Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&M

Countering Terrorism:

Informational Tactics &

Strategy

by

Ralph Mora, Ph.D., MSS

Bush 657 - Terrorism in Today’s World

Prof. Gene Culbertson

1


George Bush School of Government & Public

Policy at Texas A&M University

Spring 2006

Psychological warfare must be implemented as a multilevel

activity at strategic, operational and tactical levels. In the

current struggle, the targets need to be the terrorist’s will,

the current state of Arab social awareness, Islamic cultural

traditions, the terrorist’s economic capabilities, Arab public

sentiment, the tendencies of popular will, morale among the

terrorist ranks, and the various social groups, classes and

strata within terrorist groups. Such a focus by necessity

requires the development of a people’s war-defense mentality.1

This refers to using psychological warfare as a way of spreading

truth and justice; and of exposing the Jihadist’s plot to

confuse, corrupt or penetrate the Arab Muslim’s mental space.

2

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&MThis paper provides the context within which a more focused

informational strategy needs to be implemented. In doing so,

observations and recommendations are posed with especial emphasis

on the current state of U.S. informational operations. The

ultimate purpose is to provide an argument for the need to

develop correct and timely informational capacities that are long

overdue and critical to addressing the current struggle against

radical Islamic terrorists.

Background: Resurgent Islam

Renewal (tajdid) and reform (Islah) have always been a part

of the Islamic tradition.2 They represent “the individual and

communal effort to define Islam clearly and explicitly in terms

of God’s revelation (as recorded in the Quran) and the customs or

Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.” 3 They have also “always involved

a call for a return to the basic fundamentals of Islam”4 though

nothing in the basic fundamentals of Islam calls for the use of

1 Thomas, Timothy L. 2003. “New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare.” Special Warfare: 2-11

3

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mterrorism or the condoning of such tactics. Yet, this is

precisely what terrorists propose to the Muslim world and glorify

in their media campaign. In their use of psychological warfare,

they guide public opinion, and actively conduct public-opinion

propaganda. In Iraq, psychological tactics geared towards

inhibiting cooperation with the West have included sending

threats to Iraqis who work for American contractors, attacking

infrastructure projects, and beheading hostages. Suicide bombers

represent the “wall of iron” strategy which seeks to demonstrate

the impotency of repression.5 Insurgents also gamble that rising

Iraqi casualties and ongoing infrastructure damage will alienate

the local population and increase opposition to the occupation.

The moral legitimacy of the West was put into question when after

the Abu Ghraib incident and the allegations of abuse at

Guantanamo Bay, hostages were dressed in orange jumpsuits. The

idea was to suggest moral equivalency between the hostage taking

and the coalition’s actions. Of course, the ultimate goal is for

the insurgents to project themselves as the legitimate popular

government. Muqtada al-Sadr tried this when he proclaimed himself

president of Iraq in 2003; but, his timing was off and his lack

of real power became all too apparent. He should have realized

4

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mthat “without power, intimidation is only a scarecrow.”6 In

effect, terrorist tactics can be effective but their success is

contingent on many factors not the least of which is timing.

Traditionally, the mujadids’ purpose has been to implement the

already existing ideal that is within the Quran and Sunna. This

is in opposition to the mystic mode of Islam which tends to

create rather than oppose synthesis with cultural factors. In

today’s world, there is a desire to create authentic Islamic

institutions and ways of behaving on the one hand and

unwillingness to accept Islamic traditionalism without radical

questioning on the other. The refusal to radically question

Islamic tradition in its extremes refers to the insurgent

anarchism of some terrorist organizations. The search for Islamic

2 Voll, John, O. 1983. “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah.” Esposito, J.L., ed. 1983 Voices of Resurgent Islam J.L. Esposito. New York, Oxford University Press: 32-47.

3 Ibid. p. 32

4 Ibid. my italics, p.33

5 Schleifer, Ron. 2005. “Reconstructing Iraq: Winning the Propaganda Warin Iraq.” Middle East Quarterly XII.

6 Xu Hezhen. 2000. “Focus on Psychological War against the Background ofGrand Strategy,” Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Issue 5, pp.67-76. Quotedin Thomas, Timothy L. 2003. “New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare.” Special Warfare: 2-11

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mauthenticity can readily become a form of rigid neo-conservatism

that rejects any critical scientific thought and may mutate into

punitive ritual behaviors that oppose modernist liberal elements.

