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Contents Page

Foreword

Abstract I

Acknowledgements II

Introduction 1

Grande-Bretagne, et le “non” du General 7

Edward Heath: Lord Privy Seal 20

Into Europe, at Last! 28

Conclusion 38

Appendix I 40

Appendix II 41

Appendix III 42

Appendix IV 43

Appendix V 44

Appendix VI 45

Appendix VII 46

Bibliography 47

List of Abbreviations III

FOREWORD

Since this essay was written, Britain have elected a new Prime Minister, his name is David

Cameron of the Conservative Party. The Prime Minister seems to have a quite different

approach to the EU and its usefulness to Britain as a country. Cameron is arguing for better

value from EU than we currently receive. These events we now face are partly due to the way

the common market was designed. This essay will explain the history of the E.E.C (what is

now the EU), and Britain’s entry into it, along with the importance of it to our nation. This

essay does not serve as a definitive guide, but instead as literature to understanding Britain’s

historical entry into Europe and the context in which it happened. Especially with the EU

referendum being expected in the new few years, its time us British really developed an

understanding of the EU, in both its historical and present context.

I

ABSTRACT

This study of legislative and political history was written to bring an updated perspective

on the British political and economic issues that led to Britain's entry into the European

Economic Community. This dissertation has utilized parliamentary papers, newspapers of

the period, biographies and books discussing the European Economic Community and

Britain's relationship with Europe. Its main purpose is to analyse the former Conservative

Prime Minister Edward Heath's contribution to Britain's accession to the European

Economic Community in 1973. The study begins with an earlier analysis of the ideological

reasons for the vetoes by General Charles de Gaulle in 1963 and 1967. Subsequently, it

describes Edward Heath's contribution to parliament as Lord Privy Seal from the years

1961 to 1963, and his participation in the first application for British entry into the

European Economic Community. In its aim to examine the political reasons for Edward

Heath’s decision to apply for entry in 1973, the study intends to ultimately conclude

whether Britain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1973 was due to

Heath's pro-European foreign policy; or whether the decision was a result of the British

political and economic atmosphere.

II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Leeds Metropolitan University in its various forms, in particular the

European Documentation Centre, which contained documented sources such as the

European treaties and analyses' on the European Community. A special thanks is reserved

for Dr. Shane Ewen, my dissertation supervisor, who oversaw the construction of my work,

assisting with the careful redrafting, research and binding of the project.

I am also extremely and unreservedly thankful to Graham Glendall Norton (B.A.

(Stanford) Bsc. (Econ) (LSE), who inspired me whilst writing this dissertation, and who

was an exceptional source of the political atmosphere of the era, along with an in-depth

perspective on many of the Members of Parliament.

I appreciate the service that was made accessible by The National Archives, which I used

on a multitude of occasions, and the hundreds of hours that they allowed me to trawl

through confidential parliamentary papers of the governments of Macmillan and Edward

Heath.

There are several books that I utilized to help me understand the attitude of the main

character Edward Heath, and the attitudes of the sub-characters in my essay, General

Charles De Gaulle and Harold Macmillan. Lord Gladwyn's De Gaulle's Europe or Why the

General says No, John Campbell's Heath, Philip Ziegler's Edward Heath: The Authorised

Biography; Nora Beloff's The General says No.

1

INTRODUCTION

The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) was created in 1951 as a ‘common

market’ to allow free trade in goods and the movement of people without the restriction of

borders. The participating countries, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and

Germany, all become known as 'The Six'. Britain refused to enter at this time, partly due to

their military and economic dependence on the United States, and otherwise favouring the

Economic Free Trade Area (E.F.T.A.) and their leadership of the Commonwealth. Created

by French diplomat Robert Schuman, the main aim of the institution, in his own words,

was to 'make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible', through creating a

supranational institution, that would combine coal and steel production (the industries of

war) helping economic development and expansion while consolidating Europe under one

economic market and 'High Authority'. The overall goal was to strengthen Franco-German

relationships and to ensure world peace. With the signing and ratification of the Treaty of

Paris in 1957 (came into effect in 1958) the E.C.S.C. was adapted, thus establishing the

European Economic Community (E.E.C.).

While Edward Heath was the Leader of the Opposition from 1965-70, he made it

his primary goal to take Britain into the E.E.C. In this period, Prime Minister Harold

Wilson tried but failed, which afforded Heath's government the opportunity to try again in

1970 when he became Conservative Prime Minister. Whilst he was Leader of the

Opposition, Heath faced rivalry to his plans to achieve accession into Europe, from within

his own party and Labour, whilst battling with Wilson for the role of Prime Minister.

2

Britain did not enter into the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) until 1st

January 1973 with Prime Minister Edward Heath in office, after two unsuccessful

applications in 1963 and 1967 that were rejected by Charles De Gaulle:

EC membership in 1973 was for Edward Heath his defining political accomplishment and

the one of which he remained most proud (Geddes, 2004, p.74).

The history of Britain’s accession into the E.E.C. has been a source of critical

review and controversy as there are opposing theories on the events that led up to their

eventual entrance in 1973. Historically studied from a political and economic view, many

individuals have contributed to the historiography on the subject. Foreign Correspondent

Nora Beloff’s The General Says No, Prime Ministers Harold Wilson’s The Labour

Government 1964-70 and Civil Servant Lord Gladwyn Jebb’s The European Idea have all

been influential in offering aforetime views of the events and the political figures.

My research subject is split into two debates: the first asks what the primary causes

for Britain’s veto in 1963 and 1967 were. There is continuing controversy surrounding the

subject as there are three elements to this historic debate. These three elements are in turn

placed under political and economical motives. Historians aim to prove which one of the

following three strands was the most important factor in denying Britain’s entry, or if they

are of equal importance: first, de Gaulle’s geopolitical and politico-military stance; second,

Britain’s political and economic relationships; or, third, the establishment and maintenance

of the Common Agricultural Policy (C.AP.). Lord Gladwyn Jebb (1967) believes that the

distinctive primary cause for the veto of Britain’s applications in 1963 and 1967 was de

Gaulle’s geopolitical ideals, though he acknowledges that Britain’s political and economic

relationships did have an influence. He argues that the aim of de Gaulle’s policies was for

3

the ‘greater glory of France’, making repeated references to this ‘historic nationalism’

(Jebb, 1967, p.71). Christopher Booker and Richard North (2005) have recently written a

book using both Nora Beloff’s (1963) and Andrew Moravcsik’s (2000) work as a basis to

add further validity to this argument. Using both quantitative and qualitative data they add

a previously missed dimension to the debate, suggesting that de Gaulle’s commercial

interests were the most important factor, aimed at protecting French farming and industry.

Booker and North (2005) state that France wanted to exclude Britain from the E.E.C. until

the final agreements for the C.A.P. were in place, as if they did otherwise, it would threaten

French industry. Thus for that reason de Gaulle rejected Britain’s application, using

Britain’s Anglo-American relationship as an excuse.

‘To please the British should we call into question the Common Market and the negotiation

of the agricultural regulations that benefit us’ (North & Booker, 2005, p.117). This

argument is originally pointed out by Andrew Moravcsik in De Gaulle between Grain and

Grandeur: The Economic Origins of French EC Policy, 1958-1970 Part 1 and 2 and is

used by North and Booker to re-enforce their argument.

Politicians such as Harold Wilson (1971) and Edward Heath (1998) consider both

Britain’s political and economic relationships with U.S.A. and the dispute regarding the

C.A.P. to be the main causes of the denial of Britain’s entry. Wilson argues that de Gaulle

denied Britain entry to the E.E.C. because of the following two factors. Firstly, Britain’s

relationships with the Commonwealth countries, N.A.T.O. and E.F.T.A. and the conflict of

interests it caused with the E.E.C. Secondly, the establishment and maintenance of the

C.A.P., and the effect it would have had on British agriculture. Wilson also says that

Britain believed they were at a disadvantage if they accepted the agreements of the E.E.C:

‘The C.A.P. would have an unfair effect on British agriculture and financing. Unless

4

changes were made burden to Britain as a new member would be politically unacceptable’

(Wilson, 1971, p.421).

