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Shay  Gonzales    “CALM  stands  for  ‘be  cool,  man!’”:  A  Black  Citizen’s  Patrol  in  Denver.  

 In  1967  Denver  confronted  the  possibility  of  the  long,  hot  summer  in  a  shopping  

center  parking  lot.  On  a  Saturday  night  in  July,  youth  came  out  of  a  dance  at  the  YWCA.  One  

black  youth  was  given  a  ticket  for  jay  walking.  The  crowd  was  resentful  over  the  fairness  of  

the  ticket.  That  night  and  the  next,  the  Holly  Square  Shopping  Center  in  Northeast  Park  Hill  

was  full  of  black  youth.  They  broke  the  windows  of  several  storefronts.  On  Monday  night  

Denver  police  ordered  the  youth  to  disperse.  They  cleared  the  parking  lot  with  dogs  and  

riot  sticks.1  Nathan  Clark,  a  nineteen-­‐year-­‐old  black  man,  had  been  playing  basketball  

across  the  street  at  Skyland  Park.  He  got  into  a  friend’s  car  to  leave  just  as  more  than  a  

dozen  police  cars  arrived.  Officers,  who  had  reportedly  removed  their  name  badges,  

banged  on  the  roof  of  the  car  with  their  riot  clubs  and  told  Clark  and  his  friend  to  leave.  The  

car  would  not  start.  Clark  got  out  to  help  the  driver,  and  the  police  herded  him  across  the  

street  into  another  wall  of  officers.  He  tried  to  walk  back  to  the  car,  but  he  was  chased  by  a  

police  officer,  who  struck  him  over  the  back  of  the  legs  with  a  riot  club.2  Clark  and  the  

officer  grappled  with  the  riot  stick  as  Clark  yelled  that  he  had  not  done  anything  wrong.  

According  to  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission  investigator  present,  Clark  “was  beaten  

to  the  ground  ….  [and]  was  further  struck  by  other  policemen.”  The  crowd  watched  as  Clark  

was  beaten  until  that  investigator  intervened.3  People  were  angry.  Black  business  owners  

were  on  edge  that  the  scene  would  break  out  into  more  overt  acts  of  violence  and                                                                                                                  1Jules  Mondschein,  Summer  of  1967—Northeast  Park  Hill.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  21,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  2“Justice  is  an  Expensive  Luxury.”  New  York  Times  News  Service.  Feb  27  1970.  Clipping.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  3Frank  Plaut,  Minority  Group  –  Governmental  Relations:  Investigations  and  Recommendations.  FF  8,  Box  5.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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vandalism.  One  slept  inside  his  store.  A  black  storeowner  and  his  wife  were  told  by  two  

black  youth  around  thirteen  that  they  “would  be  burnt  out.”  When  the  wife  of  the  store  

owner  asked  what  she  had  ever  done  to  them,  one  of  the  youth  reportedly  replied,  “that’s  

the  trouble,  you’ve  never  done  anything  for  us.”  Resentment  and  tension  seemed  about  to  

break  through  to  a  major  riot.  

Some  community  members  took  direct  action  to  prevent  a  violent  reaction  to  the  

incident.  On  Tuesday,  August  1st,  fifteen  adult  black  militants  patrolled  the  shopping  center.  

They  continued  to  patrol  for  another  three  weeks.4  Jules  Mondschein,  a  consultant  for  the  

Commission  on  Community  Relations  program  through  the  Mayor’s  Office,  evaluated  the  

racially  tense  situation.  He  concluded  that  if  the  citizen’s  patrol  had  not  intervened  there  was  

a  “strong  possibility  that  the  shopping  center  would’ve  burned  to  the  ground.”5  The  Northeast  

Park  Hill  area  was  a  focal  point  of  racial  tension  in  Denver.  The  Holly  and  Dahlia  shopping  

centers  functioned  as  gathering  points  for  black  youth  from  across  the  city  and  had  been  

considered  “problem  areas”  for  vandalism  and  violence  over  the  last  several  years.6  

 For  a  brief  period  in  Denver,  residents  of  impoverished  areas  were  paid  to  participate  

in  the  federally-­‐sponsored  Model  Cities  Program  to  propose  and  implement  programs  

affecting  their  communities.  They  joined  a  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee  to  address  

the  issues  their  communities  faced  with  Police.  In  response  to  a  crisis  of  policing  and  violence  

in  Denver’s  Northeast  Park  Hill,  the  committee  proposed  Community  Action  by  Local  

Marshals  (CALM),  an  unarmed  citizen’s  patrol  that  would  draw  its  ranks  from  militant  groups.                                                                                                                  4Jules  Mondschein,  Summer  of  1967—Northeast  Park  Hill.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  21,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  5Jules  Mondschein,  Summer  of  1967—Northeast  Park  Hill.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  21,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  6Rachael  Noel,  Summary  and  Recommendations-­‐  Dahlia  Area  Summer  1966.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  19,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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The  proposal,  which  was  written  and  backed  by  self-­‐identified  “militants,”  was  heavily  

debated  but  ultimately  failed  to  maintain  a  coalition  of  support.    

Denver  is  largely  absent  from  histories  of  race  and  democracy  in  the  twentieth  century.  

Denver’s  local  political  development  can  be  contextualized  by  other  local  and  national  

histories.  Robert  Self’s  American  Babylon:  Race  and  the  Struggle  for  Postwar  Oakland,  

discusses  the  development  of  the  ideology  of  black  power  and  African  American  challenges  to  

urban  decline.  Black  power  activists,  part  of  a  dynamic  black  political  culture,  turned  

institutions  created  by  the  War  on  Poverty  into  community-­‐controlled  bodies  dedicated  to  

“organizing  the  poor.”7  These  controversial  community  organizers  contributed  a  rich  black  

power  discourse  of  community  participation  to  debates  about  planning,  poverty,  and  jobs.  In  

Denver,  black  militancy  joined  the  federal  Model  Cities  programs  and  engaged  municipal  

politics  in  radical  ways.  Michael  Flamm’s  Law  and  Order:  Street  Crime,  Civil  Unrest  and  the  

Crisis  of  Liberalism  in  the  1960s  examines  how  conservatives  merged  and  countered  civil  

unrest,  street  crime,  and  civil  disobedience  of  the  civil  rights  movement  in  the  discourse  of  

law  and  order.8  This  project  examines  the  fight  between  law  and  order  and  black  power  

movements  for  community  control  through  the  press,  politics  and  violence.  A  study  of  the  

proposal  exposes  how  resident  participation  challenged  and  tested  Denver’s  professional  

liberals.  The  debate  over  the  proposal  also  highlights  white  liberals’  struggles  to  articulate  a  

coherent  meaning  of  militancy  and  black  power.  In  the  course  of  the  debate  over  the  citizen’s  

patrol,  liberals  in  Denver  abandoned  black  militant  political  participation  and  turned  toward  

the  hardening  ideology  of  security.    

                                                                                                               7Robert  O.  Self,  American  Babylon:  Race  and  the  Struggle  for  Postwar  Oakland.  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2003)  8Michael  W.  Flamm,  Law  and  Order:  Street  Crime,  Civil  Unrest,  and  the  Crisis  of  Liberalism  in  the  1960s.  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  2005)  

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A  Delicate  Balance      

The  two  shopping  centers  in  Northeast  Park  Hill  were  the  focal  points  of  racial  

tension  manifesting  in  the  neighborhood.  Black  families  had  only  recently  settled  there.  

The  area  north  of  29th  Avenue  had  been  developed  after  World  War  II  as  affordable  tract  

housing  for  returning  white  servicemen  and  their  families.  The  war  also  provided  an  

economic  stimulus  for  black  families  who  began  to  settle  eastward  out  from  the  Five  Points  

neighborhood.  They  reached  Colorado  Boulevard  by  1955.  Across  the  street,  Northeast  

Park  Hill  was  rapidly  “block-­‐busted”  through  the  early  sixties  by  real  estate  agents  who  

exploited  fears  of  a  “Dark  Hill.”  As  white  residents  left,  the  area  rapidly  transitioned.9  The  

neighborhood  north  of  26th  Avenue  became  predominantly  black.  Some  areas,  such  as  the  

blocks  surrounding  the  Dahlia  and  Holly  Shopping  Centers,  had  gone  from  5%  to  88%  black  

within  only  ten  years.  

 

The  majority  of  black  families  living  in  the  area  in  1966  had  resided  in  the  area  for  less  than  

                                                                                                               9Thomas  Noel  and  William  J  Hansen,  The  Park  Hill  Neighborhood.  (Denver,  CO:  Historic  Denver,  Inc.,  2002),  20-­‐22.  

