Terrorism and Polítical Víolence, ll:201 213,2005Copyright @ Taylor & Francis Inc.ISSN: 0954-6553 printDOI : I 0. 1 080/09 546550490520682

l) Routledgeft \ Taylor&Francis Group

Children, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Lessons inPolicy and Practise

ANDREW SILKESchool of Law, University of East London, London, United Kingdom

Children are all too often the victims of teruorist conflícls and, as the Beslan scltoolsiege tragicctlly illustated, this victímisation can be extreme, deliberate and inten-tional. While all victitns of tenorisnt al.tract a special interest, child victims unque.s-tionably attract the mosÍ. Following this, how terrorist groups and governnxentsinitiate and react to violence which lcills and maims children can play a major rolein ltotv cot(licts are perceived and ín how campaigns unfold. A failure to appreciatethe critical íssues suruounding the victimísation of chíldren rislcs undermining per-ceived legitimacy, eroding wider support and ínueasing the backing opponentsenjoy. Dratuing on a variety of case studies, this article provides a reviev, of howthe victimísation of children has impacted in recent Íerrorist conflicts. Implicationsfor policy and practice are hÌghlighted.

Vengeance for the blood of a small childSatan has not yet created

Haim Nahman Bialik, Al ha-Shehitah (1903)

Introduction

Terrorism is often described as violence against the innocent, and no victims aremore innocent than children. Sadly, children are all too frequently the victims of ter-rorist conflicts, both of long-running campaigns and also of more isolated majorevents. When Timothy McVeigh pulled up beside the Murrah building in OklahomaCity in 1995 he parked a truck bomb directly beneath the building's kindergarten.Nineteen babies and toddlers were killed in the resulting explosion. Long runningconflicts take their toll too. Sixteen per cent of those killed as a result of The Trou-bles in Northern Ireland have been children (some six hundred children and teen-agers killed).I Forty of these were babies or toddlers. Similarly, 16 per cent of allthose killed by suicide bombers in Israel in the past three years have been childrenor teenagers.2

Sadly it is not just the terrorists who kill children. Government violence inresponse to terrorism frequently victimises children. In Northern Ireland, the BritishArmy has killed more people aged seventeen or younger than any of the major loy-alist paramilitary groups.3 Of the paramilitary groups, only the Provisional IRAhave killed more in this age category than the British Army. In Israel, government

Address correspondence to Dr. Andrew Silke, School of Law, University of East London,Duncan House, Stratford, London E15 2JB, United Kingdom. E-mail: andrew-silke@yahoo.co.uk

I

201

202 A. Silke

retaliatory assassinations against Palestinian militants have left a disturbingly highnumber of bystanders killed or injured. Currently, for every five militants killed inthis way, at least one child is also killed in the attacks. Children are sufferingespecially badly in this latest conflict Amnesty International reported in 2002 thatafter two years of violence at that stage, some 250 Palestinian children had beenkilled in the conflict, along with some seventy-two Israeli children.a The casualtiescontinue to rise in these and other conflicts, and there are no signs that childrenare being any better shielded by the various protagonists.

High media coverage ensures we are all aware that terrorist attacks occur withdisheartening regularity, and that the casualties to such attacks can be very high andvery innocent. In an atmosphere where terrorism attracts great attention the statistichighlighted by Alex Schmid, that a person is more likely to be struck by lightningthan to be killed in a terrorist attack, seems outlandish.5 Media attention has negatedsuch leassuring facts and fostered a widespread belief that terrorist attacks are bothcommon and very dangerous. 'Worse, such biased media focus plays right into thehands of terrorists.

For the professional criminal, as with the terrorist, the victim is often incidental.But the needs for the two types of victimisation are quite different. The criminal'smotivations are local and personal. In contrast, the terrorist seeks to send a widermessage, and because of this his actions will have a relevance and impact on societyin a way quite different to that of any other crime. Victims of terrorism are not sim-ply victims of violent crime, and the threatening effects on society can not beexpected to be on a par with those of crime.

Ultimately, the reason for the extra media attention is the similarity audiencesfeel they have with terrorist victims. Indeed, research has shown that it is factorsrelating to the victims and not the terrorists-that determine the media attentiongiven to terrorist incidents.6 For example, the number of terrorists taking part inan attack does not affect the depth of media coverage, but the number of victimsinvolved does. Not surprisingly, the more victims the greater attention. Followingon from this, the seriousness of the victims' injuries increases coverage also, withthe death of victims attracting a six-fold increase in media attention compared toif the victims are wounded but not killed. The nationality of the victims is importantalso, with domestic victims attracting over one hundred times more attention thanforeign victims. While this research concluded that increased media attention didnot lead to increased levels of terrorism, the effect on victims and on society wasnot considered. If the death of a compatriot attracts so much attention in the dom-estic media, it must inevitably increase awareness of terrorism and lead to heightened(and almost certainly unrealistic) expectations of the threat.

