Identity,  Acceptance,  and  Alienation:  the  case  of  the  Lebanese  community  in  West  Africa  

                           

 Danielle  Botti  

   572847  

 16  September  2013  

 Word  Count:  9941  

 This  dissertation  is  submitted  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of    

MA  –  Migration  and  Diaspora  Studies  

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Dissertation  Declaration    I  have  read  and  understood  regulations  17.9  of  the  Regulations  for  students  of  the  School  of  Oriental  and  African  Studies  concerning  plagiarism.  I  undertake  that  all  material  presented  for  examination  is  my  own  work  and  has  not  been  written  for  me,  in  whole  or  in  part  by  any  other  person.    I  undertake  that  any  quotation  or  paraphrase  from  the  published  or  unpublished  work  of  another  person  has  been  duly  acknowledged  in  the  work  which  I  now  present  for  examination.  I  understand  that  I  must  have  prior  approval  before  incorporating  any  coursework  I  have  completed  for  any  previous  qualification  either  at  SOAS  or  elsewhere,  and  that  any  such  previous  coursework  is  duly  acknowledged  in  the  dissertation  now  submitted.    In  the  instance  of  online  submission,  in  addition  to  the  above,  I  declare  that  any  printed  copies  submitted  are  identical  in  content  to  the  electronic  version.                        Signature:              Date:                                                                

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Abstract    Anthropological  approaches  to  the  evolving  concept  of  ‘diaspora  studies’  attempt  to  examine  how  identity,  culture,  and  environment  impact  and  shape  the  way  we  see  the  world  and  our  place  in  it.    This  paper  looks  at  the  cultural,  social,  and  ethnic  identity  of  the  Lebanese  diaspora  communities  in  West  Africa.  Like  other  trade  diasporas,  the  Lebanese  community  –  particularly  in  West  Africa  –  have  largely  been  overlooked  in  anthropological  study.  Their  economic  prosperity  produces  negative  stereotypes  that  isolate  them  and  discourage  academic  research  into  their  fragmented  past  and  complicated  cultural  identities.  Using  a  practical  application  of  theories  on  transnationalism,  resistance,  and  the  reproduction  of  culture,  this  paper  explores  the  role  that  external  and  internal  factors  –transnationalism,  race  relations,  integration  and  assimilation  –  have  had  on  the  cultural  construction  of  the  Lebanese  community  in  West  Africa.                                                              

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Table  of  Contents      Introduction      5  

 Reframing  the  search  for  ‘identity’      7    The  Lebanese  in  West  Africa      9  

The  middlemen     11    

The  everyday  creation  of  identity  in  West  Africa     14  Economic:  market  elite     14  Political:  home  and  away     17  Social:  participation  and  isolation     20  

 Transnationalism,  culture  and  the  Lebanese  diaspora       23  

Transnationalism  and  identity     23  Cultural  identity     26  

 ‘Lebanese-­‐ness’  and  the  reproduction  of  culture     29  

Reproduction  of  Lebanon  through  social  fields     29  Business,  family,  and  the  kin  connection     31  

 Assimilation,  integration,  and  resistance     33  

The  burden  of  being  a  blight  on  society     35    

Conclusion     39    Bibliography     41                                        

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Introduction  

Anthropological  approaches  to  the  new  concept  of  ‘diaspora  studies’  attempt  to  examine  how  

identity,  culture,  and  environment  can  shape  the  way  we  see  the  world  and  our  place  in  it.    Identity  

is  made  up  of  a  series  of  everyday  practices  and  collective  memories  that  influence  our  decisions  

and  affect  our  view  of  ourselves.    However,  this  creation  is  not  necessarily  a  choice,  and  the  

construction  of  our  identity  is  not  a  process  entirely  our  own.  External  factors  –  socio-­‐economic,  

political,  religious,  and  cultural  –  are  constantly  competing  for  a  place  in  the  everyday  restructuring  

of  our  identities.  

 

This  paper  looks  at  the  cultural,  social,  and  ethnic  identity  of  the  Lebanese  diaspora  communities  in  

West  Africa.  We  explore  the  impact  that  external  and  internal  factors  –  transnationalism,  race  

relations,  integration  and  assimilation  –  have  had  on  the  cultural  construction  of  the  Lebanese  

community  in  West  Africa.  

 

The  Lebanese  community  –  numbering  over  15  million  people  worldwide  –  is  one  of  the  largest  and  

widespread  diasporas  (Economist  2013).    In  many  of  the  corners  of  the  world  where  they’ve  

settled,  the  Lebanese  are  renowned  for  their  ability  to  maintain  strong  ties  to  their  cultural  

traditions  and  heritage.  However,  research  shows  that  Lebanese  communities  also  adapt  to  their  

‘host’  counties  and  integrate  into  the  culture  –  they  speak  local  languages,  they  eat  local  food,  they  

invest  in  the  local  economy  (Leichtman  2005;  Leichtman  2010;  Winder  1962).    

 

For  the  Lebanese  diaspora  in  West  Africa,  family  is  everything.  Family  represents  business,  

opportunity,  and  culture.  Family  relations  and  social  connections  serve  as  the  reproduction  and  

reformation  of  Lebanese  identity.  However,  their  ties  to  each  other  are  not  predicated  on  a  desire  to  

go  back  to  Lebanon  –  which  for  many  of  them  is  just  a  place  of  origin,  not  a  place  of  return.  This  

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paper  uses  theories  and  approaches  to  examine  the  duality  of  their  ties  to  home  in  West  Africa  and  

to  their  ethnic  homeland  in  Lebanon.  

 

By  holding  onto  the  traditionally  close  bond  to  both  Lebanon  and  the  global  Lebanese  diaspora,  the  

Lebanese  in  West  Africa  maintain  cultural  ties  to  Lebanon.  However,  this  reproduction  of  culture  

and  tradition  through  family  networks  has  simultaneously  made  them  suspicious  to  Africans  and  

prevented  them  from  being  fully  accepted  in  West  African  society.    

 

The  identity  of  the  Lebanese  diaspora  community  and  its  members  is  a  result  of  the  juncture  of  

their  life  in  West  Africa,  their  ties  with  the  transnational  Lebanese  community,  and  Lebanon.  All  of  

these  factors  have  a  role  to  play  in  the  ongoing  creation  and  evolution  of  what  is  ‘home’  and  where  

they  belong.  

 

 

   

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Reframing  the  search  for  ‘identity’  

“Migration  scholarship  can  provide  insights  into  global  power  and  the  relationship  to  how  narratives  

about  migrants  either  demonizes  or  celebrates  them.”  

(Glick  Schiller  2009:  4).    

 

The  Lebanese  diaspora,  especially  in  West  Africa,  have  been  historically  vilified.  There  is  a  sort  of  

tacit  understanding  in  the  media  and  public  discourse  that  the  stereotypes  about  trade  diasporas  –  

they  are  greedy,  morally  corrupt,  and  insular  –  are  accurate  (Ong  1999).  Because  of  this  bias,  little  

academic  research  has  been  undertaken  with  these  groups,  unless  it  is  done  to  push  an  agenda  that  

criticize  their  roles  in  history  because  of  their  economic  prosperity.  The  Lebanese  make  up  a  

sizeable  minority  across  West  Africa,  yet  their  history  is  simplified  into  a  story  of  economic  

dominance  and  oppression.  

 

The  Lebanese  community  –  like  other  trade  diasporas  –  have  largely  been  ignored  in  anthropology  

and  migration  studies.  I  chose  to  explore  this  subject  because  I  see  the  need  for  more  material  and  

analysis  about  the  Lebanese  diaspora  in  West  Africa  –  as  well  as  other  trade  diasporas  –  in  

anthropology.  It  is  imperative  to  not  only  understand  how  the  Lebanese  community  developed,  but  

to  get  an  accurate  comprehension  of  how  they  see  themselves  and  their  world.  Forced  to  straddle  

between  two  identities,  the  Lebanese  communities  don’t  know  where  they  belong.  Largely  

demonized  in  African  media,  politics  and  society,  they  are  told  they  do  not  belong  (Akyeampong  

2006;  Loughton  1974;  Leichtman  2010).  Their  entire  lives  are  spent  immersed  in  a  world  which  

they  are  told  they  should  not  be.  

 

One  of  the  reasons  that  I  chose  to  write  on  the  Lebanese  in  West  Africa  in  particular  is  because  of  

the  unique  circumstance  that  they  face  in  the  region.  In  many  other  places  where  the  Lebanese  have  

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settled  –  the  United  Kingdom,  United  States,  Brazil,  Australia  –  they  have  been  able  to  obtain  

citizenship  and  equal  recognition  politically  and  socially.  I  argue  that  they  have  maintained  strong  

ties  to  their  Lebanese  culture  because  of  the  lack  of  political  mobility  and  social  acceptance  in  West  

Africa.  They  have  largely  been  refused  (legitimate)  citizenship  in  West  Africa,  which  is  an  

exemplification  of  African  resistance  to  accept  the  Lebanese  community.    

 

This  paper  uses  a  practical  application  of  theories  on  transnationalism,  citizenship,  and  the  

reproduction  of  culture  to  examine  the  Lebanese  diaspora  community  in  West  Africa.  As  a  note,  

length  limitations  on  this  paper  required  that  I  narrow  my  scope  of  investigation  into  Lebanese  

identity  in  West  Africa.  Although  each  country  and  ethnicity  in  West  Africa  has  a  unique  and  rich  

history  and  distinct  set  of  cultural  norms,  we  can  recognize  that  the  collective  experiences  and  

networks  of  the  Lebanese  community  across  this  region  are  similar.      

