ELSEVIER Int. J. Production Economics 34 (1994) 359-369

international journal of

production economics

CIM and the process of innovation: Integrating the organization of production

Michael Rowlinsonaq*, Stephen Procterb, John Hassard

“School of Management and Finance, University of Noiringham. Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK

bDepartmmt of’ Management, Kc& University, Staffs ST5 5BG, UK

Abstract

The relationships between computer integrated manufacturing (CIM), corporate strategy and organization are assessed, and various periodizations for analysing the process of innovation are considered. The periodization selected consists of concept, translation, commissioning and operation, and this is then used to structure a case study, based on in-depth interviews, of the introduction of CIM in a medium sized UK manufacturer of electrical components for the automotive industry.

1. Computer integrated manufacturing

The concept of computer integrated manufactur- ing (CIM) tends to be associated with advanced information technology, automation and robotics. Its design and development is most frequently tack- led from a technical perspective. Organizational and social issues tend to be considered at the imple- mentation stage, when specialists in organization might be enrolled in order to overcome any resist- ance there may be to what is considered inevitable technological change.

Although definitions of CIM vary considerably, there is general agreement that the term encom- passes the integration of computerized activities in product design and engineering, production planning and manufacturing processes [l; pp. 170&171]. The definition is often widened to include the integra- tion of computerized systems for sales ordering,

* Corresponding author.

finance, payroll processing and human resource management. These systems interface with design and production activities throughout the whole manufacturing cycle, from initial customer design specification or purchase order through to the product’s delivery and maintenance [2, pp. 170- 1781.

There is no single definition of CIM because the definition of what counts as ‘effective systems integ- ration’ is unique to each company that implements it. For example, Forrester and Hassard [3] provide a comparison of the CIM projects of two different companies and show that the interpretation of CIM by one company, incorporating a dual track of developing computer-aided design (CAD) and materials requirements planning (MRP), is quite different to the other, where the emphasis was on the development of manufacturing resources planning (MRPII).

Broader definitions of CIM have given rise to the concept of ‘Computer integrated business’ (CIB) [4, 51, and beyond this, CIM-enterprise (CIME) [6]. CIME implies that integration not only takes

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place within the engineering and manufacturing areas of the company, as with CIB, but pervades the whole business and extends to customers and suppliers. This implies the possibility of increased integration and closer working relations both with- in and between manufacturing organizations.

2. CIM and corporate strategy

An idealized view of CIM is that it is a key strategic consideration because it can contribute to the competitive edge of a company through reducing costs, improving quality, enabling variety produc- tion, reducing product introduction times, cutting delivery times and improving delivery reliability. Production and design engineers tend to see integ- ration as an objective in itself [7], particularly when it is linked with the continual quality improvement offered by total quality management (TQM) and the control and coordination facilitated by Just- in-Time (JIT) [S]. According to this view, if it is accepted that decisions and choices at the opera- tions level can contribute to the order-winning criteria of a company [l. 91, then the distinctive contribution of CIM is that it integrates the two areas of manufacturing strategy: process choice (through shop-floor automation, etc.) and produc- tion infrastructure (design processes and proced- ures, manufacturing planning and control, and organizational integration). CIM is seen as a key element in the exploitation of information techno- logy which will enable companies and industries to compete in world markets [lo].

Even in companies committed to CIM, however, it is not always seen as having strategic importance by senior decision makers, who regard it more as a technical project. CIM is often not part of the ‘corporate debate’ [9], especially in companies with a history of computer systems development fail- ures, and it is treated with suspicion by many senior executives.

More fundamental criticisms of CIM have been made in relation to industrial strategy. Best [1 1, pp. 27222731 counterposes his favoured strategy of ‘a skill-based factory that uses computers’ to ‘a technology-based factory that seeks to eliminate direct labour’, which he argues corresponds to the

CIM vision. He maintains that ‘the CIM vision is a chimera’, which is particularly appealing to many managers trapped in the Taylorized environment of mass production...

To date, the ideal of the “unmanned factory” has run into

two severe problems when put into practice. First, the linan-

aal costs of both hardware and software tend to mushroom

beyond the capacity of even firms the size of General Motors.

