Côte d’Ivoire 2010-11 post-electoral crisis:An approach from the media

José Carlos SendínRey Juan Carlos University

AbstractThe objective of this work is approaching the politicalcrisis occurred in Côte d´Ivoire after the contestedelections of 2010, through the perspective of the Ivorianmedia and media professionals. This study draws theoreticallyon the media political economy and critical understanding ofthe relationship between democracy and the media. After abrief description of Côte d´Ivoire political history, as wellas its media political economy, perceptions from foreigncorrespondents and Ivoirian journalist were gathered.Conclusions show the sheer complexity of the role played bythe media, which goes beyond its information providerresponsibility to turn into platforms for the politicalstruggle in a highly political polarised environment. At thesame time, it is demonstrated how foreign perceptions ofIvorian media performance are built against idealrepresentations of media that often fail to grasp particularcontexts.

Keywords: Media, Côte d´Ivoire, journalism, politicaltransition cultural industries.

Introduction

Approaching the complex issue of the Côte d´Ivoire crisisafter the contested presidential elections held last December

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2010 through the media, requires a panoramic view intoseveral angles involved in the equation. From identifyingmain media outlets, assessing the political economy ofcommunications in Côte d´Ivoire, reviewing media content, toappraising audience reactions and perceptions to mediaperformance, among others.

Faced to the impossibility of engaging in all of theseangles, this work offers an approach that have taken intoconsideration a double view on the Ivorian political andmedia landscape, in order to provide some preliminary answersto the main question posed. First, it was provided a conciseaccount of the main political events after independence,together with an overlook on the Ivorian media politicaleconomy. Second, performance of Ivorian media was assessedfrom the perspective of media professionals, in this casetrying to gather views from local journalists and foreigncorrespondents them covering the Ivorian crisis.

In the perspective of this work, media will be operativelyconsidered as both the traditional newspapers, magazines,radio and TV, together with new Internet based blogs. Otherforms of media, such as street discussion groups (i.e. LaSorbonne, agoras, grins, as in our case study), together withEvangelical and prophetic churches, or those lessrecognizable forms of information circulation like DVD,cassettes, etc will not be appraised, even though it isimportant to note that these particular media formatsconstitute privileged instruments through which ordinarypeople get information and build up their opinions.

Already in the 1970, several scholars started to assess thepolitical economy of media perspective in the context of thecritique to the cultural industries approach (Mattelart,1986, 1997; Miège, 2006, Bustamante & Zallo, 1988). The mainpurpose of this tradition is to identify who is behind eachmedia outlet, or decipher the property structure of anyparticular media, be it public or private. It was implied on

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this approach that both economic and political leverage onmedia could determine its content and, arguably, itsinfluence in society at large. Particularly, mediaconcentration, as the most prominent feature of mediaworldwide, has been signaled not only as an economic strategyto build larger groups and gain competitiveness, but still asa threat to democracy, because it translates political powerconcentration and consequently reduction of plurality;although this type of consequences are not easy to indentifyin the short term (Miège, 2006).

Côte d´Ivoire media landscape presents a highly concentratedmedia scenario in the hands of well known political figuresand its allies, together with low distribution figures in thecase of the press, along with a big concentration ofaudiovisual media in the hands of the state (Moussa, 2012).This trend may possibly help explain how plurality in themedia is hampered by property concentration, and thereforeprojects some shades over the issue of democracy.

Nevertheless, the connection between media and democracy is acomplex issue that should be analysed in light of a broadenunderstanding of democracy and the context in which it isplayed. As Nyamnjoh (2005, 27) puts it, almost everywhereliberal democratic assumptions have been made about the mediaand their role in democratisation and society, with littleregard to the cultures, histories and sociology of Africansocieties. According to critical scholarship of democracy(Curran, 2010; Perret, 2005; Nyamnjoh 2005) the troublesfaced by the media and its practitioners are no longer seensimply as their own failures; rather, they are increasinglyperceived as a result of the very deficiency of the currentform of liberal democracy applied to Africa.

As Zelizer (2005) argues, journalistic conventions, routinesand practices are dynamic and contingent on situational andhistorical circumstances. Journalists and the media in theregion face multiple obstacles (Tomaselli 2009:9), especially

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by the companies that own the media in which they work,together with financial problems linked to high vulnerabilityto corruption and dereliction of ethical values.Additionally, the situation may differ according to languagepatterns and past colonisation legacies, among other factors.Whereas the media sector of the former British colonies isgrowing, especially Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Tanzania, wherepowerful print and broadcasting media groups are emerging, inthe French-language speaking region, the media fit into theold French press tradition, with their intellectual circlesroots, rather than business. The media in former French -suchas the Côte d´Ivoire case studied here- and Belgian coloniessuffer from profound structural weaknesses (Frere 2011: 11-12). As Nyamnjoh (2005:89) point out the Anglophones continueto be inspired by Anglo-Saxon (business-objectivity) mediatraditions, while Francophones have remained French or Latin(literary-interpretive) in style.

