Casual Cynics or Disillusioned Democrats?Political Alienation in Japan

Ikuo KabashimaFaculty of Law, University of Tokyo

Jonathan MarshallDepartment of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

Takayoshi Uekami and Dae-Song HyunFaculty of Law, University of Tokyo

This paper examines the structure of political alienation among Japanese eligible voters,using data from the first, second, fifth, and sixth waves of the seven-wave Japanese ElectoralSurvey II (JES II). Political alienation can be expressed as comprising two dimensions,political trust and civic-mindedness. Males and people with more years of schooling aremore allegiant in general; that is, they are both more trusting and more civic-minded.Evaluations of cabinet performance and support for democratic mechanisms are stronglyrelated to political trust and civic-mindedness. Supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) are no more civic-minded than average but are more trusting politically, whereasJapan Communist Party supporters are more civic-minded but a good deal less politicallytrusting than average. Independents are below the overall average on both the political trustand civic-mindedness dimensions. Even though party support is unstable, Japan’s politicalsystem will not lose its stability as long as LDP supporters and independents constitute themajority of Japan’s electorate. The advent of a new party capable of providing an alternativeto the LDP is important to the future of Japanese democracy.

KEY WORDS: political alienation, Japan, political trust, political efficacy, party identification.

Japanese voters have long expressed dissatisfaction with politics. Generallylow levels of trust in government and lack of a sense of effectiveness amongJapanese voters hardly come as a surprise to specialists in Japanese politics or tothe reading public. Closer analysis of Japanese voters’ sense of alienation supportsexisting explanations developed for political alienation in a different national

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0162-895X © 2000 International Society of Political PsychologyPublished by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

context. It also suggests that partisan support and changing party alignments areclosely connected to attitudes of allegiance or alienation, and that well-knowncharacterizations of political behavior in Japan do not necessarily match politicalattitudes.

This paper has two objectives. The first is to apply to Japan some of the causalarguments about political alienation that have been developed in other contexts.Theories developed in the study of political behavior in the United States explainalienation as either the result of poor government performance or lack of policydifferentiation among parties. That is, expressions of alienation really captureevaluations of government performance (Citrin, 1974). Alternatively, perceivedlack of difference between parties on matters of policy causes voters to becomealienated (Miller, 1974). Meanwhile, the empirical literature on Japanese votingbehavior provides direction on how social attributes affect attitudes toward politicsand government. Those who have fewer years of formal education, are farmers orself-employed, live in rural areas, or are politically conservative will be morepolitically allegiant (see, e.g., Flanagan, Kôhei, Miyake, Richardson, & Watanuki,1991; Miyake, 1985). In the process of evaluating these theories, we find thatconventional wisdom about the effects of social attributes does not necessarilytranslate from behaviors to attitudes.

Our second objective is to describe the Japanese electorate in terms of theconcept “political alienation.” We attempt to locate key political and social groupswithin a plane defined by attitudes of political trust and psychological engagementwith politics. This graphical understanding helps illustrate how voters regroup inresponse to changes in party structure and why the current “load” on the politicalsystem is light. It also shows that a new party could capture potential voters whoare actively and positively oriented toward politics, as long as it guards against thedisappointment and frustration that have dogged attempts to build a party tocontend with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for control.

Approaches to Political Alienation

The concept of alienation as an attribute of social life in industrial societiesgoes back to the pioneering social scientists of the 19th century, most notably Marxand Durkheim. Alienation, as applied to social phenomena in general, has a numberof possible dimensions—including powerlessness, meaninglessness, normless-ness, isolation, and “self-estrangement”—that can be characterized as expectationsabout the world, rather than objective descriptions of the world (Seeman, 1959).These dimensions are helpful in operationalizing the concept, especially in socio-logical research, but it is unclear which of them are necessary (or sufficient)elements for alienation to be the operative concept.

Ada Finifter (1970) started with Seeman’s “modes” of powerlessness, mean-inglessness, normlessness, and isolation, but modified the terms to bring them moreinto line with the model of political behavior developed at the University of

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Michigan. Thus, political powerlessness is an individual’s perception that he or shecannot affect the actions of government, or what the Michigan model calls efficacy.Similarly, political meaninglessness is an individual’s perception that politics isunpredictable. These two dimensions later emerge in the behavior literature, at leastin an operational sense, as external and internal efficacy. “Perceived politicalnormlessness” is the belief that “the rules intended to govern political relationshave broken down,” perhaps embodied in perceptions that “officials violate legalprocedures in dealing with the public or arriving at policy decisions.” Finally,political isolation is the rejection of widely shared political norms and goals in anygiven society (Finifter, 1970, pp. 390–391). Finifter tested these hypotheticaldimensions against the data from the American sample in The Civic Culture(Almond & Verba, 1963) data set. She found empirical support for two dimensions:powerlessness and perceived normlessness (Finifter, 1970, pp. 395–397). Wemodify this two-dimensional conceptualization of political alienation and use it toanalyze groups of Japanese eligible voters.

Explanations: Issues and Performance

Causal treatments of political alienation also came to take advantage of thegrowing body of survey research data. The political unrest of the late 1960s ledresearchers to look beyond the background variables1 that the earlier literature onpolitical attitudes had featured, toward actual objects in the political world. ArthurMiller (1974) argued that American voters became increasingly alienated frompolitics over the course of the 1960s because of the growing gap in policypreferences between the two centrist parties and an ever more polarized electorate.In short, actual events and policy preferences affected levels of trust and satisfac-tion on an individual level.

In a rejoinder to Miller, Jack Citrin (1974) pointed to two difficulties with anyempirical examination of political alienation. The first difficulty is that the surveyitems designed to measure trust in government tap too many underlying concepts,from the performance of current political leaders to the nature of the politicalsystem itself.2 Much of what is measured as alienation is really just a performanceevaluation of political incumbents. The second difficulty is also a measurementproblem: Contemporary political culture sanctions expressions of cynicism, so thatpeople may respond cynically to an interview question and yet behave no morecynically than they did before. Increases in trust during the 1980s seemed tovindicate the argument that performance evaluations of incumbents (such as the

1 For example, education, income, occupation, age, race, and sex.2 This distinction was developed by Easton (1965), who separated the objects of political cognition into

community, regime, and government levels. Community is group (“the Japanese people”), regime isinstitutional (voting, parliamentary rule, the constitution), and government is the set of politicalincumbents (individual figures, the LDP).