Figure  1:  Racial  Composition  of  Park  Hill  1960,  1966,  1970     1960   1966   1970     #  Black  

Residents  Total  #  

%  Black  

#  Black  Residents  

Total  #  

%  Black  

#  Black  Residents  

Total  #  

%  Black  

Northeast  Park  Hill  (north  of  26th  avenue)  

558    

17,290   3.2%   10,591   16,804   63%   14,683   17,539   83.7%  

Greater  Park  Hill  Area   566   32,679   1.7%   11,512   31,066   37%   17,763   32,980   53%  Sourced  from:  George  E.  Bardwell,  Characteristics  of  Negro  Residencies  in  the  Park  Hill  Area  of  Denver,  Colorado,  (Denver,  Commission  on  Community  Relations,  1966).  Bureau  of  the  Census,  1970  census  of  Housing:  block  statistics,  Denver,  Colorado,  urbanized  (Washington:  Government  Printing  Office,  1971)    

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a  year.  Despite  some  migration  to  the  southern  portion  of  Park  Hill,  the  color  line  was  

distinct  at  26th  Avenue.10    

 

The  social  condition  of  Northeast  Park  Hill  was  becoming  a  concern.  A  few  weeks  

prior  to  the  beating  of  Nathan  Clark,  Chris  Wilkerson,  a  black  policeman,  spoke  on  

delinquency  in  the  area  in  a  meeting  with  the  Park  Hill  Civic  Association,  an  organization  of  

black  community  leaders.  He  asked  for  their  support  for  increased  police  presence  at  the  

Dahlia  Shopping  Center  down  the  street.  The  area’s  delinquency  problem,  he  admitted,  was                                                                                                                  10George  E.  Bardwell,  Characteristics  of  Negro  Residencies  in  the  Park  Hill  Area  of  Denver,  Colorado.  (Denver,  Commission  on  Community  Relations,  1966).  Bureau  of  the  Census,  1970  Census  of  Housing:  Block  Statistics,  Denver,  Colorado,  urbanized  (Washington:  Government  Printing  Office,  1971)  

Figure  2:  Greater  Park  Hill  Area  

 

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no  worse  than  “the  older  Negro  areas  west  of  Colorado  Boulevard  and  particularly  west  of  

York  St.”  Wilkerson  was  distressed  because  what  was  perhaps,  “the  most  beautifully  

planned  residential  part  of  the  city  [was]  going  to  hell.”11  According  to  a  black  community  

activist  the  neighborhood  was  “a  well-­‐constructed  community  with  physical  elements  of  

middle-­‐class  living.”12  Jules  Mondschein  defined  the  area  as  “not  a  ghetto.”13  It  was,  

however,  already  in  decline  and  lacked  “middle-­‐class  money,”  bus  service  after  7pm,  

quality  schools,  and  adequate  representation  on  the  city  council.14  The  combined  area  of  

Five  Points,  the  neighborhoods  north  of  City  Park,  and  Park  Hill  had  the  highest  youth  

delinquency  cases  for  the  city  in  1968.  9%  of  youth  enrolled  in  secondary  school  had  a  

delinquency  filing.  Northeast  Denver’s  high  number  of  dropouts  may  have  affected  the  

statistic,  which  was  twice  as  high  as  the  4.3%  delinquency  rate  in  Northwest  Denver.15  

Youth  were  the  cause  for  the  recent  uptick  in  Denver’s  crime  rates.  From  1963  through  

1965,  Denver’s  crime  rates  had  bucked  national  trends,  decreasing  at  a  rate  of  about  

twenty  percent  annually.16  In  1967  Denver  rejoined  the  nation  with  a  29.9%  increase  in  

major  crimes  like  auto  thefts,  burglaries,  and  assaults.  More  than  half  of  all  felony  arrests  in  

1966  were  juveniles.  Police  blamed  lax  juvenile  court  judges  and  the  Children’s  Code  for  

encouraging  habitual  offenders.17  After  the  incident  with  Nathan  Clark,  rumors  circulated  

                                                                                                               11Greg  Pinney,  “Police  Need  Support,  ‘Trouble  Area’  Advised.”  Denver  Post,  July  7  1967.  12Shelley  Rhym,  Through  My  Eyes:  The  Denver  Negro  Community  March  1934-­‐January  1968.  (Denver  CO:  Denver  Post  and  Core  Ministries,  1968)  13Jules  Mondschein,  Summer  of  1967—Northeast  Park  Hill.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  21,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  14Shelley  Rhym,  Through  My  Eyes:  The  Denver  Negro  Community  March  1934-­‐January  1968.  (Denver  CO:  Denver  Post  and  Core  Ministries,  1968)  15Judith  Brimberg,  “Juvenile  Court:  Key  Delinquency  Areas  Listed.”  Denver  Post,  Mar  23  1969.  16Michael  Rounds,  “Denver’s  1965  Crime  Rate  down  20  percent  from  ’63.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  Jan  16  1966.  17Michael  Rounds,  “Denver  Crime  Rate  up  by  29.9  Percent.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  April  12  1967.  Michael  Rounds,  “Youth  Involved  in  Half  of  Major  Crimes.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  Jan  22  1968  

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that  Denver  was  ripe  for  majorly  destructive  riots  like  those  that  took  other  cities.18  

Something  needed  to  be  done  in  Northeast  Park  Hill  to  pacify  the  youth  and  prevent  an  

incident  of  police  violence  that  could  escalate  the  situation.  

After  the  beating  of  Nathan  Clark  many  of  the  city’s  white  liberal  professionals  

placed  the  violence  in  sociological  terms  and  called  to  remedy  the  social  and  economic  

inequality  that  caused  it.  In  a  letter  to  the  editor  concerning  a  new  recreation  center  in  the  

area,  Warren  D.  Alexander,  the  assistant  director  of  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission,  

contested  the  assertion  that  the  disturbances  were  racial  riots.  He  called  the  violence  

“hostile  expressions  of  a  disgruntled  minority  over  the  inequalities  foisted  upon  them  by  

the  dominant  power  structure,”  which,  he  added,  “would  no  doubt  have  been  termed  

‘youthful  exuberance’  had  white  youth  been  involved.”  For  Alexander,  calling  the  incidents  

“racial  riots”  only  lent  “credence  to  the  fear  and  the  myth  that  pervades  the  white  

community.”19  Alexander  knew  fear  of  black  violence  was  a  barrier  to  solving  racial  tension  

in  the  area.  Liberals  argued  that  the  riots  were  hardly  spontaneous.  The  real  causes  of  the  

disturbances,  a  Denver  Post  editorial  argued,  were  a  lack  of  recreation  centers  and  jobs.20  

Helen  Peterson,  of  the  Commission  on  Community  Relations  echoed  this  sentiment  when  

she  said  that  rather  than  merely  “maintaining  the  peace,”  Denver  needed  to  close  the  gap  of  

achievement  and  opportunity.  She  called  for  state  intervention  and  funding  for  even  more  

“massive  programs”  to  remedy  the  inequalities  that  lead  to  violence.  She  compared  the  

current  War  on  Poverty  to  mere  aspirin  when  areas  in  Denver  required  surgery.21  White  

                                                                                                               18“Will  Black  Denver  Riot?”  Denver  Blade,  June  22  1967.  19Alexander  Warren,  Letter  to  Gene  Cervi  C/O  Cervi’s  Rocky  Mountain  Journal.  March  7  1968.  FF  9,  Box  5.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  20“What  the  Denver  Police  Must  Do.”  Denver  Post,  Aug  23  1967.  21Helen  Peterson,  The  Model  City  Program’s  Challenge  to  Denver  Human  Relations.  FF  13,  Box  12.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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professional  liberals  with  a  strong  faith  in  economic  intervention  believed  that  in  order  to  

stop  youth  disturbances  resources  would  have  to  be  reallocated.  Existing  federal  programs  

that  did  not  offer  full  employment  and  genuine  economic  opportunities  were  simply  

pacifiers.    

Liberal  officials  and  community  activists  alike  called  for  more  modern  and  

professional  police.  The  Denver  Post  believed  the  problem  lay  with  an  older  generation  of  

policemen  who  were  practicing  an  outmoded  form  of  policing.22  After  jobs,  liberals  wanted  

an  in  depth  review  of  “police  attitudes.”  Black  community  activist  Shelly  Rhym  asked  that  

police  be  trained  in  the  “conditions  of  they  neighborhoods  they  serve  in.”23  The  Denver  

Blade,  Denver’s  black  newspaper,  wanted  to  see  more  black  policemen  in  the  area  to  

prevent  any  kind  of  incident  that  could  lead  to  rioting.24  Prominent  black  liberal  officials  

and  professional  activists  were  not  adverse  to  police  presence  itself,  but  they  were  upset  

that  Northeast  Denver  was  both  neglected  and  brutalized  by  the  police,  which  hurt  

community  businesses  and  the  community’s  sense  of  dignity.  Rachael  Noel,  State  Senator  

George  Brown,  and  Reverend  MC  Williams  signed  a  petition  and  press  release.  They  

condemned  police  brutality  and  said  that  police  directives  “approximated  a  state  of  martial  

law,”  which  had  reduced  the  Northeast  Denver  community  to  a  “concentration  camp.”25    

Black  leaders  also  believed  attention  to  disturbances  damaged  local  businesses.  

