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Cochran vs. McDaniel: An Analysis of a Primary

Ethan Snyder

Fielding Graduate University

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I affirm that this my original work and has not been copied or plagiarized from any other sources, nor has it been previously submitted for academic credit. This electronic message counts as my signature: Ethan Snyder

In November 2014, Democrat Travis Childers ran against

Republican incumbent Thad Cochran for one of Mississippi’s senate

seats. Cochran, a 30 year veteran senator, had no trouble

defeating Childers. In the end, the Republican garnered over 61%

of the vote. But Cochran almost wasn’t the Republican candidate.

Despite incumbent status, Cochran was challenged in a Republican

primary by state Senator Chris McDaniel. This challenge led to

what has been called the “filthiest political fight” in

Mississippi history, (Costas, 2014). McDaniel was backed by

several groups affiliated with the Tea Party movement, while

Cochran was backed by more traditional Republicans (Dallas, 2014;

Feldman, 2014; Goldmacher, 2014). The first primary election was

so close a run-off election had to be held. The viciousness of

this fight begs the question: What forces within U.S. politics

could make two members of the same party engage in such a battle?

The Players

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Thad Cochran was first elected as a Senator from Mississippi

in 1978. Currently he is the ranking member of the Senate

Agriculture Committee, having previously chaired that Committee

from 2003 to 2005 and also chaired the Senate Appropriations

Committee from 2005 to 2007 (Costa, 2014). At the time, Cochran

was the third most-senior Senator and the second most-senior

Republican member (Blake, 2014). With a total of $490 million in

earmarks, he has been cited as requesting the most congressional

earmarks of any senator (Miss. Senator Leads Congress in

Earmarks, 2010). Time Magazine (2006) named him as one of

"America's 10 Best Senators and dubbed "The Quiet Persuader" for

his role in winning money for the Gulf Coast in the wake of

Hurricane Katrina. He managed to win $29 billion out of his

colleagues, more than twice what leaders had initially pledged

(Thad Cochran: The Quiet Persuader, 2006). He opposed the

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which prohibited "inhumane

treatment of prisoners, including prisoners at Guantanamo Bay"

and The Patient Protestation and Affordable Healthcare Act

(PPAHCA) (Thad Cochrane Biography, 2014). Cochran served under 6

presidents. After his first term, he never received less than

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60% of the vote (Thad Cochrane Biography, 2014). For the most

part, Mississippi voters seemed to have approved of the Senators

actions. For the most part, Cochran had been able to maintain

his seat of influence and power with very little effort. After

his first election, he was never challenged in a primary until

2014 (Thad Cochrane Biography, 2014).

Thirty-Five years younger than Cochran, Chris McDaniel was

elected a Mississippi State Senator in 2008 (Lofton, 2010). In

the state senate, he represented the 42nd District, which

encompasses part of South Mississippi, in particular the wealthy

resort areas on the Gulf of Mexico (Kieffer, 2014). Prior to

joining the senate, he was a partner in a law firm where he

focused on insurance defense, corporate law, products liability,

commercial litigation, consumer products litigation, legislation,

constitutional law and civil rights (Lofton, 2010). He was also

part of a popular nationally syndicated conservative radio show,

The Right Side Radio Show (Levinson, 2014). While a State Senator, he

championed a fight to protect private property rights by opposing

eminent domain legislation that prevented government from taking

private land for use by private companies. He also played a key

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role in defeating the House redistricting plan (Senator Chris

McDaniel's Biography, 2013). It appeared McDaniel was well

respected by voters in his district and party officials, and he

seemed to be making steady progress in Mississippi politics.

On the surface, both these men seemed to represent the

republican platform. Both were against the PPAHCA; both were

pro-gun and hunting rights; both were anti-abortion; both were

pro-American security at any cost; both wanted smaller

government, and both were pro-business (Costa, 2014). By all

rights, they should have been on the same team, and they were,

the Republican team. Political insiders assumed Cochran would

not choose to run for reelection due to age and family needs

which may be why on October 17, 2013, McDaniel declared his

candidacy for U.S. Senator (Harrison, 2014). Cochran had not yet

announced a decision to run or not. Commentators have suggested

McDaniel announced early to get support and perhaps influence

Cochran not to run (Higgins, 2014). This strategy may have, in

fact, influenced Cochran to seek reelection. Many in the

Republican Party did not like McDaniel’s stances on issues, and

may have pressured Cochran to seek reelection (Costa, 2014; DSCC:

