Changes and Continuities in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Politics of the Survival of the 1965...

ChangesandContinuitiesinPost-Suharto

Indonesia:ThePoliticsoftheSurvivalofthe1965

Narrative

RebeccaMeckelburg18802795

Ideclarethatthisproject/dissertationismyownaccountofmyownresearch.Itcontainsasitsmaincontentworkwhichhasnotbeenpreviouslysubmittedforadegreeatanyuniversity.

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ThisdissertationissubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofPoliticsandInternationalStudies(Honours)

MurdochUniversity2013

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ContentsAcknowledgements...............................................................................................................................iiiAbstract.......................................................................................................................................................vGlossaryofTerms.................................................................................................................................viiIntroduction..............................................................................................................................................1ChapterOne...............................................................................................................................................7HistoricalNarrative:TheCreationOfNationalIdentityAndPoliticalLegitimacy....7HistoricalNarrative,NationalismandIdeology...................................................................7MassViolenceandNationalIdeology.......................................................................................8NationalismandLegaciesofAuthoritarianRegimes.........................................................9NarrativeandContestationofPower.....................................................................................10

ChapterTwo............................................................................................................................................15NewOrderHistoricalNarrativeandPoliticalPower............................................................15OriginsoftheMassViolence.......................................................................................................16PurposeoftheViolence.................................................................................................................18TheCreationoftheNewOrderMyth......................................................................................19

Chapterthree..........................................................................................................................................25HistoryasaWeapon:TheStruggleforDemocracy...............................................................25ThestruggleforhistoryafterSuharto....................................................................................27ChallengestotheNewOrdernarrativeabout1965.........................................................28AbdurrahmanWahidPresidency.............................................................................................31TheSurvivalofthe1965Narrative..........................................................................................33

ChapterFour...........................................................................................................................................41Historythatwillnotgoaway...........................................................................................................41TheTruthisTold:KOMNASHAMBreaksRanks...............................................................42RenewalofContestation...............................................................................................................45PresidentialApology......................................................................................................................50TalkingAboutthePast:NewHopesandNewFears........................................................51DemocraticStagnation..................................................................................................................53

ChapterFive............................................................................................................................................57PoliticsofthePast:ChangesandContinuities.........................................................................57PoliticalChangeandDealingwiththePast..........................................................................57ContinuitiesandtheProspectsforChange...........................................................................60

Conclusion................................................................................................................................................63Thesisbibliography.............................................................................................................................65

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AcknowledgementsIowethankstomanypeopleinmyjourneytoproducethisthesis.

MyfirstthanksistomyfriendsandfamilyinIndonesiawhoshareagreatconcern

forthepastandhowitshapestherealityofourlivesnowandhowwemay

imagineourfuture.

MyspecialthankstoIanWilson,mysupervisor,forhisencouragement,guidance

andcriticalengagementwithmywriting.

Myparents,JamesandPatriciaMeckelburg,havebeenagreatsourceofinspiration

throughoutmylife,settinganexampleofhowtostruggleforsomething

worthwhiledoing.MyspecialthankstomyfatherJamesforhelpwiththetechnical

aspectsofthesisproduction.

MythankstoMaxLane,thefirstpersontolighttheflamethatgrewtobecomemy

passionforthestruggleoftheIndonesianpeople.MythanksalsotoDavid

BourchierforhisinterestandsharingofideasandtoDavidHillforhelpingetting

started.

Iwouldneverhavemadeitthisfarwithouttheloveandunflaggingsupportfrom

myhusbandDidotandsonKayonthroughoutthisyear.Inmanywaystheyarethe

reasonIhavedonethisworkasthisstoryispartoftheirpastandtheirlife

aspirationsarepartofoursharedimaginedfuture.

AlltranslationsofIndonesianmaterialthatappearsinthisworkaremyown.

v

AbstractFifteenyearsafterthefalloftheSuhartodictatorshipinIndonesia,the

authoritarianhistoricalnarrativeabout1965thatwascreatedbytheNewOrder

regimehasbeendefendedandreaffirmedbythepost-NewOrder‘democratic’

state.DuringtheNewOrder,the1965narrativewasusedtojustifyandlegitimize

statesponsoredviolenceagainstthePKIandotherleftwingnationaliststhat

resultedinatleasthalfamilliondeathsinthemid1960s.Thissamenarrative

underpinnedthepoliticallegitimacyofthenewlyemergingNewOrderstateand

articulatedaversionofnationalidentityandnationbuildingthatwasthe

antithesisofthepreviousera.

Thesurvivalofthe1965narrativehasfacilitatedthesurvivalofanti-communist

ideologyfromtheNewOrder.Itcontinuestounderpinpoliticallegitimacyfor

thoseinpoweraswellasprovideimpunityforactsofpoliticalviolenceand

repressionthatareusedtodefendtheirsocialandpoliticalpower.Anti-communist

ideologycontinuestosupportarestrictednotionofcitizenshipandnational

identity.Restrictednotionsofcitizenshiptodaysignificantlyconstrainthe

freedomsofcivilsocietytoengageinopendiscourseaboutthepossibilitiesfor

deepeningandstrengtheningpoliticaldemocracyanditsinstitutions.

Theongoingcontestationoverthe1965historicalnarrativeindicatesthathistory

andversionsof‘thepast’arepartofthedynamicofdemocraticpoliticsin

Indonesia.Analysisofthecontestationoverthe1965authoritarianhistorical

narrativeallowsustoexaminethechangesandcontinuitiesinconceptsofnational

identityandcitizenship,andinthecategoriesofpolitical‘inclusion’and‘exclusion’

fromtheNewOrderauthoritarianregimetothereformeddemocraticstatethat

existstoday.

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GlossaryofTermsAliansiJurnalisIndependen(AJI):AllianceofIndependentJournalistsAngkatanBersenjataRepublikIndonesia(ABRI):ArmedForcesoftheRepublicofIndonesiaBadanIntelejenNegara(BIN):StateIntelligenceAgency(NU)BarisanSerbaguna(Banser):Multi-PurposeBrigadeDewanPerwakilanRakyat(DPR):People’sRepresentativeCouncil(thenationallegislature)40HariKegagalanG-30-S1Oktober–10Nopember:TheFortyDayFailureofthe30SeptemberMovement1October–10NovemberGerakanPemudaAnsor(GPAnsor):AnsorYouthMovementGerakan30September(G-30-S):30thofSeptemberMovementGerakanWanitaIndonesia(Gerwani):IndonesianWomen’sMovementGolkar(GolonganKarya):FunctionalGroupIkatanKeluargaOrangHilangIndonesia(IKOHI):IndonesianAssociationoftheFamiliesoftheDissapearedJagal:ButcherKeterbukaan:OpennessKetuaMajelisPimpinanCabangPemudaPancasila:ChairpersonofthebranchexecutiveofPancasilaYouthKoalisiuntukKeadilandanPengungkapanKebenaran(KKPK):CoalitionforJusticeandTruthFindingKomandoOperasiPemulihanKeamanandanKetertiban(KOPKAMTIB):OperationalCommandfortheRestorationofSecurityandOrderKomisiNasionalHakAsaziManusia(KOMNASHAM):IndonesianNationalCommissionforHumanRightsKomisiuntukOrangHilangdanKorbanTindakKekerasan(KONTRAS):CommissionfortheDisappearedandVictimsofViolenceKomiteRakyat:People’sCommittee(proposalinitiatedbythestudents’ForumKota(Forkot):CityForum)KomunitasTaman65:Gardenof65CommunityLaskarJihad:MoslemHolyWarFightersLembagaBantuanHukumJakarta(LBHJakarta):JakartaLegalAidInstituteLembagaPenelitianKorbanPeristiwa65/66(LPKP):InstitutefortheResearchofthe1965/66AffairLembagaPerjuanganRehabilitasiKorbanRejimOrdeBaru(LPRKROB):InstituteofStrugglefortheRehabilitationofVictimsoftheNewOrderRegime

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LembagaStudidanAdvokasiMasyarakat(ELSAM):TheInstituteforSocialStudyandAdvocacyLubangBuaya:CrocodileHoleMahkamahKonstitusional(MK):ConstitutionalCourtMajelisPermusyawaratanRakyat(MPR):People’sConsultativeAssembly(Indonesia’ssupremelegislativebody)MajelisUlamaIndonesia(MUI):IndonesianIslamicClericsCouncilMasyarakatSantriuntukAdvokasiRakyat(Syarikat):SantriSocietyforPeople’sAdvocacyMonumenPancasilaSakti:SacredPancasilaMonumentNahdlatulUlama(NU):(RevivaloftheIslamicscholars)thelargesttraditionalSunniIslamicgroupinIndonesiaOrdeBaru:NewOrderPaguyubanKorbanOrdeBaru(PAKORBA):SocietyoftheVictimsoftheNewOrderRegimePancasila:FivePrinciplesPanglimaDaerahMiliter(Pangdam):MilitaryAreaCommnaderPanglimaKodamIV/Diponegoro:Commanderofthe4thMilitaryAreaCommand/DiponegoroPartaiAmanatNasional(PAN):NationalMandatePartyPartaiDemokrasiIndonesia(PDI):IndonesianDemocraticPartyPartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(PDI-P):TheIndonesianDemocraticPartyofStrugglePartaiGolkar:ThePartyoftheFunctionalGroupsPartaiKeadilanSejahtera(PKS):ProsperousJusticePartyPartaiKebangkitanBangsa(PKB):NationalAwakeningPartyPartaiKomunisIndonesia(PKI):IndonesianCommunistPartyPartaiNasionalIndonesia(PNI):IndonesianNationalPartyPartaiPersatuanPembangunan(PPP):UnitedDevelopmentPartyPartaiRakyatDemokratik(PRD):People’sDemocraticPartyPemudaPancasila(PP):PancasilaYouthPengkhianatanG-30-S/PKI:TheBetrayalbythe30thSeptemberMovement/IndonesianCommunistPartyPenguasaKeamananDaerah(Penganda):RegionalSecurityCommanderPengurusBesarNahdhatulUlama(PBNU):NahdatulUlamaExecutiveBoardPeristiwaTanjungPriok:TanjungPriokAffairPersatuanPurnawirawanAngkatanBersenjataRepublikIndonesia(PEPABRI):AssociationoftheRetireesoftheIndonesianArmedForces

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PorosTengah:CentralAxisReformasi:Reform/Reformation

ResimenParaKomandoAngkatanDarat(RPKAD):ArmyPara-CommandoRegimentnowknownasKOPASSUSSekretariatBersama65(SEKBER65):JointSecretariaton1965SuratPerintahSebelasMaret(Supersemar):OrderofMarchtheEleventhTentaraNasionalIndonesia(TNI):IndonesianNationalMilitaryYayasanPenelitianKorbanPembunuhan1965/66(YPKP):FoundationfortheResearchofthe1965/1966MassacreYayasanPenelitianKorbanPembunuhan1965(YPKP65):(FoundationforResearchoftheVictimsof1965MassacreYayasanPenelitianKorbanPelanggaranHakAsasiManusia(YPKPHAM):FoundationfortheResearchofTheVictimsofHumanRightsViolationsYayasanKasutPerdamaian:ShoeforPeaceFoundation

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IntroductionTheauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativeabout1965thatwascreatedbytheNew

Orderregimeremainsafundamentaltoolunderpinningpoliticallegitimacyforthe

currentdemocraticpoliticalorderinIndonesiaandthesocialandeconomic

intereststhatitdefends.Thecurrentstateoppositiontowardsare-examinationof

historicaleventsandthe1965eventsinparticular,arenotjustbadhistory,but

ratheradefenseagainstwhatisunderstoodtobeachallengetotheideological

underpinningsoftheIndonesianNewOrderregime,whichinturnchallengesthe

currentpolitical,socialandeconomicorder.

Indonesia’scentralizedmilitarystate,bornoutof‘crisis’withthepurposeof

protectingthenationfromapoliticalandideologicalfoe(communism),justifiedits

needforconstantsurveillanceandrepressionofpoliticaloppositionthroughthe

creationof‘myth’abouttheIndonesianCommunistParty(PKI)andaversionof

historythatplacedatitscentretheongoinglatentdangerofaresurgent

communistthreat.TheIndonesianstate’scontemporarydefenceofanti-

communistideology,reliesuponthisnarrativewhichremainsapotentpolitical

toolforensuringsupportfor,andthesilencingofopposition,toactsofpolitical

repressionandviolencecarriedoutorsupportedbythestate.

Fifteenyearsafterthemassivepoliticalupheavalthatledtothedownfallof

Suharto’s32-yearmilitaryrule,successive‘democratic’Indonesiangovernments

havelargelyfailedtoactontheissueofstatesponsoredviolenceandthe

widespreadabuseofhumanrightsduringtheperiodoftheNewOrderregime.The

mostsignificanteventsofmassviolencewerethosedirectedagainstthePKIand

otherleftwingnationaliststhatresultedinatleasthalfamilliondeathsinthemid

1960s.InthewakeofthismassviolencetheNewOrderstatewasquicktocreatea

newofficialnarrativeofIndonesianhistory.Thisnarrativecreatedanofficial

silenceovertheeventsof1965andrewrotethehistoryofIndonesiaandits

struggleforindependenceandofnationbuilding.Itsprincipalpurposewasto

providepoliticallegitimacyfortheNewOrderstatethatwasbeingbuilt,aversion

ofnationbuildingthatwastheantithesisofthepreviouseraofnationbuilding.

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Responsesfromgovernmentofficialsaswellasrepresentativesofcivilsocietyto

recenteventsthatarticulatedifferent‘versions’ofthe1965periodofIndonesian

history,indicatethatthereareongoingtensionsbetweenentrenchedelements

fromwithinthecurrentpoliticalregime,representinganorderorinterestsbased

onthisfounding‘myth’,andsocialandpoliticalforcesseekingtore-examinethis

history.Thesecontestingsocialandpoliticalforcesarecomingfromcivilsociety,

butalsofromwithinstateinstitutions,specifically,theNationalHumanRights

Commission(KOMNASHAM).Thepurposeofthisstudyistoanalysethereasons

forthesurvivalofthe1965NewOrdernarrativeaftertheendofNewOrder

authoritarianrule.

Theconceptof‘authoritarianhistoricalnarrative’inthisthesisreferstothe

representations1ornationalmythscreatedbyanauthoritarianregimeaboutthe

pasttoprovideanideologicalunderpinningforpoliticallegitimacy.Thisthesisis

primarilyconcernedwithwhathappenstothisnarrativeintheprocessofpolitical

changefromanauthoritarianstatetoareformedanddemocratizedstate,which

requiresthestateanditspoliticalinstitutionstoredefineitsauthorityand

legitimacytoitscitizens.Inthesemomentsrepresentationsofthepastmay

disappear,betransformed,losetheirlegitimacyortheymayinfactpersist.

PreviousacademicinvestigationprovidesuswithextensiveevidencethattheNew

Order1965narrativewasconstructed2tolegitimizethebloodymassacresthat

tookplaceinthemid1960sacrosstheIndonesianarchipelago.Thesemassacres

werepartofasystematicallyorganizedplanbytheIndonesianmilitarytowipeout

thePKIandtoseizestatepowerundertheleadershipofGeneralSuharto.This

researchhassubstantiallyunderminedthemythcreatedbytheNewOrderabout

theeventsofthe1October1965.Itisinthiscontextthatweexaminethereasons

fortherecentoppositionbytheIndonesianstateandsomegroupsincivilsociety

toareexaminationofthe1965events.Studyingthiscontestationallowsusto

analysethepoliticalintereststhatareatstake,theinterestgroupsthatare

1Authoritarianhistoricalnarrativereferstoofficialstateversionsofhistoricaleventsthathavebeenconstructedforideologicalpurposesandthatunderpinthelegitimacyofpoliticalelitestoholdpower.McGregor’suseoftheconceptof‘representation’issimilartotheuseoftheconceptofhistoricalnarrativeinthisthesis.McGregorexplainsthatrepresentationattemptstoemphasisetheinfluenceofthepresentonre-representingthepast(2007,5).2JohnRoosa2006;KateMcGregor2007;DouglasKammenandKateMcGregor(eds)2012.

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involvedinthecontestationandthefunctionthenarrativeservesforthosein

powertoday.

Previousacademicworkhasdemonstratedthatdespiteaprocessof

democratizationsince1998,thereismuchpoliticalcontinuityfromtheprevious

authoritarianNewOrderregime,whichmightsuggestalimitedorshallow

democratizationhastakenplace3.Otheracademicworkhasemphasizedthe

reformnatureoftheYudhoyonogovernmentelectedin2004,itsachievementsin

democraticconsolidationanditsresponsivenesstosocietalpressuresforongoing

reform4.Analysingthecontestationoverthe1965authoritarianhistorical

narrativeallowsustoconstructaframeworktoexaminechangesandcontinuities

inconceptsofnationalidentityandcitizenship,andinthecategoriesofpolitical

‘inclusion’and‘exclusion’fromtheNewOrderauthoritarianregimetothe

reformeddemocraticstatethatexiststoday.Theresultsofthisexamination

providesomeevidenceonthenatureofthedemocraticchangethathastaken

placeinthepost-authoritarianIndonesianstate.

Theauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativeaboutthemassviolenceanddestructionof

thePKIin1965thatwascreatedbytheNewOrderregimebecamepartofthe

foundationofNewOrderideology,underpinningitspoliticallegitimacy5and

creatingaconceptofcitizenshipthatwascutofffromitsprevioushistorical

traditions.Chapteroneoutlinesatheoreticalframeworkforanalyzingthe

functionsandusesofhistoricalnarrativebynation-statesgenerallyandby

authoritarianstatesspecificallyinprovidinganideologicalunderpinningfor

politicallegitimacy.‘Defenceofthenation’isoftenusedasanideologicalweapon

3HadizandRobison2004;Ryter2009;Zurbuchen20054Mietzner2009b;Aspinall2010b;vanKlinken2008.5Theconceptofpoliticallegitimacyisusedinthisthesisintwo(mutuallysupportive)ways.Oneisageneraluseoftheconceptofpoliticallegitimacytotalkabouttheprocessbywhichpowerisbothinstitutionalisedandgivenmoralgrounding,wherebythosewhoholdpowerclaimtheirlegitimacyonthebasisofeithertraditional,charismatic(affectualoremotionalgrounds),orrational-legalgrounds(Marshall1998,363).InthecaseofthesystematiccampaignofmassviolenceagainstthePKIinIndonesiain1965theconceptofpoliticallegitimacyhasanadditionaluse.The1965historicalnarrativewasusedto‘legitimise’(provideajustificationfor)theactionsofthemilitaryinannihilatingthePKIandincreatinganewpoliticalorderfundamentallydifferentfromthatwhichithadreplaced.Itdidthisbyholdingthattherearecertaingroupsofpeoplewho,byvirtueofaspecificassignedcharacteristic(iecommunist),oughttobeexcludedfromthemoralandlegalprotectionsnormallyowedtohumans(Bellamy2012,161).Legitimacyandtheprocessofjustificationareimportantcomponentsofthepoliticsofmassatrocities.Atthesametimetheseactsarealmostneverlegitimatetoallsocialgroupsandhencetheeffortstocoverupandhidethenatureofthemassacresbothdomesticallyandinternationally.

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increatingcategoriesofpoliticalinclusionandexclusioninrelationtothepast.

Thestudyofpowerandpoliticalcontestationiskeytounderstandingtherangeof

responses,discourses,andsocialimaginingsthatinfluencethesurvivalornotof

authoritarianhistoricalnarrativesinpostauthoritarianstates.Inthecontextof

significantpoliticalupheavalalternativehistoricalnarrativesmayunderminethe

politicalstatusquoandturn‘thepast’intoasiteforstruggleoverpowerand

politicallegitimacy.Chapteronefocusesontheoriesandaspectsofanalysisthat

arespecificallyrelevanttothecaseofIndonesiaandoutlinesthepossible

functionsandpurposeofasurvivingauthoritarianhistoricalnarrative.