Justice and Just-Worlds

While all victims ol terrorism attract a special interest, child victims unquestionablyattract the most. Children are an especially clear lens through which to view theimpact and dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism. The principle reason forthis is that in the muddied waters of culpability, responsibility and cycles of violencewhich invest terrorist conflicts, children stand aloof. They are not seen as initiatorsof violence or as provocateurs. Primarily, they are seen as the recipients of others'actions and intents, and in the case of terrorism these actions and intents can beappalling indeed.

Children, Terrorism and Counter terrorism 203

Humans have many faults but as a species, psychologically speaking, we do havea keen awareness for justice. This is not justice in a strictly legal sense-cultures andsocieties vary dramatically in their legal codes and sanctions-but rather at an indi-vidual and small-group level. This is a trait humans share with other animals whichlive in close social groups. For such communities to work it is important that mem-bers fulf,rl roles and responsibilities, and that other members can detect shirkers andcheaters and react accordingly. Thus, at a psychological level, humans generallyoperate according to rules of fair play at least within their own immediate group.

An intricate element to this human sensitivity to justice is a capacity for sanctionin the face of violation. Such sanctions may take the form of voiced displeasure, alack of cooperation, a lack of support, isolating the offender, ostracising them andcan also escalate to aggression and violence. A desire for vengeance and revenge isessentially a desire for punishment of a perceived wrong.

Cota-McKinley, Woody and Bell in psychological research defined vengeance as:

the infliction of harm in return for perceived injury or insult or as simplygetting back at another person. . . vengeance can have many irrationaland destructive consequences for the person seeking vengeance as wellas for the target. The person seeking vengeance will often compromisehis or her own integrity, social standing, and personal safety for the sakeof revenge.T

This observation is supported by a number of research studies. For example, in oneSwiss study researchers gave students a cooperative task of the 'prisoner's dilemma'kind: All students in the study beneht provided each behaves honourably, but thosewho cheat will benefit more provided they are not caught. The students wererewarded with real money if they did well and fined if they did not. They were alsoable to punish fellow players by imposing fines but could only do this by forfeitingmoney themselves. This meant that those who punished others frequently would endup with considerably less than those who punished others only a little. Despite this,the research found that the participants tended to punish cheats severely, eventhough they lost out by doing so. People seem to hate cheats so much that theyare prepared to incur significant losses themselves in order to inflict some punish-ment on the transgressors.s

Cota-McKinley, Woody and Bell highlighted that revenge can fulfil a range ofgoals, including righting perceived injustice, restoring the self-worth of the vengefulindividual and deterring future injustice. Lying at the heart of the whole process areperceptions of personal harm, unfairness and injustice and the 'anger, indignation,and hatred' associated with the perceived injustice.e

Ultimately, the desire for revenge is tied both to the self-worth of the originallyoffended individual and also to a deterrent role against future unjust treatment. Thevengeful individual'sends the message that harmful acts will not go unanswered'.10Not only is the goal to stop this particular form of maltreatment in the future, it is todeter the transgtessor from wanting to commit similar crimes; additionally, ven-geance may stop other potential offenders from committing similar crimes or fromeven considering similar crimes.

In-group and out-group stereotyping, however, can leave opposing sides depress-ingly blind to such insight. As Cota-McKinley, Woody and Bell emphasised, revengerevolves around the idea of injustice and, more particularly, redressing injustice.

204 A. Silke

However, appreciating this reality sometimes involves accepting that your in-group has

behaved in an unjustmanner. In a conflict situation, however, stereotyping does not eas-

ily allow for accepting ignoble behaviour of the in-group. We are good, they are bad.God is on our side. Everything we do is justified, everything they do is provocative,inhumane and cruel. We are innocent, they ale guilty. Or at least, we are moreinnocent than they are.

Children, however, bring an added dimension to this issue. Put simply, its not as

easy to denigrate children as it is to denigrate adults, regardless of how repellent orhostile we may perceive the group they belong to. Humans invest very heavily intheir offspring and in general 'we are very sensitive to the well-being of children,and sensitive too to their suffering.

