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Chequered Moderation: Tracing Hamas’s Moderation Journey

By Marty Kear, PhD Candidate, University of Sydney

In the expanding corpus of the Inclusion-Moderation

thesis, studies analysing the political participation of

Islamist organisations in the Arab world have focused

primarily on the processes of ideational change to explain

how, and to what extent, they may have moderated their

political behaviour. The literature reveals that often

Islamist organisations participate in the political system

through a combination of strategic calculation, political

learning and/or institutional constraint, once the regime has

increased the amount of political space available to them.1

While there is common consensus that moderation is a process

and not a category, and that moderation exists on a continuum2,

there appears to be little attention paid to, nor

understanding of, the decision-making processes explicating

1 For example see Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan andYemen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 3 and CarrieRosefsky Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in theFormation of Egypt’s Wasat Party’, Comparative Politics, 36, no. 2 (January,2004), pp. 205 – 228.2 Jillian Schwedler, ‘Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation and theArab Uprisings’, Middle East Development Journal, 5, no. 1 (2013), p. 1350006-3.

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precisely why these organisations/parties embark on their

moderation journey, nor to explaining the reasons for any

moderation oscillations along this continuum.

There is an assumption in the literature that the

decision to embark upon the moderation journey is one driven

predominantly by opportunity and wholly a matter of

negotiation between the regime and the organisation. This

proposition opens the door to a number of questions,

principally what is/are the organisation’s objective(s) in

participating in the political process? And, how might this

influence the extent of their moderation? Is participation

just about obtaining access to the political system? Or, is

it about gaining unilateral political power? Alternatively,

how do organisations cope in circumstances of fluctuating

levels of available political space?

In addition to these particular questions, there has been

an apparent reticence to consider the Islamic Resistance

Movement (Hamas) as an appropriate moderation case study, with

both Ashour and Tezcur excluding it from their studies, for

its failure to renounce violence and that it is not faced with

a trade-off between the pursuit of organisational goals and

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survival, respectively.3 However, Hamas has participated in

and won, one of the very few genuinely pluralistic and

transparent elections in the Arab world. Indeed, there is

ample evidence to suggest that since the 2005 Cairo Agreement,

Hamas has made concerted efforts to implement more moderate

political and ideological policy positions and continues to

possess a fervent desire to participate in Palestinian

electoral politics. Under the leadership of Khaled Mishal and

Ismail Haniyeh, a number of Hamas’s key ideological tenets

have undergone progressive modernisation in an effort to

propel Hamas along a more moderate political path while

remaining cognisant of the organisation’s ultimate objective –

a sovereign Palestine.

In order to address these lacunas, this paper will seek

to answer the question of why does Hamas participate in the

political process to achieve organisational goals. The

central argument will be that the primary causal impetus for

Hamas’s political moderation, and thus its political

participation, is the desire for and contest over, political

3 See Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements(Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 25 – 26 and Gunes Murat Tezcur, Muslim Reformersin Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Austin: University of Texas Press,2010), p. 210.

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legitimation. To explore this, the paper will first outline

some of the key studies on the Inclusion-Moderation thesis

that have managed to explicate a nuanced understanding of the

thesis. While this will clearly not be an exhaustive list, it

will provide a snapshot of the areas of analytical debates

currently being conducted within this field and the gap that

this paper seeks, in part, to fill. The paper will then

explain the key concepts and operationalization of political

legitimation and its influence on Hamas’s political

moderation. However, it should be noted that while it is

necessary to have some understanding of the origins of

political legitimacy, this analysis will not be a normative

assessment of what legitimacy ought to be. Rather it is an

empirical examination of the processes of legitimation, and

how the function of that legitimation ultimately influences

Hamas.4 Finally, in order to demonstrate the causal nexus

between political legitimation and political moderation, the

paper will trace Hamas’s moderation journey from 2006 until

2014 by analysing the Reconciliation Agreements between Hamas

and Fateh in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014.

4 For an analysis on the subtle differences between ‘legitimacy’ and‘legitimation’, see Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations ofRulers and Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001), pp. 1 – 29.

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Understanding Inclusion-Moderation:

The Inclusion-Moderation thesis is an analytical tool

used to comprehend the processes undertaken by both opposition

organisations/parties and state regimes in response to the

political opportunities arising from the decision by the

regime to increase the available political space. Brown

describes the practice as one where, ‘…over time, given a

political process that offers substantial rewards for

participation and substantial risks for other strategies,

movements on the edge of a system will become politicised and

orientate themselves towards securing their goals through

peaceful and legal political activity.’5 Additionally,

Schwedler writes that the process of inclusion is designed as,

‘…a mechanism for deflating radical opposition voices,

promoting tolerance and pluralism and perhaps even advancing a

democratization process.’6

As mentioned above, moderation is generally considered as

a process and not a category. Schwedler argues that

moderation, ‘…entails a process of change that might be

5 Nathan J. Brown, When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), p. 33.6 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, p. 11.

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described as movement along a continuum from radical to

moderate, whereby a move away from more exclusionary practices

equates to an increase in moderation.’7 Along similar lines,

Wegner and Pellicer define moderation as, ‘…an increasing

flexibility towards core ideological beliefs.’8 With the

occasional exception of an organisation’s policy ‘redlines’,

or articles of faith central to its raison d’être, an

organisation’s various policy positions are rarely immutable

and are affected by contextual and temporal factors.9 As such,

organisations, such as Hamas, cannot be deemed unitary actors.

There is likely to be differing levels of moderation among

factions, there may be differences in moderation between the

leadership and the membership and the organisation’s various

policy positions may fluctuate along the moderate-radical

continuum, espousing more moderate policy responses in some

areas and more radical responses in others.10

7 Jillian Schwedler, ‘Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation ofIslamist Parties’, Development, 50, no. 1 (2007), p. 59.8 Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, ‘Islamist Moderation WithoutDemocratization: The Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice andDevelopment?’, Democratization, 16, no 1 (2009), p. 158.9 Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation’, p. 206.10 Manfred Broker and Mirjam Kunkler, ‘Religious Parties: Revisiting theInclusion-Moderation Hypothesis – Introduction’, Party Politics, 19, no. 2(2013), p. 177.

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Within the process of moderation, there are two

analytical perspectives: Tactical Moderation and Ideological

Moderation. Karakaya and Yildirim define the former as

occurring, ‘…where anti-system parties strategically decide to

embrace electoral democracy to realize their ideological goal…

while renouncing the use of extreme/radical tactics.’, while

they define the latter as being, ‘…marked by a major

transformation of the central tenets of party ideology.

[This] involves embracing pluralist democracy, the free market

and Muslim values. Because parties want to win a greater

share of votes and be more responsive to the electorate to

prevent increasing marginalization, they moderate their

ideologies.’11

Within the corpus of Inclusion-Moderation thesis, there

have been a number of influential studies that have expanded

the empirical boundaries of knowledge. Schwedler’s comparison

of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) and Yemen’s

Congregation for Reform (Islah) posits that despite decidedly

11Suveyda Karakaya and A. Kadir Yildirim, ‘Islamist Moderation inPerspective: Comparative Analysis of the Moderation of Islamist and WesternCommunist Parties’, Democratization, 20, no. 7 (2013), p. 1328. Tezcurrefers to Tactical Moderation as Behavioural Moderation defining it as, ‘…the adaptation of electoral, conciliatory and non-confrontationalstrategies that seek compromise and peaceful settlement of disputes...’See Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey, pp. 10 – 11.

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undemocratic political environments, the respective regimes

had significantly restructured their public political space to

provide limited political openings that facilitated the

increased political engagement of both parties.12 Despite this

re-structuring, the study discovered that over time, the IAF

had become more moderate, while Islah had not.13 Schwedler

concluded that the IAF’s gradual ideological moderation was

chiefly driven by the leadership’s ability to justify its

reformist actions within the terms of the organisation’s

existing ideological and Islamic tenets, while Islah had not.

This ability was assisted by the fact that the IAF operates in

a monarchical system, while Islah operates within a presidential

system. The IAF has able to partake in a broader range of

pluralist styled actions, particularly forming alliances,

which do not directly challenge the monarchy’s political

hegemony.14 Islah, however, has to be far more circumspect with

their political activities and who they potentially formed

alliances with, lest this is seen to amount to too much of a

12 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, p. 3.13 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, p. 192.14 Clarke challenges this assertion concluding in her study that the IAFonly cooperated with other parties on matters that had no bearing on shari’a.See Janine A. Clark, ‘The Conditions of Islamist Cooperation: UnpackingCross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan’, International Journal of Middle East Studies,38, no. 4 (2006), pp. 555 – 556.