They  protested  sensationalized  coverage  of  the  violence.  The  Denver  Blade  stated  that  the  

                                                                                                               22“What  the  Denver  Police  Must  Do.”  Denver  Post,  Aug  23  1967.  23Shelly  Rhym,  Dahlia  Summary.  FF  19,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  24“Denver  Doesn’t  Need  It.”  Denver  Blade,  Jun  28  1967.  25Press  Release.  Aug  1  1967.  FF  13,  Box  12.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  “Negro  Leaders  Condemn  Police  Brutality.”  Denver  Post,  August  1  1967.  

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incidents  of  criminal  behavior  “constituted  vandalism,  not  rebellion.”26  Other  black  

community  members  emphasized  that  youth  delinquency  was  everywhere,  not  just  

Northeast  Denver.27  

Mayor  Currigan’s  liberal  administration  struggled  to  balance  the  allegations  of  

brutality  from  black  citizens  against  cries  from  whites  on  the  right  for  greater  security.  He  

received  several  letters  from  white  residents  of  the  area  who  wanted  a  firmer  police  

presence.  One  skeptical  citizen  wrote  to  Mayor  Currigan  to  protest  the  press’  repeated  use  

of  the  word  “youthful”  to  describe  vandals  and  rioters,  as  it  minimized  the  damage  to  

businesses.  He  wrote  that  slum  conditions  and  brutality  were  transparent  excuses  and  

cautioned  that  any  restriction  on  policemen  would  lead  to  Denver  becoming  Detroit.28  

Currigan’s  own  hesitancy  with  the  issue  is  even  evidenced  in  his  personal  papers.  Shortly  

before  making  a  statement  to  the  press,  Currigan  renumbered  his  speech  to  shift  the  

number  one  priority  from  “law  and  order”  to  what  was  originally  the  second,  a  call  for  

Denver  police  to  treat  citizens  humanely.29    

Liberal  solutions  were  inadequate  and  limited  to  policy  and  media  advocacy.  Rioting  

seemed  imminent.  No  policy  solution  or  letter  to  the  editor  could  affect  the  young  people  in  

the  shopping  centers  before  nightfall.  Younger  people,  some  activists  and  officials  believed,  

were  harbingers  of  a  new  militancy  that  rejected  liberalism’s  slow  inclusivity.  Concerned  

liberals,  black  and  white,  saw  the  Watts  Riot  as  an  instigator  of  a  new  form  of  militant  

                                                                                                               26Joe  L  Brown,  “Denver  Race  Problems.”Denver  Blade,  Aug  3  1967.  27Greg  Pinney,  “Police  Need  Support,  ‘Trouble  Area’  Advised.”  Denver  Post,  Jul  7  1967.    28Lee  Haas,  Letter  to  Mayor  Currigan.  August  8  1967.  FF  13,  Box  12.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  29Thomas  Currigan,  Statement  to  the  Press.  August  1967.  FF  13,  Box  12.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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action,  violence,  and  that  it  was  contagious.30  The  Denver  Blade  wrote  that  youth  who  

identified  themselves  as  “enemy  to  society  in  general”  wouldn’t  be  swayed  by  liberal  

programs  to  fund  recreation  centers  and  create  economic  stimulus.  Liberals  “could  build  

swimming  pools,  grant  large  amounts  of  money,  create  more  and  better  opportunities  and  

yet  any  infringement  on  dignity  and  rioters  would  burn  it  all  up  in  an  afternoon.”31  

Sundiata,  an  African  culture  and  history-­‐oriented  group  that  shared  a  building  in  Five  

Points  with  the  Black  Panthers,  rejected  liberal  programs.  “We  black  men,”  they  wrote  in  a  

pamphlet,  “will  not  be  given  better  jobs,  money,  homes.  We  must  get  them  for  ourselves.”32  

Autonomy,  self-­‐sufficiency  and  dignity  formed  the  basic  tenets  of  black  militancy.  Youth  

were  responsive  to  appeals  with  militancy’s  authenticity.  One  black  teacher  at  Metro  State  

College  phoned  Mayor  Currigan’s  office  to  tell  him  that  he  was  in  touch  with  the  “wrong  

people,”  and  that  he  needed  to  be  in  touch  with  “black  nationalists”  who  held  “the  respect  

of  younger  people.”33  Jules  Mondschein,  in  his  analysis  of  the  citizen’s  patrol  following  the  

beating  of  Nathan  Clark,  saw  that  the  adults’  militant  posturing  successfully  swayed  the  

youth.  He  also  claimed  that  the  members  of  the  citizen’s  patrol  were  effective  because  of  

their  militancy,  and  the  youth  listened  to  them  because  they  had  also  protested  the  

brutality  against  Nathan  Clark.34  Militancy  held  legitimacy  with  the  youth,  and  activists  saw  

the  potential  efficacy  of  involving  militants  in  riot  prevention.  

                                                                                                               30Jules  Mondschein,  Summer  of  1967—Northeast  Park  Hill.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  21,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  31“Denver  Doesn’t  Need  It.”  Denver  Blade,  Jun  28  1967.  32Sundiata:  Dignity  Unity  Power  Pamphlet.  FF  20,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  33Call  from  Mrs.  Gwendolyn  Thomas.  FF  13,  Box  12.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  34Jules  Mondschein,  Summer  of  1967—Northeast  Park  Hill.  Commission  on  Community  Relations.  FF  21,  Box  19.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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In  1967  the  Colorado  Commission  of  Civil  Rights  authored  a  report  showing  that  the  

Denver  Police  Department  perpetuated  a  racist  culture.  Patrol  cars  regularly  shone  their  

lights  into  each  home  in  the  primarily  black  sections  of  Park  Hill.  Police  told  groups  of  

youth  of  color  to  “break  it  up”  without  any  justification.  Illegal  searches  were  

commonplace.  A  civil  rights  commission  investigator  observed  an  officer  using  an  Amos  and  

Andy  dialect  while  arresting  and  booking  a  black  man.35  The  problem  was  deeper  than  

personal  prejudices  and  resultant  hostilities  against  communities  of  color.  The  police  force  

was  also  overwhelmingly  white.  Only  twenty-­‐two  black  officers  were  employed  in  August  

1967,  with  none  above  the  rank  of  detective  or  technician.36  According  to  the  Civil  Rights  

Commission’s  investigation,  the  Denver  Police  Department  maintained  a  program  within  

the  Community  Police  Relations  Bureau  exclusively  for  youth  in  Northeast  Denver.  Youth  in  

the  program  were  instructed  by  police  officers  to  “respectfully  answer  questions”  and  if  an  

officer  asked,  “always  consent  to  a  search,”  including  “offering  to  open  the  trunk."37  The  

Police  Departments  largest  community  relations  program  was  instructing  the  youth  of  

Northeast  Denver  to  waive  their  constitutional  rights.    

The  study  pressured  Mayor  Currigan  to  reform  the  Police  Department.  Currigan  

began  by  appointing  a  new  police  chief,  George  Seaton.  .  Seaton  was  chosen  to  straddle  the  

divide  between  liberal  discourses  about  jobs  and  community  relations  and  a  pragmatic  

approach  to  security.  Police  Chief  Dill  announced  his  resignation  November  1st.  The  Denver  

Post  speculated  that  Dill  lacked  “enthusiasm  for  [Currigan’s]  community  relations  ideas,  

                                                                                                               35Frank  Plaut,  Minority  Group  –  Governmental  Relations:  Investigations  and  Recommendations.  FF  8,  Box  5.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  36Bruce  Wilkinson,  “Potter  Wants  Emphasis  in  Race  Relations.”  Denver  Post,  Aug  22  1967.  John  Tooley,  “Minority  Problems:  Bureau  Handles  Frequent  Issues.”  Denver  Post,  Aug  22  1967.  37Frank  Plaut,  Minority  Group  –  Governmental  Relations:  Investigations  and  Recommendations.  FF  8,  Box  5.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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especially  in  regard  to  minorities.”  In  a  statement  shortly  after  the  was  named,  Seaton  said  

he  saw  the  role  of  police  as  “maintaining  democracy”  and  identified  the  two  major  barriers  

to  this  goal  as  rising  crime  rates  and  the  “struggle  for  social  tranquility.”38  Seaton  was  

contributing  to  a  newly  emerging  discourse  of  “law  and  order”  that  collapsed  racialized  

civil  disorders  and  civil  rights  as  incursions  on  a  right  to  security  and  peace.  He  mirrored  

the  liberal  doctrines  that  civil  disorders  were  primarily  caused  by  lack  of  economic  

opportunities.  He  also  planned  to  modernize  the  police  department  with  training  in  human  

relations  and  help  from  sociologists.  Seaton  added  staff  to  the  Police  Department’s  