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What Republicans Say about Chris McDaniel, 2014). Cochran has

gone on record and said he planned to retire and not seek

reelection convinced by others to do so (Johnson, 2014). Cochran

announced his run for a seventh term until December 6, 2013,

nearly 2 months after McDaniel (Ward, 2013). Had McDaniel waited

for Cochran’s announcement to not seek reelection, there may not

have been such a contentious primary. Cochran was likely

pressured by influencers because McDaniel had announced his

candidacy. Republicans may have found another candidate, but

probably not one with as much experience and influence that

Cochran already had. With Tea Party backing, McDaniel may have

been a winner if he had been patient, but his need to grasp for

power seems to have been too strong to ignore.

Prior to 2010, an upstart facing off with an elder statesman

would have been unlikely to succeed (Ward, 2013). However, the

tea party movement, which was losing influence in the country,

was seeking to increase its power (Dallas, 2014b). Though

technically affiliated with the Republican Party, the Tea Party

Movement promotes a more conservative ideology and is devoted to

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a strict limited-government agenda (Tea Party Express Supporting

McDaniel's Election Challenge, 2014).

The Tea Party movement began around 2007, and has been

attributed to gaining influence from the views of Senator Ron

Paul (R) Kentucky (Tapscott, 2009). Paul’s views the U.S.

constitution, foreign policy, education and Federal Reserve have

all influenced the ideology of the movement (Bowman, 2014). The

Tea Party does not have a single uniform agenda and lacks a

formal structure or hierarchy which allows each autonomous group

to set its own priorities and goals (Costa, 2014; Bowman, 2014).

Goals may conflict, and priorities will often differ between

affiliated groups (Bowman, 2014). The Tea Party generally

focuses on government reform, including a significant reduction

in the size and scope of the government, reducing government

spending, lowering the national debt and opposing tax increases

(Costas, 2014). It was this ideology that had fueled the group’s

popularity. People disgruntled with the government were quick to

join and it didn’t take long for those with influence to create

groups that harnessed this new political thought. The Tea

Party’s desire to limit government interference with commerce and

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limit taxation appealed to businesses. Before long, there was a

lot of money being invested in the Tea Party movement. Since

money is the cornerstone of political persuasion (Bueno de

Mesquita, 2013), many were eager to take advantage of this new

group and use it to get ahead. Much of the Tea Party’s success

revolved around the emotions of its members, which may have

helped it gain steam (Westen, 2014). In particular, rally’s

seemed to focus on fear, anger and frustration of group members

with the government. This likely aided the group’s ability to

get voters to feel connected to candidates and increase the

probability of Tea Party members voting.

The Tea Party Movement quickly gained power and influence

(Clancy, 2014). People unhappy with the U.S. government were

fast to support new and novel ideology that promised to fix a

broken system. In the 2010 midterm elections, The New York Times

identified 138 candidates for Congress with significant Tea Party

support, and reported that all of them were running as

Republicans—of whom 129 were running for the House and 9 for the

Senate (Bowman, 2014). Tea Party supported candidates won 5 of

10 Senate races, and 40 of 130 House races (Bowman, 2014). In

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the primaries for Colorado, Nevada and Delaware the Tea-party

backed Senate Republican nominees defeated "establishment"

Republicans. (Costas, 2014). The Tea Party had acquired the

positions of power and influence it sought.

By 2012 the Tea Party momentum was decreasing. Between 2010

and 2012, events such as the government shutdown were blamed on

Tea Party members who stymied Congressional votes (Bowman, 2014).

In 2012, the power and influence the part had was waning. Tea

Party candidates were less successful in the 2012 election,

winning only 4 of 16 Senate races, and losing approximately 20%

of the seats in the House that had been gained (Costas, 2014).

Tea Party Caucus founder Michele Bachmann, one of the high

profile members, was reelected by a narrow margin (Dallas,

2014a). Because politics is about getting maintaining power, the

Tea Party needed to focus on 2014 elections in order to keep any

semblance power (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008).

