'Core and Periphery: The Netherlands and the Empire from the Late Fifteenth to the Early Seventeenth...

© 2012 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978 90 04 20683 0

The Holy Roman Empire, 1495–1806

A European Perspective

Edited by

R.J.W. Evans and Peter H. Wilson

LEIDEN • BOSTON2012


CONTENTS

List of Illustrations and Maps ..................................................................... ixList of Contributors ........................................................................................ xi

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1Peter H. Wilson and R.J.W. Evans

SECTION ONE

TURNING POINTS

The Westphalian Peace: Augsburg Mark II or Celebrated Armistice? .................................................................................................... 19Lothar Höbelt

The Holy Roman Empire as Model for Saint-Pierre’s Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe .................................................... 35Peter Schröder

‘Once we were Trojans!’ Contemporary Reactions to the Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation ... 51Wolfgang Burgdorf

SECTION TWO

HABSBURG GOVERNANCE

Inside the Empire and for the House of Austria: The Buquoy Family from the Spanish Low Countries to Bohemia .................... 79Olivier Chaline

The Habsburg Court in Vienna: Kaiserhof or Reichshof ? ................... 91Jeroen Duindam

Bohemia and the Empire: Acceptance and Rejection ......................... 121Jaroslav Pánek

vi contents


Bohemia, Silesia and the Empire: Negotiating Princely Dignity on the Eastern Periphery ......................................................................... 143Petr Mata

Separation and Symbiosis: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Empire in the Seventeenth Century .................................................... 167Thomas Winkelbauer

SECTION THREE

CORES AND PERIPHERIES

State-Building within the Empire: The Cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Savoy-Sardinia ..................................................................... 187Sven Externbrink

Core and Periphery: The Netherlands and the Empire from the Late Fifteenth to the Early Seventeenth Century ............................ 203Nicolette Mout

The Imperial System in Early Modern Northern Italy: A Web of Dukedoms, Fiefs and Enclaves along the Po ..................................... 217Blythe Raviola

SECTION FOUR

NEIGHBOURS

The Impact of War: The Holy Roman Empire and Poland-Lithuania, c. 1600–1806 ............................................................................. 239Robert Frost

An ‘Old Empire’ on the Periphery of the Old Empire: The Kingdom of Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries ................................................. 259Géza Pálfffy

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Electoral Saxony in the Early Eighteenth Century: Crisis and Cooperation .................. 281Adam Perłakowski

contents vii


The Northern Periphery: German Cultural Influences on the Danish-Norwegian Kingdom during the Enlightenment .............. 293Thomas Munck

SECTION FIVE

IMPERIAL CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Centres or Periphery? Art and Architecture in the Empire .............. 315Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann

Where Did the Jewels of the German Imperial Princes Come From? Aspects of Material Cultural in the Empire ......................... 333Kim Siebenhüner

Portraiture at the Imperial Court in the First Half of the 17th Century ................................................................................................. 349Friedrich Polleross

Epilogue International System and Imperial System in the ‘Short’ Eighteenth Century: Two Worlds? ....................................................... 367Heinz Duchhardt

Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 373Index ................................................................................................................... 385Illustration Section


CORE AND PERIPHERY: THE NETHERLANDS AND THE EMPIRE FROM THE

LATE FIFTEENTH TO THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Nicolette Mout

A Dutch minister of fĳinance was once asked what he would do if he were the president of the German Federal Bank. ‘Never ask a Dutchman what he would do if he were a German’, was his reply. Such a sense of absolute sep-arateness must be the result of a long historical development. During the eleventh and twelfth century, emperors still visited the Netherlands quite regularly. If in about 1200 a bishop of Utrecht had been asked whether he regarded his diocese as a part of the Regnum Teutonico rum his answer would have been afffĳirmative as a matter of course. From the thirteenth century onwards the ties between the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire became less signifĳicant. Rulers of a number of Netherlandish ter-ritories became more and more involved with France and England and the emperors stopped their visits to this periphery of the Empire. During the fĳifteenth century the Netherlands were not even represented at the imperial diets nor did they pay imperial taxes.1

