Chapter 4

Participatory Irrigation Management

In Egypt

Introduction

Participatory irrigation management (PIM) refers to a relatively

new approach that seeks to increase farmer's direct involvement

in system management--either as a complement or substitute for

the state role. Either approach generally leads to some form of

joint management of irrigation systems, with the state

responsible for more tasks at higher levels of the system, and

farmers' organizations responsible for more at lower levels

(Meinzen-Dick, Raju & Gulati 2005).

The reasons for adopting such programs are also numerous.

Obviously the desire to improve system performance has played a

major role, but serious financial crises have been a motivation

behind the adoption of management transfer programs in many

developing countries such as Mexico. Also, in some cases they

1

have been a part of larger structural adjustment packages, as in

the case of Senegal (Ibid.). More importantly perhaps, donor

pressures, either for economic reform or for participation and

democratization--have clearly played a role in many cases,

especially as the World Bank and USAID, push for greater

stakeholder participation.

In Egypt, WUAs are part of the institutional component of a

comprehensive modernization scheme of the irrigation system

undertaken by the Egyptian government. In the 1970s and 1980s

various foreign donors, but particularly USAID, began to discuss

with the government of Egypt ways of improving the performance of

the Egyptian irrigation system. The aim was to produce more food

as well as save water and improve income for farmers (Abdelaziz

1995). The overall goal was two-fold; financial and institutional

as indicated in the report prepared by EPIC Water Policy Team

(Barakat et. al. 1999: 72):

The policy of allowing these associations to perform O&M contracts is designed to improve the allocation of government funds and to obtain greater benefit from these expenditures… it is believed that associations will do more careful work, thereby increasing the length of time before

2

maintenance needs repeating. This would tend to reduce the overall rate of depreciation of the irrigation system below current rates. In turn, lower rates of depreciation can prolong the need for rehabilitation, and reduce future costsassociated with this rehabilitation when it occurs.

It is believed that management of a branch canal by a water users association will resultin better overall management, leading to improved availability of water for all reaches, inaddition to reducing the canal’s rate of physical depreciation. There is also the benefit ofgreater convenience and more equity in distribution throughout the branch canal servicearea. Farmers obtain these benefits through a canal association operated essentially as arecord-keeping house.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical overview of

participatory irrigation management implementation in Egypt. The

chapter will shed light on the most important issues raised in

project documents, as well as reports and studies carried out by

different projects and Egyptian experts and officials. These will

be complemented by interviews with ministry officials. The point

of view of farmers as reflected by these reports and studies will

also be explored.

Irrigation Improvement Projects and Water Users Associations

3

The recognition of the potential benefits of organizing farmers

in formal associations can be traced back to the Egypt Water Use and

Management Project (EWUP, 1977-84), a project implemented by the

Egyptian government in cooperation with Colorado State

University. The project adopted the notion that farmers’

participation in irrigation water management including

scheduling, rotations, operation and maintenance (O&M) was

essential for improved service delivery.

These improvement paved the way to the Irrigation

Improvement Project (IIP), started in 1987, which has since then

acquired sector status within the MWRI and been supported by

several donors including the USAID and the World Bank. Hvidt

(2004) described IIP as being “a state-of-the-art project,

especially in terms of the approach followed in involving the end

users - the farmers - through Water User Associations (WUAs) in

the design, implementation and maintenance of the physical

structures and the allocation and distribution of water by WUAs

themselves” (Hvidt, 2004). The project has improved 2900 mesqas

covering an area of 200,000 feddan (World Bank, 2007).

4

Subsequently the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS), whose

role was to help farmers establish WUAs and provide technical and

financial advice, was established. Other innovations included the

installation of single-point pumping stations to lift water from

secondary canals into the concrete-lined mesqas or into storage

tanks that serve the buried pipelines. The single-point pumping

replaced a multitude of individual pumps along the mesqa and

necessitated cooperation among farmers.