 

   

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The  Lebanese  in  West  Africa  

The  Lebanese  community  in  West  Africa  numbers  well  over  250,000  people  (Economist  2013).  

Sizeable  Lebanese  communities  are  found  all  along  West  Africa’s  coastal  countries,  largely  in  the  

capital  cities,  but  pockets  are  found  in  almost  every  major  city  and  town  throughout  West  Africa.  

Many  these  communities  have  been  established  for  well  over  100  years.  However,  they  hold  a  

precarious  position  in  West  Africa  between  the  Colonial  authorities  and  the  locals.  They  straddle  a  

racial,  social,  and  political  divide  –  both  self-­‐imposed  and  externally  enforced  –  that  keeps  them  

apart  (Winder  1962:  297).    

 

Lebanese  first  arrived  in  West  Africa  in  the  1880s.  Many  intended  to  travel  across  the  Atlantic  to  

destinations  in  the  Americas,  but  were  persuaded  to  go  to  West  Africa  while  in  Marseille  (one  of  

Europe’s  main  transportation  hubs  of  the  late  nineteenth  century).  Due  to  drawn-­‐out  visa  

applications  and  delays  with  the  ships,  they  spent  most  of  their  money  in  the  port  city  and  could  

only  afford  the  fare  to  West  African  destinations  (Leichtman  2010:  274;  Loughton  1974;  Winder  

1962).  

 

They  arrived  with  nothing  in  West  Africa,  and  braved  harsh  conditions.  Many  lived  in  basic  housing  

and  primitive  environments  for  the  first  few  years  while  getting  establishing.  When  they  arrived  in  

parts  of  Nigeria,  Lebanese  settlers  lived  in  mud  huts  and  with  very  little  resources.  In  the  Nigerian  

trading  community  in  Calabar,  the  Lebanese  were  referred  to  as  ‘white  Bush  men’  in  pigeon  English,  

because  of  their  willingness  to  live  in  remote  areas  (Morrill  1962:  150).  As  businessmen,  they  

would  travel  to  areas  that  Europeans  refused.  They  learned  their  market,  and  they  tailored  their  

businesses  to  the  clientele  and  to  the  environment.  After  establishing  some  small  trading  

businesses,  they  started  to  control  some  of  the  market  by  setting  the  price  for  rice,  a  staple  crop  in  

West  Africa  (Loughton  1974;  Winder  1962).    

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After  arriving  as  destitute  economic  migrants,  the  swift  ascent  of  the  Lebanese  the  top  of  the  

economic  and  social  ladder  in  many  West  African  countries  caused  frustration  and  discontent  with  

local  populations.  Their  inability  or  unwillingness  to  completely  integrate  and  their  apparent  

colluding  with  colonial  authorities  made  them  an  easy  scapegoat.  

 

In  Sierra  Leone,  the  Lebanese  started  out  as  impoverished  low-­‐level  peddlers.  They  were  called  

‘coral  men’  because  of  the  cheap  red  necklaces  they  hawked  on  the  streets.  However,  their  limited  

goods  soon  proved  tiresome  for  Freetown,  so  they  took  their  business  upcountry.  They  traveled  to  

places  and  entrenched  themselves  in  communities  and  markets  that  the  European  and  Creole  (the  

elite  class  in  Sierra  Leone)  traders  would  not.  They  got  to  know  local  customs,  and  tailored  their  

wares  to  fit  the  market  and  clients  (Loughton  1974:  23).    

 

Not  all  Lebanese  business  practices  were  fair,  and  many  left  Africans  vulnerable  to  manipulation.  

Because  of  their  widespread  and  remote  markets,  the  Lebanese  businessmen  were  able  to  trade  

and  sell  directly  to  African  farmers,  and  in  cash.  This  meant  they  were  able  to  bind  farmers  by  

offering  small  cash  advances.  Through  undervaluing  crops  that  they  bought  from  the  farmer,  they  

were  able  to  create  a  debt  cycle  which  drove  the  farmers  further  and  further  into  debt  (Loughton  

1974:  24).    

 

In  Guinea,  the  Lebanese  arrived  in  the  late  1800s  as  peddlers  of  common  goods,  and  within  six  

months  held  a  monopoly  over  the  rubber  trade,  making  both  French  and  African  businesses  

dependent  on  them  (Winder  1962:  299).  In  Sierra  Leone,  the  Lebanese  weren’t  able  to  buy  land,  so  

they  expanded  their  markets  and  consumer  base  to  increase  profits.    However,  their  financial  

success  forced  out  many  of  their  competitors  and  largely  drove  the  Creoles  out  of  business.  In  

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addition,  the  Lebanese  were  also  borrowing  from  the  Europeans,  who  preferred  to  lend  to  the  

Lebanese  over  Africans  (Loughton  1974:  24).    This  helped  set  the  stage  for  their  widely  criticized  

dominance  in  the  business  sector  in  throughout  West  Africa.  

 

The  middlemen  

 

In  1919,  Sierra  Leone  saw  a  rice  shortage  due  to  a  crop  failure  the  year  before,  as  well  as  war  

restrictions,  and  rising  cost  of  living  (Kaniki  1973:  98).  The  anti-­‐Lebanese  ‘rice  riots’  that  followed  

targeted  the  Lebanese  for  hoarding  rice,  and  were  a  peak  in  the  uneasy  relationship  between  the  

early  Lebanese  settlers,  the  African  populace,  and  the  colonial  authorities  (Kaniki  1973:  97).  

 

The  riots  targeted  Lebanese  shops  and  houses  in  Freetown  and  in  every  other  city  with  Lebanese  

communities.  Although  only  three  Lebanese  died  during  the  rioting,  the  safety  and  mobility  of  the  

community  was  so  threatened  that  many  moved  back  to  Freetown  where  their  movements  were  

severely  restricted  (Kaniki  1973:  101).  Although  the  Creoles  cited  riots  triggers  as  Lebanese  

arrogance  and  unfair  business  practices,  news  sources  and  authorities  saw  that  this  was  a  response  

to  envy  regarding  Lebanese  economic  success.  According  to  the  local  Weekly  News  paper  in  1919,  

the  riots  and  raids  were  not  “offensive  but  defensive  acts”  against  an  oppressive  Lebanese  

conglomerate  (Kaniki  1973:  104).    

 

These  riots  were  instrumental  for  many  reasons,  not  only  their  effect  on  the  welfare  of  the  

Lebanese  community,  but  on  the  direction  of  relations  between  the  groups  vying  for  power  in  the  

region.  The  riots,  and  the  colonial  response  to  them,  guided  the  approach  of  the  colonial  powers  

towards  Creole  autonomy  and  general  economic  policy  across  colonial  West  Africa.  The  colonial  

authorities  enabled  the  Lebanese  to  remove  the  Creoles  from  the  trade  market  almost  altogether  

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(Kaniki  1973:  98).  But  this  only  served  to  make  the  Lebanese  more  socially  vulnerable  and  set  the  

stage  for  future  political  isolation.    

 

However,  European  businesses  and  elites  also  criticized  Lebanese  businessmen,  using  them  as  a  

scapegoat  for  economic  or  social  unrest.  The  Lebanese  were  thrust  into  a  middleman  role  –  

economically  and  culturally  –  between  the  white  colonial  elite  and  the  African  population.  They  

were  seen  as  a  different  race.  They  weren’t  considered  European,  and  were  excluded  from  the  

colonial  circles.  In  Nigeria,  they  weren’t  allowed  into  the  colonial  social  clubs  and  establishments,  

and  were  excluded  from  European  community.  In  this  community,  they  had  far  more  contact  and  

social  interaction  with  Africans.  In  fact,  an  African  social  club  was  established  in  which  Africans  and  

Lebanese  were  members  and  socialized  together  (Morrill  1962:  151).    

 

Both  African  and  Europeans  were  suspicious  and  resentful  of  their  dominance  in  the  market  

(Kaniki  1973:  104).  They  were  worried  that  the  Lebanese  would  move  into  a  higher  social  class  as  

well.  The  African  elite  wanted  to  make  sure  they  weren’t  pushed  further  down  in  the  colonial  

hierarchy,  and  the  Europeans  wanted  to  keep  a  firm  grip  on  their  authority.  However,  the  

Europeans  needed  the  Lebanese  trade  industry,  and  oscillated  between  condemning  and  protecting  

the  community.  After  Sierra  Leone’s  rice  riots,  the  British  allow  the  Lebanese  to  stay,  personally  

guaranteeing  their  safety  (Kaniki  1973:  111).  They  directly  and  indirectly  supported  the  Lebanese,  

providing  them  with  protection  measures,  residency  permits  and  importing  licenses.    

 

While  this  support  was  helpful  in  the  short-­‐term,  it  only  further  fuelled  African  suspicion  that  the  

colonial  powers  and  Lebanese  were  working  together  (Loughton  1974:  26).  But  the  Lebanese  were  

not  altogether  safe  from  European  disapproval  either.  From  the  1920s  through  the  1960s,  the  

colonial  authorities  put  out  a  series  of  statements  and  warnings  against  the  presence  of  ‘non-­‐

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Africans’  in  colonies  (Loughton  1974;  Kaniki  1973).  Although  the  colonial  period  had  inadvertently  

created  a  multicultural  society  in  many  places,  the  colonial  officials  sought  to  control  this  

(Akyeampong  2006:  312).  The  Lebanese  were  brought  in  the  colonial  powers  to  provide  a  

backbone  for  trade,  but  were  restricted  when  they  exceeded  expectations  and  began  to  show  signs  

of  power.      

