YaleCollege

Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier: Philippine Instability, U.S. MilitaryPreparedness, and the Implications of

Climate Change on U.S. National Security

Senior EssaySubmitted to:

The Yale Department ofPolitical Science

New Haven,Connecticut

Author:Samuel Alexander

Teicher

FacultyAdvisor:SeanSmith

Submitted for consideration:April 16, 2012

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Contents

List of Tables/Maps…………………………….………………………….....3

List of Abbreviations………..………………….…………………………….4

Preface..……...……….………………………………...………………….…5

I. Introduction.………………………….…….………...………………….…8

II. Argument…….………………………….……………………………...…9

III. Case Study………………………..………….………………………….15Climate Threats in the Philippines and

Implications for U.S. NationalSecurity

IV. Case Study………......……………………………….………………….27Strategic Shift for U.S. Military Forces in Response to Climate Change

V. Conclusion………………………………….…………..………………..34

Bibliography………………………………………….……………………..39

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Maps

World Map of the Global Climate Risk Index 1991-2010, published by

Germanwatch……………………………………………………...18

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Abbreviations

CBDP community-based disaster preparedness

CCI climate

change-induced CIM

climate-induced migration

CNA Center for

Naval Analysis

COE U.S. Pacific Command’s Center for Disaster Management and

HumanitarianAssistance

DSB U.S. Defense Science Board

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DoD U.S.

Department of Defense DoS

U.S. Department of State

GHG greenhouse

gases

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MILF Moro Islamic

Liberation Front

NGO non-governmental

organization NIC

U.S. National Intelligence

Council NPA New

People’s Army

PACOM U.S. Pacific Command

QDR U.S. Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

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Preface

I didn’t always intend to dedicate myself to solving

environmental challenges. When I was a kid, I wanted to be a

fighter pilot (as I’m sure most did after seeing Top Gun for the

first time). An eyeglass prescription by ten dashed those dreams.

I next thought I’d be a marine biologist or an entomologist. I

became a certified scuba diver when I was 13, and I couldn’t

believe the underwater wonders that exist around us all (let

alone that I could breathe down there). I also really loved bugs

after spending years in my backyard, rolling over logs and

watching natural symphonies of insects and critters in action.

Through classes and curriculum though, I discovered that organic

chemistry and other hard science courses weren’t for me. Then, I

wanted to work on making education better for kids in America. I

went to DC Public Schools from 4th grade through high school, and

there were so many days I knew that school and learning could be

better, and that good education truly could be used as a tool for

empowerment and mobility. Finally, I found myself fascinated by

geopolitics, international security, and the Middle East, taking

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after my dad, who worked on these issues when he served on the

National Security Council under President Reagan.

I was on that path freshman year of college when I happened

to take a course called Global Environmental History. I’ve been a

history buff since I could read a book, and it seemed like a fun

class about a subject I knew little about. That’s when everything

changed. Our professor was lecturing about an ancient Syrian

settlement that faced a drought. The villagers faced three

choices: adapt, move, or die. They failed to adapt, they chose to

stay put, and the town and its people vanished into time. Those

villagers certainly weren’t lucky, especially considering that

they suffered from something far greater than anything they

themselves could influence or control. But at least they had the

choice to move. We don’t have that choice today (at least not

until Elon Musk has established his Mars colony).

Food, clothes, and shelter are, at our core, the basic needs

of humanity. Climate change affects everything that we need and

all that we work to achieve. It floods valleys and dries up

reservoirs; pounds cities with storms and inundates coastlines

through rising seas; kills coral reefs and spreads pestilence.

This isn’t hyperbole. It’s reality. And I realized that, when

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compounded by environmental degradation through fisheries

collapse, massive deforestation, freshwater and food insecurity,

and the acidification of the oceans, this problem was too

consequential to dismiss or ignore. More fighter sorties in

resource and climate-induced wars, dead reefs and empty oceans,

and children growing up on a planet that is diminishing in its

capacity to sustain all that we love and need. I had to something

about it. I must. And I will continue to do so.

I hope this paper is useful for anyone who reads it:

policymakers, students, strategists and tacticians, curious

individuals, Americans, islanders, or any human being from any

creed or nation. For both my fellow Americans and people from

around the world, I wrote this from the perspective of an

American college student. I wrote it because, as if the economic,

public health, humanitarian, or environmental reasons weren’t

good enough, our leaders are failing us on climate change, and we

may suffer even greater from the security consequences. Those

ancient villagers didn’t have the tools, resources, or predictive

capabilities that we now possess. Our children and history will

remember if we fail.

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It’s also worth noting that certain events relevant to

climate change and security have transpired since I published

this paper in 2012. Interestingly enough, one such happening is

the publication of several (still debated) studies on freshwater

decline, drought, and changing climate contributing to the

outbreak of the Syrian Civil War (although obviously not being

the sole factors). Who knows if the authors knew about the

ancient Syrian settlement? Anyways, I list these new events in no

particular order (and recognizing there are other important

things left off), and suggest that the reader follow up on

certain claims or facts made here to see if things have changed:

new climate threat assessments from the Center for Naval

Analyses, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2014

Department of Defense Climate Adaptation Roadmap, and the 2015

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,

and the 2015 National Security Strategy; Typhoons Haiyan and

Hagupit in the Philippines and Superstorm Sandy on the Eastern

Seaboard; a peace agreement ending 45 years of conflict between

the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front;

the launch of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, initiatives

announced by President Obama at the United Nations directing U.S.

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agencies to better work with international partners on climate

change adaptation, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and

China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and the elevation of

climate change as a threat multiplier and national security risk

into President Obama’s 2015 State of the Union.

Finally, I’d like to thank my parents Howard and Gayle and

my brother Seth for their everlasting support and inspiration, as

well as my advisor Professor Sean Smith for his guidance and good

humor as I cranked out this thesis out during the heady days of

Senior Spring.

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I. Introduction

The unmanaged march of climate change poses a serious danger

to United States national security, global geopolitical

stability, and human welfare. The U.S. Military and Intelligence

communities take climate change as a reality and are preparing

accordingly, despite inaction and political resistance at the

legislative level of government. National security, climate

change, and energy are inextricably connected, and this paper

seeks to answer the questions: how do climate threat multipliers

jeopardize U.S. national security, and is the U.S. military

effectively preparing for a climate change future?

To answer these questions, this paper will discuss the

reasons why climate change is now a top U.S. national security

priority by exploring the concept of climate threat multipliers.