A WUA is defined as “a private organization owned,

controlled and operated by member users for their benefits in

improving water delivery, water use and other organizational

efforts related to water for increasing their production

possibilities” (Hvidt, 2004). WUAs access water from the Branch

canal in which, following IIP’s design, a continuous supply of

water (continuous flow) is to be ensured, instead of the

traditional on/off rotation. This is to be achieved by

retrofitting regulators and the branch canal profile and using

automatic gates that allow more water in when a downstream

increased demand manifests itself by a drop in water levels.

5

Continuous flow was the most important feature for farmers, who

saw the prospect of a continuous supply and the end of water

shortages, and rightly seen as “important to assure the success

of the project” (Metawie, 2002). Equally important was improved

maintenance of the irrigation system. In short, the IIP project

had several expected benefits (Hvidt, 1994):

The collective pumping stations would do away with the

scattered and diffuse individual pumps and achieve

economies of scale in terms of energy costs (for both

farmers and society).

Engineers anticipated that continuous flow would put an

end to unpredictable supply, which was considered as

the main cause of farmers‟ “over-pumping” during their

“on” turn (seen as a means of storing water in the soil

profile to offset possible discontinuities in supply).

Delivery of water to the marwa or plot level through a

network of lined canals or pipes would reduce losses

and improve irrigation efficiencies (also limiting

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overall water abstraction and return flows to drains,

where quality is often degraded).

Equity of water distribution would be improved due to

the ease in distributing water and head-end/tail-end

inequities would be relieved.

Positive environmental and health impacts would result

from farmers no longer needing to pump polluted and/or

saline drain water and mesqa being filled in.

Filling-in mesqas would increase arable land by 1 to

2%.

Farmer‟s irrigation costs (labor, pumping and mesqa

maintenance) and drudgery (necessity to move the pump

back and forth) would be substantially reduced.

Increased crop yield, diversification to cash crops

(and farmer income) would result from a better and more

secure availability of water.

However, there were several technical problems. Perhaps the

most challenging was the establishment of continuous flow, “the

7

key and lead technology of IIP” (IRG et al., 1998), has been the

main challenge. In many mesqas pumps were installed before the

improvement on the branch canals were completed, and as result

continuous flow could not be implemented, which led to

frustration among farmers (IRG et al., 1999).

A second problem which remains a concern until today is

contractor performance. This includes poor work execution, such

as canals with faulty slope, leaks in canals or pipes, bad

compacting, poor design and too low pressure in pipes, low or no

responsiveness to the problems indicated by farmers following

construction, etc. The limited monitoring of work and

accountability created situations where contractors were rushing

to bid for and initiate new works without having finished the on-

going ones (World Bank, 2007). Another issue reported by farmers

is the difficulty to find spare parts or to find the technical

expertise to deal with technical problems, such as broken pumps

for example, including electric ones and associated transformers.

With regards to the institutional component of the project,

the rationale for establishing WUAs was rooted in principles of

8

participatory irrigation management (PIM), whose “generally

acknowledged benefits include, but are not limited to,

productivity increases, positive changes in cropping intensity,

improvement in financial impact performance indicators,

resolution of water-related conflicts, and a positive

environmental impact” (IRG, 1999). But the policy to develop WUAs

in the late 1990s was very much driven by a desire to reduce

state expenditures and enforce “cost-sharing plans” (IRG et al.,

1999). These plans were to define in a negotiated manner between

the WUAs and the Ministry scheduled Operations and Maintenance

(O&M) works.

The main functions of WUAs as described within the IIP are

(Ibid.):

1- Participation in planning, design, and construction of

improved mesqas.

2- Operation, maintenance, and follow-up of the improved

mesqas.

3- Improvement of water use activities on the mesqa level.

9

4- Identification of roles and responsibilities of the mesqa's

head and setting up rules to resolve conflicts.

5- Establishment of linkages for coordination with other

agriculture and irrigation concerned agencies.

6- Establishment of linkages for coordination with other WUAs.

7- Development of financial resources in order to improve

operation and maintenance.

8- Participation with higher-level organizations of the branch

canal and cooperation with the district engineer.