Second, the flexibility of CIM depends upon the past model-

ling of the part or product within the computer system

CIM does not engage in innovation with respect to new

products which by definition have not yet been designed and

modelled. Thus a firm committed to the “unmanned factory”

still depends upon people. somewhere, for its innovative

capability; in this It may well become dependent upon de-

signers and, ultimately, a support function for skilled labor

located In other firms.

Best believes that the need for an alternative to the CIM vision is not widely accepted ‘amongst those who direct much of American and British manufacturing’.

Without going as far as Best, other critics of CIM point to the problems of its inflexibility 112, pp. 13221341. Hill’s [9. p. 1961 warning about the dangers of freezing the production process and creating expensive data bases which may not be needed is as applicable to CIM as to MRP:

There is a tendency for executives to assume that they must

live with the current level of complexity withln a business.

They percelvc the solution to its control through the intro-

ductlon of specialist knowledge and complicated systems.

No one tells them otherwise. Once the level of complexity is

assumed as given, then it follows that specialists must be

correct m advocating computers to handle the complexity

and to advocate seeking the gains which come from integrat-

ing the computer data bases and thus availing themselves of

the added advantages of computer systems over manual

controls.. However. there are serious trade-ol%, based upon

the premise that existing complexity cannot be altered.

3. CIM and organization

The link between technological innovation and company structure is one that has been widely explored in relation to the management of organ- izational change. Since Carter and Williams’ [ 131 study of the ‘technically progressive firm’ and Burns and Stalker’s [ 141 work on ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ structures, it has been a widely accepted

commonplace that the rigid modes of communica- tion exhibited by functionally differentiated firms can inhibit the innovation process. Recent work has placed greater emphasis on the notion that the prevailing culture and attitudes within an organiza- tion may be as great an obstacle to CIM as the organizational structure, especially when senior management see CIM as a purely technical phe- nomenon because of the emphasis placed on sys- tems design [15, 161. According to Stinchcombe [17, pp. 152.-1533, the underlying problem with turning inventions into innovations is that building a social system around an innovation is still not routine, even though it is (sometimes) done in large organizations.. . an incentive systems that works well fine for routinized production will not serve for producing an innovation’.

Stinchcombe [ 17, pp. 166 1673 explains that in- novations, as opposed to inventions which may be purely technical, usually engender changes in the social system, and they are likely to meet opposi- tion when, for example, they involve a redistribu- tion of status within an organization. An example of an ‘ideal type of an innovation with zero social system requirements’ would be a replacement board that upgrades a computer but interfaces with the existing hardware and software, and does not involve hiring, firing or retraining anyone. Since most innovations depart from this ideal type, ‘a proposal to institute an innovation (or to imple- ment a decision to introduce an innovation) must have a theory of the social requirements’ of the innovation, ‘or be forced to develop one as it goes along’.

The theories involved in innovations are often characterized by what Stinchcombe [17, p. I741 calls ‘technological utopianism’, which means that they merely describe the technical way to achieve some end, ‘with no analysis of the social and eco- nomic forces needed to bring the innovation into being’. Although there is a long period of ‘social debugging’ for innovations, ‘there is more muddle in the muddling through for innovations introduced with utopian theories’.

Critical commentators have frequently dichoto- mized management approaches to technological change. In their study of changing work organiza- tion at Cadbury, the UK chocolate confectionery

manufacturer, Smith et al. [18, pp. 116--- 1173 identi- fied an internal division within ‘the techno-struc-

ture.. . between those seeking incremental labour intensification and those committed to automation and labour elimination’. The latter group are de- scribed as ‘automation romantics’ because they ‘were firmly committed to the absolute goal of automation and labour elimination’.