Community  Relations  Division,  a  department  charged  with  improving  relations  with  

minorities.39  Under  his  new  training  program,  officers  were  required  to  take  college  

courses  and  were  given  training  in  basic  crowd  control  with  weekly  refreshers.40  Pragmatic  

about  security,  Seaton  also  formed  a  riot  squad,  which  was  specially  trained  by  the  FBI.  To  

aid  the  liberal  image  of  a  modern,  professional  and  community-­‐oriented  policeman,  Chief  

Seaton  also  ordered  regular  officers  to  stop  wearing  the  signature  hard  helmets  and  

replace  their  riot  sticks  with  mace.41  White  liberals  were  originally  hopeful  about  Seaton’s  

potential  as  a  reformer.  A  Denver  Post  editorial  praised  his  intentions  with  regards  to  

police-­‐minority  relations,  but  warned  that  even  the  most  “enlightened”  chiefs  would  face  

difficulty  keeping  the  peace  with  the  “present  volatile  mood  of  the  minorities.”42  

Chief  Seaton  was  capable  of  negotiating  with  liberal  city  officials  to  project  a  

cohesive  liberal  image.  In  the  spring  of  1967,  he  began  making  stronger  statements  about  

                                                                                                               38“Detective  Captain  is  Promoted:  Seaton  is  Police  Chief,  Dill  Successor  Says  he  Plans  some  Changes.”  Denver  Post,  Dec  29  1967.  39“Seaton  to  Attack  Strife  Causes.”  Denver  Post,  Dec  31  1967.  40“Denver  Police  Chart  Aid-­‐to-­‐People  Plans.”  Denver  Post,  Dec  31  1967.  41“Denver  Police:  Riot  Controls  Slated.”  Denver  Post,  Jan  14  1968.  42“Seaton  Impresses  Minority  Leaders.”  Denver  Post,  Jan  15  1968.  

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civil  disorders  to  the  chagrin  of  the  Commission  on  Community  Relations.43  In  one  article  

he  specified  an  additional  special  unit  to  combat  a  crime  wave  that  would  also  be  used  for  

riots.44  The  Commission  invited  Seaton  to  an  off-­‐the-­‐record  meeting  to  discuss  their  

concerns  about  the  “too-­‐widely  publicized  news  stories  about  ‘riot  control.’”45  Seaton  was  

responsive.  In  an  interview  that  appeared  in  the  Denver  Post  a  few  days  after  the  meeting,  

he  presented  Denver’s  riot  control  plan  as  less  militaristic  than  other  cities’.  He  told  the  

reporter  that  the  civil  disorders  plan  was  secondary  to  the  departments’  programs  to  

prevent  disorder.  The  prevention  efforts  Seaton  mentioned  included  targeted  minority  and  

youth  relations  programs  as  well  as  a  plan  to  hire  and  promote  more  minority  officers.  

Seaton  recognized  that  the  relationship  between  the  community  and  the  police  department  

was  one  of  the  main  sources  of  minority  group  satisfaction.46  The  Commission  on  

Community  Relations  wrote  to  praise  him.  Seaton  was,  at  first,  a  pragmatic  security  minded  

official  with  the  ability  to  tailor  his  language  to  an  established  liberal  platform.  

Crisis  and  Response:  The  Summer  of  1968  

On  June  13,  1968,  a  party  let  out  around  ten  thirty  at  night,  and  a  hundred  youth  

gathered  at  the  Holly  Shopping  Center.  Richard  Clark,  a  consultant  with  the  Commission  on  

Community  Relations,  was  in  the  area  and  later  reported  that  the  crowd  was  peaceful.  

Reverend  Jonathan  Fujita  passed  the  crowd  on  his  way  home  and  also  noticed  no  violence  

                                                                                                               43“Violence  Won’t  be  Tolerated.”  Denver  Post,  Mar  3  1968.  Letter  from  Commission  on  Community  Relations  to  Chief  George  L.  Seaton,  March  14  1968.  FF  22,  Box  18.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  44“Police  Task  Force  Announced.”  Denver  Post,  Mar  7  1968.  45Letter  from  Commission  on  Community  Relations  to  Chief  George  L.  Seaton,  March  14  1968.  FF  22,  Box  18.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  46Dick  Thomas,  “Police  Map  Disorder  Control.”  Denver  Post,  March  17  1967.    

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or  rock  throwing.47  At  eleven,  a  squad  car  announced  the  curfew.  Clark  and  other  

community  members  worked  through  the  crowd,  trying  to  get  the  youth  to  disperse.48  

More  police  arrived,  and  Clark  decided  to  stay  within  the  crowd  to  “maintain  effectiveness.”  

He  saw  the  youths’  growing  resentment  toward  the  officers.  Clark  noticed  a  cloud  of  smoke  

coming  from  an  alleyway.  Believing  there  was  a  fire,  he  ran  directly  into  what  he  

discovered  to  be  tear  gas.  The  gas  had  been  set  off  without  warning  from  two  sides  of  the  

street.49  Residents  had  to  leave  their  homes,  and  some  received  medical  treatment  from  the  

fire  department.  Clark  called  Minoru  Yasui,  the  Director  of  the  Community  Relations  

Commission,  who  immediately  sent  off  a  memo  to  Chief  Seaton  late  that  night.  Yasui  wrote  

to  Chief  Seaton  that  many  in  the  neighborhood  believed  the  “police  felt  free  to  

indiscriminately  release  tear  gas  because  these  were  Negroes—not  citizens  or  human  

beings.”  Clark  worried  that  the  incident  would  lead  to  greater  violence  in  Northeast  Denver.  

The  gassing  signaled  the  close  of  an  amicable  relationship  between  Seaton  and  liberal  city  

officials.  Seaton  expressed  his  frustration  with  the  youth  in  Northeast  Park  Hill  to  the  press.  

In  response  to  Yasui’s  memo,  an  “irate”  Seaton  told  the  director  and  the  press  that  Denver’s  

patrolmen  were  “tired  of  baby  sitting  …  every  weekend  night.”50  Activists  remembered  the  

chief’s  paternalism  later.51  Seaton’s  refusal  to  issue  an  apology  for  the  gassing  signaled  the  

shift  of  his  discourse  toward  security  and  a  revival  of  the  previous  summer’s  tensions.    

                                                                                                               47Interview  with  Reverend  Fujita,  June  14  1968,  FF  22,  Box  18.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  48Memo  to  Chief  Seaton,  from  Minoru  Yasui,  June  14  1967.  FF  22,  Box  18.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  49Interview  with  Reverend  Fujita,  June  14  1968.  FF  22,  Box  18.  Thomas  G.  Currigan  Papers,  WH929,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  50John  Tooley,  “’Tired  of  Baby  Sitting’:  Seaton  Defends  Gas  Use.”  Denver  Post,  June  18  1968.  51Clemens  Work,  “Negroes  Discuss  Racial  Tension.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  23  1968.  

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Another  incident  broke  out  a  few  days  later.  On  Friday,  June  21st,  police  responded  

to  a  call  about  a  fight  in  the  parking  lot  of  the  Park  Hill  Shopping  Center  where  around  150  

youth  were  gathered.  One  youth,  Nathan  Jones,  came  out  of  the  crowd  toward  the  patrol  

car.  Officer  Robert  Moravek  asked  if  he  was  hurt.  Jones  lifted  his  shirt  and  in  the  same  

motion,  shot  at  Moravek,  grazing  the  back  of  his  head.  Moravek  responded  with  four  shots  

out  of  the  window,  hitting  Jones  and  two  other  youth  in  the  crowd.  His  partner  quickly  

drove  Moravek  to  the  hospital,  leaving  Jones  behind.  Moravek’s  partner  radioed  for  more  

officers.  Chief  George  Seaton  had  been  conferring  with  district  Captain  Doral  E.  Smith  a  few  

blocks  away  and  responded  to  the  scene  within  a  few  minutes.52  When  they  arrived  they  

were  confronted  with  an  angry  crowd.53  There  was  a  brief  standoff.  Someone  in  the  crowd  

of  black  youth  yelled  “Civil  Rights!”54  Officers  were  then  pelted  with  rocks  and  bottles.  