In modern times the history of the relations between the Low Countries and the Holy Roman Empire has attracted the atten tion of a number of scholars. Historians of constitutional law, for instance, have tried to solve the question how and when the Netherlands reached their independence from the Empire.2 During the Second World War the Netherlands were

1 Johan Huizinga, ‘Die Mittlerstellung der Niederlande zwischen West- und Mit-teleuropa’, in his Verzamelde werken, vol. 2 (Haarlem, 1948), 292; Henny Grüneisen, ‘Die westlichen Reichsstände in der Auseinanderset zung zwischen dem Reich, Burgund und Frankreich bis 1473’, Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter, 226 (1961), 22–77; Johannes Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 1566 bis 1648 (Cologne etc., 1998), 32–3.

2 For instance: Felix Rachfahl, ‘Die Trennung der Niederlande vom Deutschen Reiche’, Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst, 19 (1900), 79–119; Heinrich von Srbik, Die Niederlande und Österreich. Vier Jahrhunderte staatlicher Beziehungen (Amsterdam, 1923); Johannes A. van Arkel, ‘De Nederlandsche Republiek en haar staatsrechtelijke band met het Duitsche Rijk’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 59 (1946), 219–28; Robert Feenstra, ‘A quelle époque les Provinces-Unies sont-elles devenues indépendantes en droit à l’égard du Saint-Empire’, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 20 (1952), 30–63, 182–218, 479–80, with references to older literature in the fĳield of legal history; id., ‘Een onuitgegeven leenakte van keizer Karel VI en het einde van den leenband met het Heilige Roomse Rijk’, Bijdragen

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(re)incorpora ted into a German Reich once more, and this gave rise to a number of scho larly publica tions which, however, had a diffferent empha-sis. Between 1940 and 1945 German scholars tried to prove that the bonds between the Netherlands and the Empire had been natural, indissoluble and eternal.3

In what follows the ancient dispute whether and, if so, until when the Netherlands were part of the Holy Roman Empire will not be taken up again. It is enough to know that, although formally the emperors never gave up their claims, they did not assert their rights either.4 A glance at the history of the actual political relations between the Netherlands and the Empire during the sixteenth century seems to be more promising, because then the stage was set for develop ments in later times. From a practical-political point of view, legal matters or the fĳine points of political theory must be regarded as less important than political action and espe-cially interaction between the two bodies. During the sixteenth century constitutional practice in the Empire presented the spectacle of a certain dynamism—fed by the Reformation and the ensuing political conflicts—whereas from the sixties onwards important political and constitutional changes were engendered by the Revolt in the Netherlands.5

As far as the relations between the Empire and the Netherlands are concerned the sixteenth century must be divided into two distinct peri-ods: 1512–48 and 1548–1609. In 1512 Emperor Maximilian I organized the Empire into circles (Kreise), of which the Burgundian circle was one. Together with a part of the Westphali an circle it comprised the whole of the Netherlands. In 1548 the treaty of Augsburg (or Burgundian treaty) was concluded between Emperor Charles V and his brother King Ferdinand. The treaty should have controlled the constitutional relations between the Empire and the Netherlands for ever, but did so only until the out-break of the Revolt of the Netherlands in the late sixties. Lastly, 1609 is the

en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap, 69 (1955), 109–29; cf. for more recent lit-erature, Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 36–8.

3 Ivo Schöfffer, Het nationaalsocialistische beeld van de geschiedenis der Nederlanden. Een historiografĳische en bibliografĳische studie (2nd edn, Utrecht, 1978), 185–94.

4 Volker Press, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich in der Frühen Neuzeit’, in Etat et religion aux XV e et XVI e siècles/ Staat en religie in de 15e en 16e eeuw, ed. Willem P. Blockmans and Herman van Nufffel (Brussels, 1986), 321–39; Václav Čihák, Les Provinces-Unies et la cour imperiale, 1667–1672 (Amsterdam, 1974), 59–67.