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president, in the case of the United States) are closely tied to individual-levelfeelings of trust in government (Citrin & Green, 1986). However, those levels oftrust only recovered momentarily, so that even if evaluations of performanceexplain trust in government to a certain extent, they do not constitute a sufficientexplanation for declining trust over the longer term.3 Other explanations fordeclining trust in government, such as a decline in the stock of social capital(Putnam, 1993, 1995), were not amenable to testing with the survey data availableand so must remain subjects for future research.4

Fluidity and Alienation

In taking an analytic framework from the U.S. context and applying it to Japan,we adopt what might be called a “most different systems” approach to confirmingtheory (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The context in which voters operate in Japanis very different from the one that influences the attitudes of American voters, fora number of reasons. Japan’s political institutions differ from those that producedthe theories outlined above. Japan is a parliamentary rather than a presidentialsystem. Voters made their choices (through 1993) in a multi-member districtsystem with a single, non-transferable ballot. There have been multiple politicalparties throughout the postwar era, not simply two. Japan is unitary rather thanfederal. Finally, a single conservative party, the LDP, governed without interrup-tion from 1955 to 1993. On the macro level, the element of similarity between Japanand the United States is the simple fact that they are both industrialized, repre-sentative democracies. Thus, to the extent that the theories induced from Americandata also explain observations made in Japan, those theories are confirmed asgeneral propositions about political attitudes in the industrial democracies.

Japan’s unusual electoral system for the Lower House, coupling medium-magnitude districts with a single, non-transferable vote, predated Japan’spost–World War II constitution and had been consciously designed to minimizethe potential for strong political parties. It prevailed in its last incarnation from 1947through the electoral reforms of 1994. The electoral arrangements produced amultiparty system in which any prospective majority party faced the daunting

3 Changes in social norms that encourage expressions of cynicism about a wide range of institutionsmay still account for the apparent increase in political alienation (Citrin, 1974). Because even “casualcynicism” might lead to changes in true (yet unspoken) beliefs, it still merits investigation. Suchdissimulation (whether it represents “social acceptability bias” or tatemae, in the Japanese context) is,nevertheless, a thorny methodological problem.

4 One aspect of social capital, involvement in voluntary associations, is reflected in the Japanese surveyresearch data. Organizational affiliations, with one exception, made no substantive difference inindividual levels of political trust or psychological engagement, and hence are omitted from thispaper’s analytic scope (compare, however, Brehm & Rahn, 1997). The single exception, affiliationwith a religious organization, had a strong positive effect on our “civic-mindedness” index. This isalmost certainly the effect of the survey question’s tapping membership in the Buddhist lay organiza-tion Sôka Gakkai, which mobilizes support for the Clean Government Party.

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prospect of running more than one candidate per district. As a result, the LDPdeveloped a system of factions based on the dynamics of intraparty campaigncompetition, and campaigns themselves became races between individual candi-dates over and above any appeals to partisan platforms (Curtis, 1988). The current“parallel” electoral system, instituted in 1994, combines single-member and pro-portional districts and gives each voter a single ballot in each constituency. It thusreduces intraparty competition but safeguards the existence of smaller parties.

Although the initial postwar decades saw fragmentation on both the right andleft, unification of the right and left wings of the Socialist Party and the consequentconservative union of the Liberal and Democratic parties in 1955 established theoutlines for the party system that endured, with some modification, through 1993.The “1955 System,” as it is often called, was characterized by absolute majoritiesfor the LDP in both houses of the Diet and a high degree of bureaucratic initiativein policymaking (in cooperation with the LDP). The Japan Socialist Party (JSP)exerted leverage chiefly through its ability to block passage of the budget. Farmersand later small business formed the main electoral base of the LDP, which was ableto use the threat of the left parties (the JSP and Communists) to enlist the supportof big business. The JSP, formally Marxist, enjoyed the support of most oforganized labor. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) also had a hard-core supportgroup that persisted (and even grew in strength) through the period of the 1955System, even as the LDP and JSP both saw declining support throughout the 1960sand particularly the 1970s. Although economic and fiscal policy positions sepa-rated the LDP from the JCP and JSP, the signal cleavage during the period wasover the “peace constitution” and Japan’s foreign policy, especially its securitytreaty with the United States. The ruling LDP favored alliance with the UnitedStates, whereas the opposition favored a stricter construction of the 1947 Consti-tution, up to and including unarmed neutrality.

The JSP split into left and right factions again in 1960, and the right wing,under the new moniker of Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), took private-sectorunions as its support base. An additional party, the Clean Government Party (CGPor Kômeitô), drew its support from dislocated recent migrants to large cities andfrom the Buddhist lay organization Sôka Gakkai. The CGP first elected candidatesto national office in 1964. Thus, from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s, Japanhad a fairly stable array of five major political parties, as might be predicted on thebasis of its electoral system (Curtis, 1988). Over the course of the 1970s supportfor the LDP eroded, but it rebounded in 1980, and there was no substantialweakening in the party’s position until 1989, when a combination of scandal andthe introduction of an unpopular consumption tax led to the LDP’s loss of itsabsolute majority in the Upper House. At the same time, the Cold War world orderand Japan’s impressive economic growth both suddenly evaporated (for English-language analyses of the Japanese party system during the 1955 System period, seeCalder, 1988; Curtis, 1988).

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Economic stagnation and renewed scandal led finally to defections from theLDP to new parties and to the LDP’s electoral defeat after a no-confidence vote in1993. The resulting coalition government under Morihiro Hosokawa united thenon-JCP opposition parties old and new, but by virtue of that fact was able toachieve only a revamping of the electoral system and campaign laws. A “strangebedfellows” coalition uniting the LDP and JSP5 followed in 1994. This develop-ment returned the LDP to power (albeit as the largest party in a coalition), damagedthe credibility of the JSP, and perpetuated the shifting alliances that have charac-terized Japanese politics since 1993. At present, the LDP governs in coalition withthe Liberal Party, conservative reformers and followers of Ichiro Ozawa, one ofthe leaders of the 1993 defectors.6 The LDP has also incorporated the CGP (whoseassistance is necessary in the Upper House) in this second “strange bedfellows”coalition, while the JCP, JSP, and Democratic Party (consisting of both formerSocialists and Liberal Democrats) continue in the role of a somewhat stylizedopposition. In short, it is not yet clear that the post-1994 electoral system hasproduced a stable party system.

After almost 30 years of stability in the general outlines of its party system,Japan entered an era of great fluidity in the early 1990s. Party support becameexceptionally mobile, with the exception of core LDP and JCP supporters andmembers of the Sôka Gakkai who had traditionally been CGP supporters. Thispattern of movement between party support and nonpartisanship may be the resultof dissatisfaction with performance and subsequent alienation from politics(Kabashima & Ishio, 1998).