Chaptertwooutlinesanextensivebodyofacademicworkthatcritically

contradictstheofficialhistoricalnarrativeabouttheeventsof1October1965and

thehistoricalroleofthePKIinnationbuilding.ItdiscusseshowtheNewOrder

regimeusedthe1965narrativetolegitimisetheIndonesianmilitary’sactionsin

carryingoutmassviolenceagainstalegitimate,legalpoliticalorganization,the

PKI.Itexplainshowthe1965narrativewasinitiallyusedtoprovidetheideological

foundationforlegitimizingafundamentallydifferentversionofnation-building

andnationalidentityfromthepreviousorder.Overtimethenarrativewas

extendedtoarticulatemoreexplicitlythenation’sprincipalfoe,thecommunists.

Anti-communistideologythenprovidedongoinglegitimacyforactsofstate

repressionagainstthosethatchallengedthelegitimacyoftheNewOrderregime.

Chapterthreediscussesthecontestationoverthe1965narrativethatemergedin

thefirstdecadeofreformasi6.Thisisanalysedinthecontextofthedemocratization

processthatbeganwhenSuhartosteppeddownfrompowerinMay1998.The

characterofthecontestationovertheNewOrderhistoricalnarrativeabout1965

thatemergedfrom1998,waspartofthebroaderdemocraticstrugglesthatexisted

andthediscoursesabouttheformsthatanewdemocraticsocietycouldtake.I

examinetheconditionsinwhichthiscontestationtookplaceandthesocialforces

involvedinthecontestation.UsingCesariniandHite’sanalyticalframeworkI

arguethatthemanagementofthetransitionbypredominantlyNewOrderelites7

madeitlikelythatthe1965authoritariannarrativewouldbemaintainedand

6ReformasiisthetermusedtodescribetheperiodofreformorreformationthatIndonesiaenteredintoafterthefallofSuhartoinMay1998.Italsoreferstotheaspirationsofthedemocraticmovementthatstruggledtobringdownthedictatorship.7Theseincludethesemi-oppositionelementsdescribedbyEdAspinall(2010a).

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defendedinthisinitialperiod.UsingthissameframeworkIexaminewherethe

authoritarianlegacyofthe1965narrativewasdefendedandaffirmedinthisfirst

decade.

Dealingwiththepastisshapedbythelegaciesofauthoritarianruleandthe

political,institutionalandlegalfactorsthatinfluencethedevelopmentofthepost-

authoritarianstate(BarahonadeBrito2001,158).Thenarrowingofpolitical

space,particularlyaftertheendoftheWahidpresidency,witnessedanarrowingof

optionsforseekingtruthandjusticeforthevictimsof1965andtheirfamiliesand

forchangestotheofficialnarrative.Therenewalofpubliccontestationoverthe

1965narrativesinceearly2012isframedmoreexplicitlywithintheframeworkof

humanrightsdiscourse.Chapterfouranalysessomefactorsstimulatingthis

renewedcontestationandtheactorsengagedinthecontestation.Itanalysesthe

significanceoftheKomnasHAMreportthatwasreleasedinJuly2012andthe

responseofotherstateinstitutionsandgovernmentofficialstoitsrelease.It

brieflydiscussesthecontributionofthefilm‘ActofKilling8’tothiscontestation

andtheresponseswithinIndonesiatothefilm.Thisanalysisisthenusedtodraw

someconclusionsaboutthenatureofgovernment,politicalinstitutionsandthe

reformsthathavebeenmadeundertheYudhoyonoledgovernment.

Chapterfiveexaminesthenatureofdemocracythatdevelopsinpost-authoritarian

stateswhenitisnegotiatedbypreviousauthoritarianelites.Usingacomparative

approachIexaminethefunctionsthatthe1965narrativeplaysforthoseinpower

todaywithparticularattentiontorestrictednotionsofcitizenship.Restricted

notionsofcitizenship,passedonfrompreviousauthoritarianregimesusually

indicatethenon-democraticvaluesoftheeliteforcesthatcurrentlyholdpower.It

isthesesamerestrictednotionsofcitizenshipthatoftenplacesignificant

constraintsonpressuresfromcivilsocietytodeepenandstrengthenpolitical

democracyanditsinstitutions.

IconcludebyproposingthattheprocessofdemocratizationinIndonesiahasnot

beendeep.Thedeclineofapoliticisedcivilsociety,particularlyafter2001,the

weaknessofthedemocraticparliamentaryoppositionandtheongoingrestrictions

oncitizen’sdemocraticrights,havelimitedthedemocraticoptionsavailableto8‘ActofKilling’isafilmthatdocumentsthestoriesofactsofkillingthatoccurredinMedaninNorthSumateraduringthemasskillingsof1965-66inIndonesia.Thestoriesaretoldbythekillersthemselveswhoreenacttheirstoriesinfrontofthecamera(Oppenheimer2012).

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Indonesiansociety.Thedefenceofthe1965narrativeisnotonlyaboutwhathas

takenplaceinthepast.Arguablymoresignificantly,thenarrativecontinuestoplay

anideologicalroleinconstructingnotionsofcitizenshipthatexcludepoliticalideas

andideologiesthatchallengethesocialandeconomicinterestsofthoseinpower

today.Thesefactorsindicatethatashallowdemocracyhastakenholdin

Indonesia,onethatisnotrepresentativeoftheneedsandaspirationsofthearray

ofsocialforcesinvolvedintopplingtheSuhartodictatorshipin1998.

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ChapterOne

HistoricalNarrative:TheCreationOfNationalIdentityAndPoliticalLegitimacy

HistoricalNarrative,NationalismandIdeologyThehistoricalnarrativeaboutthemassviolenceanddestructionofthePKIin1965

thatwascreatedbytheNewOrderregimebecamepartofthefoundationofNew

Orderideology,underpinningitspoliticallegitimacyandcreatingaconceptof

citizenshipthatwascutofffromitsprevioushistoricaltraditions.Thischapter

outlinesatheoreticalframeworkforanalyzingthefunctionsandusesofhistorical

narrativebynation-statesgenerallyandbyauthoritarianstatesspecificallyin

providinganideologicalunderpinningforpoliticallegitimacy.Itdiscussesthe

factorsthatinfluencethesurvivaloftheseauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativesin

postauthoritarianstates.Itfocusesonthemesandaspectsofanalysisthatare

specificallyrelevanttothecaseofIndonesiaandoutlinesthefunctionandpurpose

ofasurvivingauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativeforthosewhoholdpower.

Historicalnarrativeispresentinallsocietiesinmultipleforms.Thedominantform

ofhistoricalnarrativeintheeraofmodernnation-statesishistoricalnarrative(s)

aboutnationsandnationbuilding(Anderson2006;vanKlinken2005).

Nationalismhasinclusivedemocratizingformsthatemphasisecommitmentto

politicalideasandinstitutionsthatarerepresentativeofthepeople(civic

nationalism).Italsohasexclusionaryessentialistformsthathighlightmythsof

origin(culturalnationalismorethnicnationalism)(vanKlinken2005,234)and

oftenincludeexclusiveidentitiesornotionsofmembership/citizenship.Astrongly

definedformofnationalidentitymaybepresentinstateideologyoravarietyof

expressionsofnationalismmaycoexistwithinaspecificnationalcontext(Gol

2005).

Statenarrativesofhistoricaleventsareoftencriticalinunderpinningparticular

typesofpoliticalorderorpowerrelations9.Whatmayhappentoanauthoritarian

9TheTurkishstatewasestablishedin1923onthebasisofadenialofthemultiethnicstatusofpeopleslivingwithintheterritoriesofthepreviousOttomanEmpireinwhichtheTurkishStateTerritorywasdeclared.UnresolvedissuesofethnicdiscriminationthathadexistedwithintheOttomanEmpireremainedwhentheTurkishstatewascreated.Thenationalidentityandconcept

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historicalnarrativeintheprocessofpoliticalchange(transition)froman

authoritariantopost-authoritarianstatecantellussomethingsaboutthenature

ofthischangeandofthepost-authoritarianstateitself.Onastatelevel,official

historicalnarrativeoften,ifnotusually,playsanideologicalroleintheshapingof

theacceptablelimitsofnationalidentity.Conceptsofcitizenshiparebasedona

constructofnationalidentitythatallowspeopleto‘belong’usuallysolongasthey

relinquishtheirrighttoclaimstootherpossibleidentities(Gol2005;Dixon2010,

Anderson2005).Thedegreeofpersuasivenessoftheselectivetraditionsofofficial

nationalismshingesonstatesystems’controloverthemeansofdistributionof

socialmeaningsandontherelationsofforcesinsociety.Thiscanbeunderstoodas

astrategyofcreatingaselectivetraditionofnationalism,whichbecomesthekey

fortheconsolidationofstatelegitimacy,whichisproducedbytheinstitutionsand

personnelofthestatesystem(Gol2005,135;Isyar2005).

Thepotentialforalternativehistoricalnarrativestounderminethepoliticalstatus

quoturns‘thepast’intoasiteforstruggleoverpowerandpoliticallegitimacy

(Anderson2006;BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001,38).

Consequently,itisnoaccidentthatnation-statessystematicallydeveloptheirown

officialnarrativesofhistoryinanattempttolegitimisethestateandtheexisting

powerrelationsthroughthecontrolof(representationsof)thepast.Thestudyof

officialhistoricalnarrativeovertimecanprovideakeytounderstandingthe

natureofchangesinpowerrelationswithinasocietyatparticularmomentsin

time(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001,39).

MassViolenceandNationalIdeology‘Defenceofthenation’isoftenwieldedasanideologicalweaponincreating

categoriesofpoliticalinclusionandexclusioninrelationtothepast.Attimesof

significantrupturesuchastheexperienceofgenocideormassviolence,peopleand

societiesexperiencechangesinconsciousnessthat‘bringwiththemcharacteristic

amnesia.Outofsuchoblivions,inspecifichistoricalcircumstances,spring

narratives’(Anderson2006)basedonmyth.Thesenarrativesarealsoreferredto

ofcitizenshipthatwascreatedatthattimewasbasedonaTurkishethnicidentitythatactivelyexcludedotherethnicgroupsincludingKurds,Armenians,GreeksandAssyrians.TheofficialTurkishstatenarrativedeniesthemassacresandforceddeportationscarriedoutagainstethnicArmeniansin1915thatclaimedthelivesofmorethan300,000people.Itcontinuestosuppressdemocraticandcivilrightsofothersignificantethnicminorities,suchastheKurdishminoritylivingwithintheboundariesoftheTurkishstate(Gocek2008;Gol2005).

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as‘socialmemorymaking’(SchwartzinBarahona2010,17).Thesenarratives

mostoftenrelyontheassertionofacollectiveidentitythatallowsmembershipor

not.Socialmemoryisusedasamembershipmakingapparatus,whichisatthe

coreofthecreationof“ImaginedCommunities”(Anderson2006).Mythsand

memorieslegitimatepowerholdersandshapehowpeopleknowandinterpret

politicalrealities(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001,38).Fear

ofexclusionisafactorthatmotivatesindividualsandcollectivestorememberas

wellastoforget(Cesarini2004).

Powerandpoliticalcontestationarekeytounderstandingtherangeofresponses,

discourses,andsocialimaginingsthatoftenareinconflictwithoneanotherwithin

societiesandculturesandinindividualsstrugglingtocontinuetofindmeaning

yearsaftertheexperienceofextremeviolence.Thesestrugglesinvariablyintensify

innewpoliticalconditionsofdemocratictransitionfromauthoritarianregimes

(Pouligny,Chesterman&Schnabel2007).Whilewemightimaginethatapost-

authoritariandemocraticstateandcivilsocietywouldfacilitatetherevisitingand

activecontestationofauthoritarianhistoricalnarratives,inmanycases

authoritariannarrativespersistevendecadesaftertheendofanauthoritarian

regime(Gocek2008).Thesurvivalofthesehistoricalnarrativescanprovideclues

towhathashappenedintheprocessofpoliticalchangetoapost-authoritarian

state.Post-authoritarianstatesmaydevelopassomeformofliberaldemocracy,

introducingnewdemocraticinstitutionssuchasfreeparliamentaryelectionsor

theymaybeinanewformofnon-democraticorauthoritarianregime(Barahona

deBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001).Politico-businessoligarchies

inheritedfrompreviousregimesmayexistinbothsituationsandtheirrelative

powerinthenewpost-Authoritariansituationwillbedependentupontheirability

togainholdoverthenew,revampedorsameoldinstitutionsofpowerthat

developorexistinthenewpoliticalsituation(RobisonandHadiz2004).

NationalismandLegaciesofAuthoritarianRegimesCesarini(2004,172-73)arguesthatperiodsofsignificantsocialchangearecrucial

momentsforre-making‘myths’regardingthenationandthepast.Thesemythscan

supporttherevitalizationofpeople’sinterestandsupportfornewdemocratic

institutions,whichwillunderminethecontinuationofauthoritarianlegaciesfrom

thepast.Similarlywherethesehistoricalmomentsarenotseizeduponas

10

opportunitiesforsignificantpoliticalchange,theremaybelittleornochangein

thelevelofpeople’s(dis)interestinpoliticalinstitutions.

Thepersistenceofauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativeorthe‘politicsofthepastin

thepresent’inapostauthoritarianstateordemocratictransitioncanbedefinedas

beingpartofthelegacyofanauthoritarianregime.CesariniandHite(2004,2)

conceptualizeauthoritarianlegaciesinthreeways:asstructuresandinstitutions

thatareinheritedfrompreviousauthoritarianregimes;thelingeringpowerand

influenceoftraditional/conservativegroups;andasculturalorpsychological

manifestationsofauthoritarianism(uncertainty,fear,distrust).Authoritarian

historicalnarrativesmaybepresentinoneoralloftheselegaciesandmaybe

reproducedviapoliticalinstitutions(governmentpolicy,lawmaking),official

discourses(schoolcurriculum,museumsandotherofficialhistorical

representations)andnon-officialdiscourses(socialdiscoursesthatdefine‘good’

andevil’).

NarrativeandContestationofPowerEconomiccrisisandthefallofauthoritarianpoliticalregimesdonotalwayssignal

theendortheautomaticremovalofentrenchedeconomicandpoliticalinterestsof

apreviousauthoritarianregime.Conditionsofeconomicandpoliticalcrisisopen

thedoortonewpoliticalopportunitiestoforgenewconstellationsofpower10and

theopportunitytostrengthencivilandpoliticalrights.Whatwillemergeinnew

conditionsaftertheendofanauthoritarianregimewilldependonnewalliances

thatareformedinastruggletodeterminewhowillbeabletocapturepolitical

power.Politicalalliancesmaybebasedontemporaryormoreenduringinterests

(RobisonandHadiz2004).Itwilldependonthestrengthofthenewcontesting

politicalforcesaswellasthecapacityofoldauthoritarianintereststotransform

themselvesinthenewpoliticallandscape.

10HadizandRobisonconceivetheproblemofpowerandpoliticalchange(inIndonesia)“intermsofvaststrugglesbetweencoalitionsofstateandsocialpower”(2004,13).Powerisnotconceivedofaslyingwithintheinstitutionsofthestatebutratherinspecificcoalitionsofsocial,economicandpoliticalinterests.ThecoalitionsofsocialintereststhatheldpowerintheNewOrderregimeincludedthestatebureaucracy,politico-businessfamilies,corporateconglomeratesandcommercialpropertiedinterests.Economic(andsocialandpolitical)crisisfrom1997/1998allowedforothersocialandeconomicforcestocompeteormakealliancesinthepoliticalenvironmentofparliamentarycapitalismthatemergedpost-Suharto.Thenewconstellationofpowerthathasbeenconsolidatedpost-SuhartoincludesthesameNewOrderelitesinallianceswithnewpoliticalplayerswhoconstitutesocialandeconomicintereststhatwerepreviouslyonthefringesofpowerundertheNewOrder(ibid.2004,12-13,16).

11

Thereorganizingofpowerandtheestablishmentofpoliticallegitimacyforthose

whoholdpowerinapost-authoritarianstatemayrelyon‘newimaginings’ofthe

nationandsocietyormayrelyonpreviouslyestablishednarrativesthatprovided

politicallegitimacyforthepreviouspoliticalorder.Thecontestationoversocial

memoryorhistoricalnarrativesreflectsastruggleoverpowerandwhogetsto

decidethefuture(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001,38).The

persistenceofauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativesinapostauthoritarianstatecan

beunderstood,atleastinsignificantpart,tobeaproductoftheoutcomeof

contestationoverpowerinapostauthoritarianstate.Whetherthereis

opportunitytopromotenewpolitical‘imaginings’(narratives)aboutthepastwill

dependonhowsignificantthechangesinthestatestructuresandpersonnelfrom

thepreviousregimeare.

Thenatureofademocraticchangeandwhoholdspowerinapostauthoritarian

statewillsignificantlydeterminewhohascontroloverthe(re)makingofstoriesor

officialnarrativesaboutthepast.Theinvolvementofelitesfromtheprevious

authoritarianregimeintheprocessofbrokeringornegotiatingthesetransitionsor

periodsofchangewillsignificantlyinfluencetheextenttowhichthereisamajor

breakwiththepastaswellasthestrengthandinfluenceoftheauthoritarian

legaciesthatsurvivethetransitions(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&

Aguilar2001).Howsignificantthechangesinstatestructuresandinstitutionsas

wellasformaldiscoursesarewillbeinfluencedbythecapacityandsuccessof

alternativesocialforces(fromoutsideofthepreviousauthoritarianregimeelites)

inunderminingthelegitimacyoftheelitesfromthepreviousorderand

discreditingthempolitically.

Theupholdingofauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativebypost-authoritarianstates

canserveseveraloforallofthefollowingpurposes.Inthefirstinstancethis

historicalnarrativeservesanideologicalpurpose,providinglegitimacyforthenew

powerarrangementsorthepolitical,economicandsocialorderthatis

consolidatedinthenewpoliticalconditions.Intheperiodofdemocraticchangeor

transitionthisnarrativeservesthepurposeofmaintainingcategoriesofpolitical

inclusionandexclusionfromthepastregime.Thisfacilitatesthe‘forgetting’ofpast

atrocitiesandreflectsthelackofpoliticalwilltodealwiththepastbecauseoffear

ofpunitiveactionsforcrimesofviolencethatbeneficiariesofthenewpower

12

arrangementshavecommittedinthepast(McGregor2012,Molino2010)11.It

providesadefencenotonlyagainstthethreatofpunitiveactions,butalsoagainst

challengestotheirholdonpowerandtotheireconomicorfinancialinterestsfor

thosewhohavebeenmaterialbeneficiariesofthepreviouspoliticalorder12.

Socialrelationsthatare(re)formedinsocietiesaftertheexperienceofmass

violenceorgenocidearecomplex(Pouligny,Chesterman&Schnabel2007).

Beneficiariesarenotlimitedtoactorswhowieldsignificanteconomicandsocial

powerbutalsoto‘ordinarypeople’whohaveandcontinuetobenefitfromthe

suppressionofalternativenarrativesorasearchfortruth13.

Inprovidinganideologicaldefenceforthepreviousauthoritarianstate’sactsof

politicalviolence,theauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativelegitimizestheongoinguse

ofrepressivemeasuresincludingviolencebythenewdemocraticregimeagainst

thosethatchallengethenewpowerarrangements.Actsofstateviolenceare

justifiedandlegitimizedonthebasisoftheideologicalconstructionofthenational

interestandexclusivedefinitionsofcitizenship.Challengestotheexistingpolitical

orderareidentifiedasprimarily‘internalthreats’tothesovereigntyofthenation

anddeemedtobeathreattothenationalinterest.

Themaintenanceoftheoldcategoriesofinclusionandexclusiondenyan

alternativelexiconorideologicalframetosocialforcesandclassesseekingmore

substantivesocialchangeandpoliticalreform.Thethreatoforactualuseof

violenceandotherrepressivemeasuresbythepost-authoritarianstaterestricts

thecapacityofcivildemocraticmovementstocampaignforthedeepeningof

democraticinstitutions.

