age fin-

ished education, social class, religious

membership, and employment status.

At level 2, racial heterogeneity was sig-

nificant. All of these relationships were

significant at the p \ .001 level exceptfor employment status, which was signif-

icant at p = .01. The effect of individual

level confidence in the government was

marginally significant (p = .093). Table

5 reports the findings of the full fixed

effects model.

As Model 1 of Table 5 indicates, the

level-2 effect of the Hofstede index scoreon charitable participation was both posi-

tive and significant (OR = 1.014, p =

.005), which supports Hypothesis 1. That

is, for every unit a nation increased on

the Hofstede index, its rate of charitable

participation increased by 1.43 percent.

For example, Model 1 predicts that the

rate of active membership in charitableorganizations is 2.416 times higher in

Canada (individualism score = 80) than

in South Korea (individualism score = 18).

We argued that higher levels of individ-

ualism are associated with more trust

among group members. We further

argued that high levels of trust promote

preferences for charitable organizationsversus support for government welfare.

Taken together, the theory suggests that

Table 4. Individualism Score and Trust

Estimated odds ratio95 percent

confidence interval

Level 1 (n = 37,411)Sex .960 .893, 1.032Age 1.002 .998, 1.005Age finished education 1.019*** 1.009, 1.028Social class 1.120*** 1.053, 1.191Religious .975 .887, 1.072Employed 1.133** 1.036, 1.240Confidence in government 1.015 .983, 1.049

Level 2 (n = 33)Individualism 1.019*** 1.011, 1.028Religiosity .068*** .028, .164

Note: n = number of cases at that level.*p \ .05. **p \ .01. ***p \ .001.




trust serves as a mediator between indi-

vidualism and membership in charitable

organizations. We included trust as

a level-2 control in Model 2 (s2 = .9512, t2 =

.3122) to test for mediation.6

In Model 2, the level-1 measures of

trust, sex, age, age finished education,

social class, and religiosity were signifi-cant at the p \ .001 level, as was the

level-2 measure of racial heterogeneity.

The level-1 effect of employment status

was also significant (p = .013), while the

effect of confidence in the government

was marginally significant (p = .079).

Most importantly, Model 2 indicates

that the relationship between Hofstedescore and rate of charitable participation

becomes marginally significant when we

added the aggregated trust measure into

the model (p = .005 in Model 1 and p =

.054 in Model 2), suggesting that the

inclusion of trust dampens the effect of

individualism on charitable organization

membership. Additionally, the relation-

ship between the collective measure of

trust and charitable participation was

significant (OR = 6.045, p = .007) control-

ling for individualism, thus supporting

our theoretical argument that trust medi-

ates the relationship between level ofindividualism and first-order coopera-

tion. Specifically, Model 2 indicates that

the rate of charitable participation is

6.045 times higher in a nation where

everyone feels that others are generally

trustworthy than in a nation in which

no one believes that others are

trustworthy.It is worth noting that the model pre-

dicts a large effect of a nation’s racial het-

erogeneity on its rate of charitable partic-

ipation (OR = 6.002 in Model 1 and 9.041

in Model 2). This suggests that a nation

with complete racial heterogeneity will

have a rate of charitable participation

about six to nine times higher than therate of charitable participation in a nation

with no racial heterogeneity.

Table 5. Individualism and Active Membership in a Charitable Organization

Model 1 Model 2

Estimatedodds ratio

95 percentconfidence

intervalEstimatedodds ratio

95 percentconfidence

interval

Level 1 (n = 36,364)Trust 1.216*** 1.083, 1.366 1.216*** 1.083, 1.365Sex 1.281*** 1.155, 1.421 1.280*** 1.154, 1.420Age 1.012*** 1.008, 1.017 1.012*** 1.008, 1.016Age finished education 1.030*** 1.025, 1.035 1.030*** 1.025, 1.035Social class 1.302*** 1.174, 1.444 1.302*** 1.174, 1.443Religious 1.600*** 1.401, 1.826 1.606*** 1.406, 1.836Employed 1.237* 1.047, 1.461 1.235* 1.045, 1.459Confidence in government .945 .888, 1.007 .945 .887, 1.007

Level 2 (n = 32)Individualism 1.014** 1.005, 1.24 1.008 1.000, 1.017Racial heterogeneity 6.002*** 2.366, 15.223 9.041*** 3.677, 22.231Aggregate trust — 6.045** 1.719, 21.259

Note: n = number of cases at that level.*p \ .05. **p \ .01. ***p \ .001.

6We aggregated the trust variable becausemediation cannot occur across levels of analysis(see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).