Zuboff 1191 identifies the potential for informa- tion technology to be used to ‘informate’ as well as ‘automate’ production. If information technology is used to informate, then there will be discontinuity, the acquisition of new skills by workers who are powerful enough to take autonomous action for themselves, and have the capacity to reflect on the information they receive. This will necessarily rep- resent a challenge to existing managerial hierar- chies. More likely is the automation scenario described by Zuboff [19, p. 71, where ‘new techno- logy becomes the source of surveillance techniques that are used to ensnare organizational members or to subtly bully them into conformity’. According to the more sceptical social constructionist view [20, 21, p. 2431 CIM is likely to contribute to the strengthening of‘disciplinary power’ and the ‘inten- sive surveillance of work processes’ associated with JIT and TQM. The development of the so-called ‘Social Taylorism’ is captured by metaphor of the ‘electronic’ [21, p. 2503 or ‘information panopticon’ [19, Chapter 93

In order to rebut charges of either ignoring the social system or imposing Taylorism, those involved in the introduction of new technologies are often advised to consider the organizational implications of what they are doing, This advice consists of ready-made versions of what Stin- chcombe calls theories of the social requirements of innovation. It ranges from truisms about the need for adequate resources and management commitment, to highly contestable assertions, such as that:

Advanced manufacturing technologies such as FMS or

CIM, which potentially contribute a new level of flexibility to a firm, are impossible to use effectively when rigid work rules and structures constrain people’s activities. Installing, com- missioning, operating and maintaining such equipment re-

quires multiskil~~d people cooperating in a flexible work

environment [22, p. 1331.

This is all very reassuring, since if CIM is seen to be in operation it has, almost by defnition, en- hanced the organizational environment, but if CIM fails to come to fruition then its advocates can point to organizational impediments that were to blame. Social constructionists warn that talk of delegation of responsibilities is subverted by surveillance mechanisms which provide the centralized forces with ever more power’ [Zl, p. 2501.

If CIM involves more than the technical integra- tion of various computer systems, then as an innova- tion it needs a theory of the social requirements. Despite the widespread availability of integrating technology that makes possible the computerized interface between ~on~puter-aided engineering (CAE) and computer-aided production management (CAPM), there exists a number of difficulties relat- ing to design and operation [7]. CAE modules encompass those activities traditionally performed by designers and engineers, whilst CAPM replaces the manual activities of production scheduling, control and operation. historically within the domain of production management.

4. Analysing the process of innovation

A numer of periodizations have been developed to assist research into the process of innovation, along with categorizations of innovation and its elements. The different periodizations offered by two major case studies of innovation and technolo- gical change are assessed here. First, Whipp and Clark’s [23] historical investigation of the Rover SD1 project from 1968 to 1982 in what was, at the outset, the British Leyland Motor Corporation. They develop a model with four main stages: con- cept, transIation, comlnissioning and operation. They maintain that this model enabled their re- search to come to terms with the massively intricate process of designing cars and their methods of pro- duction. Second, the study by Clark et al. [24] of the introduction of a new telephone exchange system, the TXE4 by British Telecom in the early 1980s. They believe that for analytical purposes the process of introducing new technology can be broken down into five main stages: initiation, decision to adopt. system selection, implementation and routine

operation. However, they concentrate on the fourth and fifth stages, of implementation and routine operation, and focus on the process of introducing the new system into the workplace, emphasizing the scope for negotiations and substrategies.

There are important differences between these two studies, and Whipp and Clark’s [23] model is preferred on theoretical grounds for the analysis of CIM. Clark et al. [24, p. 301 are concerned with ‘how technologies, oncr chosen, shape the nature of work and organization in practice.’ Even though they explain that by ‘technological change’ they mean, a “radical” rather than “incremental” change’, the approach of CLark et al. is not really compatible with Stinchcomb~‘s [ 171 analysis of how inventions are turned into innovations. Clark et al. tend to reify technology by adopting a narrow definition of it as ‘equipment or apparatus’, includ- ing ‘the overall system configuration and the system principles’, but excluding ‘factors such as organization and the work done in organizations’ [24. p. 141. Clark et al. build into their periodiz- ation the lack of what Stinchcombe [17, p. 1671 would call a ‘complete theory of an innovation’ which they found in the earIy stages of their par- ticular case study, thus undermining the extent to which their five-stage model can be generalized.