Nora Beloff (1963) examined the topic from a political outlook in her book The

General Says No: Britain’s exclusion from Europe. She offers one of the earliest

assessments of Britain’s accession. Predominantly, she argues that it was Britain’s

relationship with the US that played the most important role in the veto. Beloff (1963)

explains how during a conference in Parliament, the ministers contemplated their political

and economic relationships in regards to Europe and Britain’s entry into the E.E.C: ‘Few of

the fifty people round the conference table doubted that the General was trying to exclude

Britain primarily because she was too tied up with the Americans’ (Beloff, 1963, p.15).

She also explains the links between U.S.A. and Britain at the time, describing the

establishment of The Atlantic Alliance and the N.A.T.O. agreement. She suggests that De

Gaulle saw this as a problem because he feared that due to the U.S.A.’s influence and

power: ‘A Colossal Atlantic community would emerge under American dependence and

control, which would soon swallow up the European Community’ (Beloff, 1963, p. 15).

She makes reference to de Gaulle’s geopolitical ideals, writing about his historical task of

‘the promotion of French national grandeur’, proposing that his nationalism was an issue

but claims that it did not affect his political decisions.

My second chapter will prelude the final debate, it describes the role Heath played

in the 1961 -1963 negotiations before 1973, during his time as Lord Privy Seal. I aim to

enhance the answers to the question in my third chapter which is described below. Heath's

period as Lord Privy Seal is important because it shaped his political beliefs that he

expressed during his time as Prime Minister, which I examine in my second debate.

The second debate examines the circumstances in which Edward Heath signed up to the

5

E.E.C., asking whether it was due to political and economic factors within Britain, or if it

was solely due to his pro-European stance. Historians often claim that Edward Heath’s (the

1970-74 Prime Minister) foreign policy was an important factor in Britain joining the

European Community, Ziegler (2010) and Campbell (1994) support this view. I aim to

critique this view by examining his political relationships, and the economic climate of the

period, with an aim to investigating the extent of its validity, and if it is disproved, to

discover what other factors acted as a catalyst to Heath’s decision in 1973.

The main aim of the dissertation is to build on the published literature which

examines the factors and events that took place from 1963 to 1973. I want to bring a new

and updated assessment into the study of the European Union, studying it from both a

political and economic viewpoint, dealing with international relations between the

European countries. I will analyse the economic climate of Britain and Europe at the time,

while examining Heath from both a social and political angle, looking at his policies and

his attitudes both within his time as Lord Privy Seal and Prime Minister.

This dissertation has 3 main aims: first, why was Britain vetoed by De Gaulle? Second,

what role did Edward Heath have to play in Britain’s accession to the E.E.C? Third, what

factors led to Heath bringing Britain into the European Community? The chapters

endeavour to answer these questions by highlighting the key debates that surround each

question, with the aim to developing a new insight or agreeing with another.

The construction of this work involves carrying out a political study with primary

sources from the National Archives, looking at the policies, transcripts, brief papers and

white papers that concerned both Labour’s Harold Wilson and Conservative minister

Edward Heath from the years 1964 to 1971. Primary sources are the best way of analysing

the information because it gives a greatly valuable and somewhat more accurate account

6

into the decision-making process and foreign policy. Methodological issues will most

likely occur with the mechanisms undertaken in this study. The Freedom of Information

Act (FoI) changed the ‘Thirty Year Rule’ and thus allows information from the National

Archives to be accessed easily and freely. Though this is the case, one difficulty, that will

affect my study, is the issue of access to some archival documents, due to the ‘Thirty Year

Rule’. This rule restriction has allowed me to examine the Heath cabinet minutes, brief

papers and white papers, but has restricted me from writing about any events later than the

1990s, as doing so would break the Thirty year rule.

These sources also have limitations, although they are highly useful for describing

events and attitudes of the time, their reliability has to be questioned as there have often

been discrepancies between a politician’s ideological beliefs and what they call ‘party

politics’, as they may often have to disregard these and agree with their party’s actions.

One of the major problems is that the parliamentary papers will only give a 'top down'

approach of Britain, and therefore could limit my dissertation to a political perspective.

These problems are minimised by wider reading and the collection of different sources,

such as newspapers: as these give me a more eclectic view of Britain at the time, both

socially and economically.

The secondary sources in my dissertation are useful too; they show each historian’s

view on the subject. Heath’s own autobiography, and other published material, including

biographies written by Philip Ziegler (2010) and John Campbell (1994) will be used to

support my argument. Some other important secondary sources that cover both political

and economic questions are written by authors such as Richard Davis (1997), Andrew

Moravcsik (2000), Christopher Booker and Richard North (2003), James Young (2000),

Hugo Young (1998) and John Turner (2000).

CHAPTER 1

7

GRANDE-BRETAGNE, ET LE “NON” DU GENERAL

The key to de Gaulle lies in his ideological vision and individual psychology (Moravcsik,

2000, p.5).

This chapter will investigate how true the above statement is, by first examining what

influenced de Gaulle’s political belief system, analysing his attitude and his decision-

making, then by looking at the effect they had on his politics, and France’s foreign policy,

to discover why he made the decisions he did. There have been countless studies of de

Gaulle and the role he played in the progression of the European Economic Community

(E.E.C.) has been studied consistently over a 50 year period from 1963, with journalist

Nora Beloff, political scientist Andrew Moravcsik and politician Gladywn Jebb bringing

political and economic critiques to the actions that the General took in 1963 and 1967

when he vetoed Britain’s application to join the E.E.C. As described in the introduction,

there are three strands contained in the opinions of historians: first, whether de Gaulle’s

decisions were influenced by his geopolitical vision; second, whether they were influenced

by economic and commercial goals, mainly the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.); and

finally, as a result of Britain’s political and economic close other relationships especially

the USA. The term geopolitical is used to describe his world view “ou sont les interests de

la France?, which translates to, where are the interests of France? By geopolitical vision, I

mean the specific political objectives that de Gaulle had for France and the E.E.C., and the

view that he had of the rest of the world in regards to these political objectives. The

majority of scholars have presented three key factors in de Gaulle’s thinking; nationalism,

independence and military force. I have defined these ideals as forming de Gaulle’s

geopolitical vision, as supported by Moravcsik (2000). This chapter will elaborate on the

three key factors of his thinking in relation to his geopolitical vision, while analysing the

8

arguments, to ask which cause of his veto was more important, or whether it was a

combination of all.

De Gaulle is often described as a person who created his own persona, keeping to

the principles contained therein. Emmanuel d’Astier, de Gaulle’s biographer, points out

that a number of different historical influences contributed to this, forming his political

outlook and attitude, stating that de Gaulle ‘was to make of Nietzsche, Charles Maurras,

and Machiavelli a very personal salad’ (Beloff, 1963, p.20). De Gaulle combined selected

thinking from these three figures contributing to the above and his mode of operation. De

Gaulle adopted the nationalism and patriotism traits described by Maurras in his often-

quoted phrase: ‘A true nationalist places his country above everything’, though he is not

linked with Maurras' fascist views. The cunning that Machiavelli is often associated with

was also adopted by de Gaulle as part of his character visible in events such as the

Algerian Crisis. These attributes influenced the actions he took regarding the E.E.C. while

governing France. It is important to look at de Gaulle’s nationalism as the prime factor of

this chapter, while discussing the impact of other influences because it is present in both

arguments described by academics.

In his Memoirs he wrote ‘Toute ma vie je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France’– ‘All

my life I have had a certain idea of France’ (Jebb, 1969).

This is evident through his ideas and underlying ambition of restoring France to the

Great Power status that it once had, from Louis XIV through to the Napoleonic era and

beyond into the early twentieth century, until the fall of France in 1940. France emerged

from World War Two in a state of economic ruin and her national humiliation at the hands

of Germany. As a leader of the Free French Forces against the Nazis during World War II,

de Gaulle witnessed its events. During the war he never stopped from forcefully stating the

9

French position, to the annoyance of Churchill and Roosevelt. At a press conference in

1960 de Gaulle had said that 'France obviously cannot leave her own destiny and even her

own life to the discretion of others' (Menil, 1977).

It was these events and influences that fuelled his thoughts and attitude on

independence and nationalistic tendencies that historians consistently reference.