For the West, this means that a passive psychological defense

will not suffice. Only with initiative can the U.S. and its

allies use public opinion to advantage. As noted above, timing is

important and thus informational products need to be prepared in

advance. The material included must counter terrorist

organizations’ attacks that will be made against the initial

release of Western information products. 7 Indeed, control of the

media in the Middle East is the front line in this psychological

war. The West is attempting to change Iraq and Afghanistan’s

fundamental social concepts and the larger Muslim society’s sense

of values by using democracy, individual freedom and human

rights. In contrast, Islamic extremists have learned that their

inability to defeat their foes in open battle has made terrorism

a useful tactic to weaken enemy morale. They choose targets that

maximize psychological impact and thereby magnify their actions.

7 Li yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli 2000. “On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare.” Junshi Kexue (Chinese Military Science), Issue 6. Quoted inThomas, Timothy L. 2003. “New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare.” Special Warfare: 2-11

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&MIn the Middle East, the search for a clear and authentic Arab

Muslim identity provides a psychologically significant issue that

terrorists can exploit.

Islamic identity was first formed and sustained in the shadow

of a sultan-caliph. This did not allow for the development of

Arab autonomy separate from the caliphate.8 The breakup of the

Ottoman Empire post WWI and the subsequent era of mandates

provided the first challenge to Arab and Islamic identity. The

Arab defeat in 1967, the trouble in Syria over the role of Islam

in their constitution in 1973, the 1974 debate in Egypt on the

application of Sharia and the 1979 advent of Ayatollah Khomeni

all reflect subsequent attempts to define Islam and the Arab

world. Indeed, between 1945 and 1970 popular and intellectual

writings drew significantly closer to religious articles

concerning religious topics particularly with regard to Islamic

authenticity.9 Conceptually, Islamic authenticity is multi

8 Muhammad Amarah, ed. 1975 Complete Works of al-Kawakabi. Beirut: al-Mussah al-Carabiyah: 355-358. Quoted in Donohue, J.J. 1983. “Islam and the Search for Identity in the Arab World.” Esposito, J.L., ed. 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam New York, Oxford University Press

9 Donohue, J.J. 1983. “Islam and the Search for Identity in the Arab World.” Esposito, J.L., ed. 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam New York, Oxford University Press: 48-62.

7

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mfaceted and reflects identity as Arab, Islamic, Arab-Muslim and

national authenticity.

The expulsion of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt with its

proponents scattered throughout the Middle East and particularly

to Saudi Arabia provided the greater Arab populations immediate

access to the tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood including the need

to resist Western influence. This led to the growing mutations of

what has become a radical Islamic movement throughout the Middle

East. Russia’s attempt to convert Afghanistan to Communism set

the stage for the unification of those concerned with Arab and

Islamic authenticity. The expulsion of the Russians was defined

by the Jihadists as a victory for radical Islam and for their

version of the will of Allah. In effect, they exploited popular

opinion among the Arabs who were seeking a tangible sense of

identity. In the meantime, the West failed to exploit its

position and everyone conveniently forgot where the arms and

supplies came from. Tactically this was good use of information

operations as a strategy by the radical Islamists which led to

control of most of Afghanistan by the Taliban. For the Taliban

intimidation was “a key strategy…..used to influence both public

opinion and the media.” 10 Individual liberties were summarily

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mdenied and Islam was mutated into a system that denied its basic

fundamentals. This style of governance is the prototype of what

the radical Islamists are trying to achieve throughout the Arab

world. And, it is from such an intolerant and radical view that

Al Qaeda’s exportation of violent extremism has been nurtured.

It is noteworthy that America’s efforts against the

Afghanistan regime went ahead with most of the rest of the

world’s blessing. America had been attacked and went after those

who had attacked it. It seemed fair and just and everyone (in the

West) was and is on board. Yet, the expansion of America’s

efforts into Iraq was seen as a hostile preemptive act against a

nation that had not attacked America. And so, the “War on

Terrorism” was defined by this action and in the eyes of the Arab

Muslim world, America was and is guilty of acting on hegemonic

designs against the Arab Middle East and most importantly,

against Islam.