Ifstatenarrativesofhistoricaleventsarecriticalinunderpinningparticulartypes

ofpoliticalorderorpowerrelations,thenthesurvivalofauthoritarianhistorical

narrativeinapost-authoritariandemocraticstatetellsussomethingaboutthe

11DespiteoneofthecentraldemandsofthereformmovementbeingacallforjusticeforvictimsofstateviolencelimitedstepshavebeentakentomakestateofficialsaccountableforgrosshumanrightsviolationscommittedduringtheNewOrder(Suh2012;Sulistiyanto2007).12SuhartoandhisfamilyandseveralotheroligarchyfiguresbecamethepersonalownersofstateassetsandaccruedenormouswealthduringtheNewOrder.OneofthedemandsofthereformmovementwasfortheseizureoftheseprivateassetsthatrightlybelongedtothepeopleofIndonesia.Noneofthesedemandshavebeenactedupon(O’Rourke2002).13InBali,asignificantfactorintheviolencewasinter-clanrivalry.Perpetratorsbecameimmediatematerialbeneficiariesofassetsthatwereseizedafterpeopleweremurderedorincarcerated(DwyerandSantikarma2007).

13

natureofthepoliticalchangeprocessthathastakenplaceandaboutthebalanceof

forcesbetweendifferentsocialforcescontestingpoliticalpower.

Itwouldgenerallyindicatethateliteforcesfromthepreviousauthoritarianregime

haveplayedasignificantroleinnegotiatingormanagingtheprocessofpolitical

change.Studyingthechangesinconceptsofnationalidentityandcitizenshipand

categoriesofpolitical‘inclusion’and‘exclusion’fromthepreviousregimeprovides

somemeasureofhowsubstantialthedevelopmentofdemocraticpolitical

institutionshasbeen.Afailuretore-makemythsaboutthenationandthepast

aftertheendofanauthoritarianregimewillunderminetheinterestofpeoplein

politicsandpoliticalinstitutionsandhenceweakenthepotentialfortheongoing

undermininganddismantlingofauthoritarianlegacies.

15

ChapterTwo

NewOrderHistoricalNarrativeandPoliticalPowerTheNewOrdernarrativeabout1965wascriticalinprovidinglegitimacyforthe

newpolitical,socialandeconomicorderthatwascreatedafterthemassviolence

of1965-6814.Thisnarrativeplayedanideologicalroleinlegitimizinga

fundamentallydifferentversionofnation-buildingandnationalidentityfromthe

previousorder(Hadiz2006;Dwyer&Santikarma2007;Goodfellow2003;

Djakababa2010;VanLangenberg1990).Discreditingtheprevioussocialand

politicalorderwasessentialinprovidinglegitimacyfortheactsofmassviolence

initiated,coordinatedandcarriedoutbythemilitary.Thisrequiredtheseveringof

anyhistoricallinkswiththepoliticsofthepastandthecreationofsilenceoverthe

massviolence(McGregor2005,228;Djakababa2010,143-144;Dwyer&

Santikarma2007,194-195).

Throughthecontrolovertherepresentationsofpasthistoricaleventsthis

narrativecreatedanewandexclusiveconceptofcitizenship15basedonloyaltyto

Pancasilaideology(Hadiz2006;McGregor2007;Anderson2005).TheNewOrder

regimecreatedanewIndonesiannationalidentityandideologythatdemonized

communistsandcommunismandcreatedaversionofhistoryaboutthePKIas

‘betrayers’inthehistoricalstrugglefornationalindependenceandintheearly

yearsofformativenationbuilding.Atthesametimediscussionofpoliticsbecame

taboo.Nationalunitywasnowtobebasedonthesingularideologicalprincipleof

Pancasila(McGregor2007;Djakababa2010)whichdidnotallowotherideologies.

ThiswouldsubsequentlyjustifythebanningofMarxist-Leninist(communist)

ideologyin1966.

14Themajorityofkillingswerecarriedoutinthefirstfourmonthsofthemilitary’scampaignstartinginearlyOctober1965.KammenandMcGregor(2012)talkaboutthecontoursofmassviolencethattookplacebetween1965-68todescribethemultipleformsofviolencethattookplaceacrosstheArchipelagoasa‘counter-revolutionintendedtocurtailthemassmobilizationsandpopularparticipationunleashedbythenationalrevolution;destroythesocialbasesofSukarno’sleft-leaningpoliticalsystem;andtoestablishanewpro-Westernmilitaryauthoritarianregime’.15Forexamplepeopleapplyingforpublicservantpositionshadtodemonstratetheircommitmenttopancasilaandasserttheircommunist-freefamilybackground.Anyactionsconsideredtobepoliticalsuchasalabourdemonstrationcouldbedeemedcommunistastheyweredivisiveanddisruptedthesocialharmonyrequiredtobuildthenationcollectivelybasedonconsensus.FormerpoliticalprisonerswererequiredtocarryIDcardsthatstatedtheirformerpoliticalprisonerstatus(Conroe2012).

16

Forthepurposeofthisthesistheuseof‘authoritarianhistoricalnarrative’orthe

‘1965NewOrdernarrative’refersinthefirstinstancetotheNewOrderregime

versionofeventsthattookplaceonthemorningof1October1965withthe

murderofsixgeneralsatthelubangbuaya(crocodilehole)inJakarta.This

narrativewascreatedbythenewlyemergingpoweroftheNewOrdershortlyafter

theeventstookplace16.The‘version’ofhistoricaleventsabout1965thatwas

upheldbytheNewOrderregimewasnotonlyabouttheeventsof1October1965

andthemurderofthesixgeneralsspecifically.Morecruciallythisnarrativetolda

storythatwasthenusedasjustificationfortheremovalofPresidentSukarno,the

massmurdersofatleast500,000membersandsympathisersoftheIndonesian

CommunistParty(PKI)andotherleftwingnationalistsandthecreationofananti-

communistideologybytheNewOrdermilitaryregime.

The‘NewOrdernarrativeabout1965’referstotheexplanationsthatdoexistfor

themasskillingsthatoccurredin1965asbeingprovokedbythePKIwho

threatenedpeople’slivesandthevaluesofPancasila.ItarguesthatthePKIwere

atheistsandmurderersandthattheyhadalwaysprovokedrebellionanddisunity.

Thisnarrativearguesthatthepoliticalclimateatthetimein1965wasoneof‘kill

(communists)orbekilled’(Zurbuchen2005,15).

Thischapteroutlinesthehistoricalbackgroundtothecontemporarypoliticsthat

arethefocusofthethesis.ItexplainshowtheNewOrderregimeusedthe

narrativetoprovidelegitimacyfortheIndonesianmilitary’sactionsincarryingout

massviolenceagainstalegitimate,legalpoliticalorganization,thePKI(Anderson

2013;McGregor2007).Itdescribesthebasicfactsofthemassacres,thepurpose

oftheviolence,theestablishmentoftheNewOrdersystemofpoliticalpower,the

creationoftheofficialversionofIndonesia’s1965historyandthesilencethatwas

imposedonanydiscussionofthishistoryinsubsequentdecades.

OriginsoftheMassViolenceSixarmygeneralsweremurderedinJakartaon1October1965.Whois

responsiblefortheirkidnappingandmurderremainshighlycontested(Roosa

2006,Djakababa2010).Despiteuncertaintyoverwhowasresponsibleforthe30

16ThefirstofficialversionentitledtheThefortydayfailureofthe30thSeptemberMovementwasproducedwithin40daysofthe1stOctober1965andwaspublishedbeforetheendof1965(McGregor2007,62).

17

Septembermovement(G30S)17(Roosa2006),significantacademicresearch

clearlysupportstheargumentthatafactionoftheIndonesianarmyledbyGeneral

Suhartousedthiseventasjustificationtobeginasystematiccampaignofmass

violenceandterroracrosstheIndonesianarchipelago(Kammen&McGregor

2012;Djakababa2010;Melvin2013).TheyphysicallywipedouttheIndonesian

CommunistPartyandotherleft-wingnationaliststhroughmassacres,

incarcerationwithoutlegalprocess,disappearances,tortureandsexualviolence.

Estimatesofthenumberskilledvarybetween500,000to3millionpeople,the

majoritybeingkilledinthefirstfourmonthsoftheviolence.Afurther600,000to

750,000people18wereinternedaspoliticalprisonersforyearsandinsomecases

decades(McGregor2013).

Since1998,agrowingbodyofresearchandtestimoniesabouttheactors,

processesandformsofviolenceindifferentlocalitiesacrossIndonesiahasbeen

published.Theseworksprovidedetailofthespecificrolesandmotivesoftheelite

armythepara-commandounit(RPKAD),regionalarmycommandsandtheirnon-

militaryalliesinpriming,facilitatingandcarryingouttheviolence.(Cribb1990;

FealyandMcGregor2012;Siregar2007;JenkinsandKammen2012)

Themilitaryatbothcentralandregionallevelplayedapivotalroleinthe

orchestrationandconductoftheviolence.Theviolencewasnotspontaneousnor

wasitanarchistic.Themilitarywereactivelysupportiveofviolencethatwas

carriedoutordirectlycoordinatedtheviolence(KammenandMcGregor2012).

Socialclass,ethnicityandlocalfactorsaffectedlocalpatternsofviolence.These

factorswereusedtoprovideexplanationsofthecausesoftheviolenceassimply

strugglesbetweennationalists,religiousorganisationsandthecommunists

(KammenandMcGregor2012;DwyerandSantikarma2007).Localconflictswere

exploitedbythemilitarytoinitiateorfacilitatethecarryingoutoftheviolence19

17Agroupthatreferredtothemselvesasthe30thSeptemberMovement(G30S)kidnappedandmurderedsixarmygeneralsonthemorningof1October1965(Roosa2006).18Reportedfiguresvarywildlyfrom70,000to1millionpeopleinterred.19InEastJavafollowersofthemassIslamicorganisationNUoftenbelievethatreligionisvalidasajustificationfortheviolencethattookplace.FealyandMcGregor(2012)arguethatpoliticalandsocio-economicfactorsweremoreimportantthanreligionassuch.ThePKIinsupportingandsometimesinitiatingpoorfarmers’claimsforlandbroughtthemintoconflictwithwealthyNUulamaelite.TheyconcludethatretainingpowerandprivilegewascriticalinexplainingthekillingsinEastJava.

18

Inmanycasesthemilitaryspreadhearsayandrumourstoprovokeandprovide

masssupportforviolentactionsincludingthemurderofPKImembers20.

PurposeoftheViolencePriortoOctober1965,Indonesiahadbeeninastateofincreasingsocial,political

andeconomicconflict.In1965thesetensionsbecameincreasinglysharpandthere

wereseveralindicationsthatapoliticalstrugglewasbeingwagedbetweenthePKI

andleft-wingnationalistsandthemilitaryinagrabforpowerthatwouldenable

thesecontradictionstoberesolvedineitheramoreexplicitlysocialistoramore

clearlypro-capitalistdirection(Kammen&McGregor2012;Hadiz2006;

Djakababa2010;Lane2008;Siregar2007).ThedestructionofthePKIremoved

thearmy’sonlyrivalforpower.ThearmythenremovedPresidentSukarno.

Throughout1966thearmysoughttoundermineSukarnoism,firstbypurgingthe

civilservice,thenbytargetingtheSukarnoistIndonesianNationalParty(PNI)and

finallybypurgingtheranksofthemilitaryitselfofallleftistandSukarnoist

elements(KammenandMcGregor2012).

Theseactionswerecarriedouttorealizeanumberofstrategicgoals.Thesewere

theeliminationofthePKIandthebroaderleft-wingnationalistmovementasthe

military’sonlysignificantpoliticalrivalforpower;topunishcommunistsandleft

nationalistsforactionsthatthreatenedlongestablishedpropertyrelationsthat

werediscriminativeandbasedonfeudalorcolonialrelations;andtorealizetheir

politicalandeconomicambitionstocreateamoderncapitalistnationstate(a

counter-revolution)thatwouldinitiallyhaveatitshelmSuhartoandaninfluential

militaryfactioninalliancewithWesterndevelopedcountries.Inotherwordsa

fundamentalreshapingofthenatureofpowerandsocialrelationsinIndonesia

(Kammen&McGregor2012;Hadiz2006;Lane2008;vanLangenberg1990).

Westerngovernmentswerecommittedtotheestablishmentofanauthoritarian

regimeinIndonesiapriortotheeventsof1965-66.Simpson(2012)explainsthat

inAugust1964theUnitesStatesadoptedacovertstrategytoremoveSukarno,

whichitwashopedwouldprovokeaviolentconflictbetweentheIndonesian

20TheprovocationbythemilitarywastosuchanextentthatinareasinBaliwheretherewerenotanysignificantnumbersofPKImembersorsympathizers,peoplewereaccusedofbeingPKIandthenmurderedtoensurethatlocalleadersmettheir‘quota’ofPKImembers.ThiswasoutoffearthatiftheydidnotfindPKImemberstheythemselveswouldbeaccusedofbeingcommunist(Dwyer&Santikarma2007;200).

19

ArmedforcesandtheIndonesianCommunistParty21.TheU.Sgavecritical

financialsupporttothearmyduringthecampaignagainstthePKI(Simpson2012

60-61).TheBritishandAustraliangovernmentslikewisesupportedSuharto’s

comingtopowerandtheestablishmentoftheNewOrderregime22.Thisexplains

whywesternpowershaveneverquestionedtheSuhartoregimeoranypost-

SuhartogovernmentoverthecampaignagainstthePKIandthenarrativethatwas

subsequentlycreated23.

Theleadersofthisnewlyemergingmilitarystatemovedquicklytoconsolidate

theirlegitimacybygainingcontrolofthecontentoftheimmediatepast(aboutthe

PKI,left-wingnationalismandSukarnoism)thatwasthentobere-madeinthe

mindsofthepublic(McGregor2007;Wieringa2003;Djakababa2010).

TheCreationoftheNewOrderMythThedominantpoliticalideasorideologyinIndonesiapriortoOctober1965were

communist,socialistandleftwingnationalistideas.Lieutenant-GeneralAli

MoertopolecturedhispropoagandistsintheInformationDepartmentthat,

“"Indonesianshavebeeninfluencedbycommunismasasystemofthoughtforso

longthatitcametobeidentifiedastheIndonesianwayofthinking."(p.110)

Moertopowasdesigningindoctrinationcourses"tomakeIndonesianstruly

Indonesian",becausehewantedtodivorcethemfromtheirnation'shistory.”

(BourchierandHadiz2003,110-111)

Assuch,theactionsofSuhartoandthosethatcametopowerwithhimwerenot

onlyarepudiationofSukarnoism,butadecisivedestructionofthesocialbasisfor

anewkindofpoliticalpower.Itwasanideologicalrejectionofthepopularmass

participationthatwasunleashedduringtheIndonesianrevolutionandwhich

continuedtothriveinthe1950sandearly1960s.

21ThemassviolenceinIndonesiacommencedatatimewhentheUnitedStateswasactivelyengagedinwaragainst‘communists’inVietnamandwhereU.SeconomicinterestswerebeingchallengedinSumaterabyplantationworkers.TherewassignificantpoliticaldebateabouttheneedtonationalizeforeignoilenterprisesandtherewasagrowingclimateofinsecurityforforeigneconomicventuresinIndonesia(Simpson2012).22AustralianPrimeMinisterHaroldHoltcommentedinTheNewYorkTimes(6July1966)"With500,000toamillioncommunistsympathisersknockedoff...Ithinkit'ssafetoassumeareorientationhastakenplace."23InstarkcontrasttothehorrorexpressedbythesamewesterngovernmentsovertheCommunistKhmerRougekillingsinCambodiain1975-79,WesterngovernmentsneverraisedchallengestotheSuhartoregimeoverthemasskillingsof1965-66,rathertheyactivelypromotedthecampaignagainstthePKI(Simpson2012).

20

TheNewOrdergovernmentledbySuhartocreatedthemythofthedemonPKI,the

enemyofthenation.TheycreatedthemyththatthePKIhadrepeatedlycommitted

treasonagainstthestate,andthatbyencouragingcommunistsandtryingto

shelterthemevenaftertheirtreasonSukarnoforfeitedhisrighttoleadthenation24.

InthefirstinstancethenarrativemadeuseofthePancasilaideologyofthe

previousorderledbySukarno,butredefinedittoexcludethe‘atheist

communists’25.Theuseofgenderideologybecameacriticalfactorinthe

establishmentoftheNewOrderstate26.Thisnarrativerecasttheidentityof

Indonesianwomenasthesubservientsupportersoftheirsociallyactivehusbands,

theguardiansofhomeandhearth.Iterasedtheleadingrolethatwomenhad

playedsociallyandpoliticallyinnationbuilding.Itdidthisthroughthecreationof

animageofthepoliticalleftactivistwomanassexualanddangerous,immoral,

threateningthemoralvaluesofthetrueIndonesiansociety(Wieringa2003;

McGregor2007).

TheblackpropagandacampaignagainstPKIandtheIndonesianWomen’s

Movement(Gerwani)notonlyfacilitatedtheactualchangeofpower,itlaidoneof

theideologicalfoundationsfortheNewOrder'smilitaryrule.Fromthenon,any

resistancetothemilitaryhasbeenblamedonsomePKIremnantorthelatent

dangerthePKIissaidtorepresent(Wieringa2003;Zurbuchen2002).Thenew

versionofnationalistideologysaidthattheheroesoftheanti-colonialmovement

werenolongerthepeople,butthemilitary(male)generalsandaristocrats.

Museumswerecreated,guidebooks,films,textbooks,schoolcurriculum,

reenactmentsofpasteventsandcommemorativehistorieswerepublishedthat

emphasisedthemilitaryincludingitspoliticalroleandarevisedversionof

pancasila(McGregor2007,28).

24Internalmilitaryconflictsoverrationalisationanddecommissioningofleftistdivisionsinthearmyledtoanuprisingin1948wherecommunistsandmuslimleaderswerekilled.Theseeventswerereconstructedintheformofmythaboutthe‘MadiunAffair’thatbecamepartofthesystematiccampaigntodiscreditthePKI(McGregor2013).25Compulsorypancasilaindoctrinationeducationwasinstitutedforschoolstudentsintheearly1970s,foruniversitystudentsinthemid1970sandforcivilservantsin1978.ThemilitarywerethedefendersofthepancasilaandthePKIweretheenemiesofthepancasila(McGregor2007).26SaskiaWieringaexplainshowtheNewOrdercreatedarepresentationofGerwaniwomenas‘debauched’,whichbecameametaphorforthedisorderofthelatterperiodoftheSukarnoera(Guideddemocracyperiod1959-1965).TheNewOrderregimeusedtheserepresentationstodepoliticizetheIndonesianWomen’sMovementandtoputforward‘appropriate’socialrolesforwomen(inMcGregor2007,82).

21

Thesacredpancasilamonument,whichincludesthepreservedlubangbuaya

(crocodilehole)27,becamesignificantinthecreationofthenarrativeandthe

‘representation’ofthe30Septembermovement(McGregor2007).Themonument,

usingadiorama,showsimagesprojectedofcommunists(includingGerwani)as

representingeverythingtheNewOrderrejected.Suhartodeclaredthepurposeof

themonumentwastopresentthefactsofthetreasonofthePKIandtheNew

OrdergovernmentastheprotectorsoftheIndonesiannationalphilosophyof

Pancasila.TheLubangBuayawaspreservedtoprovidethephysicalevidenceof

theneedtokillthecommunists(McGregor2007,70).

Thenarrativewasnotsingularandunchanging,butwasaddedtoand

strengthenedovertheperiodoftheNewOrder.Inthe1980sandagaininthe

1990sthemythofthe30thSeptemberMovementandthetreacheryandevilnessof

thePKIwasfocusedonspecificallyforelaboration(Budiawan2004;McGregor

2007).In1983afourhourlongfilmentitledtheTreacheryofthe30thSeptember

Movementwasproducedandbecamerequiredviewingforallhighschoolstudents

ontheannualanniversaryofthe30thSeptembermovement28.Therepresentations

ofthecommunistsaremoredevelopedasevil,schemingandcorruptcharacters

(McGregor2007,96).

