Certification and Communities: Alternatives

for Regulating the Environmental and Social

Impacts of Shrimp Farming

PETER VANDERGEEST *

York University, Toronto, Canada

Summary. — This paper examines two distinct environmental regulatory networks for shrimpfarming, one based in certification, the other in community and local government regulation. Fieldresearch in Southern Thailand shows that local communities and local governments are currentlythe most effective regulators of shrimp farming. Emerging environmental certification networks donot provide for community input into setting, monitoring, or enforcing technical standards. Certi-fication networks could be more effective at containing negative social and environmental impacts ifthey borrowed from Community Based Natural Resource Management approaches to make thedefinition of technical standards more flexible and open to participation by affected communities.

� 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — environment, certification, community, shrimp, governance, Thailand

* Research on which this paper is based was carried out

the support of grants from the Social Sciences and Hu-

manities Research Council of Canada, and with the ex-

cellent research assistance of Keith Barney and Jaroon

Kanjanapan. Melanie Dupuis and Robin Roth provided

comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and Annemarie

Gallaugher provided crucial assistance with the writing

and editing. Final revision accepted: December 15, 2006.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the past it was assumed that governmentsshould take ultimate responsibility for safe-guarding the environment on behalf of thepublic good. Governments, however, are nowwidely seen as lacking capacity to implementand enforce detailed environmental regulations,or as too often acting for a narrow nationalinterest against global environmental problems.This paper uses the example of the environmen-tal problems associated with industrial shrimpfarming to investigate the implications andpotential interactions between two alternativeapproaches to environmental governance: envi-ronmental certification and community-basedresource management.

While considerable attention has been direc-ted at certification as an alternative or supple-ment to direct government regulation, it is notthe only approach to addressing the perceivedlack of government regulatory capacity. A sec-ond approach, most often found in the ‘‘globalsouth’’ (including, e.g., northern Canada), re-lies on mobilizing local communities to partici-pate in managing natural resources, especiallynatural resources characterized by commonproperty or collective tenure arrangements

(e.g., IDRC, 2005; Tyler, 2006). Although certi-fication and community-based approaches toenvironmental regulation emerged more or lesssimultaneously and address similar problems,they tend to be applied in distinct situations,with very little overlap (Taylor, 2005). NGOsthat support community-based conservationapproaches are often critical of certification be-cause of the fact that communities are being ex-cluded from substantial participation in settingstandards or making certification decisions.

Shrimp farming makes an excellent case forexamining the interaction between certificationand community-based regulation. It has be-come a major global industry over the pasttwo decades, with total production worth overUS$7 billion per year (Bene, 2005). Farmedshrimp is produced almost entirely in the

coastal zones of tropical countries, and for ex-port to the United States, Japan, Europe, andother wealthy countries. It is thus a significantsource of foreign exchange for many develop-ing countries, and integrates often previouslymarginal coastal communities into high valuecommodity networks. Researchers and NGOshave documented considerable environmentaland social problems of the sort often associ-ated with intensive farming operations (Boyd& Clay, 1998; Clay, 2004; Vandergeest, Flah-erty, & Miller, 1999), and the industry has re-sponded by identifying ‘‘Best ManagementPractices’’ (BMPs) and creating institutionsfor certifying producers who follow theseBMPs (Bene, 2005). Recent commitments bymajor buyers such as Wal-Mart (2005, 2006),Darden, and Lyons to buy only certified sea-food, including farmed shrimp, indicate thatsignificant portions of global industrial aqua-culture production may soon come under thecertification umbrella. In response to thesedevelopments, a group of NGOs has launcheda coordinated campaign seeking to influencethe environmental certification of shrimp farm-ing (see Forest Peoples Programme, 2006). Akey criticism concerns the way that certifica-tion institutions and procedures do not allowfor participation by all stakeholders, includingcoastal communities where shrimp farms arelocated.

This paper is organized into five sections.Following this introduction, Section 2 reviewsthe emergence of certification as an approachto environmental governance, and locates certi-fication in relation to a broader approach toenvironmental governance 1 that I label ‘‘Envi-ronmental Regulatory Networks’’ (ERNs). Iargue that accounts of certification as ‘‘Non-State, Market Driven’’ (NSMD; see Cashore,2002; Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004) missesthe way that these certification institutions arecomprised of shifting networks of actors,including many located within state organiza-tions, and how the driving forces include notonly markets, but also complex intersectingmotives associated with the multiple actorswho participate in these networks. Broadeningthis approach allows me to bring ‘‘Commu-nity-Based Natural Resource Management’’(CBNRM) into the picture as another form ofenvironmental governance that also blursboundaries between state and non-state actors,and that has been promoted by some NGOs asan alternative to certification. Section 3 drawson field research in Southern Thailand to docu-

ment how the local impacts of shrimp produc-tion have generated ‘‘community’’-basedactions to regulate shrimp farming, facilitatedby decentralization policies that have empow-ered elected local governments to become moreactive in environmental management. In Sec-tion 4, I review certification institutions forshrimp farming to show how they have so farfailed to recognize or make any attempt towork with community-based regulatory prac-tices. In the fifth and final section, I discussthe potential for integrating these approaches,through bringing community governing prac-tices into certification institutions.

2. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORYNETWORKS

Scholars and practitioners of environmentalregulation have been documenting the emer-gence of new types of regulation often charac-terized as marketdriven (Cashore, 2002), or asthe privatization of governance (Gereffi, Gar-cia-Johnson, & Sasser, 2001). 2 In the contextof agrofood studies, for example, Busch andBain (2004) describe what they call the rise ofa private regulatory system driven by supermar-kets in the global agrofood system, whileCashore (2002) and Cashore et al. (2004) usethe term ‘‘Non-State Market-Driven’’ (NSMD)to characterize emergent governance systemsfor socially and environmentally responsibleproduction processes. Many environmentalgroups are abandoning the traditional view thatit is the state that should act on behalf of collec-tive interests, and are turning instead to mobi-lizing large institutional buyers and concernedconsumers (Mastny, 2003) to use environmen-tal, social, or ethical criteria in their purchasingdecisions. Prominent examples of institutionsthat have emerged to certify commodities forenvironmental qualities include the ForestryStewardship Council and other forestry certifi-cation regimes (Meidinger, Elliot, & Oesten,2002; Taylor, 2005), the Marine StewardshipCouncil, and ISO 14000 certification (Clapp,2005). Many other certification regimes are lessfocused on environmental impacts but claimsustainability as one of their goals. Theseregimes include Fair Trade (Raynolds, 2002),organic food certification, the new ecotourismcouncil (Hamilton, 2004), and proliferatingcodes of conduct in sectors that are controver-sial for their environmental impacts, for exam-ple, mining and chemical manufacture.

This broader trend in the environmentalmovement is reinforced in the agrofood sectorby the growing involvement of food retailersin the regulation of their suppliers (Busch &Bain, 2004; Friedmann, 2005; Lockie, 2002;Marsden, Flynn, & Harrison, 2000; Raynolds,2002). Scholars have documented how theseregulatory practices are being extended acrossnational borders from northern consumptionsites to production sites in Africa (Freidberg,2004), Latin America (Raynolds, 2004; Rear-don, Timmer, Barrett, & Berdegue, 2003), andAsia (Boselie, Henson, & Weatherspoon,2003; Reardon et al., 2003; Wiboonpongse &Sriboonchitta, 2004). The most common expla-nation for the increase in retailer-driven regula-tion in the agrofood sector is that food retailersin northern countries are competing increas-ingly on the basis of quality, and are thereforeincreasing their involvement of the productionpractices of their suppliers in order to ensurespecific qualities (Friedmann, 2005; Ponte,2002). These qualities can include both ‘‘experi-ence’’ characteristics (Josling, Roberts, &Orden, 2004) such as freshness or taste thatcan be detected directly by consumers afterpurchase, and ‘‘credence’’ or non-materialcharacteristics that cannot be detected byconsumers. These credence qualities includethe environmental and ethical conditions ofproduction. For example, is the item producedorganically? Are beef cattle fed hormones? Docrops include genetically modified varieties?Are coffee producers being paid a fair price?Are tuna caught by methods that minimizedangers to dolphins? Under what conditionswere animals raised? Because these qualitiesare process based and not readily apparent inthe physical product that reaches the consumer,consumers can respond only if the product hastrustworthy labels. The effect is to make theregulation of food production a way of produc-ing new quality-based values that can be mar-keted to consumers.