Someone  in  the  crowed  shoved  Chief  George  Seaton.55  The  police  laid  down  a  blanket  of  

tear  gas  without  warning.  Observers  worried  that  Nathan  Jones,  who  was  still  on  the  

ground,  could  not  breathe.56  Some  black  community  members  attempted  to  disperse  youth  

over  bullhorns.  Newspaper  reports  carried  differing  accounts  of  their  success.57  A  riot  

began  and  spread  to  the  nearby  Five  Points  neighborhood.58  The  press  detailed  many  

incidents  of  racialized  violence  against  white  people.  One  older  white  man  was  attacked  by  

youth  who  threw  rocks  through  his  car  windows.59  White  owned  businesses  downtown  

                                                                                                               52Michael  Rounds,  “State  Patrol  Aids  Police  In  Tense  Denver  Areas.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  23  1968.  53Richard  O’Reilly,  “Chief  Seaton  Gives  Report  on  Shootings,  Investigation.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  Harry  Gessing  and  Fred  Baker,  “Police  at  Site;  One  Critical  in  Hospital.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.    54Charles  Green,  “Details  are  Described  by  Witness  at  Center.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  55Ed  Pendleton,  “Bystanders  Bewildered  After  Shooting.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  56Ed  Pendleton,  “Bystanders  Bewildered  After  Shooting.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  57Harry  Gessing  and  Fred  Baker,  “Police  at  Site;  One  Critical  in  Hospital.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  Michael  Rounds,  “Rights  Leader  Is  Beaten,  Robbed  in  Disturbance.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  23  1968.  58Michael  Rounds,  “State  Patrols  Aid  Police  in  Tense  Denver  Areas.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  23  1968.  59Harry  Gessing  and  Fred  Baker,  “Police  at  Site;  One  Critical  in  Hospital.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  

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and  on  Welton  Street  were  vandalized  and  looted.60  A  Denver  Post  reporter  witnessed  

several  black  youth  attack  a  white  gas  station  attendant.  Minoru  Yasui  was  mugged;  the  

Japanese  internment  survivor  said  he  had  “apparently”  been  mistaken  for  an  Anglo.61    

After  the  are  cooled  off,  black  residents  mobilized.  Around  three  hundred  met  

Sunday  in  the  Curtis  Park  Community  Center.  They  elected  George  L.  Brown,  a  state  senator  

from  Denver,  to  serve  as  their  spokesman.  Brown  announced  their  plans  to  march  and  

meet  again  Tuesday  afternoon  to  issue  their  demands  to  the  city.  Flanked  by  some  of  his  

unidentified  “young  friends,”  Brown  said  that  the  black  community  did  not  need  whites  in  

their  march.62  Joe  Boyd,  a  middle-­‐aged  letter  carrier  and  secretary  to  the  newly  formed  

Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee  under  Denver’s  Model  Cities  program,  attended  

the  meeting.  He  wrote  in  a  memo  to  the  committee,  “I  was  in  a  meeting  with  some  more  

reputable  people  of  east  Denver  area  and  we  were  in  agreement  that  we  should  try  to  

prevent  this  necessity  by  patrolling  in  advance  of  these  incidents  in  order  to  alleviate  the  

police  department’s  involvement.”63  Before  the  march  on  Tuesday  the  newly  formed  group  

called  Black  Citizens  United  asked  a  student  from  Adams  State  College  to  read  their  

demands  from  the  steps  of  the  City  and  County  Building.  The  exact  details  of  the  group’s  

membership  are  absent  from  newspaper  accounts.  They  claimed  to  represent  the  “entire  

black  community,”  but  according  to  a  reporter,  the  march  on  Tuesday  consisted  primarily  

of  young  men.  Their  militancy  was  also  unspecified.  They  maintained  a  calm  and  friendly  

relationship  with  the  black  police  officers  who  escorted  the  march.  Senator  Brown  denied  

                                                                                                               60Richard  O’Reilly,  “Chief  Seaton  Gives  Report  on  Shootings,  Investigation.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  61Ed  Pendleton,  “Bystanders  Bewildered  After  Shooting.”  Denver  Post,  June  22  1968.  62Greg  Pinney,  “Negroes  Plan  Denver  March  on  Tuesday.”  Denver  Post,  June  24  1968.  63Joe  Boyd  to  Police  Community  Relations  Committee,  June  17,  1968.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library.  

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rumors  the  march  would  be  violent.  “We  are  wonderful,  beautiful  black  people,  and  we  

know  how  to  act,”  he  said,  rejecting  the  idea  that  the  group  would  riot.  After  the  march,  the  

group  gave  their  demands  from  the  steps  of  the  capitol.  They  pledged  to  end  vandalism  and  

disturbances.  They  wanted  the  immediate  removal  of  all  white  police  officers  from  the  

black  community.  They  said  white  police  couldn’t  effect  a  solution  because  they  were  a  part  

of  the  problem,  and  some  within  the  group  declared  they  were  the  whole  problem.  They  

also  pledged  to  set  up  their  own  citizen’s  patrol.  They  called  for  an  end  to  the  use  of  “tear  

gas,  mace  and  riot  sticks,  ‘stop  and  frisk’  as  well  as  abusive  language,  inhumane  treatment  

and  disrespect  of  all  black  people.”  In  addition  to  these  moves  toward  autonomy  and  

dignity,  they  wanted  the  city  and  state  to  allocate  more  resources  to  riot  prevention,  the  

inclusion  of  black  men  in  policy-­‐making,  and  less  sensational  reporting  from  the  news  

media.64  According  to  a  reporter,  a  “cadre  of  militants  who  declared  they  were  unsatisfied  

with  the  march”  confronted  Senator  Brown  afterwards.  The  reporter  concluded  the  article  

with  the  statement  that  despite  this  interruption,  “Brown  prevailed”  when  the  march  

peacefully  dispersed  as  scheduled.  Available  accounts  support  the  idea  that  although  Black  

Citizens  United  was  made  of  young,  black  men,  they  represented  a  variation  of  black  power  

rhetoric  that  garnered  a  broad  coalition  of  support  and  rejected  the  spectacular  tactics  of  

groups  like  the  Black  Panthers.  

 The  Denver  Post  ran  an  editorial  a  few  days  later  in  support  of  most  of  the  group’s  

demands.  The  paper  called  the  group’s  pledge  to  contribute  to  reforms  a  “constructive  

manifestation  of  black  dignity,”  which  gave  meaning  to  previously  empty  terms  like  “black  

power.”  The  paper  was  hopeful  that  the  group  which  it  wrote,  “represented  virtually  every                                                                                                                  64Richard  O’Reilly  and  Leonard  Larsen,  “Tuesday  March:  City  Negros  List  Pledges  and  Demands.”  Denver  Post,  June  26  1968.  

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segment  of  opinion”  would  lead  the  entire  metropolitan  area  to  “peaceful  progress.”  The  

editors  did  not  believe,  however,  that  the  police  presence  in  Park  Hill  should  be  entirely  

black,  as  the  neighborhood  was  also  home  to  many  white  residents.  This  ignored  the  

concentration  of  black  residents  north  of  26th  Avenue.  The  paper  did  call  a  black  patrol  of  

men  and  young  men  to  work  with  the  police  to  prevent  rioting  “the  only  way  to  improve  

the  situation  until  sufficient  Negro  policemen  [could]  be  recruited  and  trained.”65  

Professionalization  and  other  traditional  liberal  policy-­‐based  solutions  had  failed  to  

remedy  the  situation.  With  this  push  from  a  well-­‐packaged  militant  group,  white  liberals  

opened  to  new  strategies  including  expanding  of  black  participation  and  recognizing  

militancy  as  an  authentic  political  culture.  

After  the  rally,  the  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee,  a  resident  project  of  

Denver’s  Model  Cities  program,  met  to  draft  their  patrol  proposal,  Community  Action  by  

Local  Marshalls  (CALM).  They  also  heard  from  Nathan  Jones’  brother  about  the  shooting  

and  discussed  gassing  incidents  near  their  home.  They  stayed  late  drafting  the  proposal  in  

preparation  for  a  presentation  to  the  regional  branch  of  the  federal  Office  of  Economic  

Opportunity  (OEO)  in  Kansas  City.66  CALM  planned  for  nearly  a  hundred  men  from  the  

“Black  and  Mexican  communities”  between  seventeen  and  twenty  five  to  patrol  Denver’s  

five  target  areas,  including  Northeast  Park  Hill,  to  quell  any  “summer  disturbances.”  The  

marshals  would  be  recruited  through  militant  organizations  such  as  the  Black  Panthers,  

SNCC,  and  Crusade  for  Justice.  The  marshals  would  patrol  streets,  disperse  “disorderly  

assemblies,”  direct  traffic,  investigate  complaints  of  disturbances  and  provide  emergency  

                                                                                                               65“Negro  Ideas  Merit  Positive  Action.”  Denver  Post,  June  28  1968.  66Meeting  Minutes,  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee.  July  2  1968.  Box  305.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  

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first  aid.  They  wanted  to  begin  immediately  and  end  the  program  in  September.  The  CALM  

proposal  received  an  endorsement  from  the  OEO.  They  were  ineligible  for  federal  funding  

but  would  receive  any  returned  funds  on  the  condition  that  the  plan  gained  the  support  of  

the  Police  Department.67  A  few  days  later,  Denver’s  police  and  the  city  officials  announced  

their  rejection  of  CALM.  

