Competition and choice in charter

Innovation in Education Markets: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Competition andChoice in Charter SchoolsAuthor(s): Christopher LubienskiSource: American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 395-443Published by: American Educational Research AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699394 .

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American Educational Research Journal Summer 2003, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 395-443

Innovation in Education Markets: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of

Competition and Choice in Charter Schools

Christopher Lubienski Iowa State University

Charter schools elevate choice and competition to foster educational innovations. Indeed, these market-style mechanisms are intended to challenge standardized practices associated with district administration of schools. However, a comprehensive review of practices in charter schools indicates that, although some organizational innovations are evident, classroom strategies tend toward the familiar. Drawing on organizational and economic theory, this article considers the forces shaping educational innovation in market-oriented reforms. Although reformers assume that competition and choice necessarily lead to innovations within schools, a more complex examination of competitive institutional environments suggests that mechanisms employed by reformers may actually undercut their intended purposes. The discussion highlights the potential for choice and competition to constrain opportunities for educational innovation and to impose pedagogical and curricular conformity.

KEYWORDs: charter schools, competition, education policy, school choice.

"It's just like Pepsi-Cola!"--Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze, after sampling Coca-Cola at the opening of a new Coke bottling plant in Tiblisi

Few ideas are more closely associated with charter schools than the notion of innovation. Much of the thinking on school choice proceeds from the

premise that state-administered schools are necessarily bound by bureau-

CHRISTOPHER LUBIENSKI is an Assistant Professor of Historical and Comparative Studies in Education at Iowa State University, E155A Lagomarcino Hall, Ames, IA 50011; e-mail [email protected]. He is also a Fellow at Brown University's Advanced Studies Fellowship Program. His area of specialization is the policy and politics of education, with research interests in equity and organizational behavior in choice-based education reforms.



Lubienski

cratic regulations, inhibiting innovation and enforcing uniformity in the way that children are educated. Many reformers argue against such a "one-size- fits-all" model for education and believe that market-style mechanisms of consumer choice and competition between autonomous schools will encourage diverse and innovative approaches for increasing achievement (e.g., Anderson, 1997; Bennett et al., 1998; Caudell, 1997; Finn & Gau, 1998; Leonardi, 1998; Nathan, 1996a). Efforts to free schools from burdensome bureaucratic regulations are intended to undercut monopolistic political control of public education, giving educators in charter schools the opportunity and motivation to experiment with new instructional strategies (Allen, 2001; Budde, 1988; Kolderie, 1990). Based largely on reformers' observations of choice and competition in markets for consumer goods, these dynamics are expected to induce better achievement, more options for parents, and new ways of educating students-particularly those groups traditionally marginalized in the current public system. Thus charter schools, in particular, are often cast as "laboratories" or "R&D centers" designed to generate curricular and pedagogical approaches not available in bureaucratically bound district schools (e.g., Kolderie, 1994; Manno, Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek, 1998b; Nathan & Power, 1996; RPP International, 2001).

Yet, aside from theoretical expectations, little is known about the types of actual changes that have been engendered by these forces in and through charter classrooms (Gill, Timpane, Ross, & Brewer, 2001). Research on the effects of comparable yet more developed reforms in other nations indicates that choice and competition can lead to innovations in organizational behaviors in many cases, whereas classroom practices are relatively familiar and often revert to traditionalist modes of curriculum and instruction (Gauri, 1998; Lauder et al., 1999; Lubienski, 2001c; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998; Woods, Bagley, & Glatter, 1998). In competing for students, schools in these cases tend to emulate established conceptions of schooling rather than use their autonomy to try substantively different approaches.

In light of these patterns in other nations, this analysis examines the issue of innovation in North American charter schools.' First, by reviewing the goals and expectations of reformers, I consider the theoretical assumptions and innovative potential embedded in these schools. Expectations for innovation in charter schools are apparent across the political spectrum and are evident in state legislation, in school mission statements, and in the attraction that charter schools hold for educators as well as for market-oriented school reformers. In the subsequent section, I suggest a framework from which to study the issue of innovation in schools. That framework then serves as a lens through which to examine various forms of change represented in and by charter schools. Despite the multiple conceptions of "innovation" at play in the study of school change, the central purpose here is not to assert the inherent superiority of any one definition but to examine how the practices in charter schools reflect the expectations set out for them by theorists, legislators, and reformers. In view of those expectations, I look at how charter schools are developing novel approaches to the practice of schooling. In

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Innovation in Education Markets

general, the analysis indicates that charter schools are diversifying options for parents but not offering innovations in the manner anticipated by reformers. The concluding discussion considers a number of analytical approaches that offer insights into the patterns of change, continuity, and conformity in charter schools. Perhaps most significant, these perspectives problematize optimistic assumptions about the innovative potential of charters and other forms of school choice. Whereas reformers look to choice and competition as a way to unleash entrepreneurial innovation, this analysis suggests that, under some conditions, choice and competition may lead to counterintuitive consequences. It is not simply that the introduction of market forces into school accountability structures somehow failed to increase educational innovation; rather, curricular conformity and instructional standardization may in fact be caused by the very market mechanisms that were unleashed to address those ills.

Innovation as an Expected Outcome: Theory and Policy A viable choice system presupposes a range of options from which parents may choose. Yet, as critics note, public monopolies engender dis-incentives for trying different approaches (Coulson, 1999; Durant, 1997; Forstmann, 1999). Choice and competition encourage experimentation and diverse options in many consumer markets-for transportation, restaurants, clothes, and so on (Ascher, Berne, & Fruchter, 1996; Bennett et al., 1998; du Pont, 2001; Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Gintis in Glass, 1994; Nathan, 1996a; Peterson, 1998). Some suggest similar dynamics would be useful in forcing schools away from rigid, top-heavy administrative models to focus on the needs of students (Brandl, 1998; Hoxby, 1994). Charter advocates encourage choice, autonomy, and competition to make schools more flexible and innovative "with the perceived assumption that such innovations will produce identifiable improvements in student achievement" (Wohlstetter & Griffin, 1998, p. 3; see, e.g., Clayton Foundation, 1997, 1998; Lane, 1999; Price, 1998). In that respect themes such as "innovation," "choice," "competition," and "diversity," although they all have some value in and of themselves, often serve as intermediate goals that structure opportunities for institutions to increase achievement (Miron & Nelson, 2002). Even as intermediate goals, however, choice, competition, and innovation are cast as the necessary vehicles for advancing academic outcomes. Therefore, the extent to which school choice reforms succeed in securing these ideals indicates the likelihood of reaching the primary objective in this logic model. Moreover, innovation and diversification are primary goals for those reformers who seek ways of engaging children and communities traditionally marginalized by the "one-size-fits-all" uniformity associated with the status quo (Bosetti, 2001; Flaherty, 1995; Fulford, Raack, & Sunderman, 1997; Lane, 1999; Nathan & Power, 1996). Thus, although it should not be overstated, the significance of encouraging innovative approaches to education also should not be slighted, because it is often central to arguments for, and expectations of, school choice.

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The Market Theory Critique of the Uniformity of Public Provision

Indeed, arguments for charter schools implicitly affirm the importance of variety and innovation, particularly when they critique bureaucratically administered education as moribund, inflexible, and inefficient. "Market theory" pre- sumes diverse individual preferences that are neglected in necessarily uniform public provision, because public schools are shielded from market discipline and are not accountable to their consumers (Walberg, 2000). The public choice theory variant, in particular, is quite cogent in its critique of public administration and "provider capture" (Buchanan, 2000; Buchanan & Tullock, 1999; Kalt & Zupan, 1984; Niskanen, 1971; Romer & Rosenthal, 1979). In the case of education, of course, this notion is applied to the "education establishment" of teachers unions, administrators, and the like (Levin, 1997; Levin & Young, 1999). As a consequence of public administration, "every school ... was essentially identical to every other" (Finn & Gau, 1998, p. 79; e.g., Allen, 2001; Coulson, 1999; Dunne, Reed, & Wilbanks, 1997; Fitzgerald, 1995; Gintis, 1995; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Maranto, 1999; Peterson, 1990; Robson, 2001). The "anti-bureaucracy" sentiment of public choice theory suggests "market-based school reform" as a self-evident remedy to the uniformity associated with state provision of education (Garn, 1998; e.g., Budde, 1988; Kolderie, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994; Walberg & Bast, 2001). Charter schools are premised on individual (or family) choices where such choices are thought to best reflect the diverse preferences of the choosers rather than the dictates of monolithic bureaucracies. Communities are shaped around common interests and values, and charter schools give form to communities based on educational issues (Brandl, 1998; Clayton Foundation, 1999; Finn & Manno, 1998b; Viteritti, 1999). Public choice theorists would see such communities as homogenous preference clusters that best respond to aggregated preferences while reducing friction and conflict over such issues in the wider context (e.g., Chubb & Moe, 1990). And when this local, decentralized form of provision fails to meet the diverse needs of consumers, they have the right or responsibility to seek satisfaction of education preferences elsewhere- thereby holding publicly funded providers accountable to users through the threat or exercise of an exit option not available in pupil assignment schemes (Manno et al., 1998b; Vanourek, Manno, Finn, & Bierlein, 1997).

Although there are other motivations and justifications that serve as the catalysts for school choice reforms (such as teacher professionalism), charter schools bear the unmistakable imprint of market theory in the diagnosis of the pathologies of state provision and advocacy of alternative institutional arrangements. Market theory criticizes state administration on the assumption that public bureaucracies cannot innovate, whereas consumer choice and competition between autonomous providers offer the opportunity and incentives for innovation. For instance, Nobel laureate economists such as Milton Friedman and Gary Becker contend that choice and competition "would induce a more rapid rate of innovation into curriculum and teaching" (Becker, 1999, p. 2; Friedman, 1955; see also Chubb & Moe, 1990; Coulson,

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1994, 1996, 1999; Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Gintis, 1995; Henderson, 1997; Lieberman, 2001; Osborne, 1999; Tooley, 1999; West, 1982, 1995, 1996). Similarly, sociologist James Coleman (1990, 1997) argues that the private sector is the organizational model for innovation because businesses are accountable to external (not internal) standards, and are output-driven-not authority-driven like public school systems.

Innovation as a Policy Goal for Charter Schools

These assumptions are also quite evident in state charter school legislation. Thirty-nine states, plus Washington, D.C. (as well as Alberta, Canada), have passed laws authorizing these publicly funded schools to run largely or completely free of district oversight. The specifics vary by state-with greater flexibility, freedom from regulations, and ease of entry defining "strong laws" according to advocates-qualities that then "shape the scope, adequacy, quality, innovativeness, and educational value of charter schools" (Vanourek et al., 1997, on-line; see also Bierlein, 1997; Center for Education Reform, 2001a; Molnar, 1996; Viteritti, 1999). Thus the Illinois statute seeks "the development of innovative and accountable teaching techniques" intended to "create new, innovative, and more flexible ways of educating children" (Illinois, 1996, 27A, et seq.). As the first state to authorize charter schools, Minnesota established them as vehicles to "(1) improve pupil learning; (2) increase learning opportunities for pupils; (3) encourage the use of different and innovative teaching methods" (Minnesota, 1991, 124D.10, Sub. 1). This language is exactly the same in at least 14 states, and nearly verbatim in many others.