My study of emerging certification practicesfor industrial shrimp farming (Section 3) rein-forces the view that some of this literature over-states the degree to which these regulatorynetworks are non-state, or marketdriven. AsRaynolds (2004) has pointed out for the caseof organic certification, it is important to recog-nize that regulatory networks are not just aboutretailers controlling producers. Raynolds(2004) and Ponte (2002) develop a morenuanced governance analysis, drawing on net-work and convention theories, to ‘‘portray the

complex web of material and nonmaterial rela-tionships connecting the social, political, andeconomic actors enmeshed in the life of acommodity’’ (Raynolds, 2004, p. 728). Morespecifically, the idea that regulation is private,non-state and marketdriven (NSMD) assumesa clear separation between state and market,or public and private—a distinction that is dif-ficult to sustain when examining specific exam-ples of certification. Recent writing using theconcept of governance (Clapp, 2005; Higgins& Lawrence, 2005; Levy & Newell, 2005) haspointed to how environmental governance,and the governance of agrofood chains, in-cludes but is not limited to state actors, andspecifically points to the blurring of boundariesamong actors in the private and public sectors.For the purpose of this paper, I propose thatthe notion of an Environmental RegulatoryNetwork (ERN) is a more open and accurateway of understanding certification than theconcept of NSMD. As my description of certi-fication in shrimp farming will show, ERNsmay include different state institutions, environ-mental groups, the World Bank and other mul-tilateral and bilateral development agencies,UN organizations, trade agreements, consum-ers, retailer organizations, farmers, policy andresearch centers, and even, if one is convincedthat Actor Network Theory has something use-ful to contribute (Goodman, 1999), non-humanactants such as viruses, bacteria, and (in thisstudy) shrimp. Actors in these networks are dri-ven by multiple motives, including reducingharmful environmental impacts, promotingeconomic growth, harmonizing certificationstandards for the purpose of facilitating trade,ensuring safe food, protecting domestic indus-tries, and creating new food qualities that canbe marketed to consumers.

Framing regulation broadly as ERNs allowsme to direct attention to a second significant re-sponse to the assertion that states in developingcountries have failed to protect the environ-ment, which is to decentralize environmentalmanagement to local government or village-level institutions. For the purpose of this paper,I refer to this as Community Based Natural Re-source Management (CBNRM), understood asa decentralized approach to environmental reg-ulation. CBNRM networks typically enroll ac-tors ranging from international developmentdonors to government resource departments(Departments of Forestry, Fisheries, and Irri-gation). Like certification networks, they arejustified in part through the argument that cen-

tralized resource management agencies lack thecapacity and legitimacy to manage natural re-sources effectively. CBNRM aims to addressthis problem by finding ways of increasing theparticipation of rural communities in resourcemanagement, often through co-managementarrangements. The argument is that rural com-munities have more intimate knowledge of theirlocalities than the state resource agencies, andthat they also have a greater stake in managingresources sustainably because their livelihoodsdepend on it. These arguments complementethical or legal arguments about the rights ofcommunities to use resources in places wherethey may have lived for many generations.

CBNRM has also been criticized around anumber of issues in the pages of this and otherjournals. Although CBNRM is supposed to en-hance the role of local communities in environ-mental regulation, there is also evidence thatapplied rigidly or as a means to achieve otherobjectives, CBNRM can undermine existingcommunity institutions and livelihoods, replac-ing them with state administrative institutionsor new restrictions enforced by these institutions(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Vandergeest, 2003).Tania Li, for example, argues that while simpli-fications of complex processes are necessary foreffective policy advocacy on behalf of rural peo-ple, there is doubt about whether the particularsimplifications associated with CBNRM andcommon property advocacy cause more goodthan harm for many rural people (Li, 1996,2002). Li also points out that CBNRM is oftenbased on a conventional notion of communityas a stable social group bound by locality, withthe effect of erasing from consideration mobilepeoples such as rural–rural migrants. CBNRMdevelopment projects are also often character-ized by a lack of attention to gender, class, caste,or racialized differences in rural areas (Beck &Nesmith, 2001).

Despite the skeptical commentaries, however,the idea of community as a key form of ruralcollective action has proven resilient. It seemsunavoidable, both as a shorthand for referencesto ‘‘local’’ people, and because it has uses thatother terms have failed to capture. Mostimportantly, community allows scholars anddevelopment practitioners to discuss forms ofplace-based collective action that cannot easilybe reduced to class, ethnic group, and so on. Itis also useful for scholars and activists whosework engages larger scale processes such asglobalization, but who nevertheless need away of referring to local-scale actors in a way

that brackets the complexities of local socialdifferences. In this paper, I will thus use theterm community to refer to locality-based col-lective action, but with the understanding thatthis collective action is not based on the collec-tive interests of a homogeneous local commu-nity, but is the outcome of local gender, class,ethnic, and power relations. Local communitiesand collective action, as the research in South-ern Thailand will show (Section 3), are also notseparate from or opposed to states. Rather,they are tied up with state institutions in com-plex ways that cannot be reduced to the ideathat CBNRM is about governments re-orient-ing local institutions to achieve state regulatoryobjectives.

Bringing CBNRM into the discussion of envi-ronmental regulation draws attention to theway that the people or communities that aremost affected by the environmental practicesof producers are seldom enrolled in any mean-ingful way in certification networks (Durst,McKenzie, Brown, & Appanah, 2006; ForestPeoples Programme, 2006; Taylor, 2005). Thisobservation can be framed more broadly withreference to how environmental certificationcan reinforce global inequities in who definesand enforces standards. I will show below forthe case of shrimp farming certification thatwhen communities are mentioned in the stan-dards, it is almost always in relation to theso-called social standards typically included incertification templates. These standards oftenmandate varying combinations of consultation,sharing of benefits, labor rights, and respectingproperty and/or human rights. But they donot allow for including local communities inthe process of setting, monitoring, or enforcingtechnical standards. This situation is not onlytrue for the case of shrimp farming. Other envi-ronmental certification schemes have also failedto generate support among NGOs active incommunity-based conservation work, as illus-trated by lack of support among these groupsfor the FSC and competing forest certificationschemes (e.g., Muhtaman & Prasetyo, 2006,p. 50; Shahwahid, 2006, p. 85; Taylor, 2005).A key reason is that certification networks tendto adopt ‘‘immutable’’ technical standards(Campbell & Stuart, 2005) that circulateinternationally, but are not open to commu-nity-based understandings of what constitutessustainability.

In the case of shrimp farming, this exclusionis particularly significant, as much of the criti-cism of shrimp farming is based on its impact

on rural communities. In Section 3, I draw onfield research in Southern Thailand to showhow local people and governments have re-sponded to the problems created by shrimpfarming through what can be framed as com-munity-based regulation.

3. COMMUNITY-BASED REGULATION

The author of this paper has conducted re-search on agrarian change in the Songkla Lakearea in Southern Thailand since 1985 (Vander-geest, 1989). Since 1995, this research has fol-lowed the rapid development of the shrimpindustry in the area, and included numerousinterviews with shrimp farmers, rice farmers,fishers, government officials, NGOs, andresearchers (Flaherty, Vandergeest, & Miller,1999; Vandergeest et al., 1999).