McDaniel and the Tea Party were a perfect match. The Tea

Party was looking to maintain and hopefully increase power in the

2014 Congressional elections. Chris McDaniel was looking to

become a U.S. Senator. Having unseated incumbent same-party

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candidates in the past, the Tea Party was ready to do it again by

helping McDaniel against Cochran. If McDaniel won he’d have the

power and influence of being a senator and the Tea Party would

have an ally in the senate to focus on their agenda. As Bueno de

Mesquita and Smith (2008) might have put it, the Tea Party would

become McDaniel’s cronies, the loyal few that helped him get and

maintain power. Once he had political power, he would be able to

reward those who had supported him. It probably seemed like a

win-win situation for both of them.

Mainstream Republicans didn’t want to lose power, either.

Many in the Republican Party did not feel McDaniel was a good

choice of candidate for their party (DSCC: What Republicans Say

about Chris McDaniel, 2014). The state Republicans also knew if

a new senator was elected, the state of Mississippi would have

two relatively new and inexperienced senators (Higgins, 2014).

This would have decreased Mississippi’s influence in the

Congress, meaning a decrease in appropriations, earmarks and

other political advantages. These advantages may not be readily

noticeable to most of the electorate, but they were important to

the political parties and the businesses that supported them

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(Higgins, 2014). If McDaniel were elected, Republicans stood to

lose influence on a number of levels. Therefore, Cochran was

pressured by influencers in the Republican Party to run yet

again.

The Campaign

Many in Mississippi didn’t understand McDaniel’s desire to

challenge Cochran. The Jackson Free Press (2014) remarked that if

McDaniel faced Cochran, it would be the "beginning of [the] end

of [his] political career" (p. B2). Republican lobbyist Henry

Barbour, the nephew of former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour,

said: "I think he will get his head handed to him, and that will

be what he deserves. [But] it's a free country” (Dallas, 2014a,

p.1). Many people in local politics discounted McDaniel as

contender (Feldman, 2014; Dallas, 2014c; Goldmacher, 2014).

However, much of his political support came from outside the

state (Goldmacher, 2014). McDaniel was immediately endorsed by

the Club for Growth PAC, Citizens United, Freedomworks and Jim

DeMint's Senate Conservatives Fund (Dallas, 2014c). The Tea

Party Express also back McDaniel politically and financially

(Goldmacher, 2014). Sarah Palin, Rick Santorum, Sean Hannity,

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Gary Bauer and Glenn Beck all endorsed McDaniel (Bauer Endorses

McDaniel for Senate, 2014). He was also backed by a number of

businesses and publications in his district, but very little

outside of there (Goldmacher, 2014). The vast majority of

financial and political support for McDaniel came from outside

the state (Goldmacher, 2014).

Some commentators wondered if McDaniel was truly aligned

with the Tea Party’s ideology (Cillizza, 2014). Statements and

positions he took once affiliated with the group were often in

conflict with statement from before. Whether or not McDaniel

supported the Tea Party platform, he was now beholden to it.

Republicans both nationally and in Mississippi slammed McDaniel

for being ideologically extreme (Cillizza, 2014). GOP Strategist

Stuart Stevens derided McDaniel as a "trial lawyer putting on a

show” (Clancy, 2014, p. 2). But it was in McDaniel’s best

interest to toe the line of the Tea Party if he wanted to gain

power since they backed him with millions of dollars from

fundraisers all over the country (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013).

Noticeably absent from supporting McDaniel were sitting

senators who had been backed by the same tea party groups in

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previous elections. Senators such as Marco Rubio (R) Florida,

Mike Lee (R) Utah, Ted Cruz (R) Texas and Rand Paul (R) Kentucky

all refused to endorse either Mississippi candidate (Hall, 2014).

Paul stated it came down to the decision of supporting a

challenger over a colleague (Hall, 2014). The real question for

these senators may have been: Which is in my best interest to back? By

backing the Tea Party candidate, senators were likely to get

support from group member voters, but these voters may be

interchangeable, since even if they did not have future Tea Party

backing, the senators would likely have general Republican voters

(Bueno de Mesquita, 2013). Their best chance at maintaining

power probably came by backing, or at least not alienating, an

incumbent colleague (Hall, 2014). They needed the support of

colleagues in order to pass or block legislation, which was

likely to make them popular with the voters. Therefore, it’s of

little surprise sitting senators chose not to back challengers.

According to an advisor for Mark Rubio, “The majority of

Washington-based groups endorsed his opponent, Charlie Crist, in

his primary because they didn't think Marco could win. [Rubio]

doesn't want to make the same mistake they made" (hall, 2014, p.

