Patrick BurkeProfessor HibbardSenior ThesisApril 2015

Explaining Civilian Victimization During Guerilla War: A Comparison of the Second

Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) & the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939)

This paper explores why states indiscriminately kill large

numbers of civilians during guerilla warfare by comparing the

Boer War (1889-1902) to the Arab Revolt (1936-1939). I find that

the strongest predictor of indiscriminate killing is when

militaries are granted a monopoly of power over the formation and

implementation of counter-guerilla strategy. To be clear, this is

not because militaries are inherently evil. Rather, a military is

a coercive tool of the state. Fundamentally, any military’s main

institutional goal is to win wars as quickly and cheaply as

possible. Because guerillas are so reliant on the civilian

population for survival, it often becomes rational to either

directly kill or remove noncombatants (Downes 2008, 157).

Conversely, I find that indiscriminate killing is far less likely

when the military cooperates with civilian government officials

on a counter-guerilla strategy. Again, this is not because

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civilian officials are inherently good. Rather, the institutional

goal of civilian officials is to govern the civilian population.

Because it is more difficult to govern a population after mass

death of noncombatants occurs, civilian government officials are

more likely to temper the military’s counter-guerilla strategy.

First, I examine the diverse literature on civilian

victimization; a term used to describe mass killing of civilians

by states during warfare. I derive three different hypotheses

from this literature, which in turn are tested through a

comparison of the Boer War and the Arab Revolt. Second, I explain

the scope conditions of the paper. Third, I define three

important terms: “guerilla strength conditions,” “indiscriminate

killing,” and “combatants and noncombatants.” Fourth, I explain

the logic for using a comparative case-study methodology, as well

as the reasons for the cases selected. Fifth, I delve into the

case study of the Boer War, focusing on providing details that

will allow me to test the three hypotheses derived from the

literature review. Sixth, I briefly examine key colonial wars

fought by the British between 1902 and 1936 in order to better

understand how and why the relationship between the military and

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civilian officials changed within this time frame. Seventh, I

conduct a case study of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Eight, I

discuss the results of my study. I conclude by discussing how my

theory can be studied in the future.

Literature Review & Derived Hypotheses

Rationalist theories explain civilian victimization as a

product of strategic incentives brought about by the structure of

combat. These scholars argue that civilian victimization will

occur during wars in which noncombatants impede war aims. For

instance, Alex Downes argues that territorial conquest

incentivizes mass civilian killing because of “the need to deal

with potentially troublesome populations dwelling on land that an

expansionist state seeks to annex (2008, 13).” Additionally, many

scholars identify strong causal explanations for civilian

victimization in wars of attrition in which states perceive

targeting civilian populations as a prudent coercive mechanism to

induce surrender by a combatant state. This incentive in wars of

attrition increases in tandem with desperation to win at the

least possible cost to a combatant state’s forces and population

(Downes 2008; Valentino, Huth and Crocco 2006; Pape 1996).

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Similarly, rationalist scholars argue that insurgent’s heavy

reliance on noncombatants largely explains civilian victimization

by states fighting against opponents that rely on guerilla

warfare (Downes 2007; Valentino, Huth and Crocco 2006; Valentino,

Huth, Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino 2004; Kalyvas 2004, 2006).

Benjamin Valentino (2004) identifies two conditions that

cause counterinsurgents to intentionally target civilians. First,

strength of the civilian-insurgent relationship: i.e., “The greater the number

of supporters and the more extensive the assistance that leaders

believe the guerillas are receiving from the civilian population,

therefore, the greater will be the incentives to target this

population.” Second, strength of the insurgent threat: i.e., “mass

killing in counterguerilla warfare may ... be averted when

insurgent military operations remain at levels that do not pose a

major military threat to the government.” In a Large-N study of

counter-guerilla warfare since 1945 Valentino, Huth, and Balch-

Lindsay find statistical significance for the hypothesis that

guerilla strength is the best predictor of civilian

victimization. Further, when they combine guerilla threat and

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high levels of civilian support, they find a 72 per cent change

in probability of civilian victimization (2004, 398).

There are two problems with their findings, however. First,

as the authors admit, there may be some degree of endogeneity

between the mass killing variable and the level of civilian

support. That is, mass killing may contribute to increases in

civilian support. However, the authors argue that first,

“approximately 44 percent of guerrilla wars with high civilian

support do not experience mass killing. High civilian support for

guerrillas, therefore, cannot be solely a reaction to government

policies of mass killing (ibid., 391).” Second, secondary

accounts show that mass killing occurs mainly as an initial

reaction to widespread civilian support (ibid., 392). High

civilian support is defined as having more than 100,000 civilians

providing logistical support (e.g., “providing food, shelter,

information, portage, or other logistical aid”).

The second, and more significant, problem with their study

is the definition of guerilla strength. They coded strong

guerilla groups as those that: (1) maintain 37,500 or more active

fighters at their peak strength, and/or (2) kill 19 per cent or

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more of the government troops at their peak strength. This

definition contradicts basic definitions of guerilla warfare.

That is: “[guerilla] warfare takes place when the weaker actor

refuses to face the stronger on directly and, instead, fights by

deception (Kalyvas 2006, 67).” Guerilla war does regularly

include attacks on military forces. However, these are usually

“hit-and-run” style attacks, after which “they will melt into the

larger population or retreat into impenetrable terrain, denying

the government forces any opportunity to bring their superior

numbers or firepower to bear on them (Mockaitis 1990, 4).” Of

course, guerilla forces that are large in number, or are able to

kill a significant portion of a military force do in fact pose a

significant threat. However, I argue that this is only a partial

measure of guerilla strength. As will be explained in more detail

below, I define guerilla strength by the organizational capacity

of guerilla forces to maintain control of territory.

The rationalist theories of mass killing in guerilla war

produce the following hypothesis:

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--Hypothesis 1: In conflicts in which: (1) insurgent-civilian relationship is strong and (2)

insurgents pose a strong military threat, counterinsurgents are likely to resort to mass

killing.

A different group of scholars argues that, while the

strategic realities of combat cannot be ignored, a combatant

state’s military organizational-culture provides the strongest

causal explanation for conduct during warfare (Crawford 2013;

Kahl 2007; Hull 2005, 2003; Nagl 2002; Keir 1997; Legro 1995).

Colin Kahl offers a succinct definition of military-

organizational culture:

a system of causal beliefs, values, norms, and practices that specify how an organization should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal affairs. Military culture is institutionalized, routinized, and reproduced in several ways, including education and training, career incentives, doctrine and war plans, budgetary priorities, procurement programs, and even force structures. This culture establishes organizational goals, creates a filter through which information is interpreted, shapes shared understandings among military personnel regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of certain means of war fighting, reinforces behavioral tendencies in accordance with these beliefs, and even creates a bias toward the development of material capabilities to carry them out (2007, 37-38).

As indicated by the Kahl’s definition, these scholars

identify military organizational-culture to be highly

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deterministic of state policy during wartime because the manner

of war fighting in future conflicts is predicated on the (formal

and informal) doctrine, laws, and technology utilized in the past

that have been institutionalized within the organizational-

culture of a military. For instance, although there existed

strategic advantage to bombing British civilians during World War

II, German Luftwaffe officers during the inter-war period

envisioned bomber aircraft as tools for close air support for

land forces, and therefore never developed heavy bombers. Thus,

they successfully advised Hitler against a policy of bombing

British civilians (Legro 1995, 116-118).

However, there exists a debate among these scholars over the

role of civilian leadership in the creation of military doctrine.

Nagl and Legro argue that the role of civilian influence over the

conduct of military operations is weak due to military leaders’

monopoly of expertise over military doctrine. Keir similarly

argues that civilian leaders have little influence in the

development of actual military doctrine. However, she asserts

that civilian leaders do set constraints to the development of

doctrine. These constraints are based on “what they believe will

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ensure the maintenance of the preferred domestic distribution of

power (1997, 140).” Common among these three scholars is the fact

that they are examining the overall doctrine of militaries.

Keir’s work examines the development of offensive vs. defensive

doctrines of the British and French militaries during the

interwar period. Legro provides explanation for restraint or use

of: chemical weapons, submarine targeting of civilian ships, and

use of strategic bombers during WWII. Finally, Nagl provides an

atheoretical account of learning among American military officers

during the Vietnam War, and British officers during the Emergency

in Malaya. Thus, the theories posed by the latter group of

scholars are more applicable to the development and

implementation of military doctrine for large-scale conventional

warfare.

Importantly for this paper, however, the military

organizational-culture scholars who specifically examine civilian

victimization during counterinsurgency conflicts find that

civilian government leaders in democratic regimes are highly

influential in changing their military’s policies concerning

civilians (Crawford 2013, 389-430; Kahl 2007, 40; Hull 2005, 182-

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196; Merom 2003). These authors argue that because democratic

regimes are accountable to public opinion, they are more likely

to pressure the military to exercise restraint vis-à-vis

civilians. This argument seems to rely on the assumption that

militaries of democratic governments are able to be controlled by

civilian officials. This group of scholars produces the following

hypothesis:

--Hypothesis 2: Civilian victimization is less likely to occur during guerilla war when the

state military is held to account by a democratic regime.

However, empirical data seems to contradict this hypothesis.

As Downes shows throughout his book, civilian victimization is

tolerated or even encouraged by democratic societies when they

perceive the enemy as a substantial threat to national security.

Christopher Day and William Reno identify a mechanism in their

recent work: In Harm’s Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics,

which provides a better explanation for the motivation of

civilians to restrain their military forces. They argue that the

regime type in place prior to the outbreak of an insurgency

largely indicates how an incumbent will wage their

counterinsurgency campaign. They identify regime types that rely

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on patronage politics to stay in power—rather than direct

governance of the population—will continue to be unconcerned with

the fate of civilians during counterinsurgency conflict. Such a

political structure facilitates a strategic environment in which

attempting to “out govern” the insurgent though “wining hearts

and minds” becomes imprudent to victory. That is, neither the

incumbent nor insurgent organization relies on the civilian

population for victory. Instead, either side is incentivized to

exact destructive policies against civilians once it becomes

expedient for victory. For example, in the case of African

counterinsurgencies, incumbents focus on an enemy-centric

strategy in which they target insurgent leadership—most of whom

were members of the political elite. Particularly strong leaders

are co-opted back into the patronage network. Or, those insurgent

organizations with weak political ties are dealt with through

leadership decapitation (i.e., assassination or deportation).

Again, in either case, governing civilians is of little concern

for incumbents or insurgents.

Day and Reno’s work fills in the gap left by organizational-

culture scholars who do not explain why civilian officials in a

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democratic regime would be compelled to induce restraint over

military policies concerning combatants. Implicit in Day and

Reno’s work is the idea that restraint is incentivized when it is

the policy of civilian officials to govern the population at the

conclusion of a conflict. In defining “out-governing,” Day and

Reno rely on the classical and contemporary western view of

“population-centric” counterinsurgency strategies that are

characterized by “‘statebuilding’ measures such as training local

armies, building up state institutions to provide services to

non-combatants and limiting government corruption (2014, 108).”

Day and Reno’s work, however, treats the military and

civilian government as a homogenous institution. This is likely

because of the realities of the military/civilian relationship in

African states. However, this results in the inability to apply

their theory to guerilla wars in which civilian and military

officials posses distinct interests. Deborah Avant’s institutional

theory fills this gap by recognizing that dominance of civilians

over the military, or vice-versa, will result in the dominant

group’s institutional interests being reflected in military

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strategy (Avant 1994, 12). A combination of Avant’s and Day and

Reno’s work produces the following hypothesis:

--Hypothesis 3: States will abstain from civilian victimization when civilian officials

intend to govern the population at the conclusion of a conflict and are able to maintain

control of the military.

Scope Conditions

This paper is externally valid for explaining the use of, or

restraint from civilian victimization during counter-guerilla

conflicts in which a democratic state goes up against an guerilla

group with (1) a strong relationship with the civilian population

and (2) the ability to maintain a strong military threat against

the state military. Additionally, these two conditions must

remain consistent throughout the majority of the conflict. My

theory is most applicable to democratic states with a military

that has a strong organizational structure in which standard

operating procedures and rules of engagement are generally clear,

enforceable, and enforced. Further, this theory is applicable to

counter-guerilla conflicts in which civilian leaders are able to

influence the policies of military leaders—whether through formal

or informal means.

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In order to test the three hypotheses identified above, my

analysis begins when insurgents meet the two “strength

conditions” identified above, and continues even when these

conditions change. My analysis ends when insurgents and

counterinsurgents formally end hostilities. Because the

rationalist theorists do not provide a complete definition of

what makes a guerilla force strong, I rely on frameworks

identified by Paul Staniland in his book, Networks of Rebellion (2014).

My theory is most applicable to three types of warfare in

which guerilla warfare takes place: (1) colonial, (2) imperial,

and (3) occupations or annexations during interstate wars that

devolve into guerilla war. This is because the distinction

between civilian and military officials in these three types of

guerilla wars is quite apparent. That is: first, civilian

officials often directly governed the colonies. Second, most

imperial wars of the 19th and early 20th century featured little

to no civilian control. Finally, occupations/annexations in

interstate wars are also fought with little to no civilian

control. My theory becomes more difficult to apply to civil wars

since 1945. These types of wars are defined as “armed combat

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within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between

parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the

hostilities (Kalyvas 2006, 17).” Because the intuitional

relationship between the military and civilian officials is often

unstable or homogenous, especially in the immediate post-colonial

era, it is difficult to fully investigate my theory (Day and Reno

2014).

Guerilla Strength Conditions

Paul Staniland provides four distinct frameworks to describe

the organizational structure of insurgent groups: i.e., integrated,

parochial, vanguard, and fragmented. These four frameworks are

defined by the degree with which insurgent groups are able to

maintain horizontal ties among group leaders, and vertical ties

to the community. Integrated groups are able to maintain strong

control among both leaders and the civilian population. This type

of insurgent organization is the most threatening organizational

type identified by Staniland because they are able to efficiently

implement their military strategy through a cohesive and

disciplined leadership. Additionally, their strong relationship

with the civilian community provides local intelligence, material

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support (e.g., shelter, food, transport, etc.), and recruits

(Staniland 2014, 26-28).