Songkla Lake (Figure 1) is a large lagoon;about 80 km long and 20 km wide at its widestpoints, and covering a total area of about 1,000square kilometers (Choonhapran, Ratanachai,& Meechookunt, 1996, p. 2). Water flowssouthward, emptying into the Gulf of Thailandthrough a narrow opening to the Gulf of Thai-land at the city of Songkla. Although salinityvaries by season, the lower portion (Talet SapSongkla) is generally brackish and flushed bytides, while the upper portion (Talet Luang) isbrackish only in the dry season (Choonhapranet al., 1996). During the early 1990s, accordingto local researchers (Choonhapran et al., 1996),about 6,000 households in 41 villages derivedlivelihoods from fishing in the lower lake, whileabout 14,000 households in 102 villages did thesame in the upper portion. Of these, 7,000households reported that fishing was their pri-mary source of livelihood. Other importantlivelihoods include rice farming, wage labor inthe Songkla-Hat Yai urban areas to the southof the lagoon, fruit cultivation, and aquaculturein the lagoon. Wage labor is available both invarious tasks related to shrimp farming (har-vesting, sorting, security, transportation, andwork in processing facilities), and in the rapidlygrowing Songkla-HatYai urban zone to thesouth of the lagoon. In some areas rice farmingis now considered something older people doout of a sense of tradition, although there arealso significant areas where intensive rice farm-ing remains important and comes into conflictwith shrimp farming. In the lower parts of thelake, some villagers obtain supplementary in-come from raising sea bass in cages.

Large numbers of shrimp farms were builtaround the lower part of the lake during thefirst phase of shrimp farming expansion in thesouth of Thailand in the late 1980s, with addi-tional farms built in subsequent waves ofexpansion, for example, after the devaluationof the Thai baht during the 1997 financial crisisinflated the price obtained by shrimp farmers.Almost all farms were small (less than 1 ha)to medium sized (up to 5 ha). A majority wereowner-operated, and converted from rice fieldsthat had been issued legal land ownership doc-uments. A few larger farms were owned by res-idents in the local towns who purchased ruralland during the period of land speculation priorto the financial crisis of 1997. According todata collected in 2004 and 2005 in fisheries offi-ces in districts bordering the lagoon, there were1,164 shrimp farms located near the lagoon,with an average total farm area of 1.07 ha.These data are incomplete as many offices hadno data on unregistered farms, and not all dis-tricts had data available, but they give an ideaof extent and structure of shrimp farming inthe lagoon watershed.

The main environmental and social contro-versies which have accompanied the spread ofshrimp farming include the salinization of ricefields, pollution of surface and ground water,and water pollution due to primarily to poorsediment disposal (Vandergeest et al., 1999).The latter are reputed to be responsible formany fish kills, especially among sea bass raisedin cages. The particular problems vary accord-ing to location; for example, poor sediment dis-posal is the cause of conflict in the southernportion of the lake; salinization is importantwhere shrimp farms border intensive rice farm-ing areas; and water pollution is importantwhere most villagers are engaged in fisheries.

Many government agencies have regulatoryauthority related to shrimp farming, but onlytwo have been significant in practice. TheDepartment of Fisheries, currently under theMinistry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, ischarged with promoting and regulating aqua-culture as well as fisheries. Its responsibilitiesinclude registering shrimp farms, providingtechnical support, increasing aquaculture pro-duction, and enforcing government regulationson water effluent, sediment disposal, and ponddesign. The Department of Provincial Adminis-tration, under the Ministry of Interior, iscomprised of a nested civil administrationencompassing provinces, districts, subdistricts(called tambon), and villages. Provincial Gover-

Figure 1. Songkla Lake Lagoon.

nors and District Officers have jurisdiction overthe actions of other departments in their juris-

dictional areas, so that provincial fisheries offi-cials report to their respective governors as

well as to the Department of Fisheries head offi-ces located in Bangkok. Local governments areexpected to resolve civil conflicts, and respondto petitions and appeals, including those thatarise from shrimp farming. The tambon-levellocal government units, the ‘‘Tambon Adminis-trative Organizations’’ (TAO), are particularlysignificant as a key organization in the decen-tralization of bureaucratic power in Thailand.They have responsibility for local developmentactivities, the authority to manage local re-sources, including forests and water resourcesnot claimed by state resource agencies, and theright to raise money through assessing fees onbusinesses (Puntasen, 1996). TAOs are com-posed of a council of elected representativesfrom the villages that comprise a tambon (usu-ally about 10), plus hired staff who implementTAO council policies.

A major development in the regulation ofshrimp farming in the Songkla Lake area oc-curred during 1998, when a prime ministerialdirective led to a local zoning process. Theprime ministerial order directed provincialgovernors to zone their provinces into freshand salt water zones, with shrimp farming tobe permitted only in salt water zones, but itdid not specify how this zoning was to takeplace. Governors in coastal provinces foundthat the ambiguity of what was fresh or brack-ish forced them away from using purely techni-cal criteria. The governor in Songkla provinceresolved the problem by asking TAO to zonetheir tambons. The justification for this ap-proach given to me by various officials includedthe new powers given to the TAO under theTambon Administrative Unit Bill of 1995,and the provisions in the 1997 constitution giv-ing villagers the right to manage natural re-sources in rural areas. The instructions toTAO at this time also enabled them to set outlaws and conditions for the operation of shrimpfarms, for example, related to farm construc-tion and waste disposal. Zoning maps andoperational regulations set out by the TAOswere followed by reviews and approvals at thedistrict and provincial levels. Final provincialzoning in Songkla, based on the TAO zoning,was approved in early December 1998.

These national and provincial-level directivesmade it possible for villagers and local govern-ments to regulate shrimp farming in three ways.In a few tambons, new shrimp farms werebanned. In most tambons, the TAOs tried tocontain the spread of shrimp farming by allow-ing shrimp farms only within limited areas,

where they were less likely to affect agriculture.Finally, many TAOs and district committeesmade permission to engage in shrimp farmingconditional on specified management practicesdesigned to protect public water quality andfisheries.

To collect information on local or ‘‘commu-nity-based’’ regulation for this paper, I andmy local research assistant interviewed 20 farm-ers in 11 tambons during 2001–02, using a semi-structured interview format. The aim was totalk to at least two farmers in a majority ofthe tambons bordering Songkla Lake whereshrimp farming was important. Farmers werechosen randomly—that is, I talked to the firsttwo farmers I could find in each district—butif possible in different administrative villages.The interviews with farmers were treated as‘‘key informant’’ interviews. When we com-bined them with our interviews with other resi-dents and TAO officials, we considered thenumber sufficient for documenting the keyways that shrimp farmers were experiencingregulation in the Songkla Lake basin. Ourfocus was on regulation, so we did not collectdetailed information on the exact area for everyfarm. For the 15 that we did collect detailsfrom, however, the average size was 1.7 ha(ranging from 0.6 ha to 5.6 ha)—a figure some-what larger than the average for the SongklaLake Lagoon, but covering the range of typesof farms. During our interviews we surveyedthe farm operation, and asked each farmerwhether they were actively constrained or regu-lated (bang kap) by any of the following fourgroups: other villagers, the TAOs, the Depart-ment of Fisheries, or other shrimp farmers. Ini-tially we also asked about the buyers of shrimp,but dropped this question after it became clearthat buyers at the time had no interest in theenvironmental impact of the farms from whichthey purchased shrimp.

A second set of semi-structured interviewswere conducted during 2001–02 with officialsworking for the Tambon AdministrativeOrganizations (TAOs), in the eleven subdis-tricts around Songkla Lake. These interviewsincluded questions regarding the extent andlocation of shrimp farming in the tambon,key problems, and TAO action, if any, to ad-dress these problems. We also interviewed oneor two randomly selected villagers not engagedin shrimp farming in each of these districts. Theinformation obtained from these surveysbuilt on my previous research and knowledgeof the area (above). After the 2001–02 survey,

I continued to make annual follow-up visitsto the area, the most recent in February,2006. In each of these visits, I interviewedapproximately five farmers about changing reg-ulatory practices, most recently, with attentionto their enrollment into the Department ofFisheries’ Good Aquaculture Practices pro-gram (see below).

