This volume is a result of the project “The EU as regional player. Cooperation and integration in Eastern neighbourhood (EURINT)” within the Jean Monnet Life Long Learning Programme - Key Activity 1, financed by the European Commission (Grant No 2012-2712/001-001).

This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. The organizing committee is not responsible for the content and originality of the papers.

ISBN 978-973-703-892-0

© Editura Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iaşi, 2013 700109 – Iaşi, str. Pinului, nr. 1A, tel./fax: (0232) 314947 http:// www.editura.uaic.ro e-mail: editura@uaic.ro

Ramona FRUNZĂ Gabriela Carmen PASCARIU Teodor MOGA

(coordinators)

The EU as a model of soft power

in the Eastern neighbourhood

15-17 May 2013

Iaşi-Romania

EDITURA UNIVERSITĂȚII „ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA” IAȘI

2013

CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE – THE EUROPEAN UNION VS. THE

EURASIAN UNION?

Mircea-Cristian GHENGHEA

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi, Romania,

mcghenghea2010@yahoo.com

Abstract: From October 2011, when former Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin

brought to attention the plan of creating a Eurasian union, many politicians, analysts

and researchers dealing with matters of the ex-Soviet space regarded this as another

initiative of re-Sovietizing the Russian Federation and Central Asia as well. Despite

disbelief and international critics, the Eurasian Union’s mechanisms began to be

established even at the end of 2011 and early 2012. The proposed year for this

endeavour to become a reality and an important global actor is 2015. Until then the

subject of who is to be a member of this political and economic union seems to gain

a particular importance for its main promoter, Russia. In order to achieve its

objectives, which refer also to maintaining and extending its influence all over the

former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation is forced to deal with the European

Union and its enlargement policy towards the East. This aspect might also presume

the counteracting of the European Union’s initiatives within the Eastern Europe,

namely the Eastern Partnership, especially considering the fact that during a

roundtable in Moscow in November 2011 it was indicated that the Eurasian Union

should include countries like Finland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria.

Keywords: European Union, Eurasian Union, Russian Federation, challenge,

Eastern Partnership.

INTRODUCTION

The accomplishment of the Eurasian Union from Scotland to New Zealand

seems to be one of the strategic tasks of President Vladimir Putin, who made quite a

number of statements in which he mentioned this aspect. He is regarded as the only

man capable of bringing stability and prosperity to Russia. The creation of a Eurasian

Union in order to counterbalance the influence of the Northern Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO), the United States of America and the European Union has

important economic, military and political stakes.

The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood 53

1. THE EURASIAN UNION – HISTORICAL ROOTS

At the end of 2011, the entire world found out with greater or lesser

surprise that Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, was determined

to achieve the plan of creating a Eurasian Union. It was also said that Putin retook

an older idea first expressed by Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazahstan.

During a speech delivered at a Moscow university in May 1994, less than three

years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he mentioned the concept of a

Eurasian Union. Yet, as already shown by different specialists (Chaudet,

Parmentier and Pélopidas, 2009, pp. 39-48), the idea was not new at all – it

derived from the older concepts that were discussed and developed during the

interwar period by young Russian emigrants like geographer Piotr Savitski

(1895-1968), theologian Georgi Florovski (1893-1979), ethnologist Nikolaї

Trubetskoy (1890-1938), linguist Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896-1982),

historian Georgi Vernadsky (1887-1973), etc. (Chaudet, Parmentier and

Pélopidas, 2009, p. 44). Following the Revolution in 1917, most of these

intellectuals that contributed to the articulation of the Eurasianist idea regarded

Russia like a world apart, belonging neither to Europe nor to Asia. They

practically associated the term of geographical Eurasia (the whole of Europe and

Asia) to this idea. This was the starting point of the intellectual genesis of

Eurasianism. The main debate evolved around one issue: how much of Europe is

in Russia and how much of Russia is in Europe? Nonetheless, one must bear in

mind that the very notion of Eurasianism was initially regarded as a “Third Way”

by the Russian emigration, “neither Tsarist nor socialist nor capitalist but simply

the best to redefine the frontiers of collective identity” (Chaudet, Parmentier and

Pélopidas, 2009, p. 45).