In fact, the policy goals for charter schools in most states are rather similar. In surveying legislative language, "innovation" was specified as a policy goal in approximately three-quarters of the laws, with virtually all of them explicitly seeking innovations in instructional practice such as "teaching methods." No other goal-including academic achievement and the diversification of programmatic options-was mentioned more frequently.2 Hence, not only is the promise of classroom innovation evident in law as a widely cited policy goal, but policymakers appear to assume a causal connection between structural reforms and innovations in classroom practice. That assumption is significant: Reformers, consistent with assumptions of market theory, expected that changes in school administrative structures would lead to "different and innovative" classroom practices.

Similar assumptions are evident in the expectations of charter autho- rizers, as well as in the charter schools themselves. For instance, Central Michigan University-which at one point had established upwards of two- thirds of the charter schools in its state-expects of the schools it charters that they "be pillars of innovation in instruction" (Khouri, Kleine, White, & Cummings, 1999, pp. 7, 25). At their inception, more than 42% of Colorado charter schools identified innovations in teaching and learning as a goal in their mission statements (see Clayton Foundation, 1997). Teachers interested in establishing or working at a charter school anticipate more freedom to

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employ "innovative methods" in pursuing their educational philosophy through classroom practices (Arizona Education Association, 1998; Clayton Foundation, 1998, 1999; Fuller, 2000a; Miron & Nelson, 2000; New Jersey Department of Education, 2001; Vanourek, Manno, Finn, & Bierlein, 1998). Some reports show similar expectations from parents and charter school founders (Clayton Foundation, 1998, 1999; New Jersey Department of Edu- cation, 2001; RPP International, 1998, 1999; SRI International, 1997; Vanourek et al., 1997). For instance, in a survey of more than 100 charter operators, "innovation" was one of the top three reasons for founding a school (see Education Commission of the States, 1995; Medler, 1996).

The frequency with which reform advocates, policymakers, and analysts endorse the expectation of educational innovations has been notably consistent over time, and is-as a whole-overwhelming (e.g., Allen, 2001; Anthes & Ziebarth, 2001; Bierlein & Mulholland, 1994; Brandl, 1998; Education Com- mission of the States & National Conference of State Legislatures, 1998; Finn & Manno, 1998a; Flake, 1999; Halpern & Culbertson, 1994; Hassel, 1999b; Hill, 1996; Kolderie, 1993, 1994, 1995; Lane, 1999; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Manno, Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek, 1998a; Manno et al., 1998b; Nathan, 1996a, 1996b; Nathan & Power, 1996; National Governors' Association, 1986, 1998; Rofes, 1996; Vanourek et al., 1997). Corporate figures such as Edison Schools chairman Benno Schmidt simply point to the business world to note, "Choice and competition breed innovation and better performance" (quoted in Symonds, Palmer, & Hylton, 2001). Likewise, policymakers from across the political spectrum embrace charters largely because, as Bill Clinton declared, the "right to choose will foster competition and innovation" (Clinton, 1997b; see also Buechler, 1997; Bush, 2001; Clinton, 1997a, 1999). Certainly, there are other goals associated with charter schools, including increased achievement, professional opportunities for teachers, and more options for parents. Indeed, some early advocates of charter schools now downplay optimistic expectations for educational innovations (e.g., Hassel, 1999b; Maranto, 1999). On the other hand, most prominent charter supporters and leading policymakers continue actively to embrace the promise that choice and competition will lead to innovations in charter school classrooms (Center for Education Reform, 2000a; Nathan, 2002). Consequently, every one of the last 11 laws passed since 1998 specifies "innovation" (almost always in teaching or learning, or both) as an expected outcome-representing a notable increase in the frequency of this goal in the legislation. For instance, in one of the most recent laws, enacted in Iowa, the potential for classroom innovation was one of two primary reasons cited by lawmakers for passing the measure-the other being access to federal funds for charter schools (Iowa State Rep. Greimann, personal communication, June 16, 2002; see also Drost, 2002). The association between charter schools and innovative educational programming is a prominent theme in the No Child Left Behind Act (2002). Indeed, insofar as the current popularity of school reforms based on choice and competition represents the future direction of school reform through vouchers and tuition tax-credits, it is important to understand the record of

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these dynamics in encouraging innovations in charter schools, where they were specifically intended to do so.

Thus there is a substantial, broad, and voluminous consensus on the potential of choice and competition to induce innovation in education. People from a wide variety of viewpoints cutting across institutional and ideological boundaries concur in the premise that organizational propen- sities for innovation and uniformity are consequences of institutional design. Consequently, reformers cast charter schools as "R&D centers" or "laboratories" to pursue "break-the-mold" innovations in classroom practice (e.g., Bosetti, 1998; Halpern & Culbertson, 1994; Wohlstetter & Griffin, 1997). " This R&D potential is an important part of any policy-oriented appraisal of the charterphenomenon" (Manno et al., 1998b, p. 490, italics mine).

Analytical Framework

Lacking a developed model of K-12 school choice in the United States, choice advocates point instead to the logic of market dynamics in other areas where goods and services are produced for consumers-restaurants, cars, higher education, and so on (e.g., Bennett et al., 1998; Friedman, 1955, 1994; Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Nathan, 1996a; Walberg, 2000). However, as noted above, comparative research on these dynamics in education systems in other nations problematizes the theoretical assumption that market dynamics will necessarily transfer into state-funded education, fostering innovation in classroom practice (Lubienski, 2001c). There being no consensus on the nature of innovation in U.S. charter schools, in this section I consider a variety of perspectives in developing an approach to analyze changes represented in charter schools. Then I apply this approach to evidence on practices in charter schools.3

Considering Innovation

Various observers advance competing conceptions of innovation intended in and through charter schools. Some predict the invention of new approaches that will "break the mold" of school practices; others focus on increasing options for local consumers (e.g., Bosetti, 1998; Halpern & Culbertson, 1994; Hassel, 1999b; Mintrom, 2000b). For example, evaluators in Pennsylvania judged charter schools to be innovative insofar as the practices in a charter school are different from the practices currently offered by the other schools in the host district (Miron & Nelson, 2000). While some argue that innovation can mean providing parents with a range of options (even familiar ones), others assess innovation in charter schools "as conventionally understood (e.g., something new)" (Good & Braden, 2000, p. 145; Stout & Garn, 1999). As this discussion of innovation has become more contentious, it is useful to distinguish between four common approaches to the question of innovation in charter schools and to identify

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their limitations for understanding the nature of change represented by charter schools:

1. A popular perspective contends that practices are innovative if they appear so in a local context (Clayton Foundation, 1997, 1998, 1999; Fitzgerald, 1995, 2000; Manno, 2001; Manno et al., 1998a, 1998b; Maranto, 1999). This subjective approach highlights the diversification goal for charter schools-deemphasizing the expected R&D "laboratory" function. It also avoids two important questions: First, under what conditions is it "innovative" to import practices from one context to another? (See Meyer, 1992.) Second, although "many charter-school founders are simply more satisfied when they do it for themselves" (Vanourek et al., 1997), is reinventing the wheel in various isolated contexts necessarily innovative?

2. Others observe that innovation does not have to emerge in the form of a singular or distinctly new inventedpractice but may involve the combination or continuation ofpreexisting practices in support ofa coherent philosophy (Fitzgerald, 2000; Flaherty, 1995; Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998; Triant, 2001). This perspective notes that nothing is new in and of itself but that all newness is a matter of recombining attributes from preexisting models. Thus applying old practices to new purposes is innovative. This approach is less helpful, however, in considering the nature of change: the degree to which new purposes are different from the old, and the extent to which innovations represent substantive or symbolic combinations of preexisting ideas. If innovation is simply a matter of recombining ideas or applying established practices in a new context, then virtually all change is innovative.

3. Some note that diversification is itself an innovation (Center for Education Reform, 2000d; Hassel, 1999b; Manno et al., 1998a, 1998b; Vanourek et al., 1997). Based on the premise of public school uniformity, this argument emphasizes the goal of providing various options for parents. While diversifying options is an obvious objective for reformers, it should not preclude consideration of the other goal in the different and innovative mandate in the authorizing legislation. Although providing more choices may be laudable, choice as an end in itself does not necessarily advance-and may in fact preempt-the other goals of charter schools, such as innovation, increased academic achievement, and inclusion of marginalized groups (Howe, 1997). By conflating diversification with innovation, such arguments disavow expectations for an "R&D center" or "laboratory" for innovative classroom practice for the whole public school system and favor the more attainable aim of providing more options for specific parents and communities.

4. Several commentators emphasize that charter schools themselves are an innovation in governance (Center for Education Reform, 2000a,

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2000c, 2000d; Hassel, 1999b; Hess, 1998; Manno, 2001; Manno et al., 1998a; Mintrom, 1997, 2000c; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Rofes, 1998a). Although this claim is true, it problematizes the diagnosis of pathologies in the public sector. As a policy innovation in school governance and administrative structures, charter schools are the result of public policymaking--not market forces-wielded as an input at the governance level to effect and structure change at another level. Thus consideration of charters as being simply a policy innovation falls outside of the scope of this article, which is concerned instead with the policy objective of encouraging "different and innovative" approaches to education. As Richard Shavelson notes, "the real issue is whether what goes on in the classroom has substantially changed" (quoted in Jacobson, 1997, p. 12).

Thus the concept of innovation itself is contested, particularly in a politi- cized area such as school reform. Organizational theory and economic models of industrial organization offer some insights into the dynamics of change in institutions and processes. For example, in thinking about the dissemina- tion of ideas, Rogers (1995) emphasizes the perception of newness for individuals in specific contexts. However, in regard to the present question, that does not help us to account for efforts by education management organizations (EMOs) to import or apply practices from one context to another through processes such as franchising, for example. Although such changes may appear innovative to some, they are not new to the franchising agency or to other practitioners in the broader context. Moreover, although a practice may emerge organically in localities isolated from knowledge of its previous use elsewhere, such notions of "innovation" encounter the "reinventing-the- wheel" problem of redundancy and inefficient use of resources (e.g., Manno, 2001). Furthermore, change alone is not innovation. As Daft and Becker (1978, p. 4) note: "Innovation is the adoption of something new; change is the adoption of something different." The question is, "New" in what context? Rather than label all change or adoption of practices imported from other systems as innovations, Meyer (1992, p. 242) suggests a standard of "at least partly exogenous support or legitimization" (see also Wakeley, 1997). Because the charter laws largely specify "different and innovative teaching methods" as the most frequently cited policy goal, we may infer an intent on behalf of policymakers that diversification of options alone is not sufficient (Good & Braden, 2000; Little Hoover Commission, 1996). Instead, it appears that many laws seek to encourage new or substantially altered practices that can benefit the education system as a whole by making teaching and learning more effective overall-simple diversification (as in bringing an established practice from one locality to another) is insufficient in terms of the stated goals of many policymakers.