In my survey of 20 shrimp farmers in theSongkla Lake area, 10 reported being regulatedby other villagers; 9 by the TAO; none by othershrimp farmers, and 2 by the Department ofFisheries. Eight farmers reported no externalregulation at all. These figures need to be ex-plained and qualified in a number of ways.First, the two farmers who reported regulationby the Department of Fisheries said that thisconsisted of just one visit: a general meetingof shrimp farmers in their village or tambonduring which the department officials told themthey should dispose of sediments properly andnot locate farms in mangroves. Overall, theDepartment of Fisheries had almost no rolein regulating any aspect of shrimp farming inthis area at this time, thus seemingly confirmingthe argument that states are ineffective regula-tors.

Second, the number of shrimp farmers whoindicated that the TAO was actively engagedin regulation suggests that a broader view ofthe state that encompasses the actions of localgovernment reveals how the government is reg-ulating shrimp farming, though not through theagency that is mandated to do so. In most caseswhere shrimp farmers reported an active TAO,they added that the TAO was acting in re-sponse to demands by villagers that it take ac-tion. Third, the apparent lack of regulation byother shrimp farmers can be partly explainedby the way that most of these farmers ex-changed water directly with the lake, and didnot share canals or other water infrastructurewith other shrimp farmers, reducing the vulner-ability of shrimp farmers to pollution or virusesfrom other farms. Finally, many among theeight farmers who responded that they didnot experience any direct regulation explainedthat shrimp farmers knew among themselveswhat they should and should not do, that theywere disposing of sediments in a way that didnot impact other resource users, and that itwas important for them to be responsible in or-der to maintain good relationships with theirneighbors. This position can be interpreted asa less active, more cooperative form of regula-tion.

The role of the Department of Fisherieschanged after this survey, with the implementa-tion of the Good Aquaculture Practices (GAP)program during 2004–05. This program wasmodeled after the Department of Agriculture’sGood Agriculture Practices certification pro-gram. Both are intended to facilitate exportsof agriculture/aquaculture products throughcreating traceability and providing laboratorytesting of products for chemical residues.According to shrimp farmers and fisheries offi-cials in Songkla province, to obtain GAP certi-fication, shrimp farmers had to register theirfarm, provide documentation to the local offi-ces of the Department of Fisheries when theypurchased postlarvae shrimp from nurseries,and again when they sold the harvest. In addi-tion, fisheries officials visited the farm to testfor water quality, and for antibiotic residuesprior to harvest. Fisheries officials indicatedthat they took notes on general farm appear-ance, cleanliness, and water/sediment disposal,and made recommendations on improvement,but the farmers interviewed for this study didnot remember any such recommendations. ByFebruary 2006, shrimp farmers were reportingthat all shrimp farms were becoming GAP cer-tified, as processors were no longer acceptingshrimp without the GAP documentation. Wehad not heard of any shrimp farm failingGAP certification standards.

Turning to the interviews with TAO officials,I classified the TAO regulatory role as strong;mixed/weak, or non-existent, according to thefollowing criteria. The TAO role was consid-ered ‘‘strong’’ if both TAO officials and villag-ers agreed that the TAOs had actively tried toregulate shrimp farming on an ongoing basis,even where their efforts were not successful.The TAO role was classified as ‘‘weak/mixed’’where interviews indicated some effort to regu-late shrimp farming, but where that effort waslimited or occurred only occasionally, in re-sponse to villager demands. TAOs that hadmade no effort at all were classified accordingly.Using this criteria, I found that five of the ele-ven TAOs took a strong regulatory role, fivetook mixed or weak actions, and one madeno effort at all.

I also classified the tambons according towhether villagers and TAO officials reportedthat the 1998 zoning (discussed above) wasbeing enforced or not, although in some casesthis zoning was enforced by villagers ratherthan the TAOs. The survey found that zoningwas enforced in five tambons, and not enforced

in four tambons. In two tambons, responseswere not reliable.

These results show that the effectiveness ofthe TAOs is mixed. On one extreme were twotambons where the TAO had completelybanned new shrimp farms, and several tambonswhere TAOs regularly fined or otherwise sanc-tioned shrimp farmers who dumped sedimentsin public waterways, or who failed to imple-ment TAO directives that ordered farms touse deep ditches to prevent seepage of salinewater into adjacent rice fields. According toinformants, village leaders in the two tambonsthat banned additional shrimp farming felt thatthe ecological threats posed by shrimp farmingexceeded the potential benefits. In these twotambons, the 1998 zoning process gave addi-tional legal sanction to previously informal lim-its on shrimp farming. At the other extremewere the tambons where the TAO made no at-tempt to constrain the farming practices ofshrimp farms. In some cases, this lack of localgovernment action was explained as due tothe fact that the shrimp farms were not directlyaffecting local villagers. Examples included situ-ations where effective zoning had confinedshrimp farming to areas where agriculture wasnot impacted, where there were no substantialfisheries or sea bass aquaculture, and wherethere were only a few shrimp farms and localvillagers were satisfied that they did not affectthe fisheries. In other cases, the lack of regula-tion was because shrimp farmers controlled theTAO and other village government institutions,and had rendered them ineffective as regulatoryinstitutions. Villagers in some tambons re-ported that they feared violent retribution ifthey attempted to appeal to district-levelauthorities or took other actions to pressureshrimp farmers to improve environmental prac-tices.

What are the specific ways that villagers orTAOs regulate shrimp farming? When weasked this question during our 2001–02 survey,the most common answer given to us by shrimpfarmers was that they did not want to causeunnecessary harm to rice farmers and fishers,and that they wanted to avoid confrontationswith other villagers. In many cases, however,regulatory actions went beyond this informalinterest among shrimp farmers in maintainingharmonious relations with neighbors who wereoften also close family, to more collective andorganized efforts to put pressure on shrimpfarmers in relation to siting or farming prac-tices. In some tambons, villagers reported that

they had organized themselves to go to theTAOs, district offices, or provincial authoritiesto ask these bodies to take action to stopshrimp farmers from polluting waterways, sali-nizing rice fields, or locating in banned zones.In at least four of the 11 tambons, villagerswere highly mobilized and the TAOs had re-sponded by actively regulating shrimp farming.For example, in a tambon where many villagersraised sea bass, villagers had organized to mon-itor shrimp farms and to inform the TAOwhenever they thought improper sediment dis-posal had killed caged sea bass. 3 In anothertambon, new shrimp farms that were built afterthe tambon banned new farms were vigorouslyopposed by local villagers, who wrote lettersand petitions, organized meetings, and helddemonstrations. Villagers in this tambon pro-vided me with a thick file with copies of thepetitions, minutes of meetings called by theTAO, and other documents.

Finally, in a few cases where the conflictswere particularly acute, villagers and TAO staffreported that shrimp farmers were forced tocomply with zoning and avoid water pollutionfor fear of having their shrimp stolen, and thatpollution episodes were often followed by re-duced harvests due to theft. Intensively farmedshrimp are portable, easy to appropriate inlarge numbers, and carry a very high value ona per kilogram basis. This made shrimp thefta highly lucrative enterprise, and a common-place occurrence among small to medium-sizedshrimp farms that could not afford fences,nighttime lighting, and armed security guards(Stonich & Vandergeest, 2001). Although mosttheft was motivated by the financial benefits,participants in the interviews indicated that vil-lagers sometimes used theft to sanction shrimpfarmers who damaged local environments.