It will then investigate the potential impacts of climate change

on state stability in the Philippines, and conclude by outlining

how the U.S. military is adapting for climate change (including

the acceleration of clean energy integration and the direct

impact on capabilities and infrastructure posed by climate

change). The Philippines are a key ally in a region critical for

U.S. national security but are one of the most threatened

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countries in the world from climate change in most predicted

future scenarios. And it is essential that the U.S. military

develop strategies to manage and mitigate climate-induced threats

in order to best protect national security. This paper will offer

recommendations as to how the U.S. should further prepare for

climate change-induced (CCI) security threats, but its scope will

not cover how the U.S. can counter climate change itself, such as

greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) reduction strategies.

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II. Argument

Climate change is “as great or greater”1 a threat to

national security as “Iraq, Afghanistan, energy security, violent

extremism, and natural or man-made pathogens.”2 Natural disasters

and storms, projected to grow in frequency and intensity in many

areas in the future, threaten to exacerbate political instability

and economic stagnation in fragile countries and regions around

the world.

The combination of rising populations, stagnant economic

growth and sustained conditions for widespread poverty, reduced

access to food and freshwater, increased health risks, energy

insecurity, resource competition, and a massive upswing in

refugee populations resulting from climate change, as noted by

Kent Butts, the director of the National Security Issues Group at

the U.S. Army War College, likely would “create social unrest,

leading to potential political upheaval, making room for

extremist movements to take over the government…the potential

geopolitical problems that could result from climate change range

from mass migrations to civil wars and decreased agricultural

1 Campbell, Kurt, et al., The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 9.2 White, Gregory, Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15.

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productivity to the spread of terrorist groups.”3 Examples of

climate and environmentally-induced upheaval (although not

explicitly linked to climate change itself) include the 2010

floods in Pakistan, Ebola outbreaks linked to deforestation and

warming temperatures4, and even elements of the Arab Spring, as

the massive drought and wildfires in Russia led to a halt in

wheat exports, causing a spike in food prices across the Middle

East, which was a major initial impetus in the widespread

protests.5

When considering the impact of climate-induced migrations

(CIM), it is projected that rising sea levels and temperatures in

Africa, Central America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia may

displace hundreds of millions and perhaps even billions of

people. “The possibility of such a significant portion of

humanity on the move… poses an enormous challenge even if played

3 Westenskow, Rosalie, Intel chief: Climate change threatens U.S. security, (United Press International, February 18, 2009). Accessed January 28, 2012 <http://www.upi.com/BU.S.iness_News/Energy- Resources/2009/02/18/Intel-chief-Climate-change-threatens-U.S.-security/UPI-14021234988045/>4 Shah, Sonia, The Spread of New Diseases: The Climate Connection (Yale Environment 360). October, 2009.5 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 63.

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out over the course of decades.”6 For example, increased floods,

droughts, or storms in Central America (which events, although

not yet proven, is speculated by many historians and

archaeologists to have caused the collapse of the Mayan

civilization) possibly may exacerbate current conditions that are

already forcing millions to flee north towards the U.S. In short,

climate change events may compound instability, especially in

fragile, developing countries, regardless of cause or

contribution to conflict.

The U.S. Military and Intelligence communities are among the

strongest advocates for developing climate threat strategies.

Recognition of the issue initially emerged as a national security

concern in the 1990s but did not become a top priority until

recent years. A pivotal shift towards integrating climate change

preparedness into the greater national security strategy came

after the 2007 publication of a groundbreaking report entitled

National Security and the Threat of Climate Change by the non-profit research

institution Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). Produced by CNA's

Military Advisory Board, a panel of eleven retired generals and 6 Campbell, Kurt, et al., The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change (Washington, DC:Center for a New American Security and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 9.

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admirals, including the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,

former Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and

former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, the report

analyzed the potential regional impacts of climate change and

their affects on U.S. national security. CNA's report argued

that climate change poses a variety of multi-leveled risks that

can erupt suddenly or take many years to evolve and manifest.

Based on current climate change projections, the capacity and

stability of weak governments will be severely strained. These

developments will place an enormous burden on poor and

disenfranchised populations and increase pressure on the U.S. and

its allies’ national security capabilities, not only to provide

aid when possible but to also maintain intelligence-gathering

capabilities necessary to more effectively mitigate state

instability. “Unlike most conventional security threats that

involve a single entity acting in specific ways and points in

time, climate change has the potential to result in multiple

chronic conditions occurring globally within the same time

frame.”7 As noted by the 2006 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of

National Intelligence’s report for Congress, “The double impact of

7 CNA's Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, Virginia: The CNA Corporation, April 2007).

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high energy and food prices is increasing the risk of social and

political instability in vulnerable countries.”8 Current

volatility in energy and food prices and supplies is predicted to

increase exponentially in many regions due to climate change. It

is apparent that failure to plan for and adapt to such realities

could have dire consequences, the most serious being state

failure and widespread power vacuums for extremists or national

competitors to exploit.

Ignoring climate threats imperils U.S. capabilities abroad

and security at home. CNA’s report, for example, states “the

primary security threats to the U.S. [from Central America] arise

from the potential demand for humanitarian aid and a likely

increase in immigration from neighbor states,” empowered drug

cartels as government attention and resources are diverted to

disaster relief, and potential conflicts over freshwater

resources, such as between the U.S. and Mexico over the Rio

Grande River.9 Other intelligence estimates assert that India

may encounter widespread public health threats from coastal

8 Negroponte, John D., Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 28, 2006.9 CNA's Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, Virginia: The CNA Corporation, April 2007).

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flooding and overtaxed water supplies,10 that Russia is likely to

experience a mix of shifting weather patterns, including more

frequent droughts, jeopardizing both local agriculture jobs and

foreign food supplies,11 and that many countries in Africa will

undergo massive human and political upheaval as millions of

people are forced to relocate due to food and water insecurity.12

This paper examines how climate change will impact state

stability in the Philippines and U.S. national security interests

and capabilities in Southeast Asia. Maintaining stability in

Southeast Asia is vital for U.S. security and economic interests.

The region holds many trading partners, is a marshaling ground

for many anti-Western terrorists, and acts as a buffer against

any possibly expansionist policies of China. There is no

assumption here about what course of action China will take

towards its neighbors in the coming years, but it is critical

(for both countries) that the U.S. and China develop a

10 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, India: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 7.11 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Russia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 7.12 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 74

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cooperative relationship with one another as best as possible,

yet that the U.S. should be prepared to support regional partners

should China become hostile towards them. In recognition of the

region’s importance in the coming decades, President Obama placed

a renewed emphasis on national security interests in the Asia-

Pacific Theater in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. To

effectively contain any threats in the region, the U.S. needs

empowered and durable governments to partner with, something that

many regional countries lack.