Whipp and Clark [23, pp. lo--121 specifically criticize what they call ‘diagnostic theory’, an example of which is quoted above [22, p. 1301, in which the appropriateness of work organization is judged implicitly and it is assumed that if execu- tives fail to initiate the appropriate organizational changes ‘an underlying Darwinian logic will elimin- ate the inappropriate forms in the competition be- tween capitals’. In this simplistic before-and-after approach, with its neat definitions of success and failure in terms of corporate profits, the innovation process is ignored and ‘technology is reified and theorized as an exogeneous, abstract force to which changes can be attributed’.

Instead of trying to define technology, Whipp and Clark 123, pp. 7, 361 attempt to give a tight de~nition of what constitutes a ‘strategic innova- tion’ for an enterprise. It includes one or more of the following: a total change in the portfolio of productive units, involving either a move away from original product markets and/or diversification;

M. Roulinson et ~1.; Itlt. J. Production Economics 34 (1994) 359-369 363

a shift in the position of productive units along a scale from flexibility to specificity; and major structural changes in work organization at all levels whilst leaving products and processes largely un- changed, an example might be ‘reengineering the corporation’ as advocated by management gurus Hammer and Champy [25]. Whipp and Clark [23, pp. 7-91 maintain that strategic innovation is needed on a periodic basis and that changes in product, production facility and work organization are likely to be involved in the innovation process at all stages, from concept through to operation.

The concept of strategic innovation is compat- ible with Stinchcombe’s analysis of how inventions are turned into innovations. A continuum of in- novation can be conceptualized on a scale from Stinchcombe’s [ 17, p. 1681 ‘zero resources innova- tion’ which requires little or no change in the social system, exemplified by the improved slip-in board that upgrades a computer, through to Whipp and Clark’s [23] strategic innovation which requires great changes in the social system. This approach allows for a multiplicity of theories of the social requirements of an innovation, both on the part of the actors involved and commentators.

Since the social system requirements of an innova- tion cannot be known in advance, innovation project teams often subscribe to a theory of technology- driven change in the absence of leadership and vision from senior management. Technology is seen as an autonomous force that, once unleased, will ‘necessitate new organizational forms’ [19, p. 2141. This can be termed ‘technological instrumentalism’, whereby what is ostensibly a technical change is used to mobilize social and economic forces in order to change the social system, as opposed to ‘technological utopianism’. This is illustrated by the survey research into workplace industrial relations and technical change in Britain reported by Daniel [26]. Management often likes to portray workers as resistant to technological change, even though there is little evidence to support this. Workers are generally fovourably disposed to new technology, because it represents investment, optimism, pro- gress and achievement. Hitched to new technology, organizational change has more chance of being accepted. This amounts to saying that the need for innovation is widely accepted, especially if it is

defined as technological, but the social system re- quirements of an innovation are often contested.

5. The research project

The research presented in this paper is part of a larger project examining the development of CIM in the context of manufacturing flexibility in the UK electrical engineering sector. Other parts of the project include the construction of a generic methodology for the introduction of CIM and the development of a ‘composite model’ within which different configurations can be mapped. The objects of this part of the research are to ascertain the reasons for the introduction of CIM and actors’ definitions of CIM, and the extent to which these can be considered organizational. The case study reported here is intended as a preliminary to the development of a temporal framework to analyse the process of innovation surrounding CIM in a number of UK manufacturing companies. This includes testing the appropriateness of Whipp and Clark’s [23] four-stage periodization for making sense of the empirical data, having argued above that its use is theoretically justified.

The case study company referred to as Alberts, is a medium-sized UK manufacturer of electrical components for the automotive industry. The com- pany grew as a family business, and although it has been part of a larger group for many years it has considerable autonomy and retains an independent identity, including the family name. There are around 4000 people employed across four manu- facturing sites. The research presented here is based on a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews carried out over two years with the members of management at Alberts.

