Characteristics of a Democratic NationalAssembly and its Role in Combating Corruption

By

Cornelius Yamai Zidyep AyubaNational Assembly Budget & Research Office

yamaizidyep@gmail.com

Being an assignment submitted to the World BankInstitute in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the Course “Parliaments and Anticorruption”.

February, 2015

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Introduction

The National Assembly (Legislature or

parliament) is the arm of Government saddled

with the responsibility of making laws. As

Nwabueze has noted, the Legislature is the

distinctive mark of a country’s sovereignty, the

index of its status as a state and the source of

much of the power exercised by the executive in

the administration of government. The sovereign

power of the state is therefore identified in

the organ that has power to make laws by

Legislation, and to issue “commands” in the form

of Legislation binding on the community.

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The legislature by virtue of its constitutional

responsibilities is the principal institution of

anticorruption, accountability, and probity. As

the bulwark of representative democracy, it is

germane to the consolidation of democracy. The

legislature is constitutionally and

strategically positioned to undermine

authoritarian tendencies on the part of the

executive, engender government effective and

adequate response to the delivery of public

goods and services, and enhance strict adherence

to constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Therefore, the legislature is critical to the

sustenance of popular trust in governance

processes, institutions, and improving

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government legitimacy. Obviously, the state of

the legislature of a nation at any particular

point in time is a significant pointer to the

health of the social contract between the

government and its citizens.

The legislature as a significant institution of

democracy consists of elected representatives of

specific political constituencies

constitutionally empowered to make laws and

oversee the government (Lafenwa, 2009;

Loewenberg, 1995). Considering that the

legislature is ‘the collective defender and

watch dog of the aspirations, ideals and

collective will of the people’ (Odinga,

1994:124), it suffices that ‘any attack against5 | P a g e

the organization, composition or functioning’

(Bello-Imam, 2004: 408) of the legislature poses

serious obstacle to democracy.

This paper seeks to examine some of the

characteristics of the National Assembly and the

roles they play in fighting corruption.

Characteristics of the National Assembly and its

role in fighting corruption

Generally, the legislature differs in

composition, structure and function globally;

however it’s representational, lawmaking,

appropriation and oversight functions are

universal and germane to deepening democracy

(Lafenwa, 2009). Some of the characteristics of

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the National Assembly as they relate with

corruption include:

a. Legislative Role

Of the core roles of parliament, it is likely

that the legislative role is the best

understood and most similar among countries.

Parliaments, constrained only by their

constitutions, have the authority to enact

any laws they wish and can therefore create

the necessary legal framework to prevent and

curb corruption. They can enact laws to

address what they consider inappropriate

behavior by citizens, businesses, and other

organizations, and they can provide for

surveillance and penalties. In addition,7 | P a g e

parliaments can focus on bolstering integrity

in governance—a broader perspective than

fighting corruption—by establishing not only

incentives to encourage appropriate private

sector behavior but also regimes for

financial and public service management,

transparency, and accountability in the

government sector. Thus, to the extent that

better laws would solve the problem of

corruption, parliaments—if they reflect well

the interests of the citizens and are not

captured by other forces—can be part of the

solution.

However, while appropriate laws may be a

necessary component in a country’s arsenal of

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policies and interventions to curb

corruption, they are never sufficient. If

they were, corruption could be easily

eradicated. As Jeremy Pope points out, it

rarely is a lack of anti-corruption

legislation that impedes such efforts;

rather, it is often the weak qualitative

formulation and the lack of implementation of

such laws that need special attention.

Legislation must follow a key set of

principles— such as compliance with human

rights standards—in clear language,

minimizing areas of discretion and adapted to

the local circumstances. In civil as well as

criminal law, parliaments should address some

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particularly relevant issues—such as

conflicts of interest, nepotism, and statutes

of limitation—not only to provide for the

necessary punitive measures but also to

promote an administrative and social

environment adverse to corruption.

However, depending on how laws are enacted

and the credibility of the electoral process,

the laws might be seen as more or less

legitimate. Moreover, an appropriate

legislative base might not be enacted if the

public and parliamentarians are unaware of

the costs and benefits of doing so. In

addition, the government might well be able

to put pressure on parliament—or on a

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sufficient number of parliamentarians—to

impede the enactment of certain legislation.

Finally, parliament will have to oversee the

implementation of the legislation by the

executive.

b. Oversight

Parliaments can also curb corruption by

fulfilling another key responsibility:

holding the government accountable. This can

be achieved through effective participation

in the budgetary process, the exercise of

parliamentary oversight through

anticorruption commissions, cooperation with

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supreme audit institutions, and promoting a

media-friendly environment.

c. Financial Control

Because financial integrity is central to

anti-corruption efforts, it is helpful to

devote direct attention to parliament’s role

in the budget cycle. The budget cycle, which

involves the government, public service,

civil society, and the legislature, comprises

four stages: drafting, legislation,

implementation, and audit. In most countries,

the ultimate control over the national budget

rests with parliament, which may delegate

responsibility to government for budget

formulation. This “power of the purse”

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constrains governments to tax and spend in

only specific ways and seeks to ensure

disciplined management of funds, disciplined

reporting, and transparency. It is one of the

most powerful parliamentary tools for holding

governments to account. It also provides a

means for parliamentarians to be heard on how

(and how much) money is to be obtained and

spent.