CALM,  along  with  the  other  demands  put  forth  by  Black  Citizens  United  were  

originally  dismissed.  Chief  Seaton  made  it  clear  that  the  Denver  Police  Department  would  

not  accept  CALM  performing  any  police  duty.  This  left  CALM  with  two  tasks:  reporting  

unsafe  conditions  and  assisting  residents  in  obtaining  public  services.  With  the  exception  of  

launching  an  investigation  into  the  shooting  of  Nathan  Jones,  the  Denver  Police  Department  

and  the  Mayor's  office  rejected  all  of  Black  Citizens  United's  demands.  Chief  Seaton  

explained  how  policies  and  lack  of  eligible  candidates  limited  his  ability  to  promote  and  

hire  black  policemen.  He  also  “saw  no  reason”  to  change  policy  on  the  use  of  procedures  

like  “stop  and  frisk”  or  riot-­‐control  weapons  like  tear  gas  and  mace.  To  the  demand  that  the  

city  spend  more  money  on  riot  prevention  and  less  on  control,  Currigan  countered  that  he  

had  devoted  more  money  to  social  programs  than  any  of  his  predecessors.  The  city  simply  

couldn’t  afford  to  expand  the  programs  without  new  revenue  sources.68  The  

administration’s  liberal  social  spending  program  had  reached  its  limit.  That  same  week,  

law-­‐and-­‐order  oriented  Democratic  Councilman  Robert  B.  Keating  said  that  he  and  other  

councilman  opposed  the  patrol,  which,  “however  meritorious,”  would  implicate  “a  lack  of  

faith  in  the  Police  Department.”69  The  answer  to  Black  Citizens  United  was  no.  The  group’s  

                                                                                                               67Richard  O’Reilley,  “Chief  Rejects  Six  Proposed  CALM  duties.”  Denver  Post,  July  3  1968.  68Richard  O’Reilley,  “Only  One  Black  Citizen  Demand  Met.”  Denver  Post,  July  3  1968.  69John  Morehead,  “Panel  Opposes  Patrol  Plan  by  Minorities.”  Denver  Post,  July  3  1968.  

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attempts  at  self-­‐sufficiency  and  autonomy  challenged  the  professionalism  of  the  police  and  

the  efficacy  of  liberal  economic  interventions.  Black  militants,  including  Black  Citizens  

United,  contested  the  legitimacy  of  a  multiracial  liberal  coalition  and  demanded  a  role  in  

the  allocation  both  of  resources  and  creation  of  policy  that  affected  them.  

The  situation  was  becoming  more  desperate.  Denver’s  black  community  received  

threats  of  violence  from  white  supremacist  groups.  At  the  same  time  the  Black  Panthers  

were  attacking  the  legitimacy  of  the  police  department  to  protect  their  communities.  

Lauren  Watson,  leader  of  the  Denver  chapter  of  the  Black  Panthers,  and  other  militants  

interrupted  a  public  meeting  of  the  Commission  of  Community  Relations.  Watson  hailed  

the  creation  of  civilian  police  patrols  as  the  “only  likely  source  of  peace  and  just  protection”  

for  the  black  residents  of  Northeast  Denver.  Watson  claimed  to  have  organized  an  armed  

group  that  was  already  proving  effective  at  preventing  violence.70  Sorl  Shead,  a  Black  

Panther,  had  recently  been  arrested  at  the  site  of  a  riot  at  the  Dahlia  Shopping  Center.  

Armed,  he  was  arrested  for  intervening  with  an  officer’s  arrest  of  a  looting  girl.  “Get  out  of  

here,”  Shead  reportedly  told  the  officer,  “I’m  in  charge  in  here  and  I  make  the  reports.”71  

The  black  residents  of  Park  Hill  felt  increasingly  desperate  to  find  a  solution  as  rumors  

spread  of  a  Minutemen  attack.  Reverend  Phillips  received  a  call  from  a  “white  male  voice”  

that  threatened  to  bomb  homes  in  the  neighborhood  if  any  “children  gather[ed]  in  the  

[Holly]  shopping  center.”  Three  area  churches  were  firebombed.72  Flyers  circulated  in  the  

neighborhood  claimed  that  Denver  Police  were  “friendly”  with  the  Minutemen.73    

                                                                                                               70Chuck  Green,  “Militants  Dominate  2nd  Relations  Meet.”  Denver  Post,  July  3  1968.  71Michael  Rounds,  “Vigilante-­‐Type  Patrols  Distress  Police.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  29  1968.  72“Negro  Minister  Reports  Telephone  Bomb  Threat.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  29  1968.  73John  Tooley,  “Police  Officials  Deny  N.E.  Denver  Law  Breakdown.”  July  3  1968.  

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As  the  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee  began  to  negotiate  with  the  mayor  

and  the  Denver  Police  Department,  white  liberals  revealed  their  misunderstanding  of  and  

distrust  for  black  militancy.  The  downtown  papers  partially  conflated  the  Black  Panthers’  

armed  patrol  with  Black  Citizens  United  and  CALM.  In  one  article,  a  writer  presented  Black  

Citizens  United's  warning  about  violence  due  to  inadequate  policing  as  a  threat.74  Another  

said  CALM  was  presented  by  “less  militant-­‐talking  youths”  and  listed  unarmed  patrols  as  

one  of  the  points  put  forth  by  “those  advocating  peaceful  solutions.”75  A  sympathetic  

Denver  Post  article  criticized  Seaton  for  opposing  the  proposal  on  the  basis  of  the  residents  

involved.  He  was  quoted  as  saying,  “I  can’t  even  talk  to  these  people"  and  “I  don’t  want  

anything  to  do  with  them.”  Shelly  Rhym,  a  black  community  activist  and  the  coordinator  of  

resident  participation  for  Model  Cities,  countered  that  the  committee  was  balanced  

between  moderates  and  militants.  Rhym  also  explained  that  militants  were  not  “advocates  

of  violence,”  and  it  was  better  to  harness  their  concern  than  to  exclude  it.  Without  militant  

involvement,  he  said,  resident  participation  was  meaningless.76  If  the  administration  was  

going  to  pick  which  resident  perspectives  were  legitimate,  they  would  effectively  

disenfranchise  Denver’s  black  community.    

Despite  these  barriers,  the  administration  sought  a  compromise.  They  were  

increasingly  aware  that  militancy  was  necessary  to  command  the  respect  of  youth  and  

prevent  rioting  and  property  destruction.  Militants  had  been  credited  with  the  de-­‐

escalation  of  the  crisis  the  previous  summer,  and  some  advocates  said  patrols  of  militants  

                                                                                                               74Richard  O’Reilly,  “Only  One  Black  Citizen  Demand  Met.”  Denver  Post,  July  3  1968.  75Chuck  Green,  “Militants  Dominate  2nd  Relations  Meet.”  Denver  Post,  July  3  1968.  76Richard  O’Reilly,  “CALM  patrol,  Seaton  Policy  Called  Unfair.”  Denver  Post,  July  4  1968.  

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had  controlled  crowds  of  up  to  1500  people.77  In  a  memo  entitled,  “Citizen  Participation  in  

Community  Harmony,”  the  mayor’s  office  requested  negotiations  between  CALM  

representatives,  the  Denver  Police  Department,  and  groups  like  Crusade  for  Justice  and  

Black  Youth  United.  The  negotiation  committee  also  included  James  E.  Young,  a  Black  

Panther.  Currigan’s  administration  wanted  the  police  to  “recognize  the  importance  of  

utilizing  some  of  the  “‘militants’  in  the  program.”78  Militants  could  command  the  respect  of  

the  youth  and  extend  authenticity  to  the  program’s  decisions.  Peace  required  collaboration.  

 The  first  set  of  negotiations  was  deadlocked  about  the  genuine  autonomy  of  the  

project.  The  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee  and  the  Police  Department  disagreed  

over  who  would  have  the  final  say  in  controlling  the  marshals.  The  police  department  

wanted  marshals  to  fall  under  the  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Division  within  the  

department.  The  organizers  found  this  unacceptable  to  the  spirit  of  CALM,  and  attempted  

to  mobilize  support  for  an  autonomous  patrol  by  holding  a  rally.79  According  to  the  Rocky  

Mountain  News,  the  administration  sided  with  the  police  and  had  no  plans  to  further  

negotiate.  The  CALM  proposers  resolved  not  to  compromise  and  requested  a  private  

meeting  with  Currigan.80  Both  sides  had  retrenched  in  their  bases:  Currigan  quietly  allied  

with  Seaton  and  the  organizers  of  CALM  turned  to  the  larger  community  for  support.  

                                                                                                               77Model  Cities  Resident  Participation  Retreat.  July  13  1968.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  78Citizen  Participation  in  Community  Harmony,  July  11,  1968.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  79Police-­‐Community  Relations  Meeting  Minutes,  July  16,  1968.  Box  305.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  80Police-­‐Community  Relations  Meeting  Minutes,  July  16,  1968.  Box  305.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  CALM  chronology,  July  16  1968.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  Box  305  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  

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The  concept  of  resident  participation  united  the  diverse  coalition  backing  CALM.  