Menil (1977) says that De Gaulle thought of the 'concept of grandeur as the historical and

natural right of France that must and shall be restored' (Menil,1977, p.29). Moravcsik

(2000) also recognises ‘grandeur’, and Beloff also, labelling ‘the promotion of French

national grandeur’ as his historic task (1963, p.38). Beloff (1963) suggests that de Gaulle

was not the type of character to let his personal feelings stop him from doing what was

politically necessary, but this view is disputed by Moravcsik (2000) and Booker & North

(2003) who argue that everything he did politically was driven by his very personal

economic and nationalistic views. This will examine the validity of Moravcsik's (2000)

arguments constantly throughout this chapter, as they have an impact on all aspects of the

events, but first the role of Britain in this period must be commented on.

The use of the Times Archive and the National Archives, have given this an insight

into the British Press and political perspective on the negotiations and the British attitude

towards the French leader. To gain an understanding of the vetoes in 1963 and 1967 and

the reasons why, we have to examine the political and economic climate of the period, the

events that preceded it, and the arguments posed by analysts of the time.

There is a compelling argument by Nora Beloff (1963), in which she states that the

reasons were mainly due to the economic and political relationships which Britain held

such as: the European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A) from 1963 and Commonwealth

preferences; as well as de Gaulle’s geopolitical vision for France. She argues that it was

10

caused completely by these factors, while rarely, if only superficially, making an argument

for the economic reasons that Moravcsik (2000) poses in his account thirty years later.

Examining the arguments with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that they are still valid

reasons for the vetoes that occurred.

When Jean Monnet held the preliminary Conference of Messina in June 1955,

Britain was expected to consider joining the E.E.C. (it was first created with the signing of

the Treaty of Rome in 1957), but they rejected that offer, believing the ‘Common Market’

would be unsuccessful, preferring instead to maintain their Commonwealth and other

relationships. Gladwyn Jebb argues that they were not ready to join the community and

were sceptical: ‘we underestimated the force of the European Idea’ (Jebb, 1967, p.53). This

view is supported by Lord Boothby and Andrew Geddes (2004), who respectively

comment that the moment Britain rejected the offer to join the E.C.S.C., or to partake in

the Treaty of Rome, it was already too late, and they had ‘missed the boat’ (Beloff, 1963,

p.148): ‘they did not believe in the European project to the extent that the member states

did’ (Geddes, 2004, p.73).

But in 1962, with a change of government, Britain entered into E.E.C.

negotiations, with Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader Harold Macmillan

attempting to bring Britain into the European Community. After almost 15 months of

negotiations, in 1963 de Gaulle exercised the first veto. The causes for the rejection are

consistently disputed, and are often attributed to economic and political reasons. It is

argued by Beloff and Gladwyn Jebb that the conditions for entry were not correct for that

period, as Britain firstly, was ‘too tied up with the Americans’ (Beloff, 1963, p.15);

secondly, the three subjects of disagreement, 'EFTA, Commonwealth preferences and

tariffs' (Beloff, 1963, p.15). The problem uncovered during the negotiations was that

11

Britain aimed to obtain concessions in the interests of the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A

countries that the E.E.C. members were not prepared to give, as a result of the acquis

communautaire.

Booker and North explain the way the acquis works: 'Power can only be handed by

individual states to the supra-national entity; never the other way round' (Booker & North,

2003, p.103). It is essentially non-negotiable, though there is a transitional period where

some of the rules are accepted, while the further framework is put in place to accommodate

the remaining elements of the acquis. Britain wanted to preserve its economic

Commonwealth preference and E.F.T.A relationship, while still seeking full E.E.C.

membership. Beloff says, ‘Britain’s entry into Europe was made conditional not only on

the entry of all the other [E.F.T.A] six ‘into an integrated European market’, but on the

pledge that all Seven [of them] must go in at the same time’ (Beloff, 1963, p.110). As

Macmillan, promised 'Britain would only join if satisfactory arrangements could be made

to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the

European Free Trade Association' (Booker &North, 2003, p.103).The French official,

Olivier Wormser, dispelling any realistic chance of this happening, reportedly said to

Heath, 'there could be no modus vivendi between the two regional economic systems- the

Commonwealth and the E.E.C.' (Young, 1998, p.125). With that being said, Britain's entry

was not possible because the situation would put Britain in two separate regional

groupings. This unrealistic objective and plan that the British had agreed with the

Commonwealth and E.F.T.A countries were a result of them not wanting to relinquish

governance to external forces, and by the need for them to protect their own economic and

political interests first before acknowledging the needs of Europe.

12

The theme of protecting their political and economic interests is continued with the

relationship that Britain maintained with the U.S. There are numerous references made by

writers to what they call the ‘special relationship’- a term first used by Winston Churchill -

due to a history of shared values and a common language, and, as argued by Lord Jebb, 'we

had, owing to comradeship of the war and the language, a 'special relationship' with the

United States' (Jebb, 1967, pp.45-46). This impact and interest that America had in Europe

as a result of their assistance after the Second World War, through programmes such as

the “cash and carry” policy (1939), Lend-Lease programme(1941) and the 'Marshall Plan'

(1948), as Lois Pattison de Menil (1977) states, 'put the future of Western Europe in the

hands of U.S diplomacy' (Menil, 1977, p.1). Researchers confirm this link between Britain

and America consistently. For example, Beloff affirms this stating that ‘de Gaulle’s most

serious dispute with the British has been that, the British could always be relied upon to

take the American side’ (Beloff, 1963, p.33).

There are two associations between the USA and Britain that are of relevance to the

attitude that de Gaulle took towards Britain; the ratification of N.A.T.O., and the Suez

Crisis of 1956. The link between Britain and America was supported and further

recognised in the signing of The North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, of which France were a

signatory, and thus created the intergovernmental military alliance called N.A.T.O., (often

named the Atlantic Alliance). De Gaulle believed if Britain was to be accepted into the

E.E.C., this would allow America to have an influence over European policy, as the two

countries were closely tied. This view is valid, because in 1962, the President and Prime

Minister of the time, John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan respectively, reached an

agreement to have the USA sell Polaris missiles to Britain. Before this agreement was

signed, the same offer was extended to de Gaulle who refused it, believing that France

13

should not remain dependent on either of the 'super powers' for their nuclear arsenal. (See

Appendix 1).

This description shows that Britain was economically, politically and militarily

dependent on the United States within this period, which de Gaulle was only too well

aware of, and did not favour, in the hope it would not happen to France, as it was against

his core beliefs; 'To pour our means into a multilateral force under foreign command

would be running counter to this principle of our defence and our policy' (De Gaulle, 1963,

p.89). 'De Gaulle's objective was to reassert unequivocally France's autonomy and

resumption of responsibility for her own security' (Menil, 1977, p.57). Beloff supports this,

writing about de Gaulle's politico-military stance, and his need to build a nuclear force, to

rival that of the U.S or Soviet Union. She explains that he felt the French army must be

given 'the most modern weapons; a nuclear armoury was needed to salvage its loyalty and

respect' (Beloff, 1963, p.149). This is another example of de Gaulle's motives being

controlled by national identity, his need for France to remain independent and for it to have

a major role in the world once again. His aim was to build an independent European

nuclear force under his command, which could not happen if Britain were allowed into the

E.E.C.

The Suez crisis of 1956 occurred when on the 26th

July, President Gamal Abdel

Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, breaching an agreement signed in 1954 which had

ruled this out. This action had adverse effects on the French and the British who had

private investors and the majority of shareholdings in the Canal Company as well as

strategic interests. The French and British forces invaded the Canal Zone, until American

President Dwight Eisenhower denounced the military action and ordered Britain to pull

14

out. This action severely dented the Anglo-French relations, and led de Gaulle to believe

that Britain could no longer be trusted to support France either morally or militarily.

All of these earlier events had an effect on de Gaulle's attitude towards both

America and Britain as Beloff (1963) acknowledges: 'As de Gaulle grows older, his bias

against the United States has increasingly conditioned his behaviour' (Beloff, 1963, p.38).

This shows that de Gaulle's personal beliefs about America influenced his geopolitical

ideology. Julius Pratt (1968) supports this analysis into de Gaulle's character, stating:

'Coloring his words and deeds is a distinct tinge of malice toward what he likes to call "the

Anglo-Saxon powers”. This is seen in a milder form in his repeated vetoes of British entry

into the Common Market' (Pratt, 1968. p.6). De Gaulle believed that if Britain were

admitted into the Community, in its placed would emerge 'a colossal Atlantic community

under American dependence and direction, and which would quickly have absorbed the

community of Europe' (De Gaulle, 1963, p.86).