 

The  French,  who  were  the  main  colonial  power  in  West  Africa  at  the  time,  were  worried  about  the  

rising  numbers  of  Arab  immigrants  (the  Lebanese  were  a  particular  threat).  They  started  anti-­‐

Lebanese  policies  and  campaigns,  including  segregation  from  Africans  to  discourage  use  of  Arabic,  

Islamism,  and  anticolonial  sentiment  (Leichtman  2010:  274).    During  the  colonial  period,  the  

French  businesses  in  West  Africa  launched  a  campaign  against  Lebanese  traders,  who  were  taking  

their  business.  These  anti-­‐Lebanese  campaigns  were  a  culmination  of  the  animosity  brewing  

against  the  Lebanese  from  the  colonial  officials  (Boumedouha  1990:  538).  

 

Even  after  independence,  the  new  African  leadership  continued  with  these  campaigns.  Between  

1962  and  1967,  a  series  of  restrictions  were  placed  on  the  Lebanese  community  throughout  West  

Africa,  including  hiring  quotas,  regulations  on  goods,  and  constraints  on  immigration.  This  was  

meant  to  direct  the  economic  prosperity  of  the  Lebanese  minority  to  the  emerging  African  middle  

class  (Loughton  1974,  27).    

 

However,  these  became  only  symbolic,  as  they  were  designed  to  encourage  the  Lebanese  to  use  

illegitimate  means  to  buy  their  right  to  stay.  Forced  to  pay  high  costs  or  bribes  from  to  everything  

from  visas  to  exports,  the  Lebanese  became  a  source  of  income  for  those  in  power  (Loughton  1974:  

27  –  28).    

 

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The  everyday  creation  of  identity  in  West  Africa  

Diasporic  groups  living  in  an  isolated  position  in  society  learn  how  to  negotiate  their  multiple  

identities.  For  the  Lebanese,  this  is  particularly  tricky.  They  value  their  African  identity  and  are  

constantly  being  impacted  and  shaped  by  their  life  in  Africa.  Yet,  the  ethnic  enclaves  in  which  they  

live  are  constantly  reproducing  their  Lebanese  culture  and  traditions  (Leichtman  2010).  Although  it  

is  difficult  to  classify  or  categorize  lived  realities,  we  will  look  at  three  specific  spheres  –  economic,  

political,  and  social  –  which  imprint  on  the  Lebanese  experience  in  West  Africa.  Their  participation  

in  the  economic,  political  and  social  domains  both  a  cause  and  effect  of  their  Lebanese  ethnicity  and  

their  West  African  history.    

 

Economic:  market  dominance  

 

When  on  the  streets  in  almost  any  West  African  city,  one  can  immediately  notice  the  dominance  of  

Lebanese  shop-­‐owners,  stores  and  trading  venues.  There  is  no  doubt  about  it,  business  is  important  

to  the  Lebanese  diaspora.  The  size  of  a  Lebanese  community  in  a  West  African  country  or  city  is  

directly  connected  to  the  “potential  inventory  turnover”  –  the  demand  for  goods  and  services  –  not  

the  size  of  the  population  (Khoury  1965:  388).  They  fill  gaps  in  retail  and  are  vital  to  the  import  and  

export  business  throughout  West  Africa.    

 

From  early  on,  the  Lebanese  had  more  contact  with  their  African  clients  than  other  African  and  

European  traders  and  tailored  their  business  to  the  client  and  the  environment.  Because  of  their  

hands-­‐on  business  practices,  they  were  able  to  expand  rapidly.  Today,  Lebanese  own  a  majority  of  

businesses  in  their  respective  countries.  Retail  and  wholesale  stores  are  the  backbone  of  the  

Lebanese  economic  venture,  however,  they  also  own  many  of  the  hotels  and  entertainment  

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complexes  (Winder  1962:  308).  They  also  moved  into  real  estate,  transport,  construction,  and  

travel  and  tourism  (Bierwirth  1998:  92).  

 

Their  business  practices  are  largely  criticized.  One  of  the  major  concerns  is  that  they  employ  their  

own  family  and  other  Lebanese  workers,  instead  of  hiring  Africans.  If  they  do  employ  Africans,  they  

are  seen  to  do  so  at  low  wages  (Winder  1962:  314).  The  Lebanese  were  able  to  succeed  because  

they  also  had  lower  personal  consumption  patterns  than  the  Europeans  in  the  early  years  (Winder  

1962:  309).  The  Lebanese  family  business  model  kept  down  costs  and  enabled  passing  down  on  

skills  from  generation  to  generation.    

 

They  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  hesitancy  of  the  Europeans  to  lend  money  to  the  Africans.  

They  Lebanese  were  seen  as  trustworthy,  largely  based  on  the  familial  connections  and  sense  social  

pressure  to  pay  back  debts  (Winder  1962:  310).  They  were  able  to  secure  more  loans  and  capital  

than  their  African  competitors,  and  were  able  to  spread  out  to  many  economic  sectors,  controlling  

diverse  businesses  and  markets.  

 

The  car  trade  in  Benin  –  which  is  largely  dominated  by  the  Lebanese  –  is  a  perfect  example  of  the  

mixed  and  complicated  nature  of  economics  in  West  Africa.  Lebanese  traders  were  able  to  thrive  

thanks  to  their  immersive  economic  practices  and  a  mix  of  kinship-­‐based  economic  backing,  

significant  interaction  with  their  African  clients,  and  luck  in  a  fluctuating  market  (Beuving  2006).  

 

The  Lebanese  started  expanding  into  other  sectors  as  well.  Freetown’s  first  public  transportation  

system  was  founded  by  a  Lebanese  businessman  around  1925.  The  Lebanese  also  controlled  the  car  

import  business,  and  by  the  1960s,  the  Lebanese  controlled  the  produce  trade  in  Sierra  Leone  as  

well  (Loughton  1974:  24).  The  Lebanese  also  have  a  strong  hand  in  the  real  estate  market  in  many  

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countries.  Even  in  smaller  villages,  most  of  the  residential  and  business  buildings  are  owned  by  the  

Lebanese  (Winder  1962:  312).  They  are  also  seen  to  be  involved  in  other  businesses  and  illegal  

ventures,  such  as  diamond  dealing  in  Sierra  Leone  and  the  international  drug  trade  in  Gambia  and  

Guinea  (Economist  2011;  Leichtman  2010;  Harmon  2013).    

 

Lebanese  businessmen  in  Liberia  say  that  the  factor  most  crucial  to  their  success  has  been  their  

networks  with  other  Lebanese  diaspora  (Economist  2013).  The  Lebanese  financial  pattern  involves  

ownership  or  participation  in  many  businesses,  which  are  maintained  through  social  channels  

(Beuving  2006:  326).    In  every  stage  of  professional  life,  a  reliance  on  an  extended  network  of  

family  and  social  contacts  is  vital  to  Lebanese  businessmen  (Beuving  2006:  343).  However,  the  

Lebanese  success  in  marketing  is  still  heavily  reliant  on  good  relations  with  their  clients  and  the  

West  Africans  they  cater  to  (Beuving  2006:  346).    

 

Estimates  of  Cote  d'Ivoire’s  Lebanese  population  vary  from  25,000  to  300,000  (Bierwirth  1998:  80).  

Because  they  largely  don’t  hold  passports,  yet  have  entire  families  living  in  the  country,  their  

growth  is  hard  to  measure.  Like  in  almost  every  West  African  country,  there  is  likely  to  be  a  

Lebanese  shopkeeper  in  every  city,  town,  and  village  in  Cote  d'Ivoire.  They  operate  a  range  of  

businesses,  selling  auto  parts,  books,  housewares,  textiles,  and  a  range  of  other  consumables.  Their  

retail  and  wholesale  businesses  led  them  into  the  import-­‐export  trade,  which  Lebanese  companies  

now  dominate  (Bierwirth  1998:  90).  Families  used  the  community  resources  and  capital  accessed  

through  Lebanese  networks  to  open  and  manage  businesses  (Bierwirth  1998).    

 

There  are  accusations  that  the  Lebanese  send  the  money  they  earn  ‘home’  to  Lebanon.  However,  

there  is  much  evidence  to  the  contrary  which  shows  significant  investment  in  West  Africa.  

Remittances  are  surely  sent  home,  to  support  families  and  to  invest  in  property  and  communities,  

  17  

but  much  of  the  money  stays  in  West  Africa  (Winder  1962:  314;  Leichtman  2010).  Although  they  

enjoy  a  prosperous  economic  position,  they  remain  vulnerable  politically  and  socially  and  are  

largely  left  out  of  Ivorian  society.  Around  ten  percent  of  the  Lebanese  population  has  secured  

Ivorian  citizenship,  but  this  doesn’t  change  their  position  socially  (Bierwirth  1998:  92).    

 

Political:  home  and  away  

 

In  many  countries  across  West  Africa,  Lebanese  communities  face  daunting  racial  barriers.  Politics  

in  particular  is  an  “African  institution”,  and  this  leaves  Lebanese  marginalized,  and  in  many  ways  

powerless  (Bierwirth  1998:  93).  The  Lebanese  recognize  the  importance  of  their  political  silence  

and  have  been  economically  prosperous  by  remaining  invisible  in  the  political  and  social  arenas  

(Leichtman  2010:  275).  Although  they  remain  informed  and  invested  in  politics,  there  are  only  a  

handful  of  cases  of  Lebanese  becoming  publicly  involved  with  politics.  Especially  during  the  periods  

just  before  independence,  African  nationalism  produced  a  new  or  awakened  consciousness  about  

being  African,  and  made  the  Lebanese  acutely  aware  of  their  own  cultural  backgrounds.  This  made  

the  Lebanese  also  more  aware  of  their  own  position  in  this  society,  in  which  there  was  becoming  a  

smaller  space  for  them  (Morrill  1962).  