Data Analysis

Two-Dimensional Model of Political Alienation

The data we used to examine political alienation were taken from the JES IIseven-wave panel study conducted from 1993 to 1996 (see the Appendix). Al-though this span might seem relatively brief, it covers the crucial period from thefall of LDP predominance to the first election held under the revised electoralsystem. This period is marked both by rapid changes in the political landscape andby fluidity in the partisan orientations of voters (Kabashima & Ishio, 1998).Nevertheless, the remarkably rich data allow us to connect more durable attitudesto these fluid orientations, and they also let us examine the problems of engagement

5 The JSP had changed its name by this time to the Social Democratic Party, but for the sake of claritywe continue to refer to it by its former name.

6 One of Ozawa’s earlier efforts, the New Frontier Party (NFP), had united CGP legislators, legislatorselected under the Japan New Party banner in 1993, and former DSP Diet members, and was the leadingopposition party after the 1996 elections, but it too had foundered by the end of 1997.

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with and trust in government with the same tools that are used in other industrialdemocracies.7

Although the JES II survey instrument dwells more on political informationand electoral mobilization than it does on general attitudes, it does contain a varietyof items suited to measuring political efficacy, trust, interest, and so on. This paperrelies on items from the first and second waves for two reasons. First, because thepolitical belief structure for each individual respondent should not be subject tosudden, short-term change,8 we can suppose that the structure revealed during thefirst and second waves continues throughout the study. Second, the sample size islarger because dropout does not yet present a problem. In addition, the first andsecond waves are the pre- and post-election interviews from the 1993 Lower Houseelections, so that they offer insight into the era of single-party dominance and havea higher response rate than the mail-in questionnaires from the third and fourthwaves.

To probe alienation with the JES II items, we first selected questions whosecontent seemed explicitly related to political alienation. We then excluded onconceptual grounds questions about trust in levels of government other than thenational and about any proximate phenomena, such as interest in the currentelection. The resulting questions included items about general trust in nationalpolitics, trust in national politicians, belief that politics is controlled by “theinterests,” honesty of national officials, factionalism, general political interest,belief that an individual’s vote “counts,” and political efficacy (see the Appendixfor the wording of the questions).

Scholars have debated, or have reserved judgment on, the dimensionality ofthe concept of political alienation (see, e.g., Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, & Snider-man, 1975; Mason, House, & Martin, 1985; Seeman, 1959). Finifter (1970),reanalyzing the American survey data from the Civic Culture project, found twodimensions, “perceptions of normlessness” (belief that government fails to functionin accord with stated principles) and “feelings of powerlessness” (lack of politicalefficacy). We used factor analysis to confirm that two dimensions adequately

7 The scope of our research invites some questioning. First, the bulk of the reasoning in this paper isfrom one set of psychological states to another, rather than from a state of mind to a particular behaviorlike casting a ballot. There are, nevertheless, reasons to assign logical priority to beliefs about the roleof the democratic citizen and the trustworthiness of various features of the political landscape. Second,the time frame covered by the panel data set is characterized by instability, both of partisan preferenceand of the party system itself. Although this instability might be atypical of Japanese democracy underthe 1955 System, it is in many ways the culmination of a long-term decline in partisan alignment inthe electorate. In any event, such a period’s relationship to political alienation is interesting in its ownright. Finally, space and data limitations preclude any discussion of other possible causes of alienation,such as the mass media, as well as making the distinction between politicians and bureaucrats as objectsof trust, for example.

8 We are making the assumption that attitudes of trust, efficacy, and so forth are durable, and that feelingstoward a given party, politician, or program are ephemeral in nature. This is a logical way to proceed,especially in the light of findings about the fluidity of party support.

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described the set of items restricted as described above.9 The results of theexploratory factor analysis are shown in Table I. The two factors that emergedemonstrate that Finifter’s two dimensions, although developed from surveyresearch conducted in the United States in 1959, are useful in describing theJapanese electorate more than three decades later.10 The general item about trustin politics was shown to indicate the same underlying factor as the items that speakto “normlessness” among politicians and officials. The “participatory values” itemand the general political interest item were similarly found (with the two efficacyitems) to indicate “powerlessness.” We call these two dimensions political trustand civic-mindedness. Civic-mindedness may be interpreted as a measure of activepsychological engagement with politics. Efficacy, interest, and participatory valuesare essential qualities of democratic citizenship, and their role in the maintenanceand development of democracy has long been a concern of political theorists.11

Sample means, standard deviations, and ranges for all of the JES II attitudinalitems used in the analysis are reported in the Appendix.12 As shown below, theseparation of political alienation into two dimensions is useful in describingdemographic and partisan groups in Japanese society, and makes it easier to predictpossible future directions for partisan alignment and political participation.

Causes of Political Alienation

Before discussing the locations of various demographic and partisan groupsof voters in a two-dimensional space defined by political trust and civic-minded-ness, we first consider possible predictors of alienation on the individual level. Inother words, what makes Japanese voters trust or distrust politics and politicians,and why are certain citizens active and others passive? Both political attitudes and

9 In the process, we discarded one measure of participatory orientation and a measure of trust after thefactor analysis indicated that these items probably tapped different underlying attitudes. These itemsare noted in the Appendix.

10 We are starting with conceptual and empirical reasons for thinking that alienation is not a unidimen-sional concept. Because of our desire to represent politically salient groups (JCP supporters, LDPsupporters, and independents) in terms of how alienated they are, we opted for a factor analytic method(rotating the factor axes such that they remain orthogonal) that gives us the uncorrelated factors“perceptions of normlessness” and “powerlessness.” Like Finifter, we impose structure on the variousitems in order to make them more useful. Stephen Jay Gould (1984, pp. 234–320) discussed in detailthe methodological consequences of conceptual first principles in attempts to define and measure theconcept “intelligence.” One might also object that our two-dimensional concept is an artifact of thesurvey instrument, which is itself based on American models. The only answer to this criticism is todevelop a completely new instrument and see whether our depiction holds. (On issues of method inthis vein, see also Erber & Lau, 1990; Hetherington, 1998; Luskin, 1990; Mishler & Rose, 1997;Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991.)

11 See, for example, Tocqueville (1848/1969), pp. 95, 162, 236, and 243.12 As the mean values in the Appendix show, Japanese eligible voters do not trust politicians or

national-level politics very highly, nor do they feel particularly efficacious in the political sphere.These mean values do not, however, indicate any major change from earlier findings (Pharr, 1997,pp. 239–240).

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social characteristics are likely to play a role in determining an individual’s levelof political trust and civic-mindedness.13

To examine the relationships that account for political trust and civic-minded-ness, we used regression models with groups of independent variables representingsocial attributes and political attitudes. We used the same regression model for bothcivic-mindedness and political trust.14 Independent variables included indices forevaluation of cabinet performance, belief in the machinery of representativedemocracy (“system support”), and traditional political values; these variables areregression factor scores derived from a factor analysis of the attitude items.15

Attitudes that did not fall into these indices include left-right ideological self-place-ment, political satisfaction, pride in Japanese democracy, and perceptions ofdifference among political parties. The other independent variables were socialattributes (age, sex, income, education, type of dwelling, population of municipal-ity, and so on). For easier interpretation, all of the independent variables wererescaled to range from 0 to 1. The complete models are given in Tables II and III.