Once the budget has been allocated, the

parliament—and its specialized committees

(such as the public accounts committee)

considers the audit findings provided by

supreme audit institutions and provides

recommendations for the next budget. To

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ensure transparency and accountability, such

a budget cycle must fulfill three conditions.

First, there must be a disciplined and

transparent assignment of authority for the

disbursal of funds granted by parliament.

Second, there should be a requirement for

clear standards of expenditure measurement,

their application, and the results associated

with those expenditures—all in relation to

the authorities granted and the commitments

made when the authorities were granted.

Third, there should be publicly accessible

controls. Such a regime of parliamentary

financial control is a key part of integrity

in governance.

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These powers are important, but even in

mature democracies, parliamentarians lament

their loss of influence in financial and

budgetary matters. Their power varies,

depending not only on the constitutional

provisions regarding its role but also on a

number of other factors. Typically, an

enormous amount of money is being processed,

the expertise and detailed information on its

application and use rest within the

executive, extremely complex financial

instruments are applied, and pressures to

employ shortcuts to respond to crises are

compelling. In addition, in some countries,

finances are so stressed that financial

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management is reduced to cash flow

management. Apart from issues of sufficient

material and human resource, there is the

question of the timing of the budget. It

should be tabled sufficiently in advance of

the fiscal year to allow for effective

scrutiny and analysis.

Another variable is the access to

information, which is crucial for parliament

to exercise its financial control function,

because only accurate, reliable, and timely

information can guarantee a proper analysis

and evaluation of proposals. Political

dynamics and power relationships between the

executive and the legislative and between

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government and the opposition constitute a

final important variable. For all these

reasons, parliamentarians struggle to

understand the application and use of public

resources, to influence their use, and to

communicate financial matters and any

concerns to their constituents. This leads

directly to other oversight practices

employed by parliament, including the work of

parliamentary agents (such as auditors and

ombudsmen), mandatory executive reporting on

certain operations and performance, or the

direct authority to question ministers

publicly on the operations of their

departments.

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This also includes the authority to review

departmental and program performance (usually

by parliamentary committees) by calling for

witnesses and documents, and doing all of

this in a transparent fashion in cooperation

with outside bodies.

Also, in some countries, parliaments have the

authority to review and approve appointments

of certain public officials. These practices

vary considerably and take various

institutional forms, even among jurisdictions

with apparently similar oversight structures.

Two oversight tools are of particular

interest here: supreme audit institutions and

anti-corruption commissions.

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d. Representation

Representation is a combination of public

deliberation and consensus building within

parliament, as well as the engagement of

citizens on matters of public policy.

Although it is perhaps less tangible than the

other parliamentary roles, representation is

an important parliamentary instrument for

building integrity in public governance. It

occurs through a number of different

channels, such as the participation of civil

society or the formation of political

parties, and can have the effect of

empowering citizens to reject corrupt

practices and expose politicians and

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officials who engage in corrupt activity. In

this way, parliamentarians can help establish

public standards for appropriate behavior.

In the most direct sense, parliamentarians,

as representatives of the people, are

mandated to represent the wishes and concerns

of their constituents. Especially in many

developing countries, it is likely that a

large number of these constituents will be

poor. However, because corruption threatens

and affects the poor in the worst way,

parliamentarians, as their representatives,

must prevent it. It falls to them to travel

back regularly to their home regions to

organize forums of discussions, listen to

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their constituents, understand the causes and

effects of corruption, include this

information and awareness in the formulation

of anti-corruption policies, and monitor

their impact. However, parliamentary

practices and support services, regardless of

party affiliation, might affect the capacity

of individual parliamentarians to pursue a

public leadership role in fighting

corruption. Where public resources are

provided to individual Members to maintain an

office in their districts and funds for

travel to retain regular face-to-face

contact, this aspect of representation is

likely to be more effective. Such

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constituency services are crucial for

parliamentarians to retain the necessary

legitimacy and public endorsement to pursue

their policies.

e. Public Questioning and Media Involvement

As the fourth estate, an independent and

attentive media can to a great extent support

these parliamentary oversight efforts.

Indeed, the media owe it to themselves and to

society to participate in the fight against

corruption and often do so effectively.

Parliament can follow up on public exposure

of corrupt officials, the prompting of

investigations, and the exhibition of

commercial wrongdoing by the media. While

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ministers may be obligated to respond, they

do not always answer the questions posed by

parliament.

Nonetheless, where there are independent

media, such behavior attracts public

attention and thereby reinforces

parliamentary oversight. At the same time,

parliament has a key role to play in ensuring

a free and vibrant media to permit such

oversight. It can promote a diverse media

landscape, ensure the protection of

journalists, push for free access to

information, support media accountability,

and so forth. An excellent example of such

fruitful cooperation occurred during the

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aftermath of the war in the 1990s in Uganda.