Parochial organizations are able to maintain strong vertical

ties to the civilian populations, but are unable to maintain

strong horizontal ties among leaders. Staniland identifies two

types of leadership structures for parochial organizations. The

first are insurgent groups with a central leader that engages in

“tenuous brokerage across distinct factions or a fractious

collective leadership of commanders (ibid, 30).” The second type

of organization is comprised of “a coalition of commanders of

factions who act autonomously despite the existence of an

ostensible collective leadership (ibid, 31).” As will be

explained in greater detail below, this second type of parochial

organization is of more significance to my analysis for two

reasons. First, the Arab guerillas during the Revolt changed into

this type of organization from and integrated group. Second,

although this type of parochial organization is more vulnerable

to state militaries than integrated organizations, the individual

sub-factions can be just as threatening to the state, though on a

much smaller scale. As Staniland notes, “The local units of a

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parochial groups tend to be tough fighters who know their local

areas well and are able to induce cooperation from the civilian

population, both through preexisting links and through the

credible manipulation of coercion and bribery (ibid, 31-32).”

This paper mainly relies on the integrated and parochial

insurgent organization frameworks to measure the two “strength

conditions” identified by rational theories as the main causal

mechanisms explaining civilian victimization during

counterinsurgency conflicts. This is because both integrated and

parochial organizations are characterized by both strong

civilian-insurgent relationship and the ability to pose a strong

military threat to counterinsurgents. I exclude vanguard groups

from my analysis because they are characterized by the ability to

maintain strong horizontal ties to insurgent leaders, but are

unable to maintain strong vertical ties to the civilian

population (ibid, 28-30). Additionally, fragmented organizations

are unable to maintain either vertical or horizontal ties, and

fall apart relatively quickly (ibid, 32-33). While some

historians identify Arab guerillas during the Revolt as

eventually changing to a fragmented group, this occurred toward

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the end of hostilities and thus comprises a small portion of my

analysis.

Staniland’s organizational theory explains the foundational

strength, and likely longevity of guerilla organizations.

However, he does not provide a mechanism that can be quickly

identified across guerilla wars that indicates the strength of

guerilla forces. Kalyvas (2004) argues that states will likely

victimize civilians through indiscriminate violence at the

beginning of conflicts because selective violence (i.e.,

targeting combatants and their immediate supporters) is resource

intensive and requires the control of territory. In building on

his theory, I argue that during counter-guerilla warfare states

will perceive the ability of guerillas to control territory as

the measure of their strength, and the level of threat they pose.

This is because the ability to control territory allows guerillas

the ability to gain logistical support from the civilian

population necessary to carryout their military goals.

Measuring “Indiscriminate Killing”

Civilian victimization is a term used by social scientists

to describe killing of civilians that “consists of two

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components: (1) a government-sanctioned military strategy that

(2) intentionally targets and kills noncombatants or involves

operations that will predictably kill large numbers of

noncombatants (Downes 2008, 14).” In this paper I focus on

civilian victimization that occurs when indiscriminate military

force results in reasonably predictable deaths of civilians, and

is done so as a policy of the combatant state. I have narrowed my

focus to “indiscriminate killings” for analytical clarity. While

this limits the scope of my analysis, “indiscriminate killing” is

no less important than “intentional killing” of civilians, as the

former accounts for “a large portion of mass killing deaths in

the twentieth century (Valentino 2004, 11).” I follow Downes’

definitions of “indiscriminate” killing: i.e., “strategies that

cause large numbers—tens of thousands—of civilian deaths owing to

belligerents’ inability or refusal to discriminate between

combatants and noncombatants or their failure to exercise due

care in their treatment of civilians (2008, 16).”

For example, during the war in the Philippines (1899-1902)

“the U.S. Army forced much of the rural population—including the

entire population of certain islands—into camps where many died

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owning to sickness and disease.” Downes argues that these deaths

were foreseeable, and thus constitute a government-sanctioned

policy of indiscriminate civilian killing (2008, 20). By

contrast, the German military intentionally killed 75-80 per cent of

the Herero population in Southwest Africa in the early 1900’s

(Hull 2003, 144). The “intentionality” of such killing is not

only based on the stated intent of German military leaders for a

final solution in Southwest Africa, but also the tactics used by

the military; such as forcing the civilian population into the

desert with no food or water, and in many cases committing large-

scale homicide (Hull 2005, 5-90; Hull 2003). I will continue my

discussion on “indiscriminate killing” below, but it is first

important to define who is considered a “noncombatant” in my

analysis.

Defining Combatants and Noncombatants

I define combatants as those soldiers or civilians who

either directly engage in combat, or comprise Walzer’s definition

of “munitions workers;” i.e., those who “are actually engaged in

activities threatening and harmful to their enemies (1977, 145-

146).” These “munitions workers” include those who create,

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transport, or store munitions (e.g., small arms, bombs, bullets,

etc.). By contrast, noncombatants are those who do not directly

supply munitions to combatants, carry weapons, or engage in

combat. In accordance with my definition, civilians living in a

village in which some members house combatants or store munitions

do not collectively surrender their immunity. Rather, those

specific homes possessing munitions and/or sheltering combatants

(whether consensually or not) become valid targets. Noncombatants

within those homes can be killed as long as every reasonable

precaution is taken to avoid their deaths, and doing so falls in

line with military necessity. Providing further detail into the

scope of noncombatant immunity is not necessary for the purposes

of this paper. Importantly, however, the definition of

noncombatant provided described here generally falls in line with

the definition provided by the rationalist and military

organizational-culture scholars from whom I derive the two

hypotheses tested in this paper.

Methodology

A single case study could provide a robust understanding of

the historical events that lead to civilian victimization

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(Bennett 2007). However, in order to provide a generalizable

account of civilian victimization during guerilla warfare I rely

on comparative case study methodology (Achen and Snidal 1989,

146). Because the two cases chosen (i.e., the Boer War and the

Arab Revolt) feature the same state actor, I am able to control

for numerous variables. First, choosing two wars that feature the

same state actor allows for the ability to explore the affect of

military-organizational culture and the influence of civilian

officials on the choice to victimize civilians, or abstain. This

is done though in-depth process tracing of the evolution of the

organizational culture of the British military and its

relationship with the civilian government between the two

guerilla wars. Comparative case-study methodology is the best way

to study military-organizational culture because of the level of

fine-grained analysis needed to truly understand the evolution of

such a complex institution (Bennett 2013, 106; Downes 2008, 58;

Legro 1995, 33). Further, this methodology allows for a fine-

grained analysis for explaining how change occurred within the

military over time (Staniland 2014, 11).

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Second, both guerilla wars featured guerilla organizations

that fit the two “strength conditions” described earlier. This

allows me to test the rational scholars’ hypothesis. However,

unlike Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, I able to provide an

in-depth explanation for how the evolving level of the guerilla

and civilian support influenced the state’s decision to victimize

civilians, or abstain. Concomitantly, because civilian

victimization occurred during the Boer War, but did not during

the Arab Revolt, I am able to differentiate the causal strength

of variables present or absent in each case.

Sources for the case studies derive from both secondary and

primary archival sources. The historical literature on the Boer

War is far more developed than the Arab Revolt. Thus, while I

relied on secondary sources for both wars, I relied more heavily

on archival material for the Arab Revolt. Primary source material

was gather from online databases from the National Archives at

Kew, England. Other primary sources, such as newspapers, were

gathered from online databases such as Lexus Nexus Academic.

The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902)

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There existed two conflicting institutional motivations

during the guerilla phase of the Boer War. On one side was the

military, lead by the Commander-in-Chief of South Africa, Lord

Kitchener. On the other was the civilian administration, lead by

the High Commissioner of South Africa, Alfred Milner. This

“conflict,” however, was characterized by a lopsided balance of

power, favoring Kitchener. He generally enjoyed autonomy from the

civilian leadership (the prime minister, the secretary of state

for war, and the colonial secretary) in the creation and

implementation of military strategy (Avant 1994, 114).

Kitchener’s mission was to win the guerilla war as quickly and

cheaply as possible, and had little concern for governance in the

Republics following cessation of hostilities. This mission

resulted in no disincentive for utilizing militarily expedient

strategies that involved high civilian mortality rates. However,

Milner, as future Governor of the Republics, was wholly invested

in laying the groundwork for loyal and productive colonial

subjects. Therefore, it is not surprising that Milner’s proposed

policies during the guerilla war were designed to avoid large-

scale death and destruction. Further, considering his

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motivations, it is logical that upon gaining full responsibility

for administration of the concentration camps, Milner tirelessly

worked to reverse the upward trending rate in civilian mortality.

In the following case study I will argue that indiscriminate

killing occurred during the Boer War because the institution

lacking motivation to govern (the military), was granted general

autonomy in the creation and implementation of military strategy.

This case study will focus on two interrelating events that lead

to large-scale civilian mortality: (1) the military strategy

employed against the guerillas, and (2) the administration of the

concentration camps. The examination of these events will focus

on how the institutional motivations for governance of the

population led military and civilian officials to create, change,

and influence the treatment of civilians.

Strength Conditions of the Boer Guerillas

Following political turmoil between the British and the Boer

Republic of the Transvaal, a conventional war broke out in

October 1899. The origins and causes of this war will be covered

in more detail later in this paper. However, it is important to

note that Following Lord Roberts’ annexation of the two Boer

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Republics (The Orange Free State and the Transvaal) the Boer

leadership, at a War Council on 17 March 1900, officially

declared to fight a guerilla war against the British (Judd &

Surridge 2003, 199). Thus, upon succeeding Lord Roberts as

Commander-in-Chief of South Africa in November 1900, Lord

Kitchener inherited a worsening guerilla war, one that dragged on

until Boer commanders surrendered at Veneering on 31 May 1902

(Pretorius 2000, 178). A Boer force of about 44,000 men (no more

than 15,000 were engaged in combat operations at one time),

including the most skilled Boer Generals, consistently sabotaged

communication lines, trains, and successfully defeated columns of

British troops in several instances (Belfield 1993, 131). The

commandos were even able to invade the Cape Colony several times.

Though large commando forces were often repelled from the Cape,

thousands of rebels carried out operations throughout the

guerilla phase. Significantly, this increased the threat of an

Afrikaans rebellion in the Cape, a potentially disastrous reality

for British rule in South Africa—though the rebellion never

actualized (Pakenham 1979, 544-545).

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There were two main characteristics that contributed to the

Boer commandos’ formidability as a military threat. The first was

their mobility. Unlike the British forces, the commandos were

expert horseman, able to live off the land, and navigate the

expansive veldt. This skill provided them with the ability to

effectively execute sabotage operations or attacks on British

columns (Stone & Schmidl 1988, 33-37). Second, the commandos

enjoyed extraordinary nationalistic and material support from the

Boer civilian community in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and

even to some extent in the Cape Colony (Avant 1994, 114; Boot

2013, 199). In fact, at the beginning of the guerilla war,

commandos often lived within their districts, which provided

food, shelter, and information on the activities of British

columns (Pretorius 2000, 173).1

1 Following the end to conventional fighting many Boers choose toremain surrendered. Commandos often used coercive tactics to bring these men back to the fight, including the threat of summary execution and destruction of property. These threats werecarried out upon refusal to fight. Those suspected to collaboratewith the British were executed and/or had their property destroyed. However, these “collaborators” and surrendered Boers were not in sufficient number to temper popular support for the commandos.

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This highly “integrated” group (Staniland 2014, 26-28) was

able to exact a heavy toll on British forces. Of the 200,000

British troops in South Africa during the guerilla phase, about

75,000 were engaged in direct combat (Belfield 1993, 104). It is

estimated that 2,000 British personnel were killed in action.

However, Kitchener’s counter-guerilla strategies were quite

effective against the commandos. Of the estimated 44,000

commandos, about 2,000 were killed in action during the guerilla

phase (ibid., 131). However, as with many guerillas, attacking

British columns was only one of many factors that allowed the

Boers to pose a significant military threat. The commandos' main

objective was to break the will of the British to continue

fighting. Thus, the commandos sought multiple strategies to bring

this about. This included seeking third party state support by

sending Boer delegates to Washington, Berlin, Paris, and St.

Petersburg. The Boers also set out to turn public opinion in

England, and around the world, against the war through propaganda

campaigns in the news media (ibid., 103-104).

Militarily, the Boers sought to make the war expensive for

the British by sabotaging supply lines, trains, communications,

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as well as attacking British columns. However, the most

important objective was to take and hold territory. Of course,

doing so in the two Republics increased the military strength of

the Boers (i.e., by facilitating procurement of supplies and

shelter). But contesting territory in the Cape was far more

importantly to the commandos because a rebellion in the Cape

would have crippled the British military (Pakenham 1979, 323-

326). As will be shown below, the ability of the Boers to

consistently sabotage British supplies and communications, defeat

British columns, hold territory, and maintain the support of the

civilian community, lead the British military to implement

destructive counter-guerilla measures that resulted in the

indiscriminate killing of tens of thousands of noncombatants.

Counter-Guerilla Strategy During the Boer War

Kitchener set in place multiple strategies to destroy the

Boer commandos’ strength. One strategy, beginning in June 1901,

was the construction of a series of blockhouses used to trap Boer

commandos in barbed wire fences as they attempted to flee British

columns. Each blockhouse was set 1000 meters apart, housed

guards, and had barbed wire connecting each house. Over 8,000

29

blockhouses were built, covering about 3,700 miles (Ibid., 132).

The blockhouses were successful, evidenced by the increasing

rates of commandos captured and killed, and the plummeting rates

of sabotaged trains and communication lines (Spies 1977, 224).

Along with the blockhouses, Kitchener sent flying columns on

“sweeping operations” meant to deprive the commandos of food,

shelter, potential male recruits that had previously

surrendered2, and Boer women and children. Blacks who worked on

Boer farms were also taken into the camps, having had their

property destroyed as well. Roberts had used similar tactics at

the outset of the guerilla war. However, under Roberts, farms

were usually destroyed as a punishment for sabotage of trains or

communication lines (Spies 1977, 127). This resulted in an

estimated 521 farms being destroyed during his command (Heyningen

2013, 58). Although Roberts’ tactics resulted in relatively few

2 On 15 March 1900, Roberts signed a proclamation stating that all surrendered Boers would be allowed to return to their homes as long as they laid down their arms and did not aid the guerillas in any way (Spies, 18). However, Boer commandos sought out these surrendered men and often forced them to return to commando with the threat of being hung or having their property destroyed. Indeed, one of Kitchener’s main motivations for establishing the camps was to protect these surrendered Boers from coercion (Ibid. 182-183).