This way of thinking, quite intimately connected even then with the

theological level and with mystic elements that represented a true constant within

the Russian mentality of the last two centuries might offer an interesting

perspective regarding the perpetuity of an idea: the dominance of Europe and, if

possible, of the entire world. Almost any major intellectual and political

movement that originated in or from the Russian space during the 19 th and 20th

centuries and approached the relation between Russia and the rest of the world

gave Russia a very special place – always in opposition to the Western powers,

always trying to fulfil a providential mission (“Mother” of all the Slavs, The

Third Rome, The True Heartland of Europe, etc.) (Copilaş, 2009, pp. 65-69;

Silion, 2004, passim; Laats, 2009, pp. 98-113). Whether we think at

Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism, Internationalism (the official ideology of the

newborn Communist Russia under Vladimir Ilyich Lenin), Eurasianism and even

the Communist ideology promoted by Stalin and his followers, we can only

notice that all these represent various expressions of the Russian tendency of

dominance over an increasingly larger space.

54 The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood

Territorial plans came almost as a natural consequence, and from the 18th

century on, the borders of the Russian state were shifting periodically. At the

middle of the 19th century, the Russian Empire had territories on three continents

– Europe, Asia and Northern America. In addition to this extraordinary territorial

increase, one must not forget the projection of an image representing a God-

chosen country, meant to impose the true faith and a superior civilization to the

world (during the Tsarist regime) or the New Man and the New Communist

Society (during the Communist regime). Nevertheless, Russia had already

become a European power during the 18th century, after defeating Sweden and

King Charles XII. Almost a century later, after its significant contribution to the

defeat of Napoleon I, Russia began to formulate its claims as a universal power

(Cliveti, 2010, pp. 61, 231). One of the results of all the intellectual and political

currents previously mentioned was the general belief within the Russian elites

and not only in the providential role which Russia was supposed to have. For

instance, right before the Second World War a poet named Pavel Davidovich

Kogan wrote a poem which contains these verses: “I am a patriot. I love Russian

air and Russian soil. / But we will reach the Ganges River, / and we will die in

fights, / to make our Motherland shine / from Japan to England”.

Historically speaking, it was not for the first time when Russia had claimed

its dominance over such a large area. Taking into consideration the theological

and mystic aspects already mentioned, one must say that the first signs of these

tendencies can be identified at the beginning of the 19 th century, during the wars

against Napoleon I. In 1814-1815, after defeating the French Emperor, Tsar

Alexander I proved to be more than a simple winner. He tried to impose his ideas

regarding a united Europe, a European federation or even a United Christian

Nation in Europe. It was more like a mystic approach, as already noticed by

different researchers of the phenomenon (Cliveti, 2009, pp. 90-91; Manoilov,

2010, passim; Bodnár, 2006, p. 100), yet it could easily be linked with certain

aspects specific to the realities of our times. Even now, representatives like

Aleksandr Dugin, one of the most active promoters of the Eurasian theory and

“The Prophet of the New Russian Empire” (Liverant, 2009), as known in the

Western world, consider that Russia should militate for a union of the Slav

peoples already united through traditions, linguistic analogies and Orthodoxy as

a counter-power against the Occident, especially the Unites States of America

and their allies.

Nevertheless, one must bear in mind the fact that the Eurasian / Neo-

Eurasian idea enforces another way of dominance for the use of Russia, which is

seen like the main element of connection between the civilizations from East and

West – “The Eurasianist trend of the Russian geopolitical school helps to justify

Russia’s historically developed imperial ambitions of dominating the centre of

the geographical continent, Eurasia” (Ismailov, Papava, 2010, p. 21). Practically,

the essence of this Eurasianism resides in the fact that, by occupying the whole

The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood 55

central space between Asia and Europe, Russia was providentially settled at the

intersection of two great worlds, East and West, representing a special social and

cultural universe which is meant to unite both sides.