Table I. Dimensions of Political Alienation: Principal Components Analysis With Varimax Rotation

ComponentItem 1 2

Representatives forget public 0.65 –0.16Who benefits from politics? 0.61 –0.33Honesty of national officials 0.67 –0.25Faction and corruption impact 0.72 –0.32Trust national politics 0.49 –0.06Individual influence over government 0.31 0.61Complexity of politics 0.40 0.61General political interest 0.30 0.58Vote does not count 0.25 0.50

Cumulative percentage 44.86Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value 0.72

Note. See the Appendix for question wording and codings.

13 The political attitude index variables were constructed on the basis of factor analysis of the items inthe JES II survey (see Kabashima, 1998).

14 Following Achen’s (1982, pp. 56–58) suggestion, we checked whether the relationship between theindependent variables of age and education and the dependent variable was linear in the fullspecification of each model by incorporating dummy variables for each category (less one) ofeducation and age. The coefficients on the dummy variables showed that the trust model would fitthe data with just linear age and education terms, whereas the civic-mindedness model would fit betterwith the addition of squared terms for age and education to the model. The improvement in fit wasnegligible, however, so in the interest of interpretability we report only the linear specifications ofthe models.

15 In all but one of the indices (“traditional political values”), the individual items are weighted aboutequally; we therefore could have constructed the indices by simply adding up the items.

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These independent variables are derived from three schools of analysis.Scholarship on vote choice and turnout in Japan has historically focused onideology, demographic characteristics, income, union membership, and whetherthe respondent is self-employed or a farmer. These choices reflect the charac-teristics of the support bases for the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists under the1955 System.16 The variables for government performance, pride in democracy,and support for representative mechanisms are the ones singled out for testing byCitrin, whereas perceived lack of interparty policy distance is Miller’s favoredexplanation for individual-level alienation. The relative merits of these avenues ofexplanation can be expressed in the following hypotheses.

Proposition 1: All else being equal, individuals who rate government perform-ance more highly will be more trusting in government (the Citrin hypothesis).

Table II. Predicting Voters’ Level of Political Trust: Multiple Regression Analysis

Demographics + Political attitudesIndependent variables B β Sig T B β Sig T

Constant –0.36 0.02 –1.61 0.00Sex 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.03Age 0.54 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.77Income self-report –0.11 –0.03 0.49 –0.06 –0.01 0.69Education 0.23 0.08 0.05 0.31 0.10 0.00Years of residence 0.14 0.04 0.28 0.09 0.03 0.44Homeowner –0.01 0.00 0.95 –0.05 –0.02 0.52City size –0.17 –0.06 0.11 –0.11 –0.04 0.27Farmer 0.20 0.04 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.31Self-employed 0.03 0.01 0.72 –0.04 –0.01 0.63System support index 0.51 0.11 0.00Pride in political system 0.31 0.10 0.00Performance index 1.00 0.17 0.00Political satisfaction 0.71 0.19 0.00Life satisfaction 0.20 0.05 0.15Interparty difference –0.19 –0.06 0.04Traditional political values index 0.24 0.06 0.08Ideology self-report 0.42 0.10 0.00Strength of party ID 0.10 0.03 0.34

Adjusted R2 0.033 0.213Regression standard error 0.974 0.878N = 867

Note. The dependent variable is the political trust index; β, standardized regression coefficient; Sig T,significance of T value. See the Appendix for question wording and codings.

16 The extensive Japanese-language literature on politics and voting behavior guided the choice of thesevariables (in addition to the Japanese sources cited in the text, see Araki, 1983, 1994; Ikeda, 1997;Inoguchi, 1983; Kobayashi, 1991; Kôhei, 1979; Miyake, 1989, 1995; Murayama, 1994; Tanaka, 1996;Watanuki, Miyake, Inoguchi, & Kabashima, 1986; Yamada, 1994).

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Proposition 2: All else being equal, those who see a clearer difference betweenparties on matters of policy will be more politically allegiant (less alienated); thatis, they will score higher on both dimensions (the Miller hypothesis).

Proposition 3: All else being equal, those who have fewer years of formaleducation, are farmers or self-employed, live in rural areas, or rate themselves asmore politically conservative will be more politically allegiant (the 1955 Systemhypothesis).

Tables II and III show the coefficients (and their significance levels) obtainedfor the explanatory variables in the two models. For reference, we give twospecifications (demographic variables only, and the full model containing demo-graphic and attitudinal variables) and the measure of fit associated with each.System support, pride in Japanese democracy, evaluation of cabinet performance,political satisfaction, and conservative ideology all have a positive influence onpolitical trust, as does level of education and being male. Traditional politicalvalues seem as though they ought to positively influence trust, but it is impossibleto reject the null hypothesis at the standard confidence level. Increasing perceptionof policy difference among parties has a negative effect on trust.

Table III. Predicting Voters’ Level of Civic-Mindedness: Multiple Regression Analysis

Demographics + Political attitudesIndependent variables B β Sig T B β Sig T

Constant –0.64 0.00 –0.59 0.00Sex 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.12 0.00Age 1.03 0.22 0.00 0.92 0.20 0.00Income self-report 0.63 0.15 0.00 0.49 0.12 0.00Education 0.56 0.19 0.00 0.49 0.17 0.00Years of residence –0.13 –0.04 0.26 –0.11 –0.04 0.32Homeowner –0.04 –0.02 0.67 –0.01 –0.01 0.87City size –0.11 –0.04 0.24 –0.12 –0.04 0.19Farmer 0.08 0.02 0.59 0.17 0.04 0.24Self-employed 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.09System support index 0.44 0.10 0.00Pride in political system 0.16 0.05 0.08Performance index –0.07 –0.01 0.73Political satisfaction –0.20 –0.05 0.11Life satisfaction –0.06 –0.01 0.64Interparty difference –0.39 –0.14 0.00Traditional political values index –0.63 –0.15 0.00Ideology self-report –0.34 –0.08 0.02Strength of party ID 0.61 0.19 0.00

Adjusted R2 0.135 0.227Regression standard error 0.907 0.857N = 920

Note. The dependent variable is the civic-mindedness index; β, standardized regression coefficient; SigT, significance of T value. See the Appendix for question wording and codings.