In a separate, less intensive study, we alsoconducted interviews during 2001–02 in thetambons of Hua Sai and Ranot, an area wellknown for its large number of intensive shrimpfarms located in a strip along the Gulf of Thai-land coast. These two districts are located justnorth of the Songkla Lake basin (see Figure1). Although, we did not attempt systematicsampling of farmers, our interviews with keyinformants knowledgeable about the situationthere (including relatives of my research assis-tant) provided instructive comparisons withthe Songkla Lake area with respect to regula-tion. The large number and high density ofshrimp farms in this area is indicated by 2004data from the Ranot District Fisheries Office,

showing 1,452 registered shrimp farms in thisone district, all located in a band along thecoast, with the inland edge often several kilo-meters or more from the Gulf of Thailand.The canals that ran inland from the Gulf wereused for both water intake and disposal bymany shrimp farmers, leaving these farmersvulnerable to the harmful environmental prac-tices of other shrimp farmers. At the inlandfrontier of the expanding shrimp farming zone,salinization of rice fields was a contentious is-sue. Rice farmers had periodically staged largedemonstrations, filed petitions, and used a vari-ety of other strategies in attempts to stop theexpansion of shrimp farming, obtain compen-sation for polluted rice fields, and force shrimpfarmers to refrain from dumping saline or pol-luted water into waterways used for irrigation.

My interviews in the districts of Hua Sai andRanot suggest some significant differences,based on the above ecological and social con-texts, from the Songkla Lake basin with respectto the specific forms of local regulation. Thecollective use of canals had facilitated the devel-opment of a strong set of collective normsamong shrimp farmers for governing the dis-posal of sediments and waste water, so as toavoid pollution of the shared canals. Shrimpfarms in Ranot district, for example, oftenhad wide, deep ditches around their farms,which were used for water treatment prior todisposal into the canals. These ditches facili-tated good water treatment practices, but theywere originally constructed because they weremandated by TAOs as a way of blockingunderground seepage from shrimp farms to ricefields. Sediment disposal practices also high-lighted how ecological context shaped local reg-ulation. Around Songkla Lake, most shrimpfarmers washed out sediments from pond bot-toms to areas adjacent to their farms whilethe sediments were still wet, often resultingin the pollution of canals and nearby areas ofthe lake. In Hua Sai the common practice wasto let the sediments dry before mechanical re-moval to a disposal site on the farm, whichwas isolated from the ditches and canals. Thehigh degree of dependence on common waterinfrastructure in Hua Sai and Ranot meant thatproper sediment disposal was crucial for thesustainability of all shrimp farming operations.Overall, the combined effect of a history of dis-ease-induced crises, extensive sharing of waterinfrastructure, and mobilization by rice farmershad produced strong norms around the im-portance of collective self-regulation, and the

involvement of local civil authorities in regulat-ing certain aspects of shrimp farm operation.Local government and collective self-regulationhelps to explain why shrimp farming in thesedistricts had not experienced the permanentdisease-induced collapse that many critics ofthe industry had predicted for this area.

My goal in presenting these research results isnot to provide a definitive explanation as towhy local regulation was strong in some areasand not in others, nor is it to present a detailedaccount of the mechanisms by which communi-ties act collectively to regulate or manage com-mon property resources. The central point forthis paper is that local communities and localgovernments can act collectively to regulateshrimp farming, especially when facilitated bynational and provincial government policies.A second point is that diversity in local ecolog-ical and social contexts led to different sorts ofenvironmental problems, and that collectiveaction varied accordingly. Finally, the studyshows that the state was active in regulation,but that different state agencies were differentlyinvolved, and that it is often not possible toseparate out ‘‘community’’ action from localgovernment action. We might add, finally, thatlocal NGOs who were active in community-based lake and fisheries conservation oftenhad an important indirect impact in facilitatingcollective action in some villages, but they kepta low profile and were not mentioned by villag-ers during our interviews.

This section suggests that in SouthernThailand, the most effective regulators on theground were a combination of community-based collective action, and local governments,although their effectiveness is mixed. CBNRMproponents would predict that these conclu-sions can be generalized, as local communitiesneed to live with shrimp farming on a day-to-day basis, know best the local social andenvironmental impacts, and are most moti-vated to contain these impacts. At the sametime, CBNRM analysis shows that effectivecommunity action needs to be facilitated andsupported by central government policies andagencies, including both technical agencies likethe Department of Fisheries, and civil authori-ties (Tyler, 2006). Although there is currentlynot much research focused on community-based regulation of shrimp farming, evidencedrawn from the case studies sponsored by theConsortium Program on Shrimp Farming andthe Environment (World Bank, NACA, &WWF, 2002) reinforce the conclusion that

communities can benefit from shrimp farmingwhile acting as effective participants in regula-tory action (World Bank et al., 2002, p. 52; Nis-sapa & Boromthaanarat, 2002). 4

4. CERTIFICATION NETWORKS

A number of features of farmed shrimp makeit a prime candidate for environmental certifi-cation. First, the industry has come under con-siderable criticism for its environmental andsocial impacts, and many prominent NGOshave launched high profile campaigns that por-tray shrimp farming as destructive to coastalecologies and communities. A broad range ofenvironmental and conservation groups haveprofiled critical accounts of shrimp farmingthat target consumers in northern countries.These campaigns range in approach from thoseof the Monterrey Bay Aquarium, whose Sea-food Watch Program tells consumers how theycan help the oceans through seafood consump-tion choices, to those of groups like Greenpeaceand the Environmental Justice Foundation(2004), who are more critical in denouncingnot only environmental impacts but highlight-ing human rights abuses. Although most con-sumers in North America were still relativelyunaware of the controversies around shrimpfarming as of 2002 (Skladany & Vandergeest,2004), campaigns in Europe and Japan havebeen successful in generating consumer concernabout shrimp farming (Hall, 2006). In the Uni-ted States, moreover, the successful campaignby an alliance of southern shrimpers for theimposition of tariffs on farmed shrimp im-ported from six major producing countrieshas contributed to consumer suspicion aboutthe quality of imported farmed shrimp, parti-cularly in relation to the antibiotic residuesassociated with intensive farming methods(Southern Shrimpers Alliance, 2006).

A second reason that farmed shrimp is agood candidate for certification is that mostfarmed shrimp is produced in southern coun-tries but consumed in northern countries. Pro-duction/consumption of shrimp can easily beframed as a global environmental justiceproblem in which northern over-consumptioncauses environmental and social harm in thesouth. In addition, although shrimp may beAmerica’s favorite seafood (Public Citizen,2004), it is still consumed only occasionally asa special meal, often in restaurants. Thus theconsumption situation of shrimp makes it eas-

ily substitutable, and susceptible to consumercampaigns. Third, there is substantial agree-ment among technical experts in the industryand among environmental groups like theWWF regarding the key elements of the bettermanagement practices (BMPs) that wouldsolve many of the environmental problemsassociated with shrimp farming (Bene, 2005;Boyd, Hargreaves, & Clay, 2002; World Bank,NACA, & WWF, 2006). The same list of pre-scriptions appear and re-appear in industrycodes of conduct, government regulations,and papers by academic advisors such asClaude Boyd and environmental activists suchas Jason Clay of the WWF. Boyd and Clay’s(1998) list includes, for example, not buildingshrimp farms in mangroves or tidal wetlands,more efficient feeding practices, restrictions onwater exchange, water and sludge treatment,and careful use of chemicals such as antibiotics.Fourth is the difficulty experienced by central-ized state regulatory agencies in monitoring,let alone enforcing, compliance with many ofthe best practices identified by the aquacultureexperts, especially where smallholder shrimpfarming is significant. The research results de-scribed above are illustrative. Only recentlyhas the Department of Fisheries been able toput in place a basic testing program tied totraceability; however, it does not have thecapacity on the ground to monitor and enforcedetailed environmental regulations. A final rea-son is that the environmental and social contro-versies surrounding shrimp are an opportunityfor retailers who are seeking a competitive edgein relation to product quality and corporateimage.

