Britain’s Outsider Status in Crisis? UK

Pro-Enlargement Policy and Implications for

EU-Balkan relations

Amelie Meyer-Robinson

This paper seeks to address the tension between Britain’s role as an out-

sider in the European integration process and its pro-enlargement policy

with regard to the Western Balkans. Coloured by its liberal intervention-

ist involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Yugoslavia in

1995 and 1999 (eds Daddow and Gaskarth 2011), Britain has attempted

to cover its bases by pursuing inclusive enlargement while demanding

adherence to standards of liberal democracy, the rule of law and respect

for ethnic minorities. Nonetheless, Britain remains affected by the deep

divide between its domestic elite and public opinion with regard to Eu-

ropean enlargement and integration, and also faces accusations of pursu-

ing enlargement as a way of weakening the European project (Herranz-

Surralles 2012; Chatham House 2012). Using identity-based and discur-

sive analysis of Britain’s foreign policy, this paper argues that British

policy toward the Western Balkans has been part and parcel of attempts

to control the enlargement process while isolating Britain from further

integration into the EU. Importantly, Britain is as involved as Germany

and France in empire-building in the candidate states (Zielonka 2006; ed.

Parker 2008; Subotic 2011).

1

Keywords: foreign policy analysis; identity; discourse analysis; empire;

New Labour; Cameron.

It has become somewhat of a cliche to speak of the Anglo-American relationship

as a ‘special’ relationship; nevertheless, this special relationship provides a striking

contrast to the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union,

which is marked by vacillation between mistrust and outright displeasure. Several

arguments have been forwarded for the supposed amity in foreign affairs between

the United States and the United Kingdom, one of which, published recently, argues

that racialised norms at the turn of the twentieth century cemented the cooperation

and era of peaceful relations between the declining imperial state and the upstart

constitutional democracy (Vucetic 2011).

This paper began out of the interest in how these relationships are mediated

through forms of identity and discourse, an approach attributed in the literature to

authors like Janice Bially Mattern (2005), Iver B. Neumann (1996a/b, 1998, 2011),

Ole Waever (1997) and Barry Buzan (2010).

It proposes an English School approach to explaining why the United Kingdom

has, over the period from the second wave of European Union enlargement between

1981 and 1986 to the most recent inclusion of Croatia into the European Union in

July 2013, pursued an overwhelmingly inclusive and standards-based policy on en-

largement. It uses as evidence the discourse of the party platforms of the three major

UK parties, the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties, as well as pol-

icy papers, conference notes, think tank and party policy briefings, and statements

by European and national politicians. This research method is informed by a piece

by Anna Herranz-Surralles (2012) entitled ”Justifying Enlargement in a Multi-level

Polity: A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the Elites-Public Gap over European

Union Enlargement,” which argues that the European Union enlargement process is

characterised by a series of arguments forwarded by national elites in convincing

Euroskeptic populations of the utility and benefits of enlargement. These arguments

2

are subdivided into ‘normative’ and ‘utilitarian’ arguments for the enlargement pro-

cess. The study cites arguments about economic benefits and rising global political

influence as a result of enlargement, as well as normative appeals to the fostering

of peace and stability in the European neighbourhood and shared culture, as types

of arguments forwarded by elites in persuading publics. In the case of the UK, I

have considered public opinion polls like the 2012 Chatham House YouGov poll and

Eurobarometer polls on European enlargement (2009) and UK attitudes toward the

European Union (2011). Moreover, I propose a combination of standards-based and

utilitarian arguments for enlargement in the UK case.

The theoretical framework of this paper, in order to argue that the UK’s pro-

enlargement policy is motivated by the identity turn in international relations, is

that proposed by the English School of International Relations, and what it pro-

poses about the expansion of a community of states. Fred Halliday has summarised

this tradition in Rethinking International Relations (1994) as a ”constitutive” tra-

dition, which accords importance to ”what happens within states and societies, and

examines the interaction of international activity with domestic legitimacy and sta-

bility (1994: 95).” Halliday asks, how can we locate convergence between members of

international society not in transnational, that is, liberal, or systemic, that is, realist,

accounts of state formation, but rather in a constitutive tradition? He continues by

conceding:

Inter-state relations may....constitute a society, not so much because of

the shared values involved, but because it is a grouping established by

the coercion of some states by others and maintained, with a variety

of ideological and military mechanisms, by the more powerful members.