2. BORDERS AND MEMBERS OF THE EURASIAN UNION –

PRESENT SITUATION AND PRESUMED FUTURE

As already mentioned, the Russian territorial projection knew an

extraordinary development. The continuous expansion registered by the Russian

state during the 18th and 19th centuries had an important impact both for the

Russian elites and the people. This is why, despite any strong social and political

convulsions in the 19th and 20th centuries, the idea that Russia was meant to have

a special destiny and finally lead the world was very popular in every social class

and intellectual movement. The idea was practically assumed by the

Communists, who substituted the religious and mystic part of the Russian

providential mission with the Bolshevik utopia of the New Man and the New

Society. Same content, different shape… As noticed within different works, most

of the representatives of the Eurasianist idea gradually moved towards

Bolshevism, which had begun to be seen “as a form of national Communism”

(Chaudet, Parmentier and Pélopidas, 2009, p. 46). A sort of symbiosis between

Eurasianism and the Soviet Union slowly took place during the late ’20s and

increased its power as the connections between Russia and Asia became even

stronger after the Bolshevik Revolution, an important psychological moment

being the famous Baku Congress in 1924 (Chaudet, Parmentier and Pélopidas,

2009, p. 46). Following the Second World War, the Eurasianism entered a period

of latency; the idea and the perspectives involved were “rediscovered” and

promoted during the late ’80s, especially thanks to the works of Lev

Nikolayevich Gumilev, an ethnologist and anthropologist who encountered and

corresponded for many years with Piotr Savitski, the exiled geographer. Lev

Gumilev established the borders of the Eurasian mega-continent by analyzing

geographical and weather conditions. According to his opinion, Eurasia

comprises three regions: Upper Asia (including here Mongolia, Dzungaria, Tyva

and Trans-Baikal), the Southern Region (Kazahstan and Middle Asia), and the

Western Region (which includes Eastern Europe). This “reborn” Eurasian idea

was given the name of “Neo-Eurasianism”.

It is naturally understood that the question of territories involved by the

Neo-Eurasianist idea still stands. At the moment, the declared purpose of the

Neo-Eurasianist promoters is to create a huge economic space, with a common

market of more than 200 million consumers, the adoption of a common economic

legislation, and the insurance of the free circulation of capital, services and

labour force (Drăghici, 2013). Yet, what would be the exact extent of this

economic space? At the end of 2011, a roundtable was organised in Moscow by

56 The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood

the United Russia party, an opportunity for Vladimir Putin (then still Prime

Minister of Russia) to outline his geopolitical ambitions and projections. The

subject of the roundtable was the constitution of the Eurasian Union primarily as

an economic organisation. According to Russian political scientists like Dmitry

Orlov, the projected Union should bring together, apart from the countries of the

former Soviet Union, nations that are historically and culturally close to Russia

and are “loyal to Russia’s interests”; in this context, Orlov indicated states like

Finland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria in Europe, Mongolia and

Vietnam in Asia, and quite surprisingly for many, Cuba and Venezuela in Latin

America (Moscow fleshes out “Eurasian Union” plans, 2011).

What is certain for now is that only two former Soviet republics have

joined the plan – Kazahstan and Belarus; in January 2010 the Customs Union

between the Russian Federation, Kazahstan and Belarus was founded. After this

first step, the end of 2011 brought to attention the Eurasian Union, which, as

different Russian experts stated, should be ideally conceived without the

mistakes made when the European Union was created (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

ready to join Customs Union, 2012). In December 2012, Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan have also announced their intention of entering the Customs Union

(Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan ready to join Customs Union, 2012). As the situation

is not yet cleared with other former Soviet republics, this seems to be the core of

the desired Eurasian organisation.