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direct threat to the continued electoral viability of the

regime.15

In analysing the reasons behind the moderation of Egypt’s

Centre Party (Wasat), Wickham concluded that Wasat’s

ideological moderation was driven by a combination of

political learning and strategic calculation on the part of

its leadership.16 Like Schwedler, Wickham concluded that

Wasat’s ideological moderation was assisted through the

formation of alliances with other political parties and the

willingness and ability of the party to take advantage of the

limited institutional openings and incentives provided by

Egypt’s regime.17 Importantly, Wickham noted that electoral

participation alone did not necessarily translate into the

ideological moderation of the organisation. For Wickham, the

primary driver of ideological moderation is facilitated by the

political learning undertaken by the organisation’s leadership

that lead to a transformation in their core values and

beliefs. This political learning was facilitated by the

opening up of political space by the regime, thereby allowing

the organisation to, ‘…break out of the insular networks of15 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, pp. 194 – 195.16 See Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation’, pp. 205 – 228.17 Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation’, p. 207.

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movement politics and engage in sustained dialogue and

cooperation with other groups.’18

Tezcur, in his assessment of the Inclusion-Moderation

thesis, compared Turkey’s Peace and Justice Party (JDP) with

Iran’s Reform Front (RF).19 His study focuses more on the

motives behind the respective party’s behavioural moderation.

It also sought to provide a level of understanding concerning

the sustainable democratic consolidation of both Turkey and

Iran by highlighting the relationship between political and

social actors.20 Tezcur challenges the notion that the act of

inclusion itself provides the genesis of an organisation’s

ideological moderation. He contends that an organisation’s

leadership would already have to possess a moderate worldview,

and have been able to justify ideologically its decision to

enter the political system before actually committing itself

actively to political participation.21

Tezcur challenges the assumption that political inclusion

necessarily leads to an increase in the democratic credentials

of Islamist organisations and the ultimate democratisation of

18 Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation’, p. 225.19 See Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey.20 Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey, p. 21.21 Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey, pp. 14 – 15.

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the political system itself. Tezcur theorises that there

exists a ‘Paradox of Moderation’, whereby the behavioural

moderation of Islamist organisations/parties can actually

undermine the democratic credentials of both the organisation

and the political system. Once ensconced in the political

system, Islamist parties maybe unwilling to risk their newly

won political position along with any of the associated

benefits bequeathed by the regime. As such, Islamist parties

can be reluctant to actively pursuing further democratising

actions that might directly challenge the regime’s political

hegemony. These parties effectively become co-opted by the

system, and unless their position is challenged directly by

the regime, avoid adopting political positions that could

result in state repression.22 In this way, organisational

stability and progressive and attainable electoral goals

assumed primacy over the adoption and promotion of democratic

norms.23

Michaelle Browers in her study of intellectual moderates

primarily from within Arab nationalist and Islamist

ideological movements uses the Kifaya (Enough) Movement in Egypt

22 Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey, p. 20.23 Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey, p. 212.

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and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) in Yemen as examples. Her

study branches out by considering non-Islamist organisations,

based on an agent driven analysis, rather than the

structuralist approaches of the previous studies. She

maintains that the locus of ideological transformation lies

with the networks of individuals inside and outside of the

party, not necessarily the party itself.24 For Browers, the

genesis of moderation comes not from an ability to take

advantage of increasing political space, but as a result of

the intellectual debates of the wasatiyya, or moderate trend,

present within the various politically articulate

organisations of whatever ideological ilk, present throughout

the Arab world.25

Browers contends that even though these intellectuals

hold disparate ideological positions, they are able to find

common intellectual ground based on shared experiences and

positions thereby developing a coherent ideological

justification necessary for moderation.26 Essentially, the

24 See Michaelle Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation andTransformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).25 Browers defines wasatiyya as, ‘An intellectual trend characterised orclaiming characterisation as centrist or moderate, or said to occupy themiddle between extremist alternatives.’ See Browers, Political Ideology in theArab World, p. ix.26 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World, p. 10.

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process of moderation can only begin when moderate

intellectuals can associate freely promoting alternative

social and political frameworks.27 However, Browers’s study

does acknowledge that while the wasatiyya discourse discusses

some issues predominantly relating to the operationalization

of democracy, debates concerning social issues such as gender

rights and Islamic theology are almost completely neglected.28

The above perspectives articulate and explore the

circumstances surrounding the extent to which Islamist

organisations, such as Hamas, are able to moderate and the

causal mechanisms associated with this process. Despite this,

they do not explain why Islamist organisations like Hamas

began their moderation journey or why they can oscillate along

the moderate-radical continuum. Nor do they consider the

potential role that majority public opinion can have on their

tactical and ideological moderation. To explore this further,

particularly in the case of Hamas, this paper will consider

the part played by an organisation’s desire for and contest

over political legitimation.

Political Legitimation and Hamas:27 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World, p. 179.28 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World, p. 11.

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In the case of Hamas’s moderation journey, this paper

argues that it is the desire for and contest over political

legitimation that is the primary driver for the organisation’s

progressive moderation. However, this journey cannot be

divorced from the broader Palestinian/Israeli conflict and

Hamas’s concomitant struggle with Fateh for hegemony of

Palestinian resistance efforts and its struggle with Israel

for Palestinian self-determination. Hamas is an offshoot of

the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, launched at

the beginning of the First Intifada in December 1987 as a

reaction to the apparent societal malaise, burning resentment

and sense of injustice stemming from the effects of Israeli

occupation.29 Hamas is described as, ‘…an Islamic movement, a

nationalist movement, a militant movement, a political

movement – in addition to its cultural and social dimensions,

its service functions and its institutional building.’30 The

evolution of Hamas began a process in Palestinian politics of

conflating militant resistance with social change. Just as

importantly, this militancy extended to challenging the

29 For a description of the birth of Hamas see Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: UnwrittenChapters (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2nd Ed., 2009), pp. 10 –34.30 Mouin Rabbani, ‘The Making of a Palestinian Islamist Leader: An InterviewWith Khaled Mishal Part I’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 37, no. 3 (2008), p. 69.

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ideological and political hegemony of the Fateh led Palestine

Liberation Organisation (PLO) over the nature and direction of

Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation.31

Hamas’s use of violence to combat Israeli occupation was

designed to place it in the vanguard of Palestinian resistance

efforts because as Hroub states, ‘The legitimate leader (or

organisation) is the one who holds the banner of resistance

and revolution, advancing and bringing the goals of liberation

closer. Thus, the identifier of legitimacy is the measure of

its resistance against the occupier.’32 However, the signing

of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the subsequent establishment

of the Palestinian Authority (PA), lead to Presidential and

parliamentary elections that saw the addition of a political

dimension to resistance efforts.33 As such, ‘…Palestinian

legitimacy…moved to integrate electoral legitimacy with the

legitimacy of resistance.’34 THIS IS THE LINK TO THE

31 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence(New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd Ed., 2006), pp. 36-37.32 Khaled Hroub, ‘Hamas: Conflating National Liberation and Socio-PoliticalChange’, in Khaled Hroub, ed., Political Islam: Context versus Ideology (London: TheLondon Middle East Institute, 2010), p. 175. 33 See ‘Oslo I Accords: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-GovernmentArrangements’, al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/arab-israeli-negotiations-and-treaties/109467-oslo-i-accords-declaration-of-principles-on-interim-self-government-arrangements-1993.html#.T9bXi7VaeP8, accessed 12/6/2012.34 Hroub, ‘Hamas’, p. 176.

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MODERATION LITERATURE INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL MODERATION FORM

PART OF THE EFFORTS TO SEEK SUPPORT IN THE COMPETITION FOR

LEADERSHIP OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION EFFORTS. It took

until March 2005 for Hamas to embark upon its moderation

journey when it and the other thirteen Palestinian factions,

including Fateh, signed the Cairo Agreement whereby the

signatories agreed to support the democratic process by

holding local and legislative council elections.35 This

Agreement complemented the International Quartet’s 2003 Middle

East Road Map that called upon the Palestinian factions to

undertake comprehensive political reform through holding free,

fair and open elections.36 In return for these moderating

actions, was the commitment by the Quartet to realise a

sovereign Palestine.37

35 See ‘17/3/2005 Cairo Agreement Between the 13 Palestinian Factions(2005)’, al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/palestinian-documents/109085-cairo-agreement-between-the-13-palestinian-factions-2005.html?print#.T9Ql3bVaeP8, accessed 10/6/2012.36 See ‘Middle East Road Map & Israeli Reservations, 30/4/2003’, al-ZaytounaCentre for Studies & Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/arab-israeli-negotiations-and-treaties/151254-30-4-2003-middle-east-roadmap-2003-israeli-reservations.html#.T9bePrVaeP8, accessed 12/6/2012. 37 Nathalie Tocci, ‘The Middle East Quartet and (In)EffectiveMultilateralism’, Middle East Journal, 67, no. 1 (Winter, 2013), pp. 30 – 31.