It was these relationships and the inability to overcome the problems that they

posed that reviewers believe led to the 1963 veto. From the arguments and evidence posed,

it is evident that De Gaulle’s geopolitical vision and his dislike of American influence in

Europe played an important role in the first veto; but analysts say that the veto was

primarily a result of Britain’s political and economic relationships, both with America and

with the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. Evidence for this is also shown in de Gaulle's

speech at a press conference on 14th

of January 1963 where he said:

But the question, to know whether Great Britain can now place herself like the Continent

and with it inside a tariff which is genuinely common, to renounce all Commonwealth

preferences, to cease any pretence that her agriculture be privileged, and, more than that, to

treat her engagements with other countries of the free trade area as null and void that

question is the whole question (De Gaulle, 1963, p.86).

15

So the evidence examined from the analysts and from de Gaulle himself, shows that

the General's reasons for applying the first veto, were, in his own words, firstly, because of

the Commonwealth preferences and the free trade area relationships that they were unable

to give up; and, secondly, their political and economic relationship with America through

the Atlantic Community, 'claiming that Britain was not yet sufficiently “European” in her

outlook' (Booker & North, 2003, p.102). De Gaulle added that if they were able to give up

their preferences and become 'European', France would not be an obstacle in their

application for accession (See Appendix 2). In making this decision, he was protecting

France from being controlled economically and militarily by either Britain or America, so

it his clear that his nationalistic views were the primary catalyst.

Did de Gaulle ever intend to let Britain into the European Community? Hugo

Young (1998) does not think so, he believes 'the odds were long against him ever

welcoming Britain into the E.E.C.' (1998, p.143). Recent years have brought an economic

argument to de Gaulle's actions, using the writings of Gladwyn and Beloff as a basis to

build their counter-arguments. Moravcsik (2000) and Booker and North (2003) follow

Young's (1998) opinion. Arguing their thesis from an economic viewpoint, they say that

his economic policy was put in place for the sole reason of protecting French industries

and agriculture: 'France couldn't afford to allow Britain into the Common Market' (Booker

& North, 2003, p.103). Moravcsik (2000)dismisses the geopolitical argument posed by

previous scholars: ‘direct evidence for a link between geopolitical ideas and the British

veto is almost non-existent’(Moravcsik, 2000, p.8). He says that the arguments posed by

other analysts were cited out of context and that nationalism and economics were the most

important elements in de Gaulle’s ideology (ibid). His main argument is that ‘de Gaulle's

foreign policy was designed to ‘appease powerful industrial and agricultural groups’ (ibid),

16

stating that de Gaulle’s geopolitical vision was heavily argued by other analysts such as

Vaiise and Charles Cougan as the most important reason for the veto. To counter this, he

asserts that the economic interests were the primary and dominate influence on the vetoes

(ibid).

The Common Agricultural Policy was ratified in January 1962 with three

intentions: market unity, community preference and financial solidarity. With the E.E.C.

greatly improving the conditions of the member states, in the years after the first veto, the

C.A.P. became the most controversial issue that caused the existing problems of the first

veto to re-enter the political discussion in 1967: 'Agriculture and agricultural financing

would be the central issue' (Wilson, 1971,p.424).

The C.A.P. is used to subsidise agriculture, to provide the consumers with

reasonable food prices and to encourage production by the nation-states. According to the

Former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the C.A.P. was favoured by the six member states

because they were Europe's biggest exporters of farming produce and so it worked to their

advantage. In contrast, Britain owed only a small percentage of its industry to farming, as

they were the world's largest importer; so from the beginning Britain had a problem to

overcome. Prime Minister Harold Wilson said that the C.A.P. was a source of conflict

between Britain and the E.E.C., as Britain wanted to continue reaping the benefits that they

received under the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. agreements, but the C.A.P. would affect

these policies. He argued that the C.A.P. would have an unfair effect on British agriculture

and financing, stating that: 'subsidized imports from the Community would injure our

producers' (Wilson, 1971, p.424). He added, 'Unless changes were made, the burden to

Britain as a new member would be so unfair as to be politically unacceptable' (ibid), even

if they made transitional arrangements in their system of production. As explained earlier

17

in the chapter, the acquis communautaire forbade any changes. These opinions formulated

by Wilson proves two things: there was constant conflict between the E.E.C. and Britain,

and that Britain decided that they could not accept the arrangements as it would not benefit

them in any way.

De Gaulle's geopolitical vision led him to believe that if Britain were accepted into

the E.E.C., that it would change the nature of the Community. Booker and North (2003)

argue that though de Gaulle insisted that the Commonwealth imports were the fundamental

issue, that he was hiding behind the E.E.C. to protect France's national interest in farming

and industry. France stood to gain from the C.A.P., as their agriculture accounted for 25%

of their employment, while Britain only accounted for 4%, and they had instead placed

their efforts into developing their computer industry, spending £226 million. If Britain

were to join the Common Market, they would have to raise the tariffs against the imports,

while the countries within the Six would be able to export goods to Britain without having

to pay a tariff fee. This meant that the subsidies for the C.A.P. would come under threat, as

the E.E.C. widened, and more countries had an effect on the prices and distribution of

financing.

Moravcsik (2000) argues that De Gaulle thought that if Britain were accepted into

the E.E.C. the economic outcome for the member states, particularly France, would not be

ideal. He argues that this dominated the Frenchman's thinking when deciding on Britain's

entry, and makes several references to this line of thought. Moravcsik (2000) states that

Britain was essentially an industrial country, and had little agricultural industry left. De

Gaulle believed that Britain would block the policies that differed from their own national

interests, notably the C.A.P., and that Britain would also turn the Common Market into a

18

free trade area. Evidence of this consensus is shown in the British cabinet meeting in

December 1962 when one minister said:

The rest of the Six feared that if we acceded without firm conditions binding us to accept

the [C.A.P.] in its present form, the Germans and we would combine for our separate

reasons to render it inoperable (Moravcsik, 2000, p.12).

The argument of de Gaulle promoting national interests is supported through a

press conference when he said:

In these negotiations we remain the principal country interested in agriculture, which we

must modernize by creating outlets. This is a national problem of the first order. . . .The

Common Market must help us (ibid).

Another instance of him promoting this argument about the importance of

agriculture to the French, he said:

If Great Britain and . . . the Commonwealth enter, it would be as if the Common Market

had . . . dissolved within a large free trade area. . . . Always the same question is posed, but

the British don't answer. Instead they say, it is the French who don't want it. . . . To please

the British, we should call into question the Common Market and the negotiation of

agricultural regulations that benefit us? (ibid).

It is argued by Wilson that the C.A.P. was a central issue in the negotiations, rather

than de Gaulle's geopolitical vision. From the evidence shown throughout this chapter, the

agricultural differences and economic reasons are proposed by Moravcsik (2000) and

Booker & North (2003) to be the main causes for the vetoes by de Gaulle. Essentially de

Gaulle thought that the acceptance of Britain into the E.E.C. would 'overturn everything,

implying a completely different Common Market' (Moravcsik, 2000, p.13). As Moravcsik

says, de Gaulle could not afford to let Britain enter into the European Community at the

time because Britain would harm the negotiations over the C.A.P. from which France and

the other Member states stood to gain: as the member states were mainly exporters.

19

Therefore, he stated that until the Commonwealth had been 'dismantled' Britain would not

be able to enter into the Common Market, instead de Gaulle asked Britain to take part in an

association of commercial exchanges, rather than as a full member.

The geopolitical argument by Lord Jebb, Andrew Geddes, Jean Menil and Nora

Beloff is just as valid as the economic reason posed by analysts. This is because de Gaulle

had a vision for France which underlined all his actions, both economically and politically.

Britain's economic and political relationships were also a cause for the veto, but this was

due to de Gaulle's geopolitical vision in respect to Britain and the USA. It also is clear to

see that De Gaulle's decisions were influenced by economic and commercial goals, by the

speeches he made about the C.A.P., and its effect on the E.E.C. But, these are all of a

piece, with de Gaulle's ambition and aim of restoring France's grandeur, and Great Power

status in the world. This integrated view was his motivation for the vetoes of 1963 and

1967. This means that the quote that opens this chapter is correct. In support of this, it

should be noted that de Gaulle gave noticed in 1965 and withdrew the French forces from

NATO in 1969.