The collaboration between an active and

representative parliament and a free and

independent media, able to challenge the

government and provide coverage of corruption

scandals, allowed MPs to tackle several high

profile cases of fraud.

f. Specialized Agencies

As the complexity of government has grown,

complicated by globalization on one side and

devolution and decentralization of power on

the other, and as the range of financial

instruments used in public finance has

expanded, the need for professional expertise

and resources has led to the creation of

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specialized parliamentary investigation and

accountability agencies in many countries.

The best-known of these agencies are supreme

audit institutions (SAIs).

Although their mandates vary considerably,

particularly among the differing governance

systems, SAIs can help to deter waste and

corruption by attesting to the financial

accuracy of the data provided by the

government; checking whether the executive’s

spending has complied with applicable

provisions, laws, and regulations; and

reviewing the government’s performance (that

is, whether it has delivered public services

in an effective manner). To be effective, an

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SAI should feature a clear mandate, be

independent, continuously update its

expertise, and be allowed to report its

results to specialized parliamentary

committees such as the public accounts

committee—which should then consider making

recommendations to parliament for enactment.

In addition, the need for specialist

supporting organizations that are adequately

resourced and independent of the executive is

growing.

There has been a lot of debate surrounding

the role and efficiency of anti-corruption

commissions, another institution helping

parliament to control corruption.

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Indeed, sometimes created as hollow

constructs, their sole purpose can be to

delay meaningful legal reforms and satisfy

the call for reforms from international

donors. To ensure their effectiveness, they

should be the result of a broad-based appeal

by constituents. Moreover, to work

successfully, anti-corruption commissions

must be independent, part of a broader anti-

corruption strategy, embedded in a reporting

hierarchy encompassing the legislative and

executive, and have the government enact its

recommendations.

g. Corruption in Political Parties and

Parliament

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Little can be achieved by legislators on a

national level if they do not first confront

the specter of corruption within their ranks.

Two particular sets of issues come to mind:

political party financing and codes of

conduct for parliamentarians.

As the strength of political parties has

increased over time, they have become a locus

of administrative power and therefore a

potential agent of corruption, particularly

where their accountability to their members

and the entire electorate is weak. Riccardo

Pelizzo illustrates this point in chapter 11,

showing how the weak institutionalization of

political parties in many developing

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countries increases the temptation to quell

financial needs by illegal means. This

problem is particularly acute during the

electoral competition of political parties

for power, leading to a race for financial

resources, engendering the problem of party

political funding, examined by Michael Pinto-

Duschinsky. Corruption scandals in campaign

financing, often implicating the

parliamentarians themselves, abound and can

take a multitude of forms such as vote

buying, contributions from criminal sources,

illegal use of state sources, and so forth.

In many countries, this problem is compounded

by traditions of patron-client relationships.

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The attitude of the electorate then becomes

another issue: although they might be

condemning corruption in general, they might

still sell their votes. Also, in some cases,

candidates for office believe that they have

no other choice but to engage in illicit fund

raising if they must pay for campaigning

without public subsidies (Bryan and Baer

2005). Although the problem might never be

completely solved, it is up to the

legislators to formulate laws regulating

campaign finances, including regulations on

the disclosure of interests, spending and

contribution limits, and the provision of

public subsidies. It is also up to

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parliamentarians to pressurize the government

to enforce such laws, establish ethics

committees to monitor the political

campaigns, and so forth.

The legitimacy of democracy does not only

depend on the integrity of political parties.

Parliamentarians themselves must adhere to

strictly ethical behavior. Covering

everything from conflicts of interest and the

disclosure of assets to rules on post

governmental employment and nepotism, codes

of conduct and codes of ethics perform two

functions: internally, they improve the

behavior of legislators; externally, they

restore the often-shattered public confidence

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in parliamentarians. To be effective, such

codes must be accompanied by enforcement

mechanisms and be based on a shared

understanding by parliamentarians of what is

appropriate behavior and what is not, because

otherwise they amount to little else then

empty promises. A practical insight into the

development and application of codes of

conduct is provided with Sir Philip Mawer’s

case study of the House of Commons’

Parliamentary Codes of Conduct and Registers

of Members’ Interests in the United Kingdom.

One of the key aspects of this code is the

open and publicly accessible disclosure of

the assets of Members of Parliament (MPs),

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which provide the population with the

knowledge of the interests that might affect

the MP’s decision making.

Another important element is the relatively

effective means of enforcement. Although

ethical problems still do occur, it seems

that this code has managed to restore public

confidence in the parliamentary system in

many ways.

CONCLUSION

Together, these four approaches to oversight—

financial control, specialized agencies, public

questioning, and media involvement—can be a

powerful antidote to corruption. They are more

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effective to the degree that they have

professional staff support and independent media

to ensure that the public is well informed as to

what is occurring—ultimately under their

“authority.” However, where parliament itself is

dominated by a corrupt executive or lacks

representative legitimacy, these theoretical

oversight powers might well not exist in

practice. Thus, as with legislative power, they

are only part of the parliamentary toolbox for

curbing corruption.

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