5 Press, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 332; Volker Press, ‘Das römisch-deutsche Reich—ein politisches System in verfassungs- und sozialgeschichtlicher Fragestellung’, in: Spezialforschung und ‛Gesamtgeschichte’. Beispiele und Methodenfragen zur Geschichte der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Grete Klingenstein and Heinrich Lutz (Munich, 1982), 221–42.

core and periphery: the netherlands and the empire 205


date of the beginning of the Twelve Years Truce between the Dutch rebels and Spain. At that moment, the United Provinces of the Nether lands were de facto recog nized as an indepen dent state by all European powers.

Undeniably the Empire and its Netherlandish periphery in the north-west part of Europe had become quite alienated from the thirteenth cen-tury onwards. However, there was no doubt that those lands were part of the Empire. In the fĳifteenth century, the Dutch states general from time to time emphasized their independence from the emperor, but not so much from the Empire. At the end of the fĳifteenth and the beginning of the six-teenth century certain French feudal rights had been usurped, when suc-cessive emperors enfeofffed members of the house of Habsburg-Burgundy with large parts of the Netherlands. These enfeofffments can be inter-preted as the sign of a new stage in the relationship between the Empire and the Netherlands.6 The establishment of the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) in 1495 meant the beginning of endless quibbles about the question whether the jurisdiction of this court extended to the Netherlands, although these territories contributed to its costs.7

*In the fĳirst half of the sixteenth century relations with the Empire were controlled by the develop ment of Habsburg power, and consequently by the balance between this power and internal Netherlandish inter-ests. Such was the Netherlandish point of view. But when Maximilian I set up the Burgundian circle in 1512 it was not entirely clear exactly which territories belonged to it. Moreover, the creation of the circle had no immediate impact on Netherlandish politics. It is therefore under-standable that a certain aloofness on both sides characterized the rela-tions with the Empire during the fĳirst decade after 1512. However, after Charles V became emperor the Netherlands soon became a key factor in his policy. Its relation to the Empire had therefore to be redefĳined. In 1531, Charles V secretly instructed his brother Ferdinand that the Netherlands were to be kept outside the jurisdiction of the Empire whereas the impe-rial estates insisted that they were part of the Empire. Consequently, the estates argued, the Netherlands had to pay up for the defence against the

6 Nicolette Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich im 16. Jahrhundert, 1512–1609’, in Alternativen zur Reichsver fassung in der Frühen Neuzeit?, ed. Volker Press and Dieter Stiev-ermann (Munich, 1995), 144–5.

7 Paul L. Nève, Het Rijkskamergerecht en de Nederlanden. Competentie—Territoir—Archieven (Assen, 1972).

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Turks and were subjected to the jurisdiction of the Reichskammerge richt. Because of pressing fĳinancial problems caused by the wars against France Charles V could not be too dismissive about these claims, but the Neth-erlanders steadfastly refused to pay the imperial taxes (Reichskontributio-nen) for defence against the Turks, and they wanted to avoid the authority of the Reichskammergericht altogether. In this they were, in fact, backed by the regent, Mary of Hungary, and the emperor himself. In 1542, after the fall of Buda to the sultan, the imperial diet decided once again that the Burgun dian circle and the Netherlandish part of the Westphalian circle were obliged to send not only tax money, but also troops to the Turkish wars. The diet’s views were seconded by Fer dinand, who was respon sible for military operations in Austria and Hungary and could use some more troops and money from imperial taxation. However, the diet’s decision was sabotaged by Mary of Hungary as well as by the emperor himself. Between the two of them they were of the opinion that tax money from the Netherlands ought to pay for the wars against France and Guelders in the fĳirst place. Moreover, the imperial estates had irritated Charles V because they had tried to protect the special status of those northern and eastern parts of the Netherlands which undoub tedly had belong ed to the Empire since medieval times and were now being conquered by the emperor: the provinces of Frisia, Groningen (Ommelanden), Overijssel, Utrecht and Guelders.8