 

Resistance  to  let  the  Lebanese  participate  in  politics  is  a  backlash  from  the  African  press  and  

officials  based  on  the  Lebanese  dominance  of  the  market.  Many  fear  the  Lebanese  would  take  over  

the  political  world,  like  they  are  seen  to  have  done  with  the  economy  (Sierra  Leone  Express  2012).  

Although  there  is  some  Lebanese  support  for  political  parties,  there  is  an  understanding  to  stay  out  

–  or  stay  invisible  –  in  the  political  world,  for  the  good  of  the  Lebanese  community  (Leichtman  

2005;  Leichtman  2010;  Winder  1962;  Akyeampong  2006).      

 

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Not  only  kept  from  political  participation,  the  Lebanese  have  been  targeted  by  the  political  elite  and  

law  forces.  In  a  wave  of  prosecutions  for  tax  evaders,  Lebanese  businessmen  were  targeted,  and  

their  names  published  in  the  media  to  help  bolster  the  image  of  the  money-­‐hungry  Lebanese  

(Bierwirth  1998:  93).  Ivorian  government  officials  and  politicians  can  often  turn  to  blaming  the  

Lebanese,  as  they  are  such  a  convenient  and  popular  scapegoat.  Because  of  their  unstable  position,  

many  Lebanese  fear  being  expelled,  and  live  in  a  constant  state  of  uncertainty  (Bierwirth  1998:  94).    

 

Although  the  Lebanese  diaspora  in  Senegal  have  been  there  for  generations,  after  independence  

they  were  never  able  to  secure  Senegalese  citizenship  for  the  entire  community.  Before  

independence,  Lebanese  supported  all  the  nationalist  parties,  to  be  seen  to  be  independent.  Some  

Lebanese  were  rewarded  with  citizenship,  providing  a  feeling  of  security  for  the  community,  but  

there  was  never  a  universal  acceptance  of  the  community’s  right  to  be  there  (Leichtman  2010:  275).      

 

During  Senegal’s  independence  period,  many  Lebanese  had  both  Lebanese  and  French  citizenship,  

so  they  weren’t  urgently  in  need  of  citizenship.  However,  they  wanted  Senegalese  citizenship  to  

show  solidarity  and  as  a  testament  to  their  own  roots.  The  Senegalese  remained  suspicious  of  them  

because  they  sent  earnings  to  Lebanon,  and  were  seen  to  prefer  being  ‘Lebanese’.  To  counteract  this  

opinion,  those  Lebanese  who  can  prefer  to  only  carry  a  Senegalese  passport,  in  order  to  show  their  

pride  and  loyalty  (Leichtman  2010:  275).    

 

The  Lebanese  involvement  in  politics  in  Lebanon  is  also  double-­‐sided.  While  they  stay  extremely  

informed  on  current  affairs  in  the  Middle  East,  many  have  never  been  to  the  region  or  to  Lebanon  

(Leichtman  2005:  671;  Boumedouha  1990).  During  times  of  crisis,  such  as  the  2006  Israel-­‐Lebanon  

war,  the  community  will  come  out  with  displays  of  solidarity.  However,  they  are  always  sure  to  note  

their  loyalty  to  Senegal  as  well.  In  2006,  when  the  Lebanese  took  to  the  streets  of  Dakar  in  support  

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of  ending  the  Israeli  invasion,  they  also  carried  banners  showing  their  love  and  gratitude  for  

Senegal  (Leichtman  2010:  270).    

 

The  Lebanese  diaspora  in  Senegal  are  more  unified  than  in  Lebanon,  as  they  are  only  involved  with  

Lebanon  only  from  a  distance,  and  from  a  distinctly  Lebanese-­‐Senegalese  perspective  (Leichtman  

2010:  272).  In  fact,  during  the  2006  war,  Lebanese  officials  in  Senegal  said  that  many  Lebanese  

sought  to  distance  themselves  from  those  in  Lebanon  by  discouraging  emigration  from  their  

contacts  in  Lebanon  and  pushing  for  stricter  visa  restrictions  (Leichtman  2005:  670).  They  wanted  

to  distance  themselves  from  being  seen  as  part  of  Lebanon  and  not  the  Lebanese-­‐Senegalese  

community.    

 

In  other  countries,  the  Lebanese  are  recognized  for  some  of  the  work  they  have  done  to  improve  

West  Africa’s  economy,  but  they  are  still  kept  out  of  the  political  circle.  In  Liberia,  President  Ellen  

Sirleaf  Johnson  acknowledges  that  the  community  has  been  key  in  helping  to  accelerate  economic  

development  in  the  country.  Yet,  although  she  is  willing  to  recognize  the  important  role  of  the  

community,  she  is  hesitant  about  the  citizenship  debate  and  has  done  little  to  support  the  issue  

(New  Democrat  2010;  Economist  2013).  

 

Nasser  Ayoub,  a  third  generation  Lebanese  born  in  Sierra  Leone,  threatened  to  go  on  hunger  strike  

if  he  isn’t  granted  full  citizenship.  He  is  leading  a  campaign  for  the  right  for  Lebanese  to  obtain  

Sierra  Leonean  passports.  As  a  member  of  the  cultural  and  economic  life  in  Sierra  Leone  –  he  owns  

a  small  hotel  chain  and  is  a  small-­‐scale  music  and  film  star  –  Ayoub  sees  his  exclusion  as  racial  

discrimination.  He  claims  that  despite  their  connection  to  the  land  and  dedication  to  the  country,  

they  are  excluded  on  account  of  the  colour  of  their  skin  (Sierra  Leone  Express  2012).  

 

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The  Lebanese  diaspora  civil  society  sees  investment  in  their  ‘host  country’  as  a  public  duty,  and  

critical  to  their  integration.  The  World  Lebanese  Cultural  Union  (WLCU)  sees  their  role  as  

important  in  helping  Liberian  businesses  set  up  and  prosper.  They  are  looking  to  expand  

businesses  needed  in  the  country,  with  joint  ventures  with  Liberian  companies.  Opening  remarks  at  

the  opening  of  the  Joint  Committee  of  Lebanese  and  Liberian  Businesses  in  2010  came  from  the  

President  of  the  World  Lebanese  Cultural  Union.  He  placed  a  great  emphasis  on  contributing  to  the  

economy  and  employment  of  young  Liberians  (WLCU  website).    

 

The  head  of  the  WLCU  recently  called  on  Lebanese  schools  in  Monrovia  to  host  more  Liberian  and  

Lebanese  children  in  the  same  classroom,  in  hope  to  expand  the  educational  opportunities  for  

Liberians  and  to  show  a  more  integrated  face  However,  he  also  advocates  on  the  Liberian  

government  to  give  the  Lebanese  communities  permanent  residency.  He  sees  restrictions  on  laws  

are  discriminatory  against  the  community,  who  see  Liberia  as  their  home  (New  Democrat  2010).    

 

Social:  participation  and  isolation  

 

The  Lebanese  communities  take  part  in  many  parts  of  West  African  life.  They  maintain  close  ties  

with  their  African  neighbours,  both  in  business  and  social  obligations  (Loughton  1974;  Leichtman  

2005;  Leichtman  2010;  Winder  1962).  However,  they  are  still  seen  to  be  isolated.  The  Africans  

didn’t  know  what  to  make  of  the  Lebanese,  or  how  they  fit  in  to  the  white-­‐black  hierarchy  that  

existed  in  colonial  Africa  (Winder  1962:  317;  Akyeampong  2006).  The  Lebanese  themselves  arrived  

with  their  own  misconceptions  and  prejudices.  They  considered  themselves  at  a  superior  place  to  

the  Africans,  mistake  they  were  slow  to  correct  (Winder  1962:  318).  However,  with  close  daily  

contact  with  Africans,  they’ve  become  more  and  more  invested  and  involved  in  society,  seeing  their  

own  role  as  a  cultural  middleman.  

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Especially  among  the  Lebanese  families  who  settled  in  remote  areas,  many  of  their  connections  

with  Lebanon  eroded  after  their  settlement  in  West  Africa.  Because  of  the  nature  of  travel  and  

commodities  in  the  early  years,  the  Lebanese  had  to  substitute  African  food,  education,  and  

commodities  for  those  they  could  not  readily  get  from  Lebanon.  This  produced  a  generation  of  

Lebanese  who  preferred  African  food  over  Lebanese  cuisine  and  children  who  don’t  speak  Arabic  as  

a  first  language  (Morrill  1962:  154).    

 

Many  Lebanese  children  grow  up  learning  the  local  African  language  of  their  area  –  largely  due  to  

their  rearing  at  the  hands  of  an  African  nurse  –  and  English  or  French.  Without  Arabic  in  schools  

(only  be  found  in  religious  schools),  Lebanese  children  aren’t  exposed  to  the  language,  especially  in  

written  form  (Winder  1962:  319  –  320).  Further  education  usually  takes  place  in  Lebanon  or  

Europe,  but  with  the  expectation  that  the  children  will  settle  back  in  West  Africa  (Winder  1962).  

Lebanese  children  are  commonly  raised  by  a  cadre  of  African  nurses,  cooks,  and  playmates  –  

surroundings  which  impact  the  way  that  they  see  their  own  interaction  with  Africa  and  Africans.  

Although  these  relationships  are  founded  on  a  power  imbalance  of  sorts,  they  are  also  pivotal  in  

making  Lebanese  children  and  families  feel  as  though  they  are  integrally  woven  into  the  fabric  of  

African  society  (Winder  1962;  Akyeampong  2006;  Khoury  1965).      