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When the dependent variable is civic-mindedness, once again the attitudinalvariable “system support” shows a positive relationship, as does strength of partysupport.17 Males are not only more trusting, all else equal, but are also morecivic-minded by our measure. Age, income, and years of education also show apositive effect on civic-mindedness. Traditional political values, increasing per-ception of policy difference among parties, and conservative ideology reducecivic-mindedness.

Cabinet performance is the most influential attitudinal independent variablein the trust model. Political satisfaction follows in second place.18 Without control-ling for attitudinal variables, age also positively affects political trust and especiallycivic-mindedness, but the full model shows that the effect of age on trust ismediated by political attitudes. As Table II shows, most of the explanatory powerin the political trust model lies in the set of independent variables that measureindividual attitudes, which means that we are in effect explaining one set ofattitudes with another, logically prior, set. Nevertheless, demographic facts suchas level of education and sex have a statistically and substantively important effecton political trust and an even greater effect on civic-mindedness, often in unex-pected ways (which we discuss below).

The data confirm Proposition 1. An individual’s assessment of how the cabinetis performing quite logically affects his or her feelings of trust toward politics.Proposition 2, however, does not stand up: Perceptions of greater policy distancebetween parties actually reduce both civic-mindedness and political trust.19 Al-though Proposition 2 may have correctly explained political alienation in theUnited States of the late 1960s, it cannot be generalized to Japan. In fact, this resultis quite logical given the context of the 1955 System, in which a conservativecatch-all party (the LDP) faced a major opposition party (the JSP) that was far tothe left of center in its stated policies. Thus, although there were certainly policydifferences, there was not true policy choice for an electorate that was distributedaround the policy center. This interaction between the party system and voterpreferences makes cross-national evaluations of the distance hypothesis diffi-cult. It is probably more productive to think of Proposition 2 in terms of viablepolicy choice among parties, rather than simply policy distance. In sum, Citrin’s

17 STRENG1 is a follow-up question about party ID; we include it as a proxy for psychologicalcommitment to politics.

18 Political satisfaction did not tap the same underlying attitudes that were tapped by the measures ofpolitical trust or incumbent performance. Also, life satisfaction did not affect levels of trust ofcivic-mindedness, a finding consistent with the persistent gap between political satisfaction and lifesatisfaction in Japan (see Watanuki & Kabashima, 1997).

19 This result may be an artifact of the asymmetric alternatives presented in the “policy differences”question. Respondents are asked to place themselves on a 5-point scale between position A (“recently,the policy differences between ruling and opposition parties have gotten smaller”) and position B(“even recently, the policy differences between ruling and opposition parties are too large”), withposition B at the top of the scale.

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explanation may be more general than Miller’s, although Miller’s explanation mayalso be useful in comparative perspective if cast in terms of viable alternatives.

Finally, Proposition 3 needs a bit of revision in the face of these data. Livingin a smaller community, counting oneself a farmer, or being self-employed seemnot to affect alienation, all else being equal.20 Conservative ideology, unsurpris-ingly, makes Japanese eligible voters more politically trusting, but it also makesthem less civic-minded. Although women have a higher propensity to turn out tovote, they are indeed alienated when compared to men, possibly because theirparticipation is conditioned by the social networks that engage women, especiallymothers of school-age children (Cox, Rosenbluth, & Thies, 1998; see also Flanaganet al., 1991; Miyake, 1985). In a similar vein, level of schooling has a negativeeffect on behavior, specifically turnout (Pharr, 1997; but see also Kabashima, 1998,p. 227), but a college education seems to make people more allegiant in Japan, aselsewhere.21

In the models outlined here, membership in the groups that were supposed toform the social base for the 1955 System, particularly farmers and the self-employed (see Calder, 1988), does not seem to matter, although the self-employedmay be more civic-minded. This somewhat counterintuitive result could be themicro-level outcome of the collapse of the LDP electoral coalition and the redis-tributive politics that had characterized Japan since the mid-1950s (Kabashima,1984), or it may highlight an individual-level disjunction between attitudes and themost commonly examined behavior, voting. If farmers indeed vote their objectiveinterests rather than their feelings of allegiance or alienation, the result may beinterpreted as a reflection of the continuing rural bias in both public spending andDiet representation.

Strong partisans show greater political trust and greater civic-mindedness thanaverage. This relationship suggests that increased political alienation may be a signof weakened partisan attachment. Kabashima and Ishio (1998) showed that dissat-isfaction with politics is a cause of the current instability in party support attitudes.We analyze the relationship between party support and the two dimensions in moredetail below.

20 Under relaxed standards for statistical significance, it is possible to claim a positive effect forself-employment on civic-mindedness. A positive effect would square with ethnographic studies ofparticipation in neighborhood associations (see Bestor, 1989).

21 The bivariate relationship between level of schooling and political trust is U-shaped rather than linear,with a minimum value for those who have completed a 2-year college or vocational school. Those ateither end of the scale (college graduates and those who have finished only the compulsory 9 yearsof schooling) have similar levels of trust, and the curve is more pronounced for women than for men.

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Locating Groups in “Alienation Space”

Party Support and Political Alienation

Party support is a central explanatory variable in the “Michigan school” ofvoting behavior, and party support seems to be the most important variable inexplaining Japanese voting behavior as well.22 Recent research shows, however,that party support among Japanese eligible voters has become much more fluidwith the collapse of LDP dominance and the accompanying realignments in thepolitical realm (Kabashima & Ishio, 1998). In the following discussion, we analyzethe connection between party support and the pent-up sense of alienation that wassupposed to be prevalent at the time of the survey, and we attempt to locate variousgroups of party supporters in the two-dimensional space defined above. We alsoassess what sorts of eligible voters are apt to change their party support.23

Table IV and the accompanying Figure 1 show mean factor scores for politicaltrust and civic-mindedness by partisan identification. Supporters of the LDP, theJCP, and independents deserve notice for both the proportion of respondents thatthey represent and, especially in the case of the JCP, the role they have played inJapanese politics. Supporters of the LDP show a high level of trust but only anaverage level of civic-mindedness. As supporters of the party in power, they trustpolitics, naturally enough, but at the same time they are at somewhat of a psycho-logical remove from politics. Conversely, the JCP has never governed, and itssupporters tend not to trust politics even though they tend to present themselves ascivic-minded. JCP supporters thus match the image of politically active individualswho are moved to distrust by corruption and their desire to eliminate it. Inde-pendents, the second largest category of eligible voters after LDP supporters, areno more or less trusting than average but show low levels of psychic involvementin politics. These results accord quite well with the popular image of each partisangroup.