Methodological note

A qualitative perspective was applied to assess the Ivorianpost-electoral crisis through the lens of the media. Thisoption entailed a twofold procedure.

First, relevant information of the Côte d’Ivoire social andpolitical background and context was gathered, including themedia landscape in the country, in order to clarify thehistorical processes which could help understand thepolitical transition after the 2010 elections. The politicaleconomy Ivorian media was also appraised.

Second, the perception of Ivorian media performance was dweltthrough a purposive sampling focused on media practitioners.Therefore, a series of semi-structured interviews using aquestionnaire were conducted through email with two Ivorianjournalists/communication experts (Group Cyclone, andUniversity Cocody-Abidjan), and one Ivorian diaspora blogger.At the same time, four foreign correspondents then on the

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spot were also interviewed (BBC, Bloomberg, La Croix, TimeMagazine/The Wall Street Journal).

Finally, all answers were analysed and compared critically inorder to provide a set of combined views which ultimatelymight shed some light into the research question.

Côte d’Ivoire background

After decolonisation, Félix Houphouët-Boigny regimemaintained close ties to the French and used the ever-blooming cocoa industry as his own personal cash cow, underpersonal patronage. For Boigny regime, media were mainly ameans of national integration and an instrument ofmobilization.

Côte d'Ivoire experienced one coup d’état, in 1999, and arebellion in 2002, that somehow paved the way to the violenttransition in 2010-2011. Contrary to some narratives of greedand the political economy of war, what is unique in Côted’Ivoire crisis is the contested claims on citizenship (Bah2010:598) and sovereignty (Marsahll-Fratany 2006:11). Afterthe 1999 putsch, the general Robert Guéï sponsored areferendum July 2000, adding the Article 35i to the IvorianConstitution in which it is required that both parents ofanyone running for presidential office must be Ivoriancitizens, rather than just one, as has been stipulated by theConstitution until then. Based in what has been calledivoirité (Piccolino 2011:2), this nationalistic claim wasobviously intended to barring from running his opponent,Alassane Ouattara, a malinké -traditionally attached tocommerce and business- from the North of the country, who wasprime minister and deputy manager of International MonetaryFund. On 6/10/2000 a Supreme Court appointed by Guéï himselfruled that neither Konan Bedié nor Alassane Ouattara wereeligible to run for president, leaving only the long-termopponent Laurent Gbagbo (a beté, from the West and historyprofessor), who took over on 22 October.

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The rebellion held on September 2002 was initiated by rebelsfrom the North and West of the country. Former president R.Guéï and his immediate family together with the interiorminister Emile Boga Doudou were murdered. As a result, thecountry was divided, in fact, into two, setting a scene, ashas often been too simply put it, in which northerners, oftenlumped together as Burkinabe were allegedly barred from thepolitical opportunities enjoyed by the southerners who weretaken as the true Ivorians. Later on, president Gbagboemployed what is called souverainisme to block outsideattempts at peace brokerage unfavourable to his regime.

From March 2004 onwards, home arrests started, as well asdisappearances and extrajudicial killings of presumednortherners neighbourhoods of Abidjan. A UN commission ofinquiry established that at least 120 civilians were killedand described: “the indiscriminate killing of civilians andthe committing of human rights violations.”ii The UN SecurityCouncil passed resolution 1572/2004 authorising targetedsanctions against those responsible for human rights abuses,war crimes and blocking the peace process and imposing anarms embargo on Côte d´Ivoireiii.

International actors, from ECOWAS, via the AU (African Union)to the UN responded by giving Gbagbo and the government ofnational unity a one-year grace period within which to holdelections. Nevertheless, after several clashes between YoungPatriots -a pro-Gbagbo movement that arrogate thenationalistic narrative of a second independence againstFrench former coloniser, (Banegas, 2006)- and UN forces, theinternational institutions failed to act on their threats andsimply set a new deadline of Oct 2007 for elections,(McGovern, 2011: 23-24).