30

refugees, already by August 1900 British officers and civilian

officials began to urge Roberts to erect camps in the Republics.

Many refugees fled to occupied towns because the commandos could

not provide for them, due to lack of food, medicine, and shelter.

Others had surrendered to the British and were seeking protection

from being punished for treason by the commandos, or being

coerced back onto commando. Most concerning to the British

officials, however, were civilians left to wader the veldt, as

they were highly susceptible to death from starvation, exposure,

or at the hands of vengeful African tribes. Thus, in September

1900, a small number of camps were set up in the Transvaal,

Orange River Colony, and Natal (Ibid., 63-65).

Kitchener, on the other hand, used the scorched earth

strategy to deprive rather than punish (Spies 1977, 120). His

forces burnt the majority of the estimated 30,000 farms between

1900 and 1902, killing millions of heads of cattle, and burning

thousands of acres of crops (Downes 2008, 169). In numerous

instances entire towns were destroyed (Spies 1977, 176). As a

result, the numbers of refugees being pumped into the camps grew

at a staggering rate. In the end, about 160,000 Boers and 130,000

31

Blacks were held in the camps. In the span of just under two

years, 27,927 Boers, and 18,003 Blacks died, mainly of disease

(Downes 2008, 161).

Results of the “Sweeps”: Influx of Civilians to the Camps

As many historians note, the influx of civilians into the

camps was the fuel for the spread of disease, and was thus the

main contributing factor to the high mortality rate. In fact, the

months during which the sweeps brought in the most refugees

(between March and November 1901) saw the highest morality rates.

(In December 1901 Kitchener formally ended the policy of brining

refugees to the camps, leaving an estimate 13,000 civilians on

the veldt or to the care of the commandos—a point I will return

to shortly.) Thus, British columns brought in most of the

civilians. Usually, columns arrived with civilians after days or

weeks on the march, and were ill equipped to ensure the women and

children’s health during the trek to the camps. Although

Kitchener ordered that columns provide better care for civilians

during transport, this order was rarely complied with, and never

enforced (Spies 1977, 183). Other civilians attempted to reside

with the commandos. However, they were largely unable to care for

32

civilians, and it became common for the commandos to turn

civilians over to British columns, or send them to British

occupied towns (Heyningen 2013, 101). Indeed, many commandos

welcomed the erection of the camps. Lastly, some civilians were

simply found wandering on the veldt (Belfield 1993, 142).

Although civilians came to the camps in varying ways, they

shared three commonalities. First, they either carried disease,

or were highly susceptible due to malnourishment. Second, the

vast majority was rendered homeless after their farms, crops, and

livestock were destroyed by British columns. Third, they were

mostly women and children (Farwell 1976, 407; Heyningen 2013,

134-135). These malnourished and diseased civilians were often

forced to live in densely populated tents, with poor sanitation

and little protection from the elements. The civilians’ immune

systems were rendered defenseless, owing to the lack of nutrition

in rations during the early months of the camps—including the

absence of vegetables. Making matters worse, the Boer civilians

were largely rural dwelling people, not accustom to living in

close proximity to one another. As a result, the women’s poor

health habits exacerbated the spread these diseases at an

33

astounding rate (Belfield 1993, 142; Heyningen 2013, 134-135).

Generally, black camps fared far worse. Medical aid was only

rendered when deaths threatened the labor they provided to white

camps. Latrines were sometimes nonexistent, and food rations

lacked nutrition to keep inmates alive (Downes 2008, 165). It is

important to note that both black and white Camps often differed

in condition. However, the number of camps with poor

administration was enough to produce thousands of foreseeable

deaths, and thus can be characterized as systemic failure of the

British government

Kitchener’s Administration of the Camps, September 1900-November 1900

Even in the early months of the camps, administrators were

aware that the influx of refugees was resulting in high mortality

rates. This is evidenced by appeals from camp administrators for

more food, tents, medicine, and above all medical professionals

(Pakenham 1979, 523-534; Spies 200; Heyningen 2013, 115-116). Two

examples evidence this claim. First, in September 1900, when the

camps had barely begun, General French predicted that

overcrowding would lead to epidemic, and thus ordered refugees to

be dispersed to other camps (Spies 1977, 150). Second, in March

34

1901, Captain A.G. Trollop (provisional chief superintendent of

the Orange River Colony camps) was denied additional tents by the

army. He “privately told the chief ordinance officer that it was

impossible to expect women and children to crowd the tents to

this extent. The people were ‘not so cleanly as soldiers’ and

epidemics were bound to result (Heyningen 2013, 116).” These two

army officers were able to make this observation with no formal

medical training, but merely a basic scientific literacy common

amongst all those in the British officer class. This point will

be returned to shortly.

Indeed, Kitchener’s control of the camps often led to

military expediency dominating humanitarian appeals. On 12 April

1901 St. John Broderick, the Secretary of State for War, had

enquired Kitchener about reports the War Office had received

indicating that provisions in the Bloemfontein camp were lacking,

and that typhoid was prevalent. Kitchener replied that some camps

were lacking in provisions, but that the Military Governor of the

Transvaal had made a public appeal for aid to the camps. In

reality, however, in March 1901 Kitchener personally denied the

appeal for aid because it would be admittance to shortages, and

35

“play into the hands of the pro-Boers (Pakenham 1979, 524).” In

May, he again denied aid from England because it would tie up the

railways being used for transport of troops and military supplies

(Spies 1977, 216).

Kitchener’s neglect can be identified more broadly by the

fact that he would often send an influx of refugees to camps

without providing sufficient provisions to administrators

(Farewell 1976, 405). Kitchener also failed to communicate with

camp administrators on the number of civilians that would be

brought into camps, and rarely specified the date of their

arrival (Spies 1977, 192-195). Thus, not only were the camps

being overcrowded, and the provisions lacking, but the

administrators could not plan effectively because they lacked

information. In the end, 83% of the Boer fatalities, and 57% of

the black fatalities between May 1901 and May 1902 occurred

during Kitchener’s control of the camps.3

A Positive Case of “Indiscriminate Killing”

Before considering whether Kitchener’s actions can be

characterized as “indiscriminate killing” it is important to

3 Statistics derived from Downes 2008, 161.

36

first examine the extent of his authority over the camps. And

second, the strategic logic and intended outcome of the “sweeps”

must be understood in order to establish that Kitchener did not

internationally kill civilians.

First, Kitchener officially granted control of the camps to

civilian authorities in January 1901. However, it was not until

16 November 1901 that Chamberlain formally ordered Milner to take

complete control of the camps. Prior to this date, Kitchener

delegated some authority for administration of the camps to

civilians, but maintained the final authority on vital issues

(e.g., placement and movement of the camps, apportionment of

supplies, allotment of rations per inmate, etc.). He also kept

reports on the camps from the eyes of the War Office and Colonial

Office—a move motivated by neglect rather than an attempt to

conceal his inaction (Spies 1977, 253). To this point, the

Cabinet and Milner did initially approved of the sweeping

operations in December 1900. However, they had little idea that

Kitchener aimed to destroy the majority of the country and

transfer a significant portion of the population into camps

(Heyningen 2013, 77).

37

Second, Kitchener’s “sweeps” strategy can be best understood

as a synthesis between Robert Pape’s definitions of “coercion by

civilian punishment” and “coercion by military denial (1996, 7).”

The “sweeps” can be defined as “coercion by civilian punishment,”

because Kitchener believed the Boers would surrender in order to

be reunited with their families (Heyningen 2013, 76). In fact,

Kitchener mandated that Boer women whose men were still on

commando should receive less rations than women whose men

surrendered—though this order was seldom followed (Farwell 1976,

400).4 And although many were refugees, civilians thought to be

aiding the commandos were forced into the camps (Pakenham 1979,

523).

The strategy was also a form of “coercion by military

denial” because it destroyed any means for the Boers to continue

fighting. As mentioned earlier, the “sweeps” were meant to

deprive the commandos of food, shelter, and potential male

recruits. Importantly, Kitchener perceived the sweeps to be

4 Generally, this meant women whose men were on commando receivedno meat. They were not starved, nor had their health aversely affected in any substantial way. Further, the rations scales formally ended in February 1901 due to outrage form MPs in the House of Commons (Farwell 400).

38

working throughout the guerilla war. As S.B. Spies concludes, the

commandos did in fact surrender at Vereeniging in May 1902

because they had no means to continue fighting, and they were

increasingly fearful of the high rate of mortality in the camps

(Spies 1977, 284-292). Considering these points, it is clear that

Kitchener had no intention to kill Boer civilians. Rather, it seems

Kitchener was simply disproportionally devoted to carrying out

the military aims of the “sweeps” (i.e., depleting the commandos

military capabilities and their morale) (Pakenham 1979, 524).

However, can Kitchener’s counter-guerilla strategy be

characterized as a case of indiscriminate killing? Alex Downes

argues that Kitchener likely knew that the camps would lead to

high mortality rates because of the highly publicized Spanish

experiment with concentration camps in Cuba just a few years

prior to the Boer war. During the Cuban Insurrection (1895-98),

Spanish General Valeriano Weyler concentrated thousands of rural

Cubans into fortified towns, killing between 100,000 and 300,000

civilians, mainly from disease (Downes 2008, 171). Farwell (1976,

393) points out that there is no historical evidence that

Kitchener was aware of this event. However, this is highly

39

unlikely; when the mortality rates in the Cuban camps became

public, there was highly publicized condemnation of the Spanish

by European nations, and the U.S. (Hyslop 2011, 264).5

Further, even if Kitchener was unaware of the Cuban case,

the British military had direct knowledge of camp administration

in India. In fact, following the Ladies’ Committee report—which

will be explained below—Chamberlain brought in officers with

experience administering the plague and famine camps in India in

order to improve the camps in South Africa (Heyningen 2013, 199-

200). Lastly, as Elizabeth Van Heyningen shows throughout her

book, the level of scientific literacy common among the British

officer class during the early 20th century provided Kitchener

the foresight to know his plan would lead to an epidemic—as

Captain Trollope and General French were able to do. Considering

these points, it is reasonable to conclude that Kitchener was

aware many would die in the camps, and thus his extreme neglect

of administration, and refusal to slow the influx of refugees

(until December 1901) can be characterized as indiscriminate

killing. 5 In fact, the U.S. used the Cuban case as a pretext for conquestof Cuba, and the Spanish held Philippines (Hyslop 2011, 264).

40

Finally, Kitchener’s decision to end the flow of refugees to

the camps in December 1901 must be considered. Was this a

humanitarian action? Or simply another strategy that can be

defined as indiscriminate killing? The death toll in the camps

fell sharply after October 1901. Many factors lead to this

result, including, for example, improvements in administration of

the camps. However, the largest contributing factor, according to

Heyningen, was the end of the measles epidemic. Simply put,

because the “sweeps” were largely over by November 1901, the

declining number of new inmates deprived the disease fuel to

survive. As Heyningen notes, Kitchener’s decision in December

1901 to end the policy of brining refugees into the camps largely

contributed to the decline in mortality (2013, 207).

However, I argue that Kitchener’s decision was motivated

more by military expediency than humanitarianism. It is important

to note that the initial decision to construct the camps made

little sense militarily. According to historian Eversley

Belfield, leaving the Boer civilians to the commandos would have

slowed them to such an extent that it is unlikely they could have

conducted any militarily significant guerilla operations. Not

41

only were the commandos lacking in provisions to keep their kin

alive, but they also could not leave civilians alone to carry out

operations because of the threat of African tribes (1993, 142).

By December, Kitchener’s frustrations with the commandos’

resiliency led him to deprive them of this advantage. Though the

“sweeps” were reducing in intensity and scope by November 1901,

between December 1901 and May 1902 an estimated 13,000 civilians

were left on the veldt, or with the commandos. The threat of

African tribes, and death from exposure or starvation was still

prevalent, if not more acute after months of destruction of

farms, livestock, and crops. Even those taken into the care of

the commandos (themselves lacking provisions) were not much

better off (Judd & Surridge 2002, 295; Spies 258-259).6 Although

it seems little is know of fate of these 13,000 civilians, it is

reasonable to conclude that Kitchener had the foresight to know

that ending the policy of brining civilians to the camps, while

continuing the sweeps, put there lives at risk.

6 In fact, in December 1901 Kitchener sent a letter to Boer leaders telling them he would transfer civilians to their care ifthey so chose. Botha ignored the letter, but the leaders of the Orange Free State refused the offer, citing the fact that the commandos had no means to keep their kin alive (Spies 258-259).

42

The next section will focus on the battle between Kitchener

and Milner for control over the counter-guerilla strategy

employed in South Africa. This section will shed light on how the

institutional motivations of the two men lead them to advocate

their respective strategies.

Alfred Milner: The Motivation to Govern

Milner’s motivation to govern South Africa upon cessation of

hostilities lead him to pursue a counter-guerilla strategy that

would likely have mitigated wide scale indiscriminate killing. As

I will show, at the outset of the guerilla war Milner proposed a

strategy involving the slow pacification of the Boer civilian

population through restarting the economies of occupied towns,

rather than wide-scale destruction. Milner believed his strategy

would cause the Boer civilians to end support for the commandos,

and become loyal to Britain. However, Milner was not motivated by

a humanitarian impulse. In fact, he was the main instigator of

the Boer War, and knowingly prolonged the war through

inflexibility during various peace negotiations. These positions

may seem contradictory, however, they derive from Milner’s

motivation to govern South Africa.

43

Alfred Milner became Governor of the Cape Colony and High

Commissioner of South Africa in 1897. Forged by the history of

British rule in South Africa, Milner inherited a politically

tumultuous situation. After being annexed by the British in 1877,

the Transvaal Boers rose in rebellion in 1881, known as the First

Boer War. The war lasted only three months, ending in an

embarrassing defeat of the British at the Battle of Majuba Hill

(Farwell 1976, 13-21). The discovery of Gold 1887, however,

reinvigorated British efforts to re-take control of the

Transvaal. In December 1895, Cecil Rhodes (multimillionaire and

Prime Minister of the Cape Colony), in partnership with Joseph

Chamberlain, designed a plan to annex the Transvaal using

mercenaries from the Chartered Company. This became known as the

“Jameson Raid.” Rhodes hired Dr. Leander Starr Jameson to invade

the Transvaal with 500 armed men in an attempt to ferment an

Uitlander7 uprising that would provide a pretext for a British

invasion of the Transvaal. The raid failed due to poor planning

and execution. Rhodes was investigated by the House of Commons,

7 These were mainly British immigrants working the diamond and gold mines in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

44

and later sacked as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.