Successful terrorist campaigns tend to have a number of characteristics but one

of the most important concerns who is blamed for the violence. The attribution ofblame is a critical factor. One might expect, for example, that victims of criminalviolence would focus hostility and enmity arising from their experience solely againstthe perpetrators. But this is not the case. Research has shown that people tend to ratethe police as more intimidating, oppressive and corrupt after they have been victi-mised by criminals. Such victims also tend to rate the police as being less efficient,sympathetic, pleasant, helpful and competent.ll

Further, people not involved in the event can also be very prone to placing blamein unexpected places. Indeed, observers frequently blame the victims for their victim-isation. This common reaction, sometimes relerred to as victim derogation, ltrstreceived signif,rcant attention in the context of rape victims. For example, one studyon rape presented simulated newspaper accounts of a rape to 650 people. The situa-tions included (1) stranger rape, (2) date rape and (3) rape after consensual sex. Theparticipants were asked to judge the seriousness of the crime. Overall women judgedrape to be more serious than men, however, the sentences suggested fol the rapistswere less severe when the rapist and victim knew each other.l2 Overall, research onrape victims has identihed several factors which reduce the likelihood that a womanwill be seen as having been raped by a date even though she rejects his sexual advances.

Such factors include items such as having had an expensive date, having agreed to go

to a man's apartment or having originally asked the man out. Within the context of arape, such factors reduce the perceived illegality of the act and the perceived violationof the victim. Natulally, variables like these have no legal or moral relevance, but theydo impact on how the event is perceived by wider audiences.13

This impact is a result of the just-world fallacy. This is a legacy of the humanconcentration on fair play. The just-world fallacy comes about because, cognitively,people perceive the world as a fair environment, and in a fair environment goodthings will happen to good people, bad things will happen to bad people. Unfortu-nately, the real world is not such a place, but is in general harsher and crueller. Yet,research in this area has shown that people find it very important to believe that theydo actually live in a just world. The result, however, is that when they are confrontedby a case olapparently f\agrant injustice, people can distort matters so as to see thevictim as deserving their fate. As already described, there is strong evidence that rapevictims are often treated in this way.t4 It is likely that similar effects are seen in howthe victims of violence resulting from terrorist conflicts both those killed by the ter-rorists and by the state opposing them. Victim derogation is especially likely whenthe victims belong to the out-group. In contrast, victim exoneration is seen morefor victims who belong to the in-group. Our people are generally innocent (and thus

Childr en, Terrorism and Counterterrorism 20s

undeserving of their ill-fate), while their people must be guilty in some way (and thus

deserving of their fate). The psychology of in-group/out-group competition all tooeasily allows such perceptions to become entrenched.

An example of such processes in action can arguably be seen even in efforts toprovide an objective assessment of conflicts. Don Radlauer, for example, provided

an assessment of casualties as a result of the latest phase of the Palestinian Israeli

conflict.l5 Radlauer argued that the casualties of this recent campaign of violence are

often described in terms which are too simplistic and which paint a misleading and

overly negative view of the Israeli role. Most repolts of the Al-Aqsa conflict simplynote that (at27 July 2002) the violence had claimed 1,551 Palestinian lives compared

to 578 Israelis. To the wider world the Palestinians were dying three times faster thanthe Israelis and this has generally been interpreted as the result ofheavy-handed and

unjust policies on the part of the Israelis.Radlauer tried to counter such perceptions and pointed out, for example, that

not all Palestinian fatalities were the result of Israeli actions. Many alleged colla-borators had been killed by the Palestinians themselves, and there have also been

sporadic clashes between rival Palestinian groups which have resulted in deaths.

Further, there have been a number of 'own-goals' where Palestinians have died when

weapons they were making or carrying exploded prematurely, not to mention the

fact that suicide bombers are also included in the list of Palestinian fatalities. Thus,

Radlauer argued, it was too simplistic to view the conflict as being quite as one-sided

as the raw casualty totals seemed to portray.This is certainly a valid point and it deserved to be made. Radlauer, though,

undermined such legitimate observations when the study then engaged in some

rather questionable sleights of hand to try and make the casualty statistics even less

critical of Israel. Victim derogation research suggests that this can be achieved

through attempting to portray the in-group as more innocent and undeserving ofill-fate and the out-group of being more guilty and hence deserving of unhappyendings.

Radlauer divided fatalities into two categories: combatants and noncombatants.This seems perfectly reasonable, but the fact that Radlauer's system allowed the

inclusion of uniformed Israeli soldiers (who were carrying weapons) into the non-combatant category began to raise doubts about the overall picture being painted.