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Therefore, the notions of resistance, legitimacy and

statehood are tightly interwoven and they form what can be

viewed as the Palestinian social compact:

1. Re-establishing and maintaining Palestinian national

identity;

2. Ending Israeli occupation of Palestinian land; and

3. Establishing a sovereign Palestinian state.

While never overtly articulated, these objectives

permeate through Hamas’s premier political documents, from the

1988 Charter, to the 2006 election manifesto and the

subsequent Palestinian unity Declarations that are the subject

of this analysis.38 As such, Hamas clearly recognises the

poignancy of these three objectives, so much so that its

legitimacy is inextricably linked to achieving, or at least

striving for, these objectives. Simultaneously the

38 See ‘The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 1988’, al-ZaytounaCentre for Studies & Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/palestinian-documents/97062-the-covenant-of-the-islamic-resistance-movement-hamas-covenant-1988.html#.T9gsHbVadm8, accessed 12/6/2012, ‘Appendix VI – ElectionManifesto for the Elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council 2006’,Azzam Tamimi, Hamas, pp. 292 – 316, ‘17/3/2005 Cairo Agreement’, accessed10/6/2012 and ‘2007 Mecca Agreement & Program for the Palestinian UnityGovernment’, al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/palestinian-documents/109086-mecca-agreement-amp-program-of-the-palestinian-unity-government-2007.html?print#.T9QjGLVaeP8, accessed 10/6/2012 respectively.

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Palestinian polity have to believe that Hamas is willing to

take whatever actions necessary to meet the objectives

outlined in the Compact.

Given the importance that legitimacy plays in Hamas’s

moderation journey, it is necessary to have an understanding

of its various conceptualisations. At a foundational level,

these conceptualisations can be bifurcated into those

associating legitimacy with power and those with belief.

Legitimacy and Power:

Analysing the association of legitimacy and power,

Rousseau argued against the notion that legitimacy is a

product of natural authority, as might be advanced by

monarchies, the wealthy, because of conquest or as a product

of the tacit consent of the people.39 He maintained that at

some point, regimes have to realise that blunt coercion can

never ensure perpetual obedience and that any regime that

bases its legitimacy upon fear masquerading as compliance is

illegitimate.40 For Rousseau, an individual’s submission to

the authority of the regime must originate from their39 J. G. Merquior, Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1980), p. 20.40 Michael Hechter, ‘Legitimacy in the Modern World’, American BehavioralScientist, 53, no. 3 (November, 2009), p. 280.

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voluntary entrance into a covenant with that regime based on

common interest. This social covenant between the ruler and

the ruled is a bond based on freedom and equality emanating

from the peoples’ common interest in attaining justice through

egalitarian law making.41 The legitimacy of the regime comes

from its just, moral and legal use of power, the parameters of

which are outlined by the Social Covenant or Compact,

resulting in a symbiotic relationship between the ruler and

ruled.

Stinchcombe approaches the association from a different

direction, believing a regime is considered legitimate because

it is deemed as such by the centres of power within the state,

such as the various state institutions. Therefore, regimes

are able to resist circumstances of general civilian

unpopularity and still be considered legitimate, because they

are able to call upon these various strategic centres of power

that act as legitimacy stockpiles.42 Viewed in this particular

context, regimes rise or fall because of their (in)ability to

convince the various centres of power to make the regime’s

intrinsic power effective, meaning that the citizenry become41 Merquior, Rousseau and Weber, p. 20 and p. 29. 42 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (San Francisco: Harcourt,Brace & World, Inc., 1968), p. 162.

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merely reactive passengers. This is not to say that

Stinchcombe is completely dismissive of the role played by a

polity in the process of regime legitimation. However, he

notes that, ‘…power based only on the shifting sands of public

opinion and willing obedience is inherently unstable.’43

Similarly, Tilly argues that legitimacy emanates from the

likelihood that authorities will act to confirm the decisions

of another authority. This confirmation appears more certain

the greater the ability of the challenged authority to

demonstrate its monopoly on the use of force within its

territory.44 Importantly, Tilly makes the point that the

ability of states to accrue confirmation of their use of

violence from a number of other authorities, both inside and

outside of the state, is the clear distinction to their use of

violence being viewed as legitimate. Conversely, illegitimacy

comes from an organisation or state’s inability to garner such

support from these other authorities.45

Legitimacy and Belief:

43 Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, p. 161.44 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in PeterB. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State BackIn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 171 – 172.45 Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, p. 173.

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On the other side of the conceptual divide lies Max Weber

who reasoned that an entity possesses political legitimacy if

it is deemed valid by the collective belief of the people

whether that belief is based on rational, traditional or

charismatic grounds.46 For Weber the people’s belief in these

forms of domination inevitably gives them prestige. Weber

argued that the social relationship between the ruler and the

ruled can only be deemed valid, that is legitimate, when the

ruled voluntarily submit to the ruler. This submission

revolves around an acceptance or belief in the political

authority of that specific entity.47 However, Weber

acknowledges a state’s legitimacy cannot be based on just one

of these systems alone to the exclusion of the other two.

This is because such a state could never successfully generate

the requisite amount of belief from its citizenry. All three

types of domination must be present in varying degrees to

influence the people’s beliefs to such an extent that they

acquiesce to the state’s monopoly on the execution of

political power within its territory.48 46 Max Weber, ‘The Types of Legitimate Domination’, in Guenther Roth andClaus Wittich, eds., Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Society, translatedby Ephraim Fischoff (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p.215.47 Merquior, Rousseau and Weber, pp. 90 – 93.48 Weber, ‘The Types of Legitimate Domination’, pp. 262 – 263.

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By focusing on the issue of belief, it is possible to

identify legitimacy claimants and to assess the source(s) of

that claim in order to judge its validity.49 Therefore,

political legitimation becomes emblematic of the belief

amongst a polity that a political order, authority or person

has the right to govern and to exercise political power in

that territory. Conversely, there also exists the parallel

belief by that political order, authority or person in his or

her own legitimate right to exercise that power.50

External Legitimation:

These types of discussions really only consider the

process of legitimation at the internal or domestic level.

However, political legitimation also has an external, or

international, facet that plays a crucial role in the

structuring Hamas’s tactical and ideological moderation. In

this arena, state and non-state actors seek legitimation as

rightful members of the international community from various

external centres of power, namely other states and

49 Merquior, Rousseau and Weber, pp. 6 – 7.50 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1990), p. 59.

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international institutions.51 There is an appeal by these

prospective members to these bodies for recognition and

legitimation and they make their assessment based on issues of

legality, morality and constitutionality.52 However, the

process of recognition is problematic because these

international bodies rarely if ever act altruistically and the

decision over the conference of legitimacy is most always a

subjective one, meaning that the process of recognition, and

the subsequent path to international legitimation, is not

simply one of meeting the appropriate criteria.53

Ordinarily, the process of international legitimation

should not pose the state any real concern, as its sovereignty

is uncontested and its internal legitimacy secure. However,

in deeply divided societies, such as Israel/Palestine, where

the internal legitimacy of Hamas is being challenged by both

its domestic rival Fateh over hegemony of Palestinian

resistance and by Israel over its self-determination efforts,

the accrual of international legitimacy from external centres51 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2005), p. 25. 52 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, pp. 26 – 29.53 The most widely accepted formula for assessing a state’s status is setdown by the Montevideo Convention (1933). See ‘Article 1 - Convention onRights and Duties of States (inter-American), 26 December, 1933’, AvalonProject, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp, accessed 16/1/2013.

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of power assumes heightened significance.54 This is because

the attainment of a dominant level of political legitimacy

within a given territory becomes the apex of achievement for

national groups in their transformational quest for statehood.

These groups have strong visceral attachments to their

territory and they alter its character to reflect their own

distinctive national identity. This allows the polity to

acquire locations that are politically, socially, culturally

and economically significant to them.55 Consequently,

achieving both internal and external political legitimation

means one national group gaining the ability to dominate the

right to exercise political power over that territory, while

concomitantly denying that ability to their opponent. A

crucial part of this process is having that ability recognised

by international community. If Hamas is able to achieve

complete political legitimation in Palestine then it means

that the similar aspirations of Fateh have been quashed and

vice versa. The winner will never condone any attempt by its

54 Guelke characterises deeply divided societies, ‘…as polities in whichthere is a contest for legitimacy between mutually incompatible politicalprojects…’, see Adrian Guelke, Politics in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: PolityPress, 2012), p. 156.55 Frank Dietrich, ‘Changing Borders by Secession: Normative Assessment ofTerritorial Claims’, in Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan, eds., TheAshgate Research Companion to Secession (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited,2011), pp. 87 – 88.

25

rival to maintain the ability to establish an alternative

source of power capable of promulgating contradictory sets of

laws.56

As such, the competition for external political

legitimation between Fateh and Hamas transforms into a zero-

sum race of duelling political narratives. This zero-sum

competition means that both sides will attempt to prevent

their rival from amassing legitimation from any source. This

need to garner support from external sources of power means

that the entire process of legitimation in deeply divided

societies like Palestine takes place in more than one external

arena. Consequently, legitimation assumes a multi-dimensional

character, in that for Hamas the contest exists not just in

the domestic arena, but also simultaneously in the national,

regional and international arenas. This is because the two

adversaries cannot rely solely on the ‘…shifting sands of

public opinion…’57, and must gather support for their

monopolisation of political power from these external

authorities. In effect, these arenas assume the role of

Stinchcombe’s ‘centres of power’, in that they reservoirs of56 Allen Buchanan, ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’, Ethics, 112, no. 4(2002), p. 690.57 Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, p. 161.