 

In  stark  difference  to  the  social  patterns  of  the  colonial  authorities,  the  Lebanese  and  West  African  

communities  often  have  friendlier  and  more  personal  relations.  They  attend  each  other’s  social  

events  and  functions.  The  closer  relationships  with  their  African  clients  and  partners  have  helped  

foster  a  comradery  of  sorts  between  the  two.  However,  feelings  of  resistance  and  suspicion  on  both  

sides  still  exist  (Winder  1962:  323).  

 

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Lebanese  take  pride  in  their  contributions  to  West  Africa,  both  economically  and  socially.  In  

Senegal,  they  are  fluent  in  the  local  language  (Wolof),  eat  Senegalese  food,  and  live  Senegalese  lives.  

They  run  a  variety  of  businesses,  and  those  with  the  means  send  their  children  for  education  

overseas,  however,  they  almost  always  return  to  participate  in  the  family  trade.  This  means  an  

entire  network  exists  for  the  Lebanese,  and  they  work  as  everything  from  shop  owners  and  

wholesalers  to  doctors,  lawyers,  and  tailors.  (Leichtman  2010:  276).    

 

However,  many  Lebanese  social  contacts  in  West  Africa  remain  insular.  Patterns  of  social,  political,  

economic  and  personal  relationships  are  within  family  and  friends.  One  key  indicator  of  any  distinct  

social  group  is  their  residential  settling  patterns.  The  retail  business  setup  that  many  Lebanese  

lived  in  required  them  to  live  above  or  behind  their  shops,  thus  concentrating  them  in  certain  

quarters  or  streets  (Winder  1962:  318).  Out  of  these  residential  structures,  similar  social  circles  

and  patterns  arose.  They  established  Lebanese  beaches,  restaurants,  and  social  clubs.  As  more  and  

more  Lebanese  arrived  and  established  themselves  in  families  and  communities,  Lebanese  schools  

were  built  (Winder  1962;  Leichtman  2010).    

 

Their  networks  make  resource  mobilization,  diversification  of  business,  and  social  support  easily  

attainable  and  less  risky  (Beuving  2006:  326).  Across  West  Africa,  Lebanese  communities  were  

unwilling  to  assimilate  in  African  society,  and  they  were  excluded  from  European  colonial  circles.  

Even  with  their  economic  status  in  places  like  Cote  d'Ivoire,  they  were  in  a  vulnerable  position  

(Bierwirth  1999:  79).  The  family  links  that  have  helped  them  extend  their  financial  success  and  

economic  achievements  have  also  provided  the  perpetuation  of  culture.  Although  many  in  the  

Lebanese  community  speak  limited  Arabic  and  don’t  regularly  travel  to  Lebanon,  they  are  still  able  

to  live  as  a  ‘Lebanese’.    

 

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Transnationalism,  ‘culture’  and  the  Lebanese    

Transnationalism  and  identity  

 

The  Lebanese  diaspora  in  West  African  live  a  transnational  experience.  They  maintain  ties  with  

their  homeland,  although  sometimes  this  can  be  as  tenuous  a  having  an  ethnic  background  from  

Lebanon.  They  exist  not  as  a  particularly  Lebanese  community,  but  as  Lebanese-­‐Senegalese,  or  

Lebanese-­‐Sierra  Leonean,  or  Lebanese-­‐Ivorian  communities.  They  have  carved  out  a  new  identity  

for  themselves.  However,  the  blurred  lines  of  that  identity  are  suspicious  to  many.    

 

Much  research  into  transnationalism  puts  an  emphasis  on  production  of  culture  (Levitt  and  Glick  

Schiller  2004:  1016).  When  we  look  at  reproduction,  we  can  explore  the  ways  that  the  diaspora  

stays  the  same,  and  how  it  changes,  and  molds  to  fit.  Transnational  experiences  don’t  exist  in  

isolation  from  each  other  or  the  societies  in  which  they  take  shape.  The  transnational  community  

can  feel  and  absorb  many  political  and  social  experiences  at  the  same  time  (Levitt  and  Glick  Schiller  

2004:  1025).    

 

The  Lebanese  have  been  in  West  Africa  for  more  than  100  years.  With  this  entrenched  

transnationalism,  the  community  has  learned  different  coping  mechanisms.  From  the  early  years  in  

West  Africa,  these  migrants  were  there  to  stay.  Their  settlement  patterns  indicated  that  they  saw  

their  future  in  West  Africa.  After  sending  for  wives  and  children,  they  began  settling  up  permanent  

structures,  including  social  and  cultural  establishments,  in  their  new  home  in  West  Africa  (Winder  

1962;  Akyeampong  2006).  They  have  learned  survival  tactics  and  pass  on  expectations  to  the  next  

generation.  Although  they  experience  their  world  from  the  outside,  they  are  able  to  rely  on  their  

resiliency  and  skills  to  thrive  in  spite  of  the  challenges.  

 

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Faist  (2000)  says  that  transnationalism  provides  migrants  with  three  types  of  resources  –  

reciprocity,  exchange,  and  solidarity,  and  that  these  correspond  to  three  types  of  transnational  

social  space  (Faist  2000:  193).  The  Lebanese  diaspora  across  West  Africa,  and  across  the  globe,  

utilizes  these  categories  to  support  and  strengthen  their  networks  and  its  members.  They  share  

resources,  access  to  capital,  and  support  each  other  in  times  of  need,  such  as  expulsion,  economic  

slumps,  or  political  instability.  In  such  transnational  networks,  there  is  more  of  an  implication  for  

celebrating  shared  common  history  (Adamson  2012:  35).  In  the  Lebanese  West  African  networks,  

this  means  embracing  the  nature  of  their  common  history  in  West  Africa.  Therefore  the  very  

concept  of  being  ‘Lebanese’  is  shifting  and  fluid.  

 

Many  researchers  have  placed  much  emphasis  on  the  rootedness  or  boundaries  of  identity.  

However,  nation-­‐sates  have  very  little  to  do  with  our  concepts  of  identity  (Levitt  and  Glick  Schiller  

2004,  1007).  In  the  case  of  the  Lebanese  diaspora,  they  have  not  been  directly  attached  to  any  

nation-­‐state.  They  pull  meaning  and  importance  –  cultural,  ethnic,  historical  –  from  each  place  they  

are  connected  to.    

 

Glick-­‐Schiller  and  Levitt  describe  social  fields  as  “a  set  of  multiple  interlocking  networks  of  social  

relationships  through  which  ideas,  practices,  and  resources  are  unequally  exchanged,  organized  

and  transformed”  (Levitt  and  Glick  Schiller  2004:  1009).  Glick  and  Levitt  (2004)  propose  that  these  

social  fields  are  based  on  “ways  of  being  and  ways  of  belonging”  (Levitt  and  Glick  Schiller  2004:  

1008).  Ways  of  being  –  the  social  relations  and  practices  of  cultural  reproduction  that  influence  the  

formation  of  identity  or  the  passing  on  of  culture  –  do  not  require  one  to  consciously  take  part  in  

(Levitt  and  Glick  Schiller  2004:  1010).    

 

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Ways  of  belonging  can  come  in  both  action  and  awareness,  and  partaking  in  activities  of  traditional  

or  cultural  relevance  may  not,  in  fact,  link  to  the  place  of  origin.  The  ways  in  which  these  layers  

interact  together  culminates  in  negating  to  require  full  assimilation  for  any  to  take  place  (Levitt  and  

Glick  Schiller  2004:  1011).  The  Lebanese  identity  was  built  both  around  their  own  internal  factors  

as  well  as  their  reception  from  their  host  country  and  the  colonial  powers  at  the  time.  Their  

everyday  reproduction  of  their  culture  and  reformation  of  identity  is  based  on  the  conscious  and  

inadvertent  participation  in  social  fields  with  their  own  community  as  well  as  with  West  African  

society.  

 

A  public  misconception  is  that  levels  of  transnationalism  within  diasporas  imply  a  lack  of  

integration,  which  then  would  discourage  integration  from  the  wider  society  (Adamson  2012:  31).  

However,  we  know  this  isn’t  accurate.  A  community’s  refusal  to  give  up  their  own  culture  is  not  an  

indicator  of  their  potential  for  integration.  Further,  it  cannot  be  an  indicator  in  their  connection  to  

or  feeling  of  belonging  in  a  society.  Traditions,  old  and  new,  can  exist  simultaneously,  adding  depth  

to  the  human  experience.    

 

Faist  (2000)  tells  us  that  migration  scholarship  has  perhaps  been  too  quick  to  assume  that  

immigrants  lose  their  “cultural  baggage”.  People  don’t  just  lose  their  cultural  identity  and  markers  

in  order  to  fit  into  another  society.  In  the  case  of  the  Lebanese,  they  have  been  called  out  for  

refusing  to  give  up  their  cultural  practices  and  displays  of  Lebanese-­‐ness.  But  why  should  they  be  

forced  to?  They  should  have  the  right  to  remain  a  distinct  ethnic  group  within  the  majority  society  

(Faist  2000:  30).    

 

Binaisa  (2011)  discusses  the  importance  that  immigration  status  has  on  Ugandan  immigrants  in  

Britain.  Being  granted  asylum,  indefinite  leave  to  stay,  or  neither  places  them  in  a  category  that  

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becomes  part  of  their  conception  of  self.  It  has  a  clear  impact  on  their  opportunities,  but  also  on  

what  they  perceive  they  will  be  able  to  do.  We  can  compare  this  to  the  conception  of  self  in  

countries  where  immigrants  are  either  not  granted  citizenship  or  are  limited  in  what  they  feel  they  

will  be  possible  of  doing  (Binaisa  2011).    