Chamberlain’s role remained secret (Farwell 1976, 21-27).

Following these failures, Chamberlain withdrew from the idea

of formally annexing the Transvaal, instead seeking informal

rule. His plan was to coarse the President of the Transvaal,

Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, to politically enfranchise the

growing population of English immigrants, known as “Uitlanders,”

who largely owned and worked in the gold mines. Seizing on the

upward trend of the Uitlander population, Chamberlain’s goal was

to democratically overthrow Kruger’s control in order to increase

the British government’s share of the gold mines. Alfred Milner

inherited this mission upon arrival in South Africa (Judd and

Surridge 2003, 42). However, Milner sought formal annexation of

the Transvaal instead. Indeed, he was motivated in part by his

government’s mission to benefit from the gold mines. However, he

was more so motivated by the glory of governing a united South

Africa (Pakenham 1979, 61). Additionally, Milner believed in the

imperial mission; i.e., “that British rule was the best rule,”

and that no Englishmen should be ruled by another race (Farewell

1976, 28).

45

Less than a year into his governorship, Milner began his

attempt to convince Chamberlain that war with the Transvaal was

inevitable. Chamberlain, however, believed public opinion in

England was not ready for war, and asked Milner to write a

dispatch summing his views for release to the public. Milner’s

dispatch, which became known as the “Helot’s Dispatch,” was

essentially an emotive call for the defense of disenfranchised

British subjects (i.e., Uitlanders) in the Transvaal through

military intervention. The dispatch reached Chamberlain in 31 May

1899. However, it was not released due to an impeding meeting

between Milner and Kruger in Bloemfontein, convened to discuss

the possibility of political enfranchisement of the Uitlanders,

and a last ditch effort to avoid war (Farewell 1976, 33). Though

Kruger offered some compromise, Milner had no intention of

avoiding war. The conference ended in failure on 5 June 1899.

Chamberlain subsequently released the “Helot’s Dispatch,” himself

now in support of war. Public opinion in England rallied to the

cause of protecting the Uitlanders. Following three months of

military buildup, and impossible ultimatums issued by both sides,

the war began in October 1899 (ibid., 35-36).

46

Milner’s Efforts Towards Governance: Initial Stages of Guerilla War

Milner played a lead role in creating the war, however, he

largely stayed out of military matters during the conventional

phase, apparently believing that politicians must remain silent

on the conduct of military operations. However, shortly after

cessation of the conventional war in February 1900, Milner began

lobbying Roberts and Kitchener to set in motion policies that, in

his estimation, would lead to a loyal and productive crown colony

in the two Boer Republics. Already in May 1900, Milner sent a

letter to Roberts urging him to allow the steady establishment of

a civil administration in the Transvaal. He proposed that the

Republics should be ruled as a crown colony initially, and later

changed to a system of self-rule once the political environment

was conducive. However, on 31 May 1900 Chamberlain informed

Milner that military rule would remain in place, at least in the

Transvaal, due to the increasing military threat of the Boer

commandos (Headlam 1933, 142-145). By July 1900 the military was

forced to take control of the ORC as well (ibid., 153).

Milner begrudgingly accepted military rule. However, this

did not stop him from attempting to influence the political

47

environment of his future colonies. In June 1900, Milner urged

Roberts to discriminate his scorched earth strategy:

I am anxious about cases of this character, as I feel it is important, both for our good reputation and for the future popularity of British rule, that people should understand that we are scrupulous in the protection of property and that nothing will be taken from people except (1) as a legitimate punishment for misconduct—such as taking up arms after submission, etc,. or (2) for military requirements, inwhich case, payment ought always to be made...” (Milner papers, 133).

After three months of punitive farm burning under Robert’s

command, on 21 September 1900, Milner was far more assertive than

his previous letter, and urged Roberts to end the policy. He

suggested that it was only through establishing protected areas

and pacifying the population that the guerilla war would be

brought to an end. The only alternative, in his view, would be

devastation of the entirety of the Republics. Milner, in half-

hearted reverence to Roberts’ military expertise, stated that

such a policy “may no doubt be inevitable, but which in view of

the future, one would be most sorry to have adopted in a country

which is now our property (Spies 1977, 125).”

In late October 1900, Milner shifted his attention to

Kitchener, due to his impending takeover as Commander-in-Chief

48

(C-in-C) of South Africa in November. Milner’s letter to

Kitchener on 31 October 1900 is important because it encapsulates

the counter-guerilla strategy that he would agitate for during

the guerilla war. Milner begins his letter stressing that

destruction of farms, crops, and/or livestock should only be done

in reaction to “definite acts of treachery (Headlam 1933, 164).”

Milner asserts that devastating all of South Africa would be

impossible, and that a scorched earth strategy would strengthen

the commandos by simultaneously increasing popular sentiment

among civilians and increasing the number of commandos. No doubt,

Milner’s fear of popular sentiment for the commandos was caused

by his fear of rebellion in the Cape Colony. A rebellion had been

stamped out in the Cape during the conventional phase of the war.

However, the escalation of the guerilla war increased the threat

of a new rebellion. Indeed, Milner was fully aware that the Cape

Assembly, the Afrikaans press, and other agitators derived much

of their propaganda from “acts of harshness” by the British in

the Republics (Pakenham 1979, 514).

The alternative strategy posed by Milner in his letter to

Kitchener in October involved using soldiers to occupy and police

49

towns, with the aim of re-starting industry. He believed that

allowing civilians to go back to “their usual occupations,” while

simultaneously protecting them from reprisal by the commandos,

would “dishearten the enemy and encourage the waverers to come to

us (Headlam 1933, 164).” Milner’s strategy also involved sending

out “emissaries into neighbouring districts to point out the

advantage of submission, and create a local opinion” in favor of

the British (ibid.,165). These emissaries would communicate that

the British intended to protect Boer towns from the commandos,

and that the British government would compensate for any property

destroyed by the commandos. The last, and likely in his view most

important portion of his letter, concerned restarting the gold

mines in the Transvaal (Headlam 1933, 165). Though Kitchener

proceeded to largely ignore Milner’s strategy between October

1900 and March 1901, Milner—mainly with the help of Chamberlain—

fought to gain the approval of the Cabinet (Spies 1977, 177).8

8 Milner also continued to lobby Kitchener on reducing the destruction of the sweeps, but the C-in-C mainly paid lip serviceto the idea. Milner’s correspondence with the Cabinet focused mainly on the failures, and expense of Kitchener’s sweeps. On February 6 1901, Milner cited correspondence from military governors and district commissioners in the Republics who also saw the sweeps as counterproductive (Spies 1977, 177).

50

Though Milner and the Cabinet approved of Kitchener’s

strategy in December 1900,9 by March 1901 several factors lead

the Cabinet to side with Milner’s strategy. The most important

factor was the cost of the guerilla war—about 6 million pounds a

month (Pakenham 1979, 525). Indeed, the impending peace talks at

Middelburg drove home the reality that Britain would have to pay

for re-construction upon cessation of hostilities (Judd &

Surridge 2003, 203).10 Thus, re-starting the gold mines seemed

logical. Concomitantly, it was agreed that slowly occupying and

policing protected areas was more cost-effective than wide-scale

destruction, which would make re-building the future colonies

extremely costly. Another important factor was the resiliency of

the commandos—who had invaded the Cape for the third time in

9 As noted earlier, Milner and the Cabinet initially approved of Kitchener’s proposal for sweeping operations in December 1900. However, the intended scope of Kitchener’s strategy was unclear to Milner and the Cabinet at that time. Further, Milner’s initialapproval of the sweeps should be understood as a politically motivated decision, whereby he could avoid making an enemy of thenew Commander-in-Chief of South Africa, and avoid conflicting with the Cabinet. Lastly, as I will explore in the next section, Milner continued to lobby for his counter-guerilla strategy even after approving Kitchener’s sweeps. 10 CAB 37/56/27 23 FEB 01, page 2; CAB 37/56/29 4 MAR 01; CAB 37/57/34 19 MAR 01.

51

February. This caused the Cabinet to question the logic of

Kitchener’s military strategy. (Pakenham 1979, 524-525).

Feeling this pressure, Kitchener re-started some of the

mines and established them as protected areas (Spies 1977, 199).

However, Kitchener was averse to fully re-starting the mines

because it would involve a large number of troops to guard them

as well as to protect the railways needed for supplies.

Additionally, Milner’s plan would involve the transfer tens of

thousands of Uitlander refugees to the mining districts.

Kitchener believed it would be impossible to feed them, and an

attempt to do so would revert supplies away from his troops

(Spies 1977, 173-174). Due to Kitchener’s lack of effort as well

as sabotage of mines by commandos, by May 1901 only 150 of the

6,000 available mine stamps were working, producing only about 2

percent of the pre-war monthly output capacity (Pakenham 1979,

588). However, after the failure of the peace talks at Middelburg

in late March, the logic of Kitchener’s strategy was given

credence by the Cabinet, and the scope and severity of the sweeps

rapidly increased.

Milner’s Lobbying of the Cabinet, June-September 1901

52

Ironically, the failure at Middelburg was in large part a

result of Milner and the Cabinet’s inflexibility on several

points—the most significant being the question of amnesty for

Cape rebels. In reality, however, the failure of the talks was

because the Boer commandos were simply not ready to give up

independence. Nevertheless, Kitchener had ardently lobbied for

amnesty, identifying the issue as the main obstacle to peace. In

fact, it seems Kitchener was willing to facilitate peace at any

cost, chiefly because he was unconcerned with how the

negotiations affected governance of the colonies following his

departure. He simply wanted the war to end. Milner, on the other

hand, was fundamentally opposed to the Middelburg peace talks,

believing that any concessions would reduce the effectiveness of

his future governance—only total surrender war acceptable to the

High Commissioner. Milner kept his aversions private, likely

fearing political retribution from the Cabinet and/or Kitchener.

Thus, vetoing amnesty for the Cape commandos—a move supported by

the Cabinet—seemed to grant him political cover to poison the

peace talks (Judd and Surridge 2003, 201-207).

53

Milner did not give up on implementing his counter-guerilla

strategy following the failure at Middelburg. In fact, on 20

March 1901, he sent a letter to Kitchener re-iterating the

strategy he proposed in October 1900 (Spies 1977, 177). Kitchener

once again ignored Milner. The High Commissioner then set his

sights toward the Cabinet. At the urging of Chamberlain, Milner

left South Africa for England on 8 May 1901 (Heyningen 2013,

184). Following numerous meetings with Chamberlain, and directly

addressing the Cabinet on 21 June (Judd and Surridge 2003, 209),

5 days later the Cabinet considered Milner’s circular memorandum

laying out how he viewed the counter-guerilla strategy should be

implemented going foreword. The memorandum read:

The weakness of our present course of action (he maintained)would seem to be the absence of any positive or constructiveelement. This is due to the fact that at every stage of the war it was always expected that it would only last a few months longer. 'Only let us finish the war first.' 'Everything must wait until we have beaten the Boers'...

Quite recently a small exception was made to the principle that everything else must wait till the fighting was finished, and a few mines on the Rand have been allowed to work a limited number of stamps . . . (but) this is only a very small beginning...

The process of sweeping the country cannot go on indefinitely. For some time it has been carried on on a vast

54

scale with enormous vigour, and with very considerable success. The last thing I would suggest would be any relaxation of our efforts in this direction during the present winter. But it is evident that every successive sweeping will produce less result, while it will be equally costly to us.The purely aggressive and destructive policy will, sooner orlater, have done all it can do. It may yet prove completely successful. If not, it would seem to be a question not of choice but of necessity to fall back upon the defensive and consu-uctive policy — the gradual extension of protected areas, and the substitution of police work on an extended scale for large military expeditions . . . ' (Spies 1977, 245-246)

The Cabinet agreed that Kitchener must fully re-start gold

mining and focus his military strategy away from wide-scale

devastation and instead on hunting down the remaining commandos

(Judd and Surridge 2003, 209-210). Thus, the same logic that

endeared the Cabinet to Milner’s plan in March, once again lead

them to approve his plan in June—though more forcefully this

time. Again, however, the rising threat of Boer commandos halted

the implementation of Milner’s strategy. By the end of July—while

Milner was still in England—the threat of the Boer commandos in

the Cape lead Kitchener to execute two separate offensives to

root out the commandos (ibid., 210-211).

55

Milner continued to lobby for the implementation of his

strategy upon his return to South Africa in September, but on 20

September Lord Roberts (now C-in-C of the War Office) stepped in

and successfully block his efforts. Roberts convinced both

Broderick and Chamberlain that Kitchener’s strategy must continue

because of the threat the commandos posed in the Republics, and

especially in the Cape. Chamberlain was also motivated by the

reality that public opinion in England favored “a more hard-

hitting approach towards the elusive Boer (Judd and Surridge

2003, 212).”

Milner staged one final drive to gain cabinet approval of

his strategy. On 1 November 1901 Milner cabled Chamberlain a

memorandum requesting that Kitchener be sacked, citing his

refusal to work with civil authorities, or to implement Milner’s

counter-guerilla strategy. The Cabinet was split on the decision,

but Prime Minister Salisbury cast the deciding vote in favor of

keeping Kitchener. His reasoning was that Kitchener was the right

man for the job, and it was not certain that his replacement

would be more conducive to working with the civil government. The

56

historians Denis Judd and Keith Surridge argue that following

this decision:

“Milner realized he could no longer influence the direction of military strategy and that his earlier schemes lay dead in the water. The government lacked the resolution to confront its military expert in South Africa and all he could do was wait ... for the military situation to improve (ibid., 213).”

Thus, from November until the end of the war Milner gave up

significant efforts to affect the military strategy in South

Africa. Instead he set out to tackle a different problem that had

the potential to make future governance of South Africa extremely

difficult, if not impossible; the concentration camps.