The mechanism identified in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, whereby

the subjugated accept their ruler’s values, would also apply in the in-

ternational arena (as would the theoretical ambiguities Gramsci’s thesis

raises, such as whether those who are subordinate actually accept the

values, ‘believe’ in them, or pretend to, or are in fact subjugated by their

espousing a different, subaltern value system (102)).

3

My argument is also informed by a reading of identity in international relations,

specifically of European identity, proposed by geopolitical and international-order

focused approaches to studying the politics of the European Union. Jan Zielonka

(2006) and Ola Tunander et al. (eds 1997) have (to paraphrase this research some-

what reductively) studied the European enlargement process as a process of empire-

building, arguing that the politics of conditionality, the role of far-reaching standards

to which candidate states must adhere, embodied by the Copenhagen criteria and

Agenda 2000, and the geopolitical anxiety of EU members at the periphery of Eu-

rope, have strengthened the perception of Europe as an empire in the post-Cold

War era. Frameworks that challenge the somewhat benign reading of the English

School, not least the critical hegemonic analysis proposed by Antonio Gramsci and

geopolitical analyses that focus on the EU as neomedieval, sit somewhat uneasily

next to the dominant liberal institutionalist analysis of European cooperation and

the instruments of conditionality (see notably Schimmelfennig 2006, Paraskevopoulos

2001). These suggest that international relations in Europe are at least partly medi-

ated by the identity aspects of centre-periphery relations in Europe. Peer Joenniemi,

Noel Parker (2008) and Ole Waever (1997) have argued that the United Kingdom,

as well as Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, are informed by their marginal

position vis-a-vis the ‘central’ powers of Europe, usually identified as Germany and

France, and Parker emphasises various mechanisms by which the UK has leveraged

its marginal status into the formulation of a particular form of civic democracy and

a role as the chief provider of capital for the continent. Others, like Barbara Lip-

pert and Heather Grabbe (2001), in their work on British and German interests in

EU enlargement, argue that Britain’s position raises a geopolitical paradox. The

“strongest supporters” of enlargement, according to Lippert and Grabbe, have been

those countries

with immediate geopolitical and security concerns arising from geograph-

ical proximity to and substantial economic interest in the potential new

entrants: the Scandinavian and Nordic countries, Germany, Austria, and,

to some extent, Greece...Britain is somewhat unusual, supporting enlarge-

ment principally for reasons of security and stability in Europe as a whole,

4

despite being both geographically distant and lacking major economic in-

terests in the region.

It is clear, though, that the ‘answer’ to this paradox, as I hope to demonstrate, lies

in Britain’s position of peripherality in Europe as a whole, and the role of so-called

‘standards of civilisation’ that inform the UK’s position on enlargement.

British policy on enlargement, far from constituting an attempt to weaken the EU’s

efforts at integration by introducing more voices, is grounded in an inclusive position

in respect of candidate states to the EU. Britain hopes to hold these countries to

what it considers a peculiarly Western standard of civilisation, and has pursued this

position both by force, during the intervention of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

Republic of Yugoslavia, or by persuasion, through a policy that is explicitly centred

around candidates meeting standards like the rule of law, good governance, civilian

control over the military, democracy, and protection of LGBTQ rights. This has also

come to mirror the influence of solidarism on public discourse in Britain regarding the

norms and values that informed citizens feel should guide international action, and

elite discourses centred around normative and utilitarian arguments for enlargement

which are made despite significant resistance to further enlargement. Importantly,

2013 enlargement has been the culmination of one of ”the most drawn-out” accession

processes in the history of EU integration (Bieber 2012, p 5). After Croatian acces-

sion, Florian Bieber (2012) argues, the western Balkans region is palpably ‘shrinking’

into a group of ‘left-over’ states. For Bieber, this means that the enlargement pro-

cess feels almost as though linked to the conceptual pairing of a state’s joining the

EU and, through its accession, excluding the Western Balkans from Europe ‘proper’.