26

legitimacy, which the two protagonists call upon to assist

them in their struggle for political legitimation and de-

legitimation.

As such, both Hamas and Fateh become simultaneous

cultivators and subverters of political legitimacy

articulating their case simultaneously across the four arenas.

However, there is an inherent bias within the international

system whereby states recognise some prospective non-state

actors as legitimate, while denying this same level of

legitimacy to other non-state actors, particularly if they are

Islamist.58 The international system has even developed into

series of hierarchal structures of dominant and subordinate

states where notions of universality and equality are paid lip

service and where rightful membership is not necessarily

judged simply on being identified as a state, but the type of

state that is being considered for membership. Those states

possessing greater amounts of international legitimacy set

themselves up as exemplars for emulation and there are

numerous inducements held out to both supposedly recalcitrant

58 Christopher Clapham, ‘The Challenge of the State in a Globalized World’,in Jennifer Milliken, ed., State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003), p. 27.

27

states and to prospective members to conform to those ideals.59

Therefore, the race for increased legitimacy between Fateh and

Hamas becomes one for the accumulation of international

benefactors who can be convinced to recognise the primacy of

their cause and the nature of their character. The

benefactor’s recognition validates the narrative of their

suitor and in doing so increases their ability not only to

influence other states to support their cause, but equally in

the concomitant strategy of denying this support and

validation of their opponent.60

As well as being assiduous cultivators of political

legitimacy, Fateh and Hamas are simultaneously attempting to

subvert the political legitimacy of each other and it is here

that Fateh has a distinct advantage. It has already been

recognised as legitimate by the international community as the

‘acceptable’ face of Palestinian politics. On the other hand,

the legitimacy of Hamas is inextricably linked to the

conflation of Islamist and terrorism. While there is

significant evidence in support of this, by automatically

59 David A. Lake, ‘Relational Authority and Legitimacy in InternationalRelations’, American Behavioral Scientist, 53, no. 3 (2009), p. 332 and pp. 338 –343.60 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1991), pp.122 – 123.

28

conflating these two paradigms intentionally eclipses all

other activities undertaken by Hamas. This terrorist

classification not only de-legitimises the organisation, but

crucially its counter narrative, because nothing a terrorist

expresses has any validity. Consequently, the rival’s

narrative becomes subservient to it having to justify

continually an existence that has already been pre-determined

as evil and immoral.61 While Fateh is not directly responsible

for this classification, it most certainly benefits from it

politically.

Hamas’s Leap of Faith:

In order to demonstrate the influence the desire for and

contest over political legitimation has on the extent of

behavioural and ideological moderation of Hamas, this section

will trace the involvement of Hamas in the political process

from the 2006 elections to 2014, focussing primarily upon

events surrounding the unity government announcements with

Fateh in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014. The causal nexus between

Hamas’s tactical and strategic moderation and its desire for

and contest over political legitimation can be demonstrated61 Anders Strindberg and Mats Warn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization and Resistance(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 32.

29

through analysing the numerous opinion polls conducted in the

lead up and aftermath of these Agreements. These provide

crucial indicators for Hamas’s moderation efforts because as

Brown notes, ‘Hamas leaders [are] strongly orientated toward

Palestinian public opinion, often allowing it to guide

tactical decision making, especially on questions related to

means of resistance and methods of political participation.’62

The 2006 Election and its Aftermath:

Hamas’s moderation journey begins with its stunning

election victory in the January 2006 PLC elections. Hamas had

presented itself as a stable alternative to the corruption,

nepotism and bureaucratic malfeasance of Fateh. Most

importantly, Hamas saw its political participation as a

national duty, reinforcing its narrative and claims of

legitimacy amongst Palestinians.63 By participating in the

electoral process and gaining access to parliamentary

institutions, Hamas had hoped to alter the face of the PA by

ridding it of Fateh’s hegemony, thereby transforming the

62 Brown, When Victory is Not an Option, p. 197. 63 Mouin Rabbani, ‘A Hamas Perspective on the Movement’s Evolving Role: AnInterview with Khaled Mishal, Part II’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 37, no. 4(2008), p. 69.

30

institution into the primary advocate for the resolution of

the Palestinian Question.64

Hamas’s electoral victory was attributed to four key

points: first, the organisation’s unceasing commitment to

attaining a sovereign Palestine. Secondly, Hamas’s efficient

and conscientious provision of social services compared to the

rampant corruption associated with those delivered by the PA.

Thirdly, the organisation’s Islamic ideology reflected not

just a growing piety amongst Palestinians, but also a broader

repudiation of nationalist efforts at self-determination.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, was the persistent

failure of Fateh’s Peace Process negotiation strategy.65

Hamas’s electoral success vindicated the progressive

behavioural and ideological moderation instigated by Mishal

and Haniyeh. The first two of these reasons provides an

indication of the policy priorities for ordinary Palestinians.

They wanted a government free of corruption, nepotism and

bureaucratic malfeasance, and one that would do a better job

of realising a sovereign Palestine. Fateh’s persistent

64 Rabbani, ‘A Hamas Perspective on the Movement’s Evolving Role’, p. 67.65 Graham Usher, ‘The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah and thePalestinian Elections’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 35, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p.21.

31

failures in these areas ultimately cost them the election and

hegemony over the course of Palestinian self-determination.66

In a poll conducted in March 2006, 35.6% of respondents

believed that Hamas had won the election because of it was

perceived as a clean authority that fights corruption.

Similarly, 51.9% believed that Fateh had lost the election as

punishment by voters for the spread of corruption in the PA.67

In the period after the election, the various political

machinations undertaken by Hamas set the tone for its ongoing

competition with Fateh over legitimation and reveal the

underlying causes for Hamas’s episodic progression and

regression along the moderation continuum. In the electoral

aftermath, Hamas was keenly aware of the magnitude of the

domestic and international political situation it was

confronted with, and in the following weeks and months made

various attempts to allay domestic and international fears

concerning the strategic direction of a future Hamas

government by emphasising its political pragmatism and

moderate stance. What Hamas desired was sufficient political

66 Tamimi, Hamas, pp. 219 – 221.67 See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No.19, 16 – 18 March, 2006, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/index.html, accessed 5/8/2014.

32

space within which to design and implement an acceptable

strategy to deal with the uncertain situation.68 On 28 January

2006, Mishal reiterated Hamas’s extension of its unilateral

truce with Israel, its continued commitment to achieving a

unity government containing the elected members of all

Palestinian factions and the organisation’s intention to

respect the commitments negotiated previously by Fateh/PLO.69

Despite this, the International Quartet, supported by

Israel and Fateh, imposed three stringent stipulations before

they would accept Hamas as the legitimate governing body of

the PLC. First, Hamas had to recognise Israel, second it had

to renounce unilaterally the use of violence and third it had

to accept all previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements.70

According to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, these

diplomatic stipulations were crafted in the likelihood that

Hamas would reject them, because none of the other key actors68 In this Hamas was largely unsuccessful. It generally failed to achieveany degree of organisational consensus on the most appropriate course ofaction of how to deal with the pressures coming from Fateh, Israel and theinternational community. For a brief description of these problems see‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink’, MiddleEast Report No. 54, 13 June, 2006, International Crisis Group,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/054-palestinians-israel-and-the-quartet-pulling-back-from-the-brink.aspx, accessed 4/6/2012, pp. 3 – 9. 69 Tamimi, Hamas, pp. 224 – 225.70 Tamimi, Hamas, p. 225. While Hamas had agreed to ‘respect’ theseprevious Agreements, Israel, the Quartet members and Fateh demanded thatthey ‘accept’ them in totality.

33

in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, Fateh, Israel and the

International Quartet, were willing to accept the legitimation

of Hamas that the election provided.71 When Hamas refused to

accepted them, the Quartet and Israel imposed a range of

economic and political sanctions designed to constrict Hamas’s

political legitimation by cutting off all economic aid

designated for the PA, thereby endeavouring to expurgate it

from Palestinian politics by engineering Hamas’s internal

demise.72

This dilemma forced Hamas to secure whatever funding was

available from any source, which ultimately led to a more

extensive relationship with Iran. In the immediate aftermath

of the 2006 election, Iran had purportedly offered the PA

US$250 million in assistance should the US and Israel withdraw

their aid money.73 Hamas had had prior contact with Iran

through its association with Hezbollah, though this was

predominantly restricted to military matters.74 However, in

71 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (London:Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2011), pp. 419 – 420.72 Tamimi, Hamas, p. 226.73 Aaron Dina, ‘Fatah and Hamas: the New Palestinian Factional Reality’, 3March, 2006, RS22395, Congressional Research Service,http://fpc.state.gov/c17248.htm, accessed 12/1/2013, p. 3.74 Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic ResistanceMovement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 132-33.

34

the precarious post-election financial environment, Hamas was

pressured into a more economically dependent relationship.