Indeed, nearly 10 per cent of Israeli 'noncombatant' victirns were armed and uni-formed members of Israel's security forces. Most neutral observers, however, wouldhave some serious (and warranted) difhculties about classing armed soldiers as non-combatants (especially given the wider context of an ongoing serious domestic

conflict).Yet if one belongs to or identifies with the group suffering casualties, there is a

tendency to do just this. However, such an approach runs into particular difficultiesin the case of children and this was something that was well illustrated in the

Radlauer analysis. The report drew attention to the fact that a disproportionatelyhigh number of the Israeli victims have been female (177 compared to seventy

Palestinian females). The report also suggested that Israelis have suffered more eld-

erly victims compared to the Palestinians. While 172 Israeli 'noncombatants' killedv/ere aged forty or over, there were seventy-four Palestinians in the same category.

Such statistics certainly suggested that vulnerable sections of Israeli society were

being disproportionately targeted. The report, however, then became reluctantto provide such blunt descriptions of especially young victims. In dealing with

206 A, SíIKC

statistics on child fatalities the report started to talk in terms of proportions: theproportion of all Israeli victims which were children versus the proportion of allPalestinian victims which were children. This was the only way that Israeli casual-ties could be viewed as apparently equivalent. But why did Radlauer not focusattention on the actual figures (as opposed to proportions)? No reasons are givenin the study. Amnesty International, however, reported fhat at roughly the timeRadlauer published his report some 250 Palestinian children had at that stage beenkilled in the conflict, compared to just seventy-two Israeli children.r6 In otherwords, for every one Israeli child killed, 3.5 Palestinian children had also beenkilled. More recent figures by B'Tselem suggest this ratio has now climbed evenhigher and is more than four to one.l7 Radlauer was prepared to discuss such ratioswith regard to female victims and victims over forty (where clearly more Israelisthan Palestinians had died) but he did not follow the same pattern for children.Indeed, there is no discussion at all of the ratios or raw figures when it comes tochild deaths. It is at least reasonable to suggest that this is because more straight-forward reporting of child casualties did not support the general argument theresearch was intended to make.

Policy Lessons

Ultimately, a fundamental and simple truth is that it is extremely difficult for mostpeople not to sympathise with child victims. The less connected people are with aconflict, the more uninhibited such sympathy will be. And sympathy with the victimcontains within it condemnation of the perpetrator. If one identifies with the groupthe child belongs to, the emotions felt in response will be much stronger, but even ifthere is no prior affiliation, child victims will create identification. This issuebecomes especially important for those conflicts where there is significant inter-national awareness and interest in what is happening. International interest willfocus on a narro\ryer range of issues, and child victimisation is certainly adramatically captivating and compelling issue. The result: Whoever hurts childrentakes great risks in terms of the perceived legitimacy of their cause, risks undermin-ing their wider support and risks inflaming and augmenting the support theiropponent enjoys in the conflict.

Political violence is messy and accidents happen. People are injured and killedwho were not meant to be hurt and who were not intended to die. This applies tochildren too. Thus, both terrorists and governments kill and maim children-some-times intentionally, more generally not. How they react to such events, however,can play a major role in how the conflict is perceived and in how campaignsunfold.

Terrorism related to Northern Ireland provides a good illustration of the sig-nificance of child victims. Over the course of the past thirty-five years, politicalviolence related to that conflict has claimed nearly 4,000 lives and left some50,000 people injured. In an average year prior to fhe 1994 cease-fires, some 900terrorist attacks would take place, including shootings, bombings, mortar attacks,incendiary fire-bombings and so on. In the 1970s, the level of violence was evenhigher with some 4,000 attacks taking place each year. In the worst year, 1972,there were over 12,000 terrorist incidents l8

The wider impact of any given attack was generally low, but there are excep-tions. A small number of incidents-a tiny proportion of the total-are universally

Children, Terrorism and Counter terrorism 207

recognised as having had a significant impact on the conflict. The conflict altered inits course after them. A significant characteristic of a surprising number of suchwatershed incidents are that their casualties included children. Among such eventsale Bloody Sunday inl9l2 (thirteen Catholics killed, seven of whom were teenagers),the Shankill Road bombing in 1993 (nine Protestant civilians killed including twoyoung girls) and the Omagh bombing in 1998 (twenty-nine dead including twelvechildren). These events altered the dynamics of the conflict, and always to the detri-ment of the group responsible for the deaths. After Bloody Sunday, IRA violenceescalated alarmingly. In the three years before that day some 250 people had beenkilled in the conflict. In the twelve months which followed nearly 500 people died.reThe Omagh bombing led to backlash against the perpetrators, the Real IRA. Theorganization's commander was locked out of his business premises in the Republicof Ireland, people openly protested outside his home and the group vvas forced todeclare a surly cease-fire at a time when they had wanted to place increasing pressureon the peace process. As a movement, the organisation has nevef recovered. Thoughit restarted its campaign of violence in late 2000, support for the group has been pal-try and the vast majority of its operations end in failure. Most new recruits arearrested and imprisoned without ever taking part in successful attacks, moraleremains low, internal conflicts rife and there are no signs that the group can hopeto change their fortunes.