However, the intensions of the Russian President Vladimir Putin are not to

be neglected. On 19th November 2011 Russia, Kazahstan, and Belarus had

already founded a mixed commission in order to accomplish the task of creating

the Eurasian Union until 2015. On 1st January 2012 the Common Economic

Space came into force. On 1st February the same year the Eurasian Economic

Commission, a permanent body of Customs Union and of the Common Economic

Space, became operational. 2013 and 2014 might be the decisive years for the

creation of the Eurasian Union. Already at the beginning of 2013, during the

Gaidar Forum that took place in Moscow, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev

reaffirmed the objectives of shaping Eurasia as a mega-region of the world and a

connection space between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. At the same event

there were discussions regarding the necessity of cooperation between the newly

formulated organism and the European Union, in order to create a commission

which should include representatives of both the Eurasian Economic

Commission and the European Union. One of the main issues in the debate was

the accomplishment of a common economic space from Scotland to New

Zealand, an enormous continental market (Drăghici, 2013).

3. BUILDING THE EURASIAN UNION – INTERNATIONAL

REACTIONS

The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood 57

The creation of the Eurasian Union and the first measures that were taken

provoked quite a wide range of reactions in the international arena. Major actors

like the United States of America and the European Union immediately

appreciated that the nascent of the Eurasian community represents a reborn of

the Soviet empire in disguise (Stares, 2012). The American Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton clearly described the Russian efforts as “a move to re -Sovietize

the region” (the former Soviet space). “It’s not going to be called that. It’s going

to be called a customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that. But

let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to

figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it” (Morrissey, 2012; Bridge,

2012). Needless say that the statement of the American official provoked a harsh

response from Kremlin. President Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, showed

that Hillary Clinon’s comments simply betray a lack of understanding of the true

nature of the processes and changes that take place within the former Soviet

Union (Bridge, 2012).

In its turn, the European Union regarded in a wariness manner the Russian

efforts to articulate a Eurasian Union. As the Eurasian integration process has

become an important issue in Russian foreign policy and it is expected to remain

a top priority over the next few years, the European Union has no choice but to

carefully analyze the situation in order to make a proper decision towards the

evolving realities in the East. Several conferences and international meetings

were organised in an attempt to define the integration processes in the post-Soviet

space and their impact on the relations between the European Union and the

Russian Federation (e.g. Berlin, 14-15 June 2012; Brussels, 23 October 2012;

etc.).

On the other hand, Russia seems to have improved relations with China, a

fact demonstrated by the last BRICS summit held in March 2013 in Durban,

South Africa (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Various

analysts and commentators spoke about a true “Rise of Sinorussia”, a force

“capable of dominating Eurasia and projecting its influence over the entire globe”

(The Rise of Sinorussia And Its Geopolitical Consequences – Analysis, 2013).

Territorial disputes between the two powers were gradually and peacefully

settled during the last two decades, despite some still disturbing aspects for the

Russian Federation. A number of economic deals were signed and put to practice

between Russian and Chinese companies and, so far, China has not necessarily

objected to Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian plan, even though different voices within

Russia claimed that the Eurasian economic union might represent an effective

barrier against China’s pressure in Central Asia (Krichevsky, 2011).

The reactions among the former members of the Soviet Union were rather

contradictory. While Kazahstan and Belarus promptly confirmed their adhesion

to the Eurasian plan, other countries like Ukraine did not give the answer that

58 The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood

Kremlin wanted. Some results appeared at the end of 2012, when Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan decided to join the Customs Union, as previously mentioned.

4. THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP, RUSSIA AND THE EURASIAN

UNION – ACTION AND REACTION?

It is already a common place that the European Union is regarded as an

emerging superpower by different scholars, diplomats and politicians (Guttman,

2001, passim), the 21st century being considered as the century in which this

aspect has to become reality. The European Union’s primary mechanisms have

been settled in the ’50s; despite frequent tensions and discontents, the

cooperation between the member states works properly in many regards.

Newcomers like Poland, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,

Slovenia, the Baltic countries (2004) and finally Bulgaria and Romania (2007)

found their place within the Union. Even if there are still many things to be

achieved, the European Union presents itself as a well-articulated organism, a

credible and strong economic and political voice.