Inthe1990snewofficialversionswereproducedthatweremorecomplexand

detailedaboutthecommunistthreat.TheMuseumofPKITreasonwasopenedin

1990(Roosa2006)andatorturescenewasaddedtotheoriginaldiorama.AWhite

book29waspublishedbytheNewOrderstate,withanintroductionbytheMinister

ofthestatesecretariatin199430.Thisbookextendedthenarrativeoriginally

createdbyNugrohoaboutthePKI(Budiawan2004;McGregor2007).Itsfocuswas

therevivalandelaborationofthecommunistthreatasthemainthreattothe

integrityoftheIndonesianstate.

Aspinallexplainsthisasaresponsetothereformelementsthatwereemergingat

thattime(2005).AnyindividualororganizationthatchallengedtheNewOrder

versionofPancasilaideology,theversionof1965historyorthelegitimacyofthe

regimewaslabeleda(communist)threattonationalsecurity.Theywouldoften

27Thebodiesofthesixmurderedgeneralswerefoundinawellcalledthelubangbuaya.28ItwasalsoshownonnationalTVonthesameday.29Officialstatepublication30Writer’stranslationtakenfromBudiawan2004.

22

experienceintimidationordirectrepressionbythemilitary31.Themilitaryactively

usedthethreatofthe‘latentdangerofcommunism’tolegitimizetherepressionof

oppositionforcesthatemergedduringtheperiodofopennessorketerbukaanin

theearly1990s(McGregor194-197;Aspinall2005).

Whilethemilitaryinitiallyledacampaignforgreateropennessinorderto

broadentheirpoliticalbaseinthelate1980sandearly1990s,32the‘communist

threat’wasatthesametimerevivedandstrengthenedbySuharto.Severalactions

weretakentostrengthenthe1965narrativeincludingapresidentialdecree

againstformercommunistswarningthat18millionformercommunistmembers

wereatlargeandcouldmakeacomeback(McGregor2007,196)33.

TherewerechallengestoversionsofIndonesianhistoryduringtheNewOrderera.

Theresponsebytheregimewasusuallytobanandcensorthem.Ofmorethan

2,000booksthatwerebannedduringtheNewOrder,mostdealtwiththeeventsof

1965-66(VanKlinken2005,239).Throughtheircontrolofofficialdiscoursessuch

ashistorybooks,monumentsandmuseums,lawsandlegalinstrumentsandthe

repressiveapparatusofthemilitarytheNewOrderregimewereabletoeffectively

controlhistoricaldiscoursesandmaintainthesilenceoverthemasskillingsthat

hadlegitimatedtheirtakingofpower.Pancasilaideologywasthecornerstoneof

thispost-ideologicaldevelopmentaliststaterequiringtheactiverepressionof

alternativeideologiesandpoliticalthoughtandaction,whichwasdeemedto

undermineunityandthenation-buildingproject.

Thesilenceoverthekillingsprovidedprotectionforthosewhobenefited

materiallyandpoliticallyfromthemasskillingsandwhobenefiteddirectlyinthe

social,economicandpoliticalorderthatwasestablishedafterthedefeatofthe

Army’sonlypoliticalrivalthePKI.ThisincludedassetsoftheyoungIndonesian

republicwhichsubsequentlybecamethepropertyofthemilitarybureaucracyand

individualstateofficialsaswellascivilianswhohadseizedastheirown,property31Oneoftheorganizationstargetedusingtheanti-communistideologywasthePeople’sDemocraticParty,whowerehunteddown,arrested,torturedanddisappearedafteraviolentclashattheIndonesianDemocraticPartyheadquartersonJuly271996whichtheywereaccusedofmasterminding.32AsconflictsbetweenSuhartoandthemilitaryunderBennyMurdanibecameincreasinglysharp(Aspinall2005,McGregor2007).33OneeventthatmarkedthereturntorepressionwasthebanningofthreepublicationsDetik,EditorandTempoonJune211994.Followingthisthemilitaryreturnedtoapatternofintimidationandcoercionandareturntotheuseofthe‘danger’ofacommunistthreat(Aspinall2005).

23

andgoodsofthosewhohadbeenmassacredorinterredwithoutlegalprocess

(Hadiz2006).Theenforcedsilenceoverthemassviolenceprovidedimpunityfor

thoseresponsibleforandwhoweredirectlyinvolvedincarryingoutthemass

killings(McGregor2012).ThroughouttheNewOrderacultureofimpunityfor

actsofmassviolencebythestatebecamelegitimized.TheIndonesianstate

bureaucracy,themilitaryandrepresentativesofcivilorganisationsdirectly

responsibleforcarryingoutorhavinglinkstothoseinvolvedinthemasskillings

havebeentheprimedefendersoftheofficialnarrativesincetheestablishmentof

theNewOrdergovernment.

ThedevelopmentandstrengtheningofthenarrativeduringtheNewOrderperiod

legitimizedthefierceanti-communismoftheregimeandwasactivelyemployedto

legitimizetherepressionofmoreradical(non-elite)politicalopposition

throughouttheNewOrderandspecificallyagainstthepoliticaloppositiontothe

dictatorshipthatemergedduringthe1990s.ItiswiththislegacythatIndonesia

enteredintoitsjourneyofdemocratizationthatbeganwiththesteppingdownof

SuhartoinMay1998.

25

Chapterthree

HistoryasaWeapon:TheStruggleforDemocracyAfterthefallofthedictatorSuhartoinMay1998therewasasignificantopening

upwithinsocietyofdiscussionaboutmanyaspectsofIndonesianhistoryincluding

theeventsof1965(McGregor2007;vanKlinken2005;Zurbuchen2002).The

liftingofrestrictionsonthepressandafreerpublishingenvironmentallowedlong

suppressedhistoriographiestoemerge34.Thenarrativeabout1965was

challengeddirectlyby,amongstothers,formerarmedforcespersonnelandbythe

survivorsofpoliticalrepressionof1965andtheirfamilies.

Rememberingthatalternativehistoricalnarrativesalwayshavethepotentialto

underminethepoliticalstatusquo(Anderson2005)itcanbearguedthatthis

contestationoverthepastwasindeedpartofthestruggleforpowerandpolitical

legitimacy(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001,38)by

competingsocialforcesintheimmediateperiodafterthefallofSuharto.The

characterofthecontestationovertheNewOrderhistoricalnarrativeabout1965

waspartofthebroaderdemocraticstrugglesthatexistedpostthefallofSuharto

andthediscoursesabouttheshapethatanewdemocraticsocietycouldtake.At

thesametimethattherewerechallengestotheNewOrdernarrativetherewere

explicitcallstobringSuhartoandhiscroniestojusticefortheirrobberyofstate

assetsandforabusesofhumanrights(O’Rourke2002;HadizandRobison2004).

HoweverthemanagedtransitionofpowerbyNewOrderelitesinthefirstthree

yearsofreformasiresultedinafailuretotakeactiononsignificantpolitical

demandsofthereformasimovement,specificallythecallstobringSuhartoandhis

croniestojustice.Thepoliticalclimateremainedonewhereitwasoftendifficultto

holdopenpoliticaldiscussionsaboutthepast35andactionstakenbytheAttorney-

34ManypeopleprotestedofficialhistoricalversionsthatwereperceivedaspromotingacultofthepersonalityofSuhartoaswellasthehistoricalroleoftheArmyasthenation’ssaviour.Ordinarypeople,parents,schoolchildren,aswellasretiredmilitaryofficersandformerofficersfromtheSukarnoerawerepartofagroundswellwherepeoplebegantotalkaboutandto‘correct’history(vanKlinken2005,242).Atthesametimethemilitarywasactiveinensuringthatmanypublicationsdidnotmakeittopress(vanKlinken2005).35FormerDeputysecretary-generaloftheIndonesianWomen’sMovement(Gerwani)wasinstrumentalintheestablishmentoftheYPKP.Sheroutinelyexperiencedthreatsandattacksweremadeonherhomeandworkplace.TheYPKPwebsitereportsthatonMay14,200020to30people

26

General’sofficein2007officiallysilencedanyofficialdiscoursesthatchallenged

the1965historicalnarrativeexplicitly36.

Chapterthreediscussesthecontestationoverthe1965narrativethatemergedin

thefirstdecadeofreformasi.Itoutlinestheinitialopportunitiesthatexistedfor

thosecontestingthe1965narrativetoputforwardalternativeversionsofhistory

andthesocialforcesinvolvedinthecontestation.UsingCesariniandHite’s(2004)

analysisIarguethatthemanagementofthetransitionbypredominantlyNew

Orderelites37madeitlikelythatthe1965authoritariannarrativewouldbe

maintainedanddefendedinthisinitialperiod.IoutlinehowconservativeNew

Orderelitesgainedcontrolofthenewdemocraticgovernmentand,alongwiththe

military,weresuccessfulindefendingandreaffirmingtheNewOrder1965

narrative.Thischapterthendrawsonthetheoreticalframeworkprovidedby

CesariniandHitetoidentifywhereauthoritarianlegacyofthe1965narrativehas

beendefendedinthereformasiera.

Indonesia’sexperienceafterthefallofSuhartoin1998,confirmsCesarini’s

argumentthatperiodsofsignificantsocialchangearecrucialmomentsfor

remaking‘myths’regardingthenationandthepast.Followingthesteppingdown

ofSuhartoin1998,expectationsofsignificantpoliticalreformanddemocratisation

werehighamongstmanysocialgroupswithincivilsociety.Aspinall(2005)argues

thatthisreflectedtheongoingprocessofpoliticisationsincetheearly1990sof

manysociallayerswithinsocietyfromthemiddleclassestostudents,workers,and

poorfarmers38andsignificantlyintheeventsof1998,asignificantsectionofthe

urbanpoorofJakarta.

Aspinall(ibid)describesthesocialandpoliticalexpectationsofmanysociallayers

fromcivilsocietythathadbeenbroughtintoavarietyofformsofpoliticalactionin

theprocessofbuildingofoppositiontothedictatorship.Oncethedictatorhad

gone,peopleexpressedtheirwillfornewdemocraticfreedomsinthepoliticalfromtheAnti-CommunistCommandcametotheYPKPoffice(IbuSulami’shome),claimingtheywerereadytokillanyonewhosoughttoremovetheanti-communistlawsinIndonesiaandclaimingthatIbuSulamiwasonesuchperson.YPKPwebsitehttp://wirantaprawira.de/ypkp/sulami.htm36In2007theAttorneyGeneralissuedaformaldecreeorsuratkeputusanthatrequiredallhistorybookstorefertothe30thSeptemberMovementas30thSeptemberMovement/IndonesianCommunistParty(G30S/PKI).(Roosa2008,XV).37Thisincludesthesemi-oppositionelementsdescribedbyEdAspinall(2010a).38Politicalprotestbyworkersandfarmersemergedasanincreasingphenomenonduringthe1990s(Aspinall2005).

27

spacethathadopenedup.Whilemuchofthestruggleforpowertookplace

betweenNewOrderelitesorthosewhowerelowerdownthefoodchaininthe

NewOrdersystem,therewassomeideologicalcontestationoverthe(re)makingof

thepostNewOrdersocial,economicandpoliticalorderintheearlyperiodof

reformasi(Aspinall2005;RobisonandHadiz2004;Lane2008).Inthisstruggle,

historybecameonesiteforideologicalcontestation.

ThestruggleforhistoryafterSuharto

ThepoliticalconditionssurroundingthefallofSuhartoallowedfortheopeningof

apoliticalspace39thathadnotexistedsincepriortothemassviolenceof1965.

Therewasintensivedebateincivilsocietyaboutwhowouldoverseethepolitical

transitionuntildemocraticelectionscouldbeheldandPresidentHabibie40faced

constantattacksonhislegitimacy41(HadizandRobison2004;Aspinall2005).

Politicaluncertaintyallowedrelativefreedomsthathadnotexistedpreviously

(RobisonandHadiz2004;vanKlinken2005,233;Aspinall2005;Lane2008;).For

atime,discussionanddebateaboutthenation,societyandhistorywasveryopen

andwhowouldemergetodecisivelyholdpoliticalpowerinthenewsocial,

politicalandeconomicrealitypostSuhartohadnotyetbeensettled.The

challengestotheNewOrderversionofhistoryweresignificantandinvolved

differentsocialgroupsandinterestswithinsociety(vanKlinken2005;McGregor

2007,16).

39Aspinall(2005)referstothe‘politicalspace’thatallowedreformelementstoopenlyanddirectlyorganizetochallengetheNewOrderinstitutionsofstatepowerandtheirofficialswithagreatlyreducedthreatorfearofrepression.40PresidentHabibiemadeseveralinstitutionalandlegalreforminitiatives(Apsinall2005;Anonymous2009)includinglooseningtherestrictionsonpoliticalpartiesandtradeunions,thefreeingofpoliticalprisoners,freedomofthepressandHabibiepromisedfreeandfairelectionsinthenearfuture.ThesewerearguablynecessarypoliticalconcessionsmadeinresponsetotheconstantpressuretorejectHabibieasalegitimatepresidentandcallsforhisresignation(Aspinall2005,271;HadizandRobison2004).ThroughtheseconcessionsHabibiewasabletoreconstitutehisadministrationasaninterimgovernmentuntilelectionswereheldin1999.41EffortstoestablishapresidiumofPeople’sCouncilconsistingofoppositionfigures,studentsandpeople’srepresentativesdidnoteventuate.Therewasnotextensivesupportforreformsinitiatedoutsideofthestateinstitutions,mostsignificantlyfromwhatAspinallreferstoasthesemi-oppositionfiguresofAmienRais,AbdurrahmanWahidandMegawatiSukarnoputri.Thestudentmovement,includingitsmoreradicalwingwerenotinagreementaboutunitingandformingallianceswiththemassofpoorworkers,farmersandurbanpoorcitizens(HadizandRobison2004).

28

Withtheimplementationofpoliticaldecentralizationandtheorganisingofdirect

elections,ordinarypeoplewerenotafraidtochallengeGolkar42officialsdirectly,

demandingtheirresignationfromlocalandregionalofficesintheinitialperiodof

reformasi.Themilitarywerekeentodemonstratetheirreformcredentialsasthey

cameunderpressurenotonlydomesticallybutfromtheinternationalhuman

rightscommunitythatwerecallingforaccountabilityfortheviolencecarriedout

inEastTimoratthetimeofthereferendumin1999(Suh2012;Mietzner2009a).

ThechallengetokeyNewOrderinstitutions,specificallythemilitaryandGolkar,

whichhadbeendiscreditedintheeyesofmanyIndonesians(Mietzner2009a),

providedopportunitiestochallengetheNewOrderversionofhistoryinits

broadestsense(VanKlinken2005).Thisnewpoliticalclimateallowedafreeingof

discussionaboutIndonesianhistory,notonlyorspecificallyabouttheNewOrder

versionoftheeventsof1965butaboutjustabouteverything43.Thebattleover

historywasonepartofthestruggleforpoliticalchangeanddemocratisation.

ChallengestotheNewOrdernarrativeabout1965

Intheinitialperiodofreformasi,somepro-reformasigroupscampaignedexplicitly

tounderminethelegitimacyofNewOrderinstitutionsofauthoritarianruleandfor

theremovalofNewOrderpoliticalfiguresfromgovernmentinstitutions(Robison

andHadiz2004;Aspinall2005,227;Lane2008).Itwasinthispolitical

environmentthatsomesurvivorsofthe1965massviolenceestablishednew

organizationsandalongwithhumanrightsorganizationsbeganinvestigationsinto

thepastthroughthecollectionoforaltestimonies,exhumationofmassgravesand

thecollectionofsurvivinghistoricaldocumentationthatcontradictedtheNew

Orderversionofhistory(McGregor2012,234-5).

42GOLKARwastheprincipalpoliticalorganizationusedbySuhartotomanagemanyaspectsofthedictatorships’organisations.Organisedexplicitlyasa‘functionalgroup’(GolongonKarya–Golkar)notapoliticalpartyitwasthemainvehicleforobtainingaccesstoandbecomingpartofthe‘in-group’oftheSuhartoregime.Beingactivegaveopportunitiestoreceivepolitical,economicorsocialprivileges.DuringtheHabibiepresidency,HabibieusedthestructuresofGolkarrightdowntothelocalleveltomobilizepoliticalsupport.Byofferingthereleaseofcertaincentralgovernmentpowerstotheregionshewasabletoeffectivelymobilizepoliticalsupportforhispresidencywhichwasaimedatprovidingthosewhosepowerwasthreatenedtoregroupandreorganisethemselvesinanewpowersharingarrangement.43IntheearlyyearsafterSuharto’sfallfrompowerin1998,censorshipofpublicationsalmostdisappeared.Long-forbiddenworksbydeadcommunists–goingbackasfarasthe1920s–wereresurrected.AccountsbycommunistsurvivorsoftheirsufferinginSuharto’sgulagcirculatedwithoutbeingbanned.Afloodofconflictinganalysesof‘whatreallyhappenedin1965’soldwell,especiallyiftheyclaimedthatthesecretmastermindsoftheGerakan30September(G-30-S)wereSuharto,theCIA,orMI-5(Anderson,2013).

29

From1998until2003,therewerethreesignificantgroupingsthatopenly

challengedthehistoricalnarrativeabout1965.Theprinciplechallengersofthe

NewOrderhistoricalnarrativeabout1965andthePKI,weretheformerpolitical

prisoners,thesurvivorsofthemassviolenceandtheirfamilies.Thesewerethe

citizenswhohadbeen‘excluded’anddeniedcivilandhumanrightsbytheSuharto

dictatorship.Theyformedorganizationsinthefirstfewyearsafterthefallof

Suhartowiththepurposeofresearchingthekillings,imprisonmentsandhuman

rightsabusesthattookplaceduring1965-6844.Theyincludedtheremnantsof

thosepoliticallyconscioussectionsofsocietythatrememberedwhathad

happenedin1965(McGregor2007;Lane2008).Theevidencetheyproducedand

thetestimoniesthattheypublished,directlychallengedtheNewOrderhistorical

representationofcommunists.

Secondly,weretheliberalreformersfromthe‘semi-opposition’NewOrder

politicalelites.ThethreeprincipalpoliticalfigureswereAbdurrahmanWahid,

AmienRaisandMegawatiSukarnoputri45wholedtheirrespectivepoliticalparties

oftheNationalAwakeningParty(PKB),theNationalMandateParty(PAN)andthe

IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle(PDI-P).BothWahidandthePDI-P

initiatedbillsintotheparliamenttorepealthelawbanningcommunism.Arguably,

onlywiththisreformcouldatrulyopendiscussionabout1965takeplace46.

AmienRaiswasopenlyhostiletocommunismandthePKI(HadizandRobison

2004)andMegawatiSukarnoputritendedtoavoiddirectstatementsinsupportof44TheleadersoftheseorganizationsincludedfiguressuchasSulami,formervice-secretary-generaloftheIndonesianWomen’sMovement(Gerwani)andPramoedyaAnantaToeraculturalactivistpriortotheNewOrder(McGregor2012).KatharineMcGregor(2012)discussestheworkofsomeoftheseorganisationsinherchapter“MassGravesandMemoriesofthe1965IndonesianKillings’focusingonacasestudyoftheworkofoneorganization,theFoundationfortheResearchintoVictimsofthe1965-66killings(YPKP).Otherorganizationsinclude:SocietyoftheVictimsoftheNewOrderRegime(PAKORBA),InstituteofStruggleforRehabilitationoftheVictimsofNewOrderRegime(LPRKROB),InstituteforResearchintothe1965/66Affair(LPKP),ResearchFoundationforTheVictimsofHumanRightsViolations(YPKPHAM),ResearchFoundationfortheVictimsof1965MassacreYPKP65,JointSecretariaton1965,(Sekretariatbersama65-Solo),ShoeforPeaceFoundation(YayasanKasutperdamaian),SantriSocietyforPeople’sAdvocacy(Syarikat),Gardenof’65Community(Taman65-Bali).45AbdurrahmanWahidwastheformerChairpersonoftheNahdlatulUlama,Indonesia’slargestmuslimorganisationandIndonesia’sfourthpresidentfrom1999-2001.DuringtheSuhartodictatorshipAmienRaiswasaleadingcriticalmuslimacademicandleaderofMuhammadiyahIndonesia’ssecondlargestmuslimparty.MegawatiSukarnoputriisthepopulistleaderoftheIndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle.SheservedasIndonesia’sfirstwomanpresidentfrom2001-200446In2000theKOMNASHAMrefusedtosetupaninvestigationintothemasskillingsof1965-66onthebasisthattheparliamenthadnotyetliftedthebanonMarxist-Leninistteachings(McGregor2012).