Finally, elections took place in October-November 2010.Alassane Ouattara backed by Henri Konan Bedié and his PDCIparty, as well as a number of smaller parties defeated

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Laurent Gbagbo in the November second round elections.International electoral observation missions unanimously saidthat the election was globally free and fair, but Gbagborefused to step down and a horrific spiral of violencestarted.

From December 2010 to late February 2011 the post-electionviolence was primarily perpetrated by security forces andallied militia loyal to Gbagbo. During that time, Ouattaraand his shade government were confined at Hotel du Golf inAbidjan, under the protection of UN forces. Throughout thewest, pro-Ouattara forces killed, raped, and burned villages.At the conflict’s peak more than 180,000 Ivorians had fled toLiberia. Several hundred thousand more remain internallydisplaced for similar reasons. (HRW, 2012).

President Gbagbo surrendered on April 2011, under highpressure from UN and especially the French forces (Banegas2011:465). Ouattara immediately took over and confirmed theauthority of the International Criminal Court to investigatecrimes under its jurisdiction, and Gbagbo was handed to TheHague tribunal.

Ivorian media political economy and its responsibility on the2010 crisis

From 1990 onwards, Côte d´Ivoire enters a new period of itshistory characterised by the return of the multiparty systemand a press blossom, euphorically referred to as thespringtime. Between 1990 and 1996, some 178 newspapersappeared on the nation’s market. Ibrahim Sy Savané, formerDirector General of Fraternité Matin, Minister of Communicationand currently the Chairman of the High Authority forBroadcast Communication (HACA), explained this phenomenon andits significance:

“Some newspapers even appeared only once, just the time for theirpainstakingly accumulated small capital to be dissipated.Meanwhile, the great majority have managed to struggle along under

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conditions which defy the rule book. To continue, one had to, andas has been the case, must always either remain close, to say theleast, to a political party with activists and a good following, orbenefit from the generosity of a hidden sponsor, who has some smallgrant, and who wants to project himself or has some scores tosettle” (as quoted by Moussa, 2012:10).

In his latest and comprehensive report on Ivoirian mediaduring the crisis, Zio Moussa, chairman of the IvorianObservatory for Press Freedom and Professional Code of Ethics(OLPED) point out that public service media belongs to theState of Côte d’Ivoire. Main newspaper Fraternité Matin’s capitalis wholly owned by the state. In the capital of the IvorianBroadcasting Service (RTI: 2 television channels, RTI 1 andRTI2 and 2 of the national radio as well as Fréquence 2) thestate of Côte d’Ivoire controls a massive 98% of the shares.The Ivorian News Agency (AIP) is also owned by the state ofCôte d’Ivoire (Moussa, 2012:52). Venance Konan, Fraternité Matin´smanaging director tried to clarify the role of state media inCôte d´Ivoire when he declared to Reporters Without Borders on 28April 2011 that despite being a State owned media, FraternitéMatin will give space to every Ivorian voice, because theState represents everyone in the country.

On the other hand, private newspapers seem to have reducedradically in numbers. From the remarkable figure of 178newspapers founded during the springtime period, only thirtywere still operating by the end of 2011. The circulation dataof all of them have fallen drastically. Nearly 8 millionpurchases were lost, from 35, 984, 611copies in 2001 to 29,501, 504 in 2005. The most important newspaper, FraternitéMatin only sold 30.000 copies daily in 2011. The majority ofnewspapers endure high rates of unsold copies.

As in other media markets worldwide, the Ivorian consumers ofnews are not ignorant of the relationships of dependencebetween the media and power blocs, and group them by colour:those which are for Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front(FPI), are the blues; those for the Democratic Party of Côte

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d’Ivoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) of Henri KonanBédié, the greens. (Moussa, 2012: 11,45).

Moreover, there it is a clear connection between mediaproperty and key political figures. Notre Voie clearly belongsto the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) of former PresidentLaurent Gbagbo; the current Minister of the Interior, AhmedBakayoko, is the majority shareholder -475 shares out of 500-of the publishing company Mayama Editions et Production, with theremaining 25 shares held by the staff. Denis Kah Moussan,member of the PDCI-RDA holds 400 shares out of 500 shares ofEditions Le Réveil, publishers of the daily newspaper Le NouveauRéveil, against 100 for the staff. The 500 shares of CycloneSARL, publishers of pro-Laurent Gbagbo daily newspaper LeTemps, are divided between two shareholders: Bamba Nadiani(second´s Gbagbo wife), 350 shares and Gbagbo Koudou Al RaisDavid (her son), 150 shares. Méité Sindou, current ChiefExecutive of the Directorate for Good Governance and formerspokesman for Prime Minister Soro Kigbafori Guillaume holds275 shares of Nord-Sud Communication; the other 225 shares aredistributed among six minority shareholders. (Moussa,2012:56-57).