Management theory equates product innovation with the act of invention because firms invest in R&D to secure advantages over competitors (Hill & Jones, 1989). The economic literature on industrial organization is a

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bit different, placing technological innovation as the central component in a process through which an invention is adapted for commercial application (innovation) before diffusion through the marketplace largely by imitation (Davies, 1988; Greer, 1984; Jacquemin, 1987; Shepherd, 1997). Insofar as such a conception of change can be applied to charter schools as R&D centers, there must be both the means of diffusion (often presumed to be competition-inspired emulation),4 and the potential for replicability of those innovations in district schools. These assumptions are not givens. Because charter schools can draw from diverse practices to support a coherent mission (Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998), some practices that they generate may not be appropriate or effective in district schools that, by their public function, must necessarily be "all things to all people" (Hassel, 1999a, p. 132). That is, inasmuch as charters are public-private hybrids (Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000; Lubienski, 2001b), they occupy an area between the different institutional roles (and consequent structural characteristics) typically played by public and private schools (Lubienski, in press; Scott & Meyer, 1994). Indeed, research suggests that coherence of mission is a positive attribute for school effectiveness and that the act of choosing schools facilitates such coherence through the clustered and aligned preferences of parents- which are not necessarily available to neighborhood schools (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 1997; Smrekar, 1996). On this point, the issue of innovation in charter schools moves into problematic questions about the public nature of schools and the value of the common school ideals or the comprehensive model relative to other goals such as effectiveness and innovation.5

In view of this range of approaches to the notion of change, this article employs three considerations for analyzing and understanding the changes represented in and by charter school practices. These considerations are hardly neat, and are mutually dependent and overlapping. Still, they are useful in examining charter school practices. As applied to the evidence from the research on charter schools reviewed below, the three considerations were posed as follows:

* At what level within the institution does the practice represent change? * To what extent is the practice established and familiar, or original

and unique? * To what extent are views on the second question informed by con-

textual perspectives across educational institutions? (That is, what is the scope of analysis?)

Thus I considered the level at which the practice occurs within institutions. This factor emerges from the analytical distinction suggested by the reform experiences in other countries, where research indicates that similar reforms succeed in inducing certain types of innovation and diversification at particular levels (for a review of this literature, see Lubienski, 2001c; see, e.g., Woods et al., 1998). Thus, I distinguished between educational changes (practices regarding curricular content and instructional strategies with immediate impact at the classroom-level) and administrative changes

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(organization-level practices and structural designs that do not directly affect classroom techniques or content), following Daft and Becker (1978; see also Meyer, 1992, on juxtaposing innovations in form and content).

Moreover, I examined changes in terms of both innovation and diversification, so as to better assess the potential of choice and competition to generate original practices in local contexts or to transfer practices within school systems. Because charters are accountable to consumers for outcomes (not processes), I use innovation in the "product development" sense-whereby providers develop new or substantively altered products for consumers (Davies & Lyons, 1988; Hill & Jones, 1989; Shepherd, 1997). This sense is consistent with the "different and innovative" aspect of the "charter law intent of encouraging new methods" (Little Hoover Commission, 1996). In that respect, I examined evidence on charter school practices in terms of their original characteristics as they would be evident to a local consumer-essentially, the quality of newness (Daft & Becker, 1978). In addition, because the "R&D potential is an important part of any policy-oriented appraisal" (Manno et al., 1998b, p. 490), I examined the unique and distinctive characteristics of charter schools within the broader context of education.

Furthermore, I attended to the policy goal of diversification of options within a given context. Because theorists locate innovation within a process of development and implementation (and implementation is assumed here, as this analysis focuses on practices reported to be in use), innovation necessarily leads to diversification. However, not all diversification is an immediate consequence of innovation, because diversification could be a result of emulating, importing, or renewing practices. Consequently, a lack of diversification implicitly indicates a lack of innovation. Yet, regardless of the means of diversification, policymakers hope to increase the variety of options for families, so I examined the record of charter schools in that respect.

Evidence on Charter School Practices

If, as market theorists have argued, the problems with public schools are symptomatic of an anti-competitive bureaucratic culture in a monopolistic education establishment, and if those problems appear in the classroom as stagnant and uncreative teaching and learning, then modifying that institutional structure is expected to spark creativity in the classroom. This prescriptive logic can be outlined as follows:

1 State policy changes-+ 2 Substantive institutional autonomy for schools and

choice for consumers--+ 3 Incentives for innovation in educational practice not possible in

district classrooms.

If this logic holds true, then a sector designed to be responsive to choice and competition would develop innovations that had been previously unavail-

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able in a sector defined by state-monopoly provision and assigned student placements. To test this assumption, one can examine innovations produced by charter schools in comparison with practices currently in use in traditionally governed district schools. Thus, within the scope of the publicly funded school system, the unit of analysis for such a comparison would be the organizational sector, as characterized by governance-that is, district-run (noncharter public) schools on the one hand and charter schools on the other- because market theorists juxtapose schools administered by districts with those driven by consumer preferences (e.g., Chubb & Moe, 1990; Coulson, 1999; Tooley, 1999; Walberg & Bast, 2001).

Data and Analysis

To examine the assumption that charter schools would generate innovative practices, I reviewed all known research and scholarly studies available that reported evidence of innovations in charter schools. Specifically, to understand the nature of innovative practices in charter schools as compared with district schools, I focused on charter school practices cited as innovations in these reports as the data for my analysis. Following Light and Pillemer (1984), this exploratory review of research attempted to "cast as wide a net as possible" in accessing every study available on the topic, to consider a broad range of practices. This approach would control for any potential selection bias in gathering studies and assembling lists of practices reported as innovative.

In all, approximately 190 published works were collected that deal with the issue of innovation in charter schools in some significant way. (Published works on this topic were compiled through regular and exhaustive Web searches, ERIC searches, and comprehensive literature reviews of publications focusing on charter schools.) Of those, a substantial number of the publications made no pretensions of scholarly inquiry. Many were not based on systematic observations of charter schools but instead made unsubstantiated assertions in attacking or advocating for charter schools; as such, they were not useful in understanding charter school practices and were thus set aside.6 Of those offering evidence on innovative practices in charter schools collected in any systematic manner, none were excluded. Consequently, this article analyzes practices reported in 56 studies-including state-level evaluations and other research reports that provide evidence regarding innovative practices in charter schools.7 Taken together, this broad collection of studies represents the most comprehensive research available on the topic of charter school innovation-providing a rich set of data on charter school practices.

Of these reports, most have been published recently (86% since 1997), and several focus only on charter schools that have been in operation for some time. Although the reports provide primary data on innovations in charter schools, the numerous studies used various methods of inquiry to gather data: classroom observations, examinations of curriculum materials, interviews with employees and parents, and innovations self-reported by charter school operators. The studies were undertaken by a number of orga-

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nizations, groups, and individuals with a range of interests in charter schools. Their stated conclusions often diverge from each other on the issue of charter school innovations because of conflicting conceptions of the issue. However, as is demonstrated below, the weight of the evidence from multiple reports suggests an overall (albeit unacknowledged) consensus on the nature of changes represented in and by charter schools.

In light of the multiple definitions of "innovation" used by the authors of charter school reports, the practices analyzed here are necessarily derived from sources with uneven standards for identifying innovative practices. Yet, to explore the research and development potential of charter schools, it is essential that the use of this data drawn from such reports be as inclusive as possible, with no prior restrictions imposed on what the various reports may, in a sense, "nominate" as an innovative practice to be considered in this analysis. This approach allows for analyses of perspectives and definitions relative to variations in findings. Consequently, no studies were excluded on the basis of a particular standard or definition of "innovation." The result was a richer set of examples of innovation to consider as potentially new or significant departures from existing practices.8

Thus practices reported as charter school innovations in these reports were compared with practices already in use in district schools, in order to test the assumption of "market-based reform" that location in a sector defined by choice and competition would lead to the development of innovations not possible in a state-administered system (Walberg & Bast, 2001). As noted above, I reviewed each individual study-without regard to how the authors defined "innovation"-and compiled the practices cited into lists, by study. Then, on the basis of the analytical framework outlined in the preceding section, I considered each of three dimensions in characterizing the innovative nature of each practice:

1. The level within the institution: administrative and/or classroom level. As suggested by literature on organizational theory, innovation could be expected in organization-level structures and practices (in governance, structure, and relationships external to the classroom) or in practices that would be primarily evident in the classroom- what Daft and Becker (1978) characterize as "administrative" and "educational" innovations, respectively (see also Meyer, 1992). As noted above, these categories are consistent with findings from research on comparable school choice reforms in other nations and are also evident in state legislation that seeks innovations not only in governance but also in "learning" and "teaching methods."

2. The distinctive nature of the practice: replications offamiliarprac- tices, adoption of practices used elsewhere, or development of new practices. These three categories emerge from the conflicting perspectives on what constitutes "innovation," in relation to "diversification" of options (discussed above). The dimensions are intended to account for contrasting interpretations and theoretical perspectives

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regarding innovation, while examining the record of charter schools in meeting the "different and innovative" legislative expectation.

3. The appearance of innovation in a given context: local, state, or national. Because ways of addressing the preceding dimension are necessarily contextually dependent, this third dimension takes into account the perspectives of various constituencies and goals. The degree of innovative-ness as it appears to someone choosing a charter school would usually be informed by the local context (i.e., the set of options immediately available to a particular parent). Yet charter schools are authorized in state laws, which often set out expectations for then (hence, many of the reports are state-level evaluations). Still, theoretical expectations for innovation are usually framed in the context of system-wide sectors, as defined by governance (e.g., "government schools," "autonomous schools").

Each practice that was cited as innovative was categorized on these three dimensions. Although most practices could be neatly described as either "administrative" (marketing, merit pay) or "educational" (Afrocentric focus in curriculum, hands-on learning), some of the practices-especially programmatic ones-fell into both categories (an Edison school model, block scheduling). Likewise, many of the practices that were cited as innovations would be quite familiar to educational researchers and other observers of school policy, history, and reform, but were new in a local community. For example, many teachers established charters to introduce child-centered practices popular in the progressive era into a local community; in some cases, although practices had been developed elsewhere, charter schools were the first schools in a given state to adopt a particular curriculum---Core Knowl- edge in Colorado, for instance. In most cases, it was relatively clear whether a practice was already in use elsewhere in the public school system before its appearance in a charter school. However, a few cases (e.g., Waldorf curriculum, parent contracts) required an examination of current practices in other schools to ascertain the degree of "newness" of a charter practice in a given state or in the nation. Practices for which no corresponding evidence of use elsewhere was found were then treated as being innovative at some level (e.g., the "Reggio Emilia" approach, teacher-run cooperative). Furthermore, the simple existence of a practice in surrounding noncharter public schools, for instance, did not disqualify that practice as an innovation in this analysis. As R&D centers, charter schools are expected to develop and diffuse practices to other schools. This study focused on the development function. Therefore, charter practices are identified here as innovative even if they are also in use in other schools, provided they were developed, adapted, or substantially altered first by charter schools before adoption elsewhere.

This analysis draws from these varied reports in considering charter school innovations in comparison to practices in noncharter public schools.9 Hence, the analytical approach employed here offers the advantage of dis- tinguishing areas and types of change by sector. Furthermore, it is consistent

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not only with the assumptions of market theory but with the pronounced policy goals spelled out in charter school legislation, mission statements, and stakeholder expectations for "new" and "innovative" approaches to education different from practices currently in use in the public school system.