Around 1542 there certainly was some bad blood between the two par-ties, but there was no question of a parting of ways. As the Netherlands urgently needed military help against the king of France and the duke of Cleves, Mary of Hungary devised a defensive treaty between the Empire and the Netherlands. She sent one of her best diplomats, the Frisian jurist Viglius van Aytta, to two consecutive imperial diets at Nuremberg in 1542–3 with a shrewd plan. Tax money should go to the Empire in exchange for imperial troops for the Netherlands, which in this deal was presented as a separate political entity. Predictably the diet and Ferdinand would have none of it. They insisted, then and at the following diets, on sizeable con-tributions from the Netherlands for the war against the Turks. However, Mary of Hungary refused to pay up as long as the war with France and Cleves lasted.9

8 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 147–50; Folkert Postma, Viglius van Aytta als humanist en diplomaat, 1507–49 (Zutphen, 1983), 89–96.

9 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 150–1; Postma, Viglius van Aytta als humanist en diplomaat, 100–9.



After peace with Cleves was concluded in 1543 and with France a year later, rumours reached Ferdinand that the emperor was contemplating a complete separation between his Netherlandish and Burgundian Erblande and the Empire. These rumours were not wide offf the mark. Discussions were indeed going on at the Brussels court about the extent of feudal rights exercised by the Empire in the Netherlands and their impact on administrative practice and jurisdiction. These discussions resulted in a second plan for a defensive treaty, very similar to the fĳirst one, which was presented by Viglius to the diet of Worms in 1545. The main topic at this diet was the state of religion in the Empire, certainly not the problems of the Netherlands. What is interesting is not so much the understandably negative reaction of the imperial estates to the plan concocted in Brussels, but Viglius’s political reasoning. In case of a defen sive treaty, he argued, the imperial estates would be obliged to assist the Netherlands, but this should not impinge on existing privileges of these territories; the imperial taxes were too high for the Netherlands anyhow and should be lowered in any case. Viglius clearly wanted to stress the factual political and con-stitutional indepen dence of the Low Countries from the Empire. In doing so, he was echoing the prevailing mood in Brussels.10

As these plans for a defensive treaty came to nothing it was the emperor himself who desired to put the relations on a new footing. In future Mary of Hungary and her counsellors at Brussels would be permitted to advise Charles V, but not to formulate an indepen dent political line any more. After the battle of Mühlberg a change in policy led to plans in 1547–8 for the incor poration of the Netherlands into an Imperial League (Reichs-bund). Charles V was in favour of a bipolar organiza tion of the Reichsbund with the Nether lands as the northern, Austria as the southern pole. In such a way he hoped to be able to perfect his control over his territories and to organize the defence against the French and the Turks more efffĳi-ciently. For the Netherlands it would mean that they would become part of a confeder ation in which all the imperial estates were represented. The Brussels government was greatly alarmed, as in its eyes this constituted a serious threat to its own powers. It probably also feared the combined power which the southern German territories and the Aus trian hereditary lands would acquire in such a con federation. Espe cially Viglius worked hard to convince both Mary of Hungary and the council of state in Brussels

10 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 151–2; Postma, Viglius van Aytta als humanist en diplomaat, 129.

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that incorporation into such an confederation would not be advantageous to the Netherlands.11