10 Xu Hezhen 2000. “Focus on Psychological War Against the Background ofGrand Strategy.” Junshi Kexue (Chimese Military Science) Issue 5. Quoted in Thomas, Timothy L. 2003. “New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare.” Special Warfare: 2-11

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&MAmerican IO Strategy

Information Operations are both offensive and defensive.”11

Offensive IO seeks to influence the behavior of target decision-

makers or audiences and defensive IO is meant to shield or defend

friendly decision-makers or audiences from being unduly

influenced. IO activities occur within an information

environment. Such activities include psychological operations

(PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operations security

(OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations

(CNO).

Criticisms of current IO include the fact that there is no

consensus on the definition of IO. Each service, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and DOD have competing definitions of IO.12 This

11 U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations. 2004 Information Operations Primer: Fundamentals of Information Operations. Carlisle, PA.: U.S. Army War College.

12 Department of Defense, 30 October 2003 Information Operations Roadmap. This publication was only recently declassified. The writers acknowledgethe need for a unified definition of Information Operations and provide the following: “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military Deception and Operations Security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.” P. 11

10

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mmeans that working synergistically within the Iraqi battle space

is hampered by a blurring of meaning among components of even the

same armed forces.

EW plant and policy investment is outdated. For example, in

March 2003, the U.S. Air Force used an experimental

electromagnetic pulse device called the ‘E-Bomb’ in order to

attempt a shut down of Saddam Hussein’s propaganda machine.13

Significantly a year and a half previously a poor man’s E-Bomb

was displayed in a popular American magazine that would allow a

terrorist to attack heavily guarded sites through their

telecommunication connections.14

PSYOP needs to be decentralized and integrated with Public

Affairs and Public Diplomacy. Experience in Iraq between USAID

and the 1st CAV highlighted the need for visible and sustained

presence on the ground with a multitude of small community impact

projects in order to win the cooperation that gives the U.S. time

to design and implement large projects whose ultimate benefits

are far downstream.15 Nevertheless, the perception of the average

Iraqi one year after the end of the major combat operations was

13 Martin, David. March 25, 2003. U.S. Drops ‘E-Bomb’ On Iraqi TV. CBS

14 Wilson, Jim. September 11, 2001. “E-Bomb.” Popular Mechanics Magazine.

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mthat nothing was being done. This perception has aided the

insurgency.

In effect, IO is a developing competency in the U.S.

governmental apparatus and has not clearly demonstrated its

benefit because clarity of purpose and direction are lacking.

Certain operational strategies at the tactical or operational

level have evidenced some limited successes. Work programs funded

and accomplished through the USAID won hearts and minds and

offered force protection. However, such programs are only an

element of stabilization and are expensive and transitory. Such

efforts buy time for the reconstruction phase; but after three

years reconstruction seems far away. American strategy purports

to support the establishment of a democratic process in Iraq. The

initial focus is on training Iraqis to provide security for their

own nation while the process continues to build the democratic

infrastructure needed for democracy to develop. This is done in

tandem with providing American security in the cities and roads

and for Iraqi oil assets and sea and land points of embarkation

15 Stephenson, James. N.d. Sowing New Ground: A Field Perspective on Military-Civilian Cooperation in Iraq. Washington D.C:, U.S. Agency for International Development. This draft document provides a background of the lead agentfor USAID in Iraq beginning in February 2004. ]

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mreportedly until the Iraqi forces can take over. Repairing the

infrastructure of Iraq has become a priority as terrorist attacks

have consistently targeted such efforts and thereby cause doubts

in the Iraqi mindset about America and America’s ability to help.

Information operations are in the end about instilling hope in

the future. But the individual Iraqi only asks himself if he and

his family are better off today than they were under Sadam

Hussein. Without good water and functioning electricity, the

native Iraqi can see little hope or benefit in America’s ability

to be of real help.