That Hamas was willing and able to withstand the

political and economic storms can be attributed in part to the

continuing support for its policy position amongst

Palestinians. In a Poll taken in March 2006, support for

Change and Reform (CR), Hamas’s political party, had

solidified, increasing from 46.2% to 47%, while support for

Fateh had dropped from 44.4% at election to 38.9%. On the

crucial issue of the legitimation of any Hamas government

being contingent on recognising Israel, nearly 60% of

respondents believed that Hamas should not cave into

international demands. Additionally, 78% of respondents

believed that even if the international community did cut off

financial aid to the PA that Hamas would be able to function

through donations from Arab and Muslim countries.75

Despite clear support for Hamas’s policy stance in a

number of areas, the Poll sounded a warning for Hamas

concerning its fraught relationship with Israel. Almost 82%

of respondents believed that Palestinians and Israelis should

75 PCPSR Poll No. 19, 16 – 18 March, 2006, accessed 5/8/2014.

35

negotiate their differences rather to resolve them

unilaterally. Just over 75% of respondents believed that if

Israel agreed to negotiate over the Two-State solution with a

Hamas-led government then the government should participate.

Additionally 53% expected Hamas, as the governing authority,

to implement the Road Map Plan, while over 72% supported the

PA negotiating with Israel over any plans for future Israeli

disengagements or withdrawals from the West Bank.76 These

results indicate a politically moderate streak amongst the

Palestinian public that while they support Hamas’s current

stance as a response to international constrictions, this is

not a licence to adopt obdurate attitudes more generally.

These results also indicate that the extent and direction of

Hamas’s tactical and ideological moderation is governed by

public opinion. In effect, the Palestinian public provide the

boundaries within which Hamas’s moderation efforts take place.

The troubled relationship between Hamas and Fateh became

characterised by episodic centrifugal forces propelling the

two organisations apart, accompanied by episodic centripetal

forces exhorting them to reconcile. The 2006 election result,

76 PCPSR Poll No. 19, 16 – 18 March, 2006, accessed 5/8/2014.

36

and the legitimacy this bestowed upon Hamas, meant that

Palestinian society had itself become further divided. The

competition between Hamas and Fateh became a power struggle

for the legitimacy over Palestinian resistance and had little

to do with achieving national unity.77 For Hamas the struggle

was about maintaining and/or enhancing the legitimation it had

gained through the 2006 election, and its desire to remain an

integral part of Palestinian politics in order to influence

the course of Palestinian resistance.

The 2007 Mecca Agreement:

The genesis of the first centripetal event began with the

imposition of the three conditions and Hamas’s refusal to

yield, confident that they retained the majority support of

the Palestinian people. However, throughout 2006 support for

CR dissipated. In a December 2006 poll, dissatisfaction with

the Hamas government had risen to 62.3%, while support for CR

had dropped to 35.8%, while support for Fateh had climbed to

42.4%.78 There was further bad news for Hamas, with 57.7% of77 ‘Palestine Divided’, Middle East Briefing No. 25, 17 December, 2008,International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/B025-palestine-divided.aspx, accessed13/5/2012, p. 1.78 Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 22, 14 –16 December, 2006, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html, accessed 8/8/2014.

37

respondents indicating that if an independent Palestinian

state were established that it should recognise Israel. This

was a remarkable turnaround in support given that just nine

months ago, nearly 60% of Palestinians believed that Hamas

should not cave into international demands to recognise

Israel. To add to this general perception of

apprehensiveness, over 90% of Palestinians surveyed believed

that the conditions for Palestinians in the Territories were

‘Bad’ or ‘Very Bad’.79 The campaign of de-legitimation and

isolation instigated by the Quartet, Israel and Fateh stripped

Hamas of the strategic initiative to control and influence the

current political and diplomatic situation. Hamas’s

leadership remained cognisant that for their strategic goals

to be realised, the organisation needed to be an integral, and

not a peripheral, element of Palestinian politics. Only by

retaining Palestinian public support could Hamas hope to

institute the reforms necessary to strip progressively away

Fateh’s hegemony of the PA and the PLO.80

Throughout 2006, the two parties adopted increasingly

obdurate attitudes and their relationship disintegrated to79 PCPSR Research Poll No. 22, 14 – 16 December, 2006, accessed 8/8/2014.80 Paola Caridi, Hamas: From Resistance to Government, translated by Andrea Teti(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2011), p. 240.

38

such an extent that by the end of the year, civil war seemed

increasingly likely.81 It was at this point that Saudi Arabia

made one of its rare direct interventions in the conflict and

a meeting between the respective leaderships was convened in

Mecca in early February, 2007. On 8 February 2007, it was

announced that the two parties had reached an agreement to

form a unity government.82 For many observers the signing of

the Mecca Agreement was a clear victory for Hamas because it

sounded the death knell for Fateh’s hegemony over Palestinian

politics with a commitment to ‘…the principle of political

partnership…’ and as ‘…the basis of political pluralism…’.83

As well as announcing the formation of a unity government, the

Agreement stressed the importance of national unity and

committed the parties to reforming the PLO, something that

Hamas greatly desired, as the PLO remained the internationally

81 ‘After Mecca: Engaging Hamas’, Middle East Report No. 62, 26 February,2007, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/062-after-mecca-engaging-hamas.aspx,accessed 13/5/2012, p. 18 and Tamimi, Hamas, p. 256. Despite numerousanalyses of this period using the phrase ‘civil war’, Caridi makes thepoint that the increasing enmity really only existed between the respectivearmed wings and did not necessarily include civilians. See Caridi, Hamas,p. 245. 82 See ‘Mecca Agreement and Program for the Palestinian Unity Government2007’, al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/palestinian-documents/109086-mecca-agreement-amp-program-of-the-palestinian-unity-government-2007.html?print#.T9QjGLVaeP8, accessed 10/6/2012.83 ‘Mecca Agreement and Program for the Palestinian Unity Government 2007’,accessed 10/6/2012, p. 1.

39

legitimate Palestinian representative organisation.84 With

Hamas’s electoral legitimation confirmed, Fateh could no

longer ignore or impugn its Islamist rival; it would now have

to deal with a situation where Hamas had to be treated as a

political equal and not as a political vassal.

However, perhaps the Agreement’s most controversial

aspect was that Hamas agreed to, ‘…respect the Arab and

international legitimacy resolutions and agreements signed by

the PLO.’85 Without expressly stating as much, Hamas had

astonishingly agreed to ‘respect’ United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242 and 338 and the once reviled

Oslo Accords, meaning that for the first time Hamas had

tacitly accepted that any future Palestinian state would only

consist of the West Bank and Gaza.86 The concession

demonstrates a clear willingness and ability of the Hamas

leadership to ideologically compromise in order to remain an

integral player in Palestinian politics and more importantly,

to clearly display to the Palestinian public that the

84 ‘Mecca Agreement and Program for the Palestinian Unity Government 2007’,accessed 10/6/2012, p. 1.85 ‘Mecca Agreement and Program for the Palestinian Unity Government 2007’,accessed 10/6/2012, p. 2.86 See ‘Oslo I Accords: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-GovernmentArrangements’, accessed 12/6/2012.

40

organisation was committed to pursuing the objectives outlined

by the Compact . Crucially, the compromise showed an apparent

ideological adroitness and level of political pragmatism by

Hamas, because while only addressing the Palestinian side of

the issue, through accepting the Two-State solution, the

leadership had artfully sidestepped the ideological black hole

of the formal recognition of Israel.

The signing of the Mecca Agreement is a clear

demonstration of Hamas’s efforts at tactical and ideological

moderation. As with the Mecca Agreement in 2005, there is

this commitment to achieving a pluralistic Palestinian

political system, to ensuring national unity, to preventing

the destabilising fratricidal conflict with Fateh and most

importantly, that achieving the Palestinian national interest

comes from negotiated political settlement.87 That Hamas

adopted these positions is also recognition of the influence

of Palestinian public opinion and what policy positions they

expected their political representatives to adopt. The

signing of the Agreement was greeted with relief amongst the

87 ‘After Gaza’, Middle East Report No. 68, 2 August, 2007, International CrisisGroup,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/068-after-gaza.aspx, accessed 13/5/2012, p. 4.

41

majority of Palestinians. In a poll taken in March 2007, over

87% were satisfied with the establishment of the new

government, with nearly 62% believing that both sides had been

asked to make concessions in order to reach the accord. The

overwhelming majority of respondents believed that key

domestic issues such as law and order, the debilitating

economic conditions, the fight against corruption and general

safety and security would all improve significantly now that

peace between the two parties had been established. This

positivity was duplicated for international concerns with a

similar convincing majority believing that the extent of the

international political boycott and international sanctions

would both decrease. There was also an increased expectation

that the new deal would precipitate a return to the

negotiating table with the Israelis.88

Notwithstanding this, the Agreement was still a marriage

of convenience and tended to paper over the serious fissures

that remained in Palestinian politics. Hamas’s leadership

fervently believed that they had fairly won the right to form

a majority government, and were genuinely willing to accept88 See Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 23,22 – 24 March, 2007, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html , accessed 12/8/2014.