In establishing a water user association, the engineer meets

with the farmers to inform them about the decree and to

explain the details. At the first meeting, called by the

engineer, the farmers elect their officials. The head is

called a “shaykh”; there can also be a treasurer and a

secretary, as well as a system operator. The assembly of the

association, then, chooses a title, and applies to have it

registered. The association’s officials work with the ministry

to develop the canal. When it is ready it is handed over to

10

the association, which is then responsible for operation and

maintenance, and for the financial accounting. The association

has a bank account, and it sets the fees, collects the money,

deposits it and decides on expenditures.

WUAs were, thus, established to operate the pump stations,

manage the delivery of water to farm ditches, and collect fees to

reimburse the government for capital costs and to pay for

operation and maintenance. However, it was not until 1994 that

WUAs were granted legal status at the mesqa level in the improved

irrigation systems (IIP) in the old lands. In the New Lands Water

Users Unions (WUUs) were made established. The bylaws of Law 213

(Decree No 14900 of 1995) detailed the rights and duties of the

WUAs and WUUs.

During the period of 1994-2009 the Dutch-funded Fayoum Water

Management Project established the first Water Users Organization

at the Branch Canal level (BCWUA), sometimes called a “Local

Water Board” (Abdel-Aziz, 2003). These local WBs were responsible

for the operation and maintenance of irrigation intake structures

11

of all mesqas, possible saqias (water wheels), and secondary

drainage infrastructures in their command areas, weed control, as

well as for domestic water use based on canal and drains. Small

infrastructure works were funded by the project where needed.

Below this level, infrastructures such as mesqas, individual

saquias, marwas or field drains remained fully under the purview

of individual farmers and are not the responsibility of the Water

Board. Membership of the Water Board was made obligatory for all

users of water drawn from irrigation and drainage, be they

farmers, residents or industries.

Simultaneously, under the Agricultural Policy Reform Program

(APRP) of USAID (1996-2003), a strong support to different kinds

of decentralization and Irrigation Management Transfer was

translated into several policy initiatives and changes, including

the formation of secondary-level Branch Canal Water User

Associations (BCWUAs). Nine initial BCWUAs have been formed in

the Nile Basin by Ministerial decree (IRG, 2002).

The involvement of water users in management decisions was

expected to help establish “mutual confidence between the MWRI

12

District engineering staff and the farmers with respect to the

ability to manage tasks on the branch canals to the benefit of

both. Without this confidence, privatization will be a much

slower process” (IRG, 2002). However, branch canal level

experiments were constrained by several factors. The absence of a

legal status for user organizations at levels above the mesqa

level boundaries made it difficult to develop the financial

dimensions of decentralization; the “Revision of Law 12/1984 on

Irrigation and Drainage”, that was to recognize BCWUAs Water

Boards as user organizations for water management at the

secondary canal level and above made it to parliament but until

present day has not been passed.1 Likewise the policy of

transferring the responsibility to maintain assets such as canals

made it necessary to rehabilitate these infrastructures before

transferring their management to users but often funding was

insufficient and thus the transfer did not actually take place.

In parallel, the MWRI “adopted a policy to integrate all

water management functions at the district level to support

1 Pilot BCWUAs were established under a ministerial decree.

13

decentralized management” (IRG, 2002) and designated two pilot

districts. The definition of an Integrated Water Management District

(IWMD) was given as “an entity that has sufficient manpower,

material, and fiscal resources to operate and maintain all water

resources under its jurisdiction. All of the divisions support

the water distribution process to ensure that water is delivered

equitably, resulting in the various district water entities

currently being merged to constitute a single entity referred to

as an IWMD” (IRG, 2002).

The aim was to merge the different exiting districts

(Irrigation, drainage, mechanical), all defined with different

boundaries and neither of them corresponding to administrative

districts, into one integrated district, thus 1) reducing the

number of staff and putting all of them under the authority of

one district engineer, 2) getting rid of the intermediate layer

of the Inspectorate, 3) integrating the different functions of

water management for coordinated planning and management. The two

pilot IWMD of Zifta and Ibrahimia, in the delta, were defined in

14

2001 by Ministerial Decree No. 506 and further development led to

covering another 27 districts in 2007 (IRG,, 2002).