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1). Based on his experience, Rubio seemed to believe there is

reason to be concerned with upsetting the influencers, the people

that help keep one in power and embarrassing himself, not the

voters (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013). Of course, backing the losing

horse could also be embarrassing.

McDaniel began campaigning as soon as he announced his

candidacy (ward, 2013). He focused on connecting with voters by

mostly campaigning in town hall meetings (Feldman, 2014). In the

beginning, McDaniel largely avoided press and news agencies

because, as some strategists suggested, there was worry that he

is might stumble verbally the way that candidates such as Todd

Akin in Missouri and Richard Mourdock in Indiana did in 2012

(Johnson, 2014). Instead, he relied on what one reporter

described as “the look and feel of a southern preacher . . . he

worked his audience in a call-and-response style more familiar in

churches than at political rallies” (Johnson, 2014, p. 1). This

likely provided attendees a familiar emotional connection with

McDaniel. As Westen (2008) points out, emotional connection with

a candidate is stronger than a rational one and can be

influential.

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Cochran, perhaps not expecting McDaniel to be a threat, did

very little in the way of campaigning early on (Ward, 2013).

Cochran took the stance that his record spoke for itself and

there was little left for him to say (Mississippi: National Desk,

2014). Cochran refused to debate McDaniel, stating, “I’m not

running to be a member of the debate team. I’m a candidate for

the U.S. Senate” (Dallas, 2014c, p. 1). Like McDaniel, there

seemed to be concern that Cochran was apt to say something

embarrassing during events. Some suggested he was kept away from

the press and public because he sounded like someone who was too

old to be reelected; he may have come off as feeble or absent

minded (Johnson, 2014). In one of the few statements he made to

the press, Cochran even alluded to the fact that if people heard

too much of him they may not like him (Higgins, 2014). This

avoidance approach, however, would need to be changed in coming

months as McDaniel’s support grew. This tactic limited his

ability to make the same emotional connection McDaniel was.

Worse still, in the beginning Cochran took the rational approach,

focusing on numbers like jobs, subsidies and tax breaks he had

generated for the state (Ward, 2014). Perhaps if he had started

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out of the box with making an emotional connection, playing up

the experienced elder southern statesman role he would have

gotten more emotional connection with more voters.

By February 2014, four months prior to the primary vote, ads

were beginning to air for McDaniel. Many of the first ads were

funded by Political Action Committees that attacked Cochran (FRC

Action's Super-PAC Unveils Radio Ad Supporting Chris McDaniel in

Mississippi, 2014). Early ads framed Cochran as having supported

the PPAHCA, or as it was often referred to in the media,

ObamaCare (Clancy, 2014). This ad blurred the truth as Cochran

had voted against funding the act and had spoken out against it

on numerous occasions (Thad Cochran Biography, 2014). However,

McDaniel supporters used the reasoning that although Cochran did

vote against the final bill, he knew that voting for cloture to

end debate would allow funding of ObamaCare by a party-line vote,

and thus a vote for cloture was a de facto vote to fund ObamaCare

(Clancy, 2014). This reasoning was not mentioned in the

commercials, only that Cochran was pro-ObamaCare. By framing the

argument in this manner, McDaniel’s supporters were likely to

trigger an emotional reaction in Republicans that did not support

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the act (Westen, 2008). "Every compromise conservatives reach,

the liberals always win. That's not compromise. That's called

surrender," McDaniel said in the ads (FRC Action's Super-PAC

Unveils Radio Ad Supporting Chris McDaniel in Mississippi, 2014).

Again, this tapped into the emotional reactions many

conservatives had toward sitting Republicans.

Other McDaniel ads attacked Cochran’s former assistant who

had been found guilty of swapping legislative favors for event

tickets and other gifts from lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Cochran had

been investigated as well, but had been cleared of any wrong

doing (Blake, 2014). However, McDaniel backers essentially

framed ads suggesting guilt by association (Blake 2014).