30

thevictimsof1965(McGregor2012).HoweverAbdurrahmanWahidandseveral

leadingfiguresinthePKBandthePDI-P47werepreparedtochallengethe

historicalnarrativeabout1965specificallyandthebanonMarxism-Leninismand

thePKI.

DuringtheWahidpresidencykeyfiguresfromthePKB,includingthe

parliamentaryleadersoftheDPRandMPR,48openlysupportedWahid’sinitiative

toprovokepublicdebateaboutrepealofthelawsbanningcommunismand

rehabilitationofthevictimsof1965,yetthepartyasawholewasnotunanimously

insupport.WhenWahidmadeanapologytothevictimsof1965onbehalfofthe

NahdlatulUlama(NU)itbecameclearthattheorganizationwasdeeplydivided

overtheirattitudetotheeventsof1965.FollowingWahid’sapology,youngerNU

activists49becameconcernedabouttheroleoftheNUinthemassviolenceof

1965-68specificallyinJava(McGregor2012,238).

ThethirdgroupwereIndonesianNon-GovernmentOrganisations(NGOs)that

campaignforhumanrights.TheseNGOsincludedtheCommissionforthe

DisappearedandVictimsofViolence(KomisiuntukOrangHilangdanKorban

TindakKekerasan-KONTRAS),theInstitutefortheStudyandAdvocacyofHuman

Rights(LembagaStudidanAdvokasiHAMMasyarakat-Elsam),Associationforthe

FamiliesoftheDisappearedIndonesia(IkatanKeluargaOrangHilangIndonesia-

IKOHI)andtheLegalAidInstitute(LembagaBantuanHukumJakarta-LBH

Jakarta).Theseorganizationsplayedasignificantroleintheearlypoliticaldebates

abouthowtodealwiththepast,particularlyinthedevelopmentoflegislative

optionsfortruthandreconciliationandjusticeandrehabilitationforvictimsof

violenceinthepast(Suh2012).Theyhavecontinuedtoplayasignificantrolein

maintainingtheongoingcontestationofthe1965narrative.

47ThePDI-PasapartyactivelysupportedandreintroducedthebilltorepealthelawsbanningMarxism-Leninismin2003.“Ditolak,PencabutanTapSoalPKI.”2003.SuaraMerdeka.August3.http://suaramerdeka.com.48Hamdani,D.,AsroriS.K.andHaryadi,R.2000.“DagangPolitikPaluArit.”GatraNomor21/VI,April8.From:http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2000/04/13/0034.html49HistoricallymembersoftheNUhadofficiallycelebratedtheirroleincrushingcommunistsastheircontributiontothenation.ManyyouthfromNUacknowledgedthishistoryandmettogetherin1999todiscusstheNUyouthwingAnsor’relationshipwiththeeventsof1965.TheseyouthsubsequentlyestablishedSyarikat(SantriSocietyforPeople’sadvocacy)(McGregor2012,248).

31

HumanRightsactivistMunir50,aformeroperationaldirectoroftheIndonesian

legalaidinstituteandchairpersonofKontras,madeclearstatementsthatthelaw

banningMarxism-Leninismshouldberepealed,becauseinademocracythestate

hadnorighttocontrolideology.Munirstatedthatreconciliationcouldonlybe

achievedbyseekingthetruthaboutthepastandthatformal(state)apologiesare

usuallymadeafterthetruthoftheeventsisknown51.

From1998,legal,institutionalreformsweremadeincludingthewideningofthe

powersofIndonesianHumanRightsCommission(KOMNASHAM)andnew

legislationthatprovidedfortheprovisionofadhochumanrightscourtsto

respondtocasesofhumanrightsabusesinthepast52.Schoolhistorycurriculum

wasreviewed(vanKlinken2005).Theseinitiativesappearedtoindicatestate

institutionalsupportforalternativeversionsofthe1965narrativetobediscussed

andtoaddresstheneedforrehabilitationofvictims.Atthesametime,therewas

significantoppositionandopenhostilitytoinitiativesthatrelatedtoattemptsto

establishthetruthabouttheevents1965.

AbdurrahmanWahidPresidencyDuringhispresidencyWahidapologizedtothevictimsofthe1965violenceasthe

leaderoftheNadhlatulUlamaorganization53.Wahidinitiatedseveralsignificant

democraticpoliticalreformsduringhisshortpresidency,buthewanteda

managedpaceofreform54.Oneofhisproposedreforms55washisinitiativeto

50Munirwaswidelyknownasahumanrightscampaignerwhobelievedinpoliticalactionbypeople(Suh2012).Munirwasmurderedin2004.ItiswidelybelievedthatthemastermindbehindhismurderwereseniorofficialsfromtheNationalIntelligenceAgency(BIN)andthathewasmurderedbecauseofhishumanrightsadvocacy.InformationtakenfromtheCommissionforforceddisappearancesandvictimsofviolence(KONTRAS)monitoringreportonthemurdertrialofMunir.17November2005.51“PenuntasanKejahatanHAMTerbelengguKepentinganPolitik.”2012.Rimanews.comJuly30.http://rimanews.com.52Adhochumanrightscourtscanonlybeestablishedincaseswhereitcanbedemonstratedthathumanrightsviolationsconstituteanactofgenocideor‘crimesagainsthumanity’(Kerrigan,F.andDalton,P.2006).53NadhlatulUlamaisIndonesia’slargestIslamicorganizationthatclaims30millionmembers.54Wahidinitiatedaprocesstorestructurethemilitary’scommandstructure,whichduringtheNewOrderhadallowedthemilitaryinstitutionalautonomyandpoliticalinfluence.WahidalsoinitiatedanewapproachtoresolutionofseparatistconflictsinPapuaandAcehthatwerebasedondiscussionandnegotiationnotonmilitaryrepression(Aspinall2010;Mietzner2009a).55Wahidproposedtherepealofthislawfortwoprincipledreasons.Firstlythatnoinstitutioncanprohibitideologybecauseideologyispartofpeople’sthinking.Secondly,becausethetruthabouttheeventsofOctober1,1965neededtobereexamined(Budiawan2004,4).

32

repealthelawsbanningcommunism56.Accordingtospokespeoplefromthe

NationalAwakeningParty(PKB),suchasthechairpersonoftheCentral

LeadershipCommittee(DewanPimpinanPusat)ofPKB,MatoriAbdulDjalil57,this

waspartofanattempttopromoteopen(democratic)politicalandideological

discussioninsociety58.WhilesomePKBleadersclaimedthatthePKBhadnoparty

decisiononthequestionoftherepealofthelaw,MatoristatedthatPKBhada

singleopinionontherepealofthelawbecauseitwasconsistentwiththePKB’s

platformtobuildanationalsystemthatwasdemocraticandaspirativetowards

humanrights59.Wahidbelievedthatideologicaldebateandpoliticalpluralism

werecriticalinthedemocratizationprocess(Zurbuchen2005;Lane2008;Robison

andHadiz2004)andheinspiredtheeducatedyouthofNUtoreexamineNU’spast

inrelationto1965-66(Budiawan2004).

AbdurrahmanWahid’sinitiativetorepealthelawsbanningMarxism-Leninism

duringhispresidencyprovokedsignificantpubliccontestationoverversionsofthe

1965history.ItwasatthistimethatthedefendersofNewOrder1965narrative

startedtomakeclearpublicstatementsabouttheiroppositiontoarevisitingof

thisperiodofhistory.Parliamentarygroupsthatwereopposedtorepealingthe

lawsincludedtheIndonesiannationalmilitary(TNI)aswellasAmienRais’

NationalMandateParty(PAN),Golkar,andtheUnitedDevelopmentParty(PPP)60.

WhileasignificantgroupofNUandNationalAwakeningParty(PKB)publicfigures

andelectedrepresentativessupportedPresidentWahid’sinitiative61,important

NahdlatulUlama(NU)leaderssuchasYusufHasyim,alsoPresidentAbdurrahman

Wahid’suncle,madepublicstatements,that,NUcouldnotsupport(therepeal)as

theyhadbeenoneofthekeyorganizationsthatsupportedtheintroductionofthe

originallawin1966.TheChairpersonofthenationalcommitteeoftheNahdlatul

Ulama,K.HHasyimMuzadi,welcomedWahid’sinitiationofreconciliationbut

rejectedtherepealofthelawsayingthat“wehavetoprotectthepoor(members

56ThisisknownastheTapMPRSthatbanstheIndonesianCommunistParty(PKI)andthedisseminationofcommunistorMarxist-Leninistideas.ItisreferredtoasTapMPRSNo.XXV/MPRS/1966.57AlsovicechairpersonofthePeople’sConsultativeAssembly(MPR)atthetime.58Hamdani,D.,AsroriS.K.andHaryadi,R.2000.“DagangPolitikPaluArit.”GatraNomor21/VI,April8.From:http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2000/04/13/0034.html59ibid.60Ditolak,PencabutanTapSoalPKI.”2003.SuaraMerdeka.August3.http://suaramerdeka.com.61Detailwillbediscussedlaterinthischapter

33

of)societysothattheyarenotcarriedawaybycommunistteachings”(writer’s

translation62).

TheSurvivalofthe1965NarrativeDespitetheintroductionofnewdemocraticinstitutionsafterthefallofSuharto,

andboldreforminitiativesbypresidentWahid,theresultsofthecontestationover

powerwerethatsignificantelementsfromtheNewOrderregimefinallyemerged

askeyplayersinareorganizingofpower(Hadiz&Robison2004;O’Rourke2002;

Heryanto2006;Oppenheimer2012;Zurbuchen2005;Ryter2009).Inlinewith

CesariniandHite’sthesis(2004)IhaveargueditisthereforethesesameNew

Orderelementswhohavehadsignificantcontrolovertheremakingofnarratives

about1965.

Significantchangesinstructuresofpoliticalpower,ortheremovalofpersonnel

fromoldauthoritarianstatestructures,willbeinfluencedbythecapacityand

successofalternativesocialforces(fromoutsideofthepreviousauthoritarian

regime)incompetingforpower.Aspinall(2010)arguesthatalternativestothe

broadcoalitionofeliteforcesthatformedgovernmentin1999didexist63and

therewerekeyopportunitiesformoreliberalreformtobecarriedout.Thisrested

withthethreecentraloppositionfiguresofWahid,MegawatiandRais.These

figurescouldhaveactedmoredecisivelytoexcludesignificantsectionsoftheold

NewOrderelitesbutinsteadchosetomakeallianceswiththem64.

62“HantuatauDihantukan?”2000.TempoMagazine.05/XXIX/3:April9.http://tempo.co.id63Thereissignificantdebateaboutthepossibilitiesthatdidexistin1998-2001formorefundamentalchangesinthenatureofpowerandeconomic,socialandpoliticalorganisationofsocietyafterthefallofSuharto.Lane(2007)arguesthattheroleofordinarypeople,inparticulartheurbanpoorofJakartacouldhavebeenmuchmoresignificantandcouldhaveprovidedthebasisforamoreradicalleadershiptostruggleformorefundamentalpoliticalreforms.Howeverthepotentialleadershipforsuchadecisivepoliticalchangewasweakandindecisiveatcriticalmoments(Aspinall2010,HadizandRobison2004)insomepartduetothelossofhistoricalknowledgeandexperienceoftheleftasaresultofthemassviolenceandincarcerationoftheleftfrom1965(Lane2008;Hadiz2006).64Aspinall(2010)describestheeasewithwhichwhathereferstoasthe‘semi-opponents’oftheNewOrdertransformedthemselvesintoacoalitionpartneroftheir‘erstwhilerulers’after1999.Thesesamesemi-oppositionistswerethemodernistandtraditionalMuslimsandmoderateSukarnoistnationalistswhoalliedthemselveswithorsupportedthemilitaryin1965andbecamepartoftheNewOrdersystem,albeitinsubordinatepositions.Intheelectionsof1999theyemergedinthepoliticalpartiesoftheNationalAwakeningParty(PKB),TheIndonesianDemocraticParty-Struggle(PDI-P),TheNationalMandateParty(PAN)andtheUnitedDevelopmentParty(PPP)withacollectivevoteof64%ofthetotalvotes.

34

WahidchosetomakeallianceswiththeCentralAxisofIslamicparties65,the

militaryandtheHabibiefactionofGolkar(Aspinall2010).Thiswasdespitethe

initiativebyintellectualsandstudentstoformareformasicoalitionbuiltaround

thebiggestoftheoldsemi-oppositionistforcessuchasthePKBandPDI-P(Hadiz

andRobison2004),whichwassupportedbythegrassrootsoftheseorganizations.

ReformersfromtheformerNewOrderelitehadgainedcontrolofthenew

democraticinstitutionsofparliamentandtheywereopposedtopolitical

mobilizationsevenoftheirowngrassroots(Aspinall2010).

Ultimately,Wahid’sdecisiontoallyhimselfwitholdauthoritarianeliteNewOrder

elements,whichincludedthemilitaryparliamentaryfraction,tosecurehis

presidencyin1999hadasignificanteffectonthepoliticaldynamicinIndonesia

andhisabilitytocarrythroughhisdemocraticreformsinitiatives.Itcreated

uncertaintyaboutthepositionoftheIndonesianauthoritarianpastandits

democraticfuture(ibid).TheconsequencesofWahid’sactionsmeantthathe

broughtinNewOrderelites,bothindividualsandpoliticalforces,intothehighest

levelofgovernmentwheretheycouldblockgenuineattemptstomakedemocratic

reform,forexample,crucialministriessuchasthatwouldhaveinfluenceon

reformofthemilitaryweregiventomilitaryfigures.Aspinall(2010)arguesthat

whatmayhavebeenaperiodofdramatictransformationwaswasted.

AsCesarini’s(2004)thesisoutlines,thisconfusionledtodemoralizationand

demobilisationofnon-elitedemocraticreformelements.Thegrassrootsofparties

likePKBandPDI-PindicatedtheirwillingnesstomobiliseindefenceofWahidand

yettheywereconsistentlydirectednottomobilize.Atthesametimeactionsand

demonstrationswithclearpoliticaldemandsbecamesmallerandmore

marginalizedasthepoliticalspacebecamenarrower.Thereformasimomentum

andthepoliticalspacethatexistedattheendoftheHabibiepresidencytopush

forwardmoresignificantpoliticalreformsdissipatedandthenon-elitereform

elementsbecameinvolvedindebatesandconflictsoverWahid,thecharacterofhis

governmentandthetacticsthatshouldbeemployed(Aspinall2010).

Thereorganisationofpowerthatdidtakeplaceatastateleveldidnotsignificantly

challengethepreviouslyexistingeconomic,socialandpoliticalorderormanyof

thestateinstitutionsthathadbeenbuiltbytheNewOrder(HadizandRobison65TheCentralaxis,initiatedbyAmienRais,wasformedasacoalitionofIslamicPartiesin1999.

35

2004;Aspinall2010).Whilethisreorganizationofpowerwasnotconsolidated

immediately,overtimeitbecameclearthatmanyoftheNewOrderstate

institutionsandtheirpersonnelremainedintact,andverysignificantlythose

relatedtothejudicialsystemandthemembersofthejudiciaryitself(Robison&

Hadiz2004;Zurbuchen2005,15).ManyofthepersonnelfromNewOrder

institutionsandorganisationsstillholdpositionswithinstatestructuresfromthe

nationaldowntotheregional,andeventhelocallevel(Robison&Hadiz2004;Van

Klinken&Baker2009;Ryter2009).Theongoingpoliticalinfluenceofthemilitary

hasremained,inparticularthroughitsabilitytomaintainitsregionalcommand

structure(McGregor2007,259;Mietzner2009a).

Whiledecentralizationofthepoliticalsystemdidtakeplace,theextensivereachof

Golkar’sorganizationandotherNewOrderinstitutionssuchasyouthsocial

Organisations(Ryter2009)allowedthisprocesstobeorganizedthroughsocial

networksdowntothelocallevel,inparticularduringtheperiodoftheHabibie

caretakerpresidencyimmediatelyafterthefallofSuharto.Manyofthosewhohad

benefitedduringtheNewOrderregimeand/orhadparticipateddirectlyinorhad

linkstothe1965violence,wereabletomakesuccessfulbidsinthenewstructures

thatwereestablishedwithadecentralizationofpower(Hadiz2006;Oppenheimer

2012;vanKlinkenandBaker2009,Mietzner2009a).

Itisherethatwecanexplainwhyactorspromotingalternativenarrativestothe

NewOrderversionofhistoryof1965wouldberejectedbystateinstitutionsand

governmentofficials,inparticulardemandsforatruthandreconciliation

commission.Thefindingsofaformalstateinvestigationintothepastcould

potentiallychallengeandunderminenotonlythemyththatunderpinnedthe

legitimacyoftheNewOrderregimeinthepastbutalsothelegitimacyofthosewho

hadbenefitedmostinthereorganizationofthesocial,economicandpoliticalorder

ofthepostNewOrderstate.

ReaffirmingtheNewOrder1965narrative

CesariniandHiteconceptualiseauthoritarianlegaciesinthreeways:asstructures

andinstitutionsthatareinheritedfrompreviousauthoritarianregimes;the

lingeringpowerandinfluenceoftraditionalandconservativegroups;andas

culturalorpsychologicalmanifestationsofauthoritarianism.Hereweanalyse

36

somecasesofwhereandhowthe1965NewOrdernarrativehasbeencontested

anddefendedsince1998.

Despitetheintroductionofseverallegalmechanismsforestablishingthetruth

aboutthepastandjusticeforvictimsofstateviolencetherehavebeenno

significantresults66.WhiletheIndonesianconstitutionhasstronghumanrights

provisions,theproceduresforinvestigationandlegalprosecutionallowfor

organizedpoliticalinterventiontoblockconcreteactiononinvestigationsinto

1965(McGregor2012,261;KerriganandDalton2006).Theroleofretiredanti-

communistmilitaryfiguresingovernment,includingthePresidentYudhoyono67,

hasbeencriticalintheongoingrejectionofsubstantialstepstobegina

reconciliationprocess.

Anewschoolcurriculumwasintroducedin2004beforetheendoftheMegawati

presidency(Sawitri2006).VanKlinkenarguesthatitwassocialpressurefrom

parentsandstudentsaccusingschoolteachersoflyingabouthistory,forexample

thehistoryofSupersemar68andthePKI,thatinitiallyledtheeducationminister

appointedbyHabibietoinitiateareviewofschoolcurriculum(2005,233-236).

Thenewcurriculumversionofthe30thSeptembermovementstatedthatwhowas

responsibleforthemovementandthekillingsofthesixgeneralswasuncertain.