In parallel, when he did so, this asserted his promotion of military independence. Also, by

his blocking of Britain's entry to the E.E.C. to secure the benefits to the French economy, it

could be seen that all of these actions were done in favour of and for the advantage of

France.

CHAPTER 2

20

EDWARD HEATH: LORD PRIVY SEAL

When he was appointed Lord Privy Seal [Heath] he was known to be well-disposed

towards Europe and critical of the Labour Government's failure to move towards the

Common Market (Ziegler, 2010, p.116).

During the 1963 E.E.C negotiations, while Macmillan was Prime Minister, Edward

Heath held the ministerial position of Lord Privy Seal. In Britain he had no routine duties,

but he was handed the responsibility for, what turned out to be, unsuccessfully negotiating

Britain's entry into the E.E.C. In 1965 now in Opposition, Heath became Conservative

party leader, beating his rivals Enoch Powell and Reginald Maudling: he then went on to

win the 1970 general election and become Prime Minister. This chapter will examine

Heath's contribution as Lord Privy Seal, attempting to achieve satisfactory arrangements in

the negotiations. It will do this by examining the Cabinet papers, newspapers and accounts

of meetings regarding the Common Market negotiations and Britain's European application

from a British perspective. This will be supplemented by using supporting evidence from

Ludlow (1997), Young (1998), Turner (2000) and Young's (2000) books on the topic.

By 1961 the British government had decided that they 'should participate fully and

jointly with the other member states in the development of European unity' (Young, 2000,

p.64). President Kennedy urged Macmillan to apply for entry, believing it would help the

USA's political interests. Young argues that entry was due to Macmillan recognising 'the

political significance of The Six and of Britain's declining position' (Young, 2000, p.64).

Turner uses evidence to show that 313 MPs supported the government's application, while

22 MPs abstained, showing almost complete support for the application (Turner, 2000,

p.54). He argues that this support occurred because Britain wanted to be a central influence

21

in world affairs. Turner emphasises the press perspective, stating that The Financial Times,

The Guardian and The Times all supported entry, while The Daily Express and The Daily

Telegraph opposed it.

The negotiations started on the 10th

October 1961. Ziegler (2010) asserts that the

crucial moment was in January 1961 when Macmillan met with President de Gaulle at

Rambouillet. In his report, Macmillan said emphatically there were 'some grounds for

thinking that it might now be possible to make some further progress towards a settlement

of our economic and political relationship with Europe', with there being 'powerful

influences in favour of the development of a close political federation in Europe' (Ziegler,

2010, p.117). Though Macmillan believed this, Ziegler argues that De Gaulle had no such

plans, intending instead to run the E.E.C along intergovernmental lines. The

intergovernmental system involves integration by the nation-states, where the national

governments of each member state make the main political decisions. This is in contrast to

a supranational system that the E.E.C. administration was working towards (interpreting

the common interests of all member countries through E.E.C. joint legislation, which is

then upheld by a High Authority which holds legislative control).

As Lord Privy Seal, Heath played the key role of chief negotiator in agreeing the

terms of Britain's entry into the E.E.C. Quoting Andrew Roth's study, Young (2000) states

that Heath had travelled over 100,000 miles as E.E.C. negotiator. Britain started with the

primary objective of protecting their Commonwealth and E.F.T.A.'s agricultural interests.

Heath was told by the Government to protect these as a necessity. We see this trend from

the documentation of meetings held in Cabinet:

They confirmed the view, with which there had been general agreement at their previous

discussion, that a formal application for accession to the Treaty of Rome should be made

22

without delay in order that negotiations might be opened with the Community with a view

to ascertaining whether satisfactory arrangements could be made to meet our requirements,

particularly in respect of British agriculture and of the needs of the other Commonwealth

countries and the other members of the European Free Trade Association ( TNA:PRO CAB

128/35 C.C.(44) 61, p 3)

It is clear from the minutes of the meeting on 27th

July 1961 what Britain's main

goal was from the outset:

Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to

make such an application to join the European Economic Community preparatory to

entering into negotiations with a view to securing satisfactory arrangements to meet the

special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free

Trade Association (ibid).

This was one of the important failings of the 1961 negotiations and subsequent

1963 veto. Macmillan's government wanted to achieve preferential arrangements for the

United Kingdom that would allow them to enter into the Common Market, but still keep

their previous regional economic relationships. According to Turner, many of the

Conservatives wanted assurances for E.F.T.A. and the Commonwealth, wanting Britain to

continue their 'traditional role' with the latter (Turner, 2000, p.56). As Ludlow explains,

Britain wanted the British-ruled Caribbean Islands and British Africa to enter as Associated

Overseas Territories (A.O.T.), but The Six argued that the Commonwealth exports were

'direct competition to community produce' (Ludlow, 1997, p.82) so remained reluctant.

Other countries such as Canada, Hong Kong, British Honduras and British Guiana did not

want Britain to join The Six, as they believed this would harm their economic relationship,

but if Britain were to apply, these countries wanted their preferential arrangements

preserved.

23

With these opinions from British Government present in the background, Heath

emphasised his belief that the Commonwealth was important in the eyes of the British

public, and that the trade links could not be cut, stating in the negotiations, 'I'm sure that

you will understand that Britain could not join the E.E.C under conditions in which this

trade connection was cut' (Ludlow, 1997, p.80). The Daily Express and Daily Telegraph

also agreed, supporting the role the Commonwealth played in trade. Heath argued that

joining the E.E.C would lead to a closer political union and strengthen the ties between

Britain and the Commonwealth. Thus, he suggested that 'association should be restricted to

Commonwealth countries comparable to existing associates'(Ludlow, 1997, p.83). This is

where the conflict of interests between Britain and the member states occurred in the

negotiations, making Heath's job a difficult one. Ludlow suggests that from the evidence,

the loss of the Commonwealth preference would not harm Britain. He calls it 'amongst the

weakest and most tentative of British pleas' (Ludlow, 1997, p.90), giving the example of

the three dominions of Canada, New Zealand and Australia having a GNP comparable to

'that of the richest community member state' (ibid).

Even so, the negotiations conducted by Heath included the analysis and

amendments of different tariff levels to receive appropriate arrangements for food that

originated from the Commonwealth countries, such as butter, wheat, lamb, beef and

bananas. The continual analysis of these commodities led to the view from many of the

British newspapers that the negotiations were becoming 'tedious and faintly absurd' with

the delays becoming intolerable (Ziegler, 2010, p.123). This feeling was characterized by

the satirical magazine Private Eye often referring to Heath as 'Grocer Heath' (ibid).

Ziegler explains how the French were opposed to British entry due to Britain's

24

adamant stance aimed at protecting the Commonwealth countries' exports, which they

were not prepared to abandon. In fact, he proposes that the reason for this opposition was

that the French wanted to wait for the C.A.P. to be in operation before they would allow

Britain entry: 'It was their objective to spin matters out so as to ensure that the C.A.P.

would be operational before matters came to an end' (Ziegler, 2010, p.122). Richard North

and Christopher Booker (2003) support this view. French opposition was clear to British

politicians, as Maudling had said, 'It seems to me to be pointless to be talking about

negotiations with them. They have in effect rejected in advance any proposal on the points

of vital interest to us' (Ziegler, 2010, p.120). Despite French opposition, the British

government and Heath continued to believe that the other members of The Six were happy

to accept their application and that this would lead to the country's accession. This

judgement was wrong.

By February 22nd

1962, there was news that the Six had 'ruled out any possible

quantitative deals with the Commonwealth' and that temporary measures would be put in

place, but there would be no 'permanent preferential position for Commonwealth exporters’

(Ludlow, 1997, p.98). Heath still continued to pursue Britain's objective of accession, even

when it was difficult, as American Diplomat George Ball stated: 'the political momentum

was lost in niggling bargaining' (Ziegler, 2010, p.124). Ziegler explains that a Foreign

Correspondent at the time, Nora Beloff, believed Heath to be a resilient man who wanted

to 'remain abreast of every detail of the bargaining', 'remaining thoroughly relaxed and

totally in control' (Ziegler, 2010, p.124).

When July 1962 arrived, before the spring recess of parliament, progress in the

25

negotiations was slow. Even though The Six had offered Britain a reasonable 'transition'

period for their entry (rejecting Heath's request of 15 years), it was clear in Britain's view

that The Six were still making it difficult to manoeuvre Britain's Commonwealth

preferences into the negotiations, as evident in Cabinet discussions where, according to

Heath:

But it had not been possible to obtain from the Six any precise undertakings about

continued access to the Community's markets for traditional suppliers, and very little

progress had been made in discussion of the complex arrangements for the transitional

period before any world-wide agreements could come into effect (TNA:PRO CAB 128/36

Ref: 0051, p. 3).