This analysis is supported by the work of Vedran Dzihic (2012) and Gerald Knaus

(2012, op cit), with interesting implications for our understanding of what future

accession will mean both for European identity and newly acceding states. It might

be instructive to return again to the master historical sociologist Fred Halliday, who,

referencing Martin Wight, suggests that the ”elitist” and ”exclusionary” aspects of

the expansion of a community of states are felt most clearly during the process of

accession. Wight accepted the idea of an exclusive society of states against which

5

non-members (for example, infidels, Muslim Turks, non-sovereign states) were jux-

taposed (102).

Internally, the UK has faced some interesting challenges over the past fifteen

years, not least in facing an interminable but gradual process of devolution and re-

gionalisation in line with developments in other EU countries. It is difficult to speak

of the UK as an actor with a single voice; rather, British consensus is split quite

heavily along elite-public, central-peripheral and urban-rural lines. The UK is com-

pletely unlike fellow EU member Spain, for example, beholden to a similar history

of mistrust between the centre and the periphery, with its desire for independence

from what it perceived as the foreign rule of a dominant central state. While the

South-Eastern UK belongs to the so-called ”Golden” belt, or ”Banana,” of Europe,

which includes South-Western Germany, Paris/Ile de France, Northern Spain, and

Northern Italy1, the North is economically impoverished. The legal and regulatory

process of convergence on certain issues like the budgetary opt-out, consumer pro-

tection laws and fisheries laws, have shaped the UK irrevocably, and much of this

can be traced back to the embracing of European integration in the New Labour era

under Tony Blair and under his successor, Gordon Brown. During this time, the UK

chaired two EU presidencies, one in January - June 1997, and the second from July

- December 2005, to varying success.

Despite a significant rhetorical shift in EU policy under the Tory administration

of David Cameron, the UK has been ”largely supportive of and has contributed to

the way the European community has dealt with applicant countries [since 2001]

(Lippert: 11).” Moreover, in ”emphasising the need for appropriate policy and insti-

tutional reforms as [sole] prerequisites for successful enlargement, Britain...perceives

the prospects of an EU of [25] member states more sanguinely than many others

(10).” Indeed, it seems the debate on enlargement is largely tied up to the role of

binding standards to which candidate states are held in the accession process, and

often beyond accession itself. In practice, this means that newly acceding states will

1The term ‘golden’ banana is a somewhat malapropistic term linked to the ”core-dominance”theory in geopolitics. This theory holds that the core of Europe is centred around a so-called ‘goldenbanana’ of wealthy regions, including Germany and France, which leaves the southern and non-coreregions at the periphery (Paraskevopoulos 2001).

6

continue to be subjected to external monitoring of their progress and compliance

with community standards. For example, the UK fully supported a recent recom-

mendation by EU Commissioner Stefan Fule for the European Council to adopt five

so-called ”fundamentals” underpinning the enlargement process, including the rule

of law, strengthening economic governance, support for democratic institutions, re-

spect for fundamental rights, and ties between the enlargement countries and EU

member states (Press release 16/10/13, p 1).

Second, the debate on enlargement is largely decoupled from the UK debate on

European integration, which is both much more ideologically charged and much less

informed by what Lippert and Grabbe term ”pragmatism.” For the purposes of this

paper, I am interested in the reasons for the UK’s policy on enlargement as distinct

from policy on integration, and specifically, the role of exactly these types of ‘utilitar-

ian’ or ‘pragmatic’ arguments in furthering the debate on enlargement. Importantly,

if we can recall, the clearest position in favour of integration by a British administra-

tion - under Tony Blair’s New Labour administration - was also a position that saw

a European split along opposition to and support for the War in Iraq, and effectively

divided European foreign policy consensus. The phases of enlargement to include

Croatia, beginning in 2004 with the opening of the accession process, through 2005

with the opening of membership negotiations and 2012 with the accession referendum

in Croatia, has spanned three administrations in UK politics.