Mechanisms of Change: Emily Hobhouse and the Effort to Reduce Morality Rates

Most historians agree that Emily Hobhouse’s reporting on the

conditions of the concentration camps compelled the government in

England and Milner’s civil administration to improve the camps.

Hobhouse originally went to South Africa in early 1901 to

distribute aid to the refugees in the camp. However, her tour was

also spent interviewing inmates, camp administrators, and

recording her observations on conditions in the camps. Her report

put the blame for the high death rate on neglectful

57

administration of the camps by the authorities in South Africa.

However, she made clear that conditions in the camps greatly

differed based on several factors, including: the abilities of

the camps administrator, and access to supplies and clean water

(Spies 1977, 197).

Hobhouse departed for England in May 1901 to present her

report to British officials, as well as the public.

Coincidentally, she traveled to England on the same ship as

Milner; even meeting briefly with the High Commissioner. Hobhouse

was also able to meet with Broderick upon arrival in England.

However, she maintained the status of a radical “pro-Boer,” and

much like Milner, Broderick feigned interest during the meeting,

but ignored Hobhouse afterward (Roberts 1991, 164-165). She then

turned her effort to public opinion. A pamphlet of her report was

circulated to newspapers and MPs. Some in the British public were

outraged, but no substantial political agitation ever emerged

(Downes 2008, 174-175). However, She made allies with liberal MPs

Campbell-Bannerman and David Lloyd George (Pakenham 1979, 533).

The two MPs lead the liberal party to present a motion against

the government in the House of Commons on 17 June 1901. A lengthy

58

and emotional debate ensued, during which Broderick placed the

blame for the sweeps on the guerillas themselves, and downplayed

the conditions in the camps. The motion was defeated (ibid).

Despite Broderick, Chamberlain, and Milner’s public

intransigence to Hobhouse, these officials set out with extreme

vigor to improve the camps following her efforts. Broderick

commissioned a group of prominent female conservatives, known as

the Fawcett Committee, to investigate the camps and provide

recommendations for improvements beginning in December 1901.

Broderick likely believed the conservative Fawcett Committee

would contradict the “pro-Boer radical” Emily Hobhouse. However,

the Committee agreed with most of Hobhouse’s findings, and blamed

the military and civil administration for failing to implement

even to most basic hygiene and nutrition standards. Milner,

Broderick, and Chamberlain used their considerable power to take

control of the camps and implement the recommendations of the

Committee. This included an increased number of medical

professionals, better nutrition, and the building of camps in the

Cape, Natal, and Ladysmith (where supplies would be easier to

access). Increasing the number of camps would also reduce the

59

density of individual camps, which was vital to combatting

epidemics (Heyningen 2013, 181-207). As noted earlier, Heyningen

argues that the end of the measles epidemic was likely the main

reason for the sharp decline in the death rate after October

1901. However, a substantial contributing factor was also the

administrative improvements. Although Broderick and Chamberlain

were helpful in these improvements, Milner was the man in South

Africa orchestrating the vast majority of the endeavor.

There is no doubt that Emily Hobhouse’s reporting and

political agitation was the mechanism that set the British

government in motion towards improving the camps. However,

identifying why the British government could be compelled to

action by Hobhouse’s activism is debated among civilian

victimization scholars. Isabel Hull identifies British democracy,

and the ability of the Cabinet to influence the military as the

main characteristic that allowed for Hobhouse’s efforts to affect

change. Hull asserts: “Two things seem to have moved civilians to

intervene more energetically in military policy: public criticism

and their own observation that severity was ineffective, or even

counterproductive (Hull 2005, 185).” Alexander Downes, however,

60

argues that the public outcry in England was minimal, and those

“pro-Boers” were seen as radicals who could be ignored. In his

estimation, no politician possessing significant power, including

Broderick and Chamberlain, felt substantial pressure from the

public to act. Rather, adopting Kelly M. Greenhill’s theory of

“hypocrisy costs” (2003), Downes argues that democracies are

susceptible to publicization of violations of “the norms they

otherwise live by and try to impose on others, of which the norm

against killing noncombatants is particularly prominent (2008,

175).” Thus, in his view, the civil authorities were compelled to

act, not because of public opinion, but in order to avoid

publically contradicting avowed norms.

Britain’s democratic character, ability to intervene in

military strategy, and aversion to “hypocrisy costs” can be

identified as contributing to answering why the British

government was compelled to action by Hobhouse’s activism.

However, I argue that the motivation for future governance of the

Republics was the main factor explaining why Hobhouse was so

effective. Admittedly, when viewing Chamberlain and Broderick’s

governmental responsibilities, the motivation to govern South

61

Africa was not felt as strongly as it was for Milner. Considering

this point, the “hypocrisy costs” hypothesis works better for

these two men: the British government prided themselves on the

ability to govern their colonies, and manage their dependencies.

Thus, when the death rate in the camps became public, it not only

reflected poorly on the British imperial mission, but also posed

a significant threat to future governance.

Why then did Milner not attempt to take control of the camps

prior to November 1901? Again, “hypocrisy costs” was likely a

contributing fact. But this is not the whole story. As stated

earlier, Milner was not fully aware of the mortality rates in the

camps because Kitchener did not fully inform the Colonial Office

and War Office of the conditions in the camps, or the intended

scale of the sweeps. Thus, prior to Hobhouse’s report, Milner

identified the destruction of the Republics and stagnation of the

gold mines as a far more substantial obstacle to future

governance. However, Hobhouse’s report was publicized around the

world, including South Africa. Therefore, it became clear to

Milner that the Boer people now believed the British were

intentionally attempting to wipe out their race. According to

62

Milner, the fatalities in the camps threatened future governance

because the population, sharing in their common hatred of the

British, would be intransigent to British rule, and easily

brought to rebellion (Spies 1977 305).

Forging Cooperation Between Military and Civilian Authorities: Guerilla Warfare

Between the Boer War and the Arab Revolt

Comparing the Boer War to the Arab Revolt is particularly

fruitful because of the change that occurred in the motivations

of the Colonial Office and War Office vis-à-vis governing

civilians. During the 34-year span between the Boer War and the

Arab Revolt the change in the legal structure of the colonial

governments facilitated this shift in motivations. While the Boer

War was fought as an international war, the Arab Revolt and other

guerilla conflicts that occurred during this period were

considered civil unrest. This meant that the guerillas and

surrounding civilian population were to be treated as British

subjects. Thus, the military was to aid the civil government

during times of rebellion, rather than acting as an autonomous

entity. This meant that the military was to conduct counter-

guerilla operations as an imperial police force, bound by English

63

Common Law only to use the “minimum force” necessary to restore

order.

“Minimum force” is a general principle derived from English

Common Law and can be identified as a fundamental characteristic

of British counterinsurgency doctrine throughout the 20th

century. This principle mandates that the task of British

soldiers is “not the annihilation of an enemy, but merely the

suppression of a temporary disorder, and therefore the degree of

force to be employed must be directed to that which is essential

to restore order, and must never exceed it (Mockaitis 1990, 18).”

The quote from Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1923, captures the essence

of “minimum force.” This principle prohibits excessive or

indiscriminate killing, but does not prohibit exemplary force

that falls short of homicide (e.g., punitive destruction of

property).

“Minimum force” developed from English Common Law governing

the use of force against rioters in England during the 19th

century (Townshend 1982, 171). Some historians argue that this

principle was adopted in India during the 19th century

(Poppelwell 1995), but it is quite clear that minimum force

64

became increasingly influential in the formation of

counterinsurgency doctrine throughout the 20th century

(Lehenbauer 2012, 7-18; Nagl 2002, 35-43; Mockaitis 1990).

Official War Office pamphlets, such as: Notes on Imperial Policing,

1934, and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1937, were instrumental in

legally codifying the “minimum force” principle to the Colonies—

again, based on the understanding that inhabitants were

considered subjects of the crown (Mockaitis 1990, 25).

However, historians often note the tendency of the British

military to communicate doctrinal lessons through unofficial

sources. Two of the most influential unofficial publications were

Colonel C.E. Calwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (first

published in 1896), and Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing (1934 & 1939)

(Bennett 2013, 91; Nagl 2002, 39). These texts prescribe

exemplary force in certain contexts. For instance, Callwell

prescribes the destruction of entire villages, crops, and

livestock when military officers are certain that inhabitants are

facilitating insurgent activities (ibid., 145-148). Similarly,

Gwynn, noting the difficulty of identifying insurgents and their

facilitators, explains that “it may frequently be necessary to

65

deal with the [civilian populous] by collective punishments

(ibid., 23).”

Some general parameters for the use of exemplary force are

suggested, however. These texts advise that exemplary force

should only be used against villages known to facilitate

insurgent violence (Callwell 1914, 148-149) (Gwynn 1939, 23-24).

Both texts agree that the need for these parameters stems from

the tactical necessity for compliance from the civilian

population. For instance, they advise that exemplary force should

not permanently embitter the civilian population. And while

Callwell does not provide a clear reason for such parameters,

Gwynn asserts that indiscriminate killing, or unwarranted

collective punishments would likely result in the inability to

gain intelligence from the community needed to target insurgents

(Gwynn 1939, 23).

The prescriptions and proscriptions for use of force

featured in both Callwell’s and Gwynn’s texts were largely

reflective of the official documents governing the conduct of

military forces during the 20th century, including: the King’s

Regulation’s, Manual of Military Law (1929), Notes on Imperial Policing (1934 &

66

1937), and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1934 & 1923) (Hughes 2009, 316-

317). The allowance of exemplary force may be offensive to

contemporary sensibilities, and thus may seem to contradict the

idea that such action would create difficulty in governing the

population. However, it is important to note that the

discrimination of collective punishments is well in line with

Milner’s prescriptions, and was legally sanctioned under Article

50 of the Hague Regulations.

As is made clear in the discussion of the “minimum force”

principle, the codification of English Common Law in the colonies

brought the institutional motivation of the military closer to

that of the Colonial Office. In addition, because the military

was mandated to act as an aid to the civil power, the civil

government was provided power over the formation and

implementation of the military strategy employed. Of course, the

legal delineation of responsibility between the Colonial Office

and the military was not always complied with, nor was the

principle of “minimum force.” However, according to historian

Thomas Mockaitis, such deviations were generally held to account

by the British government and/or public opinion, which resulted

67

in the strengthening of the “minimum force” principle, as well as

the role of the military as an aid to the civil power.

Mockaitis identifies three events during the 20th century

that contributed substantially to the institutionalization of

“minimum force:” the Second Anglo-Boer War; the Anglo-Irish war

(1919-1921); and the Amritsar Massacre in India in 1919. Though

wide-scale indiscriminate killing did not occur during the Anglo-

Irish war, the British government pursued a strategy involving

wide-scale destruction of property, which was met with outrage

from the British public. The public outcry that occurred during

both wars put pressure on the military to reform its counter-

guerilla strategy.

However, the Amritsar Massacre was the most formative event

of the three. In the course of dispersing a crowd, General Dyer

ordered his men to fire on a crowd of demonstrators, resulting in

and estimated 200 to 300 dead, with nearly 1000 wounded. The

Hunter Committee investigated the incident and eventually

censured Dyer. The Committee rejected his defense that the entire

Punjab was in a state of insurrection and that martial law was in

effect everywhere. Dyer believed that because martial law was in

68

effect, his actions following cessation of hostilities would be

indemnified—as is specified in the Manual of Military Law (Mockaitis

1990, 22). Instead “The Hunter Committee ... took a narrower view

of the episode. Its members concluded that Dyer was not

suppressing a rebellion but dispersing an unlawful assembly

(ibid., 23).” Essentially, this ruling resulted the “principle of

minimum force, which had previously applied only to riot

situations when the civil power was still in control, had been

expanded to include disturbances that occurred after martial law

had been declared.” This extension was codified in Notes on Imperial

Policing, 1934 (ibid., 25).

From this point onward, the military began its trajectory

towards acting as an imperial police force used to quell

disturbance, rather than a conventional army seeking destruction

of an enemy. As I will show in the next case study on the Arab

Revolt, this resulted in a more symmetric balance of power

between the military and civil authorities—mainly owed to the

similarity in their mission; i.e., govern the colonies.

The Arab Revolt During the British Mandate Over Palestine (1936-1939)

69

The Arab Revolt (1936-1939) featured a far more symmetric

distribution of power between the military and civilian

administration than during the Boer War. Indeed, the

institutional motivation of the military was to defeat the enemy

using coercive methods. Numerous communications between the War

Office and commanders in Palestine evidence the frustrations the

latter felt by the political restrains their operations faced.

However, they were legally bound to act as “an aid to the civil

power.” This legal distinction had the effect of incentivizing

the military to remain conscious of how their strategies would

effect the political situation among Palestinians. Simply put, if

a proposed plan violated the institutional motivation of the High

Commissioner (i.e., to govern), it would not be approved. Of

course, the civilian administration became more welcoming of

coercive methods as the threat from the guerillas increased. This

may have increased the rate of collective punishments, curfews,

searches, administrative detentions, and other repressive

actions, however, systematic indiscriminate killing never

occurred during the Arab Revolt. I will argue that this is a

70

product of the coordination between the military and civil

authorities.

Strength Conditions of the Arab Guerillas

The Arab Revolt occurred in two phases. Arab Palestinians

had risen up in a popular resistance against the Mandate

government’s policy of allowing Jews to immigrate to Palestine

during the first phase of the Revolt.11 The uprising began as a

relatively peaceful general strike in April, but quickly devolved

into violence. Hostilities during this phase did not cease until

12 October 1936. During the early months of the first phase, the

guerillas mainly operated with no central leadership—in bands of

15 to 20. They attacked political officials, police and military

personnel, and Jewish settlements. Sabotage of railways,

telephone lines, and police barracks became rampant. However, it

was not until the arrival of former Turkish Army officer Fawzi

Kawakji in August that the guerillas posed a substantial threat

to the Mandate Government. Prior to his arrival the government

viewed the disturbances as isolated acts of violence by

fragmented gangs. Kawakji assumed central command of the 11 Palestine Royal Commission Report, Lord William Peel, July 1937, pg. 106-125, http://tinyurl.com/oe4gdwv.

71

guerillas, and immediately implemented an effective propaganda

campaign that resulted in a rapid increase in recruitment of

fighters as well as gaining material and moral support from the

civilian population. He was also able to establish training camps

and organized the guerillas with the help of Arab officers from

Syria, Iraq, and Trans-Jordan (Rahman 1971, 100-104). By October

1936, it became clear to the mandate government that the violence

was organized, systemic, and enjoyed support from the Palestinian

population.