Thiscurriculumwaswithdrawnin2006,duringthefirstYudhoyonopresidency

(Sawitri2006).Followingthis,theAttorney-General’sofficedeclaredanofficial

banonfourteenschoolhistorytextbooksinMarch2007andorderedthattheybe

burnt69.Atleast30,000booksweresubsequentlyburned.Theofficialreason

givenbyaspokespersonfortheAttorney-General’sintelligencedepartmentwas

66In1998theNationalHumanRightsCommission’s(KOMNASHAM)powerswerewidenedtoallowtheestablishmentofadhocteamstoinvestigatepastcasesofhumanrightsabuses(Suh2012).In2000underthepresidencyofAbdurrahmanWahid,theIndonesiangovernmentpassedLawno.26(FergusKerrigan&PaulDalton2006)whichallowedfortheformationofadhochumanrightscourtstodealwithgrossviolationsofhumanrightsretrospectively,specificallyactsofgenocideandcrimesagainsthumanity.Sincethenonlytwoadhoccourtshavebeenestablished.In2004underthepresidencyofMegawatithegovernmentpassedLawno.27(Suh2012)whichprovidedamandatefortheestablishmentofatruthandreconciliationcommission.ThelawwassubsequentlyrepealedbytheConstitutionalCourtin2006afterdeclaringitunconstitutional(Sulistyanto,2007,McGregor2013).67SusiloBambangYudhoyonwasfirstelectedaspresidentin2004andiscurrentlyservinghissecondpresidentialterm,whichwillendin2014.68Supersemaristheletterof11March1966signedbyPresidentSukarnothatsupposedlyprovidedthelegalbasisforSuhartotoassumeformalpower(Baskara2007).69“KejagungSegeraEdarkanLaranganBukuSejarahKurikulum2004.”2007.AntaraNews.March13.http://antaranews.com.

37

thatitwasconsideredto“createapolemicanddisturbpublicorder”70.Acriminal

investigationintotheauthorsofthebannedtextbookswasalsoordered(Forbes

2007).Educationdepartmentstaffinvolvedindevelopingtherevised2004

curriculumwereinterrogatedbytheAttorney-General’soffice,thestate

intelligenceoffice(BIN)andthepolice.AhistorianwiththeIndonesianInstituteof

Sciences,AsviWarmanAdam,saidtheAGOwastryingtointimidatethepeople

whoweretryingtounderstandwhatreallyhappenedin1965andthesubsequent

politicaleventsleadingtoSoeharto'srisetopower(Sawitri2006).

In2007theAttorneyGeneralissuedaformaldecreeorsuratkeputusanthat

requiredallhistorybookstoagainrefertothe30thSeptemberMovementas30th

SeptemberMovement/IndonesianCommunistParty(G30S/PKI).Publications

thatdidnotdosomustbeburnt(Roosa2008,XV).Thisdecisioneffectively

providedlegalsupportfortheongoingdefenceofanduseoftheNewOrder1965

narrative.

Museumsandpublicinstitutionsthatholdrepresentationsabout1965in

particularremainthesame(McGregor2007).TheseincludetheCrocodileHole

(LubangBuaya)monumentandthePKItreasonmuseuminJakarta.

Organisationsandindividualsthatattemptedtofacilitatepublicdiscussionsabout

alternativeversionsofhistoryfacedtheongoingthreatofandactualrepression

andviolenceeitherfromstateinstitutionsorcivilmilitias.InMarch2001,apublic

ceremonytoburytherecoveredremainsofvictimsfrom1965accordingto

culturalandreligiouspractice,inKaloran,CentralJava,wasattackedby‘Islamic

groups’.AccordingtoMcGregor’s(2012,248)analysisofthoseinvolvedin

initiatingtheattacks,itwasthemilitarythattriedtoprovoketheconservativeor

hard-linefactionsofthePPPandthePKBtoparticipateintheactionandto

intimidatemembersoftheNUAnsoryouthgroupfromsupportingthegroup

carryingouttheceremony71.

ThepoliticalconditionssurroundingtheendoftheSuhartodictatorshipprovided

anopportunitytomakesignificantsocialchangesincludingtheremakingof

70Ibid.71AnANSORyouthleadersaidthatthemajorityofdemonstratorscamefromtheHolyWarFighters(LaskarJihad)inYogyakarta71.Hadtheseceremoniesbeencarriedout,thiswouldhavesymbolicallyunderminedthemythofthevictimsasgodless(communist)atheistsandreturnedtheir‘human’identitiesaspeoplewhobelievedingod(McGregor2012).

38

‘myths’aboutthepast.Institutionalmechanismswereintroducedthatallowedfor

formalchallengestothenarrative.Howevertheunwillingnessofthereform

orientedsemi-oppositionelitestomaketacticalallianceswithnon-elitereform

elements,toforcemoresubstantialreformsinthefirstfewyearsofreformasi,

allowedtheconservativeNewOrderelitestoinlargepartcontrolthereform

processandminimisedemocraticreformsthatwouldchallengetheirownpower.

TheelectionofthegovernmentledbyPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyonoin

2004markedaturningpointinthecontestationofthehistoryof1965.Itmarked

thebeginningofthewindingbackoflegalandotherreformsthathadbeen

initiatedsince1998,inparticularthecancellationoflegislationtoestablisha

commissionfortruthandreconciliationin2006.Since1998onlytwoadhoc

courtshavebeenconstituted,toinvestigatethecaseofreferendumviolencein

EastTimorin1999(Suh2012,158)andtheTanjungPriokkillingsin1984

(Sulistiyanto2007)andnonehavebeenestablishedduringtheYudhoyono

presidency.By2007itwasclearthattheNewOrdercategoriesofpolitical

‘inclusion’and‘exclusion’,thatspecificallyexclude‘godless’communists,have

remainedintactwithinstateinstitutionsandformaldiscourses.Despitetheformal

removalofthe‘ex-politicalprisoner’statusontheirnationalidentitycardsin

2004,thecommuniststigmaagainsttheseformerpoliticalprisonersandtheir

familiesremainspervasive(Conroe2012;Budiawan2004).

TenyearsafterthefallofSuhartotheNewOrdernarrativeabout1965had

survivedandbeenreinforcedthroughinstitutionallegalforums(ongoingbanon

communismandlimitedlegalavenuesforchallenges)aswellasthroughformal

discoursessuchasschoolhistorycurriculumandstatemuseums.Whilefearof

punitiveactions(McGregor2013)remainsoneofthemotivationsforthedefence

oftheNewOrder1965narrative,thenarrativecontinuestoserveoneofthe

dominantfunctionsthatitdidfortheNewOrderregimeinunderpinning

legitimacyforthestateandthosewhoholdpower.InmaintainingtheNewOrder

anti-communistideologythestateretainsanideologicaldefenceforpolitical

repressionandencouragesthecultureofimpunitythathasexistedsince1965.It

supportsthecontinueddenialofthehistoricallexiconofpoliticalorganizationand

resistancefortheclassesandsocialgroupsthatweresocially,politicallyand

economicallydisenfranchisedinthepowerrelationsthatwereestablishedunder

39

theNewOrderandthatinlargepartremaindisenfranchisedtoday.Thesesocial

classes,forexampleurbanandruralpoor,arethosemostinneedofalternative

historicalandpoliticalperspectivesandwithoutthemtheyareoftendisorganized

orattractedtosectarianorganisations72.

72forexampleconservative/radicalIslamorgangsbasedonethnicties.

41

ChapterFour

HistorythatwillnotgoawayIhavearguedthatthecharacterofthecontestationovertheNewOrderhistorical

narrativeabout1965thatexistedimmediatelyafterthefallofSuhartowas

significantlylinkedtothenatureofthepoliticalspacethatexistedforbroader

democraticstrugglesanddiscoursesabouttheshapethatanewdemocratic

societycouldtake.Howeverthemanagedtransitiontoapost-authoritarianstate

byNewOrdersemi-oppositionelitesinthefirstthreeyearsofreformasiresulted

inafailuretotakeactiononanyofthesepoliticaldemandsandtherewasno

officialchangeintheNewOrdernarrativeabout1965.

Thenarrowingofthepoliticalspace,particularlyaftertheendoftheWahid

presidency,sawanarrowingofpoliticaloptionsforseekingtruthandjusticefor

thevictimsof1965andforchangestotheofficialnarrative.Thenarrowingofthe

politicalspacefordissentandoppositioncombinedwiththegeneralpublic

consciousnessandunderstandingofcommunism,thePKIandthe30thSeptember

movement(Heryanto2006),makeitdifficulttodaytoopenlychallengetheofficial

narrative.Somesocialforcesmayopposeanyrevisitingofthepastbecausethey

themselveshaveonlyeverknowntheNewOrderversionofhistoryandthePKI.

However,therearesocialforcesthatremaininpower,thatareopposedtoa

revisitingofthenarrativeasitpotentiallychallengestheireconomicandsocial

interestsandtheirpoliticallegitimacyandthreatenssomeofthemwiththe

possibilityofpunitiveactions(Hadiz2006).Stateinstitutionsatanationallevel,

suchascourtsandthejudiciary,arestaffedbypeoplewhohaveinmanycases

havedefendedthesesameinterests.

Inpost-authoritarianstates,effortstodealwiththepastaswellasthebroader

democratizationprocessareshapedbycountryspecifichistoricalconditionsand

developments.Dealingwiththepastisshapedbythelegaciesofauthoritarianrule

andthepolitical,institutionalandlegalfactorsthatinfluencethedevelopmentof

thepost-authoritarianstate(BarahonadeBrito2001,158).Likemanycountries,

wherethepastremainsasourceofsocialconflictintheaftermathofmassviolence

inapost-authoritarianstate,oneofthepoliticaloptionsavailableforcontestation

42

overhistoricalnarrativesaboutthepastisthroughhumanrightsstruggles

(BarahonadeBrito2001,158).Therenewalofpubliccontestationoverthe1965

narrativesinceearly2012isframedmoreexplicitlywithintheframeworkof

humanrightsdiscourse.Itisnotsignificantlyrelatedto,nordependentupon,

discoursesregardingbroaderdemocraticreforms,includingcivilrights.73This

contestationhasreemergedlargelyduetotheworkoftheKOMNASHAMand

humanrightsandsurvivororganizations.

Chapterfouranalysessomefactorsstimulatingthisrenewedcontestationandthe

actorsengagedinthecontestation.ItanalysesthesignificanceoftheKomnasHAM

reportthatwasreleasedinJuly2012andtheresponseofotherstateinstitutions

andgovernmentofficialstoitsrelease.Thisanalysisisthenusedtodrawsome

conclusionsaboutthenatureofgovernment,politicalinstitutionsandthereforms

thathavebeenmadeundertheYudhoyonoledgovernment.

TheTruthisTold:KOMNASHAMBreaksRanks

AftertherepealoftheLaw27.in2006,thelegaloptionsforinitiationof

investigationsintothecrimesofmassviolencethatoccurredinthepastwere

narrowed74.InvestigationsbytheNationalCommissionforHumanRights(Komisi

NasionalHakAsasiManusia-KOMNASHAM)intothemassviolenceof1965began

in2008afteryearsoflobbyingbysurvivorsandhumanrightsgroups75.Thatthis

investigationwascommencedatallissignificantgiventhatKOMNASHAMis

fundedbythecentralgovernment.Howeverwhilelegalprovisionsforresponding

tohumanrightsexist,therearesignificantdeficienciesandambiguitieswithinthe

lawsthemselvesthatmakeiteasierforconservativeofficialstolimitthe

implementationoflaws.Anylegalactionthatmayarisefromtheinvestigations

carriedoutbyKOMNASHAMaredependentontheAttorney-General’sresponse,or

73InprivatediscussionswithTaman65,anNGOinBalithatdoesworkonreconciliationover1965andispartoftheNationalCoalitionforJusticeandTruth(KKPK)inJuly2013,onerepresentativeexplainedthattheirorganizationhastakenaconsciouslyculturalapproachtotheircampaignsandlobbying.74TheDPRortheAttorney-Generalhavethepowertoestablishanadhochumanrightscourt.Bothrequireevidencetoestablishthatactsof‘genocide’orgrossviolationsofhumanrightshaveoccurred.Thedefinitionsarespecificanditmustbedemonstratedthatthehumanrightsviolationsfittheabovedefinitions.DetailsofthelegalhumanrightsmechanismsthatexistandtheproblemswiththemcanbefoundinKerriganandDalton(2006).75EarlyattemptstolobbytheKOMNASHAMtoinvestigatecasesfrom1965-66in2000-2001failed.KOMNASHAMarguedthatthebanoncommunismwouldnotallowthemtoinvestigate(McGregor2012).

43

theDPRmayinitiateanadhoccourtifitagreesthatitiswarranted(McGregor

2012,260;KerriganandDalton2006).

WhileKOMNASHAMisalegallyindependentbody,itwascreatedbyandisfunded

bytheIndonesianstatetocarryoutarangeoffunctionsinlinewithgovernment

legislation76.Theirmandateforactivitiesinclude,researchandstudiesonlegal

instruments,legislation,fieldworkandnationalcomparativestudiesofhuman

rights.77.Whatitdoesnothavearelegalpowerstoarrest,detainorputontrial

peopleaccusedofhumanrightsviolations78.Constitutionallytheymayonlymake

recommendationstothepresident,theAttorney-General’sOfficeandthePeople’s

RepresentativeCouncil(DPR)basedontheirinvestigations(Suh2012).

KOMNASHAM’sreportontheresultsoftheinvestigationintothegrossviolation

ofhumanrightsintheeventsof1965-66tookfouryearstocomplete(KOMNAS

HAM2012,2).TheKOMNASHAMreportstatesthatnineseparateformsofhuman

rightsviolationstookplaceduringthemassviolenceof1965-66includingmurder,

extermination,slavery,evictionortheforcedremovalofcitizens,deprivationof

libertyandotherarbitraryformsofdeprivationoffreedoms,torture,rape,

persecutionandforceddisappearances.Inadditiontheyfoundthatvictims

(survivors)andtheirfamilieshadexperiencedinter-generationalsufferinginthe

formofdiscriminatoryactsinrelationtocivilandpoliticalrights,aswellastheir

economic,socialandculturalrights(KOMNASHAM2012,1).

Thereportstatesthattheviolentactionstakenwereassessedasbeingin‘theform

ofamilitaryoperationtoannihilateamovementthatwasreferredtobymilitary

andcivilianofficialsasa‘subversivemovement’.Thereportallegesthat‘crimes

againsthumanity’werecarriedoutandthattheywere‘relatedtoanattackaimed

atthecivilianpopulation’.Itstatesthatactsofmassviolence‘werenotisolated

incidents’butratherwererelatedtoandtooktheformof‘partofaseriesof(an

overall)attacksthatwasaimedatmembersandsympathisersofthePKI’.The

attackswerewidespreadandsystematicandthecrimeswerecollectiveinnature

(ibid,15-16).

76Itfitswithinthetraditionaldemocraticframeofathirdarmoversightinstitution.77Komnashamwebsite–profile–aboutthekomnasham.seehttp://www.komnasham.go.id/profil-6/tentang-komnas-ham78ThisisincontrasttotheCorruptionEradicationCommission(KPK)thathaspowerstodetainpeople,extensivepowerstoinvestigateclaimsofcorruptionandtheabilitytorequesttheassistanceofotherstateinstitutions.http://kpk.go.id/id/tentang-kpk/fungsi-dan-tugas

44

Thetimeframesoftheinvestigationgobeyondtheimmediate1965-66periodand

includeuntil‘atleastlate1978’(ibid,24)whenordersweregiventobeginthe

releaseenmasseofamajorityofpoliticalprisonersimprisonedsincetheearly

periodofviolence.Thereportclarifiesthenatureoftheevents,thatis,thatthey

wereaplannedandorganizedcampaignbythemilitaryunderthedirectionofthe

OperationalCommandfortheRestorationofSecurityandOrder(KomandoOperasi

pemulihankeamanandanketertibanKOPKAMTIB)toannihilatethePKIandits

sympathizers.ThereportdoesnotindicateinanywaythattheNUasan

organization,wasresponsible79forthecampaignagainstthePKI.

Thereportaddressesdirectlythequestionofresponsibilityforthecrimesand

outlinesthatthereareseveraltypesofcriminalresponsibilitythatcanbe

identifiedinthesecases.Theyareindividualcriminalresponsibility,directcriminal

responsibilityandimputedcriminalresponsibility,whichincludescommand

responsibility(ibid,22).Thereportgoesfurtherbynamingthosepeople

responsiblebyreferringtotheirstructuralpositionswithintheformalstructures

ofthemilitaryandstateinstitutionswithinspecifictimeframesthatplayedapart

inthemilitaryoperationtoannihilatethePKI.Theseincludeinthefirstinstance,

SuhartoascommandingofficerofKOPKAMTIB,responsibleforthepolicydecision.

Itmentionsthecommandingofficersofspecificmilitaryareacommands

(Pangdam)thatholddutyofcontroltowardstheirtroopsandregionalsecurity

commanders(Penganda)(Ibid,24-25)ThiswouldincludeLieutenantGeneral

SarwoEdhieWibowo80asthecommandingofficeroftheRPKADatthetime.

Thereport’smajorsignificanceisinthefactthatforthefirsttime,astate

institutionrecognizesandattributesblameforcrimesagainsthumanity

committedbytheIndonesiannationalmilitaryduring1965-66.Itisinthiscontext

thatwecanunderstandtheresponsefromvariouspoliticalfiguresandcivic

organizationsthathaverejectedanyfurtheractionandinvestigationsonthisissue.

Thisreportprovidesofficialevidencefromalegalstateinstitutionthatthe‘myth’

thathasbeenpromotedaboutthePKIandthehistoricaleventsof1965arealie.

79ThemythpromotedbytheNewOrderaboutthenatureoftheviolenceisthatmuchofitwasspontaneousbasedondeephorizontalsocialconflicts.TheNUanditsyouthorganizationplayedasignificantroleincarryingouttheviolence,especiallyinEastJava,howevertheKOMNASHAMreportclarifiesthattheresponsibilityfortheviolencewaswiththemilitarycommand.80SarwoEdhieWibowoisPresidentYudhoyono’sfatherinlaw.

45

Whatisatstakeisnotonlythepotentialpunitiveactionsthatcouldarisefrom

suchaninvestigationbutachallengetothelegitimacyofthepreviousNewOrder

regimeandthosewhobecamepartnersnotonlyinthemassviolenceofthepast

butinthecreationoftheNewOrderstateitself.Itchallengesthelegitimacyof

manypeoplewhoholdpositionswithintoday’sstatebureaucracyincludingthe

courts,thelegislatureandtheexecutivetoday,asmanywereformerlypartofthe

NewOrderstructuresofstatebureaucracyandthepoliticalsystem.

SincetheappointmentofthenewKOMNASHAMcommissionersinOctober2012

thecommissionhasexperiencedinternalconflict81.Thisconflictemergedafterthe

newchairperson,OttoNurAbdullah,waselectedinNovember2012.Hemade

publicstatementswhenhewasfirstappointedthathewouldfocusonpursuing

twocasesofgrossviolationofhumanrightsinAceh,the1965reportaswellasthe

investigationintotheLapindomudflows(Aritonang2012b)82.Alloftheseissues

touchsensitivenervesforkeypoliticalactorslikelytobenominatingas

presidentialcandidatesin2014includingPrabowoSubianto,WirantoandAburizal

Bakrie83.Thereisspeculationthatthisconflicthasbeenanattempttointerferein

theCommissionforpoliticallymotivatedreasons(Aritonang2013)throughdirect

dealingsbetweensomeKOMNASHAMcommissionersandpowerfulindividuals

whowerelinkedtohumanrightsabuses84.

RenewalofContestation

DespitethefailuretounderminetheNewOrdernarrativeabout1965inthefirst

tenyearsofIndonesia’snewdemocracy,humanrightsandsurvivors’

organizationshavecontinuedtopromoteinvestigationsintothepast.Afterthe

repealoflegislationin2006thatwouldestablishaTruthandReconciliation

Commission,themajorityofhumanrightsgroupsincludingthosethatfocus

particularlyonthemassviolenceof1965,organizedaunitedforumin2008under

81“NGOsCallKomnasHAMTurnoverSuspicious.”2013.JakartaPost.February9.http://thejakartapost.com82Amudflowbeganin2006thathascausedmassivedamagetocommunitiesinEastJavaisbelievedtohavebeencausedbytheactionsofaBakriecompany(Harsaputra2013).83PrabowoandWirantoareformerTNIgeneralsimplicatedinseveralcasesofgrossviolationsofhumanrightsthatoccurredundertheircommand.AburizalBakrieisthechairpersonoftheGolkarpartyandoneofIndonesia’swealthiestmen.84“KontrasreportKomnasHAMtoOmbudsman.”2013.JakartaPost.April9.