As we know now, this much-feared and criticised Reichsbund was never realized.12 Instead, Charles V recurred to the older plans for a defen-sive alliance, as part of his dynastically inspired policy after the Schmal-kaldic War. The treaty of Augsburg (1548, also known as the Burgundian treaty), which was concluded between the emperor and King Ferdinand, was undoubtedly a triumph in the fĳirst place for Vigli us, who had been responsible for its drafting. The text stressed that the Netherlanders had been a free people from time immemorial. Some of Viglius’s arguments sound surprisingly similar to those used a few decades later in the politi-cal propaganda of the rebels during the fĳirst stages of the Revolt of the Netherlands. The Brus sels government received what it had waited for so long: it was promised the pros pect of military assistance from the Empire in times of need, the unifĳication of all the Netherlandish provinces in one newly modelled Burgundian circle, and useful institutional links with the Empire. The states general of the Netherlands accepted it willingly and did not even object to the obligation to pay tax for the defence of the Empire. For the imperial estates the treaty solved a few practical problems: the new Burgundian circle recognized its feudal duties to the Empire and it was going to be represented in the diet. It would send a legal assessor to the Reichskam merge richt and accept its rulings in imperial fĳiscal matters; so it could be concluded that the Netherlands were still part of the Empire but at the same time in a defensive alliance with it. This was perhaps juridically rather awkward, but the emperor regarded the arrangement as workable in practice. However, the imperial estates repeatedly voiced their doubts, as did the imperial council of princes (Reichsfürstenrat).13 In the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549 Charles V settled questions of heredity and indivisibility of the Low Countries. In such a way it seemed guaranteed that in future all the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands would stay united under one Habsburg ruler and be kept outside the Empire in perpetuity.14

11 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 152–3; Postma, Viglius van Aytta als humanist en diplomaat, 146–51.

12 Horst Rabe, Reichsbund und Interim. Die Verfassungs- und Religionspolitik Karls V. und der Reichstag von Augsburg, 1547–8 (Cologne/Vienna, 1971); Volker Press, ‘Die Bundespläne Karls V. und die Reichsverfassung’, in Das römisch-deutsche Reich im politischen System Karls V., ed. Heinrich Lutz (Munich, 1982), 55–106.

13 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 153–5; Postma, Viglius van Aytta als humanist en diplomaat, 155–63; Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 35–40.

14 Wim Blockmans, Keizer Karel V 1500–1558. De utopie van het keizerschap (Louvain/Amsterdam, 2000), 83.



The Brussels government now set itself a number of specifĳic political and administrative tasks. Centralizing and stream lining the government of the Netherlands were its main objectives. Introducing principles of rationalization and order into an administrative system where special privileges for cities, provinces and social groups abounded did not seem an easy task. The newly conquered territories in the north and east had to be included as well. A reasonable and permanent settlement with the imperial estates without giving up Netherlandish independence was part of this Brussels policy. In principle Charles V shared this view, as long as it fĳitted in with his own political programme for his Netherland-ish Erblande. The imperial estates, however, were not much interested in either the international position or the internal administration of the Netherlands as such. They wanted tax money and troops in the fĳirst place, and they desired their institutions and rights to be fully acknowledged. As long as the emperor was not particularly interested in the actual rela-tions between the two bodies the represen tatives of the Netherlands and the Empire had been fruitlessly exchanging their views during the various diets. Only when Charles V granted the Netherlands—in the guise of the new Burgundi an Circle—a new role in his policy were the constitu tional and legal relations between the two bodies fĳirmly put on a new foun-dation. The settlement of the Treaty of Augsburg was meant to last for ever, but it was going to collapse with the outbreak of the Revolt of the Netherlands a few decades later.15

*In 1549 Prince Philip succeeded Charles V as lord of the Netherlands and two years later his enfeofff ment by the emperor followed. In the same year the treaty of Augsburg was put to the test when war with France was resumed. The imperial estates refused to send troops because the Nether-landers did not acknowledge the competence of the Reichskammerge richt in matters of defence. They were also found to be rather lax in paying the imperial taxes.16

In the years following the conclusion of the religious peace of Augsburg (1555) the estates of Brabant discussed its possible introduction in the Neth-erlands. In that case heretics would have been given the right to emigrate, which would have solved the problems posed by religious persecution. Only a minority of the magistrates supported harsh repression of heresy.

15 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 155; Alfred Kohler, Karl V., 1500–58. Eine Bio-graphie (Munich, 1999), 322–3.

16 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 156.