 

We  discuss  the  importance  of  ‘citizenship’  here,  but  we  aren’t  talking  only  about  the  right  to  a  

passport  or  even  political  participation.  This  is  about  the  importance  of  acceptance  and  equality  in  

the  making  of  ‘home’.  In  some  cases,  the  meaning  of  the  passport  is  not  just  a  legal  document  –  it  is  

a  symbol.  It  isn’t  necessarily  about  just  the  legal  right  to  residency,  its  about  acceptance  and  

legitimacy  for  the  community.  This  sense  of  ‘belonging’  is  critical  to  the  degree  to  which  one  can  

integrate,  or  feels  able  to  engage  with  the  community  in  which  they  live.  

 

Cultural  identity  

 

Cultural  identity  is  in  the  process  of  becoming,  not  just  of  being.  The  Lebanese  diaspora  in  West  

Africa  live  between  two  worlds,  never  fully  in  either.  Thier  identities  are  connected  to  a  history,  but  

they  are  in  a  constant  “play  of  history,  culture  and  power”  (Hall  1993:  225).  Although  Lebanese  

retain  many  cultural  ties  to  their  place  of  origin,  their  lived  realities  are  in  West  Africa.  The  birth  of  

their  children  happened  here.  Family  holidays,  religious  ceremonies  –  the  story  of  their  lives  take  

place  in  West  Africa.  The  setting  becomes  an  essential  background  to  their  conceptualization  of  

their  identities,  memories,  and  how  they  see  their  futures.    

 

Hall  (1993)  tells  us  that  the  very  notion  of  identity  is  problematic.  Identity  is  not  about  a  fixed  place  

and  a  fixed  thing.  It  is  a  constantly  evolving  and  shifting  phenomenon.  How  do  we  decide  who  we  

are?  How  can  we  even  quantify  it?  For  many  people,  the  construction  identity  is  a  fluid  and  

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transient  process.  Hall  (1993)  describes  cultural  identities  are  the  unstable  points  at  which  

discourse  of  history  and  culture  come  together,  compete  with  each  other,  and  settle  into  our  

consciousness  and  sub-­‐consciousness.  Identity  –  and  culture  –  develops  from  everyday  production  

of  memory  built  on  routine  practices,  environment,  lived  realities.    

 

The  subtle,  complicated  histories  that  make  up  the  very  essence  of  who  we  think  we  are  can  be  

complicated  and  even  contradictory  (Hall  1993).  History  and  experience  have  their  own  real  and  

symbolic  effects  on  us  (Hall  1993:  226).  Many  descriptions  of  transnationalism  speak  of  a  

connection  to  the  everyday  affairs  of  the  homeland  (Faist  2000),  but  this  doesn’t  apply  to  the  

Lebanese  of  West  Africa,  who  have  cursory  ties  to  their  homeland,  although  strong  ties  to  their  

ethnic  community.    

 

For  example,  there  are  about  30,000  Lebanese  in  Senegal,  most  work  in  commerce  and  unlike  much  

of  the  rest  of  West  Africa,  a  few  even  hold  Senegalese  citizenship.  Most  were  born  to  parents  whose  

own  parents  were  born  in  West  Africa.  They  have  integrated  in  many  ways.  They  speak  the  

language,  they  are  active  in  many  Senegalese  social  circles.  The  Lebanese  institutions,  cultural  and  

business  associations  include  Senegalese  membership  and  input.  Teachers  at  the  Lebanese  schools  

and  religious  groups  include  Senegalese  in  their  ranks  (Leichtman  2005).  However,  they  still  stand  

apart.  

 

The  Lebanese  of  Senegal  highly  regard  their  Senegalese  values  and  connection  in  their  identities.  As  

such,  the  Lebanese  see  a  future  in  which  they  are  integrated  into  society  –  citizens  with  full  rights  

and  respect  –  but  that  they  are  able  to  keep  their  ethnic  group  and  traditions  intact.  They  keep  

culture  alive  through  affect  immersion  –  listening  to  Arabic  songs,  reading  books  about  Lebanon  or  

in  Arabic,  and  watching  Arabic  news  channels  (Leichtman  2005:  676).  However,  the  Lebanese  are  

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also  directly  involved  in  cultural  appreciation  in  Senegal.  They  work  in  the  Senegalese  fashion  

industry,  and  they  send  artists,  dance  troupes,  and  clothing  to  Lebanon  to  promote  cross-­‐cultural  

dialogue  (Leichtman  2005:  677).  

 

When  visiting  the  World  Lebanese  cultural  union  website,  one  notices  their  many  links  to  “tourism”  

and  “culture  blogs”  about  Lebanon.  They  are  marketing  Lebanon  to  people  of  Lebanese  descent,  but  

they  recognize  that  this  is  tourism  for  them,  and  not  a  trip  ‘home’  (World  Lebanese  Cultural  Union  

2013).  The  Lebanese  communities  in  West  Africa  have  created  their  own  identities,  which  is  a  

continuation  of  their  culture  from  Lebanon,  but  it  has  grown  and  shifted  to  create  a  new  identify  

that  incorporates  their  West  African  life.    

 

The  lens  of  migration  and  transnational  theory  understands  that  assimilation  and  enduring  

transnational  ties  are  not  mutually  exclusive  ideas  (Levitt  and  Glick  Schiller  2004:  1003).  The  

Lebanese  have  not  assimilated  as  such  in  Senegal,  but  instead  have  become  an  ethnic  group  

(Leichtman  2005:  663).    Their  duality  comes  to  the  forefront  when  they  return  to  Lebanon.  They  

are  Lebanese  in  Senegal,  but  realize  quickly  that  they  are  not  Lebanese  when  they  visit  Lebanon  

(Leichtman  2005:  664).  However,  in  many  places,  they  are  constantly  reminded  that  they  are  not  

afforded  the  same  acceptance  and  equality  as  Africans,  because  of  the  colour  of  their  skin  

(Akyeampong  2006).    

 

 

   

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 ‘Lebanese-­‐ness’  and  the  reproduction  of  culture    

Reproduction  of  Lebanon  through  social  fields  and  family  units  

 

Although  many  feel  very  connected  to  their  host  countries,  the  Lebanese  maintain  ties  with  other  

Lebanese  communities  across  the  globe.  As  I  argue  in  this  paper,  those  networks  and  insular  

structures  that  the  Lebanese  employ  are  the  lifeline  of  the  community.  By  providing  resources,  

access  to  information,  business  opportunities,  these  kinship  networks  have  been  vital  for  the  

Lebanese  communities  to  succeed  and  survive.  In  turn,  they  have  also  provided  the  space  for  

culture  to  be  reproduced,  shared,  and  strengthened.      

 

Although  they  keep  their  connections  alive  through  tradition,  language,  and  food,  they  are  

connected  to  being  Lebanese,  not  particularly  to  their  ‘homeland’  of  Lebanon.  Ewing’s  (1998)  

concept  of  negotiated  identities  helps  us  examine  how  different  members  of  society  see  themselves  

and  the  others  around  them.  Social  borders  can  prove  to  be  vital  to  the  formation  of  identity,  

especially  among  minority  groups.  As  Ewing  tells,  culture  can  be  replicated  in  a  number  of  everyday  

practices  and  routines.  This  can  mean  material  goods,  social  patterns,  any  number  of  the  mundane  

activities  that  make  up  our  lives.  They  way  we  dress,  what  we  eat,  the  way  we  discuss  politics,  the  

songs  we  sing  to  our  children,  how  we  socialize  –  they  are  all  critical  in  helping  create  our  culture  

and  replicate  our  traditions  (Ewing  1998:  263).    

 

For  the  Lebanese,  the  constant  reproduction  of  Lebanese  society  is  going  on  all  around  them  all  the  

time.  By  continuing  to  eat  Middle  Eastern  food,  dressing  in  typical  attire,  and  maintaining  

traditional  family  business  structures,  they  are  strengthening  their  ties  with  Lebanese  culture.  

Although  many  of  the  early  settlers  never  returned  to  visit  Lebanon,  they  still  arranged  for  

marriages  with  Lebanese  community  or  directly  from  women  in  Lebanon  (Akyeampong  2006:  310).  

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Boumedouha  (1990)  questions  if  cultural  enclaves  in  places  like  New  York  or  London  can  serve  as  

connection  with  the  homeland.  In  diaspora  communities,  this  means  the  reproduction  of  culture  

being  done  through  immersion  in  ‘Lebanese-­‐ness’,  not  direct  contact  with  Lebanon.    

 

The  kinship  circles  and  patterns  are  constantly  being  reproduced  and  recreated  (Khoury  1965:  

386).  Social  contacts  are  often  cultivated  in  the  same  familiar  ways  –  in  social  clubs,  bars,  beach  

resorts,  restaurants,  and  in  the  marketplace.  These  same  approaches  are  how  business  is  discussed  

(Beuving  2006:  345).  

 

Business  and  pleasure  are  never  far  from  each  other,  and  the  line  between  the  professional  and  

social  is  often  blurred.  By  staying  in  such  close  contact  with  not  only  Lebanese  partners,  but  with  

Lebanese  surroundings  –  meeting  at  Lebanese  bars  or  restaurants,  immersed  in  Arabic  song,  

traditional  food  –  the  lived  realities  of  being  Lebanese  are  constantly  being  replicated  (Beuving  

2006;  Akyeampong  2006;  Bierwirth  1999).  

 

There  are  some  efforts  to  make  Lebanon  seem  appealing.  Lebanese  speak  of  the  bounties  that  

Lebanon  has,  such  as  the  beautiful  landscapes  and  its  bounty  of  fruits  and  vegetables  not  found  in  

West  Africa.  Lebanese  are  very  knowledgeable  in  Middle  East  politics,  and  watch  Lebanese  stations  

in  Senegal,  where  they  get  their  news  (Leichtman  2010:  281).  And  although  they  are  immersed  in  

African  society,  living  in  ethnic  enclaves  allows  the  Lebanese  to  constantly  reproduce  their  own  

social  fields.  They  don’t  need  to  be  connected  to  the  place  to  be  connected  to  their  past.  