46

theumbrellaoftheCoalitionforJusticeandTruthFinding(KKPK)85.Itscentral

mandateistoorganizeadvocacyfortheformulationoflegislationforaTruthand

ReconciliationCommission.Itsestablishmentwasindirectresponsetotherepeal

ofthetruthandreconciliationlegislationin2006.WhileKKPKisnotexclusively

focusedonthemassviolencein1965,itsmemberorganizationsarerepresentative

ofthediversityoforganizationsthatcampaignandpromotehumanrightsand

justiceforvictimsofhumanrightsviolationsinIndonesiainthepastandinthe

present.

Suh(2012)arguesthatatraditionofhumanrightscampaigningexistedin

IndonesiapriortothefallofSuhartoandthatthiswassignificantinthepost

Suhartoperiod.InstitutionalmechanismsalreadyexistedandIndonesianhuman

rightsgroupshadinfluenceonthedebatesaboutnewhumanrightsmechanisms

thatwererequired,recognizingthenewpoliticalcontextthatnowexisted.Despite

therepealofthelawsforestablishingatruthandreconciliationcommissionin

2006andtheverylimitedabilitytomakeuseofnewinstitutionssuchasadhoc

humanrightscourtsinthepostSuhartoera,itwashumanrightsorganizations

thatweresignificantinensuringthatthesemechanismswereestablishedinthe

firstplace(Suh2012).Intherecentcontestationtheyhavebeenadvocates

workingatthegrass-rootslevelpromotingtheyearoftruthandreconciliationin

2013andholdingpublichearingstopromotecommunityeducationabouthuman

rightsviolationsinIndonesiainthepastandthepresent.86Theseorganizations

alsoworkcollaborativelywithinternationalinstitutionstomaintainongoing

internalandexternalpressureontheIndonesiangovernmentinrelationtoits

humanrightsrecord.

Unliketheearlyperiodofreformasi,figuresfromelitepoliticsthatsupport

discussionsaboutalternativenarrativesaremuchmorenarrow.Therearefew

governmentofficialsorholdersofpublicofficewhopubliclysupporttherightto

contesttheofficial1965narrative.Electedofficials(outsideofKOMNASHAM)that

havemadepublicstatementsabouttherighttofreedomofbelief(including

85TheseincludethefollowingNon-GovernmentOrganisations:CommissionfortheDisappearedandVictimsofViolence(Kontras),AsiaJusticeandRights(AJAR),TheInstituteforSocialStudyandAdvocacy,(Elsam),AssociationoftheFamiliesoftheDisappearedIndonesia(IKOHI),andJakartaLegalAidInstitute(LBHJakarta).Otherorganizationsincludethosementionedpreviouslyinfootnote45.86SeeKKPKwebsite.http://kkpk.org

47

communism)andtheneedtodiscussopenlythehistoryof1965includePDI-P

membersPramonoAnung87andEvaKusumaSundari88.

TwoKOMNASHAMcommissionerswhowerepartofthe1965investigativeteam

from2008-2012haveemergedaspublicfiguresinthepubliccontestation.Nur

Kholispresidedastheheadoftheadhocinvestigationintotheeventsof1965.On

releaseofthereportheremindedthegovernmentthatthereareothernon-judicial

methodstoseekjusticeforthevictims/survivorsthroughatruthand

reconciliationcommissionasprovidedbyhumanrightscourtlaw(Achmadand

Rami2012).Hewasre-electedasacommissionerfor2012-2017.

YosepStanleyAdiPrasetyoaformermemberoftheAllianceofIndonesian

Journalists(AJI)andahumanrightsadvocateduringtheSuhartoera,wasa

commissioneroftheKOMNASHAMfortheperiod2007-2012.Stanleyhasbeen

outspokeninremindingthegovernmentthatvictimsshouldhavetheirfulllegal

andcivilrightsrehabilitated.Inmanycasesvictimslostnotonlytheirlibertyor

theirlives,buttheirlandwasseizedandtheyweredeniedtherighttobe

productivemembersofsociety(DwyerandSantikarma2007).

Thosedefendingtheofficialnarrativeof1965inthemostrecentcontestationhave

somenoticeabledifferences.Mostsignificantlythemoreliberalreformelements

withinthePBNUandPKBthatwereprominentduringtheWahidpresidencyhave

beensidelined.Intherecentcontestationthosewhoopposedthe

recommendationsoftheKOMNASHAMreportincludedgeneralsfromthe

Indonesianmilitary(ABRI/TNI)89,prominentgovernmentofficialsandtheir

institutions,theNationalExecutiveCommitteeofNadhlatulUlama(PBNU)90,NU

YouthOrganisationAnsor(GerakanPemudaAnsor),NUYouthMilitiaBanser91,

87Vice-chiefoftheNationalPeople’srepresentativeCouncil(DPR)andtheheadoftheIndonesianDemocraticPartyofstruggle(PDI-P)parliamentaryfraction.88PDIPmemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives(DPR)commissionthree,whichoverseeslawandhumanrights.89TheseincludethePEPABRI(retiredarmedforcesofficers’organisation)andtheForumfortheSonsandDaughtersofthePensionersoftheIndonesianArmedForces(FKPPI)(Siswadi2012).90Onthe15August2012inanactivityreferredtoasthedeclarationofbewareoftherevivalofthePKIheldatthecentralofficeofthePBNUthevice-chairpersonofthePBNU,As'adSaidAli,saidthatFormerpresidentGusDurhadgivenspacetotherestorationoftherightsofthedescendentsofPKI(members)andthereforeanapologywasnotnecessary(RepublikaAugust162012).As'adSaidAliisaformerofficialintheNationalIntelligenceAgencyBadaninteligenNegara(BIN).91NUyouthwingsweremobilizedduring1965-66tocarryoutthemassviolence,particularlybutnotexclusivelyinEastJavaandtoalesserextentinCentralJava.

48

PancasilaYouth(PemudaPancasila)92,radicalIslamicgroups,explicitlyanti-

communistgroups93andtheGOLKARparty,94theprincipalpoliticalorganisation

oftheNewOrderera.

On4August2012adeclarationofoppositiontoanofficialpresidentialapology

wasmadeintheformofasignedpetitioninBandung.Thosewhosignedthe

declarationincludedGolkarpoliticians,SonsandDaughtersofthePensionersof

theIndonesianArmedForces(FKPPI),thePancasilayouthorganisationandthe

Indonesianclericscouncil(MUI)(Siswadi2012).Theirstatementrejecteda

presidentialapologyandtheformationofadhochumanrightscourts.

Onthe15December2012,Major-GeneralHardionoSaroso,commandingofficerof

theDiponegororegionalarmycommand(PanglimaKodamIV/Diponegoro),made

apublicstatementthattheybelievedthePKIwasbeingresurrectedandthatthey

wouldhuntthemdownandkillthem(Sodiq2013).Therewasnoreactioninthe

formofpublicstatementsbygovernmentofficialsinresponsetothepublic

statementsofageneraldeclaringhisintenttohuntdownandkillIndonesian

citizensonthebasisthattheywerecommunists.

Thevice-chairpersonofthePeople’srepresentativeCouncil(DPR)PriyoBudi

Santoso,statedthatthefindingsintheKOMNASHAMreportshouldnotbe

reportedtothepublic.TheCommissionforthedisappearedandvictimsof

violenceKONTRAS,respondedthatPriyomadesuchastatementbecausehewas

fromGolkar,thepartythatduringtheNewOrdereracontributedtomanycasesof

humanrightsviolations(Revianur2012).

DespitetheKOMNASHAM’sreportfindingthattheNUdidnothaveactive

responsibilityforthemassviolence,theExecutiveBoardoftheNUmadea

92Oppenheimer’sfilmJagal-theActofKillingoutlinestheroleofthePemudaPancasilainthemasskillingsinNorthSumatera.93ThemilitaryhassystematicallyorganizedandmobilizedgangsororganizedmilitiastocarryoutmassviolencethroughouttheSuhartoeraandsincethebeginningofreformasi(O’Rourke2002,346,400).94GOLKARwastheprincipalpoliticalorganizationusedbySuhartotomanagemanyaspectsofthedictatorships’organisations.Organisedexplicitlyasa‘functionalgroup’(GolongonKarya–Golkar)notapoliticalpartyitwasthemainvehicleforobtainingaccesstoandbecomingpartofthe‘in-group’oftheSuhartoregime.Beingactivegaveopportunitiestoreceivepolitical,economicorsocialprivileges.DuringtheHabibiepresidency,HabibieusedthestructuresofGolkarrightdowntothelocalleveltomobilizepoliticalsupport.Byofferingthereleaseofcertaincentralgovernmentpowerstotheregionshewasabletoeffectivelymobilizepoliticalsupportforhispresidencywhichwasaimedatprovidingthosewhosepowerwasthreatenedtoregroupandreorganisethemselvesinanewpowersharingarrangement.

49

statementsayingthattheywouldforgetwhatthePKIwassuspectedofhaving

donein1965andthattheyhopedthatallpartiescouldforget(thepast)andlook

tothefuture(Wahyu2013).Theyrejectedtheestablishmentofanyadhochuman

rightscourts,anyformalapologytothevictimsofmassviolenceandthey

supportedtheongoingbanoncommunism.TheNahdatulUlamaExecutiveBoard

(PBNU)statementsweresupportedby23‘massorganizations’includingthe

retiredIndonesiannationalarmyofficers’corp.Thesestatementswereissuedby

thevice-chairpersonofthePengurusBesarNahlatulUlama(PBNU),himselfa

formervice-chairpersonofthenationalintelligenceagency(BIN)ofIndonesia95.

ThecurrentchairpersonofthePBNUisformer-PresidentWahid’suncle,whowas

inaminoritywithintheNUleadershipatthetimeofAbdurrahmanWahid’s

presidency,butnowistherepresentativevoiceofNUasthereformerandliberal

elementshavebeensidelined.ChairpersonoftheAnsoryouthmovement,Nusron

Wahid,madeastatementthatwhiletheyencouragedeffortsforreconciliationthey

didnotsupportastateapologybeingmade96.NusronWahidisalsoaGolkarparty

representativeinthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil(DPR).

KeyministersandgovernmentofficialssuchastheAttorneyGeneralandthe

ministerforPolitics,LawandSecurity,thathavesignificantinfluenceonthe

proceduralaspectsofrespondingtoKOMNASHAM’sreporthavebeenopenly

hostiletothereport.InOctober201297theAttorneyGeneralmadeapress

statementthattheyhadrejectedthereportfromKOMNASHAMonthegrounds

thatitwasnotcomplete.On1October2012thecoordinatingMinisterforPolitics,

LawandSecurity,DjokoSuyanto,saidthatthegovernmentdidnotneedto

apologiseforthetragicmurdersofthousandsofPKImembersandsympathizersin

1965(IraGuslinaSufa2012).Djokosaidthatthesemurdershadtobeseenasa

formofdefenceofthestatebecauseatthattimethereweregreatproteststhat

threatenedsecurityandstability.Hesaidthat‘wehavetounderstand1965

throughthelensof1965’.‘Thisincidentwasbeneficial’hesaid.‘Ifitdidn’thappen

ourcountrywouldn’tbelikeitisnow’(ibid).

95AtthetimeofhisappointmenttotheleadershipofPBNUin2010,mediaagenciesreportedthattherewererumoursthathisappointmenthadbeenencouragedbythoseinpowerandcouldbeseenasasignofstateinterventionintheNU(Purwoko2010.96“Apologyto1965PurgeVictimsnotNecessary:GPAnsor”.2012.JakartaPost.August15.97“AGOrebuffofKOMNASHAMReportaBlowtoHumanRights”.2012.JakartaPost.November12.

50

Thesestatementsarguablyclarifyinanexplicitwaytheactualpositionofmanyif

notthemajorityinpowerandingovernmentpositionsofstrategicinfluence.A

memberoftheDPRfromtheJusticeandProsperityParty(PKS)fromAceh,Nasir

Djamil,saidthatthelackofwilltorespondtotheKOMNASHAMreportaboutthe

massviolenceof1965-66wasfromallparties,particularlythegovernment.Inhis

opinion,everyoneisheldhostagetothepoliticalinterestsoftheirrespective

partieswiththeresultthatDPRmembersarenotfree(toactindependently)98.

PresidentialApology

PriortothereleaseoftheKOMNASHAM’sreport,newmomentumhadalready

emergedinthecontroversyoverhowtodealwithhumanrightsviolationsthat

occurredinthepastincluding1965.OneexplanationforthiswasthatPresident

Yudhoyonowasconcernedabouthispoortrackrecordonhumanrights

(McGregor2013)andthathehopedtoleaveamorepositivelegacy.InApril2012,

AlbertHasibuan,amemberofthePresidentialAdvisoryCouncilforPresident

Yudhoyonoannouncedthatthepresidentwasconsideringmakinganapologyto

thevictimsofthe1965-66violence(Pramudatama2012).Anapologywas

consideredtobearealisticresponsetocasesofhumanrightsviolationinthepast

asitdidnotrequirelonglegalprocesses.HumanRightsorganizationswere

positiveabouttheinitiativebutcriticalalso,sayingthatwhatwasrequiredwas

disclosureofthetruthofpastevents.Howeveranofficialapologyremains

politicallyhighlysensitiveandin2013anyofficialreferencetoastateapologyhas

largelydisappearedfrompublicdiscourse(McGregor2013;Hatley2013)99.

AJakartaPost(30September2013)editorialstatedthatPresidentYudhoyonois

unlikelytomakeanapologyandthatthereisstillgeneralapathyover1965.It

arguesthatthisisnotsurprisinggiventhatthoselinkedtothe‘1960switch-hunt

arestillinfluential’.ThisviewwassubstantiatedinearlyNovemberwhenitwas

announcedthatPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono(SBY)hadagreedthat

LieutenantGeneralSarwoEdhieWibowoshouldbemadeanationalheroin2014.

SarwoEdhiewasthemilitaryofficerresponsibleforleadingthecommandofthe

98“PenuntasanKejahatanHAMTerbelengguKepentinganPolitik,”2012.Rimanews.July30.http://rimanews.com.99ItshouldbenotedthatKOMNASHAMclearlypointedtoYudhoyono’sfather-in-law,SarwoEdhieWibowo,asoneofthoseresponsibleforthemassviolencein1965inhispositionasCommanderoftheRPKAD.

51

(RPKAD)SpecialForcesthatorganizedthemasskillingsacrossIndonesiain1965-

66.Heisspecificallymentionedasholdingresponsibilityforgrossviolationsof

humanrightsintheKOMNASHAMreportreleasedinJuly2012.Despitethe

unresolvedstatusoftheKOMNASHAMreporton1965,thegovernment’sdecision

toappointSarwoEdhieasanationalhero,demonstratesclearsupportforthis

general’sactionsinthemasskillingsin1965-66.Itcanbearguedthatthisstepby

theYudhoyonogovernmentprovidesaclearsignalthattheMinisterforPolitics,

LawandSecurity’scommentsinOctober2012werenotisolatedbutinfact

representtheactualpositionofthecurrentgovernmentonthequestionof1965.

TalkingAboutthePast:NewHopesandNewFearsShortlyafterthemediadebateprovokedbythereleaseoftheKOMNASHAM

report,anew‘incident’provokedafreshroundofdebate.AfilmentitledJagal–

TheActofKillingwasscreenedforthefirsttimeinColoradoonAugust312012.

ThefilmtellsastoryaboutsomegangstersinMedan,thecapitalcityofNorth

Sumatera,whoin1965,underthetutelageofthemilitary,becamethelocal

‘butchers’(Jagal)ofPKImembersandsympathizers.TheActofkillinghasan

ideological,apoliticalpurpose.Inthefirstinstancetoturnonitsheadwhatis

maintainedinstitutionallyasapoliticaltruth–thatthePKIvictimswere

barbariansandthatthemassmurdererswereheroes,andthentoexplainthatthe

realbarbariansarestillinpower100.

Shortlyafteritsfirstinternationalreleaseanewfacebookpageemergedwiththe

samenamethatprovidedaforumforreportingonanddiscussingscreeningsof

thefilmthatweretakingplaceinsideIndonesiaitself.Thesescreeningswere

almostallcovert.Contactcouldbemadethroughfacebookoranemailaddressto

discussorganizingscreeningsortogetinformationaboutscreeningstakingplace

indifferentlocationsacrossIndonesia.InMalangthevenueforascreening

100Thepurposeofthefilm,inthedirector’sownwordsis:“ForIndonesiansoldenoughtorememberthegenocide,thefilmmakesitimpossibletocontinuedenyingwhateverybodyinthatgenerationalreadyknows.ForIndonesianstooyoungtorememberthegenocide,butwhogrewupduringtheSuhartodictatorship,andwhoremembertheanti-communistpropaganda,thefilmisthenailinthecoffinoftheofficialhistory.ForyoungerIndonesianswhodonotremembertheSuhartodictatorship,thefilmconfirmsthegeneralsensethatthereissomethingrotteninIndonesia’sfledglingdemocracy,somethingthatpreventsthesupposedlydemocraticinstitutionsfromexpressingthepopularwill.Moreover,thefilmrevealsthesourceoftheproblem:terrorandcorruption,anditshowshowbothhavetheirrootsinimpunityforagenocidethathas,grotesquely,beencelebrated.”(Melvin2013)

52

attractedtheattentionofpoliceandBrimob101officials.Thescreeninghadtobe

cancelledaslocalorganizerswereconfusedandintimidated102.Inanothercase

membersofPemudaPancasilaattemptedtoshutdownascreeningbutwere

subsequentlyconvincedtohavediscussionaboutthefilmandtheeventsthatit

portrayed(Hatley2013).

Somewhohavewatchedthefilmthinkthattheknowledgeaboutalternative

versionsofhistoryisimportant.Butsomearealsoconcernedthatopendiscussion

mayprovokerenewedconflict.MembersoftheGardenof’65Community

(KomunitasTaman65),saythattherearerealfearsthatwidespreadviewingsof

thefilmcouldstirupangerandreprisalsfromyoungermembersofsurvivors'

familiesandanewconflictwithparamilitarygroups103.KomunitasTaman65

memberTkssaidthat“Idoworrythattheremaybeanewconflict.AfterSuharto's

'NewOrder'collapsedwethought(theperpetrators)wouldbefoundguilty”

(Irvine2013).Untilnowofcoursethecultureofimpunityremainsstrong,asthe

perpetratorshaveneverbeenmadeaccountable.

Thesefearsarewellfounded.InearlyOctober2013agroupoffamiliesofthe

survivorsof1965gatheredforasocialmeetinginJogjakarta.Theirgatheringwas

attackedbymembersoftheIndonesianAnti-CommunistFront(FrontAnti-

KomunisIndonesia-FAKI).Despiteseveralreportsthatpeopleweretakento

hospitalaftersufferinginjuriesfromtheattacks,thepolicemadestatementsthat

noonehadbeeninjured.TheFAKIalsostagedademonstrationoutsideofthe

LegalAidInstituteofficeinJogjakartademandingthatcommunistscannotbe

defendedbytheorganizationandthattheywouldkillcommunists(Perdaniand

Saragih2013;Syaifullah2013).

Whiletherehavebeensignificantobstaclestomakingthefilmbroadlyavailable

insideIndonesiaitshouldbeacknowledgedthatthenumberofpeopleactively

seekingoutthefilmhasnotbeenaswidespreadassomemayhaveimagined.Ariel

Heryanto(2012)wasoriginallycautiouslyoptimisticaboutthepossible

Indonesianpublicresponsetothefilm,howeverinAugustataconferencein

MelbournehereflectedthatIndonesian’slackofreaction(tothefilm)isbecause

101BrimobistheIndonesianelitemilitarysquad.102ReportedbyfilmscreeningorganizersonJagalofficialFacebookpage(February182013).103DiscussionwithTaman65membersinBali2July2013.