Under  Joe  Boyd’s  leadership,  the  Police-­‐Community  Relations  Committee  networked  within  

Model  Cities  and  city  government  to  ramp  up  support  for  CALM.81  Prior  to  the  first  set  of  

negotiations,  the  committee  secured  support  from  various  committees  within  Model  Cities,  

who  rallied  behind  the  idea  of  citizen  participation.82  Notes  from  the  second  negotiation  

reveal  the  administration’s  position  on  the  proposal.  City  officials  recognized  that  a  

“different  type  of  leadership  from  the  Black  and  Brown  Communities”  had  proposed  CALM  

and  they  felt  it  essential  that  the  proposal  and  its  leadership  be  maintained.  However  the  

impasse  was  to  be  breached,  both  sides  would  need  to  “sell”  the  compromise  to  their  

backers.83  Authenticity  was  essential  for  the  patrol  to  be  effective  with  the  youth.    

CALM  Compromised:  A  hard  sell  

This  second  set  of  negotiations  breached  the  impasse.  The  Denver  Police  

Department  issued  “Guidelines  for  Civilian  Volunteer  Groups,”  which  allowed  for  citizen’s  

patrols  of  all  kinds.  CALM  was  approved  by  the  Police  Department  and  readied  for  

inclusion  in  the  Denver’s  Model  Cities  proposal,  to  be  sent  to  the  City  Council  and  then  on  to  

the  OEO.  No  government  funding  would  be  involved  with  the  patrol.  The  new  proposal  put  

“overall  policy  control  …  supervision  and  coordination”  of  CALM  and  other  patrols  under  

the  Community  Relations  Division  of  the  Denver  Police  Department.84  In  an  apparent  

                                                                                                               81Police  Community  Relations  Committee  Meeting  Minutes,  July  16  1968.  Box  305.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  82Model  Cities  Resident  Participation  Retreat,  July  13  1968,  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  83Initial  Statement  of  Negotiator  at  Secret  Negotiation  Meeting,  July  17  1968.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  84Guidelines  for  Civilian  Volunteer  Groups,  July  18  1968.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  

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reversal  of  their  principled  stance,  the  organizers  of  CALM  had  ceded  control  of  the  patrol’s  

staffing  and  internal  discipline  to  the  Police  Department.  

Liberal  city  officials  and  black  community  activists  celebrated  the  compromise  as  

proof  that  resident  participation  could  work.  The  compromise  also  represented  an  effective  

integration  of  militants  into  Model  Cities  and  the  Currigan  administration.  In  his  

announcement,  Boyd  framed  the  compromise  plan  as  one  that  signified  the  closure  of  the  

communications  gap  between  citizens  of  the  “hard-­‐core”  area  of  Denver  and  the  Police  

Department.  This  was  a  “real  point  of  break  through  in  community  relations,”  Boyd  said  of  

the  proposal.85  He  also  warned  that  the  proposal  required  complete  support  from  the  

community  to  be  effective.  The  celebratory  rally  ended  with  a  plea  for  contributions  to  pay  

volunteer  marshalls.  “If  you  turn  your  back  on  the  ghetto,”  Boyd  warned,  “you  turn  your  

back  on  yourselves.”86  Shelly  Rhym  said  CALM  was  one  victory  in  a  series  of  battles  

between  minority  communities  and  the  city  administration  in  search  of  more  autonomy  in  

their  neighborhoods.  This  autonomy,  he  said,  “is  essential  to  freedom.”  Liberal  media  also  

commended  the  compromise  as  evidence  of  authentic  participation.  The  journalist  who  

interviewed  Rhym  wrote  that  the  “real  significance”  of  the  CALM  proposal  compromise  was  

that  “some  of  Denver’s  angrier  black  men  decided  to  take  a  chance  with  a  bureaucratic  

system  that  frustrates  a  lot  of  middle-­‐class  whites.”  Rhym  also  hoped  that  the  process  

would  show  the  militants  that  something  could  be  accomplished  by  “working  on  

committees  and  going  to  lots  of  meetings.”87  Optimistically  liberal  city  officials  and  

community  activists  thought  the  compromise  would  strengthen  a  multiracial  liberal  

                                                                                                               85Joe  Boyd  Speech,  July  19  1968.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  Box  186  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  86Marvin  Moran,  “City  Approves  Citizen  Patrol  Proposal.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  July  20  1968.  87Richard  O’Reilly,  “CALM  Patrols:  Minority,  City  Pact  Assessed.”  Denver  Post,  July  21  1968.  

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coalition.  The  resident  participation  celebrated  by  the  media  and  Model  Cities’  participants  

was  already  tainted  by  the  compromise  with  the  Denver  Police  Department.  

To  the  militant  supporters  of  the  CALM  proposal,  this  level  of  police  involvement  

was  unacceptable.  Two  organizations  represented  by  Lauren  Watson,  the  Black  Panthers  

and  SNCC,  withdrew  support  from  the  proposal  and  pledged  to  start  their  own  armed  

patrols.  Lauren  Watson  issued  a  statement  that  the  once-­‐good  proposal  had  been  “watered  

down  until  it  [was]  worthless.”  “The  idea  of  a  model  city  is  ridiculous,”  Watson  continued,  

“as  long  as  racist  murderers  like  Mayor  Currigan  and  Chief  Seaton  hold  control  over  all  

programs.”  The  original  proposal,  Watson  said,  did  what  Model  Cities  was  intended  to  do:  

give  the  residents  of  the  target  area  control  over  their  lives.  When  asked,  Currigan  said  

Watson’s  comments  were  “too  ridiculous”  to  warrant  a  response.88  Watson  was  not  the  

only  one  who  felt  the  new  CALM  proposal  betrayed  the  ideal  of  resident  participation.  The  

Adult  Education  Committee,  another  resident  committee  of  Model  Cities  that  had  endorsed  

CALM  at  the  Citizen  Participation  Retreat,  backed  away  from  the  new  proposal.  In  the  

committee’s  meeting  minutes,  it  wrote  that  it  took  the  “same  position  as  the  Black  Panthers  

and  SNCC.”89  In  a  statement  to  all  the  Model  Cities  committees,  the  Adult  Education  

Committee  decried  “the  establishment”  and  its  continued  use  of  “veto  power”  over  resident  

programs  as  an  expression  of  paternalism.  This  paternalism,  it  wrote,  had  created  a  

“colonial  situation.”  The  Committee  called  for  “the  establishment  [to  be]  taught  that  people  

are  the  top  priority  …  not  property,  money,  …  an  imposed  order  (generally  called  peace),  or  

                                                                                                               88Richard  O  Reilly  “Panthers,  SNCC  Quit  Patrols  Group.”  Denver  Post,  July  21  1968.  89Adult  Education  Committee  Meeting  Minutes.  Box  305.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  

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even  law.”90  To  the  more  militant  activists,  the  CALM  compromise  meant  the  

“establishment”  had  abandoned  autonomy  and  dignity,  essential  elements  of  black  power’s  

challenge  to  liberal  politics.  

The  Police  Community  Relations  Committee  continued  to  work  on  CALM  regardless  

of  the  fallout.  It  expanded  CALM  to  be  a  year-­‐round  program  and  provide  additional  

services  within  the  terms  of  the  compromise.  Joe  Boyd  resigned  from  his  position  as  a  

postal  carrier  to  fundraise  for  CALM  full  time.91  

Those  opposed  to  the  proposal  began  to  campaign  against  it  in  advance  of  the  city  

council  vote.  Robert  B.  Keating,  who  had  been  opposed  to  CALM  since  the  beginning,  took  

advantage  of  the  rift  by  conflating  CALM  and  armed  patrols.  He  said,  “many  participants  in  

CALM  [were]  the  greatest  agitators  of  unrest  in  our  community,”  and  they  now  operated  

with  “the  official  blessing  of  the  city  administration.”92  Keating  referenced  the  incident  a  

few  weeks  prior  wherein  Sorl  Shead,  a  Panther  and  member  of  the  Police-­‐Community  

Relations  Committee,  had  intervened  in  a  girl’s  arrest  at  the  Holly  Shopping  Center.93  In  a  

statement  distributed  to  the  City  Council,  Keating  said  that  CALM’s  militant  participants  

and  planners  would  likely  violate  the  rules  of  the  proposal  and  use  arms  to  intimidate  and  

interfere  with  police.94  The  compromise,  which  had  allowed  for  other  citizen’s  patrol  

groups  to  form  within  Police  Department  guidelines,  had  spawned  several  “off-­‐shoot”  

patrols.  The  informal  and  volunteer  CALM  patrol  had  split  into  an  additional  “militant  

                                                                                                               90Adult  Education  Committee,  Education  of  the  Establishment,  July  22  1968.  Box  305.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  91July  24th  Draft  of  CALM  proposal,  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  and  August  2,  Letter  of  Resignation  from  Joe  Boyd  to  USPS,  Joe  Boyd  Speech,  July  19  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  Box  186  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  92“CALM  plan  sharply  attacked  by  Keating.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  July  21  1968  93Michael  Rounds  “Vigilante-­‐Type  Patrols  Distress  Police.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  June  29  1968  94“CALM  plan  sharply  attacked  by  Keating.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  July  21  1968  

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patrol.”  Also  on  the  street  were  “unarmed  adults”  who  had  begun  patrolling  in  the  summer  

of  1967  and  the  “Virginia  Vale  Village  Association,”  a  white  patrol  that  sought  to  “protect  

white  residents.”  City  officials  were  concerned  that  the  multitude  of  groups  could  result  in  a  

competition  for  power  to  the  detriment  of  community  safety.95  After  the  above  press,  City  

Council  President  Elvin  Caldwell,  a  black  representative  of  district  containing  most  of  

Northeast  Denver,  publicly  cautioned  against  the  citizens  patrols.96    

The  CALM  proposal  failed  to  win  popular  support  because  it  could  not  be  divorced  

from  the  armed  patrols  of  the  Black  Panthers  or  rioting  youth.  Few  residents  polled  had  

heard  of  CALM.  Only  15%  knew  the  purpose  of  the  specific  patrol  or  could  identify  its  

leadership.  70%  of  those  polled  were  against  citizen  patrols  in  their  neighborhood.  The  

perspectives  of  black  businessmen  interviewed  reveal  confusion  about  the  plan’s  purpose.  