6. Concept

The basic design of the company’s product is very much within the domain of the customers, the car manufacturers, although more recently Alberts have had guest engineers working with the car manufacturers, bringing more design responsibility to the company. The major concern of product

design is to translate the customers’ specifications, which are written using the customers’ own termi- nologies and conventions, into a form that Alberts’ employees can understand and that can be directly entered into the computerized manufacturing con- trol systems. Doing this with as little delay as pos- sible is seen as the key to success. Of necessity, Alberts has always been more or less responsive to customer requirements; at issue is how this respon- siveness is to be achieved and at what cost. One manager remembered how:

Richard Albert could brag to a customer that anything he wanted he could give to him in a matter of hours. He could

give it to him by having piles and piles of stuff all over the

place and he would be able to sort him out something from

somewhere. We have got to get as far away from that as

possible.

Alberts’ ‘CIM Project’ was formally conceived in 1989, when it was given an official title. However. the development of many of the components that make up CIM was initiated long before this: CAD in 1984; CAPM in the form of MRPII in 1987; and the establishment of an advanced engineering group in 1988. In 1989 Alberts conducted an assess- ment of its engineering knowledge in product de- sign and development. The conclusion drawn from this was that the current engineering and produc- tion systems were not adequately coordinated and it was suggested that the key to maintaining the core business was the development of a fully integrated information system. This was when the initial interest in CIM developed. It was felt that the developments under the banners of CAD, electronic data interchange (EDI) and CAPM constituted a ground swell towards computerized information systems within the company.

These developments on the engineering front very much shaped the conceptualization of CIM, even though it is accepted that:

If we are talking about a truly integrated system then we have got to talk about Engineering, Manufacturing and commercial. Again. maybe within that, we can talk about

Sales and Marketing and Finance

The broader perception of the need for CIM is that:

What we need IS a system of being able to open wjndows to all our customers’ various computer systems, take that in- formation into our own system. put it into the language we

know and love, and transmit it to our manufacturing process

through the design ofjigs, through the design of the methods

of manufacture, through the designs of the layouts and so on,

and into manufacture. Therefore, we felt that talkmg about it

as computer integrated manufacturing really gave a better

flavour of what we were trying to do. and not pretend that it

was CAD. We could have called it CAM or whatever, but we

really wanted to get that integrated message over: that it is

only by integrating through the whole of our system that we

can really talk about it as a competitive activity.

Turning to the components of the proposed CIM system that are already in existence, CAD and customer ED1 require further development and re- finement before they are capable of functioning within an integrated system. The development of many of these components of CIM started from scratch within Alberts. 2D CAD was initially intro- duced in 1984 to assist in what was (and to a large extent still is) an almost entirely manual process of translating customer requirements into drawings for Alberts. A considerable number of the CAD programs comprise software written specifically to perform the functions required by the company.

Expenditure on CAD since 1984 has been around &2 million, starting with the installation of CAD screens, supporting hardware and software, and staff training. At first the emphasis was on using CAD for the design of individual components and tools. The first CAD designed component was released in 1985, closely followed by a machine tool. Component design was fully dependent on CAD by 1987, and new tool design and most modifications by 1990.

There is currently a debate within the company as to whether the benefits from CAD have justified the substantial investments of money and em- ployees’ time. Given that the initial design of the product is very much within the domain of the vehicle manufacturers, the CAD system within Alberts is used more for the translation and repres- entation of customer design details than as an in- itial design tool. As a consequence it is asked whether CAD represents an enormous investment for little direct and immediate benefit. Some senior managers are particularly critical:

Excluding people costs, Alberts have spent around El.75

million on CAD. If you were to ask me what we have had for

that, then I wouldn’t want to put it on a tape machine, it is just crap.. How anything could have been developed over so many years without linking it to information. purely

presenting pretty pictures, astounds me.

M. Rodinson et 01. :lnt. J. Production Economics 34 (1994) 359 369 365

Against this it is suggested that, although the measurable benefits from CAD at present might not be significant, the major contribution from CAD will come later when it is one of the founda- tions of CIM.

The development of ED1 has been very closely linked to CAD. The main objective in developing EDI is to enable electronic design drawings to be directly sourced from the customer and loaded automatically into CAD. In 1988 Alberts started trials with a major customer and by 1990 product design engineering communication through ED1 was in operation with two customers. Alberts can now take electronic data from customers, albeit on a tentative basis, process this through various translation packages and then transfer it directly into the CAD system. Although further refinement is required, Alberts enjoys considerable prestige amongst its customers for its pioneering work in the application of EDI. It is also highly regarded within the automotive supply industry as a whole.