53

newsaboutgangsterism,criminalboastingandimpunityisalltoocommonin

Indonesia(Indrasafitri2013).

In2013therehasbeensomeinternationalpressuretofocusattentionon

Indonesia’shumanrightsrecordinthepast,particularlyfromtheUNHRC

(Aritonang2013b).InOctober2013KOMNASHAMandtheAttorneyGeneral’s

Officeagreedtosetupajointinvestigationteamtoreviewandfollowupon

KOMNASHAM’sfindingsaboutgrosshumanrightsviolationscommittedinthe

1965massviolence(ibid).ThisdecisionfollowedaUnitedNationsHumanRights

CommissionrecommendationmadeduringtheInternationalConventiononcivil

andpoliticalrightsmeetinginGenevainJuly2013.TheUNagencyurgedthe

IndonesiangovernmenttoresolvethedeadlockbetweentheKOMNASHAMand

theAttorneyGeneral’sOffice.HoweverBritish,USandAustraliangovernmentsin

particular,whoovertlyandcovertlysupportedtheactionsofSuhartoindirecting

themassviolenceandinseizingpowerbeforethePKIwasabletodoso,aremost

likelytoretaintheirhistoricalsilence(Reuter2013;Evans2001).

DemocraticStagnation

DuringtheSusiloBambangYudhoyonopresidencythepoliticalspacethathad

openedupinthefirstfewyearsofreformasihasnarrowed.Theactionstakenby

theYudhoyonogovernmentinrelationtothenarrativespecificallyorthetruth

abouttheeventsof1965indicateaconservativeshiftfrompreviousgovernments

andfromWahid’sgovernmentinparticular.Notonlyinrelationtothemythbut

morebroadlyintermsofthedemocraticagendathatpromotesopenideological

debateandarevisitingofthetruthofpasthistoricalevents.Theanti-communist

narrativeisstillusedtopoliticallydiscreditgenuinedemocraticclaimsbyordinary

citizenssuchasthePluitresidentsinJakartawhowereaccusedbytheVice-

GovernorAhokofactinglike‘communists’whentheydisagreedwithgovernment

plansthatwouldresultinthemlosingtheirhomes(Rimadi2013).

Themilitaryremainsstronghavingsignificantindependentfinancialinterestsas

wellasretainingtheirterritorialcommandsystemthatmirrorsthecivilian

governmentdowntothevillagelevel(Mietzner2009a).Hardlineanti-communist

andIslamicorganisationscontinuetoorganizeandintimidatehumanrightsand

victims’organizationsandthereisevidencethattheseorganizationsareoften

54

linkedtomilitaryinterestsorareimplicitlysupportedbythepolice(Mietzner

2009a;O’Rourke2002).

Inthesamevain,lawsrelatingtonationalelectionshavebeenreviewedseveral

timessince1999andeachreviewhasmadeitmoredifficultforpoliticalpartiesto

participateinelectionsandtogainseats.Politicalpartiesrequireenormous

financialresourcestogainaccesstotheformalpoliticalarena,thatis,tobeeligible

tostandcandidatesortoobtainadequateminimumvotestosecureaseatin

parliament(Freedomhouse2013).Thismakesitalmostimpossibleforlocaland

regionalcandidatestoparticipateortoformtheirownrepresentativepartiesor

forgroupswithlimitedfinancialresourcestoparticipateascandidatesinthe

electoralprocess.Theneedtoobtainsupportbackingfromoneofthemajor

electoralpoliticalpartiesrequirescandidatestosubmittothedictatesofthe

variouspoliticalpartymachines.Moneypoliticsisnowdominantinordinary

people’sdecision-makingprocesswhenitcomestochoosingelectoralcandidates.

Thisisincontrastto‘aliran’politicsortraditionalorganizationalaffiliationsthat

weremoredominantinpeople’sdecisionmakingin1999and2004elections

(Aspinall2010b).

InJuly2013arevisiontothemass(civilsociety)organizationslegislation(UU

Ormas)waspassed.Priortoitspassingitwascriticizedbymanycivilrights

organizationsasprovidingthestatewiththeopportunityrestrictpolitical

freedoms.TheUnitedNationsHumanrightsCommissionquicklyrecommended

thatthelegislationberepealedafteritwaspassedonthegroundsthatitwasin

conflictwiththecovenantonpoliticalandcivilrights(Firdaus2013).Mietzner

(2012)arguesthattherehasbeenconsistentactionfromcivilsocietyresponding

toattemptstorollbackdemocraticreformsbythecurrentgovernmentinrelation

tocorruption,electoralreformandprotectionofminorityrights.Hearguesthatit

hasbeentheresistancecomingfromcivilsocietythathasresultedindemocratic

stagnationratherthandemocraticreversalinIndonesia.

Therenewalofpubliccontestationoverthe1965narrativesinceearly2012,

framedmoreexplicitlywithintheframeworkofhumanrights,reflectsthe

narrowingofpoliticaloptionsforpubliccontestation.ThedefenceoftheNew

Ordernarrativeabout1965isindicativeofapowerfulsocialandpoliticalelite

withvestedinterestsinmaintainingthenarrative.Thecurrentgovernmentis

55

largelydominatedbyconservativeex-NewOrderelitesandthemoreliberal

reformelementshavebeenmarginalized.Therearenopartiesingovernmentthat

explicitlysupportthepursuitofarevisitingofthepast.Ministersandpublic

officialsappointedbySBYtoarangeofstateagenciesandinstitutionsareactively

hostiletoalternativeversionstotheNewOrder1965history.

Thefailuretomakechangesintheofficialnarrativehastakenplaceinthecontext

oftheretreatanddemoralizationofthemajorityofelementsofcivilsocietythat

activelymobilizedfordemocraticreformsintheearlyperiodofreformasi.

Organisationsorindividualsthatchallengethepoliticalprogramofthoseinpower

bychallengingthe1965narrativearesuppressedorintimidatedthroughtheuse

ofanti-communistideologyorbyforce.Far-reachingdemocraticreformsincluding

therighttoholddifferentideologicalviewsordefenceofsomebasicdemocratic

rightsbythestate,suchasfreedomofthoughtandorganization,appeartonotyet

bepossibleinIndonesia.

57

ChapterFive

PoliticsofthePast:ChangesandContinuities

PoliticalChangeandDealingwiththePast

Inperiodsofpoliticalchange(transitions)fromauthoritarianregimestomore

democraticpoliticalregimes,twobroadkindsofchangeprocessesareidentified

(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001).Changesthatoccurasthe

resultofacollapseofanoldregimeorchangesthattaketheformofnegotiated

transitionsbetweenanincomingdemocraticeliteandelitesfromtheoldregime.

Indonesiaexperiencedanegotiatedtransition.Arguablyitisbecauseofthis

negotiatedtransitionthatIndonesiahasnotembarkeduponfar-reaching

governmentsponsoredeffortstodealwithitsauthoritarianpastinitsfirstfifteen

yearsofdemocraticrule.

Significanteffortstodealwiththepastintheearlyperiodofreformasiemergedin

largepartthroughunofficialeffortssuchascampaignsbyvictims’andhuman

rightsorganisations.Whereofficialinitiativesweremadetheyweremoreoften

thannotstymiedduetothepositionoftheoldelitesinmanagingtheprocessesof

‘democratic’transition.Official‘transitionalpolicies’thatdealtwiththepast,that

wereinitiatedbytheHabibieorWahidgovernments,werelargelyquashedwithin

thefirsttermoftheSusiloBambangYudhoyonoledgovernment.Inthisinstance

Indonesiajoinsalonglistofnations,suchasthePhilippinesorCambodia,that

haveexperiencedsignificantpoliticalchangesattheendofadictatorship,yethave

notimplementedanysignificantprocessofaccountabilityformassviolenceand

repressioninthepast(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-Enriquez&Aguilar2001,9-

10).

Thisthesisisnotconcernedwiththeliteratureontransitiontypesorformsof

accountabilitybutratherwiththefunctionorpurposeofauthoritarianhistorical

narrativeasalegacyofanauthoritarianregime.Atthesametimetheliteratureon

transitionsdoesaddressthequestionofprocessesofaccountability(ortruthand

justiceseeking)andastudyofthenatureofthedemocracythatdevelops(ornot)

inapost-authoritarianstate.Thekeyvariableforthesuccessornotoftruthand

58

justiceseekingmeasures,includingtherevisitingofofficialhistoricalnarratives

aboutthepast,seemstorestwiththerelativestrengthofthepro-reformelements

(fromthemoderatestotheradicals)thatemergefromtheoldregimeandthe

authoritarianelitesthatparticipateinthesetransitions.Itisalsosignificantly

influencedbythechoicesofpoliticalalliancesthataremadeinprocessesof

democraticchange.

Przeworskiarguesthatlegaciesofdictatorshipsaredifficulttoresolveincases

wheretransitionsarenegotiatedbyoldelites.Heidentifiesthecrucialelementas

beingwhocontrolstherepressiveapparatusduringatransitionandtheattitudeof

thearmedforcestothepreviousregime(inBarahonadeBrito1991,67).In

Indonesia’scasethemilitaryhaveretainedmuchoftheirprivilegedpoliticaland

economicstatussince1998,throughtheirregionalcommandstructureand

independentfinancialmeans.

Theresultsofsuchamanaged‘democratic’changehavebeen,likeinmanyLatin

Americandemocracies,asituationof‘unruleoflaw’thatresultsintheexclusionof

vastsectorsfromthebenefitsofdemocracy(BarahonadeBrito,Gonzalez-

Enriquez&Aguilar2001,30).Thereisalackofcontrolofelectedrepresentatives

andstateofficialsandtheformofpoliticsfavourspowerfuleconomicinterest

groupsandtendstolimitsthecivillibertiesofthemajority.Restrictionsonthe

democraticrightsofsomecitizensorrestrictednotionsofcitizenshippassedon

frompreviousauthoritarianregimesindicatethenon-democraticvaluesoftheold

eliteforceswhocontinuetobenefitfromthesesamerestrictionsondemocratic

rightsofsomeoftheircitizens.Oneoftheobstaclestoagreaterqualityof

democracyisthefunctioningofthejudiciaryandtheresistanceofthesame

judiciariestochange104.

InIndonesiawheretherehasbeenactiveresistancetochallengestoauthoritarian

legacies,specificallythehistoricalnarrativeof1965,therearecomparative

examplesofthesurvivalofauthoritarianhistoricalnarrativethatdemonstrate

someofthevariousfunctionsofsuchnarrativesforpostauthoritariansocieties.In

Turkeythehistoricalnarrativeaboutthemassacresofmorethan300,000

Armeniansin1915bytheCommitteeofUnionandProgress(CUP),whowould104Indonesia’sjudiciaryhasdemonstrateditsresistancetodealingwiththepastincasessuchasTanjungPriokwhereconvictionshavebeenoverturnedonappealorEastTimorwhereonlylowerrankingmilitarypersonnelhavebeentriedbycourts(Sulistiyanto2007).

59

subsequentlyleadtheformationoftheTurkishrepublicin1923,isonesuch

comparison.ThecreationoftheTurkishstateandaTurkishconceptofcitizenship

intheformerterritoryoftheOttomanEmpire,requiredtheactivesuppressionof

othersignificantnationalorethnicgroupsincludingArmenians,Kurds,Greeksand

Assyrians.NinetyyearsaftertheestablishmentoftheTurkishstatethetruthabout

theArmenianmassacresandforceddeportationsisstilldeniedbytheTurkish

state.

TheconstructionofTurkishnationalidentitywaspredicatedonthesuppression

anddenialoftheexistenceofotherethnicgroupswithinthenewlyformedTurkish

state(Gol2005,135;Isyar2005).Thisbecameacentralplatforminthecreationof

politicallegitimacyfortheleadersofthisnewstate.Theofficialnarrative

guaranteedimpunityforthoseresponsibleforcrimesofmassviolenceandtheft.

Manyoftheperpetratorsofthegenocidewereinvolvedinorganisingandleading

therepublicanmovementandtheirsupport,organisationalskillsandnetworksin

Anatoliawereinvaluable(Gocek2008;Canafe2007,243).

‘Turkish’nationalismhasbeenthebedrockoftheTurkishnationsinceits

inception.Thesuppressionofotherethnicaswellasreligiousidentitieshasbeen

criticalintheconceptualizationandformationofthenation.Whilethegenocidal

actstowardstheArmenianswerearguablythemostsignificantintermsofscale

andliveslost,therepublicanTurkishstatehasactivelysuppressedallalternative

possibleethnicidentities(Efegil2011;Gol2005).Thishasprecludedthe

possibilityinmorerecenttimesofamorepluralapproachtopoliticsinrelationto

ethnicity,politicsandreligion.Ithasplacedsignificantconstraintsonpressuresto

democratise,astheopeningofpoliticalspacewouldallowpublicdiscussionof

theseissues.ToacknowledgethemassacresandforceddeportationsofArmenians

couldstimulateafarwiderpoliticaldynamicthatwouldchallengethehegemony

oftheTurkishbureaucraticelitethatretainslinkswiththeearlyTurkishstate

(Dixon2010).Anotherfactorthatrequirestheongoingdefenceoftheofficial

narrativeistheconcentratedinterestsofasmallgroupofbusinessandpolitical

eliteswhosewealthcanbetracedbacktoconfiscatedArmenianassets(Akcam

2004).

ContemporaryscholarsarguethatthesurvivaloftheofficialTurkishnarrativeis

predominantlyshapedbycontinuitiesandconstraintsthathavebeeninherited

60

fromthefoundingoftheRepublic(Akcam2004;Gocek2008).Thisofficial

narrativecontinuestoprovidelegitimacyforthepoliticalrepressionofitscitizens

bythestate,impunityforgovernmentofficialswhodirectorconductactsof

politicalviolenceanddefendvestedinterestsinrelationtoproperty.

ContinuitiesandtheProspectsforChange

InIndonesia’scaseanti-communistideologyhasoutlivedtheNewOrderregime.

The‘latentcommunistthreat’(bahayalatenkomunis)isstillusedbythe

Indonesianstatetoprovidelegitimacyandimpunityforactsofviolenceand

repressionbythemilitaryorpoliceor‘militias’.Itisnotonly(thoseaccusedof

being)‘communists’thataretargetedbutanygrouporindividualsthatare

deemedtoopposePancasilaideologywhichincludestheprincipleofaunitary

state(NKRI)(Mietzner2009a,228).Thisideologyhasbeenusedtolegitimizeacts

ofstateviolenceagainstdemocraticmovementsparticularlyinAcehandPapua.

Thesameideologyrestrictsfreeandopendebateofpoliticalideasandalternative

ideologieswhichisdemonstratedbythemaintenanceofthebanoncommunism.

Theongoingcontestationofthehistoricalnarrativeof1965indicatestherelative

strengthofnon-governmentorganizationsthatcontinuetocontestofficial

decisionsonhowtodealwiththepast.Whileforeigngovernmentsrarely,andin

generalareunlikelyto,challengetheIndonesiangovernmentoveritshumanrights

violationsbothinthepastandinthepresent,bodiessuchastheUNHRCand

Internationalandregionalhumanrightsorganizationshavebecomestrong

partnersforIndonesianbasedvictimsandhumanrightsorganizations(Suh2012).

Howeverwhilestateinstitutionsandpoliticalpartiesremaindominatedbythe

vestedinterestsofthepolitico-businesselites,itisunlikelythattherewillbeany

changesintheofficialnarrative.Since2007thetrendhasratherbeento

strengthentheNewOrder1965narrative.Whatthisongoingcontestation

indicatesisthathistoryandversionsof‘thepast’arepartofthedynamicof

democraticpoliticsinIndonesia.Withinelectedgovernmentthereisalmostno

oppositiontotheofficial1965narrative.Thecontestationpredominantlytakes

placeatthelevelofstate-societyrelationsasHumanRightsorganizations

61

challengeorsometimescooperate105withstateinstitutionsorthegovernmentto

obtaintruthandjustice(BarahonadeBrito2001,159).

Changesintheofficial1965narrativearemostlikelytobelinkedtootherpolitical

factorsthatinvolvethebroadeninganddeepeningofdemocraticinstitutions.

Giventhelackofeffectivepoliticaloppositionwithintheparliament,thiswould

mostlikelyhavetoinvolvenewactorspromotingdemocraticreformsthat

challengethecurrentpowerrelations.Reid(2011,150)arguesthathistoryasa

toolwasusedtolegitimizeadictatorshipanditishistorythatcanhelptoawaken

peoplefromamnesia.Ifnewnationalnarrativescondemnthestateviolenceand

terrorcarriedoutin1965andthroughouttheNewOrderperiodtheywillneedto

searchforanewandrepresentativeframeworkfornationalidentityitself.

105AsinthecaseofKOMNASHAM.

63

ConclusionFifteenyearsafterthefalloftheSuhartodictatorship,theauthoritarianhistorical

narrativeabout1965thatwascreatedbytheNewOrderregimehasbeen

defendedandreaffirmedbythepostNewOrder‘democratic’state.Thisisbecause

thoseinpowertodayarelargelydrawnfromtheoldNewOrderelitesorfrom

socialgroupsthatbenefitedfromtheNewOrdersystemofpower.Thedefenceof

thenarrativeservesseveralfunctionsforthenew‘democratic’socialandpolitical

order.Inthefirstinstancethedefenceofthe1965narrativefacilitatesthe

‘forgetting’ofpastatrocities.Itdemonstratesthelackofpoliticalwilltodealwith

thepast,inpart,outoffearofpunitiveactionsforcrimesofviolencethat

beneficiariesofthenewpowerarrangementshavecommittedinthepast.

Thenarrativealsofacilitatesthesurvivaloftheanti-communistideologyfromthe

NewOrderregime.ThisideologycontinuestobeusedbytheIndonesianstateto

underpinpoliticallegitimacyforthoseinpowerandtoprovideimpunityforactsof

politicalviolenceandrepressionthatareusedtodefendtheirsocialandpolitical

powerfromanychallenges.Pancasila(anti-communist)ideologyhasbeen

strengthenedwiththeincorporationoftheconceptoftheunitaryIndonesianstate

(NKRI),identifyingnowtwoprincipal‘threats’toIndonesiansovereignty.Itisused

tolegitimizeactsofstaterepressionagainstdemocraticrightsmovements

generallyandparticularlyinAcehandPapua.Thissameideologyrestrictsfreeand

opendebateofpoliticalideasandalternativeideologies,whichisdemonstrated

mostclearlybythemaintenanceofthebanoncommunism.

Thisanti-communistideologysupportsarestrictednotionofcitizenship,whichin

itsmostgrotesqueformsupportsdiscoursesthatadvocatekillingcommunists.

Thisideology,inheritedfromtheNewOrderregimeindicatesthenon-democratic

valuesofmanyoftheeliteforcesthatcurrentlyholdpower.Thesesamerestricted

notionsofcitizenshipsignificantlyconstrainthefreedomsofcivilsocietytoengage

inopendiscourseaboutthepossibilitiesfordeepeningandstrengtheningpolitical

democracyanditsinstitutions.

ThedemocracythathasbeenconsolidatedinIndonesiaisnotrepresentativeofthe

needsandaspirationsofthearrayofsocialforcesinvolvedintopplingtheSuharto

64

dictatorship.Thedeclineofapoliticisedcivilsocietyafter2001,the

marginalizationofliberalreformerswithinformalstateinstitutions,theweakness

ofthedemocraticparliamentaryoppositionandtheongoingrestrictionson

citizen’sdemocraticrights,limitmanyofthecurrentdemocraticoptionsavailable

toIndonesiansociety.Howeverdespitethenon-democraticvaluesofmanyof

thoseinpower,politicalinitiativesfortheextensionordeepeningofdemocracyin

Indonesia,suchasstrugglesforjusticeforvictimsofstateviolence,continuetobe

raisedbyforcesfromwithincivilsociety.Themostrecentrenewalofcontestation

overthe1965narrativesuggeststhathistoryandversionsof‘thepast’arelikelyto

beanongoingpartofthedynamicofdemocraticpoliticsinIndonesia.

65

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