Between 1997 and 2010, British foreign policy was informed by the neo-liberal

discursive turn emphasising ‘interdependence’ in a globalised world, the renewal of

an ”ethical” turn in policy, the repositioning of Britain at the centre of European

integration after the ”trauma” of Conservative leadership under John Major, and a

meeting of various ”threats” against national unity, including those from Scottish

nationalists (Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011: 1; Griffiths and Hickson, 2010). Den-

nis Kavanagh notes that the movement was paradoxically intended to be ”post-

ideological,” drawing, according to Prof. Martin Smith, on the ”complex contradic-

tory and conflicting traditions of social democracy, social conservatism, Thatcherism

and pragmatism...[drawing] on varying traditions according to the principal goal to

advance at a particular time (in Griffiths, p 19).” The personal affinity of Prime

7

Minister Blair for Gladstonian liberalism, with ”a moralistic, sometimes messianic

tone, in [Blair’s] language” and shaped by ”clear conceptions of faith and morality

framing [the] foreign policy discourse” under New Labour underlined that this new

policy was anything but post-ideological (Hill 2005, p 389; Dyson 2009, p 36-7, in op

cit, p 5). However, the financial deregulation brought about under the Conservative

administration of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, which continued apace, also

had the paradoxical effect of strengthening Britain’s very narrowly defined role as the

center of finance in Europe while New Labour pursued greater, not less, integration

with Europe. In fact, although the British ”preference for ”negative integration”

(Wallace 1997, p 688)” is linked to an analysis of its marginal position in Europe,

from the late 1960s onwards, Noel Parker (2008) notes the ”pro-European position

has tended to go hand in hand, even in the post-Thatcher era, with adopting the

role of financial entrepot for European money (ed. Parker 2008, p 110).”

It is also difficult to separate Conservative UK policy on the Western Balkans

from the policies of Tony Blair in the region from 1997 to 2007, which very much

affected, according to Lippert and Hughes (2001, p 4)

the geopolitical questions surrounding enlargement and contributed in

no small measure to the decision...to open accession negotiations to all

the candidate countries, including Bulgaria and Romania...[and] put the

‘Restern’ Balkans on the agenda with the Stability Pact and suggestions

of possible EU membership for the Western Balkan countries...down the

line.

Importantly, New Labour ”took credit” both for improving European relations at

a time when most of Europe was divided over the issue of the war in Iraq and

for kickstarting the enlargement process, two core motivations behind the UK’s EU

Presidencies in 1997 and 2005. Blair credited New Labour in the following statement

(in eds Daddow and Gaskarth 2011, p 9):

[New Labour] achieved enlargement. We took over, with France, the

shaping of European defence. We formulated the economic reform pro-

gramme from Lisbon onwards. Even where we divided from the others,

8

we did so with allies. Finally, we put through a Budget deal that most

thought couldn’t be done.

and, on the justifications for enlargement (2002, in Zielonka 2006, p 50),

Enlargement will extend Europe’s area of peace, democracy and prosper-

ity. We will also be safer and more secure through better cooperation

on border controls, asylum and immigration, joint efforts to tackle cross-

border crime, and shared environmental standards.

The policy of David Cameron on enlargement demonstrates further continuity with

the policies of New Labour on enlargement. The Conservative Party’s European

election manifesto for 2017, when Britain is set to assume the EU presidency, reveals

that the UK is committed to pursuing a referendum on EU membership if issues of

national independence are not resolved. Moreover, the flirtation with a 2017 refer-

endum reflects the growing political influence of Euroskeptics on the Conservative

Party and mainstream public discourse. A Liberal Democratic pamphlet (2012: 8)

issued at the time of the financial crisis noted that this Euroskepticism extends in

the public mind to a fear or mistrust of enlargement, arguing ”rightly or wrongly,

the enlargement of the European Union...has been associated in the minds of many

ordinary electors in the European Union with a sense that the political identity of the

Union was being diluted, in the interest of a purely economic Union geared around

the values of economic liberalism and globalisation.” Nonetheless, the discursive and

identity-based shifts on integration policy at both the public opinion and policy lev-

els have not been met by a similar reversal on issues of enlargement. Almost all

statements by Conservative MEPs emphasise the need for widening enlargement to

include all Western Balkan states, including Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo

and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Turkey, which was offered accession in a

process beginning in 2004 but has been stymied by opposition to its accession in

Germany and France. The Minister for Europe at the UK Foreign Office, David

Lidington, commented recently:

We...underline the EU’s support for future enlargement, coupled with

a firm-but-fair approach that applies tough conditionality and rewards

9

progress made by individual countries strictly on merit. It is vital for

the credibility of the enlargement process that countries only join the EU

when they are fully ready to do so (Lidington, in EP 2013).