Findings on Types of Innovation

By the fact of their existence, charter schools often enrich the range of options available to parents in a given locality. Overall, based on the range of practices reported as innovative in these and other studies, it would appear that charter schools are embracing a variety of approaches regarding both organizational structure and curriculum. For instance, a number of charters incorporate curricular programs such as Core Knowledge or a Montessori philosophy (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999; Clayton Foundation, 1997, 1998, 1999; Colorado Department of Education, 2001; Gifford, Phillips, & Ogle, 2000; Hassel, 1999a; Horn & Miron, 2000; Lange, Lehr, Seppanen, & Sinclair, 1998; Legislative Audit Bureau [Wisconsin], 1998; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Maranto, 1999; Vanourek et al., 1997; Viteritti, 1999). Others establish discipline codes, require student uniforms, solicit parental involvement, or use marketing techniques to promote information about themselves.10 Still others experiment with instructional and technological support for children schooled at home (Clayton Foundation, 1999; Huerta, 2000). Clearly, many charter schools are free to try new or different practices in any number of areas.

However, the R&D function that is assumed in their design has produced mixed results, with obvious innovations in organizational activities but fewer clear innovations in the classroom. Findings in this regard sometimes vary by study-even within a single state. To illustrate this variance, Table 1 offers synopses of findings on a sample of states-the three states that have been subject to the most studies.11

Legislation in California and Colorado is judged to be moderately strong, while Michigan's law is among the most favorable for charter schools, according to charter proponents (Center for Education Reform, 2001a). The studies in Michigan were conducted by different research teams during the same approximate period of time, and the findings are rather similar across studies. Findings from annual evaluations of charter schools in Colorado are relatively consistent over time, with researchers noting new practices in governance, for instance, while educators in charter schools emphasized pedagogical innovations. Some studies of California charter schools have found a range of innovations; others conclude that schools are not reaching their innovative potential (indeed, they report a substantial degree of conformity to standard practices). The diversity of findings in these various reports-by state, and within states--demonstrates the ways in which both perspective and institutional context may shape perceptions of the innovative aspects of charter schools. But it also exemplifies the distinct areas of focus on different types of innovation, and it highlights the need for an interpretive syn- thesis of the disparate findings.

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Table 1 Sample of Findings of Studies, by State

Study Findings on innovation

California Anderson, L., & Marsh, J. (1998) Innovations in hiring and employment and parental

participation requirements. Teacher interviews and classroom observations indicated little innovation in classroom practice, except in home-based instruction.

Becker, H. J., Nakagawa, K., Use of parent contracts, student selection. & Corwin, R. G. (1997)

Corwin, R. G., & Implementing more innovations than comparison Flaherty, J. F. (1995) district schools. Innovations included project-

based instruction, site-based management, community and parent participation, and targeting of specific populations.

Flaherty, J. F. (1995) Similar rate of implementation of self-reported educational and organizational innovations between charter schools and comparison schools. Innova- tions in project and technology-based learning, targeting specific populations.

Link, J., Gordon, H., & Reported on three district-chartered schools, finding Khanna, R. (1999) innovations in governance and curriculum:

scheduling, language requirements, etc. Use of curriculum packages, focus on leadership and international themes.

Little Hoover Commission (1996) Found much diversity. Some "innovations" in curricular themes preceded charter status, but most were familiar.

Rothstein, R., Carnoy, M., & Found more differences within school sectors than Benveniste, L. (1999) between them. Differences between schools were

more a matter of social class of community than school type. Charter teachers defended pedagogy from parent demands for academics.

SRI International (1997) Innovations in governance, home-based instruction, mandatory parent contracts; 87% of charter respondents used traditional classroom approaches.

Wohlstetter, P., & Griffin, N. Interviewed founders in Los Angeles (and cities in (1997, 1998) other states), finding that more autonomy led to

greater flexibility for adopting programs, but that schools were not capitalizing on opportunities "for implementing cutting-edge innovations in teaching and learning."

Colorado Clayton Foundation Charters provided diverse options. Innovations in

(1997, 1998, 1999) governance, organization, parent involvement, and teacher employment practices. Curricular programs and innovations already available in district schools. Charters were not serving as "laboratories of innovation."

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Table 1 Sample of Findings of Studies, by State (Continued)

Study Findings on innovation

Colorado Department of More than 60% of schools used recognized national Education (2001) reform models. They used pedagogical approaches,

student grouping strategies, and team teaching method that were already widely available in district schools.

Fitzgerald, J. (1995, 2000) Found innovations in governance and employment, parent involvement. Reported respondents' descrip- tions of innovative teaching.

Michigan Arsen, D., Plank, D., & Sykes, G. Innovations in organization, governance, and man-

(1999) agement. Some schools employed curricular packages and ethnic themes. Otherwise, innovations in teaching and learning were marginal and no more significant or frequent than those available in district schools.

Horn, J., & Miron, G. "Few and limited innovations," usually in manage- (1999, 2000) ment and operations (although desirability was

questioned). Self-reported "innovations" in classroom practices were familiar and often distinctly traditional.

Khouri, N., Kleine, R., White, R., Innovations in administration: site-based control & Cummings, L. (1999) counteracted by EMOs. Organizing around themes;

"basic" approaches and other "common" methods. Niche schools focused on ethnic or at-risk groups.

Mintrom, M. (2000) Striking similarities across school types, with charter innovations no more frequent or remarkable than in district schools. Innovations in scheduling, foreign language requirements, uniforms.

Miron, G., & Nelson, C. (2002) Innovations in organization but few in curriculum and instruction. Competition is leading to uniforms and marketing.

Plank, D. N., & Sykes, G. (1999) Innovations tend to appear as programmatic add-ons, not in technical core; move to traditionalist instruction and basic skills. Exceptions are Edison and ethnic-based schools. Competition is leading to advertising.

Reynolds, K. (2000) Increased diversity of options. Self-reported innovations in organization, administration, and governance, including class size, scheduling, uniforms, and parent involvement. Educare school was innovative. Study found educational innovations in themes and in character and content focus, but in familiar areas.

Note. The three states included here have been examined by a number of studies over relatively long time periods.

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Organizational and Administrative Changes

As noted earlier, school responses to autonomy and competition are likely to appear in different ways-in administrative-level innovations and in educational innovations in classroom activities at the technical core of the organization (Daft & Becker, 1978). At the administrative level there is much evidence of both new and different practices in charter schools. As substantially autonomous schools, charters tend to have more control over their budgets and can direct resources in response to local conditions and goals. Several reports note that the administration of charter schools is becoming more entrepreneurial than is typically seen in public schools (Finn et al., 2000; Nathan, 1996a; Teske, Schneider, Buckley, & Clark, 2000; Triant, 2001; Vanourek et al., 1997). Many charter schools are experimenting with governance, financial arrangements, and employment practices such as merit pay that are not in use in most public schools (Anderson & Marsh, 1998; Podgursky & Ballou, 2001). Similarly, charter schools often experiment with new forms of stakeholder input into school governance, such as instituting formalized agree- ments with parents or seeking to enhance communication with the child's home (Becker, Nakagawa, & Corwin, 1997; Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998; SRI International, 1997; Teske et al., 2000).

Based on the evidence in the research on charter practices, charter schools appear to be using their administrative autonomy to experiment with many structural and programmatic approaches that offer parents more options (the "different" part of the "different and innovative" mandate). In many states, charters are implementing a range of organizational practices; some are familiar, but many are new in local communities as well as in the publicly funded sector as a whole. Indeed, in organizational behavior and administrative practice, charter schools are engaging in a whole range of approaches to governance and administration, as they have been designed with a degree of institutional autonomy that affords them opportunities to operate in ways currently unavailable to most district schools. For example, many charter schools are smaller or have smaller class sizes, or both-characteristics made possible through administrative flexibility that allows schools to shift resources as they see fit (Clayton Foundation, 1999; Education Commission of the States, 1995; Good & Braden, 2000; Kane, 1998; Miron & Nelson, 2000; Podgursky & Ballou, 2001; Urahn & Stewart, 1994). A substantial number of the schools adjust traditional boundaries of schooling-scheduling and age-grouping, for instance-to provide a distinctive option for parents (Clayton Foundation, 1997, 1998, 1999; Colorado Department of Education, 2001; Fitzgerald, 2000; General Accounting Office, 1995; Gifford et al., 2000; Link, Gordon, & Khanna, 1999; Little Hoover Com- mission, 1996; Mintrom, 2000b; Miron & Nelson, 2000; Urahn & Stewart, 1994). Charter schools are able to move away from the comprehensive or common school model of being "all things to all people" by focusing on serving specific groups-based on interest, ethnicity, risk factors, and so on (Bosetti, 2001; Bosetti et al., 2000; Corwin & Flaherty, 1995; Education Commission of the States, 1995; Flaherty, 1995; Lange et al., 1998; Legislative Audit Bureau

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[Wisconsin], 1998; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Rebarber, 1997; Rofes, 1998b). There is a wide range of organizational activities in charter schools, many of which appear as clear innovations across contexts. The evidence in this respect supports the general consensus in these reports regarding the success of this reform in developing new organizational practices.

Educational Changes

Regarding educational practices in the classroom, charters employ diverse approaches that often distinguish them from other schools in their area, thus offering choices to parents through a range of classroom-level options. For instance, many charter schools use technology as a tool to deliver or support instruction or as an instructional theme (Clayton Foundation, 1997, 1998, 1999; Corwin & Flaherty, 1995; Education Commission of the States, 1995; Flaherty, 1995; Gifford et al., 2000; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Miron & Nelson, 2000; Price, 1998; Rebarber, 1997; Reynolds, 2000; SRI International, 1997; Teske et al., 2000; Urahn & Stewart, 1994). And, certainly, while public schools have used technology in distance education, for example, on-line charter schools are introducing new types of delivery-often profit-driven- representing an innovation in school organization with a great potential for significant educational innovations. Another notable trend that many would consider to be innovative is evident in the number of schools that use individualized education planning or instruction for all students-a possibility directly related to their smaller size and favorable student-staff ratios, which in turn are related to their administrative flexibility for directing resources as they see fit (Bosetti, 2001; Clayton Foundation, 1997, 1998, 1999; Division of Charter Schools & Texas Education Agency, 2000; Gifford et al., 2000; Miron & Nelson, 2000; Reynolds, 2000; Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998; Urahn & Stewart, 1994; Vanourek et al., 1997; Viteritti, 1999). Overall, about half of the reports found "innovative" or "diverse" practices in charter school classrooms.

However, such findings do not reflect a general consensus in the research regarding innovations at the classroom level-largely because of differing interpretations of "innovation." Almost one third of the reports cited few or no practices unique to charter classrooms (e.g., Good & Braden, 2000; Good, Braden, & Drury, 2000; Horn & Miron, 1999, 2000; Khouri et al., 1999; Legislative Audit Bureau [Wisconsin], 1998; Mintrom, 2000a; Miron & Nelson, 2000; Plank & Sykes, 1999; Stout & Garn, 1999; Wohlstetter & Griffin, 1998). For instance, the Clayton Foundation (1998, p. 21) noted in its evaluation of Colorado charter schools that almost "all of the approaches ... are being used by conventional public schools." Indeed, in view of the market theory critique of district governance, the R&D expectations specified in state charter school laws, and the initial expectations shared by charter school founders and teachers, there is a notable paucity of classroom practices developed in charter schools that were not already available outside the charter school model. Thus many of the reports finding innovations in charter schools are holding to a much lower standard than would be consistent with the assumptions of market theory or with other widely held expectations.