A number of issues and constraints facing the implementation

of the IWMD were identified, including (IRG, 2002): 1) the way to

define the new boundaries (often taken as those of the irrigation

district), 2) identification and selection of the IWMD officers

(with conflict between the three departments on who would head

the IWMD), 3) IWMD budget allocation and operation mechanisms,

with budget coming from different departments, 4) lack of water

monitoring programs, needed for improved management but requiring

funding for equipment, 5) lack of public awareness and

communication programs, 6) the difficulty to come up with an

integrated operational program at the local level, 7) the

reluctance to delegate authority and decision-making from general

directorate level to the IWMD level, 8) the limited cooperation

of the Drainage and Mechanical Equipment sectors.

As for BCWUAs, their purpose is to represent a collective

association of cultivators on a branch canal, and to liaise with

the Irrigation Department in all matters related to operation,

15

maintenance and management of the branch canal. Their

responsibilities (IRG et al., 1999) as mandated by Ministerial

Decree No. 33/2001 are to:

1- Manage irrigation and drainage functions and infrastructure

at the branch command area,

2- Represent all water users within the command area vis-à-vis

outside parties;

3- Build up and maintain itself as a sustainable organization;

and Enhance participation and equity among its members.

Between 1995 and 2005, more than 40 BCWUAs have been

established in Fayoum by the Dutch-funded Water Boards project

(APP, 2007). They were trained to plan and execute, either by

themselves or through local small contractors, annual O&M works,

with funding channeled through the Technical Assistance, thus

circumventing the legal constraints faced by MWRI to transfer

funds to WUOs (APP, 2007). Ultimately it was expected that the

users would bear the costs of O&M.

16

In order to set up the BCWUA, IAS staff holds meetings with

branch canal users on each reach (head, middle and tail) to

explain the program, address queries, and help farmers to plan

their activities. When farmers have been apprised of costs and

benefits related to BCWUA formation, farmers on each reach will

be asked to nominate representatives to sit on the BCWUA

Executive Council. The Executive Council can, at its own

discretion, have a membership ranging from 7 to 15 members,

depending on branch canal stakeholder population. The Executive

Council select a chairman, vice-chairman, treasurer and secretary

from among Executive Council members.

The BCWUA then designates one person to manage daily

operations. Until the BCWUA starts generating its own resources,

this operations manager may be a Council member on a volunteer

basis. The Executive Council will develop a list of priorities

and issues for action, and an implementation schedule.

There are existing laws requiring farmers to financially

participate in BCWUA O&M. However, the BCWUA may opt to collect

assessment fees using modalities practiced by mesqa-level WUAs,

17

e.g. based on feddans under commanded irrigation per year, or

based on number of hours of irrigation. Other potential sources

of resource mobilization member voluntary contributions, income

from work contracted by BCWUA, and bank interest and investment

dividends.

The role of the IAS in establishing and supporting BCWUAs

can be summarized as follows:

Coordinate the organizing process and establishment of

BCWUAs.

Increase farmer awareness about BCWUAs.

Develop awareness among Executive Council members as to

BCWUA roles and responsibilities and provide necessary

technical consultation.

Provide orientation and training to Executive Council

members and branch canal manager.

Participate in BCWUA meetings.

Regularly collect data on BCWUA performance and

problems, evaluating activities.

18

Report problem issues to MPWWR Irrigation authorities.

Assist the BCWUAs in organizing mesqa-level WUAs (in

non-improved areas), as well as the technical package

of improvements.

Assist the BCWUA and mesqa-level WUAs prepare for the

mesqa improvements.

Coordinate with MPWWR Water Communication Unit to

develop awareness of building programs among farmers

and field staff. (Prepare fliers, news bulletins,

posters, publications etc).

Coordinate with Agriculture Extension Service and other

related agencies in the Ministry of Agriculture to

strengthen BCWUAs and WUAs.

