Changing climate, choices, and consequences: Science as sentinel
Transcript of Changing climate, choices, and consequences: Science as sentinel
Through this talk, I will provide an overview of how the climate change research community aims to be a sen;nel, or a party that keeps watch, over the economic and environmental health of people and other species. They do this through a variety of epistemological tools, such as observa;ons, scien;fic theories, and computer models. The use of models is especially important, as they provide the ability to explore uncertain;es in systema;c ways. Through this overview, you will get a sense of how my research interests, which are around socio-‐economic and technological choices, are related to Chris’ research interests, which are around the physical climate. Addi;onally, you will see how the rela;onships between these communi;es of scholars has evolved and are entering a new phase.
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Very quickly, before I get into my presenta;on, I would like to acknowledge Naomi Oreskes for providing the inspira;on for the sub;tle of this talk. For one of her presenta;ons at the Fall 2013 mee;ng of the American Geophysical Union this past December, she had the provoca;ve ;tle, “The scien;st as sen;nel.” Just so there’s no confusion, my views of “science as sen;nel” are different from hers, but there is a nice post about her main arguments online in Limn magazine. Folks should check it out if they’re curious.
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For my presenta;on, I’d like to begin by poin;ng out that scien;fic work around climate change has been happening for a long ;me, and there are many things that are well established. The fundamental theore;cal insight of earth’s GH effect dates to work in 1896 by the Swedish physical chemist Svante Arrhenius. CO2 & H2O vapor: gases in atmosphere that trap heat. This suggested changes in atm concentra;ons could impact avg T of the planet. 1930s, engineer Guy Callendar (with some Canadian origins by the way) argued that fossil fuel burning added CO2 to the atm, leading to an observable amount of warming. He assembled T records from 1880-‐1934 from sta;ons around the world to arrive at this conclusion. Late 1950s, American geochemist Dave Keeling was driven to produce accurate measurements of atmospheric CO2. In just 2 years (1958-‐1960), he had sufficient data to conclude the atm concentra;on of CO2 was rising. These measurements have con;nued ever since.
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Physical climate scien;sts have been the first sen;nels of this phenomenon. Once this scien;fic community realized that enhancement of the earth’s natural greenhouse effect was real, they developed detailed computer models of the earth system to inves;gate how surface temperature, precipita;on, ice melt, sea level, and a variety of other factors could be affected by different levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Shown here is the observed change in GAST from 1950-‐2010 as a black line. The gray shading around that is the spread of 42 climate models over the same ;me period. As you can see, the models track observed T quite well, which gives us confidence that the models are useful representa;ons of reality. (Normal is based on 1986-‐2005) Now that we have that confidence, we can run the models forward, into the future, to see what may be in store under different levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
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Here we see the comparison of two cases for temperature change over this century: -‐A red case analyzed by 39 models called RCP8.5 -‐A blue case analyzed by 32 models called RCP2.6 By 2100, these levels of climate change, which are based on equally plausible emissions scenarios, are quite different. -‐In the red case, T change averages 4degC -‐In the blue case, T change averages 1degC As you can see, there are confidence intervals around these average projec;ons, and Chris’ work is related to why these kinds of models, when projec;ng future changes in climate, exhibit this kind of spread. So what does the difference between 4deg and 1deg of climate change mean?
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A different community of researchers, those who focus on economic and environmental impacts, use the temperature projections produced by physical scientists to articulate the risks of different levels of climate change. The way to read this table is that each row describes impacts of climate change for a particular sector, such as water, ecosystems, or public health. The vertical white lines are like finish lines; as different lines are crossed, consequences of different severity become more likely. (READ EXAMPLES FOR FOLKS IN BACK) It’s pretty clear that all else being equal, more climate change is more dangerous. It would seem that our policy choices around climate change are quite simple: To avoid worse impacts from climate change, set lower global targets for greenhouse gas emissions. The lower the targets, the better. Things couldn’t be simpler, right?
Schweizer Disserta;on Defense, May 4, 2010
(2011 NAS-‐NRC report) The problem is that this brand of policy advice may be too simple. It is certainly pervasive – this is the cover of a report produced 3 years ago by The Na;onal Academies in the US. The clear message from the scien;fic community has been that if we want to choose a future climate with lower risks, we should choose to decrease our greenhouse gas emissions as much as possible as soon as possible. However, this perspec;ve speaks to only one element of the complex and dynamic system of human-‐environment interac;ons. Just as the average global temperature could change by 1 deg or 4 deg by the end of the century, a lot of other things will change. This ques;on is not simply an intellectual one; it has deeper implica;ons for the very way that climate change research is done.
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Returning to this figure from the latest IPCC report, I glossed over an important assump;on frequently employed in these temperature change projec;ons. I said previously that two cases were being compared, one called RCP8.5 and another called RCP2.6. These cases refer to alterna;ve hypothe;cal outcomes for greenhouse gas concentra;ons. [ANIMATE] The tradi;onal paradigm for thinking about where these hypothe;cal concentra;ons come from is to see them as the result of a par;cular emissions profile. [ANIMATE] In turn, the emissions profile is due to human ac;vi;es, which are subject to par;cular socio-‐economic condi;ons. [ANIMATE] Under this paradigm, socio-‐economic condi;ons drive, or determine, the shape of the temperature projec;on.