In a more informal article, a Conservative MP from Stockton South, James Wharton,

argued

both Kosovo and Albania aspire to EU membership. I have no doubt

the UK will get a referendum on whether we remain a member, hopefully

through my own Private Members Bill, but whatever the British people

decide our future in Europe should be we need to work with countries like

these to secure our long term national interest. They are making tangible

progress and if Conservatives do not engage, others will (Wharton, in

Conservative Home 2013).

How can we explain the divergence between the largely pro-inclusive enlargement

position adopted by British administrations from New Labour onwards and the gen-

eral public dissatisfaction with the European Union, and public hostility toward

integration? The most recent data (Chatham House 2012) suggest that Britons are

increasingly divided on issues of European integration, and especially on the outcome

of a referendum, with forty-nine per cent of the general public and only twenty-seven

per cent of ‘opinion formers’ suggesting they would vote to leave the European Union

in the case of a referendum. Over sixty-three per cent of elites surveyed suggested

they would vote to remain in the European Union, however, while only thirty per

cent of responders from the general public suggested they would vote to stay in the

EU (Fig. 1). Britons also tend to hold highly negative views of the EU (Fig. 3)

while affirming that the European Union is Britain’s most important ally on issues

of national interest, usually outlined along prioritisation of issues of immigration and

border security, counterterrorism and deproliferation (op cit). British attitudes as

evidenced in the 2012 poll also build on earlier poll data suggesting ”more than half

the general public and two-thirds of the opinion-formers thought Britain should work

closely with the EU (Chatham House 2010, p 4).” This paper suggests, however, that

10

the data are compatible with the expectations of Herranz-Surralles’ thesis that elites

may try to forward a series of arguments to persuade publics of the benefits of en-

largement, using both normative and utilitarian arguments. As noted in a briefing

by a think tank affiliated with the UK Liberal Democratic party, the British public

links further European enlargement to perceptions of weakened national security,

increased immigration and damaging liberalisation of economic flows.

The data in a Eurobarometer study commissioned by the European Parliament on

attitudes to enlargement (2009) confirm that these attitudes are rooted in attitudes

to the waves of European enlargement between 2007 and 2009. The study suggests

that democratic values, economic concerns and issues of immigration are of high

priority for European publics in considering further enlargement. Fifty per cent of

respondents suggested that issues of freedom and democratic values should be rated

highly in terms of European interests as a whole, followed by economic issues and

immigration. Immigration and economic issues were rated of higher priority for

respondent’s countries of origin than for Europe as a whole, however (forty-six and

thirty per cent, respectively). According to the study, ”in Italy, Malta, the United

Kingdom, and, to a certain extent, Austria, citizens were more likely to consider

immigration an important factor when it came to assessing future EU enlargements

(EB No. 257 2009, p 37-39).” Issues of shared culture and religion, and of stability

at EU borders, were named by UK respondents to a much lower degree than in Italy

and Malta.

11

Figure 1: YouGov Survey 2012 Results (General Public): European Union Results

In conclusion, British policy toward the Western Balkans from New Labour on-

wards has been part and parcel of attempts to control the enlargement process while

keeping Britain isolated from political commitment to EU integration - in line with

much of public opinion in the UK. The Conservative Party has backed this with-

drawal from the integration process, citing the encroachment on British national

interest and sovereignty by the project of European integration, while strengthening,

rather than weakening, European civilisational discourse through inclusive enlarge-

ment. The reasons for, and implications of, this policy shall be summarised in point

form in the subsequent section, and it is the hope of the author that research into the

effectiveness of UK conditionality for political developments in the Western Balkans

- in light of an analysis of empire - could be pursued.

• The UK’s push for inclusive enlargement has furthered an understanding of

12

Figure 2: YouGov Survey 2012 Results (Opinion-Formers): European Union Results

European identity as empire. For Zielonka, the challenge posed by the

opening of future candidacy to states like Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus and Turkey

is that these states will represent the greatest challenge to the imperial project,

which relies on voluntary, not hegemonic, participation. The accession process

of Croatia, which was seen as a successful casting off of intransigence on issues

of national identity, rule of law and political issues, as well as the embracing of

cooperation with the ICTY, reflects the all-or-nothing position on enlargement

that many European countries now pursue. Indeed, the (territorial and cul-

tural) exclusion of those who do not conform to this Europeanisation becomes

ever clearer.