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Severe punishments for heretics were widely rejected in the Netherlands. This was inspired by political as well as humanitarian considerations: per-secutions and especially public burnings caused unrest and heretics ought not to be punished for spiritual errors only. However, the Brussels govern-ment, since 1559 headed by the new regent, Margaret of Parma, fĳirmly kept to the treaty of Augsburg: religious policy was solely a matter for the Netherlands and in no way related to developments in the Empire. There could be no question of introducing the peace of Augsburg.17

During the early years of the Revolt of the Netherlands it became clear that the Spanish king and the emperor were pursuing their own political ends, a situation which could lead to serious diffferences between the two branches of the dynasty. Emperor Maximilian II did nothing to stop the recruitment of soldiers for the Dutch rebel army in the Empire, although he did offfer, repeatedly but unsuccessful ly, to mediate between Philip II and the rebels. Needless to say, the rebellious parts of the Netherlands had now completely stopped paying imperial taxes. Philip II, though, con-tinued to pay on behalf of his possessions in the Low Countries for the defence against the Turks.18

At fĳirst, the imperial diets did not pay much attention to the Revolt of the Nether lands. This attitude changed, however, with the execution of the counts of Egmond and Horn by the new regent, the Duke of Alba, in June 1568. The death of these high noblemen, both knights of the Golden Fleece and members of the Empire, was greeted with horror. In later years, the diet provided the stage for heated discussions with diplomats from Spain or the Spanish Netherlands about the problems caused by acts of war on German soil involving Spanish troops. At the same time both Madrid and Brussels kept up direct bilateral diplomatic correspondence with a number of rulers of the Empire who were regarded as certain or possible supporters of the Spanish case against the Dutch rebels.19

17 Ibid., 156–7; F. Postma, Viglius van Aytta. De jaren met Granvelle, 1549–64 (Zutphen, 2000) 71; J.J. Woltjer and M.E.H.N. Mout, ‘Settlements: the Netherlands’, in Handbook of European History, 1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, ed. Thomas A. Brady, Jr et al., vol. 2 (Leiden etc., 1995), 389, 395–6.

18 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 157; Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 42–9. Maximilian Lanzinner, Friedenssicherung und politische Einheit des Reiches unter Kaiser Maximilian II., 1564–76 (Göttingen, 1992).

19 Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 52–67; Monique Weis, Les Pays-Bas espagnols et les États du Saint Empire, 1559–79. Priorités et enjeux de la diplomatie en temps de troubles (Brussels, 2003), 255–363.



It was true that the rebels tried to fĳind assistance in the Empire. They hoped Protestant princes would help with money, recruitment facilities or even troops. William of Orange’s German connections were expected to be a powerful factor here. His fĳirst military campaign against the Duke of Alba was launched from his ancestral castle in the Empire, the Dillen-burg in the Nassau lands. Unfortu nately for him, many imperial estates, Protes tants among them, viewed this campaign of 1568 as an objection-able breach of the peace (Landfrie densbruch). Moreover, the leading role of the Cal vinists in the Revolt of the Netherlands did not fĳind much favour in the Empire. The raids of the maritime branch of the Dutch rebels, the sea beggars, on north German coasts and their frequent taking of German ships did not help to fĳind friends for the rebels in the Empire either.20

Bilateral diplomatic relations between the rebels and several of the most important Protestant princes did not seem to lead to substantial assistance for William of Orange. So the rebels tried a diffferent strat-egy: in 1570 they sent representatives to the diet of Speyer in order to fĳind protection against Alba there. On that occasion, the rebels stressed the relations between the Netherlands and the Empire, deliberately and conveniently forgetting about the stipulations of the treaty of Augsburg. The Duke of Alba on the other hand, fearing interference in his policies from the Empire, strictly kept to the treaty and emphasized Netherland-ish independence from the Empire. Although the estates of the Empire clearly sympathized with victims such as the widow of Horn and other nobles whose goods had been confĳiscated by Alba, they took no action whatsoever. When Maximilian II tried to intercede for these nobles, Alba referred to the treaty of Augsburg, which had put an end to impe-rial jurisdic tion in the Netherlands, ‘a free and unattached country’ (ein frei und uneingezogen land) and disregarded the emperor’s wishes com-pletely. Adam von Dietrichstein’s intercession with the Spanish king on behalf of the punished nobles, which he undertook on the instruc tions of the imperial estates, had no result either. The estates then left it at that. A much more pressing problem for them was posed by Alba’s policy to ban all imperial money from the Netherlands because an influx of debased coinage from the Empire was causing inflation there.21