The role of the Ivorian media, also referred to as combatmedia, during the crisis in the run-up for the elections andthe violence that exploded in the aftermath should be seenagainst the trend already mentioned, that establishes adirect link between media and political interest, to thepoint that media, regardless of their real influence on wideaudiences, could be considered as one of the main battlefields to the political struggle for power. Consequently,the Ivorian 2010 presidential election does not seem to havebeen an exception to this trend. Even before the kick-off ofthe electoral campaigns, results were proclaimed in thecolumns of the nation’s newspapers. “Pollsters bombardedpublic opinion with polls. And pollsters, the new charlatansof the global village and modern day diviners, succeeded in

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making us believe they had the results of the elections.(Moussa, 2012: 38).

In October 2010, Reporters Without Borders monitored 4 Ivoriannewspapers: Fraternité Matin, Le Nouveau Réveil, Notre Voie and Le Patriote.The organization expressed its serious concerns about theverbal excesses and exaggerations used on October 27, 2010,four days to the first round of the presidential election inCôte d’Ivoire, by private daily newspapers Le Nouveau Réveil,Notre Voie and Le Patriote. The organization believed that the useof the terms “mass graves and killings” to denounce analleged “unpunished genocide” committed by Laurent Gbagbo onthe first page of the daily newspaper Le Patriote, as well as theaccusation of “those who cheated the farmers” made againstthe party of candidate Alassane Ouattara on page 7 of NotreVoie, or that “the plans of attack” by pro-government formersoldiers who are preparing “troubles for the night of October29 to 30” published on page 11 of Nouveau Réveil, are excessiveand do not meet the standards of professional information.

Additionally, according to the reports undertaken by theOLPED, the number of cases of grave professional misconductcommitted by journalists and the Ivorian media is huge anddisturbing. Therefore, even if the media should not be blamedfor the conflict that followed the contested elections, itcan be stated unequivocally, that their role in what happenedwas not a minor one. Moussa (2012:28).

Meanwhile, mobile phone and the Internet also played aparticular role during the crisis. According to the statetelecoms regulator, Agence de Télécommunications de Côted’Ivoire, the country had 15.8 million mobile subscriberlines in June 2011. In 2010 Gbagbo’s government startedclosing down the SMS messaging facility on mobile phonenetworks. SMS messaging was shut down for several days inNovember 2010 during the run-up to the second round in thepresidential election. It was subsequently shut down again inFebruary 2011, as the conflict intensified. The service was

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only restored following the overthrow of Gbagbo’s governmenttwo months later (Infoasaid, accessed 27 July 2012).

As regards the radio, which has had a relevant role in thewhole continent since it started operating, Côte d´Ivoire hasexperience an exponential grow, especially private commercialradio stations, denominational radios, and neighborhoodradios. Nevertheless, they cannot legally participate in thepolitical debate, as some of the respondents to this workattested.

Finally, so far the focus has been placed on the media´s roleand the particular Côte d´Ivoire media political economy,because it is the option chosen for this work. Nevertheless,it would be misleading to ignore the place of other forms ofmedia, as well as the particular uses applied by people. Forinstance, the role of the press should be understood in lightof a particular mode of consumption and dissemination ofpress information, particularly played in Abidjan: thephenomenon of headlines specialists, referred to as“titrologues” (Bahi, 2001). The headlines spinners are peoplewho read those headlines and engage in discussions aboutthem, whether they actually bought the newspapers and readthe corresponding articles or not (Théroux-Bénoni, 2009: 82).The front pages thus serve as sources for rumours which, inthis particular case, become truth because it is written inthe newspapers ((Moussa, 2012: 30).

Other examples of places in which ordinary people discusspublic affairs and make up their mind could be the particulardiscussion groups in Abidjan context, such as “La Sorbonne”,the agoras and the parliaments, on the one hand; and thegrins -an urban setting that allows people of the samegeneration to meet after school or after work around a glassof tea in a public space-, on the other (Théroux-Bénoni,2009: 203). Both are places around which the people gatheredto discuss and exchange information, which should be takeninto consideration in future research.

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Results

Once it has been provided elements from the Ivorianbackground and context, together with the media landscape,what follows is the report of the answers from interviewees,which account to the perception of Ivorian media performanceduring the crisis. Obviously, these answers should be takenonly as mere opinions expressed by respondents and not asofficial descriptions of media performance.