42

Fateh’s participation. What they were not willing to accept

was Fateh’s continuing efforts to de-legitimate and undermine

their efforts to form government and undertake the reformation

measures that Hamas had promised the Palestinian polity.

This feeling of entitlement, which exists equally amongst

the leadership of both Hamas and Fateh, underpins the

circumstances surrounding the first of the centrifugal

episodes as the power struggle for legitimate control over

Palestinian resistance efforts intensified. In June 2007,

barely three months after signing the Agreement, rumour and

counter-rumour concerning a Fateh instigated coup aimed at

removing Hamas from Gaza swirled around the Territory. For

Hamas there was also increasing evidence that Fateh’s security

forces were being openly reinforced and funded by the United

States (US) and European Union (EU) with an accompanying

suspicion that the objective was such a military takeover.

Faced with the prospect of a dominant Hamas, legitimised by

the convincing 2006 electoral result, and Fateh on the brink

of collapse and potential irrelevancy, additional financial

support had come flooding in to Fateh from both international

43

bodies, with the specific goal of bolstering Fateh’s ailing

security apparatus.89

As military tensions increased rapidly, the political

wings of both parties desperately attempted to broker a truce

that would allow them time to re-establish a measure of

control over the situation and de-escalate the explosive

tensions. However, these were to no avail with at least seven

truces lasting little more than hours or a day before being

broken. Finally, on 9 June 2007, the fuse was lit and the two

armed wings engaged in an unrestricted fratricidal conflict

that lasted for five days. The result of this conflagration

was the polarisation of the Palestinian political system with

Hamas controlling Gaza, Fateh the West Bank, and the

consequent demolition of Palestinian political and social

unity.90

Coming Close in 2009:

89 The various international efforts at reforming the security services in the West is discussed in ‘Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform Under Occupation’, Middle East Report No. 98, 7 September, 2010, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/98%20Squaring%20the%20Circle%20--%20Palestinian%20Security%20Reform%20under%20Occupation.pdf, accessed 21/1/2013.90 See Caridi, Hamas, pp. 251 – 258 and Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas,pp. 278 – 288.

44

The two sides remained almost completely riven for the

next eighteen months only drawn together again in the

aftermath of the 2008 Gaza War. In this interim period, Hamas

had solidified its control of Gaza by boosting its own

security apparatus and reshaping the PA’s bureaucracy in Gaza.

In doing so, the organisation demonstrated to Palestinians and

the international community its ability to endure and resist

attempts at facilitating its collapse and political

repudiation.91 However, these actions had come at a cost to

its legitimacy. In a December 2008 poll, over 87% over

respondents classified the conditions in Gaza as ‘Bad’ or

‘Very Bad’. Additionally, support for CR had fallen again to

just 28.1%, while Fateh’s support remained relatively steady

on 41.5%. Moreover, with Abbas’s Presidential term due to

expire in early 2009, 72.4% believed that fresh Presidential

and PLC elections should be held, a fact that did not augur

well for CR or Hamas.92 At the same time the tenuous six-month

tahdiy’ah (truce) negotiated with Israel in June 2008 was up for

91 ‘Round Two in Gaza’, Middle East Briefing No. 24, 11 September, 2008,International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/b024-round-two-in-gaza.aspx, accessed13/5/2012, p. 1.92 See Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 30,3 – 5 December, 2008, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey,http://www.pcpsr.org/en/index-psr-polls, accessed 31/8/2014.

45

renewal, meaning that Hamas would have to re-enter

negotiations with Israel. Given that the overall societal and

economic conditions in Gaza remained perilous at best, it

would have proved impossible for the Hamas leadership to

accept any genuine concessions on their part without invoking

the ire of its more militant members.93 Tensions between

Israel and Hamas rapidly escalated and on 27 December 2008,

the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) launched an air offensive on

Gaza, followed by a ground offensive from 3 – 18 January 2009.

At the end of the conflict an estimated fourteen hundred

Palestinians had been killed, along with five IDF soldiers.94

Despite the disproportionate losses sustained by Gazans,

the asymmetric nature of the conflict actually increased

support for Hamas. Hamas needed Israel as its nemesis in

order to cement its legitimacy amongst Palestinians.95 The

presence of this nemesis generated increased legitimation not

just from Palestinians but from various members of the

international community as well, particularly from Turkey

93 Caridi, Hamas, p. 267.94 ‘Human Rights in Palestine and Other Arab Occupied Territories: Report ofthe United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, A/HRC/12/48,25 September, 2009, United Nations General Assembly,http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1424646.97360992.html, accessed 12/11/2012,pp. 16 – 17.95 Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, pp. 150 – 151.

46

whose foreign minister visited the besieged Gaza in the

immediate aftermath of the war.96 In a poll conducted in March

2009 Haniyeh now held a slender lead over Abbas, 47.1% to

45.1%, in any Presidential election. Indeed the same poll

revealed that the Gazan PA held a clear lead over its West

Bank rival, 34.6% to 25%, concerning who Palestinians

considered to be the most legitimate government. Perhaps the

most important result though is that 46.1% of Palestinians

polled believed that reconciliation and unification of the

West Bank and Gaza remained the number one priority.97 The

message to Hamas is clear: while the Palestinian public

remains generally supportive, as a reflection of the Israeli

assault, this support is conditional on achieving national

unity.

Despite its pyrrhic military victory over Israel, the

debilitating Gazan siege remained. Additionally, the Ramallah

based PA remained the only internationally accepted conduit

for foreign aid to Palestinians. While Hamas had

traditionally trusted the United Nations (UN) to distribute

96 Caridi, Hamas, p. 287.97 Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 31, 5 –7 March, 2009, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html , accessed 30/8/2014.

47

aid fairly, this situation had been complicated by the 2006

election victory and the imposition of sanctions by the

Quartet. Hamas needed access to the aid money to ensure that

it could deliver the services required by Gazans. Without it,

there was the danger that its local support would wither

altogether, especially in the face of the ever-tightening

noose of the Israeli siege.98 While Gazans held Hamas

partially responsible for the parlous situation they were

confronted with, the Fateh-led government was equally blamed.99

During the course of 2009, both sides participated in a

series of negotiations sponsored by Egypt in order to reach

some form of reconciliation. Under Egyptian auspice, the

basic framework for an agreement was drawn up with the idea

that the two sides would negotiate later over the specifics of

the final draft.100 However, the political gulf between the

two remained as large as it was in 2007 with both Hamas and

Fateh sticking to their respective negotiating positions. On

one side, Hamas wanted to rid Palestinian politics of Fateh’s

98 Caridi, Hamas, pp. 271 – 274.99 See PCPSR Poll No. 31, 5 – 7 March, 2009, accessed 30/8/2014.100 A copy of this framework is contained in ‘Reference Texts - TowardsPalestinian National Reconciliation’, 2nd Edition, 2011, Geneva Centre for theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),www.dcaf.ch/content/download/45594/.../Reconciliation_English.pdf, accessed21/7/2014, pp. 68 – 70.

48

hegemony by enforcing a redirection of any unity government’s

political direction, reforming the security services and

altering the electoral laws. On the other side, Fateh was

fighting a rear guard action and stalling, hoping to

demonstrate to Palestinians and the international community

the primacy of its particular narrative while seeking to

subvert that of Hamas.101 The release of the Goldstone Report

in September 2009 marked the end of this particular

negotiation phase and propelled the two protagonists apart

once again. The Report was highly critical of IDF tactics and

the Government of Israel (GOI)’s political objectives broadly

in respect to its relations with Palestinians and the 2008

Gaza War in particular. It noted that such tactics and

policies, ‘…are based on or result in violations of

international human rights and humanitarian law.’102 The

Report was also critical of Hamas’s indiscriminate firing of

rockets and mortar shells into Israel, noting that, ‘These

actions would constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes

101 For a more detailed explanation of these events, see Caridi, Hamas, pp.290 – 297.102 ‘Human Rights in Palestine and Other Arab Occupied Territories: Reportof the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, accessed12/11/2012, p. 404.

49

against humanity.’103 Inexplicably, Abbas had agreed to

postpone the debate on the Report in the UNSC, allegedly after

pressure was exerted on him by Israel and the US. In total

incredulity, Hamas considered the decision a complete

abrogation of Abbas’s duty as Palestinian President and an

insult to the sacrifices experienced by Gazans during the

War.104

Implications of the 2011 Arab Awakening:

The centrifugal forces of the continuous power play

between Hamas and Fateh would keep the two sides segregated

for yet another eighteen months. The next centripetal event

came from the set of seminal regional political and social

shockwaves known as the 2011 Arab Awakening and provided the

impetus for the next round of reconciliation talks. In the

interim period, Hamas began to face a gradual political threat

from an unexpected quarter –Palestinian youth. It had been

five years since Hamas’s electoral victory and the aspiration

of consolidating its political legitimation, had been replaced103 ‘Human Rights in Palestine and Other Arab Occupied Territories: Reportof the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, accessed12/11/2012, p. 419.104 Caridi, Hamas, p. 297.