McDaniel’s camp had also begun putting out thousands of

campaign signs. This in part led to one of the first scandals of

the campaign when a Cochran staffer was caught stealing McDaniel

signs (Boyle, 2014). According to a police report one of the

staffer allegedly “did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously or

mischievously disfigure, destroy, injure (or cause to be) a Chris

McDaniel campaign sign, the personal property of Tea Party

Express” (Boyle, 2014, p.2). The staffer was quickly fired and

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labeled as a rogue employee, but McDaniel’s people were quick to

jump on the accusation, using it to appeal to voters and framing

this as an act of desperation by Cochran’s camp (Boyle, 2014).

Though distancing himself from the staffer, Cochran did say he

took personal responsibility for the man’s actions.

It’s interesting to note the difference in signage the two

candidates used. McDaniel signs had his last name in large

letters and his first name small, almost unnoticeable. This is

generally how political signs are done so people recognize the

surname when casting a ballot (Effective Election Signs, 2013).

After all, there could be several candidates with same first

names. Cochran, by contrast, had signs with his first name in

large letters and his last name more obscure. This was done in

order to frame him more as an average, relatable every man to

voters and perhaps create a friendly emotional connection

(Effective Election Signs, 2013; Westen, 2008). This tactic may

have cost him votes of people confused by his name (Johnson,

2014). If voters unfamiliar with him thought his last name was

Thad, they may have been unable to find him on ballots.

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McDaniel supporters also aired commercials targeting

Cochran’s voting history in the senate. With over thirty years in

Congress, there was plenty they could use against him. Much of

what was used was taken out of context (Mississippi, 2014). Ads

blasted Cochran for raising debt limits, voting for tax

increases, minimum wage increases, senate wage increase and a

number of other issues which it deemed non-conservative (New TV

Ads by Club for Growth Action Promote Chris McDaniel in

Mississippi, 2014). What the ads failed to mention was that some

of these votes were from as far back as the 1980s when

Republicans were calling for these changes (Johnson, 2014). But

the facts were not important, it was framing the information to

get an emotional response from voters that was key (Westen, 2008)

The McDaniel’s campaign also framed Cochran’s support of

agriculture subsidies and earmarks as negative (New TV Ads by

Club for Growth Action Promote Chris McDaniel in Mississippi,

2014). Senators often fight to get money from the federal

government for projects in their states. Subsidies and earmarks

benefit a senator’s home state. This may look bad to those

outside the state, but home state voters generally want someone

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who is going to bring money in. Rationally, voting for someone

who can bring in federal money is a good idea, but this is

contrary to the concept of decreasing government spending. The

McDaniel campaign focused on money being put in the hands of

business men or political cronies and not voters to get an

emotional, not rational, response (Johnson, 2014). McDaniel

vowed to stop such “irresponsible” spending (Dallas, 2014a).

Cochran’s supporters were slower to roll out ads. According

to interviews, Cochran’s team at first didn’t think McDaniel was

going to make headway using negative ads, but as McDaniel’s poll

numbers increased, Cochran found himself having to fire back

(Hawkings, 2014). Initially, Cochran stated he was not

interested in running a negative campaign. Many of his early

commercials rationally compared and contrasted Cochran to

McDaniel politically, framing Cochran as the better candidate

(Johnson, 2014). However, it didn’t take long for more emotional

ads that attacked McDaniel began to air, funded primarily from

outside groups (Harrison, 2014b). Henry Barbour, nephew of

former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, founded the pro-

Cochran Mississippi Conservatives PAC (Harrison, 2014b). This

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group would end up spending nearly $10 million helping

Republicans fight each other. In contrast the group would only

spend $3 million fighting against Democrats (Johnson, 2014).

Unlike Cochran, McDaniel had a very limited political career

to use against him. Overall, the Cochran team would attack

McDaniel on six different subjects—state senate vote absences,

voting against meth laws, voting to increase state debt limit,

supporting common core, personal voting record (he didn’t vote

during the presidential election) and hurricane Katrina relief

(Criswell, 2014). It was the last one that may have had the

biggest impact. McDaniel was shown in an interview stating he

did not know if he would have voted for Katrina relief if he was

in the U.S. senate because he believed states should take care of

themselves and not expect money from a place thousands of miles

away (Criswell, 2014). His camp stated this was not true and a

misrepresentation, but considering his stance on taking federal

money, this was a hard argument to fight. This was contrasted

with Cochran who was known for the billions in Katrina relief he

had gotten.