Unfortunately, the abilities of regional governments are likely to worsen, as

Southeast Asia is highly at-risk from climate change, As more

intense and frequent climate-induced events such as flooding,

mudslides, and drought amplify current environmental, socio-

economic, and political problems, state capacity to provide both

disaster relief and continued basic social services is expected

to be severely tested. Sustained to failures to alleviate social

stress may lead to popular unrest, already a problem across the

region. No country is poised to be challenge to maintain order

more aggressively than the Philippines.13 If the Philippine

government collapsed, the U.S. would lose a strategic partner for

maintaining regional security and disrupting terrorist 13 Maplecroft, Big economies of the future - Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Vietnam and Pakistan - most at risk from climate change, October 21, 2010, Accessed 28 January 2012<http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi.html>.

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capabilities, and international supply chains would experience

large interruptions and shocks.

Such CCI threats demand integration of climate change

scenarios into overall military preparedness and regional

strategies for action. Although the U.S. does not possess the

capabilities, desire, or influence to address many of the global

consequences of climate change, it “does have a vital interest in

promoting stability in areas of strategic interest,” and it will

be forced to act accordingly to protect its national security and

that of its allies and partners.14 The U.S. military has accepted

the need for organic change to its climate change preparation and

has begun to analyze what threats are expected to emerge (in

strong alignment with the CNA Military Advisory Board’s

analysis). Examples of this include the previously cited 2011

report by the Defense Science Board (DSB), an advisory component

within the U.S. Department of Defense that helps prepare the

department for future conflict scenarios, as well as the National

Intelligence Council’s (NIC) 2008 report National Intelligence

Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030.

This study utilized scientific research, geopolitical analysis,

and intelligence community generated data to extrapolate how

climate change will affect six regions worldwide, (India, China,

Russia, North Africa, Mexico the Caribbean and Central America, 14 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), xiii.

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and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island States), and in turn

how these changes will likely impact national security. The 2008

NIC’s geopolitical assessment for Southeast Asia will be

frequently referenced in the Philippine case study below.

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III. Climate Threats in the Philippines and Implications for U.S. National Security

With a population of nearly 95 million, the Philippines ranked as the sixth most

at-risk country on Maplecroft’s Climate Change Vulnerability

Index (CCVI) and are one of only sixteen countries facing

‘extreme risk’ from climate change.15 In a country already wrought

with extreme seasonal precipitation variability, droughts, and

flooding, the Philippines are positioned to experience large-

scale impacts of climate change. With nearly 22,000 miles of

coastlines, increased coastal storms and the projected biggest

regional rise in sea levels, climate change threatens to act as a

major destabilizing force.1615

The Philippines are one of the United States’ longest-standing allies in Southeast

Asia. The strategic value of the country is increasing as the

U.S. seeks to strengthen its economic and security relationships

with Southeast Asian countries as it looks to develop an improved

bilateral relationship with a rising China. Ensuring the U.S.’s

ability to promote stability in the region was underscored by 15 Maplecroft, Big economies of the future - Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Vietnam and Pakistan - most at risk from climate change, October 21, 2010, Accessed 28 January 2012<http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi.html>.16 CNA's Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, Virginia: The CNA Corporation, April2007).

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President Barack Obama’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which

emphasizes the Asia-Pacific Theater as the U.S.’s central

security focus in the coming decades. Given the looming specter

of CCI threats, building and maintaining cooperative

relationships with the region’s countries is of the utmost

importance. “The negative interaction of climate change and

unsustainable development policies raises the prospect of severe

regional instability while China’s increasing regional dominance

threatens to exclude the United States from Southeast Asia and

provoke regional conflicts.”17 A stable Philippines is vital to

U.S. security in the region.

The Philippines face a myriad of climate threats. Although

altered weather patterns and increased storm frequency are

expected across the region, the Philippines are on par with

Indonesia as the only regional countries that experienced sea

level growth of roughly 15-25 millimeters per year between 1993-

2001, a rate expected to increase dramatically over time (and

already the fastest sea level growth rate in the region).18 In

comparison, the coastlines of Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam 17 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 57.18 Ibid, 9.

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only experienced between 0-10 mm of sea level rise during that

time.19 Sea level rise seriously endangers the health and welfare

of the 87% of the Philippines’ population that lives within 60

miles of the coast.20 It is projected that a one-meter rise in sea

levels will affect 64 of the Philippines’ 80 provinces,21

impacting roughly 2.4 million people and wiping out 52% of

coastal-area generated GDP, the largest percentage of any country

in the region.22 The effects of sea level rise “are interrelated

with impacts on agriculture, natural disasters, river deltas,

water resources, coastal ecosystems, human livelihoods and

infrastructure, and national security.”23

As a country, the Philippines currently experience a wide

array of climatic and extreme weather events due to its

geographic location. Annual typhoons and cyclones severely

19 Ibid, 9.20 Ibid, 16.21 Virola, Romulo A., et. al., Gearing A National Statistical System Towards the Measurement of the Impact of Climate Change: The Case of the Philippines, (U.N.Conference on Climate Change and Official Statistics, April 2008).22 Susmita Dasgupta, et. al., Sea-Level Rise and Storm Surges: A Comparative Analysis of Impacts in Developing Countries, (The World Bank, Development Research Group, Environment and Energy Team, April 2009).23 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 12.

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affect the coastlines and smaller islands, and it is common for

weather patterns to fluctuate between massive monsoon seasons and

lengthy droughts, year-to-year and island-to-island. As well, the

volcanic composition of they country’s soil and geology make it

highly susceptible to floods and landslides during weather

events.24 A country-by-country study by the non-profit policy

research organization Germanwatch analyzed how extreme weather

events affected over 140 countries between 1991-2010, and found

that the Philippines experienced an exceedingly high 270 weather

events annually, putting the country the 10th most vulnerable

worldwide on the study’s ‘Long-Term Climate Risk Index 1991-

2010.’25

According to a World Bank study, the Philippines lose

approximately $500 million annually due to natural disasters.26

These events already significantly hinder the country’s economic

viability and make it difficult for the government and relevant

24 Yumul, Graciano P., et. al. Extreme weather events and related disasters in the Philippines, 2004-08: a sign of what climate change will mean? (Disasters, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2011), 362.25 Harmeling, Sven. Global Climate Risk Index 2012: Who Suffers Most From Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2010 and 1991 to 2010,” (Germanwatch, November, 2011), 6.26 World Bank (no author), National Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines: Enhancing Poverty Alleviation Through Disaster Reduction, Washington,D.C., World Bank, October 10, 2005.