 

However,  the  reproduction  of  culture  in  West  Africa  does  not  exactly  mirror  Lebanon.  Lebanese  in  

West  Africa  have  less  social  barriers,  and  operate  as  a  larger  more  unified  community.  There  aren’t  

the  same  cultural  and  religious  barriers  and  the  community  –  poor,  rich,  Muslim,  Christian,  young,  

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old  –  largely  functions  as  an  extended  family  (Khoury  1965).  They  have  recreated  a  dynamic  that  

didn’t  exist  in  before.  The  communities  don’t  replicate  those  found  in  Lebanon,  but  instead  

incorporate  aspects  that  are  appropriate  to  their  experience  in  West  Africa.    

 

Business,  family,  and  the  ‘kin’  connection  

 

Many  Lebanese  traders  throughout  Africa  keep  in  close  contact  with  each  other  and  with  other  

Lebanese  networks  (Beuving  2006:  325).    This  means  that  business,  family,  and  social  contacts  are  

shared  throughout  the  region.  And  although  they  maintain  ties  in  Lebanon  as  well  (often  finding  

wives  and  business  contacts  from  Lebanese  connections),  their  own  cultural  circles  are  those  that  

have  been  created  in  West  Africa.      

 

Business  arrangements  and  environments  are  ‘kinship  partnerships’,  which  are  vital  for  providing  a  

safety  net  and  capital  and  resources  (Khoury  1965:  389).  These  kinship  circles  also  open  doors  for  

Lebanese  to  fill  and  extend  the  networks  in  West  Africa  (Khoury  1965).  These  networks  are  critical  

for  the  success  and  survival  of  Lebanese  communities  in  West  Africa.  Because  of  their  exclusion  and  

resentment  towards  them,  Lebanese  are  often  kept  from  accessing  traditional  forms  of  social  and  

economic  safety  nets.  They  have  had  to  rely  more  and  more  heavily  on  the  regional  alliances  with  

other  Lebanese  diaspora  communities  for  resources  and  support,  which  only  strengthens  their  

assumed  isolation.    

 

Ong’s  (1999)  work  on  ‘utilitarian  familialism’  describes  the  way  in  which  the  tight  family  structure  

enables  generations  of  Chinese  trade  diasporas  in  Hong  Kong  to  achieve  economic  success.  Through  

the  everyday  practices  of  prioritizing  family  over  all  else,  they  are  able  to  adapt  to  circumstances  

and  improve  the  overall  livelihood  and  chances  for  the  family  as  a  unit  (Ong  1999).  Ong’s  theory  

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helps  us  to  unpack  some  of  the  connections  between  the  economic  and  social  spheres  of  Lebanese  

communities.    

Business  and  economic  success  is  a  trademark  of  the  Lebanese  diaspora  the  world  over,  and  their  

cumulative  success  has  been  attributed  to  the  strong  family  and  community  dynamics  that  keep  

their  business  conglomerate  running.    

 

The  Lebanese  diaspora  heavily  rely  on  family  and  kinship-­‐based  business  practices.  The  family  

network  is  important  not  only  for  economic  strengthening,  but  also  as  a  source  of  cheap  labour.  

Business  or  shop  owners  are  able  to  send  for  family  members  and  wives  to  come  from  Lebanon,  

where  they  are  put  in  storefronts  and  put  up  by  the  family  (Beuving  2006:  342).  Business  contacts,  

trade  knowledge,  capital,  and  resources  are  all  leveraged  to  ensure  the  family,  and  the  community,  

survives.    

 

The  Lebanese  business  world  is  reliant  on  the  utilization  of  family  and  kinship  ties,  both  for  cheap  

and  reliable  labour  as  well  as  for  access  to  vast  networks  of  other  diasporic  Lebanese.  These  

networks  help  the  Lebanese  access  resources,  but  also  act  as  a  sort  of  safety  net  and  knowledge  

sharing  portal  for  these  communities  across  the  world.  The  greater  success  of  the  Lebanese  

community  is  an  inherent  priority  in  the  family.  In  West  Africa  –  where  political  and  economic  

stability  is  often  in  flux  –  these  networks  are  especially  important  (Kaniki;  Liechtman  2010;  Winder  

1962;  Bierwirth  1999;  Kaniki  1973;  Khoury  1963).    

 

 

   

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Assimilation,  integration,  and  resistance  

Although  they  want  to  be  integrated  and  accepted  into  West  African  society,  the  Lebanese  do  not  

want  to  give  up  their  own  cultural  values  and  traditions.  This  makes  them  resistant  to  the  kind  of  

assimilation  important  to  Africans  –  particularly  intermarriage.  Although  many  have  spent  their  

lives  surrounded  by  Africans,  they  do  not  wish  to  become  African.  They  want  to  retain  their  

Lebanese  ethnic  background,  as  well  as  their  African  heritage.    

   

The  Lebanese  seek  to  retain  their  cultural  traditions,  but  some  see  this  as  an  obvious  assertion  that  

that  the  Lebanese  think  they  are  superior  to  Africans.  A  constant  criticism  is  the  lack  of  

intermarriage  with  Lebanese  and  Africans,  which  Africans  see  as  instrumental  in  assimilation.  The  

issue  of  intermarriage  can  be  examined  against  the  cultural  context.  Lebanese  culture  puts  a  great  

importance  to  marry  as  close  to  the  family  as  possible,  and  even  a  preference  among  some  to  marry  

first  cousins.  They  often  marry  at  least  within  close  community  circles,  which  restricts  many  from  

intermarrying  with  Africans  (Bierwirth  1998:  98).  

 

Because  the  Lebanese  largely  marry  within  their  own  communities,  this  is  a  huge  barrier  for  the  

Senegalese  to  their  assimilation  (Leichtman  2005:  669).  Early  in  the  Lebanese  influx,  when  

Lebanese  women  were  few,  there  were  more  marriages  between  Lebanese  men  and  African  

women.  However,  after  the  arrival  of  more  Lebanese  women  and  families,  these  marriages  

dwindled  (Winder  1962:  320).  For  the  Lebanese,  it  is  not  about  race,  it  is  about  culture,  and  they  

chose  to  marry  within  their  cultural  circles  (Leichtman  2006;  Khoury  1963;  Morrill  1962).    

 

Citizenship  for  Africans  had  become  so  steeped  in  “spatial,  racial  and  civic  bodies”  that  they  could  

not  separate  them,  especially  in  the  post-­‐independence  period.  And  they  didn’t  know  which  

category  the  Lebanese  fit  into  (Akyeampong  2006:  314).  Particularly  in  post-­‐independence  West  

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Africa,  where  nationalism  was  new,  but  even  until  today,  there  is  a  social  expectation  in  Africa  that  

values  race  above  identity.  The  Lebanese  are  long-­‐term  residents,  but  never  fully  recognized  

citizens  –  even  if  they  hold  passports  (Akyeampong  2006:  313).  Colonial  leaders  instilled  a  

racialised  system  of  hierarchy  and  belonging.  By  refusing  citizenship  to  the  Lebanese,  the  colonial  

authorities  passed  on  their  racial  legacies  to  the  generations  of  free  African  leaders  (Akyeampong  

2006).  

 

The  experiences  of  many  West  African  Lebanese  include  being  discriminated  against  on  the  basis  of  

colour,  and  having  race  used  as  a  reasonable  excuse  for  being  excluded  from  Ivorian  life  (Bierwirth  

1998;  Leichtman  2005;  Akyeampong  2006).  The  Lebanese  Ivoirians  have  spent  their  entire  lives  in  

West  Africa  –  most  have  never  even  visited  Lebanon  and  don’t  speak  much  Arabic.  However,  they  

are  also  socially  as  well  as  politically  discriminated  against  or  excluded,  giving  them  a  precarious  

position  and  identity.  Many  remark  feeling  “homeless”  or  living  like  an  “outcast”  (Bierwirth  1998:  

94).  Yet,  they  see  themselves  as  very  involved  with  Ivorian  society.  They  invest  not  only  in  business  

and  capital-­‐making  ventures,  but  they  invest  heavily  in  philanthropic  causes,  community  outreach,  

and  infrastructure  projects.    

 

Ghanaians  have  similar  criticisms,  that  the  Lebanese  are  “arrogant”  and  don’t  intermarry  

(Akyeampong  2006:  299).  The  Lebanese  complain  that  even  after  being  in  the  country  for  

generations,  they  are  still  treated  as  strangers,  and  not  allowed  into  the  fabric  of  society.  And  they  

refute  many  of  the  claims  that  they  don’t  in  fact  fit  in.  They  claim  to  be  uncomfortable  in  Lebanon,  

and  have  poor  Arabic  skills.  And  they  are  forced  out  of  the  political  sphere,  which  doesn’t  mean  they  

are  unaware  or  uninterested.  It  only  means  that  they  are  acutely  aware  of  their  own  precarious  

nature  in  the  country  (Akyeampong  2006:  299).    