20 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 157–8; Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 100–5, 151–9.

21 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 158–9; Maximilian Lanzinner, ‘Der Aufstand der Niederlande und der Reichstag zu Speyer 1570’, in Fortschritte in der Geschichtswissenschaft

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For successive diets as well as for the emperors, the problems arising from the Revolt of the Netherlands were most of the time rather periph-eral. It was in their best interest to keep those problems at bay in order not to get involved into the struggle between the Dutch rebels and the Spanish king. The circle of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, however, bore the brunt of the many hostilities between Spanish and Dutch rebel troops taking place on its territory between 1568 and 1597.22 After the pacifĳicati on of Ghent (1576), the provisional peace concluded between the states general in the royalist provinces and the Dutch rebels in the north, William of Orange for a short while tried to intensify his contacts with the Empire, but he soon turned to France and Eng land for help. It was his brother, Jan van Nassau, who consistently, but often in vain, pleaded with him and other leaders of the Revolt of the Netherlands in favour of political and military cooperation with German Protestant princes. Never-theless, in the late seventies William of Orange and his counsellors were still hoping for money and troops from the Empire, especially from the Calvinist Prince John Casimir of the Palatinate.23

After Archduke Matthias of Austria had been appointed regent of the Netherlands in September 1577 (without the consent of Philip II), hopes were raised that his brother, Emperor Rudolf II, would offfer some sort of protection or mediation, or allow the imperial estates to do so. There-fore, William of Orange thought it prudent to send one of his top politi-cians, Philip Marnix of St Aldegonde, to the Deputationstag of the imperial estates at Worms in 1578. His impassioned peroration was a fĳine piece of propaganda, accusing the Spanish of posing a serious threat not only to the Netherlands, but to the Empire as well. The Spanish were cast by him in the role of a new sinister super power striving for domination of the whole world.24

The in direct outcome of Marnix’s effforts at Worms were the peace medi-ation talks in Cologne in 1579 (Kölner Pazifĳikationstag). These talks were initiated by Emperor Rudolf II, who was fĳirmly on the side of the Spanish king, but nevertheless favoured mediations because he feared a Franco-Dutch alliance. The mediation failed completely, but nevertheless the

durch Reichstagsaktenforschung, ed. Heinz Angermeier and Erich Meuthen (Göttingen, 1988), 102–17.

22 Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 104–23.23 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 160–1.24 Monique Weis, Philippe de Marnix et le Saint Empire, 1566–78 (Brussels, 2004); the

text of Marnix’ oration ibid. 65–139; cf. also Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 161–2.



Dutch states general decided not to break offf relations with the Empire.25 The Union of Utrecht, the defensive military and political alliance of the rebel provinces of 1579 which became one of the foundations for the Dutch Republic, recognized the fact that the Netherlands had ancient ties with the Empire which should not be broken. Orange’s brother, Jan van Nassau, was still seen working for co-operation with German Calvinists.Those provinces in the eastern part of the country, especially Overijssel and Guelders, which were members of the circle of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, refused to give up their relations with the Empire mainly for economic reasons. The province of Holland had no such qualms and in 1582 planned an embassy to the emperor in order to brand the election of the Duke of Anjou as lord of the Netherlands a ‘useless’ operation. From the emperor’s point of view such an embassy possibly seemed useless as well. The diet of 1582 was the last occasion Netherlandish afffairs were dis-cussed in depth there.26