26

civil institutions and humanitarian assistance organizations to

prepare for and respond to disasters. Unfortunately, the

variability and intensity of these storms and worsening climatic

conditions are expected to swell in the coming decades. As noted

in the recent DSB climate security report, “geographic

modifications, driven by climate change, can decide the fate of…

countries,”27 and the Philippines are considered to be one of the

world’s most vulnerable nations with regards to climate-induced

storms.28 The map below illustrates how the Philippines already

are severely threatened by climate events (if it is unclear, the

country is colored darkest, or most at-risk).29

27 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 62.28 Ibid, 51.29 Harmeling, Sven. Global Climate Risk Index 2012: Who Suffers Most From Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2010 and 1991 to 2010,” (Germanwatch, November, 2011), 9.

27

28

While it does not initially seem to be an issue of national

security, ecosystem destruction has clear and dire socioeconomic

and security consequences. The combined rise in sea levels and

storm frequency will seriously hamper local economic growth and

income security. An example of this is the degradation of the

nation’s coral reefs and mangrove forests. Coastal erosion,

rising ocean temperatures, and unsustainable development

practices seriously endanger them both. Putting the ecological

catastrophe of their destruction aside, coral reefs and mangroves

provide natural and socioeconomic benefits known as ‘ecosystem

services,’ acting as natural buffers against heavy waves, storm

surges, flooding, and soil erosion. As well, their health is

“central to the tourism, agriculture, fishing, and aquaculture

industries,” and healthy coral reefs and mangroves provide food

security for tens if not hundreds of millions of people

globally.30 If this considerable revenue stream is depleted, it

may accelerate the decline in financial resources available to

the Philippine government to address climate induced-disasters,

further compounding the discontent of the affected populations, 30 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 11.

29

many of whom will lose their farms, houses, and jobs. The same

relation holds true with deforestation, overfishing, and other

ecosystem or natural resource degradations.

According to the NIC’s report on the geopolitical

implications of climate change on Southeast Asia, “unsustainable

development practices such as deforestation and overfishing

threaten to bring about the near-term collapse of vital regional

ecosystems, including the tropical forests and fisheries of the

South China Sea” and Philippine Sea.31 Unmitigated large-scale

deforestation can multiply the size and quantity of erosion,

flooding, and mudslides, while the “the economic and food

security impact from such a catastrophic scenario [like fishery

collapse] could create instability across the region,” as food

prices skyrocket, wages decrease, and possibilities for resource

conflict with China and other regional countries increases.32

Rising sea levels and the probable shifts in the country’s

climate, fluctuating between increasingly intense storms to

exceedingly long droughts, can severely imperil food and water

security. Coastal inundation from sea level rise can wipe out

31 Ibid, 3.32 Ibid, 17.

30

villages, taint freshwater aquifers with saltwater or other

contaminants, and flood agricultural lands and mine shafts

(natural resource extraction is a major industry across the

country, produces a large revenue stream for the government, and

is integral for many multinational corporate supply chains).33

The irregularity between shorter and longer growing seasons “can

play havoc on farmers’ cropping cycles,” increasing “risk of pest

attack and…uncertainty over which crops are most viable in a

given environment.”34 Although the Philippine economy is not as

heavily based in agricultural production as most of its

neighbors, diminished revenue and produce will still jeopardize

stability and human security in a country where food security is

already a problem, largely due to mismanagement in the food

distribution system.35

With regards to water scarcity, the Philippines may have

mixed futures. In general, it has relatively sizeable freshwater

supplies compared to its neighbors, but shortages are still a

33 Ibid, 22.34 Allen, Katrina M. Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation: local capacity- building in the Philippines, (Disasters, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2006), 81.35 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 15.

31

concern. In areas with ample supply, the supply itself may

become a problem. While droughts may endanger certain areas and

lead to water shortages in the future, as monsoons and typhoons

increase, reservoirs and aquifers may repeatedly exceed capacity

and flood during heavier monsoons, further endangering

livelihoods. Urban areas are at most risk from water scarcity, as

“problems such as leaking pipes and pilferage [and] lack of

infrastructure” are commonplace. Manila already has had to

ration water during El Niño-induced shortages, and rising

populations (sure to further increase from CIM) will lead to

further diversion of water away from agricultural production to

cities and may increase public health threats.36

The socioeconomic and health ramifications of CCI events

will ultimately lead to what may be the biggest threat to state

stability: climate induced migration. Displacement, refugees, and

rural-to-urban migration will severely intensify the stress on

the country’s already strained capabilities. Currently, 35% of

the population lives in rural areas (approximately 34.4 million

people).37 It is projected that many inhabitants of the

36 Ibid, 19.37 Ibid, 14.

32

Philippines’ smaller islands will flee to the larger islands in

search of greater protection from “adverse weather and sea-level

rise, more reliable sources of fresh water, and greater economic

opportunity…creating social disorder.”38 Historical ethnic

tensions have long plagued the Philippines, and the migration of

Catholic refugees to the large southern island of Mindanao may

spark renewed tensions with the minority Muslim Moros. As state

by the NIC, “the poor, ethnic and religious minorities, and those

living areas…will suffer disproportionately.”39

Additionally, expanded CIM will compound the widespread

problems that already exist from rapid overpopulation. As the

population becomes more concentrated, currently overtaxed land,

food, water security, and other societal infrastructures and

services will become severely tested. Certain cities, including

the capital of Manila, are at risk of flooding, putting more

lives in danger as urban populations swell. In the Philippines,

“urban infrastructure and economy are particularly unprepared to

absorb an explosive growth in rural migration to cities.”40 Even

if the currently insufficient sewage, water, and public health

38 Ibid, 29.39 Ibid, 3.40 Ibid, 28.

33

treatment services of urban areas improve, it will be difficult

for government officials and citizens to be able to sufficiently

cope with rising CCI pressures, posing possibly the greatest

potential greatest climate-induced threat. It is rare for non-

authoritarian governments to maintain stability and public

support if they are incapable of delivering basic services, and

insurgency groups could capitalize upon such a scenario, as will

be discussed below.