 

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The  burden  of  being  a  blight  on  society  

 

 “The  Lebanese  of  Senegal  are  a  community  defined  as  much  by  others  as  by  themselves”  

(Leichtman  2005:  668).  They  are  insular  and  attached  to  their  community,  but  they  are  also  defined  

as  being  outsiders,  and  different.  Surrounded  by  a  constant  condemnation  of  their  activities  and  

lifestyle,  the  Lebanese  minority  in  West  Africa  have  only  furthered  the  feelings  of  isolation  from  

both  sides.  The  Lebanese  think  that  they  do  not  discriminate  against  the  Senegalese,  but  that,  in  

fact,  the  Senegalese  discriminate  towards  them.  However,  the  Senegalese  think  that  the  Lebanese  

are  racist  and  believe  they  are  superior  to  their  African  neighbors  (Leichtman  2005:  669).    

 

Politically,  culturally,  and  socially  the  Lebanese  have  been  excluded.  Largely  banned  from  getting  

passports  and  being  the  residual  scapegoat  for  economic  instability,  they  are  constantly  reminded  

of  their  position  in  society.  Hall  (1993)  analyses  the  formation  of  the  black  identity  in  the  Western  

World  (Hall  1993:  225  –  226).  We  can  use  his  theories  to  also  look  at  the  ‘Other-­‐ing’  of  the  Lebanese  

in  West  Africa.  African  media  and  the  public  sphere  consider  the  Lebanese  as  underhanded,  morally  

corrupt,  and  racist  (Loughton  1974;  Leichtman  2005;  Kaniki  1973).  The  Lebanese  are  forced  to  

experience  themselves  as  the  ‘Other’  –  and  a  devious  other  at  that.  

 

Africans  and  European  officials  also  assumed  that  the  financial  success  of  the  Lebanese  has  come  at  

the  cost  of  impoverishment  of  the  Africans  around  them.  Although  they  have  clearly  benefited  from  

the  market  in  many  West  African  countries,  much  of  their  personal  or  communal  economic  success  

has  had  enhanced  economic  development  in  the  region.  Many  Lebanese  consider  themselves  to  

have  provided  the  foundation  for  economic  growth  in  many  of  West  Africa  (Winder  1962).  The  

Lebanese  played  the  public  role  of  the  scapegoat,  while  simultaneously  were  able  to  leverage  their  

  36  

credit  and  economic  assets  to  carve  out  a  niche  between  expatriate  groups  and  Africans  of  varying  

social  and  economic  status  (Loughton  1974:  28).    

 

An  article  published  in  the  Liberian  New  Democrat  (New  Democrat  2013)  blames  the  Lebanese  for  

corruption  and  financial  domination.  The  article  warns  that  poverty  in  Liberia  will  continue  if  the  

Lebanese  are  allowed  to  continue  to  dominate  the  market.  They  are  blamed  for  poverty,  corruption  

in  government,  and  are  responsible  for  the  poor  state  of  education  and  healthcare  in  the  country.  In  

Sierra  Leone,  the  Lebanese  were  largely  seen  to  control  the  illegal  diamond  trade.  Their  role  as  a  

middleman  meant  that  the  Lebanese  were  able  to  not  only  control  credit,  but  to  control  prices  in  

the  market,  thus  further  pushing  their  African  counterparts  into  debt  (Loughton  1974:  26).    

 

In  Senegal,  the  Lebanese  were  left  out  of  the  Senegalese  business  and  trade  unions.  Export  and  

import  licenses  were  controlled  by  the  union,  and  the  Lebanese  felt  discriminated  against  

(Boumedouha  1990:  541).  Throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  anti-­‐Lebanese  rhetoric  increased.  

There  were  increasing  calls  for  the  Africanization  of  many  sectors.  The  Lebanese  were  accused  of  

amassing  wealth,  dominating  the  economic  sector  for  their  own  gain,  and  getting  rich  at  the  

expense  of  the  downfall  of  the  Senegalese  people  (Boumedouha  1990:  541).    

 

Senegalisation  increased  at  the  end  of  the  1970s.  Even  when  Lebanese  business  owners  hired  more  

African  staff,  the  government  restricted  this  hiring,  because  middle  and  senior  management  were  

leaving  low  paid  civil  service  and  professional  jobs  for  better  paid  jobs  working  for  Lebanese  

businesses  (Boumedouha  1990:  542).  To  gain  support,  the  Lebanese  started  a  massive  investment  

process  in  which  they  began  building  many  public  infrastructure  projects,  and  gave  to  charity.  

(Boumedouha  1990:  542).    

 

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The  Lebanese  are  often  accused  of  using  their  economic  influence  to  secure  monopolies  and  other  

privileges  at  the  expense  of  African  counterparts  and  businessmen,  and  of  repatriating  their  profits  

rather  than  reinvesting  them  in  the  country.  However,  when  we  look  at  the  numbers  of  monies  sent  

to  Lebanon  particularly  compared  to  the  numbers  reinvested  in  the  West  African  communities  

within  which  they  live,  the  numbers  are  miniscule  (Leichtman  2005).  

 

In  fact,  the  Lebanese  invest  far  more  of  their  funds  into  their  host  countries  in  West  Africa.  Charity  

and  community  involvement  is  considered  a  source  of  pride  and  obligatory  in  the  Lebanese  

community  (Leichtman  2005).  In  Senegal,  they’ve  built  mosques,  and  huge  educational  projects  for  

school  with  majority  Senegalese  students.  Lebanese  have  built  hospitals  and  health  clinics  in  poor  

areas,  and  invested  money  in  improving  health  services  and  research.  They  also  helped  in  the  

resettlement  of  Senegalese  expelled  from  other  countries  during  the  independence  period,  as  well  

as  paying  for  Senegalese  employees  to  on  hajj  (Boumedouha  1990:  543).    

 

In  Sierra  Leone,  the  Lebanese  were  influential  in  the  creation  of  new  social  class  systems.  Because  

they  were  able  to  bring  more  crops  to  market,  wealth  was  decentralized  from  the  colonial  

hierarchy.  They  helped  the  new  middle  class  to  exist  on  more  than  substance  farming.  They  also  

helped  to  solidify  the  agricultural  systems  and  bring  in  more  farmers.  Also,  buy  opening  up  more  

economic  opportunities,  such  as  import  and  export  business,  they  were  able  to  help  the  Sierra  

Leonean  economy  diversify  (Loughton  1974:  28).    

 

In  Nigeria,  the  Lebanese  are  heavily  involved  in  philanthropic  works.  There  is  a  Lebanese  Ladies  

Society  of  Nigeria,  which  gives  scholarships  to  needy  students,  provides  for  orphans.  Members  of  

the  community  donated  old  buildings  to  be  converted  into  hospitals,  renovated  secondary  schools,  

university  buildings,  and  built  churches  all  across  Nigeria  (Abedoya  2010:  73).  Giving  to  charities  or  

  38  

philanthropically  is  a  point  of  pride  in  the  Lebanese  community  and  an  expected  participatory  

aspect  of  being  part  of  society.  

  39  

Conclusion  

The  transnational  nature  of  the  Lebanese  diaspora  in  West  Africa  is  caused  by  –  and  creates  –  both  

external  and  internal  factors.  The  Lebanese  are  largely  criticized  for  their  lack  of  intermarriage  and  

their  assumed  failure  to  integrate.  Although  it  is  clear  that  they  maintain  a  strong  hold  on  their  

dominant  economic  position  and  social  class  in  West  Africa,  the  failure  to  recognize  them  as  citizens  

or  equals  only  works  to  further  marginalize  them.  Even  with  their  displays  loyalty  and  financial  and  

personal  contributions  to  West  African  development  and  growth,  they  are  viewed  with  suspicion  in  

West  Africa,  with  the  international  community,  and  in  the  media.    

 

Anthropology  heavily  focuses  on  the  effects  of  colonialism  and  the  post-­‐colonial  world.  However,  

the  perspectives  and  approaches  are  often  narrow  in  scope.  Among  the  many  transnationalism  

theorists  cited  in  this  paper,  the  majority  use  examples  and  references  are  focused  on  the  

traditional  ‘victim’  diaspora  or  refugee.  This  is  not  to  refute  the  fundamental  need  to  tell  the  story  of  

the  ‘victim’  diasporas.  Yet,  focusing  on  the  ‘victim’  element  of  any  history  only  empowers  the  forces  

that  subjugated.  Across  African  countries,  there  are  complex  histories  of  pain,  oppression,  

opportunity,  and  acceptance.    

 

We  must  change  our  preconceptions  about  power,  victimhood,  and  identity.  By  studying  trade  

diasporas  such  as  the  Lebanese,  we  expand  our  understanding  of  the  fragmented  histories  and  

shifting  power  structures  in  our  world.  When  we  explore  the  possibilities  of  the  shift  in  the  power  

balance  –  in  this  case  in  in  West  Africa  –  we  open  the  academic  discourse  to  a  more  unbiased  

approach.  Although  their  economic  privilege  facilitates  the  Lebanese  to  remain  in  West  Africa,  their  

social  and  political  alienation  is  a  force  in  the  formation  of  their  cultural  identity.  Their  

discrimination  and  demonization  proves  a  viable  influence  in  their  perceived  self-­‐isolation,  and  

explain  why  they  have  not  been  accepted  –  or  attempted  to  assimilate  –  into  mainstream  society.  

  40  

 

Immigrants,  refugees,  migrants,  and  transnational  communities  face  difficult  situations  and  

compromises  when  trying  to  establish  themselves  in  a  new  country.  Understanding  how  and  why  

people  create  and  reconstruct  identity,  both  personal  and  cultural,  is  critical  to  understanding  

migration  patterns,  and  the  political  and  socio-­‐cultural  connections  that  make  our  world  function.  

By  approaching  the  cause  and  effects  of  transnationalism,  acceptance  and  identity  from  all  angles,  

we  can  see  a  clearer  picture  of  the  impact  that  fragmented  histories  and  alienation  has  on  the  

formation  of  community  dynamics  and  personal  identities.    

             

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