One  said  he  thought  “the  militants”  were  behind  CALM  and  that  they  were  “hurting  this  

part  of  Denver”  by  destroying  property.  Another  said  that  he  thought  CALM  was  “the  basis  

of  the  troubles  we  have  been  having,”  and  blamed  the  organization  for  making  it  hard  for  

black-­‐owned  businesses  to  get  insurance.97    

Public  support  of  the  CALM  proposal  was  further  damaged  when  Denver’s  Five  

Points  erupted  in  several  nights  of  violence.  Gerald  Mitchell,  a  black  sixteen-­‐year-­‐old  boy  

caught  his  arm  on  the  screen  door  of  Gregory’s  Cleaners  on  28th  Avenue.  Mitchell  told  the  

clerk  about  his  injury,  and  the  clerk  called  him  a  slur.  Byron  Gregory,  the  white  owner,  

came  out  from  the  back  of  the  store  and  brandished  a  pipe  at  the  youth.  Gregory  threw  

cleaning  fluid  on  Mitchell  and  locked  him  out  of  the  store.  Later  that  day,  a  group  of  young  

                                                                                                               95“City  Civilian  Patrol  Plan  Spawns  Several  Offshoots.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  July  25  1968.  96Charles  Roach,  “Caldwell  fears  Results  of  Citizens  Patrol  Move.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  July  25  1968.  97Ed  Pendleton,  “Patrols  Lack  Wide  Support.”  Denver  Post,  July  28  1968.  

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black  men  broke  the  store's  windows  and  trashed  the  inside  of  the  store.  This  escalated  

into  an  open  conflict  involving  youth,  Black  Panthers,  and  police.  The  police  raided  the  

home  of  Lauren  Watson  and  swept  more  than  half  a  dozen  militants  into  custody.98  Of  

those  arrested,  many  had  affiliations  with  Model  Cities  and  had  been  under  scrutiny  by  

conservative  politicians  for  receiving  federal  funding  through  the  Resident  Participation  

program  that  paid  for  meeting  attendance.99  The  rioting  continued  into  the  following  night.  

Police  responded  to  a  kitchen  fire  in  the  neighborhood,  but  soon  after  their  arrival,  multiple  

snipers  began  to  fire  at  them.  One  of  the  arrested  sniper  suspects  was  James  E.  Young,  a  

Panther  who  also  sat  on  the  mayor’s  negotiation  committee  for  CALM.100  Rioting  continued  

in  the  area  for  several  hours.  Police  cars  were  met  with  bottles  and  rocks.  Once  again,  

newspapers  reported  on  racially  motivated  muggings  against  white  people  in  the  area.    

In  the  days  following,  Chief  Seaton  and  others  opposed  to  CALM  capitalized  on  white  

anxiety.  Seaton  enjoined  sniping  by  Panthers,  liberal  social  theories,  and  the  self-­‐identified  

militants  within  municipal  programs  in  an  attack  on  resident  participation  and  Currigan’s  

administration.  In  the  days  after  the  riots,  he  blamed  the  riots  on  “black  revolutionists,”  

who  he  said  were  “working  to  discredit  the  Denver  Police  Department.”101  In  a  meeting  

with  Chief  Seaton,  a  group  of  mostly  black  business  owners  asked  for  additional  police  

support  in  the  Five  Points  neighborhood.  A  diligent  politician,  Seaton  first  addressed  the  

crowd  by  explaining  how  he  wouldn’t  tolerate  discrimination.  When  the  mood  of  the  room  

became  apparent,  the  police  chief  switched  his  strategy  to  promising  additional  police  

                                                                                                               98“Angry  Mob  Attacks  Police  Car.”  Denver  Post,  Sept  13  1968.  99Dick  Johnson  “Aid  To  Senator  Probe  Pushed  by  Dominick.”  Denver  Post,  July  30  1968.  100Citizen  Participation  in  Community  Harmony,  July  11  1968.  Box  186.  Denver  Model  City  Program  Records,  WH1222,  Western  History  Collection,  The  Denver  Public  Library  101“Prominent  Negros  Call  for  Restraint.”  Denver  Post,  Sept  15  1968.  

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presence  and  a  crackdown  on  rioting  and  juvenile  delinquency.  Seaton  blamed  the  area’s  

under-­‐policing  on  “bad  advice”  given  by  community  relations  experts  and  unnamed  people  

in  Mayor  Currigan’s  administration.  Seaton  assured  the  group  that  he  wouldn’t  listen  to  the  

“phony  theory”  peddled  by  the  liberal  administration  and  black  militants.  Encouraged  by  

the  group’s  requests  for  additional  policing,  Seaton  named  the  militants  as  the  problem.  Joe  

Boyd  and  Lauren  Watson,  among  others,  Seaton  said,  “[are]  determined  to  run  things  in  

this  city  ….  They  want  their  own  black  police.”  He  then  encouraged  the  black  business  

owners  to  go  to  the  mayor  and  make  their  grievances  known.  The  business  owners  agreed  

that  “too  many  committees”  had  claimed  to  represent  them  and  obscured  their  needs.  The  

riots  had  led  the  black  middle  class,  concerned  first  with  economic  security,  to  ally  with  

Seaton  and  against  resident  participation.102    

  Seaton’s  shift  during  the  meeting  with  black  business  owners  signified  the  

successful  dominance  of  law  and  order  and  security  rhetoric.  In  a  statement  a  few  days  

later,  Mayor  Currigan  fell  in  line  behind  Seaton  and  endorsed  his  “get  tough”  policy.103  

Seaton  pulled  the  liberal  administration  toward  increased  policing  and  away  from  resident  

participation.  CALM  made  no  more  major  waves  in  the  media  until  it  was  withdrawn  in  

November  at  the  urging  of  the  City  Council.104  The  Rocky  Mountain  News  published  an  

editorial  on  the  floundering  Model  Cities  Program,  which  mentioned  how  some  committees  

had  become  wallowed  in  conflicts  between  minority  leaders  and  existing  city  departments.  

The  editorial  concluded,  however,  that  the  “ambiguous”  and  “ambitious”  project  was  too  

                                                                                                               102Richard  O’Reilly,  “Seaton  Vows  Better  Police  Protection.”  Denver  Post,  Sept  27  1968.  103John  Morehead,  “Mayor  OKs  Firm  Police  Reaction.”  Denver  Post,  Sept  30  1968.  104Dan  Bell,  “CALM  Proposal  is  Withdrawn  from  Model  Cities.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  Nov  8  1968.  

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costly  to  be  effective.105  Police-­‐minority  relations  in  Denver  continued  to  be  strained,  and  

Seaton  dedicated  even  more  department  resources  to  aggressively  pursuing  Denver’s  small  

Black  Panthers  chapter.    

In  the  wake  of  a  crisis  of  policing  in  Northeast  Park  Hill  black  militants  injected  

liberal  politics  with  black  power  solutions.  White  liberal  officials  at  first  opened  to  the  ideas  

of  autonomy,  dignity  and  authentic  participation  the  CALM  proposal  signified.  The  Denver  

Blade  had  defined  militancy  as  “vigil,  an  awakening,  a  need,  an  act,”  and  “a  movement  

which  is  already  here.”  The  Blade  continued  that  if  anything  were  to  be  averted  in  the  

summer  of  1968  or  any  other,  “the  power  structure”  would  have  to  “recognize  this  body,”  

referring  to  an  amorphous  militancy.106  Over  the  course  of  the  CALM  debate,  white  liberals  

split  over  the  challenge  of  incorporating  an  authentically  dynamic  black  political  culture.  In  

crisis,  liberals  abandoned  militant  voices  and  dynamic  strategies  and  turned  toward  an  

ideology  of  security.  

                                                                                                               105“Model  Cities  Experiment.”  Rocky  Mountain  News,  Nov  15  1968  106Joe  L  Brown,  “Change  the  Name  Now!”  Denver  Blade,  April  8  1968.