The most valuable resource available to help the Philippine

government during CCI stress is likely to be the country’s

vaunted civilian-based organizations, referred to here as civil

society. These collections of organizations have the credibility

and communications network to potentially prevent the country

from collapsing. The Catholic Church, non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), and community-based agencies currently act

as strong lines of communication for citizens to voice their

suggestions, concerns, and pleas for assistance to the local and

federal governments. These organizations often are the first

responders during disaster situations, becoming a safety net for

local residents as they utilize social mobilization, distribute

aid and reserve funding, and relay damage assessments to the

34

government. “Civil organizations have considerable experience

filling in the widespread gaps in state-provided social services,

addressing social problems such as education, poverty, and public

health.”41 The civil organizations provide the Filipino government

and people with a vital coping mechanism that allows for greater

resiliency following natural disasters, reducing the

vulnerability of local communities to climatic events. It is the

strength of Filipino civil society, unique to the region, which

many analysts, activists, and political leaders believe will

enable the country to stave off state collapse, acting as avenues

between the government and local communities to effectively

understand and address problems.

In preparation for and in response to crises, “organized

communities able to negotiate at the level of the city have a

critical role to play in ensuring that [the government’s]

response is adequate and appropriate.”42 This method is known as

community-based disaster preparedness (CBDP). While CBDP helps

expedite government efforts to alleviate suffering following

disasters, the most important aspect of CBDP it “to mobilize and

41 Ibid, 442 Dodman, David, et. al., Victims to victors, disasters to opportunities: Community-driven responses to climate change in the Philippines, (IDPR, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2010), 21

35

motivate community members to engage in long-term disaster

preparedness.”43 In the future, they may act as mechanisms to plan

for disaster prevention, not only just relief. However, despite

the popular support and past successes during disaster situations

such organizations have had, they are typically underfunded,

which impedes them from fulfilling their potential. The

Philippine government cannot simply be content to rely on civil

society, and addressing current socioeconomic and infrastructure

problems now is the main pathway to alleviate future CCI stress.

That being said, it is imperative that the Philippine government

realizes how valuable cooperation with the civil society is, and

it should do everything possible to emphasize its importance,

empower its capabilities, and make the populace aware of its

presence, as the organizations’ scope and resources will be

forced to expand to meet the demands of CCI threats.

The Philippines are also a crucial asset in the U.S.’s

campaign to counter global terrorism, and CCI instability

threatens to hinder these efforts. The country has a long history

43 Allen, Katrina M. Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation: local capacity- building in the Philippines, (Disasters, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2006), 87.

36

of ethnic tensions, primarily between the Catholic majority and

the Muslim minority in the southern islands. The Bangsamoro, or

the Moros, are comprised of 13 ethnic groups, most of which are

Muslim, and make up about 5% of the country’s population. They

primarily live on the islands of Mindinao, Sulu, and Palawan. The

Moros have struggled for independence since colonial times, and

in the modern era have engaged in several revolutionary attempts

to obtain autonomy beginning in the 1960s. Although open

hostilities have died down, the conflict “has been a perennial

driver of insurgency, political instability, and terrorism,”44

and “climatic stress is likely to exacerbate conflict in

Mindanao,” the country’s second largest and most impoverished

island.45

Standing to benefit from such stress are the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF), the Al Qaeda-offshoot Abu Sayyaf Group,

and the communist New People’s Army (NPA), among others, who can

exploit CCI public discontent with the government to their

advantage. U.S. national security is most threatened by the

44 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 3145 Ibid, 31.

37

latter two, which are both officially designated terrorist

organizations.

The Philippines’ politically and economically fragile

southern islands have “been a haven for the Abu Sayyaf terrorist

organization and other terrorist elements” for decades.46

Eliminating Abu Sayyaf is a major focus of cooperative U.S.

military operations in the region. Although the group primarily

attacks Filipino officials and civilians and seeks to establish

an autonomous Islamic state in the southern islands, it also

targets American and other Western citizens. Abu Sayyaf has

financial and ideological links to Al Qaeda and the Indonesian

Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization. Following the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military and several of

its intelligence agencies deployed troops and specialists to the

Philippines “to prevent Al Qaeda from establishing a new base in

the Southeast Asian country.”47 Their activities ranged from

targeted kill-or-capture missions to training local Philippine

forces in counter-terrorism tactics. CCI events could divert the

government’s attention and resources away from counter-terrorism,46 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.47 Smith, Paul J. Climate Change, Weak States, and the “War on Terrorism” in South and Southeast Asia. (Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007), 274

38

potentially enabling Abu Sayyaf to regroup, strengthen, and

extend its terror attacks and influence.

The NIC predicts that dissatisfied and impoverished rural

populations affected by climate change will further be taken

advantage of by “the lingering Communist-based insurgency” in the

southern islands led by the NPA.48 Many Philippine security

personnel believe the NPA to “to be a greater long-term threat to

the Philippine state than even the southern-based Islamist

groups.”49 The Philippine government is likely to find itself with

contradictory options, because if it fails to allocate resources

to address CCI stresses around the country (to be discussed

below), it may encounter social unrest, yet if it diverts funds

and attention away from alleviating economic stagnation or

popular suffering in the south, it is possible that it will

eventually lose the ability to diffuse the ethnic violence and

insurgencies altogether. Such a scenario would be detrimental to

U.S interests. As former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command

(PACOM) Admiral William Fallon described: “our partnership with

48 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 30.49 Smith, Paul J. Climate Change, Weak States, and the “War on Terrorism” in South and Southeast Asia. (Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007), 276.

39

the Republic of the Philippines is central to success in meeting

our War on Terror goals in Southeast Asia.”50

There is a significant risk of climate change risks becoming

a major threat multiplier to the Philippines in the coming

decades. Food and water security may become jeopardized, basic

services may become unavailable to large portions of the

populace, and insurgent groups will look to exploit public unrest

to destabilize the government. As well, territorial claims

amongst the neighboring states, especially China, may

disintegrate into open hostilities as borders shift and resource

scarcity increases. Given that “the Philippine state is hampered

by a fractious and disorganized government, abysmal national

infrastructure, and very weak resource management,” serious

political will is needed to prepare adaptability for climate

change.51

Ultimately, however, state collapse is unlikely in the

Philippines. Although the country remains highly vulnerable to

climate change, and many current economic development and

50 Fallon, William J. “Statement before the Committee on House Armed Services.” CQ Congressional Testimony, March 7, 2007.51 CENTRA Technology, Inc., and Scitor Corporation, Southeast Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to2030: Geopolitical Implications, (National Intelligence Council, January 2010), 38.