The guerillas were not attempting to gain central control of

the government through military force. Rather, the main goal of

the guerillas during this phase was to put pressure on the

British government to cede to the Arab Higher Committee’s

political demands. It seems the guerillas identified gaining

control of villages and towns as the best way to put pressure on

the British government. Controlling territory also allowed the

guerillas to build their strength their military capabilities

through: gathering of supplies, recruitment, and maintaining a

type of headquarter from which to plan and carryout attacks.

Villages and towns also supplied volunteer fighters who would aid

72

the guerillas by planting roadside bombs, sniping British

patrols, and even augmenting full-time fighters during large

engagements with British troops. Of course, killing British

soldiers and civil administrators was apart of their efforts to

gain control of territory. However, their strategy synthetized

numerous guerilla tactics (including a propaganda campaign), with

the aim of disrupting the control of the civilian administration

in towns and villages.

However, the guerillas growing strength was cut short by a

political settlement between the Mandate Government and the Arab

Higher Committee (AHC) in early October 1936. At the beginning of

the general strike the AHC, under the leadership If Haj Amin ad-

Husseini (also the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem), presented three

demands to Whitehall: “(1) Stoppage of Jewish immigration; (2)

Prohibition of land sales to Jews; and (3) Formation of a

national government responsible to the representative council.”12

Thus, the announcement of a Royal Commission to mediate these

demands largely contributed to the end of the first phase.

12 Mockaitis 89

73

The threat of increased military force also contributed to

the conclusion of disturbances. Between April and September 1936,

Wauchope attempted to mediate a political solution with the AHC

with the help delegates from surrounding Arab states. Due to the

continual intransigence of the AHC, however, the Cabinet sent

Lieutenant-General J.G. Dill to institute martial law in

Palestine in September. Dill was sent along with re-enforcements

from Egypt, which raised the number of British troops in

Palestine to around 20,000. Martial law was never established,

however. It seems the mere threat of its establishment mobilized

Arab leaders to successfully pressure the AHC to call off the

strike: on 8 October the Foreign Office issued a memorandum to

Arab leaders stating that martial law would be instituted on 14

October if hostilities did not cease. The strike ended on the

12th (ibid., 182-183).

The calm held for nine months while the Royal Commission

carried out its inquiry. However, the disturbance began once

again in July 1937, following the recommendation by the Royal

Commission to partition Palestine into two separate Arab and

Jewish states. According to the Commission: “the Jews would

74

receive Tel Aviv, the coastal plain, the northern valleys, and

part of Galilee, while the Arabs would receive the west bank of

the Jordan River, the mountainous region, and the desert in the

south. The British would retain Jerusalem and a narrow corridor

linking it to the sea (Segev 2000, 402).” Both the Jews and Arabs

rejected the plan. Though general disturbances began in July, it

was not until September when Arab gunmen killed the Assistant

District Commissioner of Galilee, Lewis Andrews, that the second

phase began its sharp devolution towards systemic revolt

(Shepherd 2000, 191).

The guerillas during the first phase of the Revolt can be

characterized as a “fragmented group (Staniland 2014).” They were

not able to organize until the arrival of Fawzi Kawakji, and thus

acted more as unorganized gangs during the majority of this

phase. In fact, although the guerillas enjoyed popular support in

Samaria and the old city of Jerusalem, a large portion of the

population opposed the rebels. Over the course of the second

phase, however, the guerillas formed into an

“integrated/parochial” organization. This change is mainly owed

to the increase in popular support for the rebellion, brought on

75

by the partition plan (Raham 1971, 210). The goals of the

guerillas remained the same; i.e., pressure the British to make

political concessions. Thus, their main strategy was to control

territory, rather than take over central control of the

government.

Although popular support increased substantially following

partition, the guerillas were never able to fully form into an

“integrated” organization. Several reasons contributed to this.

The AHC was officially declared illegal by the civil government

shortly following the assassination of Lewis Andrews. Numerous

leaders were arrested or deported. However much to the

frustration of the British, the Mufti was able to flee to

Damascus. It was there that he and his cousin, Jamal Husseni,

maintained central command of the guerilla leaders in Palestine.

However, they were not able to fully maintain control of their

ground commanders in Palestine. The two strongest of these

commanders were Abdul Rahim el Haj Mahomed, and Aref Abdul

Razzik. Both operated mainly in the Samaria district and

controlled similar numbers of guerillas. However, neither was

able to maintain control of a substantial number of subordinate

76

commanders, and both men refused to work with one another due to

pre-existing feuds. Abdul Rahim, in particular, consistently

ignored the Mufti’s orders, especially when involving violence

against rival Palestinian Arabs.

Such feuding between opposing tribes was the main factor

keeping the guerillas from forming into a fully integrated group.

The Husseni tribe regularly clashed with the Nashashibi during

the Revolt. The latter professed loyalty to Britain, and thus the

Mufti ordered his men to kill or intimidate these

“collaborators.” Rebel courts were even established where rivals

would be punished, often by summary execution. The British

estimated that 961 Palestinians were killed due to internal

conflict was between 1936 and 1939. Historian Walid Kahlidi

places the estimate closer to 1200 (1971, 846-848). Despite the

parochial tendencies of ground commanders, the guerillas were

able to pose a significant threat during the second half of the

Revolt. Estimates for the overall size of the full-time fighters

during the Revolt range between 1,000 and 15,000. However, the

number volunteer fighters (described earlier) is unknowable—but

likely well beyond 15,000. Though small in number compared to the

77

30,000 British troops present during the second phase, they were

able to effectively contest territory.

The climax occurred in October 1938 when guerillas were able

to occupy the old city of Jerusalem and virtually all of the

southern district: “in Ramallah, Jerico, Bethlehem, Hebron and

Beersheba, as well as in small villages, civil authority had

almost vanished. Police posts were evacuated and magistrates’

courts, post offices and other government services in towns and

villages were closed in various parts of the country (Rahman

1971, 231-232).” Also in the autumn of 1938, guerilla control of

the northern districts was sufficient to set in place a system of

taxation and establish rebel courts, and the Mufti was able to

implement an effective liquidation campaign of leaders of the

Nashashibi tribe (ibid., 231-232). Acts of sabotage also took

their toll during the second phase. The oil pipeline from Iraq

was constantly sabotaged. This forced the British to carryout

risky night patrols and implement the “Special Night Squads,”

lead by Captain Orde Wingate alongside Jewish supernumeraries.13

Sabotage of railways also posed a significant threat to the 13 Report on Operations in Palestine, 12 September 1938, 6, TNA WO 32-9497

78

Mandate government. In fact, the Jerusalem-Lydda railway was

closed for months in the early stage of the second phase.14

However, the guerillas quickly fell apart following the

arrival of an extra division of British troops in mid October. As

will be discussed in great detail below, the British counter-

guerilla strategy was extraordinarily effective in causing the

guerillas to fragment. They implemented a multifaceted strategy

involving village occupation, collective punishments, day and

night patrolling, administrative detention, deportation, and

leadership decapitation.15 Between 1936 and 1939 it is estimated

that the British killed 3,832 Arabs (120 by execution).

Evidencing the increase of military operations during the second

phase, about 2,400 were killed between 1938 and 1939. Official

British estimates of the numbers detained in 1938 were 2,463—

compared to 5,679 in 1939 (Kahilidi 847-848).

The leadership decapitation campaign caused the guerillas to

fragment by late 1938. Thus, the guerillas once again became

roving gangs that increasingly became unpopular amongst many in

the Palestinian population. Much of this unpopularity is owed to 14 Report on Operations in Palestine, 19 May 1939, 4-5, TNA WO 32-9499 15 Ibid.

79

the detriment the Revolt caused the Palestinian Arab economy.

However, guerillas also became unpopular because they used

coercive tactics to gain supplies and money from Arab villagers.

Further weakening the guerillas, in April 1938 the Nashibi tribe

began to attack the Mufti’s guerillas (likely with the consent of

the British) (Rahman 1971, 237-238). Political concession by the

British also contributed to the end of the Revolt. In May 1939

the British released another White Paper, which abandoned

partition, left the British Mandate government in place, limited

Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next five years, after

which no Jew could enter Palestine without Arab consent.

Mockaitis notes: “Conciliatory as the White Paper was, the Arab

rejected it, but its concessions no doubt made military defeat

easier to live with (1990, 91).”

Counter-Guerilla Strategy During the Revolt

The counter-guerilla strategy during the Revolt combined the

ferocity of offensive military action with the restraint of

imperial policing duties. British forces were limited in their

actions during the first phase of the Revolt. As will be

discussed in the next section, much of this is owed to the

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political situation. However, an additional reason what that up

until September/October 1936, the number of troops were

insufficient to carryout large-scale operations. Instead, most

were tied to defensive posts in towns, villages, and near sites

of sabotage such as railways and communication lines. Searching

operations within villages suspected of harboring guerillas

occurred during the first phase. However, these operations only

began following the influx of re-enforcements in October 1936,

and the operational scope was small compared to the second

phase.16 One of the main aims of these operations was to

confiscate small arms and munitions. Thus, the number of arms

confiscated in 1936 (322) compared to 1939 (3750) evidences the

relative scope of searching operations during each respective

phase.17

The “cordon and search” tactic was the primary means of

combatting the Revolt. These searches were carried out as

follows: when a town was known to (or suspected) of harboring

guerillas, British troops set up a cordon around the town.

16 Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, 1938, TNA WO 191/7017 These small arms and munitions include “rifles,” “pistols,” “bombs and grenades,” and “shotguns (Kahlidi 1971, 845).”

81

British troops were often aided by RAF aircraft in maintaining

the cordon. Further, when engagements occurred these aircraft

provided close air support (CAS) for British troops. The

inhabitants were warned that anyone breaking the cordon would be

shot. After the codon was established all male inhabitants were

collected for identification and interrogation. Those unable to

be identified onsite would be taken to detention centers. Once it

was established in the military courts that Arabs aided, or were

full-time guerillas, they were arrested and transferred to

concentration camps.18 Once all the men were identified, British 18 Allegations Against British Troops, 1 October 1939, 6-9, TNA WO 32-4562.There is no indication in the secondary or primary sources that conditions in these camps lead to deaths. In fact, MPs questionedthe Colonial Secretary about the conditions of the camps numeroustimes over the course of the Revolt. Secretary Gores’ answer to an MPs question about the conditions in the camps in July 1936 reflect the scar left on the Colonial Office following the Boer War:

I have no reason to think that there is any ground for complaint as to the living conditions at Sarafend concentration camp. Sarafend is a healthy locality where many British troops are ordinarily stationed. The plans of the camp are approved by the Director of Medical Services and the internees receive free rations on the scale approvedby the medical authorities. Permission has also been grantedto establish a canteen within the camp. Electric light and an adequate water supply have been installed. Among themselves, the internees enjoy full freedom of intercourse subject to orderly conduct, and facilities for daily exercise within the camp. Every facility is given for

82

forces proceeded to search every house in the village. According

to GOC Haining, “Stringent order are issued and every precaution

taken to prevent looting or wonton destruction of property or

food.” 19 However, as historian Matthew Hughes shows, these

search operations were often conducted for punitive purposes.

Thus, furniture, food supplies, and other possessions were often

destroyed by British troops (2009, 321).

Often, however, searching operations lead to engagements

between guerillas and British forces. Guerillas rarely

intentionally sought such engagements. Offensive maneuvers

against British patrols usually consisted of ambushing, and

fleeing after a brief exchange of fire. Similarly, when surprised

religious worship, and special arrangements have been made for combined prayer for Moslems on Fridays. (Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Sarafend Concentration Camp,” HC Deb01 July 1936 vol 314 c385. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1936/jul/01/sarafend-concentration-camp)

In May 1939 there were 13 camps established in Palestine, holding4,816 Arabs. Though these were all men who aided in the guerilla struggle (Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Palestine,” HC Deb 26 May 1939 vol 347 cc2692-3W. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1939/may/26/palestine#S5CV0347P0_19390526_CWA_3).19 Allegations Against British Troops, 1 October 1939, 8, TNA WO 32-4562.

83

by British forces in villages or towns, guerillas rarely engaged

for an extended period of time. Exceptions did occur, however.

For instance, on February 3, 1938, a guerilla force of 300-400

(augmented by volunteers) engaged a British patrol. After

engaging the British at close range, RAF aircraft provided CAS

and quickly inflicted 60 rebel casualties. With their numbers

quickly dwindling and morale destroyed, the guerillas retreated

(Raham 1971, 219). Numerous War Office memorandums note the

effectiveness of CAS in engagements with guerillas. Indeed, the

strength of the British forces resulted in guerillas avoiding

engagements during the second half of the Revolt. In fact, a War

Office memorandum covering the military activities in Palestine

during the height of violence (November 1938-March 1939) notes

that there were only seven military engagements worth mentioning.

Further, the ratio of guerillas to British killed evidences the

domination of the latter: during the seven engagements mentioned,

214 guerillas were killed, while only 7 British personnel were

killed.20

20 Report on Operations in Palestine, 19 May 1939, TNA WO 32-9499

84

By late May 1938, however, British commanders became

frustrated by the fact that guerillas often fled to the

countryside during the searching operations, only to return at

night. Thus, the British military and police sought a strategy of

village occupation from May 1938 until the end of hostilities.

Between May and July 1938, about 2/3 of Samaria, and 1/3 of

Galilee were occupied. Each post required at least 40 men to be

billeted in the villages or in tents. The scope of the village

garrisons’ patrols were limited to 5 kilometers of the village.

Thus, columns from Battalion and Brigade headquarters were sent

to patrol the gaps between villages, as well as to act as a

striking force against suspected guerillas.21 The stated mission

of the occupation strategy was: “To deny the village and its

neighborhood to the gangs as a source of food, shelter and

recruitment; To assist civil authorities to regain control of the

area; To protect, and gain the confidence of, the law-abiding

among the inhabitants; To assist in opening up the more

inaccessible parts of the country by road-making, patrols,

etc.”22 21 Ibid., 23-2422 Ibid.