The Provisional IRA's bomb attack in Warrington is another stark example ofwhat happens when children are the victims of terrorism. On 20 March 1993, theIRA planted two bombs in litterbins in a crowded shopping area in Warrington. Thisattack was the latest in a series of litterbin bombings across the mainland UK. A fewweeks previously a copycat litterbin attack in North London on a crowded highstreet had injured f,rfty-six people.

Two children, however, were killed in the Warrington attack. Jonathan Ball wasonly three years old and had been shopping for a Mother's Day present when thefirst bomb exploded. He died at the scene in the arms of a nurse. Timothy Parrywas twelve years old and had been going to buy a pair of football shorts. He sufferedhorrihc head injuries due to the second Semtex bomb as he was trying to run awayfrom the scene of the first explosion. The second bomb utterly destroyed most ofhis face and it was three hours before he could be identified. He never regainedconsciousness and died six days later in hospital.

In a statement issued the day after the bombing, the Provisional IRA claimedthat:

Responsibility for the tragic and deeply regrettable death and injuriescaused in Warrington yesterday lies squarely at the door of those inthe British authorities who deliberately failed to act on precise andadequate warnings.

But the warnings had neither been precise or adequate. At ll:38 a.m. on the Satur-day morning, the Samaritans in Liverpool had received a coded warning that a bombhad been left outside a Boots chemist's shop in the city.2O A police radio alert wasissued throughout the entire region, reaching as far as Warrington a town whichis twenty-five miles away (and as close to Manchestet as it is to Liverpool).Thirty-four minutes after the warning the bombs detonated, killing the two boysand leaving fìfty-one others injured.

208 A. Silke

Martin McGuinness, who at the time sat on the IRA's Army Council, latercommented:

I feel badly about the Warrington bomb, badly about those children andbadly about the effect. I believe that the republican struggle was damagedas a result. I do not believe that the people involved in that intended forthat to happen.2r

Speaking later in 2001, he would add:

The killing of Jonathan and Tim was wrong. It should not have happenedand there is a responsibility on all of us to bring about a peace process.22

The republican struggle was certainly damaged as a result. The British government atthe time of the bombing was already involved in secret negotiations with the IRAin the search for a cease-fire. The negotiations did not cease, though the tone chan-ged after the bombing. In the public sphere, following the atrocity there was simplymassive outrage both in England and in the Republic of lreland. At a peace rally inDublin, organised in response to the two deaths, people believed to be republicansympathisers were heckled and jeered:

Well, it was called a peace rally, but it was obvious when we stepped intothe street in Dublin that it was an anti-IRA rally; to me it was obvious . . .

the hatred coming from those people ... people came out totally againstus ... Theyjeered and they shouted out and they spat on us and they toreup our posters.23

Riding a wave of revulsion, on I April 1993, the Irish government introduced newprocedures which were designed to make extradition of IRA suspects to Britaineasier. Meanwhile, throughout the Republic an increasing number of IRA weaponsdumps were uncovered by security forces, as people with local knowledge refused tocontinue to turn a blind eye.

The manner in which the two boys had been killed had crossed a line. FormerIRA member Eamon Collins said it best when he noted of IRA tactics that:

The IRA - regardless of their public utterances dismissing the condemna-tions of their behaviour from church and community leaders - tried to actin a way that would avoid severe Çensure from within the nationalist com-munity; they knew they were operating within a sophisticated set of infor-mal restrictions on their behaviour, no less powerful for being largelyunspoken.2a

Warrington had broken these restrictions. As well as public apologies, the IRA chan-ged tactics. The IRA's leadership recognised that Vy'arrington damaged their cause

and undermined their support. In response they changed tactics on the mainlandUK to avoid similar harm. Bombings like Warrington were abandoned by theIRA teams operating in that theatre. Instead they solely focused on large-scale

Children, Terrorism and Counterterrorism 209

bombs aimed at economic targets (and for these great care was taken that plenty of'appropriate warning' was provided to the autholities).