40

disaster response practices require significant changes, the

government and populace both are among the most well-informed and

determined to prepare for climate change out of all the countries

in Southeast Asia. Like neighboring Indonesia, it may encounter

more audacious and capable efforts by insurgency groups and “may

suffer failure or disintegration in peripheral areas of the

archipelago, but is unlikely to suffer overall failure.”52 Based

on current analysis, the Philippines may prove to be only one of

several nations in the region to avoid state collapse, and it is

essential for both the Philippines and the U.S. that the country

remains a stable strategic partner to manage neighboring crises

and protect national security interests in Southeast Asia.

52 Ibid, 4.

41

IV. Strategic Shift for U.S. Military Forces in Response to Climate Change

Despite vocal and repeated warnings from the military,

intelligence, and national security communities, their

recommendations to make GHG reductions now to prevent future

human, national, and international security challenges have

garnered, at-best, lukewarm if not hostile reactions from the

climate change-skeptics and deniers at the legislative policy

level. Fortunately for U.S. national security, the military and

intelligence communities have begun to prepare for the multitude

of climate threat multipliers facing the U.S. and countries

around the world.

The United States’ national security and military strategies

began a complete assessment and integration of climate change

adaptation into future planning following passage of the 2008

National Defense Authorization Act by Congress. The law required

the Department of Defense (DoD), for the first time, to analyze

the impact of climate change on operational capabilities. This

resulted in climate change becoming a major focus in the “two

documents that set the framework of defense policy guidance:” the

DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the department’s major

42

defense review, and the National Security Strategy.53 Published

most recently in 2010, the QDR identified climate change as

having “a significant role in shaping the future security

environment.”54 The 2010 National Security Strategy exploicitly

cautioned that “the danger from climate change is real, urgent,

and severe,” the first time it had done so, and prioritized

climate change as posing as great a threat as terrorism, nuclear

proliferation, and state-based risks.55

This realignment in national security policy led to the

publication of the most in-depth analysis of how climate change

impacts national security to date: the 2011 Report of the Defense

Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National

and International Security.56 As stated earlier, the DSB is an advisory

component within the DoD that helps prepare the department for

future conflict scenarios, among other services. According to the

DSB report, “the current U.S. approach to national security

interests related to climate change is based on three elements of53 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 89.54 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 84.55 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, 47.56 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011).

43

national power: defense, diplomacy, and economy.”57 The three

major corresponding agencies that will most “determine the

success or failure” of reducing climate-induced security risks to

U.S. national security are the DoD, the Department of State

(DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID).58 This section will discuss efforts by the U.S. military

to prepare for climate change.

Possibly the most poignant relevant statement in the 2010

QDR was that “climate change, energy security, and economic

stability are inextricably linked.”59 The report recognized

climate change as a serious threat multiplier, ranging from

impacting mission capabilities, to state stability, to global

resource competition. In response, DoD determined that the main

two thrusts for its adaptation to climate change should be clean

energy integration and climate threat preparation. Although this

paper primarily addresses climate threats, it is necessary to

briefly review clean energy in the military, as it has a profound

affect on how DoD will plan for, manage, and respond to climate

threats.

57 Ibid, 76.58 Ibid, 77.59 Ibid, 84.

44

The current U.S. energy posture dramatically compounds its

security risks. According to the 2009 Annual Threat Assessment by

the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), “increased demand

for energy resources, disruptions in U.S. and Arctic

infrastructure, and increases in immigration from resource-scarce

regions of the world” are major challenges that must be

addressed.60 DoD is the largest consumer of energy in the entire

United States, accounting for almost 80% of the federal

government’s total energy expenditures.61 Recent energy budgets

range between $15-20 billion annually, and are often subject to

price spikes due its reliance on oil for up to 80% of its fuel

supply.62 A clean energy military increases the combat

capabilities of the armed forces by addressing operational risk,

operational effectiveness, security of supply, and price

volatility while significantly reducing the DoD’s carbon

footprint and countering the growth of climate change.63

60 Blair, Dennis C., Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community forthe Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2009.61 The Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate, Reenergizing America’s Defense: How the Armed Forces Are Stepping Forward to Combat Climate Change and Improve the U.S. Energy Posture, April 20, 2010, 9.62 The Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate, From Barracks to the Battlefield: Energy Innovation and America’s Armed Forces, September 21, 2011, 14.63 Ibid, 16

45

In recognition of financial costs, new global challenges,

and fuel supply issues, DoD is reducing dependency on fossil and

foreign fuel sources by integrating clean energy technologies and

practices. According to Joseph Dooley, a Senior Associate for the

Pew Environment Group’s Clean Energy Program, nearly 85% of

convoys attacked during the most recent Iraq War were carrying

fuel.64 Decreasing these risks will become ever more necessary

should the U.S. find the need to deploy troops to nations

affected by climate change, where rapid humanitarian aid

responses and military action would become hindered by fuel

supply delays. Lengthy and unsecure supply lines have been one of

the greatest vulnerabilities for military forces throughout

history. Ultimately, clean energy integration may offer

significant tactical advantages and produce significant budgetary

savings.

At the time of this paper, the U.S. Navy is leading the

military branches in clean energy advances. Historically, the

Navy has been a pioneer in energy innovation since its inception,

transitioning from wind to steam to coal to nuclear power.

64 Dooley, Joseph, Senior Associate, Pew Environment Group’s Clean Energy Program, interview by Sam Teicher, (March 2, 2012).

46

Through an initial one-time investment of $550 million in 2009,

Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus expects savings of up to $400

million annually from energy-efficiency initiatives.65 Investments

and future budgeting include the launching of the ‘Great Green

Fleet,’ a naval strike group fueled entirely by alternative

energy, by 2016, and that 50% of total Naval energy consumption

will be supplied by alternative energy by 2020.66 U.S. Army

initiatives include securing a baseline of 25% renewables for

total energy consumption by 2025, research into developing

“advanced power sources and storage to enhance soldier mobility

and sustainability” (such as solar-powered forward operating

bases that reduce exposure of fuel supply lines), and the

establishment of roughly twenty net-zero installations for either

energy, water, waste, or all three.67 The U.S. Air Force, by far

the largest energy and petroleum consumer, seeks to fuel all

aviation craft with a 50/50 biofuel blend by 2016.68 And the U.S.

Marine Corps is researching advanced batteries for sustainable 65 The Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate, Reenergizing America’s Defense: How the Armed Forces Are Stepping Forward to Combat Climate Change and Improve the U.S. Energy Posture, April 20, 2010, 14.66 The Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate, From Barracks to the Battlefield: Energy Innovation and America’s Armed Forces, September 21, 2011, 7167 Ibid, 59.68 Ibid, 63.