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As an illustration of this, Table 2 lists practices that were reported as innovations in states with the strongest laws where charter schools had been in existence for the longest period. Although not exhaustive (because of space considerations), these lists are relatively comprehensive in that they capture the kinds of practices typically cited. Of the "strong" states, these four had the most schools-together representing approximately 30% of the all charter schools in the United States-and had been studied in multiple reports.

The types of practices listed in Table 2 tend to fall into three categories. First, there are a number of administrative innovations, many of which are relatively rare in district schools: employment practices such as merit pay, hiring noncredentialed teachers, contracting for services, and so on. As noted above, charter schools are developing clear innovations in these areas by almost all accounts and measures. Second, there are a number of innovative charter school practices that are not transferable to most public schools. A focus on hearing-impaired students, the use of parent contracts, or an Afrocentric curriculum may offer advantages for educating some students; yet such innovations, by their nature, are largely unfeasible in the district sector-contrary to the R&D function for charter schools. Finally, many of the educational practices listed as innovations were, in fact, already evident in the district- administered classrooms (e.g., hands-on learning, use of portfolios, and cooperative learning).12 Charter schools were reported to be innovative in offering parents options in such areas as technology-focused instruction, year-round schedules, an emphasis on safety and order, and "alternative" options such as Montessori or a "back-to-basics" approach. But so do many district schools. Other reported innovations such as small class size, multi- age grouping, and integrated curricula (General Accounting Office, 1995), and character and citizenship training (Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998) are also already practiced in many traditionally governed public schools.13 Indeed, even in cases where innovations straddle administrative and educational categories-for example, block scheduling, all-day kindergarten, and nongraded classes-the evidence available in these reports indicates that the impact in the classroom tends to remain within the range of practices already available within the public sector. Whether such practices are "innovative" depends on the context in which one considers them. Table 3 offers a schematic representation of the analytical framework discussed above- applied here to classroom practices in charter schools.

In Table 3 the apparent originality of a classroom practice is scaled on the vertical classification on the left-from imitating established practices (familiar), to inventing novel approaches (new). Because familiarity and newness are context-dependent, the contextual perspectives relevant to analyzing this issue (as outlined in the framework) are arranged along the horizontal classifications along the top-from the local (perspective of a parent, for instance), to the national (within the system of public sector schools).

As illustrated in this representation, charter classroom practices would appear in a local context as spanning the spectrum from the familiar to the new (the left column of the scheme). Yet in a state-level context (the middle

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r Vr

Table 2 Practices Reported as Innovative, by State

Arizona Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota

* Employment practices * Multi-age grouping * Management and operations * Teacher-run co-op * Arts focus/integrated arts * Thematic instruction * Corporate governance * Community service projects * Back-to-basics * Vocational * Ethnicity-based curricula * Montessori * Computer-based * Employment practices * Technology theme * Afrocentric focus * Core knowledge * Coherent mission * School-to-work focus * Hearing-impaired focus * Great books focus * Extended schedule * Whole-school programs * Code of conduct * Marketing * Merit pay * Theme based * Discipline-intensive * Montessori * Parent contracts * Smaller school/smaller class size * Student-centered * Multiple intelligences * IEPs for all students * Employment practices * Curriculum-based measurement

emphasis * Character education * Parent involvement * Cooperative learning * Saxon math * Before-and-after-school programs * Basics/core knowledge focus * De-tracking * Waldorf * Gifted and talented programs * Character/citizenship focus * Team teaching * Block scheduling * Environmental focus * Multicultural emphasis * Hands-on learning * Non-graded classes * Museum-type approach * Contracting for services * Project-based learning * Thematic curriculum * At-risk focus * Advertising * Use of computers * Business focus * Academic rigor * All-day kindergarten * Low-income and at-risk focuses * Portfolios * Edison curriculum * Finance arrangements * IEPs for all students * Smaller class size * Marketing * Student uniforms * Multidisciplinary * Use of advertising * Ethnic focus See, e.g., Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, See, e.g., Lange et al., 1998; Urahn * Child-centered See, e.g., Hassel, 1999; Podgursky 1999; Dykgraaf & Lewis, 1998; & Stewart, 1994. * Active learning & Ballou, 2001; Rosenblum Horn & Miron, 1999, 2000; See, e.g., Gifford et al., Brigham Associates, 1998; Teske Khouri, Kleine, White, &

2000; Glassman, 1998; et al., 2000; Triant, 2001. Cummings, 1999; Mintrom, 2000; Maranto, 1999; Podgursky Miron & Nelson, 2002; Plank & & Ballou, 2001; Sykes, 1999. Stout & Garn, 1999.



Lubienski

Table 3 Originality of Classroom-Level Practices in Charter Schools, by Context

Context

Local State National Degree of originality (subjective) (legislative) (sector)

Familiar (replication/imitation) X X X Not new, but different in context

(adoption/adaptation) X X New (invention/innovation) X

Note. X indicates that practices have been identified in reports.

column), most of the practices that might seem innovative at the local level would now appear to replicate approaches already familiar in the state or known from elsewhere (an example is Massachusetts charters using the Edison curriculum). What is striking in the analysis at this level is how the areas of potential contribution most anticipated by market theorists-new practices not possible in the bureaucratically administered sector-are generally vacant. This pattern is particularly apparent in the national context (the right column), where charters do not appear to be engaging in practices that are new or even different from practices already available in the district- governed sector of the nation's publicly funded school system-the comparison group for market theorists. Hence, according to this representation, charter practices appear to be diversifying options for parents in some local contexts. Yet in the wider scheme of educational practice, charters are not developing options outside the range of what is already evident in schools. If these approaches are "innovative," then their earlier existence in public schools undermines the market theory premise that innovations occur outside the regulated bureaucratic sector. From the evidence available in the studies, it appears that charter classroom practices tend to be familiar, or different from other practices only in specific local contexts-thereby undercutting a critical R&D assumption of market-based school reform.

Evidence from Arizona and Michigan illustrates this pattern of organizational change coupled with pedagogical and curricular conformity. Because of the perception that bureaucracy inhibits innovation and because proposed voucher legislation was not enacted (Bolick, 1998; Keegan, 1999), Arizona has been a leading state in the charter school movement in terms of the num- bers of schools and their institutional autonomy (Garn, 1998). In fact, Arizona charter schools have pioneered a number of organizational innovations, such as advertising their services and embracing new employment practices (Gifford et al., 2000; Glassman, 1998; Maranto, 1999; Podgursky & Ballou, 2001). Yet, in a comprehensive study of 75 Arizona charter schools, Stout and Garn (1999) found little to support the expectation that charter schools would develop new practices in the classroom.

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Likewise, in Michigan, a state where inter-district choice and charter schools have substantially empowered parents as consumers and schools as quasi-autonomous providers, several recent reports cast doubt on presumptions of innovation. Although Arsen, Plank, and Sykes (1999), Horn and Miron (1999, 2000), Khouri et al. (1999), and Mintrom (2000b) found diverse offerings across an array of charter schools, their reports demonstrate that charter schools are not achieving expected classroom innovations. After analyzing innovations self-reported by charter schools, Horn and Miron (2000) concluded that few if any innovations were emerging:

We began our study of charter school initiatives with certain expectations and assumptions that innovations would occur in charter schools, that their sheer development would be cause for innovation. Unfortunately, overall innovations are not occurring in Michigan charter schools. (p. 26)

Instead, they found many schools reverting to traditional instructional practices.

There are a few exceptions to this general pattern. For example, I did not identify any district-run schools with a comprehensive whole-school environmental focus or a museum-style structure; it appears that these are innovations developed in charter schools. In addition, the Reggio Emilia approach-a critical-thinking focus developed in Italy-was embraced by a California charter school (Link et al., 1999). Use of this early learning program is concentrated almost exclusively in private and university-run preschools; it has no real pres- ence in U.S. public schools. However, exceptions such as these are remarkably infrequent and do not appear to represent any coherent trend of classroom-level innovations produced by charter schools.

Instead, much evidence indicates that there may be a trend toward standardization of practice-rather than innovation-in many of these schools. For example, Hassel (1998, p. 255) analyzed the curricular and pedagogical approach of 80 charter schools in several states and found that 54% reported a "basics" emphasis, a vocational focus, a traditional subject orientation, or a "general" approach; 9% were specific culture-centric; another 36% were "alternative" but featured familiar educational models. Furthermore, he noted other states where operators were not breaking new ground in classroom practice but, rather, embracing "well-known" curricular approaches (Hassel, 1999b, p. 85). Price (1998) reports similar findings with data from the Center for Education Reform, noting that more than 40% of the 261 charter schools surveyed reported a "back to-basics" or core-knowledge approach (see also Center for Education Reform, 2000b). Similarly, Arsen et al. (1999) saw choice and charters as bringing more "traditional" forms of instruction into use rather than fostering innovations (see also Education Commission of the States, 1995; Gifford et al., 2000; Hassel, 1999a; Plank & Sykes, 1999; Stout & Garn, 1999; Viteritti, 1999). Where innovations do appear, they tend to be structural or programmatic supplements rather than fundamental changes in classroom practice (Plank & Sykes, 1997, 1999). Perhaps most important, despite their

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initial optimism, teachers in charter schools confirm this perception of constraints on innovation after working in the schools. The percentage of teachers agreeing with the statement "The school will support/is supporting innovative practices" declined significantly--down 25% from when they were surveyed on first joining a charter school (Khouri et al., 1999, p. 56; see also Miron & Nelson, 2000). Whereas teachers were often cast in roles as inno- vators developing new and exciting curricula (e.g., Finn, Manno, & Bierlein, 1996), the reality is that they often implement curricular decisions made by building or corporate managers or EMOs (Dykgraaf & Lewis, 1998; Horn & Miron, 2000; see also Finn et al., 2000; Triant, 2001).

In general, the findings of this analysis indicate that (a) by offering alternatives for parents, charter schools are diversifying alternatives in areas such as class size, technology, and programmatic options; (b) charter schools are implementing innovations in governance, management, and other organizational practices; and (c) with few exceptions, rather than developing new educational practices, charter schools are embracing curricular and instructional approaches already in use in other public schools. Indeed, a substantial plu- rality of charter schools employ a traditional "basics" approach to instruction.

Hence, with respect to the logic of market-oriented prescriptions outlined above, the logic of quasi-market mechanisms has produced an outcome different from what was anticipated in the logic of market-oriented reformers:

1 State policy changes--+ 2 Substantive institutional autonomy for schools and choice

for consumers-+ 3 Failure of incentives for innovation in practices not present

in district classrooms.

Despite the intentions of market theorists and policymakers, charters are not "breaking the mold" in classrooms. Instructional practices and materials in charter school classrooms are relatively familiar--despite institutional autonomy, competitive incentives, and accountability to consumers. The problem with the original logic model appears to be located somewhere between the second and third assumptions. The dynamics of choice and competition built into the charter school design are likely contributing to changes in organizational structures and administrative behaviors. However, contrary to the assumptions of market theorists regarding the need to base charter schools on these market-style mechanisms, the prior existence in the district-administered sector of practices cited as innovations in charter schools indicates that charter school status, as such, is neither sufficient nor necessary for the development of innovations in curriculum or instruction. Some may attribute these trends to the relative youth of the charter movement (Rofes, 1998b; Triant, 2001); however, little difference appears across states with newer or older legislation. And similar patterns are apparent in nations with more developed choice systems (Lubienski, 2001c). This consistency across time and context suggests that institutional and environmental considerations may be more

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important than the longevity of choice and competition policies in explaining curricular conformity.