Engineering systems, centring largely on CAD and central mainframe databases form one strand in the development of computerized systems. The other major part is the emergence of a Computer Aided Production Management (CAPM) system, in particular the development of a Manufacturing Resources Planning (MRPII) system which began in 1988. Prior to this Alberts used a materials Materials Requirements Planning (MRP) system, but this was not operating satisfactorily and was difficult to upgrade because it used mostly in-house bespoke software developed between 1978 and 1982. It was decided to move towards an MRPII system and to base the new planning and control system around a vendor’s package, tailoring this to suit Alberts’ needs wherever possible.

Initial estimates of the time it would take to develop CAPM systems were highly optimistic. The general impression was that it would take around 18 months, so it was expected to be fully operational by the end of 1989. So far only one of the company’s four plants has gone “live”, and even this is restricted to MRP replacement rather than full MRPII implementation. The original justifica- tion and terms of reference of the introduction of MRPII were very loose, with few explicit or quantitative statements on the level or timing of

improvements to be made, and therefore little to measure the implementation of MRPII against in terms of evaluation of results and adherence to plans.

The responsibilities of the newly appointed CIM manager in 1989 were largely confined to oversee- ing CAE and CAPM and to effect their integration rather than the automation of production. As is explained:

We had got CAD. [MRPII...], etc., and how was all this

linked together‘? So there was born the [CIM manager’s]

job, which said what we ought to be doing is looking at this

as a total CIM package bringing these things together. We

needed a corporate look at all this, to integrate it all and

have a plan for the future so that we would get to an

integrated CIM system rather than bits and pieces all over

the place that nobody knew how to bring together.

The concept of CIM grew out of existing CAE systems and there was little reflection on its social requirements, as indicated by the assertion of the urgency of its implementation:

Well it will ensure our success as long as we do it before the

other buggers, it’s as simple as that.

7. Translation

There is a tension within the translation of CIM at Alberts between the relative emphasis given to the customer interface and internal integration. This is reflected in the statements of two senior managers of what they expect from CIM.

First senior manager: What I want is new product introduction speeded up, what

I want IS schedules reacted to more quickly.. Now my

perception is that CIM ought to have that effect. If a cus-

tomer says “I have a new project”. and one week later, or

whatever the timescale, I can have that translated into board

designs and bills of material, etc., then obviously that is the

dream ticket.. I do see it as another piece of the jigsaw which, when we get to the final event, will deliver what we

require right through the whole process, from the moment

when the order comes in, (which won’t be a piece of paper.

will it?), to the delivery of samples or goods. I see the whole

timescale coming down.

Second senior manager: Alberts have a weakness in systems generally across the

company.. in that all the systems tend to be stand-alone, on different platforms, different configurations and not easily linked for talking to one another. We cannot transpose

information around the company in the way we would like

to. This is a major weakness across the company. There IS

a lack of networked systems to enable data flows around the

company providing people around the organization with the

information they require to do their job.

CIM is not identified with any particular changes in work organization for production operatives at Alberts, it is not associated with complete automa- tion and labour elimination. This comes through in the statements of those working on the CIM project:

I had a preconceived view of what CIM was, but it wasn‘t

that. I have now come to the conclusion that.. the state-

ment that says what we want to achieve: “Information being

one of the most valuable assets in manufacturing mdustry,

how do we ensure the right people get the right information

at the right time?” I am treating that as a goal of CIM; the

quickest. the most accurate and the most useful information

that we can get to anybody that needs it.

If anything, CIM is likely to have greater implica- tions for engineers than for production operatives:

We should encourage our engineers and our manufacturing

people with a CIM philosophy to leave the simple and

mundane tasks to the computer and create time for themsel-

ves to think and do what the computers cannot do.