50

by profound political and social disunity, a debilitating

economic siege and episodic Israeli invasion and

destruction.105 The Palestinian youth that had once viewed

Hamas as the torchbearer of Palestinian resistance, were now

becoming increasingly disillusioned by Hamas’s strategy of

participation that promised much, but delivered little.106

Influenced by the remarkable events in Tunisia and Egypt,

their response was to participate in rallies throughout the

Territories on 15 March 2011.107

In a poll conducted in the immediate aftermath of the

rallies, over 55% of respondents classified conditions in Gaza

as ‘Bad’ or ‘Very Bad’, while support for CR remained steady

on 25.5% compared to Fateh’s 40.2%. Ominously, only 15.2% of

respondents believed Hamas would win if Presidential and PLC

elections were held. On the various problems confronting

Palestinians, the lack of national unity remained the

principle concern, followed closely by the spread of poverty

and unemployment and the continuing occupation.108 While Hamas105 For a description of situation in Gaza see Beverley Milton Edwards,‘Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts?’, Middle East Policy, 20, no. 3(Fall 2013), pp. 62 – 63.106 Caridi, Hamas, p. 310.107 Caridi, Hamas, pp. 314 – 316.108 See Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 39,17 – 19 March, 2011, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html , accessed 30/8/2014.

51

could do little about the continuing occupation of Palestinian

land, it could certainly do something to achieve national

unity and ameliorate poverty and unemployment. Additionally,

the inability of the Hamas leadership to improve adequately

the perilous conditions in Gaza had laid bare many of the

internal fissures that electoral success in 2006 had stifled.

There also materialised a political disconnect between the

Hamas leadership outside the Territories and the leadership

inside, as to what the most appropriate strategic direction

was, not only concerning reconciliation with Fateh, but having

to deal with an increasingly problematic social and

geopolitical situation occasioned by the Arab Awakening.109

Fearing the potentially damaging impact of a dispirited

and increasingly untrusting youth, Hamas immediately resumed

talks with Fateh over another reconciliation agreement.110 On

4 May 2011, it was announced that Hamas and Fateh had signed

yet another unity agreement. The terms of the Agreement were

109 See ‘Light at the End of Their Tunnels? Hamas and the Arab Uprisings’,Middle East Report No. 129, 14 August, 2012, International Crisis Group,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/129-light-at-the-end-of-their-tunnels-hamas-and-the-arab-uprisings.aspx, accessed 25/9/2012, pp. 15 – 17.110 Noura Erakat, ‘Palestinian Youth: New Movement, New Borders’, 4 May,2011, al-Jazeera,http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/201153101231834961.html,accessed 5/6/2011.

52

similar to those made in Cairo some six years ago. The two

sides agreed to conduct Presidential, PLC and Palestinian

National Council (PNC) elections by April 2012, to form a

higher security committee and in the interim to re-activate

the PLC.111 Despite this apparently new sense of purpose and

the traditional veneer of collegiality, the necessary

vagueness of the Agreement appeared designed more to

demonstrate to Palestinians some degree of progress rather

than any genuine desire to settle their inherent differences.

Notwithstanding this, the content of the Agreement shows that

despite the increasingly parlous political and economic

situation occasioned by international sanctions, Hamas

continued to demonstrate a commitment to its tactical and

ideological moderation efforts by continuing to stress the

importance of a pluralistic Palestinian political system and

the continuing faith in the electoral process.

That the Agreement failed yet again to realise the

establishment of the unity government was a further

demonstration of the concomitant efforts of Hamas and Fateh to

111 See ‘Text of the Agreement Between Fateh and Hamas’, al-Zaytouna Centre forStudies & Consultations,http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/palestinian-documents/142153-text-of-the-agreement-between-fatah-and-hamas.html#.T-gM9fV5dIY,accessed 12/6/2012.

53

cultivate and subvert political legitimation. Fateh’s

political strong suit was the contention that it was the only

internationally legitimate Palestinian negotiator in the Peace

Process. Given that this Process was perpetually moribund, in

September 2011 Abbas made the courageous decision to

internationalise it and seek statehood through the UNSC.112

That the bid failed was ultimately not the point, because

Abbas had demonstrated to Palestinians his ability to move the

question of prospective Palestinian statehood outside of the

tightly regulated Peace Process rubric with the view to

establishing a dramatically different negotiation status quo.113

The UN strategy placed Hamas in an invidious position

because it desired the same objective – an independent

Palestine. Given the primacy of this goal for all

Palestinians, Hamas could ill afford to oppose Fateh’s new

112 Khaled Elgindy, ‘Palestine Goes to the UN: Understanding the NewStatehood Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 90, no. 5 (Sept/Oct, 2011), p. 103.113 For descriptions of the events before and after this particular UN bidsee ‘Tipping Point? Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy’, MiddleEast Report No. 95, 26 April, 2010, International Crisis Group,http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/95%20Tipping%20Point%20-%20Palestinians%20and%20the%20Search%20for%20a%20New%20Strategy.pdf, accessed 14/5/2012 and ‘Curb YourEnthusiasm: Israel and Palestine After the UN’, Middle East Report No. 111,12 September, 2011, International Crisis Group,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/112-curb-your-enthusiasm-israel-and-palestine-after-the-un.aspx,accessed 25/4/2013.

54

strategic direction, no matter how risky or diplomatically

costly it may be to their continued support amongst

Palestinians. Crucially, any measurable success gained by

Fateh in this particular area would provide Abbas with an

enormous negotiating fillip when it came to the continually

prickly talks with Hamas on the structure and implementation

of the newly negotiated Agreement.114 Amongst Palestinians,

the prospect of success loomed large with a Poll revealing

that support for Fateh had risen to 44.6% of respondents

compared to just 29% for CR. With such attention on the UN

bid, 59% of respondents believed that achieving a Palestinian

state in along 1967 was the number one priority, with 73.6%

agreeing with Abbas’s UN strategy. Similarly, over 59% agreed

that Abbas should unilaterally declare the establishment of

the Palestinian state.115

In an effort to subvert any potential legitimation gains

made by Fateh, on 11 October, 2011 it was announced that

Israel and Hamas had reached an agreement whereby, in return

for Hamas releasing of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Israel

114 Elgindy, ‘Palestine Goes to the UN’, p. 104.115 See Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 41,15 – 17 September, 2011, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html , accessed 30/8/2014.

55

would agree to the conditional release of over one thousand

Hamas detainees.116 The news of the release of so many

prisoners was met with rapturous approval, particularly in

Gaza, with tens of thousands flocking to the street waving the

green flag of Hamas. In a poll conducted in December 2011, a

clear majority of respondents agreed with Hamas’s negotiating

positions and concessions with 37.3% stating that the prisoner

deal meant that their support of Hamas had increased.117 The

decision to release Shalit had managed to divert attention

away from Abbas’s internationalisation efforts and onto the

ability of Hamas to address a key concern of the Palestinian

general populace. The incident shored up Hamas’s domestic

support by demonstrating its willingness to negotiate

successfully with Israel. The fact that domestic and

international attention was concentrated on Hamas and the

release of so many prisoners effectively cancelled out any

116 See ‘Timeline: 1940 Days from Gilad Shalit’s Abduction to his Release’,11 October, 2011, Haaretz,http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/timeline-1-940-days-from-gilad-shalit-s-abduction-to-his-release-1.389452, accessed 1/9/2014 and‘Hamas Chief: First Phase of Shalit deal will take place in one week’, 11October, 2011, Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hamas-chief-first-phase-of-shalit-deal-will-take-place-in-one-week-1.389445,accessed 1/9/2014.117 See Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 42,15 – 17 December 2011, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html , accessed 30/8/2014.

56

prospective legitimation benefits for Fateh meaning that yet

again the reconciliation efforts petered out into nothing.

Reconciliation Revisited in 2014:

The latest chapter in Hamas’s moderation journey unfolded

after the failure of yet another round of Peace Process

negotiations in early April 2014. The centripetal forces of

rapidly deteriorating domestic and international political

situations forced Hamas to consider once again entering into

negotiations with Fateh over the formation of a unity

government. Primarily Hamas’s concerns revolved around its

persistent inability to ameliorate the devastating economic

blockade inflicted upon it by Israel and the Quartet, and the

regional after effects of the ousting of the Morsi government

in Egypt.118 Since the coup, Egypt’s military regime had

classified Hamas as a terrorist group, destroyed many of the

Rafah smuggling tunnels that Hamas had needed to generate

revenue and banned all activities by Hamas in Egypt as part of118 Amira Haas, ‘Palestinian Reconciliation: Real unity or tactics?’, 24April, 2014, Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.587004, accessed 24/4/2014.