85

Even by July 1938, there was a marked decline in guerilla

strength in villages in Samaria and Galilee. However, prior to

the arrival of an additional Division to Palestine in October,

the number of troops were insufficient to maintain control of all

of Palestine. This allowed the guerillas to effectively plan and

carryout sabotage operations from the countryside. This also

allowed guerilla commanders to shift their forces from areas

under occupation to uncontested districts, which resulted in the

Old city of Jerusalem and much of the Southern district to be

controlled by the guerillas in October 1938.23 However, by mid

November 1938 the British forces were able to reoccupy the

majority of Palestine. This allowed for the weakening of guerilla

forces by cutting off supplies and other support. However,

occupation also allowed the British to more easily decapitate

leadership and financial supporters, whether through arrest or

assassination.24

The British military also used coercive tactics against the

civilian population in the form of legally sanctioned collective

23 Ibid., 124 Ibid., 5-6

86

punishments. Primarily, the British instituted curfews,25

collective fines on entire villages, and collective house

demolitions. During the second phase, GOC Haining greatly

restricted the ability of inhabitants to travel by mandating that

all Palestinian citizens (including Jews) carry identification.

Very few Palestinian Arabs applied for these IDs because they

were threatened with death by the Mufti for doing so.26

Collective punishments occurred during both phases of the

Revolt,27 however, the scope and severity increased substantially

during the second phase. Because house demolitions occurred

during both the Boer War and Arab Revolt, it is worth briefly

describing how they were conducted, as well as their scope,

during the Revolt.

25 Curfew constituted collective punishments during the Arab Revolt due to the length of time in which they were enforced. For example, Laleh Khalili notes: “Sometimes curfews lasted from dusk to dawn; Safad was under curfew for 140 days. In other instances, twenty-two-hour curfews were put in place for days on end (Khalili 2010, 422).” 26 Report on Operations in Palestine, 19 May 1939, 3-4, TNA WO 32-949927 Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the year 1936, para. 25, http://tinyurl.com/lrvmxdk.

87

House demolitions during the Arab Revolt were carried out as

a form of collective punishment conducted under clearly defined

legal principles with the aim of deterring the Palestinian

population from actively of passively supporting Arab insurgents.

During the Revolt, house demolitions were carried out under a

series of Palestine (Defense) Orders in Council of 1931, 1936,

and 1937, as well as the Collective Punishment Ordinance 1926-

1936. As will be discussed below, jurisdiction over the decision

to carry out demolitions, and alterations to how demolitions were

to be conducted evolved over the course of the Revolt. Generally

however, demolitions were executed by military or police forces

in villages they had reason to believe actively or passively

supported Arab insurgents. Evidence could be as blatant as

British forces finding Arab insurgents hiding in a village, or as

arbitrary as tracker dogs leading British forces to a village

following an attack (Mockaitis 1990, 90-91). The British often

only destroyed the largest home in the community; usually used as

a meeting place for villagers (Newton 1938, 15). Or a handful of

homes were demolished; usually belonging to a suspected insurgent

88

or their family.28 There are some reports that whole villages

were destroyed (Hughes 2009, 323; Mockaitis 1990, 91). One

estimate places the number of homes destroyed between 1936 and

1939 at 2,000 (Hoffman, 1983, 81).

A Negative Case of “Indiscriminate Killing”

“Indiscriminate killing,” as defined in this paper, did not

occur during the Arab Revolt. Matthew Hughes conducted an

authoritative study on the treatment of civilians during the Arab

Revolt. Hughes shows that intentional killing of civilians by

British troops and police did occur. Two of the most reliable

accounts of such killing occurred in the villages of Halhul in

May 1938 and Al-Bassa in September 1938. Accounts of how the

deaths in Al-Bassa are varied, however, 20 villagers were

intentionally killed by British forces (Hughes 2009, 335-339). In

Halhul 10-14 men were killed after being left in wire cages

during a searching operation. These men were left there for days

without sufficient food or water (Ibid., 339-341). In the

conclusion of his study, Hughes argues: “Looking at the Arab

revolt as a whole, extreme acts of personal abuse were probably 28 Allegations against British Troops, 1 October 1939, 41-43, TNA WO 32-4562.

89

not systematic, and almost certainly not systemic.” Hughes goes

on to say: “it was junior officers in the field who were

intimately involved in any excesses,” and that while British

commander tolerated such abuses at these low levels, they never

instituted intentional or indiscriminate killing as a part of

their overall counter-guerilla strategy (Ibid., 350-354). Other

historians who focus on treatment of civilians during the Revolt

agree with this analysis (Norris 2008; Mockaitis 1990; 2011).

Because punitive demolitions occurred during the Boer War

and the Revolt, it is important to examine more closely the

evidence that indiscriminate killing did not occur due to

destruction of property during the Revolt. First, this author was

not able to find evidence in primary or secondary sources that

massive numbers of Palestinians were killed due to exposure from

lack of shelter. Walid Khalidi estimates that 5,032 Palestinians

were killed during the Revolt. He indicates that these deaths

were mainly due to military action by British or insurgent forces

(1971, 848). As stated earlier, one estimate puts the number of

house demolitions between during the Revolt at 2,000 (Hoffman

1983, 81). Thus, seeing as only 2,000 homes were demolished out

90

of a population of about 1 million Palestinians (Khailidi 1971,

849), it is likely that civilians were able seek shelter with

neighbors or family. Although Hughes has uncovered evidence that

entire villages were destroyed during the Revolt (Hughes 2009,

323), it is unlikely that demolitions of this scale were

sufficiently systemic to cause mass casualties due to exposure.

Second, a few examples from objective sources suggest that

British forces likely made it their policy to avoid civilian

casualties while carrying out demolitions. A previously

classified report from the British War Office emphasizes the fact

that collective house demolitions were only pursued when evidence

suggested active or passive support of insurgents within a

village. Interestingly, the report makes no mention of avoiding

civilian casualties in the course of demolitions.29 This is

likely due to the fact that those who denounced demolitions

mainly cited the arbitrariness of how the British established

active or passive support of insurgents, the disproportionate

hardship that was placed on the inhabitants, or the fact that the

29 Allegations against British Troops, 1 October 1939, TNA WO 32-4562.

91

demolitions strengthened support of insurgents from civilians.30

If the British were to have indiscriminately killed civilians as

a by-product of demolitions, it is highly likely that at least

one critic would have made such an accusation.

This is best exemplified in a pamphlet written by Frances E.

Newton, one of the most influential critics of the Mandate

Government’s handling of the Revolt. Newton was a member of a

London based non-governmental organization called the Arab

Centre, which documented “abuses” by British forces during the

Revolt—similar to modern day human rights NGOs. In May 1938,

Newton released a 24 page pamphlet titled: “Searchlight on Palestine:

Fair Play or Terrorist Methods?” The pamphlet provided stories of abusive

acts by British Forces during the Revolt, including beatings,

arbitrary killings during searches, wonton destruction of

property, and collective house demolitions. The pamphlet was

widely distributed amongst the British public, highly publicized

in newspapers (Ibid., 1), and received mention by MP Sorensen in

30 See for example: Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Jaffa (Demolition of Houses),” HC 01 July 1936, v. 314: cc 386-7. http://tinyurl.com/qhjcwfd; Allegations Against British Troops, 1 October 1939, 25-26, TNA WO 32-4562; Newton 1938, 15-18; Khalidi 1971, 343-351; Tom Segev 2000, 425.

92

the House of Commons on March 23, 1938.31 In fact, the Arab

Centre grew to become such a burden to the British that they set

up a special office to deal with the allegations (Norris 2008,

37). The few stories in the pamphlet concerning demolitions

reveal that British forces made an effort to remove civilians and

even their livestock from harms way before carrying out the

practice. Further, Newton makes no mention that demolitions led

to massive deaths of civilians from lack of shelter. Although

Newton did not have the ability to collect evidence of

demolitions on a wide enough scale to produce conclusive evidence

concerning demolitions, she did have access to many villages,

apparently none of which reported intentional civilian killing

during demolitions.

Military and Civilian Cooperation During the Arab Revolt

Military and civilian officials coordinated on the

implementation of the counter-guerilla strategy during both

phases of the Revolt. Security Committees consisting of police

commanders, military commanders, and civilian administrators

regularly met on the district level to coordinate how the 31 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Propaganda,” HC 23 March 1936,vol 333: cc 1192-3. http://tinyurl.com/nlxvxwr.

93

military could best acts as an aid to the civil power. A Central

Security Committee, consisting of the High Commissioner and the

General Officer Commanding also met regularly in Jerusalem to

delegate to district Security Committees. Both the military

leaders and civilian administration noted the effectiveness of

such coordination.32 Of course, disagreements occurred between

the military and civilian officials. The main point of

contention, especially during the first phase, arose over the

appropriate apportionment of legal authority between the military

and civilians. The military desired the necessary legal powers to

end hostilities as quickly and cheaply as possible. However, the

military never requested a free hand to implement wonton

destruction on the level of Kitchener’s “sweeps.” Rather,

commanders desired: first, the ability to carryout offensive

operations. These operations were largely antithetical to the

defensive oriented role characteristic of imperial policing.

Second, commanders desired the establishment of military courts

that would facilitate swift punishments. Commanders viewed swift

justice as a way to remove fighters and supporters from the 32 Palestine Disturbances, Martial Law Policy, 10 August 1936, 32, TNA WO 32-9618; Talks in Jerusalem, August 1938, TNA CAB/24/278/0028

94

battlefield, as well as a deterrent mechanism. 33 As will be

argued in this section, the subjugated role of the military as an

aid to the civil power likely tempered their institutional

motivations, even when granted legal authority over some

districts in October 1938.

Cooperation During the First Phase: April-October 1936

During the first phase, cooperation between military and

civilian officials was hampered by disputes over the necessary

legal system needed to quell the Revolt. Wauchope, in

disagreement with military officials, strongly argued for a

political solution to the Revolt. Thus, he was not willing to

delegate all civil authority over Palestine to GOC Dill. Wauchope

also observed that the level of disturbances was not systemic,

and therefore offensive military action would likely exacerbate

the guerilla threat by bringing public opinion to their side

(Townshend 1986, 106).34 Indeed, Wauchope already experienced how

quickly repressive measures could ignite public opinion. In June

33 Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, 1938, 35, TNA WO 191/70

34 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014.

95

1936 Wauchope had authorized the destruction of 240 homes in

Jaffa, under the pretext of infrastructure improvements. In

reality, he destroyed the homes because guerillas had effectively

taken control of the area. In his judgment delivered July 3rd,

concerning a petition by a Palestinian resident of Jaffa, Chief

Justice of the High Court of Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell,

rejected Waucope’s pretext, stating:

...it is only by pulling down that such demolition is authorized, and that it is only authorized for purposes of defense and not for carrying out improvements in the city as stated in the Official Communiqué’, the printed notice and the typewritten notice respectively (Khalidi 1971, 346).

He went on to criticize the Mandate Government’s “lack of moral

courage ... in the whole matter,” and symbolically discharged the

Order Nisi with no charge to the Palestinian petitioner (Ibid.,

347). Although McDonnell favored the government, his ruling was

printed in 10,000 pamphlets and widely distributed by Arab

guerilla leaders to the Palestinian people (Keith-Roach and Eedle

1994, 185),35 as well as being covered in the Times of London,36 the 35 Edward Keith-Roach, and Paul Eedle, Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate (London: Radcliffe Press , 1994), 18536 Our special correspondent, "Demolitions At Jaffa," Times of London, 4 July 1936, accessed October 13, 2014,http://tinyurl.com/om8uo8z.

96

Palestine Post,37 and numerous Arab newspapers in Palestine.38 A

letter dated July 6, 1936 from the High Commissioner of

Palestine, Arthur Wauchope to the Secretary of State for the

Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, reveals the seriousness with which

the Mandate government perceived the tactical threat posed by the

judgment. In the letter Wauchope writes: “There is no doubt that

this judgment will have a seriously detrimental effect on the

security position in Palestine, and will be looked upon as an

incentive to resist measures which the Government undertakes to

restore law and order.”39

Owing in part to the Jaffa judgment, both civil and military

authorities feared that Civil Courts in Palestine would constrain

heavy-handed military and police tactics needed to quell the

rebellion.40 To some degree, Wauchope agreed with this position.

While he was unwilling to cede total control to the military, he

was willing to allow the military courts to maintain jurisdiction

37 “Three Injured in Jaffa Demolition,” Palestine Post, July 1, 1936,accessed October 13, 2014, http://tinyurl.com/pcwedqc.38

39 Palestine Chief Justice Comments on Jaffa Demolitions, 10 July 1936, 4, TNA CAB/24/263/0024.40 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014; Townshend 1986, 106.

97

over criminal matters. Thus, it seems that, much like Milner,

Wauchope was averse to repressive measures, not for humanitarian

reasons, but because they had to potential to prolong the

rebellion and/or result in the loss of his legal authority.

Throughout September 1936, British cabinet and mandate

officials clarified the distribution of legal powers between

Wauchope and Dill. 41 After extensive deliberation, the Palestine

(Defense) Orders in Council of 1936 were established on 26

September.42 This conferred upon the High Commissioner the legal

authority to enact emergency regulations, including: censorship

of the press, curfews, collective fines, house demolitions,

administrative detention, deportation, and summary justice.43 It

is important to note that the Orders in Council of 1931 were 41 Wauchope on the General Situation in Palestine, 9 September 1936 TNA CAB/24/264/0013; Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014; Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 17September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0019; Suspension of Immigration Into Palestine,15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0015; The Question of Marital Law, 21 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0021; Memorandum Circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 September 1936 TNA CAB/24/264/0024; Townshend 1986,10642 Our parliamentary correspondent, "Public Safety In Palestine,"Times of London, 30 September 1936, accessed September 4, 2014, http://tinyurl.com/mc3oeyq.43 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014; Palestine Disturbances, Martial Law Policy, 10 August 1936, 97, TNA WO 32-9618; Townshend 1986, 106

98

enacted during the early stages of the first phase, and allowed

the High Commissioner similar legal authorities. However, they

did not allow for the High Commissions to delegate all legal

authority to the GOC. The Cabinet made clear that they desired

for the Orders in Council of 1936 to allow for such delegation.44

This was mandated after a Cabinet decision in early

September that GOC Dill was to gain legal control of Palestine

(Townshend 106). An important distinction was made, however,

concerning the intended legal authority conferred to Dill. In a

draft memorandum, legal officers assert that the military’s

authority under the Orders in Council of 1936 should “in no way

prejudice or derogate from the ordinary common law powers of a

military commander dealing with war, rebellion or disturbance.”45

This meant that, even upon gaining full control of Palestine, the

military was to continue to abide by the “minimum force”

principle under English Common Law. Echoing the lessons of

Amritsar, British authorities made it clear that atrocities would

not be tolerated, even upon to total abrogation of civilian 44 CAB 28 September 36 Defence order in Counil 36 complete; 21 Sept 36 Orders in council 31 legal advisement45 21 Setember 36 Orders in Council 31 Legal advisement on Martial law, 2

99

authority. Such clear instructions by the Cabinet noticeably

influenced the counter-guerilla strategy of the military in

Palestine (Avant 1994)

A War Office document reviewing the first phase of the

Revolt clearly evidences how the military’s role as an aid to the

civil power, and clear instructions from the Cabinet, affected

their institutional motivations. The report’s main conclusion is

that failure to quickly end disturbances was caused mainly by

Wauchope’s hesitation to delegate necessary legal authority to

the military. However, the report also notes that the military

commander must be sympathetic to the civilian authorities’ desire

to maintain control, even during disturbances. The logic being

that, an abrogation of civil power results in a loss of

“prestige” in the eyes of the colonial subjects. This in turn

creates difficulty governing following the resumption of power.