The panel data allow us to examine how party support relates to politicalalienation over time. To keep the exposition of these changes comprehensible, weuse the first wave (1993 pre-election interview), fifth wave (1995 post-electioninterview), and sixth wave (1996 pre-election interview) party support data. In1994, between these waves, the non-LDP coalition fell and the Liberal Democratsreturned to power in the form of a coalition with the JSP and the Harbinger(Sakigake) Party. The New Frontier Party (NFP, or Shinshinto) also formed duringthis period to contend for power with the LDP. This alternation of governing partiesand formation of a new political party should have affected the relationship betweenparty support and alienation among eligible voters. To avoid clutter, we also limit

22 Using the Michigan model outside of the American context is not without controversy; see Johnston(1992) for an argument criticizing the portability of the concept of party identification.

23 The question used to determine party ID is “This election aside, which party do you support?”

792 Kabashima et al.

our observation of micro-level change to the two largest groups, independents andLDP supporters. Table V and Figure 2 disaggregate 1993 independents and LDPsupporters by future (1995) party support and show group means along the trustand civic-mindedness dimensions.

Out of the group of 1993 LDP supporters, those eligible voters who were moretrusting went on to support the LDP in 1995. Those who went on to support theNFP, on the other hand, were more civic-minded than the group as a whole. Themore politically alienated quite logically went on to be independents in 1995.

Similarly, the more allegiant of the 1993 group of independents went on tobecome NFP or LDP supporters, whereas the more alienated remained inde-pendents. By disaggregating the two largest 1993 groups of supporters, we are ableto see that those who were more politically allegiant did not join (or remain with)the growing number of independents. Of this allegiant subgroup, those whowelcomed the return of the LDP government became LDP supporters, whereas

Table IV. Partisanship and Political Alienation (1993, 1995, 1996): Mean Factor Scoresfor Civic-Mindedness and Political Trust

Year Party support Civic-mindedness N Political trust N

1993 LDP –0.03 957 0.21 695JSP 0.17 287 –0.21 227CGP 0.45 90 –0.20 84DSP 0.23 39 –0.11 33JCP 0.47 55 –0.65 53SDF 0.48 19 –0.34 19SNS –0.04 74 0.27 62SKG 0.01 31 –0.04 20JNP 0.12 84 –0.09 59Independents –0.29 348 –0.23 286

1995 LDP 0.00 492 0.30 381NFP 0.26 246 0.03 184JSP 0.21 197 –0.24 153SKG 0.35 39 0.05 27JCP 0.63 42 –0.59 31Independents –0.18 426 –0.16 293

1996 LDP 0.01 489 0.25 373NFP 0.37 166 –0.02 127DPJ 0.31 70 –0.20 60JSP 0.14 105 –0.16 84JCP 0.35 49 –0.33 39SKG 0.64 13 0.31 10Independents –0.14 287 –0.24 196

Note. Abbreviations: LDP, Liberal Democratic Party; JSP, Japan Socialist Party/Social DemocraticParty of Japan; CGP, Clean Government Party (Kômei Party); DSP, Democratic Socialist Party; JCP,Japan Communist Party; SDF, Social Democratic Federation (Shaminren); SNS, Renewal Party (Shin-seitô); SKG, Harbinger Party (Sakigake); JNP, Japan New Party (Nihonshintô); NFP, New FrontierParty (Shinshintô); DPJ, Democratic Party of Japan.

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Figure 1. Partisanship and political alienation (1993, 1995, 1996).

those who had been waiting for the formation of a new party (the NFP) threw theirsupport in that direction. The more politically alienated, meanwhile, either aban-doned their support for the LDP or stayed independent, out of a desire to send awarning to the LDP or out of disappointment in the wake of the collapse of thenon-LDP coalition government.

Using the JES II data, we have represented alienation from national politicsalong two dimensions, trust and civic-mindedness. Evaluations of cabinet perform-ance and support for the political system strongly affect an individual’s level ofboth trust and civic-mindedness, whereas conservative ideology breeds greatertrust and progressive ideology encourages a higher degree of civic-mindedness.Also, males and those with more years of education tend to be both more politicallytrusting and more civic-minded, all else being equal.

Mapped on these two dimensions, partisan supporters (on average) differconsiderably in how politically alienated they are. LDP supporters show the mostpolitical trust but do not differ from the electorate as a whole in terms of civic-mindedness. Independents are distrustful toward and disengaged from politics. The“collapse” of the 1955 System of single-party dominance that accompanied theLDP’s loss in 1993 has already been tied to instability in party support (Kabashima& Ishio, 1998). In this paper, we have examined a more durable attitude, alienation(or its opposite, allegiance), and connected it to party support. Those LDP support-ers who were more alienated wanted to “drop out” after the LDP’s return to powerand thus became independents, whereas more politically allegiant independentswelcomed the LDP government and became supporters. Among both independentsand LDP supporters, more civic-minded individuals became supporters of newparties, and may have indeed been waiting for the formation of the NFP.

Stability of Japanese Politics

Although it may be the most important predictor of voting behavior, partysupport has already been shown to be quite fluid in contemporary Japan. Even if

Table V. Change and Continuity of Partisanship and Political Alienation (1993, 1995):Mean Factor Scores for Civic-Mindedness and Political Trust

Party support Civic-mindedness N Political trust N

Supporters of LDP in 1993 –0.03 957 0.21 695Continuously support LDP –0.03 402 0.33 321Changed support from LDP to NFP 0.15 83 0.19 54Became independents –0.10 136 0.00 95Independents in 1993 –0.29 348 –0.23 286Continuously independent –0.39 120 –0.33 95Became supporters of LDP –0.10 36 –0.08 25Became supporters of NFP –0.09 23 –0.08 21

Note. See Table IV for party abbreviations.

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Figure 2. Change and continuity of partisanship and political alienation (1993, 1995).

party support is unstable, however, the Japanese political system need not lose itsstability. The basis for this claim can be seen in Table VI, which categorizespartisans in terms of trust and civic-mindedness. The 2 × 2 matrix, although it isonly an abstract representation of how partisan supporters are arranged, has beenused as a typology in the social movements literature.

Jeffrey Paige (1971) held that an increase in the number of people who arepolitically efficacious but have low levels of trust leads to destabilization of thepolitical system, because this type of person tends to bypass the usual “input” routesand to participate in politics through demonstrations or violent action. This cate-gory corresponds to the upper right-hand cell in Table VI. Of course, we do notmean to imply that JCP supporters are inclined toward mob action. They do,however, desire fundamental changes in policy and political system.

Conversely, when those with high levels of trust but low levels of efficacy arenumerous, the “load” on the political system is light. In our characterization(Table VI), this category corresponds to LDP supporters. In the short term, groupslike our “independents” that have low levels of both political trust and civic-mindedness are “secluded from politics” and so cause political quietude. Over thelong term, however, such seclusion may expose the political system to risk becauseneither demands nor support are “input” into the political system. As David Easton(1965, p. 25) wrote, lack of support is to a political system as lack of energy is toa physical system.