As regards the role of traditional media (newspapers, radioand TV) both before and after the 2010 elections in terms offair and balanced reporting of political issues, it appears ai Article 35: ̔The President of the Republic is elected for fiveyears by universal direct suffrage. He is only reeligible one time. Thecandidate to the presidential election must be forty years of age atleast and sixty-five years at most. He must be Ivorian by birth, born ofa father and of a mother themselves Ivorian by birth. He must never haverenounced the Ivorian nationality. He must never have had anothernationality. He must have resided in Cote d’Ivoire continuously duringthe five years preceding the date of the elections and have totaled tenyears of effective presence. The obligation of residence indicated inthis article is not applicable to the members of diplomatic and consularrepresentations and to the persons designated by the State to occupy apost or accomplish a mission abroad, to international functionaries andto political exiles. The candidate to the Presidency of the Republic mustpresent a complete statement of his physical and mental well-being dulydetermined by a college of three physicians appointed by theConstitutional Council from a list proposed by the Council of the Orderof Physicians. These three physicians must take an oath before theConstitutional Council. He must be of good morals and of grand probity.He must declare his assets and substantiate the origin of them̕. Coted’Ivoire Constitution. Adopted at the Referendum, 23 July 2000.

ii (Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Events Connectedwith the March Planned for 25 March in Abidjan. Geneva, 29 Apr. 2004,paragraph 72).

iii http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1572/ (Accessed 18/07/2012)12

relative consensus among interviewees on the idea ofpolarisation and unbalanced reporting of facts by Ivorianmedia. It is emphasized in the responses particularly itsrole as combat media. And according to their vision thiscombat is played as if each side in the political strugglemanaged to convey and manipulate its constituencies throughcertain media outlets.

The Ivorian press represents the ideology of politicalparties. This means that journalists are assigned to amission, that of making propaganda for the politicalparty for which they work. The war was on two fronts,the communication and the weapons. Ivorian media andforeign media communication made war in the same way.Each expressed the crisis in terms of its bias. (RosalieKouamé: Ivorian diaspora blogger).

The role of media has been instrumental in the violentchange of government. Newspapers and radio stations areresponsible for chasing supporters from each party, eventhough today the question lie on disarming voices. Thepress called pro-Ouattara continues to accuse Gbagbo ofall the country's ills (as if the pro-Ouattara were allangels) meanwhile pro-Gbagbo media still avoid self-criticism. (Jean Arsène Yao: Mundo Negro, CocodyUniversity Abidjan).

The media played a massive role in whipping up emotionsand fuelling acts of rage in the run-up to theelections. The main public station, RTI, which iswatched by the vast majority of Ivorians (even incommunities where there are few televisions, it is shownin public bars) was a mouthpiece for governmentpropaganda. (Monica Mark: TIME Magazine & The Wall StreetJournal).

Foreigners like Burkinabe or other natives from theregion (Benin, Togo, Senegal) were targeted by the

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regime (Gbagbo) and by the television. I remember havingseen some Burkinabe totally stressed out before the20hrs news reports. They knew that if the TV broadcast areport criticizing them, they would have to stay indoorsand hide. (Olivier Monnier: Bloomberg-La Croix).

Interviewees´ opinions remain the same as above even whenthey are specifically asked to try to identify any example oftrustful and independent Ivorian media. Here, foreigncorrespondents ventured to identify specific media and makejudgements.

The Ivoirian private press is very politicized andpolarized. Most of the press here is just aboutpolitical communication and many directly or indirectlybelong to politicians: Nord/Sud defends Soro; NouveauReveil, Bedie; Le Patriote, Hamed Bakayoko (interior ministernow) and Ouattara; Notre Voie, Gbagbo... RTI, the state-owned television, was used by Gbagbo's regime as a wayto broadcast its propaganda... Soir Info and L'Internewspapers were (and are) more balanced as they belongto Lebanese businessmen (the same group of press Olympe)and aim to defend the Lebanese interests. This said,they've been unable to take any distance with theevents, leading them spread the propaganda of both camps(but at least you could have many voices in thosenewspapers). (Olivier Monnier: Bloomberg, La Croix).