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An alterna;ve view is that things aren’t that simple. We’re shining gears in this figure, because what you’re looking at is no longer some temperature projec;ons but some global CO2 emissions projec;ons. Here the amount of emissions is indexed to what was observed in 1990. The light blue shading summarizes [LIT REVIEW] The rainbow lines correspond to emissions projec;ons that were commissioned by the IPCC for a special report. What I would like to call your aoen;on to are the ranges on the far-‐right side of the figure. These 6 cases of A1FI, A1B, A1T, A2, B1, B2 refer to 6 hypothe;cal sets of socio-‐economic condi;ons, or 6 hypothe;cal worlds. [ANIMATE] What’s striking is that there is substan;al overlap in emissions profiles for these 6 worlds. The socio-‐economic condi;ons reflect assump;ons about things such as [ANIMATE]. A1 is similar to B1 except that sustainable development is not a priority, so economies are less energy efficient and don’t necessarily switch away from fossil fuels. A conclusion that has been drawn from this overlap is that human choices may NOT
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Revisi;ng the tradi;onal paradigm for the relevant rela;onships between human choices and climate change, there is nothing incorrect, per se, with this causal view. However, the climate change research community recognizes that there are shortcomings with the tradi;onal paradigm, namely that … [ANIMATE] …the conceptual scaffolding of this paradigm is incomplete.
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Bearing that caveat in mind, the SRES (that is, the image in the background here with the big light-‐blue fan and overlapping ranges for emissions) pointed out that a different conceptual rela;onship between human choices and climate may be important for the scien;fic community to inves;gate. Under the new model, some aspects of the tradi;onal causal model are retained, for instance the causal rela;onship between greenhouse gas concentra;ons and changes in surface temperature. However, mul;ple socioeconomic condi;ons can be consistent with any par;cular mix of greenhouse gases. This means that the scien;fic community should be systema;cally inves;ga;ng two “fans of uncertainty”: Alterna;ve levels of climate change AND alterna;ve socioeconomic condi;ons.
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Exploring both types of uncertainty simultaneously means thinking beyond pegging par;cular socio-‐economic condi;ons to par;cular levels of climate change. Instead, to have a beoer calibrated sense of the risks of climate change, we must consider alterna;ve socio-‐economic condi;ons in the face of any par;cular level of climate change. Because mul;ple socio-‐economic condi;ons can be consistent with a par;cular amount of climate change, the scien;fic community is moving beyond thinking about individual socio-‐economic scenarios to thinking about an array of scenarios, presented here as a matrix.
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Currently there are studies underway to bound the uniqueness of human choices on climate. When I described the light blue fan of emissions scenarios with ranges of overlap between some socioeconomic condi;ons, not all of them overlapped all of the ;me. Similarly, it is expected that for the new socio-‐economic scenarios, some levels of climate change will be “out of bounds” for par;cular sets of socio-‐economic condi;ons. However, for me as an analyst with interests in socio-‐economic condi;ons, the parts of this matrix that are most interes;ng are the rows where mul;ple socio-‐economic condi;ons would be consistent with some level of climate change.
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For the sake of argument, let’s pick the forcing level of 4.5 W/m2 by the year 2100. Under the new scenario matrix framework, scien;fic studies that consider the intersec;on of this forcing level with different socio-‐economic condi;ons in slightly different contexts can be compared. -‐Perhaps one global study of policies to mi;gate, or decrease greenhouse gas emissions, considers 4 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios
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For the sake of argument, let’s pick the forcing level of 4.5 W/m2 by the year 2100. Under the new scenario matrix framework, scien;fic studies that consider the intersec;on of this forcing level with different socio-‐economic condi;ons in slightly different contexts can be compared. -‐Perhaps one global study of policies to mi;gate, or decrease greenhouse gas emissions, considers 4 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios -‐While another considers 2 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios
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For the sake of argument, let’s pick the forcing level of 4.5 W/m2 by the year 2100. Under the new scenario matrix framework, scien;fic studies that consider the intersec;on of this forcing level with different socio-‐economic condi;ons in slightly different contexts can be compared. -‐Perhaps one global study of policies to mi;gate, or decrease greenhouse gas emissions, considers 4 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios -‐While another considers 2 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios -‐And maybe a mi;ga;on policy study at the level of con;nental regions also considers 2 other socioeconomic scenarios
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For the sake of argument, let’s pick the forcing level of 4.5 W/m2 by the year 2100. Under the new scenario matrix framework, scien;fic studies that consider the intersec;on of this forcing level with different socio-‐economic condi;ons in slightly different contexts can be compared. -‐Perhaps one global study of policies to mi;gate, or decrease greenhouse gas emissions, considers 4 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios -‐While another considers 2 alterna;ve socioeconomic scenarios -‐And maybe a mi;ga;on policy study at the level of con;nental regions also considers 2 other socioeconomic scenarios -‐One could also imagine sector-‐specific studies, such as for transporta;on. The same could be said of studies that focus on policies to adapt to climate change, or that es;mate the impacts of a changing climate on human ac;vi;es like agriculture. (green shapes)
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As the matrix is populated with the findings of these various studies, it may be possible to look across the constella;on to obtain a sense of the -‐Range of effort to mi;gate greenhouse gas emissions -‐Range of adapta;on possibili;es -‐Range of unavoidable, or residual impacts from climate change as a func;on of the COMBINED clima;c and socioeconomic condi;ons.
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In summary, this presenta;on has focused on how the scien;fic community has explored uncertain;es around climate in systema;c ways. I did not focus on any new research findings, but one thing that is always important to tell a general audience is [THERE IS NO CONTROVERSY]. Through this presenta;on, I aimed to provide you a sense of how my research interests, which are around socio-‐economic and technological choices, are related to Chris’ research interests, which are around the physical climate. Addi;onally, I described how the rela;onships between our communi;es of scholars have evolved and are entering a new phase. One way to compare and contrast the priori;es of different scien;sts doing climate change research is what kind of sen;nels they are… To address a problem as big as climate change, we need both!
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