In the eyes of some, Wauington contributed significantly to the ProvisionalIRA's decision to call a cease-hre some seventeen months after the bombing. Veryfew claim that this cease-fire was the result of just one factor. Most accept that manyforces combined to bring about that lesult. Yet, counterproductive and deeplyunpopular attacks such as Warrington contributed. Monsignor Faul of Dungannon,a Catholic priest who played a significant role in the hunger strikes olthe early 1980sand who has been an outspoken critic of both paramilitary and security force abuses

in Northern Ireland, put it succinctly:

[The IRA] had enough guns to carry on [but] they had no recruits. Derrywas getting a lot of prosperity ... They were getting no recruits fromDerry. They could keep it going in Belfast because in any big city you'llget an element that will fight ... The country people were getting fed upwith it, too. And I say that because in the last two or three years theBritish Army and the police stopped a lot of the harassment on theroads, and the economic border disappeared. They did one disaster,Warlington; all these things made them dreadfully unpopular. So theywere finishe d, anyw ay.2s

One may speculate about the precise origins of the 1994 cease-fire, but there iscertainly no denying that the Real IRA's 1998 cease-fire was entirely a reaction tothe deathtoll of the botched bombing at Omagh. This atrocity was similar to War-rington in a number of respects. Both bombings were part of established campaignsusing familiar tactics. In both cases, the disaster was caused by hopelessly inadequatewarnings. The scale of destruction of Omagh was far greater, however it remainsthe worst single atrocity of the entire Troubles. Twelve children died, and one ofthe women who was killed was heavily pregnant with twins.

The outrage, revulsion and condemnation expressed in the aftermath echoedWarrington forcefully. There were demonstrations and protests. Like the Provi-sionals, the Real IRA issued a statement the day after the bombing claiming thatthey had issued appropriate and adequate warnings adding 'We offer apologies tothe civilians'. Again, the walning had been completely inadequate. The caller hadsaid the bomb was parked outside the town's courthouse. The police quickly sealed

off that area and shepherded people away. Unfortunately many people were guidedtowards the Dublin Road junction a considerable and safe distance from the court-house. But it was here that the car containing the 500 lb. bomb had been parked, andwhen it detonated it caused carnage.

The pressure brought to bear on the Real IRA was intense. The organisation'sleader, Michael McKevitt, and his wile were openly named in the national press ofboth the UK and the Republic of Ireland. There were protests outside his home andhis business was closed by the premise's landlords. Within three days the Real IRAhad been forced to declare a sullen cease-fire - it was especially unwelcome as theyhad, after all, split from the Provisional IRA primarily because of that group's 1997

cease-fìre. It would be nearly three years belore the Real IRA felt bold enough torestart its campaign of violence (and then to only very limited effect). But the dam-age had been done. The bombing had leached support away from the group and itdid not return. In the Republic of Ireland, the government introduced the most

2t0 A. Silke

draconian counterterrorism legislation proposed by an Irish parliament in thirtyyears of conflict, and McKevitt would become the first person convicted and impri-soned under this legislation.

\When one looks at the recent history of Northern Irish terrorism, one sees aconflict where the killing of children played a significant role, a role which wasalways to the detriment of the killers. In the aftermath of such incidents, therepublican paramilitaries tried to lay blame elsewhere, offered apologies, changedtactics and even called cease-fires. Even then, the damage they suffered politicallyand socially was intense. The security forces, however, were often even moredeficient in how they reacted to deaths. Bloody Sunday was dreadfully mis-handled. The government certainly tried to lay blame elsewhere for the deathsbut this was as inept and as biased as the IRA's efforts. Unlike the paramilitaries,no official apology for the deaths was forthcoming. The result was that BloodySunday remained a festering sore running through the conflict, a constant sourceof support and motivation for militant republicanism and an apparent sign of anoppressive and brutal government. Even today, six years after the signing of theGood Friday Agreement, Bloody Sunday remains the subject of official inquiriesand public investigations. Had the incident received a more honest accounting inthe immediate aftermath many things might have been different.

Conclusions

The lessons which can be drawn from incidents such as Warrington, Omagh andBloody Sunday are not restricted solely to the folds of the British Islands. After all,there was an outpouring of reaction to these events across the world. This is to beexpected. As outlined earlier, such reactions are the result of common characteristicsof human psychology: how we react to acts of apparent injustice and how we perceiveand respond to victims. Children occupy an especially important place because unlikemany other groups, it is very difficult to denigrate children as victims. In some con-flicts, particularly in the developing world, child soldiers are responsible for countlessdeaths and maimings.'6 Yet even then, they are regarded with more compassion andsympathy than any other group of killers.