Not surprisingly, certification systems, codesof conduct, and ‘‘best management practices’’(BMPs) have been proliferating (Bene, 2005;Boyd et al., 2002). The key actors promot-ing them include the Consortium on ShrimpFarming and the Environment (World Banket al., 2006), industry organizations (Eurep-GAP, The Global Aquaculture Alliance’sAquaculture Certification Council), nationalgovernments (Thailand, Bangladesh, Australia,Belize, Malaysia), and organic certificationorganizations (IFOAM, the UK’s Soil Associa-tion, and Germany’s Naturland). Some of thesecodes and standards are specific to shrimp;others are for aquaculture more broadly, butunderstood to apply to shrimp. 5 The pace ofactivity around certifying farmed shrimp is ex-tremely rapid. Just prior to the writing of thispaper, for example, US-based Wal-Mart and

Darden (owner of the Red Lobster restaurantchain), and Lyons Seafood (the largest Britishsupplier of shrimp) all announced that theyhad launched plans to require all their suppliersto be certified by the Aquaculture CertificationCouncil’s (2006) ‘‘Best Aquaculture Practices’’program. Wal-Mart’s (2005) announcementwas linked to a broader set of commitments in-tended to green the company’s image, includinga commitment that all wild caught seafood soldin the North American market would be certi-fied by the Marine Stewardship Council withinthree to five years (Wal-Mart, 2006). This re-cent wave of commitments by major buyers topurchase certified shrimp, combined with theway that EurepGAP’s complex standards areincreasingly required for export to Europe(Friedmann, 2005), could produce a majorrestructuring of the industry, as producerswho are able to obtain certification by the mostimportant schemes secure privileged marketaccess.

Although certification networks in shrimpfarming (and seafood more generally) are grow-ing rapidly in influence, there is considerablestability in technical provisions included in thevarious certification schemes. Most have beendeveloped by an overlapping network of expertswho frequently work with each other, and whowork from the consensus that exists around thetechnical requirements for sustainable shrimpfarming. Certain of these codes are particularlyinfluential, because they circulate as templatesfor other codes, or because they are adoptedby major buyers. The former includes the BestManagement Practice (BMP) standards beingprepared by the Consortium on Shrimp Farm-ing and the Environment (World Bank et al.,2006) which, as mentioned above, has beenworking to formulate a globally acceptable codeas way of harmonizing all the other codesand thus preventing certification-based tradebarriers. Industry codes include those beingdeveloped by EurepGAP (2005), and the ACC’sBest Aquaculture Practices (2006). Organicshrimp is likely to continue to find a niche mar-ket. Naturland, IFOAM, the United StatesDepartment of Agriculture, and the Soil Associ-ation (2005) are all either discussing standards,or have already produced them and have initi-ated certification of shrimp farms. I will brieflyconsider important examples of each type ofcode based on what is currently publicly avail-able, with specific attention to how they makeprovisions for involving communities and/orlocal governments.

(a) Aquaculture Certification Council

The Aquaculture Certification Council(ACC) was set up by the Global AquacultureAlliance (GAA), an industry organization cre-ated to counter criticisms of industrial aquacul-ture, particularly of shrimp farming. Membersof the GAA include large corporate farmers,processing companies, major buyers (includingDarden Restaurants and Lyons Seafood), andcertifying companies. According to its website(Aquaculture Certification Council, 2006), theACC offers a ‘‘primarily ‘process’ rather than‘product’ certification, with an orientation to-ward seafood buyers’’ who aim to better meet‘‘demands of the growing global market forsafe, wholesome seafood produced in an envi-ronmentally and socially responsible manner.’’The ACC’s legitimacy is questioned by someenvironmental and community-developmentgroups because the Council is an industry orga-nization and its certification procedures lacktransparency, although very recently Conserva-tion International has begun to collaboratewith the council in support of the Wal-Mart ini-tiative to certify farmed shrimp through theACC (Wal-Mart, 2005).

Although the ACC is an industry organiza-tion, its standards include some of the strongestprovisions for community involvement amongthe codes reviewed for this analysis. Their BestAquaculture Practices begin with three stan-dards, all referring to community, requiringthat farms should

• comply with local and national laws andenvironmental regulation, and provide cur-rent documentation that demonstrates legalrights for land use, water use, construction,and operation;• not deny local communities access to pub-lic mangrove areas, fishing grounds, or otherpublic resources;• comply with local and national labor lawsto assure worker safety, compensation, andliving conditions at the facility.

Compliance is assessed by an ACC certifierwho is supposed to interview local peopleselected by the certifier, not by farm man-agement. Notable in these standards is the ref-erence local government and law, languagewhich could provide an opening for the ACCto mandate compliance with regulations cre-ated by institutions like the TAO in Thailand,or recognition of local customary laws wherethese are important or have national legal sta-tus, as for example, in Indonesia.

At the same time, the standards for technicalpractices including siting and waste manage-ment do not mention any role for local commu-nities in formulating locally specific guidelines,monitoring, or in enforcement. As of 2006,the six ACC standards on Environment wereseparated from those on community relations,and included specific standards for MangroveConservation and Biodiversity Protection;Effluent Management; Sediment Management;and Soil and Water Conservation. In all cases,these standards were framed as immutabletechnical requirements, with compliance to beassessed by inspectors working for one of theACC-accredited certifiers, who had completedan ACC training course for certifiers.

(b) The consortium on shrimp farming and theenvironment

This Consortium was launched in 1999,bringing together the World Bank, the Net-work of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific(NACA), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF),and the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO). It has sponsoredconsiderable research on the social and envi-ronmental dimensions of shrimp farming(World Bank et al., 2002), and has been work-ing through an extensive consultative processto formulate a globally acceptable Best Man-agement Practice code for shrimp farming.The goals include the provision of a guide forgovernment policies and industry certificationsystems, and the prevention of certification-based trade barriers. Once approved, theConsortium’s BMPs will be used in the devel-opment of the FAO Code of Conduct forResponsible Fisheries in the shrimp aquacul-ture sector.

The BMPs for shrimp farming are not acertification system, and thus do not specifyprocedures for inspections, consultation, mon-itoring, and enforcement. Like other codes,however, the BMPs separate out a social stan-dard, called ‘‘Social Equity,’’ that specifies thatshrimp farmers should minimize conflicts withlocal communities, ensure that benefits ofshrimp culture accrue to the wider commu-nity, ensure worker welfare, and minimize risksto smallholders. Standards on site selection,pond design, and water management are en-tirely technical, except for a provision thatfarm location should obey land use and otherplanning laws and coastal managementplans.

(c) Organic certification (IFOAM, Naturland,and Soil Association)

Naturland is the key organization for organiccertification in Germany, and has certifiedshrimp farms in numerous countries, includingEcuador, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The UK’sSoil Association has been working on stan-dards for shrimp aquaculture, although it hadnot certified any farms at the time of this writ-ing. Like the ACC, organic certification organi-zations separate out social standards from theirtechnical standards for siting, soil and watermanagement, and so on. Among organic certi-fiers, IFOAM’s basic standards are a key refer-ence document. IFOAM’s basic standards onsocial justice are contained in a separate chap-ter (Chapter 8), and emphasize worker rights.The standards also state that operators shouldrespect the rights of indigenous people, shouldnot use land whose use and ownership rightsare in dispute, or whose inhabitants have beendispossessed or impoverished, and should notviolate basic human rights. Other organic certi-fication bodies, including the Soil Associationand Naturland, refer to the IFOAM basic stan-dards for their general principles and more spe-cifically for their social standards. The SoilAssociation’s general standards for aquacultureare a partial exception to the general pattern ofseparating social from technical standards: forexample, the section on Location and Environ-mental Impact contains a statement thatrecommends best practices include ‘‘the devel-opment of environmental management agree-ments with neighboring fish farmers andlandowners.’’ In standards specific to shrimp,the section on Location and Environmental Im-pact adds that the operator must respect theneed for local people to access resources thatthey are legally entitled to on adjacent land orwater. These recommendations, however, arenot mentioned in relation to what should beincluded in the operator manual, and therequired records that need to be made availableto inspectors or other authorized persons (SoilAssociation, 2005). The organic certifiers alsodo not make provisions for involving com-munities in key decisions in the certificationprocess. For example, Naturland’s (2002) pro-cedures state that ‘‘previously announced (atleast once a year) and unannounced visits andinspections by personnel authorized by Natur-land shall monitor the adherence to the stan-dards.’’ Final certification decisions are made