A Contextual View

The term, “War on Terrorism,” is either a semantic mistake

or a conscious attempt to guide universal perception. Terrorism

is simply a tactic or series of tactics16 of which there are at

least seven including bombing, hijacking, arson, assault,

kidnapping, hostage taking and WMD.17 18 19 Terrorist tactics are

not restricted by territorial boundaries or whether the victims

are combatants or not. The most virulent terrorists are violent

radical Islamists. They use terrorist tactics in order to take

13

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mthe religion of Islam and the Arab Muslim population hostage.

Historical definitions of war have not always agreed with this

view. For example, SunTzu emphasized the conduct of war at the

highest strategic levels while Clausewitz focused on tactics and

operational strategy.20 For Clausewitz there was no focus on the

context within which war/ conflict occurs while for SunTzu the

context is essential. This is crucial to our understanding

because the manner in which information is presented is always

dependent on the context; i.e., the informational environment.

The context of the current struggle is tied to the how, what,

where, when and particularly the why of the radical Islamic

movement.

There are those who would view the rise of the Jihadists as

the result of a clash of civilizations21 but the fact of the

matter is that the radical forces of Islam would have little to

do with the West were it not that many Muslims consider religious

moderation a viable alternative to the radical form espoused by

the terrorists. In effect, the West is the enemy because it

presents an alternative ideology, one that threatens the dream of

a unified radical religious caliphate.

14


Sun-Tzu defines the main objective of war as defeating the

enemy without having to fight.22 The West’s greatest error (sic)

has been in conducting a military action with such unity of

effort in winning a ground war that post conflict difficulties

were minimized if not altogether forgotten. Indeed, the main

objective of a psychological operation is to win without fighting

or to win significantly with only a little fighting. The

psychological counterinsurgency plan in Iraq underplayed the role

of psychological operations in consolidating the assured

(military) victory and failed to take into account postwar regime

16 Pillar, Paul R. October 8, 2002. Statement to the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

17 Jenkins, Brian M. 1987. "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" Laqeur, Walter & Alexander, Yonah. eds. q987. The Terrorism Reader. New York: Meridian.

18 Brackett, D.W. 1996. Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo. New York:Weatherhill Publishers.

19 White, J. 2005. Terrorism and Homeland Security. 5th ed. Belmont CA: Thomas Wadsworth.

20 Handel, Michael I. 2001. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. 3rd ed. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

21 Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72: pp.22-49.

22 Sun-Tzu 1993 The Art of Warfare. Roger Ames (Translator). New York: Ballantine Books

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mchange. Before the war, U.S. psychological operations were

described as a “work in progress.” Adm. James Ellis, USN,

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command noted that “information

operations must get beyond the ‘realm of a science project.’”23

Even the Army’s current civil affairs manual only speaks of

replacing military with civilian institutions as soon as

possible.24

Sun-Tzu also noted that the main essence of war is attacking

the enemy’s strategy while the main principle is contending for

control of hearts, minds and morale.25 Only by assuring a

favorable political position and providing a moral and just

rationale for conducting the war can the U.S. achieve a

fundamental psychological advantage. Success in informational

operations relies on persuading the civilian population to

support the U.S. military presence. To accomplish this, civilians

must demonstrate a convergence of interests with those of the

West. Lack of proper planning has helped enhance the support of

23 Campen, Alan D. Col. (Ret.) June 2003. “Information Operations May Find Definition And Validation in Iraq.” Signal Magazine.

24 U.S. Department of the Army. January 1993. FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations. Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, i-iii.

25 Ibid.

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mterrorists and has made them appear much stronger and more

organized than they are. The coalition force initially and

correctly took control of Iraq’s communication systems (including

Commando Solo, a U.S. Air Force operation that broadcasted

messages to the Iraqi public and they established Al-Iraquiya

television); but, Iran had already scored with a television

station of its own weeks before. Further, U.S. psychological

operations units failed to use allied elites to test their

messages beforehand. In this struggle, perception is everything

and the terrorists are influencing Muslim perceptions as they

characterize the West and it’s supporters as attacking core

Muslim values while at the same time not living up to its own

purported values. Most recently U.S. journalists have criticized

U.S. psychological operations and termed it a fallacy for paying

Arab journalists to print positive stories.