One manager compared Alberts’ approach to n~anufacturing with the Japanese approach, which is particularly significant because of the importance of Japanese transplants and what are referred to at Alberts as “Japanese influenced” customers:

Particularly when you look at manufacturing logistics. the

Japanese have done a lot around manual visible control, we

have spent quite some time around the computerized aspect.

We see the place for both, and we are able to work together

to actually truly operate in what we call the JITiMRP environment where we see the computerized system assisting

us in our medium to long term planning and control. But we

want, you know, to move in the direction of manual visible

control for day to day, because it’s simpte and it’s easy to

relate to.

So the CIM initiative within Alberts is mainly directed towards engineering and operations con- trol, rather than the use of advanced production machinery technologies. The three-stage manufac- turing process remains Iabour intensive, especially in the second and third subassembly and final as- sembly stages. There have been some developments in the direction of automation, and while it is recog- nized that these have implications for integration

with CAE and CAPM, they are largely indepen- dent of the CIM initiative.

8. Commissioning

The most salient feature of the commissioning of CIM within Afberts is that it was given over to an internal project team. An external vendor was con- sidered, but quickly dismissed at the outset. One of those involved in the CIM project explained his feelings on the issue:

Yes, there are external vendors. No. they are not bemg

involved, because in the past when they have been brought

in at the beginning.. the vendors begin to drive the

company.. They have an axe to grind, and once they have

sold the kit they don’t want to know you. An external

consultancy, not tied to anyone. is used.. no axe to grind,

and they have been with Alberts for ten years and so far

they have been completely independent and give an honest

opinion.

It is during the commissioning stage that the lack of a clear theory of the social requirements of CIM has come to light. This is most obvious in relation to the costs of CIM. Senior management are con- cerned at the cost of the project, whereas those involved with CIM complain that:

We have been told that the CIM projects is probably the

most Important project that this company will ever under-

take. But there doesn’t appear to be.. you know. it’s the Ravour of the day. It’s just a case of today it’s that, it’s the in

thing to say. There doesn’t appear to be any corporate

objectives in the bet that we have not got a budget. Because

money is so tight we got to justify everything whereas other areas..

On the other hand, the CIM team has not been subject to the constraints that might be imposed on an external vendor. This comes through in terms of the justification of the project:

I don’t think we are even trying to justify it on the grounds of

expenditure and productivity, although I know the account- ants would like to do it that way. To some extent it is an act of faith: we know we have got to go some way down the road

in the way in which we generate engineering information, we know we have got to go down the road to improve factory

control.

And from another: CIM is an act of faith, there was very little cost benefit

analysis. A faith that we have read about it. we have seen the

presentation about it.. I think we are doing it very much on

a faith basis. I don’t think we have sat down and set out the

detailed cost benefits.

The failure to address the social requirements of CIM earlier means that issues are either having to be addressed subsequently, or else are not being addressed and changes are taking place as the unin- tended or even unrealized consequence of the intro- duction of CIM. The problem of the emphasis of the CIM project is being addressed. It is recognized that:

The CIM team is currently very much CAD based. Obvious-

ly once we have got over that mountain then we can use the

CIM team to do what it should be doing: that is to Integrate ail the manufacturing activities. Not just looking at CAD

and a httle bit of MRP. but the overall systems in the

company, to provide a consolidated whole rather than lots

of little systems around different platforms which do not integrate or talk to each other.

It is acknowledged that appropriate supporting modules need to be developed in administrative areas to support CAE and CAPM systems develop- ments. Initiatives are taking place with a computer- ized sales order processing system and computerized financial systems. A clear theory of the social re- quirements of CIM might have recognized the need for cooperation, if not integration, between func- tional areas as a prerequisite for CIM. Instead, it is hoped that CIM itself will produce organizational integration, or that specialists in organizational issues will be able to assist the CIM team to over- come organizational impediments to CIM.

Rather than confront the social requirements of CIM, which is not their specialty, the CIM team is tempted to work where their strengths lie. As a senior manager put it:

they have been playing with computers. I don’t believe that

computers are more than ten or fifteen per cent of this

project, and it ia taking up 99 per cent oftheir involvement,,

Justifying a colour plotter! It is absolutely nothing to do with the main project, but it’s very interesting, isn’t it guys’?