The newspapers were almost unanimously biased andpolarized. It was very, very hard to get neutralreporting. Such voices were swamped out by the masses ofterribly one-sided reporting. With the exception ofLebanese-owned private daily L’Inter, there was virtuallyno neutral or objective reporting. Eventually, evenL’Inter came under pressure from state officials ahead ofthe elections. Venance Konan, a famous and respectedIvorian author/commentator, used to write a weeklycolumn in L’Inter, in which he would point out

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inconsistencies in the policies of the rulinggovernment, which happened to be the Gbagboadminstration. I believe about 2 months before theelection, he was forced to quit his position as hisemployer said it had become too “controversial.” (MonicaMark: TIME Magazine & The Wall Street Journal).

When referring to the role of the national broadcaster, RTI,foreign correspondents are especially critical. They seem toagree on the perception that a national broadcaster should beparticularly respectful to journalistic ethical standardsand, coherently, RTI must play an exemplary role in thenational journalistic context.

The national media has played a divisive role, withjournalists fighting political points rather thanseeking to report the strict truth. The state televisionis perhaps the worst culprit, toeing the lien of whoeveris in power and being relentlessly upbeat. (John James:BBC).

During the height of the war itself, RTI took propagandato a whole new level. We would see “divine signs” ofGbagbo’s win, clouds coming down from the sky andfloating into the hands of pro-Gbagbo soldiers, forexample. There would be pictures of slain “rebels” as adire warning to what awaited anyone who dared contradictthe regime... Worse, on a personal level for me, wasduring our time in the Novotel. RTI was taken off airfor hours at a time, but we knew this meant there wastoo much fighting for the broadcasts to continue. Itwould then flicker on again, playing images of Gbagbo’s“swearing-in” on a loop for hours. Then, with nowarning, it would start showing images of dead “neo-colonialists” who dared to defy the regime. It waspretty effective as a propaganda tool. The people onRTI-perhaps out of fear, perhaps out of conviction- butthe presenters who stayed on RTI in the last weeks of

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the Gbagbo regime (and many did not) absolutely crossedthe line and stopped being journalists and becamepersonally responsible for encouraging deaths. Theyplayed a similar role to Radio Télévision Mille Collines inRwanda. The language was violent and full of hatred.(Monica Mark: TIME Magazine & The Wall Street Journal).

The opposition media portrayed Gbagbo as evil and thepro-Gbagbo papers portrayed Ouattara and Bedié asevil... The media was extremely polarized, both in therun-up to the elections and during the conflict/civilwar. The state broadcaster RTI was used as a tool tospread pro-Gbagbo propaganda. From December on, itsbroadcasts were extremely one-sided and it turned todisseminating hateful anti-foreigner and anti-westernmessages. The only neutral public radio was run by theUN peacekeeping mission (UNOCI). UN staff had toconstantly switch frequencies as the government tried toblock its broadcasts. All in all, however hateful andinsidious the RTI could be, many viewers still took itas truthful. (Pauline Bax: Bloomberg, Dutch newspaper). 

Some respondents mentioned the case of the UN lead radio, asplaying a very important role during this politicaltransition. Just to give a brief background, UNOCI FM was theradio broadcast established under the auspices of a UNSecurity Council resolution in February 2004.The station wasmeant to follow the example of similar radio stations of UNpeacekeeping missions in other countries (Sierra Leone,Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia). It was one of themost followed radio stations during the elections. On 8February 2011 the National Council of AudiovisualCommunication, confirmed that the frequencies assigned toUNOCI FM as part of fulfilling its mandate in Côte d'Ivoirewas removed. Nevertheless the radio continued to operate,from the UN headquarters at the former Hotel Sebroko.

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It is important to note that in the following excerpts, twoforeign correspondents praised the role played by the UNradio, while an Ivorian journalist ironically project somedoubts about the impartiality of this peace radio.

During the main battle, the newspapers weren't inproduction. Public television and radio played a keyrole. The international media was targeted notably inthe raid on the Novoteliv where many of them werestaying, which led to the kidnapping and death of thehotel manager and three others. RFI, BBC, France24 and TV5among others were all taken off the air by the Gbagboregime. Much to the Gbagbo government's chagrin, UNOCIFM was able to continue broadcasting throughout thecrisis thanks to the placement of its antennas inside UNpeacekeeping bases. UNOCI FM played a key role beginningone of the most listened to radio stations anyway andalso have a wider availability on FM particularlyoutside Abidjan. Otherwise, there isn't much independentnational media here so everyone pretty much stuck to thepolitical side they usually support. (John James: BBC).

UNOCI FM was the only independent Abidjan-based radioduring the crisis (and still now) This radio managed tokeep broadcasting during the crisis, despite thegovernment's attempts to take it off the air...International radios and Tvs (RFI, BBC, France 24, TV5 Monde)were most of the time taken off the air. (OlivierMonnier: Bloomberg, La Croix).