Hypothesis 2: Individualism/Collectivism and Government Welfare

Programs

We used a hierarchical linear model to

test our second hypothesis, which

states that decreases in individualism

generate a stronger belief in government

responsibility.

The unconditional model was signifi-

cant (lj = .988, p \ .001) and thus sug-

gested that multilevel modeling is appro-priate. At level 2, we controlled for racial

heterogeneity because it was the only

level-2 variable with a significant effect

on the dependent measure. Model 1 in

Table 6 (s2 = 7.7866, t2 = .3346) indicates

significant negative relationships of the

level-1 controls for social class and

employment status (p\ .001) and age fin-ished education (p = .011) and a significant

relationship for sex (p = .019), suggesting

that women are more likely to support

government redistribution net of the other

controls. Religiosity was marginally sig-

nificant (p = .054). The level-1 effects of

trust (p = .328), age (p = .143), and

confidence in the government (p = .798)and the level-2 effect of racial heterogene-

ity were not significant in Model 1 (p =

.205). Table 6 reports the findings of the

full fixed effects model.

As Model 1 in Table 6 indicates, thelevel-2 effect of Hofstede index score was

negative and significant (b = –.011, p =

.019). This finding therefore supports

Hypothesis 2. That is, Model 1 predicts

that belief in government responsibility

decreases by .011 on a 10-point scale for

every unit increase on Hofstede’s individ-

ualism index. Applied to the data, Model1 predicts that perceived government

responsibility is .836 points higher on the

10-point scale in Indonesia (individualism

score = 14) than in Australia (individual-

ism score = 90).

Model 2 (s2 = 7.7866, t2 = .1712) allows

us to test for mediation. The level-1 effects

of sex (p = .018), age finished education (p =

.012), social class (p \ .001), employment

status (p \ .001), and religiosity (p = .046)

were significant. The level-2 measure of

racial heterogeneity (p = .008) was also

Table 6. Individualism and Attitudes Regarding the Government’s Responsibility to GenerateGreater Equality

Model 1 Model 2

b SE b SE

Level 1 (n = 36,835)Trust .060 .061 .059 .061Sex .093* .039 .093* .039Age 2.004 .002 2.004 .002Age finished education 2.009* .003 2.009* .003Social class 2.242*** .031 2.241*** .031Religious 2.100 .052 2.104* .052Employed 2.182*** .047 2.181*** .047Confidence in government .006 .023 .006 .023

Level 2 (n = 33)Individualism 2.011* .004 2.002 .004Racial heterogeneity 2.739 .571 21.357** .469Aggregate trust — 22.706*** .676

Note: Estimated coefficients (b) and standard errors (SE). n = number of cases at that level.*p \ .05. **p \ .01. ***p \ .001.




significant. We found that the relationship

between Hofstede score and belief in gov-

ernment responsibility was insignificant

when we added aggregated trust as

a level-2 control (p = .019 in Model 1 and

p = .554 in Model 2), suggesting that trustaccounts for a significant proportion of

the variation explained by the Hofstede

measure. The relationship between level-

2 trust and government responsibility

was negative and significant (b = –2.706,

p = .001). That is, the mean belief in gov-

ernment responsibility is 2.706 points

higher in a nation in which no one believesthat others are generally trustworthy than

one in which all citizens are trusting of

others. These findings provide support for

our argument that trust mediates the rela-

tionship between level of individualism

and second-order cooperation (in this

case, belief in government responsibility).

DISCUSSION

The goal of the current work was to test an

argument about how individuals coordi-

nate their efforts in resolving important

social dilemmas. More specifically, we

suggested that culture generates prefer-ences for first- or second-order cooperation

in terms of supporting the general wel-

fare. Consistent with our theory, and prior

work, we found that individualism leads to

preferences for cooperation at the first

order (in our case, joining charitable

organizations), while collectivism pro-

motes second-order cooperation (here,supporting government redistribution).

Our models also indicated support for

our argument that trust mediates the

relationship between culture and first-

and second-order cooperation. Based on

our findings and previous research

(Gheorghiu et al. 2009; Yamagishi and

Yamagishi 1994), there is strong supportsuggesting that individualist and collec-

tivist social relations produce variation

in trust, and these trust differences can

lead to distinct behavioral outcomes in

terms of supporting the general welfare.