LDP supporters and independents are the two major forces in the Japaneseelectorate. Thus, even though party support is unstable, the political system itselfis not, because these two groups hold the majority. Furthermore, the weight of thesetwo categories of citizen probably allows the continuance of LDP dominance evenin an era of nominal “coalition government.” These voters do not guarantee thelong-term stability of the political system, however, if we accept the propositionthat a democratic polity can run out of steam.

The Democratic Nature of Japanese Politics

To maintain democracy, a polity must foster in its citizens a sense of politicaltrust as well as political efficacy, interest, and duty. LDP supporters trust politics,but they are on the whole not actively engaged by politics. Independents are thegroup most alienated from politics. Although these two categories represent themajority of Japanese voters, they are not as engaged by politics as other groups.The foregoing analysis shows that voters who later threw their support to newparties were both more trusting and more civic-minded than their fellow LDPsupporters or independents.24 The problem for Japanese politics is that these new

24 Independents are analogous in some ways to African-American voters in the United States in the late1950s and early 1960s. African-Americans changed their position (relative to the population as awhole) in terms of both trust and efficacy after putting civil rights on the national policy agenda and

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parties have kept forming and dissolving and have not yet constituted a solidalternative.

The premise of our analysis was that certain political attitudes, including trust,do not change suddenly. We do not establish that changes in party support causechanges in an individual’s level of political alienation. Nevertheless, over the longterm, support for a specific party may affect levels of trust in politics or civic-mindedness. If this relationship proves to be true, then the new parties have aparticularly important role to play. The ranks of the new parties are filled by peoplewith more political trust and greater civic-mindedness. If the new parties meet theexpectations of their supporters and can manage to expand their bases, then theywill have made an important contribution to creating citizens closer to the demo-cratic ideal. Japan will enjoy a virtuous circle of political incorporation, increasingcivic orientation, and (probably) increasing trust. The flip side of this scenario is avicious circle in which new parties fail to live up to expectations and drive evermore voters into disengagement and distrust.

APPENDIX: The JES II Survey

The Japanese Electoral Survey II (JES II), a seven-wave panel study conductedbetween 1993 and 1996, provided the data for our analyses. This data set is themost comprehensive available on contemporary Japanese political attitudes andbehavior. Central Research Services, a private polling firm, collected the data forthe JES II research group. Using a two-stage stratified area probability samplingmethod, Central Research Services targeted 3,000 eligible voters who were 20years of age or older at the time of the first wave. Of the target sample, 75.2%(2,255 cases) responded to the first wave of the survey. The first two waves usedface-to-face interviews and were conducted before and after the 40th Lower Houseelection in July 1993. The third and fourth waves were self-administered mailsurveys and were conducted in February 1994 and February 1995, respectively.The fifth wave, a face-to-face interview survey, was conducted after the Upper

thus getting drawn into politics (see Rochon & Kabashima, 1997). In the American example, animportant part of the change was that a whole new group was being mobilized into an establishedpolitical party. In Japan, conversely, an already mobilized group (independents) seems to be in searchof a party, but an established party could also draw in the “alienated.”

Table 6. Alienation and Democratic Stability (adapted from Paige, 1971, p. 812)

Political trustHigh Low

Civic-mindedness High Supporters of new parties JCP supportersLow LDP supporters Independents

798 Kabashima et al.

House election in July 1995. The sixth and seventh waves were conducted beforeand after the 41st Lower House election in October 1996. This paper primarilyexamines responses gathered from those who participated in the first and secondwaves of the panel (N = 1,893).

Survey Items

Discarded items are in italics. DK, don’t know; NA, no answer.

Political Trust Index Items

NATTRUST: To what extent do you feel you can trust national politics? (1,always; 2, most of the time; 3, sometimes; 4, not at all; 5, DK; 6, NA)

DIETMEN: What do you think of the people who were elected to the NationalDiet? Generally speaking, do you think they stop thinking about the public’sinterest immediately after taking office? Or do you think this idea is false? (1, theystop thinking about the public’s interest; 2, this idea is false; 3, it depends on thesituation; 4, DK; 5, NA)

WHORUNS: Do you think this country’s politics are largely run in order tobenefit the interests of a few big organizations like large companies and big unions?Or do you think this country’s politics are largely run on behalf of the people as awhole? (1, politics are run to benefit the interests of a few big organizations; 2,politics are run on behalf of the people as a whole; 3, it depends; 4, DK; 5, NA)

DISHONE: Do you think the people who manage our national politics aredishonest, somewhat dishonest, or honest? (1, dishonest; 2, somewhat dishonest;3, honest; 4, DK; 5, NA)

FACTION: Do you think that Japanese politicians and political parties areneglecting the interests of the people because of factional competition and corrup-tion problems? (1, yes, the interests of the people are being neglected; 2, theinterests of the people are being somewhat neglected; 3, no, the interests of thepeople are not being neglected; 4, DK; 5, NA)

POLITICN: Current Japanese politicians are not thinking about our problemsvery much. (1, agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, disagree; 5,DK; 6, NA)

Civic-Mindedness Index Items

POLINT: Regardless of whether there is an election or not, there are somepeople who are always interested in politics and some people who are not veryinterested in politics. How much attention do you pay to political events? Do youfollow politics all the time, half the time, only occasionally, or not at all? (1, I followpolitics all the time; 2, I follow politics half the time; 3, I follow politics onlyoccasionally; 4, I never follow politics; 5, DK; 6, NA)

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DUTY2: Since numerous people will vote in elections, it really doesn’t matterwhether or not I vote. (1, I agree; 2, I somewhat agree; 3, I can’t decide; 4, Isomewhat disagree; 5, I disagree; 6, DK; 7, NA)

EFF1: I have no power to influence the government’s actions. (1, I agree; 2, Isomewhat agree; 3, I can’t decide; 4, I somewhat disagree; 5, I disagree; 6, DK; 7,NA)

EFF2: Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I cannotunderstand what’s happening. (1, I agree; 2, I somewhat agree; 3, I can’t decide;4, I somewhat disagree; 5, I disagree; 6, DK; 7, NA)

DUTY: In regard to voting, choose the option that best reflects your opinion.(1, voting in elections is a citizen’s duty, it is something that a citizen is obliged todo; 2, voting in elections is something that a citizen really should do; 3, voting inelections is something that each person must decide on their own to do—one is notobliged to vote; 4, DK; 5, NA)

System Support Index Items

PARTY: Political parties make it possible for people’s voices to be heard inpolitics. (1, agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, disagree; 5, DK;6, NA)