Newspapers called the "blue press" (Notre Temps, Notre Voie,Le Courrier d’Abidjan, etc.) closed to the Ivorian PopularFront, have championed the cause of President Laurent

iv On 4 April 2011, during the final fights between pro-Gbagbo andpro-Ouattara forces, two Frenchmen, a Malaysian and a citizen of Beninwere kidnapped from the downtown Hotel Novotel by pro-Gbagbo troops. Theywere all killed by a police commissioner loyal to outgoing presidentGbagbo in the presidential Palace.

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Gbagbo. On the contrary,, newspapers such Le Patriote, NordSud, L’Expression, Le Nouveau Réveil, close to the coalitionparties around RHDP have formed a front anti-Gbagbo,with the invaluable assistance of UNOCI-FM, the radio ofUnited Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire. Today, thesedivisions continue. (Jean Arsène Yao: Mundo Negro, CocodyUniversity Abidjan).

When asked about the role of the radio stations and moreprecisely the role of community radio during the crisis,respondents are not unanimous in their perception of the roleplayed by this media during this period. Apparently radiostations are not allowed to broadcast by themselves politicalissues, but this requirement was not always adhered to.

Community radio isn't a way for people normally to gethold of political issues, given they're not supposed todeal with politics. (John James: BBC).

Community radio is often dominated by the relevant powerpolitics in the community. Various UN agencies havepumped hundreds of thousands of dollars in training ofcommunity radio journalists since the crisis began in2002, but the effects of those projects are debatable.(Pauline Bax: Bloomberg, Dutch newspaper).

Since the mid 90s, the state has authorised communityradio to operate in almost all Department Heads. Theirrole is to raise awareness of local issues. But in termsof information (national politics) they incorporateinformation from the national radio (state), which canalso be captured throughout the national territory. Infact, they had not the right to organize politicaldebates, even if in the north occupied by the ForcesNouvelles, close to Alassane Ouattara, the law was notrespected. (Jean Arsène Yao: Mundo Negro, CocodyUniversity Abidjan).

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Concerning the role played by the diasporic blogs inreporting the crisis it is not clear to what extent theyplayed a significant part on shaping attitudes. In any case,they were active outside the country, as foreigncorrespondents attest, but not very much relevant inside Côted´Ivoire, due to low access to the Internet, especially outof Abidjan.

Diasporic blogs and sites had a colour depending on theperson they supported. It must be said that the diasporamedia as a whole was much more objective in itsassessment, less passionate in its reactions than thosein Côte d'Ivoire. Diaspora did not live this wardirectly. (Rosalie Kouamé: Ivorian diaspora blogger).

It is difficult to know exactly the influence of thesenew media in the transition process, given that accessto the Internet is still very limited. These media onlyoperate in Abidjan; their coverage is very limited inthe rest of the country, so the population getinformation through traditional channels. (Jean ArsèneYao: Mundo Negro, Cocody University Abidjan).

Blogs and websites are the current main way for pro-Gbagbo elements to continue their communication.Independent websites first made an appearance publishingthe election results immediately after the second roundand continued as vehicles for propagandist material,often of an extreme nature. Blogging and twittering(with the hashtag #civ2010) played a key role due to thelack of many other sources of info during the height ofthe crisis. (John James: BBC).

Blogs in the US and France certainly played a role toforeign journalists reporting on Côte d´Ivoire andtrying to get as many diverse views as possible duringthe crisis.  It's hard to say if they played a role atall in the countryside, where internet connections are

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slow and many people are illiterate. Twitter was muchmore helpful to me. Most Ivorians would not necessarilytrust blogs to be neutral. (Pauline Bax: Bloomberg, Dutchnewspaper).   

Conclusions

The objective of this article was to assess the role of theIvorian media during the crisis of 2010-11. Two main sourcesof information have been used in this research. Firstly,historical accounts and data were collected to document Côted´Ivoire background as well as its political media economy;secondly, this was complemented with interviews with Ivorianjournalists and foreign correspondents to gather their visionof the issue. Although limited in its scope and informants itis possible to suggest and conclude several ideas.

It seems relatively clear that media sector in Côte d´Ivoirehas powerful ties with the political realm, to the extentthat the property of relevant public and private mediaoutlets remain directly in the hands of key political figuresin the country. This tells us that mainstream media are,above all, one of the privileged means to show and translatepersonal and social leverage by political figures, regardlessof their limited sales results, as was pointed out earlier.In this vein, media should be seen more in terms of places inwhich to gain and project social capital, than platforms toperform the social responsibility of informing audiences.This development, in the medium or long term, does not impedesocial capital to turn into other forms of capital, be itsymbolic or economic.