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Cochran’s team also called into doubt McDaniel’s record of

voting in relation to the platform he was now touting (Criswell,

2014). Another commercial criticized McDaniel for having the

worst voting record of any current state senator in Mississippi

the past four years (Mississippi News Desk, 2014). Other ads

shamed McDaniel for being a personal injury lawyer who voted

against tort reform because of personal interests (Criswell,

2014).

It was the probably the issue of meth legislation that

caused the most controversy. Cochran’s team ran an ad

criticizing McDaniel for voting against anti-Meth legislation.

In the commercial, the anti-meth legislation is shown to have

reduced 90% of meth labs (Criswell, 2014). This number is fuzzy,

because though a number of meth labs were raided as a result of

the law, it’s impossible to know how many meth labs actually

existed (Criswell, 2014). The ad also fails to mention that

actual meth use, reportedly, has not decreased since the

legislation or that law enforcement was reporting an increase in

mobile meth labs (Criswell, 2014). But the ad essentially framed

McDaniel as being in favor of methamphetamine abuse and can even

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be interpreted as implying he may have benefited from it.

McDaniel claimed to vote against the laws because it would

unfairly penalize average citizens by requiring a prescription

for pseudoephedrine products (Criswell, 2014). This ad, which

used images of meth labs and users, was targeted to make an

emotional appeal to viewers. It used voters’ fear of crime and

safety associated with meth abuse and associated that feeling

with McDaniel (Westen, 2008). This ad was probably the most

emotionally charged of any Cochran’s camp created.

As with any political campaign, there are hundreds of

employees and supporters. McDaniel, in particular, utilized a

grassroots campaign that included a large number of bloggers

(Gentilviso, 2014). The Mississippi Conservative Daily,

Mississippi Conservative and Constitutional Clayton were all blog

sites supporting McDaniel. It was impossible for a political

campaign to know exactly what these supporters may do in their

name. It was one of these supporters, a political blogger, which

created the biggest scandal of the campaign.

Thad Cochran’s wife, 72 year old Rose, suffers from dementia

and what press releases refer to as “a serious long term illness”

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(Gentilviso, 2014). Due to her waning health, she lives full time

in nursing facility. Clayton Kelly, creator of Constitutional

Clayton, allegedly entered the nursing home after hours and took

pictures of Rose in the nursing facility (Gentilviso, 2014).

After posting these pictures in and online video, Kelly was

arrested and charged with exploitation of a vulnerable adult

(Gentilviso, 2014). This incident immediately caused negative

press for McDaniel’s campaign, which quickly tried to distance

itself from the actions of this blogger (Gentilviso, 2014;

Johnson, 2014). McDaniel said he had reached out directly to the

Senator Cochran to "express my abhorrence for the reprehensible

actions of this individual" (Gentilviso, 2014, p. 1). But the

Cochran campaign questioned what McDaniel's campaign knew about

Kelly before his arrest. McDaniel’s camp denied ever knowing

Kelly, but later stated they had come across Kelly’s blog months

prior to the scandal and volunteers when trying to find a source

“a lot of ugly rumors and nasty stuff” so it could be “squashed"

(Gentilviso, 2014, p. 1). It didn’t help that Kelly had a photo

of himself with McDaniel on his website (Johnson, 2014). Both

attempted to use this incident to their advantage. Cochran’s

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team would also release a voice mail apology from a McDaniel

staffer that pointed to their team knowing of the incident before

it was public knowledge. Despite Cochran calling the incident a

violation of privacy to his wife and family, his campaign

continued to use the incident to their advantage, bringing the

subject up often (Johnson, 2014). Meanwhile, McDaniel’s team

tried to spin the story depicting he state senator as a victim of

slander by those who said he was involved with the incident but

also hero because he was denouncing such action in politics

(Johnson, 2014). McDaniel never took any responsibility for the

scandal, perhaps if he had he would have made better connection

as hero. Rather he played up the victim side, as he often did

when negative ads were aired, which may have made him appear weak

to some voters.