Though ego was likely a substantial contributing factor to this

logic, it is not difficult to understand the practical aspects as

well. To remedy such situations, the report advises that a

military commander “will be well advised to point out that if

repressive measures have to be taken which may leave bitterness in

100

their wake it is better for the soldiers to undertake them rather

than the civil authorities and police who will have to live on in

the country afterwards.”46

The report also clarifies the definition of “repressive

measures,” because they may be repugnant by civilian authorities.

The report stresses that such measures do not entail “brutality.”

Rather, “repressive measures” involve offensive military actions,

collective punishments, and other methods of population

control.47 In contrast, defensive operations focus on protecting

territory and infrastructure, with the intention of avoiding

“repressive measure” that, while effective, would cause civilian

government to become unpopular (35). This report evidences that

the military understood their role was to aid the civil power in

restoring order even when given full legal authority.

Concomitantly, the military could not implement a counter-

guerilla strategy that made future civilian governance

impossible. This attitude continued even during the second phase

of the Revolt when the guerilla threat increased substantially.

46 Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, 1938, 33-34, TNA WO 191/7047 Ibid., 32

101

Cooperation During the Second Phase: September 1937-June 1939

The second phase of the Revolt saw a marked shift in

relations between the military and civilian authorities. A War

Office memorandum from GOC Haining covering the events in

Palestine between November 1938 to March 1939 best evidences

this. GOC Haining states: “Where differences arose they were

smoothed out by personal liaison, for which the various local

Security Committees, consisting of members of the Government,

Police and Military and reporting to and receiving instructions

from the Central Security Committee in Jerusalem, proved and

excellent medium.” He goes on to say: “Without the ready

assistance and advice, based on their knowledge of local

conditions, so freely given by the various departments of Civil

Government, the task of the armed forces would have been a vastly

different business.” Haining concludes by making special mention

of his indebtedness to the High Commissioner.48

What caused this shift? The two main factors were: First,

the perception throughout the British government that Wauchope’s

hesitation to delegate necessary legal authority to Dill

48 Report on Operations in Palestine, 19 May 1939, 8, TNA WO 32-9499

102

prolonged disturbances. Both the League of Nations and the Royal

Commission censured Wauchope for his hesitation (Townshend 1988,

918-919). Further, the Royal Commission clearly states: “Should

disorders break out again of such a nature as to require the

intervention of the Military, there should be no hesitation in

enforcing martial law throughout the country under undivided

military control.”49 There is little doubt that these censures

and Wauchope’s early retirement sent a clear message to his

replacement, Sir Harold MacMichael, that the military must be

given necessary authority.

Second, the strength of the guerillas rose to a level that

resulted in not only effective sabotage operations, but also the

ability to control substantial portions of territory. As stated

earlier, the civilian government desired to maintain control of

Palestine in order to maintain their prestige among their

subjects. However, following Wauchope’s failures, the Cabinet

clearly communicated to MacMichael that he must delegate

appropriate legal authority to the military if his government’s

efforts proved futile. This is evidenced in a Cabinet memorandum 49 Palestine Royal Commission Report, Lord William Peel, July 1937, Ch. VII para. 57, 201-202, http://tinyurl.com/oe4gdwv.

103

from Secretary of State for the Colonies, Michael Mcdonald’s

visit to Palestine in early August 1938. He notes that

maintaining prestige is important to future governance, however,

the civilian authority must also delegate sufficient authority so

that “the military who were co-operating with it had all the

powers which they required in present circumstances to do their

work effectively.”50

As stated earlier, the military was allowed to carryout

offensive operations from the outset of second phase. No

substantial legal authority was granted to the GOC. However, the

seizure of the Old City of Jerusalem by the guerillas in October

1938 made it clear that MacMichael needed to delegate substantial

legal control to the military. In a Colonial Office memorandum,

MacMichael stated:

“I decided on the 17th [of October] to delegate to the General Officer Commanding the administration of all the Defence Regulation which he requires; and further to give him power to appoint, with my consent, military commanders over districts who will be responsible for all security and defence measures and will take over from the district administrators all the powers vested at present in the district commissioner by the Defense Regulations.”51

50 Talks in Jerusalem, August 1938, TNA CAB/24/278/002851 Palestine Disturbances, Martial Law Policy, 1938, 22, TNA WO 32-9618

104

GOC Haining limited his control to the Police Force, and by late

October 1938 military commanders took control of Samaria, the

Southern district, the Jordan Valley, and the Jerusalem district.

MacMichael makes clear in the memorandum that the latter

appointment was owed to the guerillas’ seizure of the Old City of

Jerusalem.52As evidenced earlier in this paper, wide-scale

indiscriminate killing never occurred, even when Haining took

control of the Defense Regulations, and his commanders took

control of numerous districts.

Results

--Hypothesis 1: In conflicts in which: (1) insurgent-civilian relationship is strong

and (2) insurgents pose a strong military threat, counterinsurgents are likely to

resort to mass killing.

Both conflicts featured guerilla organizations that fit the

“strength conditions” described in hypothesis 1. However, the

Boer guerillas posed a far more significant threat to British

forces than did the Arab guerillas. The Boer guerillas had

previously been apart of a conventional army, which allowed them

to better maintain their status as an “integrated organization.”

52 Ibid., 22-24

105

This resulted in their ability to carryout operations that were

far more destructive to British forces than the Arabs could have

ever hoped to achieve. Indeed, other factors contributed to the

dominance of the British over the Arabs. This included the

ability to use aircraft for close air support and reconnaissance.

As discussed earlier, War Office memorandum often note the

extraordinary value to the RAF. However, the case study shows

that the main disadvantage of the Arab guerillas was their

inability to form into a fully integrated group due to parochial

interests, and pre-existing feuds. I argue that the best measure

of how threatening a guerilla force is to a state is the former’s

ability to take and control territory. Indeed, while the Arabs

were able to take control of the Old City of Jerusalem and the

southern district, this only lasted a few weeks. The Boer

commandos, on the other hand, controlled a significant portion of

the Transvaal and the Orange Free State between 1900 and 1902.

This indicated that the length time which guerillas are able to

control territory is the best measure of guerillas strength.

It is difficult to measure how the different levels of

civilian support for the two guerilla organizations affected

106

their strength. Boer guerillas did enjoy a high degree of

logistical support from Boers in the Transvaal and Orange Free

State. Although some Boers had surrendered to the British, they

were not in significant numbers, and consistently aided the Boer

commandos. (Whether aid was rendered through coercion or consent

is not important to my analysis). However, the Boer commandos

were never able to ferment a substantial rebellion in the Cape

Colony. While there was some logistical support rendered from

Cape Boers, the British government was able to maintain control

of the territory, and thus was able to reduce such support. This

suggests that indiscriminate killing of Boers from the two

Republics can be explained by the level of logistical support

rendered to the guerillas.

However, when looking at the case of the Arab Revolt, this

explanation becomes problematic. Palestinian Arabs consistently

supported the Arab guerillas. Of course, as indicated in the case

study, political sympathy eventually faded. However, any village

in which the guerillas were able to function provided a high

level of logistical support. Again, it seems that the British

military perceived the Boer civilians as a far more substantial

107

threat than Arab civilians because the Boer commandos were able

to control the two Republics for a more extended period of time.

From the rationalist view it seems that the length of time

the guerillas are able to control territory, while also being

able to carryout military operations (sabotage, hit-and-run

operations, assassination, etc.) is the best predictor of

civilian victimization. These case-studies also show that

Stainland’s organizational frameworks serves as a clear way to

understand how the organizational foundations of guerilla

fighters translates into their ability to control territory and

carryout military operations.

--Hypothesis 2: Civilian victimization is less likely to occur during guerilla war

when the state military is held to account by a democratic regime.

Hypothesis 2 largely fails to provide an explanation for

indiscriminate killing during the Boer War, and the absence of

the phenomenon during the Arab Revolt. England was a democracy

both during the Boer War and the Arab Revolt. As the case studies

show, there was never a substantial outcry from the British

public for better treatment of civilians during either conflict.

Further, as I will discuss more below, it seems institutional

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goals of civilians better explains why publicity of civilian

victimization caused these officials to redress these issues.

--Hypothesis 3: States will abstain from civilian victimization when civilian officials

intend to govern the population at the conclusion of a conflict and are able to

maintain control of the military.

Although hypothesis 1 provides a strong explanation for

civilian victimization, I argue that the addition of hypothesis 3

is vital for providing a full explanation for the phenomenon.

That is, while the strength of the guerilla organization is an

important variable, had Milner taken control of the counter-

guerilla strategy it is highly unlikely that “sweeping

operations” would have been carried out on such a massive scale.

Instead, it is likely that the Boer territories would have been

slowly occupied, as were the Arab villages and towns during the

Arab Revolt. One major flaw with comparing these cases is that,

unlike the Boer commandos, the Arab guerillas were not able to

control territory for a sustained period of time. However, two

factors make it difficult to argue that civilian victimization

would have occurred had the Arab guerillas held territory for

longer. First, civilians maintained a high level of control over

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the military during the Arab Revolt. Even when substantial

authority was granted to the military, the civilian government

made it clear that civilian victimization would not be tolerated.

Second, the military’s organizational-culture became more aligned

with the institutional motivations of the civilian government

because of its legal distinction as an “aid to the civil power.”

Conclusion

The best explanation for civilian victimization during

guerilla warfare requires a synthesis between the hypothesis 1

and 3. The level of guerilla strength can provide a macro-

historical explanation for civilian victimization. However,

examining the military/civilian relationship during conflict

provides a fuller picture of what actually lead to the formation,

execution, and change to the counter-guerilla strategy vis-à-vis

civilians. Specifically, I have found that when civilians and

military leaders coordinate on the implementation of a counter-

guerilla strategy, the outcome is less likely to lead to civilian

victimization. When militaries are granted a monopoly of power,

civilian victimization is more likely to occur. To be clear, this

is not because militaries are inherently evil. Rather, a military

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is fundamentally a coercive tool of the state. Thus, any

military’s main institutional goal is to win wars as quickly and

cheaply as possible. Because guerillas are so reliant on the

civilian population for survival, it often becomes rational to

either directly eliminate or geographically remove this source of

power (Downes 2008, 157).

The civilian government’s institutional goal, on the other

hand, is to control the civilian population after the cessation

of hostilities. The British believed it would be easier to

control their subjects if resentment towards the government was

avoided by maintaining some degree of restraint during

hostilities. Further, in line with the “hypocrisy costs theory,”

the British civilian government prided themselves on the ability

to govern their colonies, and manage their dependencies. Thus,

civilian victimization not only reflected poorly on the British

imperial mission, but also posed a significant threat to future

governance.

Future research on civilian victimization during guerilla

warfare should focus mainly on comparing the power sharing

relationship between the military and civilian government.

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Guerilla conflicts during the imperial and colonial wars of the

19th and early 20th century as well as occupation/annexation

during international wars will be the most fruitful cases for

this type of work. The wars of imperial conquest, especially

during the 19th century, often featured a complete absence of

civilian control over the military (Vandervort 1988). Thus, we

should expect to see a greater presence of civilian victimization

during those conflicts in which the guerillas fit the strength

conditions laid out in the beginning of this paper. Specifically,

we should see civilian victimization more prevalent during

imperial wars in which the guerilla was able to hold territory

for a significant amount of time. (A possible arbitrary marker

could be set at 4 months). Similar to imperial war, wars of

occupation/annexation often feature and absence of civilian

control. Thus, guerilla warfare during occupation/annexation

should also feature civilian victimization if the guerilla

strength conditions are met.

Colonial wars of the 19th and 20th century (including the

post-colonial era) are also extremely fruitful cases to test my

theory. These cases often feature dynamic similar to the British

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case in Palestine, in which a civilian government is in direct

control of the colony. For instance, the French maintained a

civilian government in Algeria throughout the 20th century.

Again, similar to the British case, at the outset of hostilities,

civilian governments of the colonies were often required to make

the decision of what level of power sharing would take place

between their government and military forces. This decision

should be the primary focus of future research on colonial wars.

Further, the level of cooperation should be traced throughout

these conflicts in order to better explain the presence or

absence of civilian victimization.

Testing my theory during colonial or imperial wars can be

accomplished using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods.

Using the dataset from Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay it

could be possible to add an additional independent variable coded

as “cooperation between military and civilians.” If there is

little to no cooperation then a dummy variable of 0 should be

assigned, and 1 should be assigned if cooperation is present. The

“cooperation” variable would have to be coded using accounts from

secondary sources, since it is difficult to conceive of

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quantitative indicators for this variable. However, a simple

indicator could be the presence or absence of “martial law.” This

legal delineation was often established among colonial powers

when total control was given to the military—as was the common

practice of the French in Algeria (Merom 2003, 84). Comparative

case-study methodology should be implemented for the qualitative

portion of future research. Two imperial wars, and two colonial

wars would likely provide fruitful cases. Specifically, a

positive and a negative case from each respective war type should

be selected.

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