ELECT1: Elections make it possible for people’s voices to be heard in politics.(1, agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, disagree; 5, DK; 6, NA)

DIET: The National Diet makes it possible for people’s voices to be heard inpolitics. (1, agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, disagree; 5, DK;6, NA)

Traditional Political Values Index Items

DONATION: “If people from your community ask you to make some sort ofdonation, it is better to donate without complaining in order to preserve the harmonyof the neighborhood even if you do not necessarily agree with the group’s purpose.”How do you feel about this statement? (1, I agree; 2, I somewhat agree; 3, I can’tdecide; 4, I somewhat disagree; 5, I disagree; 6, DK; 7, NA)

RESPECT1: “Since those who have attained positions of leadership areoutstanding people, it is appropriate to respect their opinions.” How do you feelabout this statement? (1, I agree; 2, I somewhat agree; 3, I can’t decide; 4, Isomewhat disagree; 5, I disagree; 6, DK; 7, NA)

ENTRUST: “For the sake of improving our country, if outstanding politicalleaders come forward, it would be best to entrust things to them rather than havethe people debate issues among themselves.” How do you feel about this statement?(1, I agree; 2, I somewhat agree; 3, I can’t decide; 4, I somewhat disagree; 5, Idisagree; 6, DK; 7, NA)

800 Kabashima et al.

RESPECT2: “Since Diet Representatives, Councilors, and Governors are therepresentatives of the people, it is proper for them to command respect.” How doyou feel about this statement? (1, I agree; 2, I somewhat agree; 3, I can’t decide;4, I somewhat disagree; 5, I disagree; 6, DK; 7, NA)

Cabinet Performance Index Items

How do you feel about the Miyazawa cabinet’s record?CABIREF1: First of all, how do you feel about political reform(s)? (1, very

good; 2, somewhat good; 3, neither good nor bad; 4, somewhat bad; 5, very bad;6, DK; 7, NA)

CABIECO1: How do you feel about economic aspects, such as measurestoward business? (1, very good; 2, somewhat good; 3, neither good nor bad; 4,somewhat bad; 5, very bad; 6, DK; 7, NA)

CABIDIP1: How about diplomacy? (1, very good; 2, somewhat good; 3,neither good nor bad; 4, somewhat bad; 5, very bad; 6, DK; 7, NA)

CABINET1: What is your overall evaluation? (1, very good; 2, somewhatgood; 3, neither good nor bad; 4, somewhat bad; 5, very bad; 6, DK; 7, NA)

Other Attitude Items

PPRIDE: How do you feel about democracy in Japan? Are you proud, or notproud at all? (1, proud; 2, somewhat proud; 3, not proud at all; 4, DK; 5, NA)

IDEOLOGY: There is a lot of talk about conservatives and liberals. What isyour political position on a scale of 1 to 10? (1, progressive liberal position; 10,conservative position)

SATPOL: How satisfied are you with the present political situation? (1, verysatisfied; 2, somewhat satisfied; 3, somewhat dissatisfied; 4, very dissatisfied; 5,neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 6, DK; 7, NA)

STRENG1: How strongly do you support [the party with which you identify]:enthusiastically or not so enthusiastically? (1, enthusiastic supporter; 2, not suchan enthusiastic supporter; 3, DK; 4, NA)

POLICYDI: Statements A and B address policy differences between the partyin power and the parties not in power. A: “Recently, there has been little differencein the policies of the party in power and the parties out of power.” B: “Recently,there has been too much difference in the policies of the party in power and theparties not in power.” Which statement is closer to your opinion? (1, statement A;2, My opinion is closer to statement A; 3, neither statement is close to my opinion;4, my opinion is closer to statement B; 5, statement B; 6, DK; 7, NA)

SATISFY: Looking at another topic, how satisfied are you with your family’spresent financial situation? (1, very satisfied; 2, somewhat satisfied; 3, neithersatisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, somewhat dissatisfied; 5, very dissatisfied; 6, DK; 7,NA)

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Questions About Political Attitudes: Summary Statistics

N Mean SDMiyazawa political reform record (CABIREF1) 2,176 0.25 0.21Miyazawa economic performance (CABIECO1) 2,137 0.29 0.20Miyazawa foreign policy (CABIDIP1) 2,122 0.40 0.22Miyazawa overall performance (CABINET1) 2,194 0.31 0.19Trust national politics (NATTRUST) 2,210 0.41 0.24Representatives forget public (DIETMEN) 2,170 0.37 0.42Who benefits from politics? (WHORUNS) 2,051 0.21 0.35Honesty of national officials (DISHONE) 2,183 0.16 0.24Faction and corruption impact (FACTION) 2,154 0.37 0.36General political interest (POLINT) 2,303 0.57 0.30Harmony before preference (DONATION) 2,272 0.56 0.35Respect for leaders (RESPECT1) 2,264 0.41 0.32Let leaders decide (ENTRUST) 2,221 0.31 0.32Respect for elected representatives (RESPECT2) 2,230 0.42 0.35Parties allow democracy (PARTY) 1,939 0.70 0.28Elections allow democracy (ELECT1) 2,100 0.79 0.24The Diet allows democracy (DIET) 1,937 0.69 0.29Individual influence over government (EFF1) 2,250 0.37 0.38Complexity of politics (EFF2) 2,257 0.31 0.34Vote does not count (DUTY2) 2,292 0.81 0.31Pride in Japan’s democracy (PPRIDE) 2,070 0.50 0.33Ideology self-report (IDEOLOGY) 2,097 0.53 0.23Political satisfaction (SATPOL) 2,217 0.31 0.26Strength of party ID (STRENG1) 2,205 0.46 0.32Interparty difference (POLICYDI) 1,922 0.39 0.33Life satisfaction (SATISFY) 2,310 0.58 0.24

Note. Variables were recoded so that low values are the more “alienated” response and highvalues the more “allegiant” response. Recoded variables were then rescaled 0 to 1.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Yoshiaki Kobayashi, and Ken’ichiIkeda, the other principal investigators for the JES II project, which was funded bythe Japanese Ministry of Education’s Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research—Spe-cially Promoted Research. We also thank Yoshito Ishio and Steven Reed for theirhelpful comments; the Berkeley Study Group, Institute of Social Science, TokyoUniversity, for their help with the formulation of the text; and two anonymousreviewers for their help in catching errors, eliminating excess, and providingencouragement. The data used in the preparation of this paper are available fromthe Leviathan Databank at Koishikawa 5-11-15-302, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-0002,Japan (fax +81-3-3814-4195). Correspondence concerning this article should be

802 Kabashima et al.

sent to Jonathan Marshall, Department of Political Science, 210B Barrows Hall,University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. E-mail: jdmarshl@socra-tes.berkeley.edu

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