In the context of the extending process, which seems to be still far from

being concluded, the European Union gave a particular importance to the Eastern

part of the continent. Within the last years, the European Union enriched its

relations with some of the states in the area (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,

Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) by concluding the Eastern

Partnership in 2009. This came as a necessity after realizing that the events in the

countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus might affect the European

Union. The Partnership was also seen as a possibility of harmonizing the national

legislations with the requirements of the European Union.

In 2008 when the Eastern Partnership was established, Russia gave voice

to its discontent, accusing the European Union of expanding its “sphere of

influence”. Russian officials often denied the utility of this mechanism. It is not

exaggerated to consider that Vladimir Putin’s initiative of creating the Eurasian

Union might be also regarded as a reaction against the extending process of the

European Union, provoking Brussels’ concern: “While officially supportive of

all regional integration processes around the world, the EU is clearly wary of this

supranational upstart” (Stares, 2012). At the same time, despite friendly and

comforting statements of the Russian leaders, the simple fact that countries like

Finland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria were named as possible

members of the Eurasian Union poses a series of questions. The accession of

Belarus in the Customs Union, followed by the agreement signed by the

Presidents of Russia, Kazahstan and Belarus (on 18 th November 2011) practically

knocked out Belarus from the Eastern Partnership. The strategic interests of the

Russian Federation demand further actions in order to properly achieve the

The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood 59

proposed objectives and to prevent the integration of the remaining countries of

the Eastern Partnership in the European Union. Quite recently, at the beginning

of April 2013, the central administration of so-called Transnistrian Republic

began to develop a joint project with Russia in order to implement a process of

integration of the separatist region within the Eurasian Union – a media centre

was opened in Tiraspol, in the presence of Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime

Minister of the Russian Federation in charge of defence and space industry. Igor

Shornikov, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian

Republic, declared that “the centre is a part of complex information process” and

all those who are willing to prepare various materials regarding the Eurasian

integration are welcomed there (Joiţa, 2013).

Furthermore, it seems that Moscow is no longer disposed to accept an

increasing European influence within the former Soviet space. As Ukraine and

the Republic of Moldova are the most advanced members of the Eastern

Partnership, it would only be logical for the Russian leaders to maintain a state

of uncertainty here, a thing which actually exists. Both Ukraine and the Republic

of Moldova must face the fact that even though they made great progress and

accomplished most of their tasks in relation with the European Union, the

communist past still has a certain influence. In addition to this, there is a strong

and numerous Russian minority, especially in Ukraine, which has its own plans

and perspectives, not necessarily orientated towards the European Union.

CONCLUSIONS

The result of the Russian efforts to create a supra-state and supra-national

organism like the Eurasian Union remains yet to be seen. However, the beginning

was made, but there is still a long way to go. The attempt of creating such a mega-

structure, immediately considered as a move of re-Sovietizing the space once

mastered by the former Soviet Union, is the expression of another plan which

aims at the Russian supremacy.

The European Union and the United States of America must find their way

in dealing with the new Union if this one will become reality. While the American

attitude was clearly stated, the European Union might find itself in a difficult

position as it has to closely cooperate with Russia in different fields and, at the

same time, should continue the extending policy in the Eastern part of the

continent. The Eastern Partnership, already damaged by the loss of Belarus, has

a rather blurry future. Naming possible members of the Eurasian Union like

Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, Russia could easily put a

supplementary pressure on Ukraine, a country apparently divided between the

European and Eurasian options. It might also be regarded as another type of

warning against further extension of the European Union. Nevertheless, the fact

that Russia has drawn Belarus from the Eastern Partnership and continues to

60 The EU as a model of soft power in the Eastern neighbourhood

support, one way or another, the political regime in Tiraspol shows that the

leaders in Kremlin are not willing to abandon the positions they still hold at the

borders of their former empire. One thing is sure – the Russian Federation will

not easily accept a new extension of the European Union within the space that

sometimes was under its control.

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