The negotiations reconvened in September 1962, and the British Government's

positive mood had changed into a considerable mood of ambivalence. Labour leader Hugh

Gaitskell, a defender of Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. trade and British agriculture, made a

critical speech regarding Europe in 1962, opposing Britain's entry arguing that it would

'end a thousand years of history' (Young, 2000,p.76). But many journalists believed entry

was certain. Frank Giles, The Sunday Times Correspondent, believed Britain's accession

was guaranteed, reportedly saying the Archangel Gabriel could not do better than Mr Heath

(Ziegler, 2010, p.127).

The final event in the historical context that cemented Britain's rejection was

months before September, at the Nassau Conference when Macmillan met President

Kennedy. 'All de Gaulle required, was an excuse, which Nassau provided' (Young, 2000,

p.78). Kennedy and Macmillan agreed a nuclear programme involving Polaris Missiles and

nuclear submarines; while they omitted de Gaulle from the proceedings. It is evident that

Macmillan noticed the rift this could cause because he wrote to Heath apologising for his

26

stance, 'I only trust that nothing I have done at Rambouillet or Nassau has increased our

difficulties' (ibid). Ziegler says that Heath sympathised with de Gaulle, writing in his

memoirs 'I can well imagine de Gaulle's feeling' (Ziegler, 2010, p.128). As Young asserts,

'it effectively doomed the EEC application' (Young, 2000, p.73). This was important

evidence showing that Britain was not committed to Europe and was an absolute threat to

de Gaulle's European plan of a 'Europe of States'. This subsequently led to the veto.

Having received reassurances from French Prime Minister Courve de Murville that nothing

could stop Britain's entry, and that de Gaulle's influence could not decide their fate, Heath

believed Britain would be accepted.

Up until the veto on 14th

January 1963, the day de Gaulle made his famous speech,

this was still a general view. Heath found it hard to accept the decision, as journalist

Nicholas Carroll tried to console him having said 'You mustn't mind too much, Ted.

Nobody could have tried harder than you' (Ziegler, 2010, p.130). Despite this feeling, in his

speech Heath stated boldly, 'We would not turn our backs; we are a part of Europe by

geography, history, culture, tradition and civilisation' (ibid).

It was decided that the best chance Britain had of entry into the E.E.C., was to wait

until de Gaulle left the political scene, which is exactly what they did. Macmillan retired

due to illness in October 1963, and as a result Alec Douglas-Home renounced his peerage

to be elected as Prime Minister. Thereafter followed a second veto by de Gaulle in 1967

due to similar reasons that de Gaulle had expressed for the first veto, this time Harold

Wilson's government was in power, at this point Heath was Leader of the Opposition for

the Conservative party.

The European negotiations became Heath's political stage, and he played his part

27

exceptionally well, the effort and tact he showed enhanced his position as future leader.

Heath was to fulfil his earlier promise when as Conservative Prime Minister he took

Britain into the E.E.C. in 1973 (undoubtedly his greatest achievement as Prime Minister).

CHAPTER 3

28

INTO EUROPE, AT LAST!

We are determined to give Britain a respected place in the world again and lead her

into the European Community (Turner, 2000, p.58).

The above quote is an excerpt taken from the 1966 Conservative manifesto. It shows

Britain's committed aim to bring Britain into the E.E.C after two previously unsuccessful

attempts, and an ambition for to resume global importance.

On July 27th 1965, Edward Heath won the Leadership of the Conservative party,

with 150 votes to Reginald Maudling's 133 and Enoch Powell's 15. To the people and

newspapers that had access to the appropriate social circles, this was expected. To the

British public, it was a shock. Speaking about Heath, Macmillan had commented 'I feel

sure Ted is the best choice. He is a stronger character than Maudling' (Ziegler, 2010,

p.158). Alec Douglas-Home had said he was going to vote for Heath, while Keith Joseph

had said, 'I was a Heath man' (ibid). When the 1970 general election came, along with the

British public, the majority of the newspapers expected Wilson to win and serve a second

term. This did not happen and Heath won the election.

This chapter will examine the European strategy of Edward Heath as Conservative

Premier. From a political viewpoint, the chapter will do two things. Focusing centrally on

Heath's character, first, it will describe the opposition Heath faced, both from within his

own party, and Labour on the issue of Europe, asking, why, despite the opposition, Heath

decided to apply for E.E.C. entry. Second, it will analyse Heath and Georges Pompidou's

relationship (Heath, before he was made Prime Minister was on good terms with

Pompidou), investigating whether this had an effect on Heath's decision to negotiate

Britain's entry. From an economic argument, the essay will describe the concessions that

29

the Prime Minister agreed to within the process of the negotiations in 1971 that took place

to bring Britain into the E.E.C. It will also briefly analyse the economic state of Britain at

the time, and ask if this had an impact on Heath's decision to apply for British membership.

The chapter will refer to Ziegler (2010), Heath (1998) and Campbell's (1994) books as a

basis to describe the Prime Minister's time in office, and to gain an understanding into his

character. Newspapers of the period will be utilized to gain a perspective of how Heath was

portrayed to the public, in regards to the negotiations. Finally, Sir Con O'Neill's (2000)

book, parliamentary papers, Records of the Prime Minister's Office from the National

Archives and reports on the 1971 negotiations will be examined to understand the

economic concessions that Heath accepted when he successfully negotiated Britain's entry.

Public opinion of Heath changed over time. However, his stance on Europe

remained the same during his political career. Ziegler asserts that opposition from the

Conservatives towards Heath came because of his background; he says Heath was referred

to as a 'common little oik' by many sections of his party (Ziegler, 2000, p.180).

Commentators emphasise Heath's pro-European ideology and stubborn character. These

characteristics were especially important because the Conservative party were split on the

issue of Europe (opposition to Europe remains a continuous feature of the Tory party). The

Chief Whip William Whitelaw explained the split to Heath, stating that 'there were twenty-

nine committed 'antis' in the parliamentary party' (Ziegler, 2000, p.192). As many people

pointed out, this changed neither Heath’s view on Europe nor the foreign policy strategy

that he put in place for his party regarding Europe.

Former Prime Minister Harold Wilson said of Heath, 'He's a splitter, he will split his

party' (Ziegler, 2000, p.183). Agreeing with Wilson, Tony Benn called Heath, 'a basic

splitter who insists on getting his own way at the cost of party unity' (ibid). This is an

30

accurate account, as Heath had said in another situation, 'what matters is doing what you

believe is right' (ibid). These commentaries show that Heath was prepared to do what he

believed was necessary, even to split his own party, to bring Britain into Europe.

Highlighting Heath's character, British politician Peter Walker argued that Heath's political

motivation was due to 'simple patriotism' (Ziegler, 2000, p.160). Ziegler expands on Peter

Walker's conclusion of Heath's political motivations, explaining how Heath despised

Britain's second application to the E.E.C, on the grounds that Heath felt that it was his duty

to get Britain into Europe, 'Europe was his cause, it was he who should lead the crusade for

British entry' (Ziegler, 2000,p.191). Campbell (1994) also emphasises the public's view of

Heath, 'he remained indelibly established in the public mind as “Mr Europe”' (Campbell,

1994, p.113).

And so, despite this split in his party, and due to his pro-European opinions, he believed

that Britain's application for entry into Europe was correct, and these led him to apply.

Whilst making its bid for European entry, Britain also had to accept that there

needed to be a shift in their political and economic thinking in their historical relationships

with the Commonwealth and the U.S.A. This was emphasised through such events as the

rejection of 'The year of Europe' (the diplomatic initiative created by the US to improve

transatlantic relations with Europe) and the ambition of Heath, along with the E.E.C.

member states to 'co-ordinate their monetary policies’ (See Appendix 3).