As far as the content channelled through the media isconcerned, reports consulted seem to point towards a biasedand politicised treatment of political issues. Nevertheless,having in mind that circulation figures and diffusion -especially of print media- does not allow us to state high

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penetration of media in Ivorian society, their biasedcontent, often accompanied with excesses, may be understoodin a different direction. The media content could also beunderstood as an instrument for the political struggle; notsurprisingly, Ivorian media is often referred to as “combatmedia”. This struggle could be played not only over a certainpolitical figure in the opposition or in the ruling party whois the particular media bull´s eye, but it could be alsoplayed as a means to create meaning and identity in a verypolarised and divided society as the Ivorian is.

Therefore, traditional western perception of media as placesin which objective information is channelled towards wideaudiences, and through this the public may shape theiropinions and contribute to the public debate, may be adiscourse not only too idealistic to be applied to manywestern societies, but it is also a superficial and limitedexplanation of media in the context of the Ivoirian crisis.Media property and its content played a more complex role inthe Ivorian context, and specifically during the electoralcrisis analysed here. Ivorian media seem to be the privilegedarena to show and perform social power, to criticize anddebunk political adversaries and possibly to project personalinfluence along ethnic lines.

Some of our respondents did not managed to go beyond whatappears to be an extremely polarised media environment. It iscommon knowledge that foreign correspondents have to coverinternational crisis very often in a rush, and they are notallowed enough time so as to be able to grasp the overallpicture in which the events unfold. Some of their responsesseem to be expressed putting Ivorian media directly againstWestern media model, somehow projecting a very optimisticview of the latter. Even the most admired public broadcaster,like the BBC, has to some extent problems connected withparticular low performance, or excesses committed by itsjournalists. Not to mention public broadcasters in theMediterranean countries, whose editorial lines are, much more

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often than it is desired, contingent to the political partyin government.

Comparison with the Rwandan genocide and the role playedthere by the infamous Radio Télévision Mille Collines are recurrent inmany respondents´ views, as it is in other reports on therole played by the media in war and conflict contexts.Nevertheless, it is highly problematic to establish such acomparison straight forward with the media in Côte d´Ivoire,because it takes for granted that Ivorian media playedexactly the same role of incitement to hatred and violence asthis particular Rwandan counterpart. Additionally, thiscomparison takes for granted that there is a linearrelationship between media content and peoples´ behaviour. Inthe same line, it is also problematic, as some respondent´sdo, to establish that illiterate people take TV content asgospel, therefore obscuring the many ways in which peopledecode and negotiate TV content.

Therefore, our goal, which was to assess the role of theIvorian media during the 2010 crisis, turned to be much morecomplex than it appeared to be. Media could be and, inparticular settings certainly is, a very visible way tomobilize the public. But Ivorian media, as we have shown fromthe reports of OLPED, is not only a place for biased andpolarised content, but also a site in which social capitaland identity is played and bargained.

It is beyond the scope of this work to appraise how ordinaryIvorian citizens decode the media content and, consequently,what are the implications of this negotiated meaning in theirpolitical views. Future research should focus on differenttypes of communication and other forms of public opinionmanufacturing processes, in order to grasp how peopleperceive and use media content.

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Contributor details

José Carlos Sendín is assistant professor at Rey Juan CarlosUniversity, (Spain), where he teaches master degree courseson Media, Globalization and Development, as well asCommunication Theory for undergraduates. Dr. Sendín´s workspreads over social issues in connection with communicationand the media sector. He specializes in communication inAfrica South of the Sahara and on migration trends in Spanishsociety.Contact: Rey Juan Carlos University. Faculty of CommunicationSciences. Camino del Molino s/n 28943-Fuenlabrada (Madrid).Spain. josecarlos.sendin@urjc.es

Acknowledgements: Author expresses his gratitude to all the contributors tothis work. This research was started during author’s researchstay at the Centre for Socio Legal Studies, Programme forComparative Media and Law (PCMLP), University of Oxford in2012. Thanks to all the members of PCMLP. Also thanks to Dr.Hugo Slim, Department of Politics and InternationalRelations, Oxford University; Dr Daya K. Thussu, Universityof Westminster. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. CarmenCaffarel, Rey Juan Carlos University for her assistance andsupport; and to the insightful comments and suggestionsreceived from JAMS reviewers, which helped improveconsiderably the original article.

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