47

mobile forces, procuring energy efficient forward shelters, and

reducing battlefield fuel demand by 50% by 2025.69 While it is

unclear whether any of these savings will be reinvested to

further bolster the abilities of the armed forces to deal with

climate threats, it was clear to Ret. General David Petraeus and

current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that “a

force that makes better use of fuel will have increased agility,

improved resilience against disruption, and more capacity for

engaging…partners, particularly at the tactical edge,” a benefit

that will surely better prepare U.S. forces to deal with future

climate threats as they emerge.70 A secure energy posture within

DoD will enable the military to be better prepared to address

global climate threats.

As mentioned earlier, the second thrust of DoD’s adaptation to

climate change is climate threat preparation. Although climate

change was not identified as a threat priority until recent

years, DoD has developed methods “to mitigate the impacts of

adverse environmental actions leading to international

instability” since the early 1990s and is currently helping DoD 69 Ibid, 67.70 Petraeus, General David H, Supporting the Mission with Operational Energy. Memorandum for the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians of US Forces-Afghanistan, June 7, 2011.

48

deal with security-related climate change issues.71 This

‘preventative defense concept’ has established a capable

interagency network between DoD and relevant U.S. government

agencies “to address environmental security issues and promote

stability” abroad.72 The strategy is an oft-used mechanism by

regional U.S. military commanders to foster cooperative

relationships with countries and develop “military support for

civil authority and democracy.”73 A similar program is the

PACOM’s Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian

Assistance (COE). COE identifies society-level resiliency as a

crucial tool in effective disaster preparedness and mitigation,

and works with military commanders, partnering agencies,

international institutions, and NGOs to strengthen countries’

civil organizations.74

By increasing the scientific and analytic research dedicated to

understanding climate change scenarios, such as the reports by

the DSB and the NIC, DoD is establishing a knowledge framework

that can be used to evaluate how climate change will impact 71 Goodman, Sherri W., Statement Before the Subcommittee on Installation and Facilities by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, May 13, 1993.72 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 80.73 Ibid, 80.74 Ibid, 83.

49

national security on a region-by-region and country-by-country

basis. Such assessments are crucial for the various U.S.

military combatant commands, such as PACOM, which need the most

accurate information available “to consider the potential climate

change and disaster risk reduction impacts on their readiness to

meet mission needs.”75 In response to increasing understanding of

the multi-variable threats of climate change, the branches of the

U.S. Armed Forces have developed new initiatives to mitigate and

manage these threats. Like with clean energy initiatives, the

Navy is taking the most aggressive approach, establishing the

Task Force on Climate Change and publishing a Climate Change

Roadmap in 2010. Adaptations include preparing for expanded

Arctic operations due to opening sea-lanes from ice melt,

evaluating “the impacts of sea level rise on installations and

the potential for increased humanitarian assistance/disaster

relief missions,” integrating climate threat analysis into war

college courses, and developing next-generation prediction and

adaptability capacities through international cooperation.76 The

Army is simultaneously assessing how sea level rise will impact

its own coastal installations while working with international

partners on freshwater issues such as foreign infrastructure 75 Ibid, 9776 Ibid, 91.

50

development and conflict resolution.77 The Air Force currently

“provides air transportation and civil engineering units vital to

disaster response missions,” and additionally seeks to improve

its atmospheric and meteorological capabilities, which are vital

to observing and predicting changing climate patterns and events.

And the Marine Corps developed an energy and water program

focused on sustainable energy solutions, which can be shared with

at-risk nations to help them cope with climate change threats.78

Despite these preparations for climate threats, climate

change adaptation is still in the infancy stages of its

integration into the greater national security strategy, and

several shortcomings exist. Despite the implementation of climate

threat preparation in the 2010

U.S. National Security Strategy, “no senior-level Pentagon

official has been assigned responsibility for the DoD interest in

climate change adaptation.”79 This is a glaring hole that may

stunt adaptation progress and puts the U.S. military and national

security apparatus at a disadvantage for preventing or responding

to climate threats. The lack of a lead position has hindered

efforts unify the various DoD offices dedicated to climate change77 Ibid, 91.78 Ibid, 9179 Ibid, 79

51

issues. As well, the institutional framework that connects

relevant agencies, experts, and policy leaders is not

sufficiently strong enough. A stronger framework would more

effectively ensure the best national security strategy for

climate change is developed by reducing interagency redundancies,

pooling shared resources and knowledge, and helping to coordinate

overall efforts.80

80 Ibid, 87.

52

V. Conclusion

After analyzing the likely impacts of climate change in the

Philippines and the initiatives by the United States’ military to

integrate clean energy and climate threat preparation into the

overall defense strategy, it is clear that climate change,

without any doubt, is a major threat to U.S. national security,

as well as regional and international security. Rather than being

the direct cause, “climate change is more likely to be an

exacerbating factor for failure to meet basic human needs and for

social conflict.”81 From a military capabilities standpoint,

climate change itself is significant enough of a threat to

warrant adaption throughout DoD. As well, state instability and

collapse amongst Southeast Asian countries would seriously

inhibit the U.S.’s regional economic and security interests,

ranging from conflict with China over Philippine territorial

disputes to disruptive internal insurgencies and terrorist

activities.

The United States must help the Philippines and equally at-

risk partner nations prepare for climate-induced threats, as well

as be ready to deploy U.S. forces and resources for sizeable

81 Ibid, xi.

53

disaster assistance missions. Climate threats in the Philippines

represent an appropriate case study for U.S. national security

interests in most developing tropical or island countries. As

with most island and coastal nations, the biggest challenges

facing the Philippines from climate change are sea level rise and

more frequent and hostile extreme weather events. These in turn

can create public health crises, damage human socioeconomic

welfare, and foment social unrest. Given these possible

outcomes, the U.S. must recognize that it will have to engage in

greater humanitarian assistance abroad in response to climate

threats if it wants to maximize its national security

capabilities, especially since the Philippines, let alone other

nations, will likely require aid despite its relatively strong

resiliency and coping mechanisms. According to Dr. Leo Goff, the

Program Manager for CNA's Military Advisory Board, countries with

stable governments and that are aligned with out interests can

help the U.S. mitigate varying national security situations, such

as thwarting terrorist activities within countries and regions.82

But should threatened governments seek U.S. aid and it refuses or

is incapable of providing help, it endangers its own security by 82 Goff, Dr. Leo, Program Manager, CNA Military Advisory Board, interview by Sam Teicher, (March 2, 2012).