(d) Thailand’s Code of Conduct

The Department of Fisheries in Thailand hastwo separate certification systems for shrimpfarms: the Code of Conduct, and the GoodAquaculture Practices (GAP) program de-scribed above. The ‘‘Marine Shrimp CultureIndustry of Thailand Code of Conduct’’ (here-after, the Code of Conduct) was launched in2000, through consultation with industrial asso-ciations such as the Frozen Food Association,and the Feed Mill Association. Although theCode of Conduct was primarily for shrimpfarmers, shrimp farmers were largely absentfrom this initial effort, with the prominentexception of representatives of a well-knownsouthern-based farmer association. Since theformal signing, the Department of Fisherieshas designed a flexible frame for the code, withthe idea that groups of shrimp farmers would beable to use the frame to design farm-specificcodes appropriate to local circumstances—anapproach that introduces a degree of mutabilityinto the standards not found in the transna-tional standards reviewed above. The overallframework, however, was modeled on the stan-dards being used at the time by the GlobalAquaculture Alliance, and developed with assis-tance from the same technical experts. Enroll-ment in the Code of Conduct has been slow,with only a few large farms certified in Songklaprovince, and 141 farms listed as certified on theDepartment of Fisheries (2006) website as ofJune 2006. In contrast, the Department’s web-site listed 1,743 shrimp farmers as GAP (seeabove)-certified. This number was still less than10% of an estimated more than 20,000 shrimpfarms in Thailand, but our interviews in Song-kla province in February 2006 indicated thatmost local shrimp farmers were rapidly beingenrolled into the GAP program.

With respect to the Code of Conduct, anexamination of two manuals put together bythe Department of Fisheries/NACA (2000a,2000b) for farms which were adhering to thecode in 2001 gives an example of how the Codeof Conduct addressed the involvement of af-fected villagers who were not shrimp farmers.The manuals include standards for site selec-tion, general farm management, shrimp healthmanagement, use of chemicals and drugs, efflu-ent and sediment management, social responsi-bility, training, and recording. These standardsfollow a Department of Fisheries list of GoodManagement Practices (GMPs), used to auditCode of Conduct certified farms. In both the

manuals and the GMPs, community is men-tioned only under a standard entitled ‘‘socialresponsibility.’’ This standard mentions socialconflicts, contributions to community improve-ments, and labor practices. The more elaborateThai language versions both add that farmerswill pay minimum wage and treat workers withjustice. The manuals do not indicate that localcommunities were involved in formulating thestandards for site selection, waste disposal,and other practices that might impact localenvironments. Compliance is monitored byDOF officials; there are no specific provisionsfor consulting with or otherwise involving localcommunities or local government units such asthe TAOs.

5. SCOPE FOR RECONCILIATION?

I have shown in this paper how the environ-mental regulatory networks that are acting onshrimp farming bring together multiple actorsincluding the private sector, NGOs, govern-ment agencies, and communities. These net-works are oriented toward acting on socialand ecological relationships in ways that bringtogether diverse motives, including commercialinterests, environmental concerns, economicgrowth, and community welfare. What is strik-ing is the way that the concerns over the envi-ronmental and social impacts of shrimpfarming have led to the formation of two dis-tinct environmental regulatory networks. Oneis based in local communities and local govern-ment institutions, but also involves nationalgovernment agencies and local NGOs. Theother is based in the transnational commoditynetwork, and includes industry actors, largernorthern-based NGOs, research institutions,large development organizations, and national-level resource agencies. In this final section, Ipose the question of whether it is possible oruseful for these two networks to work together.

Certification networks for shrimp farmingdisplay a standard approach to communitiesand local governments. Social standards areinvariably separated out from technical stan-dards, although there is considerable variationin what is required in terms of these social stan-dards. Environmental standards are all framedin technical terms, and none provide for com-munity input into environmental standards.Communities have no direct involvement incertification decisions in any of the examplesdiscussed in Section 3. This lack of involvement

is in contrast with what I found to be currentpractice in southern Thailand, where localgovernments and communities were very muchinvolved in regulating environmental practices,with the specific standards varying according tolocal conditions. It also stands in contrast withthe approach developed through CBNRM, andparticipatory approaches to Integrated CoastalResource Management.

The NGOs and environmental groups thathave been most critical of shrimp farming havenot rejected certification as an approach toaddressing problems with shrimp farming, butare skeptical of current approaches. The mar-ginalization of local communities from settingstandards and decisions on certification is akey area of criticism. For example, a widely cir-culated Statement on Certification by Redman-glar (International Mangrove Network for theDefense of Marine and Coastal Ecosystemsand Community Life, based in South America),posted on the NACA website (RedmanglarInternacional, 2003), states that

any certification process must guarantee the full par-ticipation of the communities that will be affected bythe proposed activity, both in the first stages of theprocess as well as in the later follow up stages. Partic-ipation must not be restricted to mere provision ofinformation, but provide for and enable real partici-pation in the decision-making process.

These concerns are echoed in the Declaration ofConcern on Shrimp Aquaculture Certificationsigned by primarily southern-based NGOs ata large meeting in October 2006 to discussNGO responses to certification of shrimp farm-ing. The Declaration called for a moratoriumon shrimp farming certification and the estab-lishment of a consultative process that includesparticipation of indigenous and local communi-ties to establish the basis of socially equitableand ecologically sound aquaculture (ForestPeoples Programme, 2006). NGO networkswith strong southern links are not alone inpointing to the lack of substantial communityinvolvement in the development of codes ofconduct or certification standards. Boydet al.’s (2002, p. 17) assessment of codes ofpractice and conduct in shrimp aquaculture,for example, states that ‘‘most would agree thatthe development of voluntary codes requiresthe active input of those who would be affectedby them,’’ and goes on to argue that ‘‘none ofthe codes reviewed from industry or govern-ment address social issues directly, in a proac-tive way.’’ As my research in Southern

Thailand shows, it is worth paying attentionto these criticisms of certification initiativesfor shrimp farming, if certification systems areto be effective in relation to environmentaland social objectives.

In the crowded and highly differentiated fieldof certification initiatives, it may not be appro-priate for all certification schemes to approachcommunities in the same fashion, as theseschemes emphasize different sorts of qualities.My comments on how communities might beenrolled into certification networks should beunderstood as applying to situations where thereare organized local communities and govern-ments with an interest in how shrimp farmingis conducted, and as speaking to certificationschemes that claim sustainable shrimp farmingand social responsibility as important goals.

There is no doubt that involving communitiesin a more substantial way in certification andcodes of conduct can be difficult, given theway that certification tends to be oriented to-ward buyers of shrimp. In general, certificationhas arguably emerged where resources andcommodities are valuable, and industry actorsor governments are not willing to cede controlover these valuable resources to local commu-nities. Most certification networks require thatthe costs of certification be borne by the enter-prise being certified, and involve complex,expert-driven documentation and monitoringprocesses that are beyond the financial andtechnical means of small enterprises or commu-nity-based institutions. In this context, it needsto be noted that if most large buyers were tofollow Wal-Mart and Darden in making certifi-cation by transnational environmental certifi-cation networks mandatory, it is likely thatsmaller, locally-owned shrimp farms would bemarginalized from major markets on accountof lack of resources to pay for expensive certifi-cation procedures, and lack of ability to meetcomplex documentation requirements. Theelimination of many smaller farmers would re-duce the likelihood that shrimp farming wouldbenefit local communities (World Bank et al.,2002). Partially displacing these expensive andcomplex procedures by community-based pro-cesses might also contribute to making spacefor small farming enterprises in these networks.