A key influence on Heath's decision to apply for accession was the French President

Pompidou. Pompidou and Heath's relationship was formed before the latter was elected

Prime Minister in 1970 over their shared common ground on a number of issues. One of

the problems was that Pompidou had not agreed with Wilson's nuclear policy, which was a

31

possible cause for the veto. Pompidou aligned himself with de Gaulle's decision to veto

Britain's second application. In 1970 Heath and Pompidou agreed in principle on the

nuclear policy, and the French President expected more of the newly elected Prime

Minister. Pompidou believed the Tories to be more flexible in negotiating terms for entry

and so the application would have a greater likelihood to succeed. The two also shared a

common goal of seeing a united Europe. When they met in Paris in May 1970, the French

President explained to Heath that Britain's entry into Europe would create difficulties

around the rest of the world, as Europe would emerge as an economic superpower. Heath

replied, 'It won't come to that', adding, 'Anyway, if our economic power worries the United

States, Latin America and Australia, we must put up with the consequences. If the result

was the destruction of the Common Market, our own destruction would follow'(Ziegler,

2010, p.194). This statement shows Heath's complete commitment to the E.E.C., even

perhaps regardless of the risks to Britain's future economic welfare: in a bid to put Europe

first. Alongside Heath's commitment to Europe, and willingness to bring Britain into the

E.E.C, he found the French President's positive overtures encouraging. The Times support

this view in Rees-Mogg's article (See Appendix 4). This prompted Heath's belief in a

further bid to apply for accession. (See Appendix 5).

The economic climate of the period that Britain faced placed the country in a

detrimental position. Prior to Heath entering office, the country emerged from an economic

recession. During the office of Wilson's government, unemployment was just over

500,000. Unemployment rose from an estimated 500,000 to over a million in the two years

after Heath came into government, a figure that had not been seen for more than two

decades. As the population in 1971 was calculated to be fifty-four million (Barrow, 2010),

unemployment constituted 1 per cent of the population. The post-war consensus of the

32

governments was the belief in full employment. It could be said that the party began to

look at the trend of unemployment, which was giving indications that, should it continue to

rise at the current rate, then Britain would be faced with the prospect of mass

unemployment.

Evidence of an attempt to combat this is seen in the Records of the Prime Minister's

Office. The Second Permanent Secretary, Sir W. Nield, wrote to Heath on 30th

December

1970, listing the ten benefits of joining the E.E.C. One being economic growth, the excerpt

described the conditions as follows:-

Between 1958 and 1968 GNP in Britain rose by 49%; but it rose by 112% in the E.E.C.

Inside an enlarged Community of Ten, Britain would share in this quicker growth. Each 1%

improvement in our growth adds some £400 million to our national income (TNA/PRO

PREM 15/062, p.9).

Further adding, about industry and technology:-

Britain's entry into the enlarged Community will provide the best guarantee that British

research and British brains will bring about advance and growth in Britain's industry and

technology (ibid).

The Conservative government hoped that economic growth could be achieved more easily

should they be accepted to join the E.E.C, thinking, if accepted, this would create jobs and

enhance industry.

It can be concluded from the Prime Minister's papers that there was a wider and

more embracing conversation about entering the Common Market, than the party was

willing to promote. This confirmed Wilson's label that he assigned to Heath as a 'splitter'.

The partisan ideals of many in the Tory party were against entering the Common Market,

however many of the party were willing to consider an alternative view as a means of

rescuing Britain from an economic crisis.

33

In order to gain entry into the E.E.C, Britain were required to make a number of

concessions, the most important being the role of sterling in Europe, the protection of

Commonwealth sugar, the Community Finance, and the protection of New Zealand's

agriculture (See Appendix 6 for further detail). Geoffrey Rippon and Sir Con O'Neill were

the negotiators on behalf of Heath's government at the time. But, as several instances

revealed, Heath's character had an influence on the outcome.

Sterling was an important issue during the negotiations, as Britain had emerged

from the 1960s with a balance of payments problem. Diplomat Sir Con O'Neill (2000)

argues, that this due to economic weakness, along with the devaluation of the sterling, had

led to the second veto. Britain had three options: to devalue the pound, impose restrictions

on imports, or add additional tariffs on imports. To tackle this balance of payments

problem, the Labour government of the time chose to devalue the pound: as the two other

options were in the words of Harold Wilson (1971) (the Prime Minister at the time)

'contrary to our international agreements' on G.A.T.T. and E.F.T.A. (Wilson, 1971, p.29).

The Prime Minister's papers detailing the third set of negotiations make several

references to the issue of 'economic prospects and the role of sterling' (TNA/PRO PREM

15/062, p.1). In a specific letter it highlights the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice

Schumann's, meeting at Elysée with Heath about sterling. According to Sir Con O'Neill,

Pompidou did not like the reserve role of sterling that Britain enjoyed, as there could only

be one reserve currency, which was the dollar: 'He [Pompidou] saw no role for another

reserve currency based on either sterling or a European currency' (O'Neill, 2000, p.126).

He recognised that the problems of Britain's sterling balances and debts could not be

ignored, as sterling would give Britain a disadvantage, which would be absorbed by the

E.E.C if Britain's entry was accepted. Heath agreed with this, declaring in a meeting with

34

Pompidou in Paris in May 1971, that the British Government 'did not regard sterling as an

instrument of prestige nor did they feel sentimental about it' (Fenton, 2005). This

demonstrates that he would readily abandon the use of sterling, in favour of achieving a

closer Europe.

France recognised the economic benefits of Britain's entry, but simultaneously

believed 'that the British economy could not sustain membership' (O'Neill, 2000, p.126).

So, it can be argued that it was as a result of political expediency that this issue of sterling

was raised during the negotiations.

Commonwealth sugar was also an issue to be negotiated. In September 1970,

Britain proposed to The Six that the Commonwealth countries should achieve association

status; this was similar to their 1961-1963 proposals. On the 14th

October, The Six agreed

that they 'were prepared in principle to consider such an association' (O'Neill, 2000, p.109).

On November 26th

1970, the Commonwealth countries were offered this association. By

December 1st 1970, the African countries had accepted the offer. However some of the

Caribbean countries were not offered the same privileges, 'until the question of sugar was

resolved' (ibid). The question of sugar was in regards to the amount that the A.O.T.

countries were allowed to trade with the E.E.C. member states.

The extension of these privileges to the Caribbean and African countries would

have a profound effect on countries around the world. USA argued that the association of

these countries would be 'contrary to Articles I and XXIV of the GATT' agreement with

Britain (ibid). They argued that this would extend a trade bloc and put a block on free

trade. The Community did not react to these objections, they wanted sugar to receive

preferential arrangements as they realised the advantages the association would offer on

their access to commodities. There were differing views from The Six about the access to

markets the Commonwealth countries should receive after 1974. France argued it should

35

be set at '500,000 tonnes [of sugar]' (ibid), while the Dutch argued that the Commonwealth

should 'be allowed to export to the Community the whole of the negotiated price quantities'

(ibid). At a meeting in Brussels on 30th

April, the issue was settled and agreed on with a

'political solution containing a general declaration without figures'(ibid). Finally, after

months of negotiating, on 10th

May 1971 the proposal was accepted. The negotiator

Rippon welcomed this conclusion, 'the offer to all our independent developing Common

territories concerned of the 1963 options was assured' (ibid). He stressed his confidence

that the community had 'found a way forward' (ibid). An addition was made to this

proposal on 12th

May 1971, which ensured the 'safeguarding of the interests' of the

Commonwealth countries whose 'economies depended on exports of products and in

particular of sugar'(ibid). The Times article outlines the negotiations on the issue of sugar.

(See Appendix 7. for further discussion (Lyle, 1971, p.13)

Sir Con O'Neill suggests that Heath and Pompidou's meeting on the 8th

May, days

before the proposal, had an impact on the favourable outcome and subsequent quick

conclusion to the ‘sugar dossier’ (ibid). This is plausible, as the President and Prime

Minister frequently discussed the issues that were being negotiated. The evidence supports

that Heath's government was negotiating the range of issues that Europe required in order

to meet the terms for entry, into the E.E.C at all costs.

According to O'Neill, the Community Finance was the 'most important issue for us

in the whole negotiation'(ibid) as it was also for France. During the negotiations it

somehow became intertwined and dependent on the question of New Zealand: 'The

proposal put forward on New Zealand dairy products was dependent on the solution for

Community Finance' (ibid). Satisfactory agreements were settle on the issue of New

Zealand, so that left only the Community Finance problem.