On the work organization front, it would be all too easy to allege that one of the social requirements of CIM is that it either deskills or enhances the work of production operatives. However, the main focus of CIM has not been on the automation of

production, which remains fairly labour intensive

assembly work. This comes through from a senior manager who describes the situation:

We are in the marketplace for robotic assembly machines which are extremely expensive, though I would say that the most expensive things we have bought are the factories and

the second most expensive thing has been the computer. We

are a people hungry, space hungry business rather than

a materials hungry business. We are a logistics business, and we are not a capital intensive business.. Alberts is an old

fashioned. labour intensive British manufacturing company

which was a milk cow for [the parent company] through

most of the 80’s.

The final assembly operation has recently moved from a static process where a group of workers assembled the product, to a moving assembly line where the work previously carried out by one oper- ator has been split up into a number of repetitive short cycle jobs. Only one management interviewee mentioned any labour management considerations in relation to this change in work organization. Most were more or less unaware of the rhetoric of human relations and empowerment which is usually ritually recited when technological change such as the introduction of CIM is taking place [19, p.2471. That there is a gender aspect to this indifference is clear from a remark made by a manager conducting a factory tour:

As you can see, we’ve got a problem here, it’s wall to wall

female, and females don’t tend to stay very long, so we’ve got

to keep the job simple.

Although the move to more Taylorist job design IS not a consequence of CIM, the connection be- tween the two has not been considered at Alberts, and the requirements of the assembly line may be built into the CIM system by default, rendering it unresponsive in the face of any future demands for flexibility in production or even considerations of workers satisfaction. The company is developing a sophisticated HRM strategy, but there appears to have been little coordination between the FIRM function and the CIM project.

9. Conclusion

At the time of writing, CIM at Alberts has yet to go fully into operation. There are inevitable delays in a project of this nature. Clearly the process of

turning inventions into innovations is difficult for the company. This was acknowledged by a senior manager:

We arc in the process of changing almost evqthing: chang-

~ng the company philosophy: changing the manufacturing

style: changing the cngneering style: changing all of OUI

Information technology: changing our attitudes toward\

people and education. and I would say that every movement

that we are attemptIng to take forward over the last three

years i\ wmewhere between \tart and linlsh. All of that

v,ithin 3 company which has a historical philosophy of

starting to do thingh. and then halfway through. uhen it i\

beginning to get dlfticult. it goa ahaq and doa wmethlng

el\u. A\ a company we do not ha\c a track record ofcomplct-

~ng thing\.

In relation to the CIM project, a theory of the social requirements of the innovation was not de- veloped at the outset. As a result, what are seen as organizational problems have arisen with what was conccivcd as a largely technical project. Perhaps the engineering bias of the company and the pres- ence of in-house technical capabilities has meant that technical approaches. such as CIM, are pro- posed to address organizational issues.

There are clearly trade-offs between developing a clear theory of the social requirements of an innovation during the concept and translation stages of an innovation. and working out the social requirements during the commissioning and opcra- tion stages. This is implicitly recognixd within Alberts:

The concept and translation stages of the CIM innovation within Alberts were relatively trun- cated. This could be interpreted as a criticism of the periodization adopted. Instead it is argued here that the social requirements of the innovation were not addressed until the commissioning stage, and then by the project team. By this time the lack of integration, which might have been envisaged as ;I social system prerequisite for CIM, was seen merely as an organizational impediment to be over- come. Issues relating to work organization and the

management of labour have hardly been looked at by the project team, contrary to the popular pre- scriptive literature, which is not surprising given that technical rather than organizational problems are the specialty of the team.

CIM within Alberts is not identified with a vision of a totally automated factory. Taylorist work or- ganization is being adopted, but if it becomes frozen into CIM this is because the relationship between CIM and human resource management was not considered. rather than as a result of an inextricable link between CIM and deskilling. The case study is written so as to highlight the need for LI theory of the social requirements of an innova- tion. such as CIM, to be developed at some stage. rather than to advocate, in the usual prescriptive way. a favoured ready-made theory of the social requirements of CIM.

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