The emerging Dutch Republic developed a consistent foreign policy only during the 1590s. The emperor or the diet were not as important for it as certain individual Protestant princes of the Empire, who were regarded and treated as prospective allies. While Dutch diplomacy cen-tred on them, the emperor only received polite but noncommittal letters pointing out the inevitability of the Dutch war against the ‘tyrannical Spaniard’. Echoing Marnix’s words spoken earlier in 1578, the king of Spain was depicted as a threat to world peace as well as to the Empire. Although mediation in the Dutch war was a regular item on the agenda of the diets between 1594 and 1609, nothing happened, except the drafting of plaintive letters to the Dutch states general. There was certainly much to complain about, as Dutch troops operated from time to time on German territory, and behind the scene Dutch diplomats were constantly trying to con vince Protes tant estates of the Empire to give fĳinancial and diplomatic assistance to the Dutch Republic.27

When peace talks between the Dutch and the Spaniards started in 1607, Rudolf II lodged protests with both parties, because according to him the Netherlands were still fĳiefs of the Empire and therefore bilateral peace talks excluding the emperor, as feudal overlord of the territories

25 Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 63–6; Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 162.

26 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 162–8; Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 169–74.

27 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 164–7.

214 nicolette mout


concerned, were out of order. Neither party paid any attention to this, but the Dutch states general did take the trouble to write an apologetic letter to the emperor, stressing their position as a ‘free country’ which had now reached its complete independence from the Empire. Reproach fully, they added that they had never received any help against the ‘Spanish tyrant’ from any emperor.28

In one respect the treaty of Augsburg had functioned exceedingly well: the Empire never really interfered in Netherlandish afffairs. This did not change during the heyday of the Revolt of the Netherlands. The tenuous link between the states general of the Netherlands on the one hand, and the emperor and imperial estates on the other, was maintained at suc-cessive diets and in diplomatic cor respondence. Meanwhile, the govern-ments in Brussels and Madrid did their best to keep the emperor and the imperial estates out of Netherlandish afffairs, and on the whole their effforts met with success. The emperor never became a serious party in the conflict between the Dutch rebels and their legitimate overlord, the king of Spain. The mediation effforts by Maximilian II and Rudolf II posed no threat to the Spanish position, but they were not much of a help either. The war in the Netherlands continued to fĳigure regularly on the agenda of the imperial diets until well into the beginning of the seventeenth cen-tury, but no pertinent decisions were ever reached. As we have seen, the diet of 1582 was the last occasion Netherlandish afffairs were discussed in depth there.29

The attitude of the rebellious Dutch toward the Empire changed at the end of the century. From then onwards, Dutch foreign policy was solely dictated by the necessity to win the war and to round offf the territory of the emerging Republic of the United Provinces. The Republic found its allies in France and England rather than in the Empire, but existing bilat-eral contacts with several Protestant princes of the Empire were not bro-ken offf. In 1636, in the middle of the Thirty Years War, the Dutch desired to negotiate a treaty of neutrality with Emperor Ferdinand II. However, the emperor reminded the Dutch negotiator of the existence of the treaty of Augsburg. He stated that he could not work for peace or neutrality as long as the Dutch did not fulfĳill their obligations to the Empire as stated in the treaty.30 It must have been one of the last times that the treaty

28 Mout, ‘Die Niederlande und das Reich’, 167–8.29 Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 80–3; Mout, ‘Die Niederlande

und das Reich’, 168.30 Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 88.



of Augsburg was invoked. At that moment, however, nobody seemed to be interested any more in the moot question of the formal relationship between the Netherlands and the Empire. What counted was power poli-tics, not the fĳiner points of constitutio nal law. Finally, the Dutch Republic had come to occupy its defĳinitive position at the periphery of the Empire and would stay there until the end of its existence in 1795.

'Core and Periphery: The Netherlands and the Empire from the Late Fifteenth to the Early Seventeenth...

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