By Community Finance, is meant the agreements to set the level of Britain's financial

36

contribution to the Community. Britain proposed that a contribution of zero percent in the

year after accession, finishing between 13-15 per cent in the fifth year of membership. On

16th

December 1971, in a statement to the House of Commons, the Community proposal

was presented. It was as follows: 21.5 percent for 5 years from 1973 or between 10 – 15

percent for 4 years rising to 20-25% from 1977. A two year transitional period of

'corrective years' was negotiated and accepted by Britain, and the matter was given a

deadline of June by Pompidou and Heath. On June 18th

Maurice Schumann, the Minister of

Foreign Affairs, proposed a contribution of 9 percent. And on the same day, Pompidou

agreed to the proposal that Britain had offered on the issue of New Zealand, provided

Britain accepted the 'initial contribution of 9 per cent'. (ibid) So, eventually, with

intervention from Heath himself, Britain and the member states settled on this nine per

cent. Shortly before midnight on the 22-23 of June, Heath sent Mr. Rippon a telegram

giving him permission to accept 'not more than nine percent as our 1973 contribution'

(ibid). At last, after months of compromise the issue was resolved.

From 1963-73, Edward Heath played a significant role in the political liaisons

between Britain and Europe. His role as Lord Privy Seal formed his beliefs, while his role

as Prime Minister only made it easier for him to implement and enforce the plans he had

for Britain in regards to Europe. From the evidence, we can conclude, that from a political

perspective Edward Heath’s decision to apply for Britain’s E.E.C accession was driven by

his pro-European stance. This led him not to prioritise certain more traditional British

policies, such as the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth. He saw Britain and the United

States, not as a 'special relationship', but as a natural relationship based upon a shared

language and partly culture, as commented in The Washington Post (Koven,1973, p.12).

This was to contribute to the factions within the Conservative Party, which were opposed

37

to entry. It can also be said that the political conditions were favourable, due to two things:

mainly due to a change in the leadership of France, and the now leader of France

Pompidou having a more favourable relationship with Heath. This made Heath's bid to

gain access to the E.E.C easier than it previously was for a British government. We also see

from an economic perspective, that British governments considered that it would benefit

Britain to enter into the E.E.C, as this would have assisted the British economy’s growth.

But I believe that this view is only a justification for something that Heath would have

done anyway, as he planned to take Britain into the E.E.C for a number of reasons, four

years before he became Prime Minister: evident in the 1966 Conservative manifesto.

38

CONCLUSION

After the Second World War, Britain and France's relationship was always

somewhat ambivalent, Winston Churchill’s once said: the heaviest cross he’d had to bear

during the war was the ‘cross of Lorraine’ (Beloff, 1963,p.29). This was made worse due to

the relationships that both countries formed with others, the Franco-German unity that the

E.C.S.C created, and Britain’s strengthening defence ties with the U.S.A. Another reason

for this estrangement was the change in leadership of both countries; especially when

Charles de Gaulle became the President of France. This change in leadership, and the

already strong relationship between Germany and France enabled de Gaulle to influence

the E.E.C. in the best interests of France, while claiming it was for the benefit of Europe as

a whole. De Gaulle made agreements with the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and

other E.E.C. Member states in order to gain the influence he required to make the

appropriate decisions on issues that affected France. De Gaulle was also able to manipulate

the E.E.C. rules so that France would benefit, especially her agriculture, as she was

Europe’s biggest agricultural producer, all while outmanoeuvring other countries.

This is displayed through his geopolitical ideology and military ambitions when in 1958 he

created a Force de Frappe and tested the weapons a year later that previous French

governments had designed, including an atomic bomb. These two examples above were

done to bear favourably directly on de Gaulle's France.

It is also seen with the ratification of the C.A.P. when the subsidies were given to the

European farmers to help the economies. De Gaulle knew that he could only restore

France’s great world status if his nation had a nuclear bomb and if he maintained military

independence for his country.

For de Gaulle, the only thing that concerned him was complete control over and

39

independence for France, and to make sure this was not seriously threatened. Britain’s

entry into the E.E.C could put these principles in danger; in particular he feared the threat

of Britain becoming America’s Trojan horse, its policies to some extent working also for

America’s interests.

The attitude of the French Leader did not substantially change from 1961-69, and it was

only after de Gaulle died that Britain could enter into the E.E.C with Heath.

This was due to the new French President Georges Pompidou seeing European policy

differently from his predecessor. Though the French did not look favourably on the two

British governments that applied for accession before Heath, both the powerful French

bureaucracy and the political leadership recognised Heath’s willingness from the moment

when he was put in charge of first negotiating entry in 1961. They also sensed his

flexibility; and observed him distance himself from America, and rapidly reveal that for

him the E.E.C took precedent over America and the Commonwealth during his time as

Prime Minister.

Britain's relationships with the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A were strong in the first part of

the 1960s. As Britain’s economic problems became more and more acute the

Commonwealth links weakened, and there was a devaluation of the pound. As argued more

closely in the final chapter, Heath's pro-European tendency, his experience of the French

demands during the negotiations as Lord Privy Seal in 1961 and the Conservative Party

policies that he put in place as Leader of the Opposition gave him an upper-hand in

achieving that aim.

Appendix II: President de Gaulle says it rests with Britain

41

Appendix I: Trojan Horse into the E.E.C.

40

Appendix III: Britain would be happy to scrap the pound, Heath told French

42

Britain would be happy to scrap the pound, Heath told French

By Ben Fenton

12:01AM BST 25 Jul 2005

Unknown to his political colleagues or the electorate, Edward Heath was prepared to take Britain into Europe

with the full intention of seeking economic and political union, newly-released papers show.

The then prime minister told Georges Pompidou, the French president, that this country could never have a

"satisfactory partnership" with America "even if Britain wanted it" because of the disparity of power between the

transatlantic allies.

The documents, released after a Freedom of Information Act request by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation,

show that Sir Edward, as he later became, was at least as keen on monetary union as the French leader.

According to the official minutes of the summit, held in Paris in May 1971, he told Mr Pompidou that the British

Government "did not regard sterling as an instrument of prestige nor did they feel sentimental about it".

He said he believed that members of the European Community, as it was then called, should move as soon as

possible to "co-ordinate their monetary policies".

After reading the papers, Lord Deedes, a former editor of The Daily Telegraph and a backbench MP at the time,

said he and his fellow Tories would have been "astonished" and deeply disturbed if they had known what the

prime minister had said in their names.

"It goes to show the depth of his commitment to Europe," Lord Deedes said.

"But it also shows that all of his critics, especially Margaret Thatcher, who believed he was prepared to give

away anything to get us in Europe, and keep us there, were absolutely right."

Piers Ludlow, a senior lecturer in international history at the London School of Economics, said the papers filled

in the final gap in our knowledge of how Britain persuaded the French to drop their opposition, begun by

President Charles de Gaulle, to British membership of the EC.

Dr Ludlow said he thought that voters at the time, and MPs on both sides of the House, would have been very

concerned by the positions Sir Edward took on relations with America and on the ideas of political and monetary

union.

The official record quotes him, in indirect speech, as saying: "It was sometimes said that Britain only sought

partnership with the United States.

"His frank reply was that there could be no satisfactory partnership, even if Britain wanted it, between two

powers one of which was barely a quarter the size of the other.

"In Europe, on the other hand, such a partnership was possible with countries of the same size and within a

European Community applying the same rules and working to the same principles."

Sir Edward's view of Britain's role in the world was made clear at the outset of the summit and would not sit

comfortably on the lips of a current Tory leader.

"Historically, Britain had always been part of Europe.

"It was only during the past 25 years that it had come to seem as if our natural connection might be with the

United States.

"But we were in fact still part of Europe; and his Government were giving evidence of this in the extent to which

they were orienting their policies so as to bring them into line with the European Community."

The files can be seen at www.margaretthatcher.org/RECORD/eec.htm

bfenton@telegraph.co.uk

Appendix IV: France wants Britain in EEC in spite of suspicions

43

Appendix V: 'Our views on Europe are close enough', M Pompidou declares

44

Appendix VI: The United Kingdom and the European Communities

45

Appendix VII: Negotiations with EEC: The question of sugar

46

47

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III

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

C.A.P. – Common Agricultural Policy

E.C.S.C. - European Coal and Steel Community

E.E.C. – European Economic Community

E.F.T.A. – European Free Trade Area

G.A.T.T. – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

N.A.T.O. – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

U.S. - United States