Irish Republican terrorism has shown an a\ryareness of these issues. The IRA - inits various incarnations has reacted to these situations quickly. Clearly this is moti-vated out of the group's self-interest, but it would be wrong to say that genuineregret has not also been present for many. In comparison, governments are slowerto react, slower to apologise and slower to change course. Why? Governments fearthat such admissions may undermine the legitimacy of their cause and erode support.But this happens any\ryay. Being unwilling to compromise simply compounds theproblem over the long term as the apparent injustice of the state is augmented.Bloody Sunday is a case in point. In the modern age, the most obvious exampleof similar practices probably concerns the Israeli response to Palestinian aggression.Palestinian suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks are highly destructive andthere is a keenly felt desire to forcibly strike back in response. However, the mannerin which the security forces currently act on this desire does further harm to Israel'scause.

Preemptive assassinations, for example, have become a cornerstone of Israelicounterterrorism policy. Indeed, the current Israeli campaign of 'targeted killing'has resulted in a disturbingly high number of innocent fatalities. Since the latest

Children, Terrorism qnd Counterterrorism 2tt

round of slayings began in November 2000 it is thought that over 126 Palestinianmilitants and activists have been deliberately assassinated by Israeli security services.However, this campaign of elimination has also resulted in the deaths of at basteighty-six innocent bystanders, including no fewer than twenty-four children.2T

Yet advocates of these tactics are often blind to such collateral damage and itswider impact. The fact that the current campaign results in the death of nearly onebystander for every 'militant' is generally overlooked in assessments of the policy.Even the lessons of high-profile cases seem lost and quickly forgotten. In September2000, the world was transfixed by television footage showing a Palestinian father andhis twelve-year-old son cowering behind a water barrel in Netzarim. Israeli soldiersin a nearby outpost were shooting at the pair. The television footage showed the twowere clearly unarmed and were simply desperate to get away. Bullets hit them both;the father was seriously injured while the son was killed and lay slumped in hisfather's lap. There was outrage in Palestinian areas, the Arab Middle East and thewider international community. In response, Israeli authorities prevaricated,attempted to lay the blame elsewhere, did not apologise and did not change tactics.In the three weeks after Netzarim, three more Palestinian twelve-year-old boys wereshot dead by Israeli troops. The deaths helped fuel the descent into wider carnage.

For advocates of hard-line policies like targeted assassinations, the loss of assas-sinated members deals a steady stream of serious blows to the terrorist groups. Thedeath of an experienced bomb-maker, for example, can disrupt planned attackswhich must be postponed or abandoned until alternative sources of weaponry canbe acquired. The reliability and quality of these alternative suppliers may be uncer-tain, resulting in less effective and more risky operations for the terrorists. The lossof senior leaders also necessitates internal reorganisation and again a period ofadjustment for the group. Yet Israel's counterterrorism practices are currently takinga disturbingly high toll in bystanders and children. The Israeli-based human rightsgroup, B'Tselem, maintains a database of casualties from the Al-Aqsa intifadah. lL

shows that as of 7 November 2003, Palestinian terrorist attacks had killed 104 Israelichildren (aged seventeen or younger) since September 2000. This is a savage toll, butit is sobering to learn that B'Tselem reports that the Israeli security forces have killed421 Palestinian children in the same period.28 Such policies, on both sides, serve onlyto fuel the conflict and polarise positions. The discrepancy in the ratios, more thanfoul Palestinian children killed for every one Israeli child, cannot help but placemore opprobrium in the Israeli camp. Yaakov Peri, the former head of the ShinBet, spoke out publicly against government policy in this regard in November2003. In a scathing attack he said:

We are heading downhill towards near-catastrophe. If nothing happensand we go on living by the sword, we will continue to wallow in themud and destroy ourselves.2e

In the end, what are good counterterrorism policies? One answer to this ques-tion-but not necessarily the one which always carries the most importance forpolicy-makers-is that they are processes which lead to a sustained reduction inthe level of terrorist violence and ultimately to a de facto end to the terrorist cam-paign. Policy which can achieve such ends needs to be holistic in nature and it needsto consider carefully the question of what it is that will sustain a terrorist campaign.What do such campaigns of violence need to continue and to thrive? More than

212 A. Sillce

anything, terrorist campaigns need support if they are to endure. The more supportthey acquire the more resilient their efforts become, and the greater the threat theypose to the state opposing them. Losing sight of this key point-the hearts-and-minds question-is the first step in losing the initiative in the war against terrorism.Children are a lodestone for remembering this lesson. Ultimately, children are anexus point in such struggles, and around them a great deal indeed can revolve.