Additionally, terrorist leaders, like Osama bin Laden, are

seen in the Arab world as folk heroes while the West has

forgotten Sun-Tzu’s sage advice that the main idea of war is

focusing on the enemy commander’s decision-making skills and

personal traits. These issues underscore a problem in the way

that U.S. Information Operations is conducted. There is no

17

Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Msynergy of effort. Current information operations refer to a

series of seemingly disjointed tactics including leaflet drops,

and the use of TV, radio or loudspeaker.26 To counter these

shortcomings, a cohesive comprehensive multilevel strategy and a

clear understanding of resurgent Islam are needed.

Psychological Warfare Analysis and Recommendations

Most western studies on Psychological Operations refer to it

as a relatively modern aspect of war. However, in the Chinese Six

Arts of War, a command structure of 72 men included 19 psychological

operations personnel (i.e., 26 %): Five get information on the

enemy’s strength; four spy on their fame in order to destroy the

enemy’s confidence; eight scout out the enemy’s mood and intent;

and two confuse the people by exploiting their belief in gods and

spirits.27 In contrast, there is still only one active duty

26 Indeed, the U.S. appears to have not profited from the lessons learned in Bosnia where the perception on the ground was that locally executed psychological operations was not in sync with centralized planning efforts. The reader is directed to Collins, Steven 1998 “Centrally Planned and Decentrally Executed – A Dilemma facing Military Psychological Operations” Submitted to Cyber Sword.

27 Thomas, Timothy L. (2003). “New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare.” Special Warfare: 2-11

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Morganization in the U.S. Armed Forces expressly dedicated to

Information Operations - the 4th Psychological Operations Group

(4th POG). This unit provides support to the entire Defense

Department. Further, the organization that conducts strategic

policy is trifurcated, with responsibilities split among three

different organizations: the Office of Global Communications

(OGC), the Counterterrorism Information Strategy Policy

Coordination Committee (CTISPCC) and the Strategic Communications

Policy Coordination Committee (SCPCC).

It is suggested that a National Security Council Level

executive be appointed in charge of strategic information policy

for the President. This would improve timeliness among agencies

given that it took the SCPCC almost two years to come up with a

vision statement and a charter. 28 Such a change would also

provide for a unified information operations strategy and help

provide a cohesive structure to this element of national power.

In fact, not until 2003 was there an earnest effort to make

Information Operations a core military competency.29

28 Gough, Susan L. 2003. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence.” MSS. thesis U.S. Army War College.

29 U.S. Department of Defense. 30 October 2003 – Declassified January 2006. Information Operations Roadmap.

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Information operations therefore need to be better funded.

Increased implementation at tactical and operational levels is

warranted along with an increase in trained IO personnel on the

ground. Most significantly, IO policy needs to be formulated at

the highest levels and coordinated throughout the government by a

designated IO cabinet level executive. Such efforts, given the

current state of affairs in Iraq and elsewhere, are overdue. It

is interesting to note that the recently declassified DOD

Information Operations Roadmap (2003) provides five

recommendations for the defense side of the house. Notably, this

document emphasizes the military use of IO in peace and wartime

and recommends the publishing of IO policy, a full spectrum

concept of IO, a definition based upon the full spectrum concept,

delegation of selected execution authority to combatant

commanders and improving the visibility and accountability of IO

resources. Nevertheless, the role of the State Department in

public diplomacy and the International Board of Governors in

broadcasting underscore the need for an overarching policy and

leadership at the national level. There have been many errors

made because of the lack of a cohesive and fully coordinated IO

strategy al all levels. With each department attempting to

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Countering Terrorism: Informational Tactics & Strategy by Dr. Ralph Mora, Terrorism in Today’s World, George Bush School of Government & Public Policy at Texas A&Mmaintain its own part of the IO pie, this lack of cohesion and

coordination is subject to go on unabated. If America and its

coalition partners are to find any “victory” in this struggle,

significant improvements will need to be made in the way that

informational operations are conducted at all levels.

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ENDNOTES

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