Another difficulty with enrolling local com-munities into certification concerns the needto find an institution that can act on behalf ofa local collective interest, a procedure whichmay not always be possible where local govern-ment is not strong or accountable to local com-

munities. There is much variation in relation tothe question of whether local government isdownwardly accountable or has real powerover the management of natural resources(Ribot & Larson, 2005). More generally, muchdepends on diverse local situations, for exam-ple, the size and ownership of farms, how localcommunities are organized, local livelihoods,and local ecologies. At the same time, the re-search presented in this paper on SouthernThailand, as well as research organized by theConsortium on Shrimp Farming and the Envi-ronment, suggests that it is possible to workwith local government or other collective insti-tutions, especially given broader trends towarddecentralization in development policy.

The first change that is necessary if certifica-tion is to involve affected communities is thatcertification processes are revamped providefor community input into standards that arecurrently framed as technical. That is,certification institutions could break down theseparation between social standards, and envi-ronmental standards, where the latter areframed entirely in technical terms and are mon-itored by non-local certification experts. Thereason that technical standards tend to excludelocal participation is not so much that they aretechnical as that they are (in Latourian lan-guage) ‘‘immutable mobiles.’’ They are pro-duced in ‘‘centers of calculation’’ (Campbell &Stuart, 2005) located in the global north orurban research institutions, and applied uni-versally, with very little flexibility. The researchpresented in Section 3 of this paper illustratedthe importance of variation in ecological andsocial contexts, in determining what were in ef-fect locally based technical standards for moresocially just and ecologically sound shrimpfarming, even if enforcement was sometimeslacking. The problem posed for an agenda seek-ing to promote community-based participationin certification is therefore how to frame stan-dards that are open to being shaped to fit localsocial/ecological contexts, thereby makingthem more mutable, but less mobile. The moreflexible approach taken by the Department ofFisheries in Thailand in its Code of Conductfor shrimp farming provides an example ofhow this alternative approach could be applied,although the Code of Conduct specified thatonly shrimp farmers, not local communitiesand government, should determine the locallyappropriate standards.

The second precondition for reconciling cer-tification with CBNRM is to go beyond consul-

tation, to allow for communities and localgovernments to have real decision-making sta-tus in certification. NGOs working with Indig-enous Peoples, e.g., are promoting the idea of‘‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent’’ (FPIC),as a procedure by which indigenous peoplecan have an effective voice in developmentactivities affecting their communities. Beyondthe right of refusal, local governments and/orcommunity organizations could contribute todefining standards through processes similarto those of the 1998 zoning process in Songkla,described above. What happened in Songklawas the local manifestation of a broader trendin developing countries and in developmentpolicies that aims to enhance the participationof local government or municipalities in man-aging natural resources. In other words, thisexample shows that donor-driven projects inparticipatory, community-based coastal zonemanagement could be generalized. Althoughthe results were mixed in the example describedhere, they also were a significant improvementon the prior situation.

The question of local government brings upthe question of how certification reconstitutesstate regulatory action, and more specifically,different approaches to working with state insti-tutions. As with forestry, a series of competingshrimp farming certification schemes and net-works are emerging. Some work transnation-ally and bring together larger environmentalNGOs with industry actors (e.g., the Aquacul-ture Certification Council, EurepGAP). But,as pointed out above, government agencies inproducing zones have developed national certi-fication schemes as well. Current trends suggestthat these state-organized schemes may bemarginalized by the more industry-driven ap-proaches, unless organizations like the ACCand EurepGAP find ways of working with na-tional certification schemes. What is importantis that current industry- and NGO-driven (e.g.,organic) certification schemes find ways ofworking effectively with both the technical re-source departments in producing countries inthe south (Departments of Fisheries and ofForestry), and with civil administrations, espe-cially local governments.

In the case of shrimp farming, if certificationnetworks were to enroll local communities intosetting and monitoring environmental stan-dards, then the most important considerationmay be that of scale. Some environmentalimpacts are strongly local in character. Theseinclude site selection, effluent quality, sediment

disposal, ground seepage or salinization, andthe general degradation of local ecosystemsimportant for livelihoods. Other impacts areidentifiable primarily at larger scales—forexample, reliance on fishmeal-based feeds.Some local-scale environmental impacts canhave cumulative effects at larger scales, notably,water pollution and ecosystem change, but thelocal scale can be an appropriate starting pointfor controlling these impacts. In addition, somestandards contain provisions that are not neces-sarily of interest to local communities, some-times due to lack of relevance, and sometimesbecause of a lack of certain kinds of knowledge.These include the use of chemicals such as anti-biotics.

The key is to identify those impacts that havea strong local character and are of interest tolocal people, and to outline how communitiesor local governments could be involved in set-ting both technical and social standards, as wellas in monitoring, and certification decisions.Community-based techniques could be usedto develop a set of locally based priorities inrelation to appropriate shrimp farming prac-tices such as liquid and solid waste disposal,salinization, ecosystem resilience, and so on.Although it may seem difficult for technicallyoriented agencies to find ways of involvingcommunities in developing and implementingstandards, this shift could be made easier bythe fact that community-based resource man-agement programs have developed many effec-

tive methods for involving communities inresource management (for example, IDRC,2005; Tyler, 2006), and by broader trendstoward involving local and municipal govern-ments in resource management. Community-based mapping or zoning, community-basedresource management, and participatoryintegrated coastal zone management are impor-tant approaches in this broader repertoire, andcould be drawn on by certification programsthat work with either local NGOs, or localgovernments.

There are many risks in a project whichmight bring these two environmental regula-tory networks together. The global market lo-gic that orients certification networks towardnorthern buyers and consumers could easilyoverwhelm community-based efforts to regulateshrimp farming. At the same time, certificationnetwork actors may not want to risk makingthe production of shrimp contingent on the ap-proval of local government organizations thathave problems with accountability and rent-seeking behaviors. Nevertheless, to draw onwhat Taylor (2005, p. 144) has written in acomparison of FSC and Fair Trade certifica-tion, highlighting the existence of these two dis-tinct networks can create a productive tensionthat provokes certification actors into address-ing how environmental regulatory networksexpress larger north–south power relations,and into considering ways of expanding theirengagement with local communities.

NOTES

1. See Levy and Newell (2005) and Higgins andLawrence (2005). Higgins and Lawrence (2005, p. 2)provide a useful review of the applicability of the notionof governance to agrofood studies, and cite Stoker’s(1998) definition of governance as ‘‘the development ofgoverning styles in which the boundaries between andwithin the public and private sectors have becomeblurred.’’

2. See Duke University’s Global Value Chains Initia-tive website for a useful overview and bibliography onthis topic. Available from http://www.globalvalue-chains.org/.

3. Villagers believed that improper sediment disposalwas responsible for mortality among caged sea bass.Scientists at a local research institute indicated to methat they thought that villagers often tended to blame

fish kills on shrimp farming when fish could be dying forother reasons. However, their research indicated thatimproper sediment disposal could kill sea bass when theywere young, by temporarily decreasing dissolved oxygenlevels.

4. Case studies published by the Consortium onShrimp Farming and the Environment that documentthe effectiveness of local participation in regulationinclude those by Tobey, Poespitasari, and Wiryawan(2001) in Indonesia; and Nissapa and Boromthaanarat(2002) in Thailand.

5. Many of theses codes are listed in the NACA websiteunder Certification in their section on Shrimp Farmingand the Environment. Available from http://www.ena-ca.org/shrimp.

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