Facilitate establishment of communication linkages

between BCWUA and different ministerial agencies.

Farmers’ Attitude Towards PIM

The literature available on WUAs in Egypt shows that the attitude

of farmers show towards the various efforts aiming at

19

establishing participatory management and associations is not

very clear, and varies with the context. Support for a

participatory approach as envisioned by the government to the IIP

programs was closely linked to the promise of continuous flow, in

which farmers saw the end of all their water-related problems.

Reports observed that “there are indications that users are

willing to share in the costs if services are reliable and

responsive to demand” (World Bank. 2005). Similarly, improved

maintenance seems appealing to farmers and they are express

eagerness to contribute to improving it. However, reports

indicate that the majority of farmers still believe the

government is more qualified to carry out maintenance tasks

(Moustafa, 2004). Still, according to some reports (IRG et al.;

2001) farmers express a willingness to take on certain O&M tasks

on the branch canals, they indicate that trash removal and

preventing dumping trash and sewage in the canals would be

improved if BCWUAs had the authority to maintain the canals and

penalize polluters.

20

Surveys indicate that a considerable percentage of farmers

express their desire to be included in the decision-making

process regarding canal operation and maintenance activities (El-

Zanaty 2001). Willingness to participate in WUAs and to share the

cost of upgrading the irrigation and drainage systems in their

local area is also high when associated with promises such as

continuous flow or improved drainage. The wish for more

consultation, discussion, recognition, attention from officials

is widespread and also shows a feeling of hopelessness of those

located at the very tail end of both water distribution and

decision-making systems. For example “nine in ten farmers would

like the irrigation engineer to consult with them on matters such

as branch canal operation, scheduling cleaning, the rotation,

garbage in canals and illegal outtakes” (El-Zanaty 2001). Farmers

convened in workshop to discuss the role of WUAs indicate “that

the opportunity to dialogue with senior ministerial officials on

a regular basis would provide a significant psychological boost

to support the fledgling WUA organization” (IRG et al., 1999).

21

Likewise the question of the amendment of Law 12 in order to

legally allow for full-fledged and autonomous BCWUAs or district

water boards is believed to be key to improving their position to

negotiate with MWRI staff and widening their scope and self-

reliance in contractual matters, but also to “increasing the

WUOs' self-esteem” (APP, 2007).

Relations between farmers and authorities, however, remain

lukewarm. Despite training and awareness raising activities,

“many government officials do not take farmers participation

seriously, they simply do not grasp the concept,” says Engineer

Nagwa El-Khashab. 2 Batt and Merkley (2009) in their study of El-

Ibrahimia canal area (Sharkia province), reported that almost

100% of the farmers surveyed were not asked about whether they

wanted a project in their area or not, that it was all done

exclusively by government decision. As a result some farmers did

not understand the use or need of branch canal automatic

downstream control gates provided by the project, and therefore

2 Interview with Eng. Nagwa El Khashab in her office 9/10/2012.

22

tampered with them or bypassed them (World Bank, 2007). This

point will be discussed in detail in chapter five.

The Role of the State

While most of the IIP programs were focused on achieving a number

of local objectives, for which WUAs are a necessary element,

water policies took a much more reformist turn in the late 90s

with the USAID-funded Agricultural Policy Reform Program (APRP)

program. The concept of “rolling-back the state” was translated

into policy proposals that moved from conventional participatory

approaches to more radical management transfer programs.

The rationale of these transfers was to reduce state

expenditures and shift part of the O&M burden onto farmers. It is

also expected that decentralization, transfer, and the

privatization of some tasks (e.g. some maintenance work being

handled and paid for by BCWUAs, but more generally allowing the

private sector to take managerial and financial control over

operation and maintenance; IRG et al., 2001) would result in more

23

efficient outcomes in terms of water control. As made explicit by

Dr Abu Zeid, former Minister of Irrigation, “irrigation operation

and maintenance always require big efforts and form a large

financial burden to the government, and this is true in Egypt

with the large Nile irrigation system.