• UK policy, while reproducing a standards-based discourse, foresees an acceler-

ated enlargement process. The rhetorical emphasis on ‘lost time’ or ‘time

13

Figure 3: YouGov Survey 2012 Results (Opinion-Formers): European Union Results

running out’ and the emphasis on peace and stability also serve to underwrite

a kind of legitimacy on the UK’s part, since Britain is not playing for time

but would, in fact, like to see all candidate states, including Turkey, becom-

ing permanent EU members. However, given the UK’s withdrawal from the

integration process, it is unlikely that the British position will dominate the

enlargement process, which, according to many theorists of European institu-

tions, is informed by procedural, not strategic considerations (Zielonka 2006).

• From the starting point of identity, Britain’s solidarist foreign policy is in-

formed by a particularly liberal tradition that informs British actions abroad

irrespective of which administration is currently in power. The legacy of New

Labour, which tried to make liberal internationalist positions the ‘normal’ po-

sitions of government, seems to have, therefore, remained unchallenged.

14

However, it is clear that while the neo-liberal aspects of British policy are met

with mistrust in much of the Western Balkan candidate states, the British

commitment to national principles, broadly defined, has much in common with

those candidate states that fear the encroachment of the EU.

15

References

Bull, H 2002, The anarchical society: a study of order in international politics, 3rd

edn, Columbia University Press, New York.

Buzan, B 2010, Globalization and identity: is world society possible?’,

Journal of Zhejiang University, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 5-14. Available from:

http://www.journals.zju.edu.cn/soc/EN/volumn/current.shtml [5 November 2013].

Daddow, O and Gaskarth, J (eds) 2011, British foreign policy: the New Labour

years, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Dzihic, V and Hamilton, D (eds) 2012, Unfinished business: the Western Balkans

and the international community, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.

EurActiv 2013, ‘Appetite for EU enlargement hits all time low’. Avail-

able from: http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-appetite-enlargements-hits-

ti-news-531142 [5 November 2013].

Eurasia Review 2013, ‘Too Much Time Lost For FYR Macedonia, Says

Howitt MEP In Response To EU Progress Report’. Available from:

http://www.eurasiareview.com/16102013-much-time-lost-fyr-macedonia-says-

howitt-mep-response-eu-progress-report/ [5 November 2013].

European Parliamentary Labour Party (n.d.), 19 Labour MEPs: Over 100 Achieve-

ments (brochure) [PDF], Available from: http://ow.ly/ugVtd [5 November 2013].

The Federal Trust for education and research 2008, The European Parliament and

Enlargement [PDF], Available from: http://ow.ly/ugVHQ [5 November 2013].

The Gallup Organization 2009, Flash Eurobarometer: Vol. 257. Views on European

Union Enlargement (Research Report No. 257) [PDF]. [5 November 2013].

The Gallup Organization 2011, Flash Eurobarometer: Vol. 318. Attitudes towards

the EU in the United Kingdom (Research Report No. 318) [PDF]. [5 November

2013].

16

Griffiths, S and Hickson, K (eds) 2010, British party politics and ideology after New

Labour, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.

Hague, W 2010, Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World. [5 November 2013].

Halliday, F 1994, Rethinking international relations, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Hassan, G 2011, ‘The ‘forward march of Scottish nationalism’, Renewal : a Journal

of Labour Politics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 50-63.

Herranz-Surralles, A 2012, ‘Justifying enlargement in a multi-level polity: a discur-

sive institutionalist analysis of the elites-public gap over European Union enlarge-

ment’, Journal of common market studies, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 385-402.

Lebeda, V 2013, MEPs back Stefan Fule’s five fundamentals for countries wanting

to join the EU. Available from: http://ow.ly/ugW7G [5 November 2013].

Let Britain Decide (n.d.). Available from: The Conservative Party website.

http://www.letbritaindecide.com/ [5 November 2013].

Liberal Democrats 2013, Our policy on...Europe [Pamphlet] [PDF]. Available from:

http://ow.ly/ugXjm [5 November 2013]

Liberal Democrats 2013, Renewing the European Union for the 21st Century, Poster

session presented at Autumn conference of the Liberal Democrats, Glasgow [PDF].