54

either failing to abate state collapse or by fomenting resentment

towards the U.S. within the affected country. The latter is

especially true if the U.S. fails to lead in mitigating the

effects of climate change my reducing GHG emissions.

Negating any such resentment by taking a lead role in

climate threat alleviation must be made a top priority, as “the

framing of climate change as a Western-generated phenomenon

creates the potential for major anti-Western backlashes over

virtually any CCI crisis that arise.”83 This should be of

particular concern in countries already experiencing terrorism

and insurgency problem, and that also are at high risk of state

collapse due to climate threats. People that feel neglected by

their governments and disenfranchised by CCI events may turn to

alternative ideologies that seek to establish a new political

order. “If the United States continues to be perceived as the

primary obstacle in solving the climate change issue- and indeed

one of the key culprits in instigating the problem- it could help

sustain an enabling environment that would be every terrorists’

dream.”84 Soft power policies such as focused preparation efforts 83 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 5.84 Smith, Paul J. Climate Change, Weak States, and the “War on Terrorism” in South and Southeast Asia. (Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007), 278-9.

55

prior to CCI disasters and increased humanitarian aid by the U.S.

should have the dual effect of alleviating social stressors in

affected countries and enhancing its popular image abroad, both

of which are crucial for national security.

Such preparedness and disaster-relief initiatives are

typically handled by U.S. armed forces. It is imperative for

U.S. national security that climate threats are mitigated as much

as possible before escalating into destabilizing events or

conflicts. Many CCI threats in developing countries are predicted

to result from the combination of weak utilities infrastructure,

food and water insecurity, and poor land management. The U.S. has

a history of foreign military training initiatives, and the

deployment of technical experts such as “engineers, hydrologists,

planners, agricultural and fishery specialists, and medical

personnel” to help train and develop local specialists could

seriously empower local resiliency.85 Such actions would help

countries both prepare for and respond to climate crises, improve

U.S. standing in those countries, and present opportunities for

further partnership and international cooperation. Efforts to

85 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 77.

56

build “regional capabilities and promote alliances to create

climate change resilience will be an important contribution to

regional stability” around the world.86

Although the United States’ military is not actively

“working to stop climate change beyond cutting carbon emissions,”

done primarily for tactical purposes as part of each service’s

mission, the military is taking climate change as a serious

threat, and it seems to be effectively preparing itself to be

better informed and capable of responding to climate threat

multipliers.86 DoD should continue pursuing clean energy

integration during the coming decades. As the largest consumer of

energy in the U.S., DoD’s clean energy strategy appears to hold

four potential major benefits: greater fuel security from an

improved energy posture, increased military adaptability and

flexibility, a reduced carbon footprint that reduces climate

change acceleration, and the potential for sharing innovative

technologies with at-risk governments to minimize climate threats

to local energy security. The latter benefit provides DoD with a

tool to both alleviate problems in countries experiencing CCI

events and improve the U.S.’s standing in the eyes of those

86 Ibid, xv.

57

helped. For example, although the 2004 tsunami that struck

Southeast Asia was not caused in any way by climate change,

according to Ret. Admiral Gary Roughead, former Chief of Naval

Operations, the U.S.’s response to this environmental and

humanitarian disaster boosted positive perceptions of the U.S.

from around 30% to over 70% in Indonesia alone.87

At a tactical level, DoD should continue enhancing the

capabilities of the armed forces and preparing its bases for CCI

events, such as rising sea levels and storms threatening the

military’s coastal installations and “strategic island bases” at

Diego Garcia and Guam (which further threaten countless island

nations).88 Failure to prevent serious damage and potential

submersion could seriously hinder military operation capabilities

east of the Prime Meridian.89 As well, although DoD is integrating

climate change policy throughout its goals and standard operating

procedures and cooperating with relevant agencies, the lack of a

senior-level official directing climate change adaptation is a

serious problem. It is uncommon for organizations to successfully

87 Roughead, Gary, "Presenting the New Maritime Strategy." International Seapower Symposium, October 17, 2007.88 Breen, Mike, Vice President, Truman National Security Project, interviewby Sam Teicher, (April 5, 2012).89 Ibid

58

meet its goals without a set command structure. Establishing a

ranking position is of the utmost importance given the complex

and dynamic nature of this problem, the vast number of moving

parts involved within DoD, and the need for interagency and

international coordination to develop effective mitigation and

management strategies.

There is no one-size-fits-all military action plan for

climate disaster preparation and response. As with all military

campaigns and missions, response tactics and goals must be

determined on a case-by-case basis, as they fit within the

overall strategy. For more long-term climate threats, such as the

opening of Arctic sea-lanes, the U.S. military should take the

appropriate steps to ensure that the necessary capabilities to

protect U.S. interests are in place. In the case of melting

Arctic ice, the U.S. must establish more Coast Guard stations and

deploy more icebreaker ships if it doesn’t want Russia to assume

dominance over the region. Regions, countries, and situations

require constant and in-depth reassessments, identifying likely

climate threats, determining what response and resiliency

mechanisms are in place, and developing strategies for military

action during crises.

59

Despite political inaction to pass climate change mitigation

legislation, the United States military and intelligence

communities are wisely preparing for a climate change future. DoD

has successfully responded to regional environmental crises in

the past, and is beginning to incorporate climate change

scenarios into future planning. It is imperative that climate

change adaptation remains at the forefront of military and

intelligence strategies, and legislative advocacy should continue

to be promoted by members of both communities. The current U.S.

budget crisis will place many government initiatives in danger of

the chopping block, and there are already disputes over whether

the next QDR should include climate change.90 Climate change

preparedness cannot be considered a political decision. One of

the greatest difficulties posed to U.S. national security from

climate change is the unknown: “The future rate of shift and

ultimate magnitude of climate variations now underway are, as

yet, impossible to accurately predict, but the direction of these

shifts is certain. Earth is warming. It is clear that the shift

is a fundamental one that inevitably will alter factors critical

90 Ibid

60

to U.S. global interests.”91 No competent military commander

would ever knowingly ignore the warnings of scouts or allow the

fog of war to cloud his or her capabilities and preparations,

especially if the ability to anticipate dangers exists. The

threat multiplier realities of climate change demand that the

United States utilize every possible resource to analyze,

prevent, and manage these dynamic dangers, or risk jeopardizing

the country’s national security and human welfare.

91 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, (U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011), 62.

61

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Allen, Katrina M. Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation: local capacity-building in the Philippines, (Disasters, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2006).

Blair, Dennis C., Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select

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