Alternative Explanations

While our results supported our theory,

we cannot rule out all possible alternative

arguments. For example, cross-cultural

research suggests that individualist and

collectivist cultures promote very differ-

ent values, which may facilitate first- or

second-order cooperation. Researchers

generally agree that self-direction is a cen-tral value in individualist cultures (Oishi

et al. 1998; Schwartz 1992; Triandis

1995). Accordingly, people from individu-

alist countries may emphasize deciding

where, when, and how to support the gen-

eral welfare. This cultural value toward

autonomy may even cause individuals to

believe that government welfare pro-grams stunt economic growth by creating

a disincentive to achieve success (Benabou

and Tirole 2006).

Conversely, collectivist cultures encour-

age conformity and emphasize that obedi-

ence and self-discipline promote safety,

harmony, and stability within society

(Oishi et al. 1998; Triandis 1995). By trans-ferring power to a central authority to pro-

mote the general welfare, individuals

endorse the status quo by maintaining

the normative distribution of resources.

While culturally determined values (auton-

omy vs. conformity) may influence choices

among cooperative strategies, such an

argument does not explain the mediationeffects of trust in our findings. Future

work should therefore tease apart the

effects of cultural values versus trust on

choices about cooperation.

A second alternative explanation

appeals to reverse causality. Our theory

suggests that trust leads to increased par-

ticipation in charitable organizations.Others have argued just the opposite:

organizational membership generates trust

(see Putnam 1993, 2000). Importantly,




some evidence suggests that trust is not an

automatic product of voluntary member-

ship (Uslander 2002). Although more work

is needed, given the substantial variation

in whether and how voluntary organization

membership influences trust, we are confi-dent that our theory and results provide

an accurate depiction of the trust-member-

ship relationship (see also Stolle 1998).

Finally, it may be the case that diver-

sity increases with individualism, caus-

ing individualist societies to have more

diverse needs unmet by the government.

In other words, compared to those in col-lectivist societies, members of individu-

alist cultures may provide more support

to charities simply because such organi-

zations are in higher demand in individ-

ualist versus collectivist societies. Data

available in the WVS allowed us to test

this alternative argument. We per-

formed an ordinary least squares regres-sion to determine whether individualist

compared to collectivist societies are

more diverse using our measure of racial

heterogeneity as a proxy. We found that

the effect of racial heterogeneity on char-

itable participation was not significant

(b = –22.986, s2 = 17.552, p = .200). The

effect of the male-to-female ratio wasalso not significant (b = –137.596, s2 =

125.690, p = .282). Based on these

results, we are skeptical that the

observed higher charitable donations in

individualist societies are attributable

to increased diversity.

Conclusion

The research presented here, while by no

means definitive, is a step toward

explaining individuals’ preferences for

promoting and sustaining the general

welfare. Future research should consider

intranational comparisons of trust andcooperation in social dilemmas. Prior

studies provide the groundwork for such

research. For example, Simpson (2006)

argued that the U.S. South is more collec-

tivist compared to other regions of the

country. Consistent with Yamagishi and

Yamagishi’s (1994) theory, he found

markedly lower trust levels for southern-

ers versus non-southerners. Similarresults may be obtained in other coun-

tries. In particular, countries such as

China and India are rapidly developing,

and population shifts are directed toward

ever growing cities, therefore pockets of

individualism may emerge even in tradi-

tionally collectivist cultures. That is, in

large metropolitan areas, actors’ socialrelationships may resemble those from

individualist nations. The result may be

increased trust as well as higher levels

of first-order cooperation compared to

less developed parts of the country. To

address these issues, future research

should focus on the extent to which social

ties are transforming in rapidly develop-ing nations and the effects of these shifts

on traditional values. We hope the cur-

rent study inspires others to explore

how culture helps determine, in part,

how individuals coordinate their efforts

to solve important social dilemmas.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A previous version of this article was presented atthe 2010 Group Processes Mini Conference in con-junction with the joint annual meetings of theMidwest Sociological Society and North CentralSociological Society in Chicago, IL. We wouldlike to thank Benjamin Steiner, Jessica Collett,Christine Horne, all anonymous reviewers, andthe editors for their helpful comments andsuggestions.

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BIOS

Nick Berigan is a doctoral student in theDepartment of Sociology at theUniversity of South Carolina. His disser-tation research combines rational choicetheory with distributive justice to




examine how fairness perceptions affectsanctioning and retaliation toward sanc-tioners. His previous work (with BarryMarkovsky) tested derivations fromgame theory and distributive justice the-ory in public goods dilemmas. He is alsointerested in micro-macro connections insocial phenomena.

Kyle Irwin is an assistant professor inthe Sociology Department at BaylorUniversity. In addition to researchingcross-cultural differences in trust andcooperation, his current work centers onnorms as solutions to collective actionproblems and explaining antisocial pun-ishment of generous group members.




Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare

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