In attempting to explain such patterns, research suggests several reasons for the notable success that charter schools have demonstrated in some areas and the paucity of results in others. In the final section of this article, I discuss types of explanations for the disconnect between theoretical assumptions and the realities of the educational marketplace. After briefly reviewing several proposed explanations, I suggest that, rather than focusing on how to better lib- erate choice and competition as catalysts for change, policymakers might consider some ways in which the interactions of institutions within market dynamics may themselves cause curricular and pedagogical conformity.

Discussion: Understanding Patterns of Innovative Practices

Across charter schools in various states, research demonstrates virtually no innovations in curriculum or instructional strategies. In addition to the paucity of innovations in classroom practice, there may be underlying nascent tendencies toward homogenization, or "isomorphism," as schools use their newfound autonomy to emulate established practice found in successful schools. Several types of explanations for these patterns are available.

Dynamics of Consumer Choice

Because charter reforms elevate consumer preferences to a more influential position, there are distinct possibilities regarding the role of parental demand in shaping and, indeed, constraining provision.

Parents as Inherently Conservative Consumers

In an age that emphasizes diverse learning styles, arguments for elevating parental preferences as a primary determinant of educational provision pre- sume that parental preferences for education are diverse and that those preferences should influence providers to innovate to meet diverse demand (e.g., Viteritti, 1999). In fact, some evidence suggests that many parents- as an "inherently conservative clientele"-view public schools as overly innovative because these schools embrace many fads and progressive reforms (Ravitch, 2000; see Whitty et al., 1998, p. 90). Indeed, in contrast with reformers' preoccupation with innovation, many parents are often more concerned with immediate academic issues (Arsen et al., 1999; Kohn, 1998; Teske et al., 2000). While charters may empower teachers as profes- sionals to establish a school around a shared philosophy or pedagogical approach, they may run up against the discipline of the market, where parental preferences constrain opportunities for innovation (Rothstein, Carnoy, & Benveniste, 1999).

Nevertheless, it is important to avoid essentializing all parents as oppos- ing innovation, particularly in concluding that consumer-oriented schools will not be innovative (see, e.g., Arsen et al., 1999; Hassel, 1999b; Henig, 1996;

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Lane, 1999; Maranto, Milliman, Hess, & Gresham, 1999b; Plank & Sykes, 1999). Parents in general may not look to enroll their children as guinea pigs in experimental schools, but that is not the point. Instead, market mechanisms in education are thought to have the potential not only to produce innovative options (product innovations), but innovative processes of production. Such processes can produce familiar outcomes but in more efficient and effective ways that are largely outside parents' view when they are "shopping for schools." That is, consumers may not be looking for innovations in socks or soft drinks, but they look to benefit from innovative production processes that give them better quality or lower prices, or both. Consumer demand is supposed to cause innovation, even if the demand is not for innovation itself (Hill & Jones, 1989).

Consumer Information

In a complicated and often obscured production process such as education, what consumers see may be an insufficient basis from which to make a rational and informed decision-but it is all they have to go on. The market theorist's idealized "rational chooser" would use whatever information is available in making a choice (Walberg, 2000). Yet school effectiveness is far from clear. Insofar as parents focus on enhancing a child's achievement over time, the evidence most readily available at any one time is a school's achievement-which is largely a reflection of the socioeconomic status (SES) of its student intake (and perhaps peer effects), not simply the school's value- adding potential. Thus "rational" parents may shop for schools on the basis of more obvious indicators of social characteristics in intake, as represented by other consumers, rather than on the basis of obscured information such as innovative processes. Shrewd administrators may concentrate on shaping their student intake through themes and marketing to attract higher SES students rather than on diversifying or innovating, because the consumer product, rather than the process, may be a more certain route to improved tests scores and market position.

Furthermore, even if parents do have a range of preferences regarding education, the need to judge institutions and outcomes requires standardized criteria for evaluation. The need for a unidimensional standard can limit the range of alternatives for schools competing for students. Educators may wish to experiment with alternative forms of instruction or assessment, but without guaranteed resources they need to demonstrate for consumers their effectiveness relative to other schools. Thus National Heritage Academies-the only profitable EMO-does not focus on innovation but uses practices borrowed from religious schools (Golden, 1999; Schnaiberg, 1999; Walsh-Sarnecki, 1999). Charter pioneer Joe Nathan (1998, p. 502) advises charter schools "to look at carefully evaluated, proven approaches." Therefore, presumptions about the deadening conformity in public schools may, in fact, have it back- wards. Indeed, autonomous schools can use their newfound freedom to be familiar-by focusing on narrowed "instrumentalist" conceptions of school-

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ing (Lubienski, 2001a, in press). Although, according to many critics, coherence of mission on academic goals is not necessarily a bad thing, it can limit opportunities for innovation promised by reformers, particularly regarding some of the other societal goals imposed on public schools. Thus educators who establish a school on an idea such as heterogeneous grouping or serving at-risk students may find it difficult to provide consumers with evidence justifying their approach.

Quasi-Market Failures

If public provision engenders pathologies in satisfying individual preferences, then the continued public role in market-style provision also creates problems that hinder the capacity for innovation through "quasi-markets" (see Bartlett, 1993). Unlike businesses in a "genuine market," schools are in an ambiguous position for sensing and responding to market-style signals (Hirschman, 1970; Meyer, 1992). Likewise, the production processes are difficult to control, and outcomes are difficult to measure (Meyer, 1992). Particularly when bound by obligations such as open access and equity, schools often do a poor job of acting like private providers in many respects, including innovation (Lehman, 1997; Payne, 2000). Whereas a typical business may innovate in response to the exit of patrons, administrators in open-access institutions are sometimes relieved to be free of the burden of quarrelsome patrons.14

In education the identity of the consumer-a central role in the economic cast of characters-is ambiguous and is confounded by the production process. Students most immediately "consume" education, but usually are not themselves the "customers" choosing between options in an education market system. Parents are the "proxy-consumers" in choosing for their children, but they do not "consume" in the sense of enjoying the individualized capital effects of education as a direct personal benefit (Brighouse, 1997; see also Brown, 1992). Others see the community or society as the ultimate consumer of education because the externalities of widespread provision involve general social effects (Labaree, 2000; Meyer & Rowan, 1992b), such as crime rates, fertility rates, and social capital. Yet many economists dispute the idea that society is the consumer; in their view, societal benefits are external or subsequent to the purpose of education, which is directed at individuals (e.g., Gintis, 1995). Finally, there is an underlying theme in school reform- evident in many charter schools-that employers are the primary consumers of the "product" of education: skilled graduates (Gerstner, Semerad, Doyle, & Johnston, 1994; Kearns & Doyle, 1988). Without a clear sense of the consumer-a lead character in a market system-the beneficiary of (and, therefore, motivation and purpose for) innovation is uncertain.

Furthermore, there is not a clear distinction between the purchaser and the consumer-a conflation of market characters, with implications for innovation. Market logic usually advances from the premise that the purchaser is also the consumer-which is not the case when a parent chooses a child's school at public expense. Because funding in these cases is public, it removes

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a crucial market dynamic in school choice systems. Although parents may effectively serve as "proxy-consumers," they are acting on behalf of the child-beneficiary, not the public-purchaser. Market theorists expect consumers to choose rationally between options partially on the basis of cost- effectiveness; however, the cost side of the equation is absent from the consumer's perspective in a system of fully-funded school choice. The lack of immediate consumer pressure on costs corrupts incentives for providers regarding their costs, up to the threshold of funding paid by public authorities. Of course, there is an incentive for the producer to control costs to increase profit margins. But that does not directly influence the cost efficiency of the funder-in this case, the public-as is necessary in a pure market context (Lehman, 1997). Thus, in many cases incentives for innovation and experimentation are skewed, as some market purists note (e.g., Coulson, 1999; Lieberman, 2001). In fully subsidized school-choice programs, consumers do not have the incentive to shop around for lower costs; and for-profit providers can realize a profit incentive only by enlarging their customer base or by reducing costs associated with quality or R&D-factors that discourage innovation. Without the ability to charge customers more for new options, the incentive to innovate can be de-emphasized for producers (Coulson, 1999; Friedman, 1995; Henderson, 1997).

Dynamics of Provider Competition

The institutional environments in which schools operate interact with parental preferences in shaping patterns of educational provision. Examinations of these dynamics focus on both the organizational behavior of schools and patterns across populations of organizations within environments characterized by bounded rationality, imperfect information, and uncertainty about current abilities and future prospects (e.g., Adnett & Davies, 2000; Brown, 1992). Other attempts to address these patterns tend to exemplify a rather innocuous view of the effects of choice and competition on education practices. If market forces were allowed to operate more naturally, it is assumed, they would likely fulfill their presumed potential in inducing substantive change in practice (e.g., Adnett & Davies, 2000; Mintrom, 2000b). Their uneven record to this point, in this view, indicates only isolated incidents of (quasi-)market failure caused, for example, by start-up effects, peculiar consumer preferences and uses of information, or continued state participation in funding. Consequently, although reformers did not necessarily anticipate these problems, they hope to address them through simple policy correctives. Suchreformers tend to believe that, although choice and competition may not be, in and of themselves, producing the expected results for various reasons, they can be made more effective with public sector intervention and support (for instance, through parent information centers and communication networks to diffuse innovations). Here I suggest another possibility.

Organizational theory and institutional ecology provide a developed basis from which to consider organizational isomorphism in view of the

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internal logic of these competitive environments. In this regard, the paucity of classroom innovations emerges not simply in spite of the market forces that have been brought to bear through changes in school governance. Instead, curricular conformity and standardization may be encouraged by the very market forces that were unleashed to address those ills.

Mimetic Isomorpbism

Even as reformers seek to diversify options through choice and competition, standardizing tendencies appear to be embedded in those forces which- under certain conditions-may produce consequences at odds with reformers' stated goals. Analyses of institutional environments suggest that, within an organizational field, organizations inhabiting the same environment sense similar pressures and common constraints. Consequently, they adapt their internal structures in similar ways, even as the environmental conditions shape the distribution of the population of organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). As sociologists have examined educational organizations, they note "an oppressive conformism and homogeneity" across schools in the United States (Meyer, Scott, Strang, & Creighton, 1994, p. 180; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1992). While similar patterns in market systems can be understood in terms of firms seeking to survive in a competitive environment (Meyer et al., 1992), in the education sector, environmental factors in the shape of normative expectations- both societal and within institutional fields--encourage homogeneity across specific contexts (Meyer & Rowan, 1992b). Consequently, although schools are remarkable in the rate at which they adopt innovations, they are much more likely to implement and sustain innovations outside of core instructional areas, avoiding substantive changes in definitive classroom practices (Meyer et al., 1992).