Therefore, it is of the desire to transfer the irrigation

management responsibility to farmer's organizations that MWRI

took many positive steps in the direction of users participation

in water management (APP, 2007). These policies were strongly

supported by donors (IRG et al., 2001). Much effort was exerted

in trying to convince the ministry officials of the desirability

and inevitability of the reform. Numerous field trips arranged

for politicians and officials to see by themselves IMT and

privatization models in other countries, trainings and lobbying

efforts helped to provide the “bureaucratic orientation” required

(Aziz, 1995).

Unfortunately part of these bureaucratic orientation efforts

was lost because of the typical high turnover rates of officials

in the ministry, raising the need for continuous awareness

24

raising (Aziz, 1995), but also generating inefficiency and

frustration. Beyond officials at the central level of the

ministry, the importance of the involvement and attitude of field

staff is very important. Field staff includes managers from the

ministry at the Directorates and District levels, as well as the

gate operators (bahar), as well as IIP staff the IAS staff, that

was created to spearhead the creation and training of WUOs.

Apparently field staff has little interest in the reform and

its objectives (APP, 2007). This is due to several negative

incentives “like the absence of rewards, career risks, over-

asking WUOs, risk of delays in construction, lack of endorsement

by superiors, etc” (APP, 2007). The failed implementation of

continuous flow is a good example. Beyond technical

justifications it is clear that continuous flow basically

dispenses with the need for bahar and reduces the intervention

needed by both the local gate keepers and the district engineers.

This results not only in a loss of social status, prestige, self-

esteem and sense of usefulness, but also of the complementary

25

income that comes with farmers demands for extra supply and

associated bribing (Hvidt, 1998).

Likewise it can be argued that the failure to pass the

revision of the Law 12 (which made it up to parliament 10 years

ago but has not been ratified) is, in no small proportion, linked

to the disincentives to staff at different levels. Empowering

BCWUAs might not only make staff redundant (which is actually a

stated objective), replace private maintenance contractors by

community-based and controlled operators, but it is likely to

come with greater exigencies for accountability and improved

water management formulated by a stronger negotiating-power of

user organizations. All this is extremely disruptive of the

status quo and of the vested interests.

Moreover, according to Allam (2004), the ministry’s

officials were somehow confused by the multiplicity of

institutional building programmes in Egypt, where WUAs, BCWUA,

local water boards, district water boards, integrated districts,

and Farmers Federations were being developed in parallel by

diverse projects funded by USA, The Netherlands, Germany, Japan,

26

IFAD or the World Bank, without clear policy direction on

resolving possible antagonisms or contradictions.

Barakat (APP, 2007) aptly describes the division of MWRI

staff into two categories. The first category includes officials

who see institutional building as a part of a wide participatory

policy (PIM), whereby the communication between engineers and

users is improved, farmers solve some internal conflicts among

users, elect representatives to liaise with ministry staff,

collect information on crop calendar, and take care of O&M

activities at the tertiary level and below (that are beyond the

officials‟ purview and interest): “they see WUOs as an extension

of the MWRI”.

The second category includes officials with a deeper reform

agenda in mind that includes irrigation management transfer (IMT)

and therefore reduction in both the prerogatives and the

budget/staff of the ministry, against an empowerment of farmers

to be organized at different levels and increasingly in charge of

O&M in an autonomous way, with a degree of accountability to be

established between managers and users. As Barakat stresses,

27

“both reformers and improvers are not well aware of the

perspective of the other group. Because both groups make use of

the same (generally accepted) words and terminology it is quickly

assumed that there is agreement, while in reality each group

means something completely different when using the terminology”

(APP 2007: 16).

Some of the ministry officials are very enthusiastic about

the new approach. Former Minister of Irrigation and Water

Resources argued that: “The modernized process, through

implementing the full package of the IIP, can be considered as

revolutionary changes in the irrigation system in Egypt” (Allam,

2002). Engineer Atef El-Kashef, Director of Irrigation

Improvement Department, argued that: “IMT has become an

imperative if we are to modernize irrigation practices in Egypt.