57

a plan to rid the state of the influence of the Muslim

Brotherhood and its affiliates.119 Hamas’s 2014 Budget looked

bleak forecasting a deficit of US$699 million and it was

desperate to generate any form of additional income support to

replenish its coffers.120 Despite continued partial financial

support from Turkey and Qatar, and a reinvigorated financial

relationship with Iran, the projected shortfalls, with their

attendant domestic implications, remained.121 In the face of

this approaching economic abyss, Hamas’s leadership became

increasingly desperate to repair its regional connections in

an effort to shore up its support domestically.122

Exhausted from having to cope with the long running

siege, its continuing inability to garner sufficient economic

sustenance, and the realisation that its support among119 ‘Cairo Court outlaws Hamas activities in Egypt’, 4 March, 2014, Haaretz,http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.577802, accessed 6/3/2014. 120 Omar Shaban, ‘Hamas Budget shows another tough year ahead for Gaza’, 17March, 2014, translated by Rani Geha, al-Monitor,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/hamas-gaza-budget-economy-finance-blockade.html, accessed 18/3/2014.121 Adnan Abu Amer, ‘Hamas debates technocrat government in Gaza’, 10 March,2014, translated by Rani Geha, al-Monitor,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/gaza-hamas-government-polls-popularity.html, accessed 11/3/2014 and Adnan Abu Amer, ‘Iran ResumesMonetary Aid to Hamas’, 24 March, 2014, translated by Rani Geha, al-Monitor,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/iran-hamas-finance-economy-resistance-axis-gaza.html, accessed 25/3/2014.122 Adnan Abu Amer, ‘Hamas in overdrive to restore regional ties’, 16 April,2014, translated by Rani Geha, al-Monitor,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/hamas-rebuild-regional-ties.html, accessed 17/4/2014.

58

Palestinians was dwindling, Hamas representatives again

resorted to entering reconciliation talks with Fateh. On 23

April 2014, it was announced that Hamas and Fateh had

apparently reunited and had reached another Agreement to form

a unity government.123 Given its particularly dire

circumstances, Hamas was forced into making a number of key

concessions principally in agreeing to join the PLO without

having removed Fateh’s hegemony.124 In addition to this

particular concession, Hamas also agreed to withdraw

unilaterally from the new government, leaving behind a number

of technocrats to fill its positions until elections could be

held in late 2014.125 As the new unity government universally

accepted all of the three international conditions imposed

upon it by the international community in 2006, Hamas had in

effect also accepted the pre-conditions, the most contentious

of which being the recognition of Israel, an issue that the

123 Jack Khoury and Barak David, ‘Hamas, Fatah sign reconciliationagreement’, 23 April, 2014, Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.586924, accessed 24/4/2014.124 For a transcript of the Agreement see ‘Reconciliation Statement’, 23April, 2014, al-Monitor,http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Reconciliation_statement1.pdf, accessed 5/9/2014.125 Daoud Kuttab, ‘Palestinian reconciliation deal a Hamas surrender’, 28April, 2014, al-Monitor,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/fatah-plo-hamas-reconciliation-israel.html, accessed 29/4/2014.

59

leadership desperately attempted to clarify in order to avoid

internal disorder.126

Notwithstanding the potentially enormous political and

ideological implications of the Agreement, the Hamas

leadership attempted to depict it in a positive light with the

Deputy Chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Mousa Abu

Marzouk, stating that, ‘Instead of their being a victor and

vanquished, achieving half a victory is much better than

suffering a total defeat.’127 In general, Palestinians greeted

the reconciliation announcement positively with over 60% of

respondents having confidence that the new government would

meet their expectations, and 53% believing that economic

conditions would subsequently improve.128 However, it is a

measure of the political and economic conditions experienced

by Hamas, and what they might mean for its continued position

as a representative of Palestinian resistance, that they were

126 This interpretation of the Agreement is contested, with Abu Mazouk,Deputy Chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau stating that recognition was,‘…a red line that cannot be crossed’ and that ‘…Abbas alone is responsiblefor his words’. See Adnan Abu Amer, ‘Hamas’s Abu Mazouk says recognizingIsrael a ‘red line’’, 5 May, 2014, translated by Kamal Fayad, al-Monitor,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/interview-abu-marzouk-hamas-israel-fatah-reconciliation.html, accessed, 6/5/2014.127 Abu Amer, ‘Hamas’s Abu Mazouk says recognizing Israel a ‘red line’’, 5May, 2014, accessed 6/5/2014.128 Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Poll No. 52, 5 –7 June, 2014, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/psrindex.html , accessed 5/9/2014.

60

willing to enter into an Agreement with such enormous

implications.

However, the Agreement did not signal the complete

capitulation of Hamas’s political aspirations. Both sides

agreed that PLC and Presidential elections would be scheduled

and Hamas’s leadership did not shy away from actively

considering continued active participation in both. Indeed,

Abu Mazouk noted that, ‘Hamas is seriously studying this issue

[participating in the Presidential elections], and our

previous experience through legislative elections and

governmental positions has proven that popular legitimacy is

an important factor.’129 This view was supported in a Poll

taken in June 2014 with over 70% of respondents believing that

Hamas should participate in Presidential elections as well PLC

and Local Council elections. In further support of Hamas’s

compromises, almost 45% of Palestinians believed that they

were appropriate. Despite the debilitating economic siege

inflicted upon Hamas and the constriction of political space

that accompanied this, it would appear as though the

Palestinian polity had indicated clearly their desire for

129 Abu Amer, ‘Hamas’s Abu Mazouk says recognizing Israel a ‘red line’’, 5May, 2014, accessed 6/5/2014.

61

Hamas to remain a viable and active participant in Palestinian

politics.

Conclusion:

Analysis of Hamas’s moderation journey from 2006 to 2014

throws up some interesting theoretical and empirical issues.

From a theoretical perspective, the Inclusion-Moderation

thesis is premised on the notion that by increasing the amount

of political space, and including organisations in the

political system, will result in them gradually adopting more

moderate political positions. Conversely, within the

literature there is the expectation that a reduction in

political space would result, to some degree, in the

regression along the moderate-radical continuum towards

radicalisation. This has not happened in the case of Hamas.

Indeed, despite over eight years of economic and political

constrictions implemented by its domestic and international

opponents, Hamas remains firmly wedded to political

participation and the implementation of a pluralistic and

democratic Palestinian political system.

62

This paper argues that the principle reason for this is

the organisation’s desire for and contest over political

legitimation. The rewards and risks of participation

originate not from Palestinian state institutions and the

regime, as in previous Inclusion-Moderation studies, but from

the polity itself. In this particular case, the Palestinian

people appear to be the primary drivers of Hamas’s tactical

and ideological moderation efforts, not the particular

political and economic conditions it experiences. It is

Hamas’s endeavours to garner and respond to Palestinian public

support that has led it to making key ideological and

political concessions, such as acknowledgment of the primacy

of the Two-State solution and the de-facto recognition of the

Israeli state, which represent the hallmark of its gradual

ideological and tactical moderation. Adopting such positions

has some clear political benefits in that they are married to

the desires and political positions of the majority of the

Palestinian populace, and demonstrate Hamas’s willingness to

make ideological and political sacrifices in the national

interest.

63

This is not to say that Hamas has moderated completely.

Hamas’ overall moderation is uneven and to date imperfect.

Focusing on the processes of political legitimation allows an

insight into Hamas’s objectives concerning its political

moderation efforts. Understanding these objectives and their

origins can reveal why organisations, such as Hamas, make the

types of concessions that are a function of tactical and

ideological moderation. While the paths to achieving these

two analytical perspectives need to be considered separately,

there may indeed be some common contributing factor(s), like

political legitimation. Similarly, political legitimation may

be a useful analytical tool to explain the extent of an

organisation’s moderation, why some are able to go further

than others and why organisations oscillate along the

moderation continuum.

For its part, Hamas recognises that for it to assume

legitimate control of the Palestinian resistance to Israeli

occupation then the public demands that it participate in the

political system. Hamas’s legitimacy is enhanced by its

ability to resist Israeli occupation and as such, the

organisation views electoral participation as a national duty.

64

A fundamental aspect of the competition with Fateh is the

democratisation of the Palestinian resistance effort to remove

Fateh’s hegemony over key Palestinian representative

institutions, the PA and the PLO, to ensure they are a

reflection of present day Palestinian political reality.

Hamas was surprised to have won the 2006 election, but having

done so, it was not about to have its political gains stripped

away by Fateh and its international benefactors and was

willing to fight figuratively and politically to retain this

hard won gain. Hamas wanted to have its political voice heard

in order to articulate an alternative political message to

that of Fateh and Israel.

Political participation has cost Hamas enormously in

terms of prestige amongst Palestinians and the wider Arab

world. That it desires to remain such an integral part of

Palestinian politics demonstrates the usefulness of focusing

on the processes of political legitimation. By following

Hamas’s particular moderation journey it is possible to

demonstrate the clear role that public opinion has on

sustaining moderation in spite of fluctuating political space

and debilitating efforts to expurgate it from Palestinian

65

politics altogether. What comes through is that ultimately

Hamas embarked upon its specific moderation journey in order

to demonstrate to the Palestinian public the efficacy of its

political message and its desire to have its voice heard in

regional and international arenas. Hamas hoped that by

demonstrating its ability to resist Israel politically, as

well as militarily, then the support it gained not just from

the Palestinian public but from the other regional and

international benefactors would enable it to wrest control of

Palestinian resistance efforts to Israeli occupation away from

Fateh.

********

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