Available from: http://ow.ly/ugWQW [5 November 2013]

Lippert, B, Grabbe, H, Hughes, K and Becker, P 2001, British and German interests

in EU enlargement: conflict and cooperation, Continuum, London.

Mabutt, A 2010, National Security Green Paper. Available from: The Conservative

Party website. http://ow.ly/ugXED [5 November 2013].

Mandelson, P 2007, The European Union in the Global Age (pamphlet), Available

from: http://ldeg.org/en/document/european-policy-and-briefing-documents/the-

european-union-in-a-global-age.pdf [5 November 2013].

17

Mattern, JB 2005, Ordering international politics: identity, crisis, and representa-

tional force, Routledge, New York.

Mayhew, A 2007, ‘Europe, the next 50 years’ in: Europe, the next 50 years.

Paper presented at a symposium conducted at EU50 Project by the Liberal

Democrat European Group, Goodwood House, Sussex, ed. S. Quigley. Available

from: http://ldeg.org/en/article/2007/097401/europe-the-next-50-years [5 Novem-

ber 2013].

Mitzen, J 2005, Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global

Public Spheres’, American Political Science Review, vol. 99, no. 3, pp. 401-417.

Mullen, A 2007, The British left’s great debate on Europe, Continuum, London.

Neumann, IB 1996a, Russia as Europe’s other, European University Institute, Badia

Fiesolana.

Neumann, IB 1996b, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and In-

ternational Relations, Routledge, New York.

Neumann, IB 1998, Borderlines: Vol. 9. Uses of the other: The East in European

identity formation, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Neumann, IB 2011, ‘Entry into international society reconceptualised: the case of

Russia’, Review of international studies, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 463-484.

Noutcheva, G 2009, ‘Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU’s

normative power in the Western Balkans’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol.

16, no. 7, pp. 1065-1084.

Paraskevopoulos, CJ 2001, Interpreting convergence in the European Union: pat-

terns of collective action, social learning, and Europeanization, Palgrave: Bas-

ingstoke.

Parker, N (ed.) 2008, The geopolitics of Europe’s identity: centers, boundaries and

margins, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

18

Risse, T 2000, “‘Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics’, Interna-

tional Organization, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 1-32.

Schimmelfennig, F 2001, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action,

and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization,

vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 47-80.

Schimmelfennig, F, Engert, S and Knobel, H 2006, International socialization in

Europe: European organizations, political conditionality and democratic change.

Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Subotic, J 2011, ‘Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the

Balkans’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 309-330.

Tunander, O, Baev, P and Einagel, VI (eds) 1997, Geopolitics in post-Wall Europe:

security, territory and identity, SAGE, London.

Vucetic, S 2011, ‘A Racialized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Rela-

tionship Special’, Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 403-422.

Wharton, J 2013, Conservatives must forge international alliances in the Balkans, or

others will. Available from: Conservative Home blog, pp. 1-4. http://ow.ly/ugYuk

[5 November 2013].

Whitman, RG 2005, ‘No and after: options for Europe’, International Affairs, vol.

81, no. 4, pp. 673-87.

Whitman, RG 2013, ‘Croatia’s EU Accession: Enlargement Without Fanfare’.

Available from: http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/192769 [5

November 2013].

Wight, M 1960, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ International Relations,

vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 35-48.

Williams, P 2004, ‘Who’s making UK foreign policy?’ International Affairs, vol.

80, no. 5, pp. 911-929.

19

Wintour, P 1999, ‘Conflict in the Balkans: What Britain thinks: The debate: Left

and Right link up in odd alliances - Patrick Wintour on the opinions that divide

political generations’ (editorial), The Observer, p. 18.

YouGov 2011, Chatham House-YouGov Survey 2011. Available from:

http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/176813 [5 November

2013].

YouGov 2012, Chatham House-YouGov Survey 2012. Available from:

http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/europe/current-projects/chatham-house-

yougov-survey [5 November 2013].

Young, JW 2000, Britain and European unity, 1945-1999, 2nd edn, Macmillan:

Basingstoke.

Zielonka, J 2006, Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union,

Oxford University Press, Oxford.

20