Naturally, like any new concept it was met with some suspicion by

the farmers and engineers alike. But this can be overcome by

raising people’s awareness about the benefits of this approach.”3

Engineer Nagwa El-Khashab, IAS Director asserts that: “the

3 Interview with Engineer El-Kashef in his office on 9 October 2012.

28

problem is not with the farmers or engineers, the problem lies in

the managers and officials in the Ministry who do not understand

the concept of participation and partnership between the ministry

and the farmers and insist on implementing PIM in the same top-

down approach thereby defeating the purpose.”4

Role of Donor Agencies

The impact of international donor-funded projects in supporting

development of public participation in management of water and

natural resources has received mixed reviews. Svendensen and

Huppert (2003) posited ongoing donor-funded infrastructure

improvement projects were counterproductive to the participatory

process as the project staff does not recognize the new

responsibility patterns at the lower level of delivery systems.

The failure to consult WUA leadership during design of the

4 Interview with Engineer El-Khashab in her office on 9 October 2012.

29

program created a situation in which the project did not include

the contributions or participation of WUA in project design and

implementation. Nunan (2006) concluded development of an

integrated lake management process in Uganda that

implemented continuous stakeholder consultation, and the

intervention of too many experts, supported by international

donors, could hinder the development of an effective

organization.

In Egypt, donor agencies usually tend to stress the

willingness of the government to embrace reforms and changes,

even though –as shown above- this is not true for all levels or

individuals. For example, the GOE is seen as being “keen to

replicate BCWUAs in non-IIP areas, and to take the organizing and

supporting of WUAs out of a “project” modality and have it in the

mainstream of MPWWR‟s work” (IRG et al.; 1998). Effective water

user participation in irrigation system improvement, operation,

maintenance and management are said to be “a policy objective of

the Ministry” (IRG et al., 1998).

30

Conclusion

Egypt has experienced a large and varied number of projects

aiming, in addition to technically improving the irrigation

system, to decentralize water management by devolving a share of

the responsibilities to user organizations of different types.

Experience with implementation of WUAs and BCWUAs have been

characterized by a trial-and-error process involving numerous

overlapping and sometimes conflicting institutional building

interventions by various donor-funded projects. There still

exists controversy about the timing of establishing WUOs, whether

mesqa WUAs should be established before, in parallel, or after

establishing BCWUAs (World Bank, 2005) according to different

projects. Others also stress the need to first establish all

integrated districts (IWMDs) within the larger

hydrologic/organizational unit (Directorate) at one time, and

then have IWMD staff organize and support BCWUA formation (El

Atfi et al., 2007), while still others promote establishing

“water user organizations at the branch canal level, allowing for

eventual expansion to the district level” (IRG, 1999).

31

There is a clear disconnect between, on the one hand, the

enthusiasm shown by donors, aid expert, and some officials

convinced of the need for PIM and, on the other, the

implementation level where understanding and acceptance of the

reform is limited (APP, 2007). It appears that the conceptions of

participatory management in circles of decision making officials

of the MWRI are “confused and sometimes contradictory” (APP,

2007). While some genuinely believe in the merits of shifting

governance, the balance of power and responsibilities, many see

participation as a means of increasing the contribution, in kind

or cash, of end-users. There are clear disincentives for most

staff to fully embrace the logic of management transfer. This

also raises questions about the role of the ministry in the

establishment of farmer organizations. With regard to the

establishment of the water boards, for example, the question was

raised of whether the “power and freedom [was] to be entrusted to

water users to create Water Boards, along with applying to MWRI

for establishment request and support, or [was] MWRI to carry out

the task of their establishment?” (APP, 2003).

32

Farmers welcome any intervention that promises to provide a

steady water supply and better infrastructure. They are generally

enthusiastic about participating and contributing to such

efforts. However, when they become disappointed with the outcome

they tend to become negative and apathetic towards the project.

Most farmers expressed a desire to be involved from the start of

the project and to be recognized as stakeholders rather than

beneficiaries and this point will be discussed in following

chapters.

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