Examinations of homogenization across organizational fields suggest a nar- rowing range of practices within fields, despite efforts toward diversification. In focusing on institutional isomorphism for less competitive fields, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outline three related forms of institutional isomorphism operating both across populations of institutions and within individual institutions in homogenizing organizational behaviors. Normative isomorphism (described above) emerges from professional values and practices within fields. Coercive isomorphism, primarily associated with the interactions between organizations, also involves cultural expectations placed on institutions that require particular practices (regardless of effectiveness) as the price of legitimacy (see also Meyer & Rowan, 1992a; Meyer et al., 1992). For example, when parents express expectations of what constitutes "real" schooling, they thereby constrain opportunities for schools to explore alternatives (Metz, 1990; Raywid, 1996; Tyack & Tobin, 1994).

Perhaps more pertinent here, however, is the concept of mimetic isomorphism, wherein institutions employ a constricted set of responses to uncertainty. Particularly when facing a precarious environment or when operating on ambiguous goals, organizations are more likely to emulate "similar

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organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152). While marketlike conditions may engender uncertainty for organizations, Brown (1992) describes uncertainty as a product of providers' and consumers' imperfect information on school production processes and of "bounded rationality" (inability to know beyond the horizon) about abilities and future market conditions. Schools accommo- date and try to minimize consumer concerns by standardizing core services (in classroom-level practices, curriculum, etc.) across sectors-what Brown calls "comprehensive uniformity." Faced with complex and obscured production processes (as with the problematic role of peer-effects, for instance), necessarily inexperienced consumers are at a disadvantage relative to producers in terms of access to useful information from which to make rational choices (see also Meyer, 1992). Consequently, producers realize an incentive to shape their intake as much as possible through image presentation (Brown, 1992) rather than committing resources to innovations in the production process itself. Employing standardized practices and strategies based on "appearances" may be a more effective and less costly option for an organization than experimenting with new approaches or mediating between conflicting goals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Corporate Capture and Competitive Isomorphism

In some sense, it would appear that charter schools could escape the grav- itational pull toward the center because they are designed to be flexible in adapting to changing landscapes of consumer preferences. Furthermore, many charter schools can access private resources for their laboratory function. As Edison chairman Benno Schmidt notes, "We provide R&D, private sector capital, technology and training: all of which strengthen the state education system" (quoted in Bilefsky, 1998, p. 18). Although people often look to emerging and dynamic sectors such as technology for examples of innovation driven by small start-up firms, larger firms tend to be better equipped to sustain product development and process innovations over time (Davies & Lyons, 1988; Hill & Jones, 1989). Indeed, in some states, larger and more established EMOs control a substantial share of the charter management market (Hill et al., 2001; Horn & Miron, 1999, 2000; Khouri et al., 1999). In light of that trend, it is possible that potential economies of scale-not "provider capture"-may provide incentives for standardized approaches to curriculum development (particularly if educational preferences are monolithic). Yet insofar as preferences are broadly distributed, some theorists contend that such a dynamic also provokes organizations to standardize practices (e.g., Brown, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Even if autonomous charter schools can focus on a coherent purpose, DiMaggio and Powell's hypotheses suggest that the ensuing effect of competition on district schools-which must continue to negotiate competing claims and goals (e.g., Labaree, 1997)-can still induce mimetic isomorphism rather than diversity and innovation. Competitive isomorphism, particularly in unstable environments, shapes populations of organizations

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into centripetal patterns, often favoring larger-scale organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).15

In another sense, one might expect that the charter movement has the potential to promote innovation because of the high proportion of new start-up schools that are less encumbered by traditions, habits, or established practices. Indeed, in that regard, the fact that charters tend to have more inexperienced teachers, for instance, could be seen as an advantage (Lange et al., 1998; Miron & Nelson, 2002). In fact, management theory posits that the rate of product innovation is highest for organizations in their earli- est stages of development (Hill & Jones, 1989). Still, "in fields characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, new entrants, which could serve as sources of innovation and variation, will seek to overcome the liability of newness by imitating established practices within the field" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 156). There is ample evidence from more developed school choice systems that many autonomous schools tend to emulate traditional elite private schools in curriculum, discipline codes, and uniforms (Gauri, 1998; Lauder et al., 1999; Lubienski, 2001c; Whitty et al., 1998; Woods et al., 1998). Indeed, as education institutions such as the American public high school emerged, they engaged in forms of image presentation and management that invoked classical learning-isomorphic to their more prestigious competitors in the academy system (Reese, 1995; Tyack, 1974). In view of the concern of some observers regarding the propensity for public administrations to waste resources that "could be devoted to creative and innovative education programming" (Little Hoover Commission, 1996, on-line; see also Hoxby, 1994), it is somewhat ironic to observe how competition effects of charter schools often induce competing schools to mount marketing campaigns (Gifford et al., 2000; Keegan, 1999; Mackinac Center, 1999; Maranto, Milliman, Hess, & Gresham, 1999a; Miron & Nelson, 2002; Pini, 2001; Powers & Cookson, 1999).

In essence, choice-style incentives in competitive environments appear to encourage isomorphism in many cases. Part of the point of market approaches is to free public schools to act more like private schools and businesses in management. Yet such organizational behavior may decrease the overall options available to parents as schools are pulled toward a standard model, and those that are "deviant" from the model are punished by market discipline (Oettle, 1997; Whitty et al., 1998).

Other Considerations: Horizontal Differentiation and Vertical Distinctions

As reformers take schools deeper into marketlike environments through choice and competition, and as new and autonomous schools realize the same difficulties in changing core practices that have plagued educators for years, it may be useful to consider in more detail how emerging trends in education quasi-markets reflect standardizing tendencies in markets for consumer goods. Although such markets often serve as models for education reformers, more careful consideration suggests that schools could respond in ways not entirely anticipated by these reformers but predicted by economic analyses-

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highlighting the blunt manner in which the logic of markets has been projected onto schools. Indeed, while many schools re-embrace core academic practices, organizational efforts in areas such as marketing, symbolic presentation (uniforms, physical plant, etc.), and brand loyalty--rather than curricular innovation-may serve as more attractive opportunities for differentiation.

As with markets for many consumer goods, emerging education quasi- markets are defined neither by perfect competition (of multiple service providers, with ease of entry) nor by the pure monopoly control of one entrenched provider. Instead, incipient quasi-markets for schooling operate between these two extremes, as is the case with many other services and goods where close substitutes are available, and thus fall under conditions of "monopolistic competition" (Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933). Under this theory, any given firm such as an EMO has a monopoly over its particular brand, 16 but other firms in the "product group" produce brands that are very similar. Although there can be some perceived product differentiation, the distinctions can also be "spurious" matters of image and advertising to encourage brand loyalty (Mansfield, 1970, p. 286)-even when, overall, there is substantive uniformity in service or product, as with gasoline, tooth- paste, evening news, or over-the-counter pain medication.17 Perceived, rather than substantive, product differentiation is more likely when information on products or processes is obscured for consumers. That is, in lieu of perfect information, they must make decisions based on the "fenders" rather than the "motor" (Meyer, 1992, p. 251). Often, in such cases, "a lot of persuasive advertising relates to products that vary very little in their objective characteristics." (George & Joll, 1981, p. 174)

Under conditions of monopoly competition, organizations have specific options for sustaining or increasing market share. Businesses can (a) lower prices, (b) create a better product, or (c) use more effective marketing (Mansfield, 1970). Although some producers use price and quality adjustments to target "up-" and "down-market" demographics, the set per-pupil funding in public education means that the price option is essentially unavailable in the case of charter schools. Furthermore, regarding the quality option, although some producers can substantively improve a product or simply embrace gim- micks, the preceding discussion outlines the substantial difficulties in innovating core practices in education. On the other hand, schools can try to shape "quality" of intake. In turn, the third option becomes imbued with relatively attractive opportunities and incentives for schools. Providers may seek to use marketing as a way to distinguish their services (and consumers) through symbols rather than through substantive but difficult innovations in core practices. Such promotional practices would offer any given provider some security in its market share. However, such incentive structures may short- circuit the intentions of reformers who would like autonomous schools to encourage innovation in the classroom.18

Furthermore, such conditions may engender incentives that provoke vertical rather than horizontal product distinctions (Davies & Lyons, 1988). Unfor- tunately, in the case of schools, obscure or imperfect information in education

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processes may encourage diversification based on social characteristics of student intake rather than school effectiveness enhanced by innovations. This should be a significant consideration for any policymakers seeking to use market-style incentives to promote "different-but-equal" curricular and programmatic options for parents. Indeed, an emerging research literature suggests that, when given more administrative flexibility in a competitive environment, schools generally have not responded to the uncertainty inherent in market-style incentive structures by diversifying educational options. Instead, they often tend to use advertising and other forms of symbolic presentation in seeking advantageous market positions from which they may better shape their student intake-producing not curricular differentiation but, rather, a system of school choices defined by students' social characteristics (Lubienski, 2002).19 Therefore, options may differ largely on a vertical scale of social segregation rather than on a range of different-but-equal educational options. These issues are evident in research on choice in the United States (Glazerman, 1998; Henig, 1994; Howe, Eisenhart, & Betebenner, 2001; Levin, 1998; Moore & Davenport, 1990; Reardon & Yun, 2002; Ritter, Rush, & Rush, 2002; Smith & Meier, 1995; Wells, 1993; on charters, see Cobb & Glass, 1999), but they have yet to receive due consideration in the specific context of North American charter schools.

Conclusion

Many hope that market mechanisms of choice and competition can change the ways that schooling is practiced. Charter schools, in particular, have shoul- dered an extremely difficult task in this respect, because classroom practices have been remarkably resilient over the years in the face of efforts to effect change through reforms in governance and administration (Cuban, 1984; Levin & Riffel, 1997; Meyer, 1992; Tyack & Cuban, 1995). As a policy innovation, charter schools represent what Tyack (1974, p. 169) aptly terms "the lure of the structural panacea" for policymakers seeking to reform the entrenched practices of schooling. Insofar as reformers now recognize the difficulties of effecting substantive educational change, many are qualifying this particular expectation or distancing themselves from initial optimistic predictions of innovation (e.g., Finn et al., 2000; Fitzgerald, 2000; Hassel, 1999b). As Lauder et al. (1999, p. 135) note elsewhere, "it is clear that the world is a far more complex place than they envisaged."

In fact, the question of innovation in charter schools is complex and problematic-much more so than was initially anticipated. Consistent with research on more developed school choice systems in other nations, patterns in charter schools call into question the early expectations regarding the potential of choice and competition to provoke innovations in classroom instruction. Organizational analyses, which are largely descriptive, suggest some alternative effects of competition and choice not usually acknowledged in the prescriptive analyses of market theory as it has been applied to education. The application of market theory, and of public choice theory in particular,

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has been too blunt and simplistic on this particular issue. There appears to be no direct causal relationship-counter to what market advocates have assumed-between bringing market mechanisms to education and inducing educational innovation. In fact, the very causal direction is in question in view of the fact that government intervention, rather than market forces, is the cause of the charters' most frequently acknowledged innovation: the policy innovation in school governance (Center for Education Reform, 2000a, 2000c, 2000d; Rofes, 1998a). Insofar as innovation in classroom practice represents a means for enhancing choice, achievement, and equity, reformers may do well to consider the conditions under which competition and choice lead to change. Accounting for these patterns not only contributes to an understanding of the record of charter schools in promoting classroom innovation but also can inform appraisals of the potential for other market-oriented approaches either to cultivate new practices in teaching and learning or to standardize provision and product.