Public knowledge of Cochran’s bedridden wife provided

McDaniel’s camp another way to attack the senator. The group

alleged that while Cochran’s wife was in the nursing home, he had

a mistress. Reported first via ultraconservative online news

service Breitbart and picked up by a number of blogs, Cochran had

been having a long term affair with his executive assistant, Kay

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Webber (Streiff, 2014). Webber often accompanied Cochran on

trips and formal events. As the article pointed out, if one does

an internet search for Thad Cochran + Wife, more images of him

and Webber are presented than of Cochran with his actual wife

(Streiff, 2014). Cochran also rents a room from Webber when he’s

in Washington, D.C. which many saw as cover for them actually

living together (Streiff, 2014). This approach allowed McDaniel

supporters to frame Cochran as unfaithful to his wife, which was

then associated with his being untrustworthy as a politician

(Streiff, 2014). Cochran’s camp never responded to this

allegation.

A second scandal emerged during the primary when it was

alleged Cochran had used the “Race Card” (Mark, 2014; ) McDaniel

supporters argued Cochran’s camps had used "code words" such as

"food stamps” and accusing McDaniel of consorting with white

nationalists and segregationists (Jacobson, 2014). Many Cochran

supporters pointed out Cochran consistently backed funding for

historically black colleges, among other moves that supported

black voters in the past (Mark, 2014). They argued he was

already well respected by many black voters who thought McDaniel

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may have been less supportive of their community (Mark, 2014).

Blame for the race based ads were first put on a small group of

elderly Democrat Women activists calling themselves Citizens for

Progress (Drucker, 2014). However, it would later be determined

through financial records that Mississippi Conservatives PAC was

responsible for the ads (Drucker, 2014). This was more than

framing facts in an unflattering manner, this was outright

deception.

By the June 3, 2014 primary more than 23,000 television ads,

at a cost of more than $7 million, aired in the Mississippi U.S.

Senate race, according to a Center for Public Integrity analysis

(Bump, 2014). They also determined most ads, about 14,000, were

aired by outside groups, and about 9,200 aired by candidates or

parties (Harrison, 2014a). Thad Cochran's campaign led the ad

wars, with 7,333 ads, while McDaniel's campaign aired 1,959

(Harrison, 2014a). But a tea party group that supported McDaniel,

Club for Growth, weighed in with 3,553 ads (Dallas, 2014c).

Television ads weren’t the only political advertising that

was taking place. Both sides were using radio, print and

internet ads as well as robocalls, Twitter and Facebook (Ward,

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2014). By the time of the primary many citizens were disgruntled

with the media overload of negativity from both groups (Johnson,

2014). Many commentators suggested Mississippi voters were

suffering “candidate fatigue” from the inundation predominately

negative advertising (Livingston, 2014). The question now was,

would all that negative campaigning bring voters to the polls and

for which side would they vote?

The Primary

How did all the money and mudslinging effect the primary

outcome? Chris McDaniel received 49.5% of the vote, while Thad

Cochran garnered 49% (Martin, 2014). A third candidate, Thomas

Carey got 1.5% of the vote (Martin, 2014). If not for the third

candidate, one that that had gotten almost no attention, one of

the others may have gotten over 50% of the vote (Martin, 2014).

But since neither did, and Mississippi state law requires a

candidate get over 50% of the vote in order to be declared a

winner, a runoff election was scheduled for June 24, 2014

(Martin, 2014).

Could a negative campaign have harmed voter turnout? One

study reveals that when neither candidate is perceived to be

29

“going negative,” voter turnout goes up; however, when the

Republican candidate is perceived to be negative in a campaign,

voter turnout also goes up (Griffin, 2012). The study also found

Republicans reported higher intentions to vote after seeing

negative political advertisements, regardless of the sponsor of

the ad (Griffin, 2012). But both of these candidates were

Republican and both were running negative, emotionally based

campaigns. Perhaps that is why they were so close; a difference

of only 419 votes. These candidates may have actually balanced

each other out enough with negative emotional advertising to get

a nearly 50/50 split of voters.

The Runoff

Cochran and McDaniel were now in a race for votes. PACs for

both groups admitted to having spent most of their money on the

run-up to the primary, but vowed to continue fundraising to get

ads on the air (Dallas, 2014c). This endeavor would take time

however, and the majority of television ads would not air until

within a few days of the runoff (Dallas, 2014c). This meant the

candidates and their supporters would need to engage in more

door-to-door campaigning to get a connection with voters.