. . . we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have sufferedwithout lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has beenexcited by the atrocities ol our enemies . . . \4'ithout whose favor and sup-port our efforts must all prove in vain.

General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870)30

Notes

1. Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, Northem lreland's Troubles:The Human Cosls (London: Pluto Press 1999).

2. This is based on a list ol attacks maintained by the Israeli Ministry of ForeignAffairs. Analysis of this list indicates thal 446 people have been killed in suicide bombingsbetween 9 Sep.2000 and l8 Nov.2003 (this death toll excludes the bombers). Seventy-Threeof these victims have been seventeen years old or younger. The list is available athttp: //www.m f a. gov I I mfa I go.asp?MFAH0ia50

3. Fay, Morrissey and Smyth (note 1) pp.187 188.

4. See Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian Auth-ority Killing the Future: Childlen in the Line of FtÍe, httpillweb.amnesty.org/ai.nsflIndex/MD8151472002?OpenDocument &. of:COUNTRIES/ISRAEL/OCCUPIED+TERRITORIES

5. Alex Schmid, 'Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs. Fleedom fromIntimidation', in L. Howard, (ed), Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses (London: Praeger1992) p.101.

6. P. Nelson and J. Scott, 'Terrorism and the Media: An Empirical Analysis', DefenceEconomics 314 (1992) pp.329-339.

7. A. Cota-McKinley, W. Woody, and P. Bell, 'Vengeance: Effects of Gender, Age andReligious Background', Aggressive Behavior 27 (2001) pp.343 350. Quote taken from p.343.

8. C. Tudge, 'Natural Boln Killels', New Scientist 17412342 (2002) pp.36-39.9. S. Kim and R. Smith, 'Revenge and Conflict Escalation', Negotiation Journal vol.9,

No.1 (1993) pp.3743.10. Ibid., p.40.11. J. Shapland, J. Willmore, and P. Duff, Victims in the Criminal Justice System

(London: Gower 1985).12. K. L'Armand and A. Pepitone, 'Judgments of Rape: A Study of Victim-Rapist

Relationship and Victim Sexual Histoly', Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin vo1.8,

No.2 (1982) pp.134-139.13. R. Shotland and L. Goodstein, 'Sexual Precedence Reduces the Perceived Legitimacy

of Sexual Refusal: An Examination of Attributions Concerning Date Rape and ConsensualSex', Personalíty and Social Psyclrclogy Bulletin 18l6 (1992) pp.756-764.

14. John Sabini, Social Psychology,2nd edn, (London: Nortons & Company 1995).15. Don Radlauer, An Engineered Tragedy: Statistical Analysis of Casualties in the

Palestinian-Israeli Conflict September 2000 - Jrne 2002, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid : 439

16. Amnesty International (note 4).17. The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Fatal-

ities in the Al-Aqsa Intifada,: 29 Sept. 2000-7 November 2003,http:llwww.btselem.org/18. Police Service of Northern Ireland, Security-Related Incidents 1969-2003,

http: //www.psni.police.uk

Children, Terrorism and Counter t errorism 213

19. David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton, Lost Lives(London: Mainstream Publishing 1999) p.144.

20. Martin Dillon, The Enemy Within (London: Doubleday 1994) p.318.21. Quoted in Kevin Toolis, Rebel Hearts (London: Picador 1995) p.325.22. Quoted in Richard English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA (London:

MacMillan 2003) p.378.23. Quoted in Brendan O'Brien, The Long War (Dublin: O'Brien Press 1993) pp.62-63.24. Eamon Collins (with M. McGovern), Killing Rage (London: Granta Books 1997)

p.296.25. Quoted in Jonathan Stevenson, "'We Vy'recked the Place": Contemplating an End to

the Northern Irish Troubles' (London: Free Press 1996) p.112.26. Deborah Browne, 'Examining the Impact of Terrorism on Children', in Andrew Silke

(ed), Terrorists, Victims and Society (London: Wiley 2003) pp.189212.27. ^îhe Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

(note l7).28. rbid.29. BBC News Online, 'Ex-security Chiefs Chide Israel', http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/

hi/world/mid dle-east I 327 0449 I . stm30. Quoted in Peter Tsouras, Warriors' Words (London: Cassell 1992) p.70.

t

I