Notes

The author gratefully acknowledges Sarah Theule Lubienski and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions on drafts of this article. Iowa State Univer- sity's College of Education granted support for this research.

' Essentially, charter schools are public-private hybrids-publicly funded and privately managed (Lubienski, 2001b). Although details of the legislative acts vary, the schools are generally given a waiver from many regulations in the hope that the resulting autonomy will lead to experimentation and innovation in increasing student achievement (Garn, 1998; Nathan, 1996a; Wells et al., 1998). Unlike other forms of school choice, such as a vouchers system (where exit is meant to increase academic achievement) or magnet schools (for integration or to stem exit), charters are an effective subject for this study because they are explicitly intended to foster innovation.

2The similarities in expectations and policy goals may be due to the prevalence of public-choice thinking on the subjects of uniformity of practice in the district system and the promise of market mechanisms for creating innovation and diversity. However, they may also be due to the fact that state legislators appear to borrow language from organizations such as the American Legislative Exchange Council, which has a website that provides templates for legislation, including a model charter school law. This, in turn appears to be largely lifted from the original charter legislation in Minnesota. Regardless of how the language was diffused, the easy acceptance of the link between market mechanisms and innovation is telling.

For the sake of simplicity and brevity, I did not examine special education or assessment practices--two other areas where lawmakers assumed innovation would occur. Nor did I appraise the diffusion of practices from charter schools to district schools; instead, I tested the presupposition that charters are in fact producing innovations that can then be adopted in other schools.

4While this form of diffusion is often assumed, the evidence is mixed, at best, for the initial expectation that district schools are adopting charter school practices (particularly classroom practices) because of competition-hence, the call for formal networks to dis- seminate charter innovations (e.g., Bosetti, 2000; Clayton Foundation, 1999; Garn & Stout, 1999; Mintrom, 2000b; Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998; Teske, Schneider, Buckley, & Clark, 2000; Wells et al., 1998). Certainly, charter schools are often put in the untenable situation of being asked to develop innovations and then voluntarily share them with competitors. However, this article focuses on practices within charter schools, so the diffusion issue (a.k.a. "competition effect" or "ripple effect") is essentially outside the scope of this analysis. (Furthermore, the focus on diffusion begs the question of whether practices should be mirrored simply because they are popular in the marketplace.)

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5Discussions of innovations in governance-this article included-tend to refrain from critical judgments on the democratic implications of these policy innovations in governance. For such analyses, see Lubienski (2001b) and Mintrom (2001).

6 In addition to a number of newspaper reports that were discarded for lack of systematic evidence, most of the published works that were not used in this analysis were advocacy pieces (such as op-ed columns and newsletter articles) that repeated the assumption that charter schools were developing innovations without offering evidence as such. For instance, one author stated that charter schools "have become oases of innovation in a larger desert of monopolistic and cookie-cutter schools," yet provided no evidence to support that conclusion; others argued that there is "no evidence that [charter schools] will make a difference" but, similarly, made no systematic attempt to find evidence that would test that claim (From, 1999; Garcia & Garcia, 1996, p. 34; see also, e.g., Halpern & Culbertson, 1994; Bardallis, 1999). Such reports were not useful here for identifying practices reported to be innovative and so were set aside. Others simply noted the presumed potential for innovation in charter schools-based on the theoretical assumption that is the subject of the present study-again, without any attempt to present evidence on the results of that potential (e.g., Allen, 2001; Kolderie, 1993, 1994, 1995; McCutchen, 1999; Osborne, 1999). Because my analysis focuses on the development of innovations, I did not use studies that looked only at the diffusion of innovations from charter schools to district schools, unless those studies indicated that a particular practice was developed first in charter schools (e.g., Fulford et al., 1997; Rofes, 1998b; Wells et al., 1998). Finally, published works were not used here if they described charter schools as a policy innovation-which they are-but did not report on innovative practices in charter schools (e.g., Garcia & Garcia, 1996; Kolderie, 1998).

7This analysis focuses on published works that presented evidence on the issue of innovations in charter schools as a central, or ancillary yet significant, consideration. Of these, 15 were academic journal articles, books, or chapters (and an additional 2 were ref- ereed conference papers) that had undergone a process of scholarly review. The major- ity of studies analyzed here (29) were research or evaluation reports conducted and published by research organizations that would generally be regarded as objective on charter schools and related educational policies; these included universities, regional educational laboratories, government research entities, and nongovernmental research organizations commissioned to conduct official evaluations of charter school programs. In addition, I analyzed 12 reports from policy organizations that are usually regarded as hav- ing established positions on charter schools-10 of which would be seen as strong proponents of choice and charter schools (e.g., the Center for Education Reform, the Center for Market-Based Education, and the Fordham Foundation). These studies-in view of their acknowledged predispositions, data, and methods-were nevertheless useful here in providing valuable insights into charter school practices.

8There is the possibility that publication bias could cause authors of published studies to underrepresent seemingly minor or unremarkable innovations. Thus it is important to note that these reports were published by a diverse set of organizations representing a range of perspectives on the issue of innovation in charter schools. Some might be seen as opponents by charter advocates. But more of these organizations have been active in promoting charter schools or have an interest in their success-so it is reasonable to sus- pect that they would highlight more practices as innovations, given the contentious nature of the issue. Moreover, although some of the reports had been peer-reviewed, others were published directly by the organizations, which would lessen the likelihood that seemingly marginal innovations could be underreported, as they might be for a peer-review sub- mission. Finally, it is notable that, whereas innovation was a central consideration for some of these reports, it was an ancillary issue in others-suggesting different levels of incentives to exaggerate or de-emphasize evidence of innovation. Taken together, these factors help to ameliorate any publication bias that would substantially underrepresent the pres- ence of innovative practices.

9 Such a comparison is rather stringent in some respects. In following the market theory assumptions regarding governance sectors as the unit of analysis, this approach does not account for the possibility that particular practices may be more highly concentrated in charter schools than in district schools. Nor, as a system-wide analysis, does it give weight to the argument that charter schools may be innovative if they adopt innovations

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that are new in a local context. Indeed, although such conceptions of "innovation" may be valid, they are not consistent with the R&D thesis under scrutiny here; they invoke the analogy not of a "laboratory" for producing new innovations unavailable in district schools but, rather, of a "showroom" for particular educational approaches-perhaps innovative, but not in the sense assumed in market theory.

10 Several researchers note that district schools and even private schools are advertising as a way to differentiate themselves, possibly in response to charter competition (Center for Education Reform, 2000d; Gifford et al., 2000; Glassman, 1998; Keegan, 1999; Lange et al., 1998; Maranto et al., 1999a; Mintrom, 2000b; Miron & Nelson, 2000, 2002; Plank & Sykes, 1999; Reynolds, 2000).

1 The findings regarding innovation, mostly from evidence in single-state (or multi- city) studies, are consistent with evidence available in other state (and province) reports (e.g., Bosetti, 1998, 2001, 2000; Division of Charter Schools & Texas Education Agency, 2000; Dykgraaf & Lewis, 1998; Gifford et al., 2000; Glassman, 1998; Good et al., 2000; Lange et al., 1998; Legislative Audit Bureau [Wisconsin], 1998; Miron & Nelson, 2000; Rosenblum Brigham Associates, 1998; Teske et al., 2000; Triant, 2001; Urahn & Stewart, 1994). They are also consistent with the evidence from multi-state and national-level reports (e.g., Center for Education Reform, 2000b, 2001b; Education Commission of the States, 1995; Finn et al., 1996; Fuller, 2000b; General Accounting Office, 1995; Good & Braden, 2000; Hassel, 1998, 1999a; Manno et al., 1998b; Podgursky & Ballou, 2001; Rebarber, 1997; RPP International, 1997, 1998, 1999; Vanourek et al., 1997, 1998).

12 It may be that charter schools are more likely to adopt innovations than other schools-a possibility beyond the scope of this analysis. For example, it would not be inaccurate to describe team teaching or contracting for certain services as "innovative," even though they were developed outside the charter sector, because such practices represent a significant departure from standard practices in the nations' schools. However, there is a difference between "being innovative" by using innovative practices (adopting innovations developed by others) and "innovating" (developing innovations).

13The Rosenblum Brigham Associates (1998) report contends that charter schools are recombining preexisting practices rather than developing new practices: "[S]pecific practices are not the key innovation implemented in charter schools, but rather the integration of practices around a central vision, and the balance of autonomy and accountability that allows the schools to match practices (including hiring) to the vision." However, most if not all of the "innovations" that the report cited were already in practice in public schools. Perhaps the most comprehensive list of innovative practices in charter schools comes from a report by the Center for Market-Based Education on Arizona charter schools, with examples drawn from case studies (Gifford et al., 2000). However, again, although the authors listed a number of "unique" characteristics of various schools, virtually every aspect was already practiced in public schools, represented changes in administration or governance rather than classroom practice, or had to do with symbolic presentation such as advertising.

"4In Hirschman's (1970) framework, public education is structured to respond to political pressure as a public good-voice expressed through political processes. Public schools are generally not designed to be directly responsive to exit, because (as critics note) they have a semi-monopoly status. But they still often incite dissatisfied users to exit or vote with their feet (see Tiebout, 1956). Thus pathology results. Indeed, as Hirschman notes, as a lazy monopoly, primarily responsive to political pressure, schools may prefer or even encourage dissatisfied and vocal parents to exit in order to get rid of "difficult" individuals.

15Similar centripetal patterns are evident in dual-party political systems and-perhaps counterintuitively-in multiparty politics as well (Mueller, 1979).

16On encouraging brand name recognition in education provisions, see Finn et al. (2000) and Hill (1996). Hill, for instance, lauds the fact that choice and competition can encourage "brand loyalty"-schools should embrace unique approaches as a form of product differentiation.

17Although some argue that advertising associated with product differentiation can promote innovation by increasing overall sales, the general level of demand for education is largely immune to advertising. Furthermore, "many of the innovations introduced by heavily differentiated advertising-intensive industries are of very limited benefit to the consumer" (George & Joll, 1981, p. 185).

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18 The possibility that administrative innovations and symbolic activities such as advertising can preempt intended innovations in educational activities is apparent in the research on similar reforms in other nations (for an overview, see Lubienski, 2001c). For instance, in the competitive education quasi-market in New Zealand, administrators recognize the relative advantages that can be had through relatively simple changes in symbols such as school uniforms, as opposed to the more onerous and costly endeavor of reforming the curriculum (Lauder et al., 1999).

19 Such patterns are evident from a number of contexts, including research on market- oriented school reform in Chile (Espinola, 1993; Gauri, 1998; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000); New Zealand (Fiske & Ladd, 2000; Lauder et al., 1999; Thrupp, 1999; Whitty et al., 1998); and the United Kingdom (Glatter, Woods, & Bagley, 1997; Tomlinson, 1997; Willms & Echols, 1992; Woods et al., 1998). For a review of this literature, see Lubienski (2001c); in the United Kingdom, Gorard, Fitz, and Taylor have challenged claims of resegregation (Fitz & Gorard, 2000; Fitz, Gorard, & Taylor, 2002; Gorard, 1998; Gorard, Fitz, & Taylor, 2001, 2002).

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Manuscript received January 3, 2002 Revision received July 30, 2002

Accepted January 25, 2003

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