30

In what many consider an unethical move, Cochran began

courting Democrats and Independents (Pender, 2014a). Mississippi

law, is a bit murky on the subject of cross party voting in

primary elections. Some interpret it as illegal, while others do

not (Johnson, 2014). Cochran’s hope was that Democrats would

rather have him, a moderate, in office than Tea Party

conservative McDaniel (Blake, 2014). They also target African-

Americans, a largely Democratic constituency, by focusing on

because some racially provocative comments McDaniel made as a

conservative talk radio host (Johnson, 2014). McDaniel’s

supporters ridiculed the possibility that Cochran could draw

significant numbers of Democrats and Independents to defeat the

challenger and framed this as an act of desperation (Pender,

2014a). It was even charged that a Super PAC supporting Cochran

was providing "walking around money" for black Democratic votes

(Pender, 2014b). Many Democrats, however, were supporting

McDaniel because they thought if he won the primary then

Democratic candidate for senator, Childers, would have a better

chance at winning (Harrison, 2014a).

31

Both candidates increased their public presence (Kieffer,

2014). Cochran often appeared briefly in public but seldom

talked to reporters (Johnson, 2014). McDaniel spent more time

with reporters, but was often dogged by questions about the

nursing home break-in by Clayton Kelly (Johnson, 2014). McDaniel

continued his campaign in the same vain he had before, ending

government spending, shrinking government and growing anti-

Washington and anti-incumbent sentiment with little change

(Johnson, 2014).

On June 24, 2014, the runoff election was held. Tea Party

supporters, the NAACP and state officials all claimed to have

volunteers at voting locations to monitor for irregularities

(Pender, 2014b). Both sides provided bus transportation for

people to get to the polls (Pender, 2014b). This strategy seemed

to work for Cochran who was courting lower income and elderly

voters who may not have had transportation otherwise (Johnson,

2014). This resulted in one of the largest ever turnouts for

minority voters in a Mississippi primary (Ward, 2014).

Cochran received 51% of the vote to McDaniel’s 49% (Chris

McDaniel Alleging Voting Fraud in Mississippi, 2014). McDaniel

32

did not concede the race (McDaniel challenges GOP runoff loss to

Cochran, 2014). The evening of the runoff, McDaniel offered

$1,000 to anyone who could provide him with evidence of voting

irregularities (Levinson, 2014). At times he claimed to have

evidence of 3,000 incidents and at other times as many as 10,000

(McDaniel says 'hundreds' of irregularities found in Mississippi

runoff, 2014). The state Republican executive committee refused

to consider his challenge (Tea Party Express Supporting

McDaniel's Election Challenge, 2014). His campaign formally

filed a notice indicating intent to contest the election, and

groups working on behalf of McDaniel filed two lawsuits in court

as part of an effort to contest the election (Bump, 2014). A

Mississippi judge eventually dismissed McDaniel’s suit because it

was filed 41 days after the election, and the law states it must

be filed within 20 days (Judge dismisses Chris McDaniel

challenge, 2014). McDaniel appealed the decision, but the state

Supreme Court denied the appeal (Bump, 2014). A number of

Republican officials suggested McDaniel’s handling of his defeat

may have harmed him in future elections Bump, 2014). Some saw

his willingness to pay people for information as a desperate move

33

(Bump, 2014). What’s more, the evidence of fraud he claimed to

have never materialized (Bump, 2014). Perhaps it was his desire

to remain in the limelight or a possible chance to still obtain

political power that drove him to keep filing suits with the

state. Commentators suggested if he conceded after the runoff he

would have appeared more respectable and less desperate (2014).

Both sides ran negative, flawed campaigns, which Westen

(2008) may have suggested was par for the course for Republicans.

McDaniel and his Tea Party allies seemed to be making a grasp for

the power and influence, which drove them to engage in very

negative and emotional campaigning. Cochran’s initial attempt to

use rationality over emotion in advertising may have hurt his

campaign (Westen, 2008). Meanwhile, McDaniel’s tendency to frame

himself as a victim of mudslinging while at the same time also

being a perpetrator may have weakened him in the eyes of voters.

The actions of other’s in the name of their candidate afflicted

both, but McDaniel got worse by far due to the heinous nature of

the event. In the end both engaged in dubious ethical acts—

Cochran appealing to Democrats and McDaniel refusing to concede

his loss. But both men were only figure heads of a larger group

34

of people looking to use them for gain, the Tea Party for

McDaniel and the traditional Republicans for Cochran. Though

Cochran may have won the race with most votes, can any campaign,

let alone a primary, that contained the rancor and mudslinging of

this one truly have any winners?

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