-'I7 Bringing clientelism and

institutions back inThe rise and fall of religious parties inIndonesia's electoral democracy

Kikue Hamayotsu

Introduction

The fall of authoritarian rule in Indonesia and the subseq4!?nt transition to demo-cracy in 1998 raised high expectations among religious and organizationsto gain better access to state power and/or political prornm .. ):in civil society.Some of these religious actors chose to form a political~p;tty to participateactively in electoral politics, whereas others deci 'r. s~y out of formal pol-itics. After three rounds of reasonably free and zislative elections, only afew religious-based parties have survived th'e~ s and expensive electoralcompetition, whereas many others bave~f3iied to 'adjust to the various institu-tional changes that have shaped Indon(g~it. pdfuics over the last decade. Whataccounts for the political competitiv lack thereof) of religious parties inIndonesia's electoral democra'Cy'?

In addressing this questiQfr?Jfiis chapter aims to achieve two main objectives.First, to evaluate the ilit)' 6~o.minant analytical perspectives with regard toparty/electoral poli ~, 'iifing the rise and fall of religious parties, and,second, to intr~,dl!ce ative analytical perspective to fiII the gaps left inthe existing Iiterature,. Buildington \~·~.•Iiterature of party institutionalization, this chapter adoptsWeber's familiar ci~ifc'epts of bureaucratic and patrimoniallclientelistic organiza-tions to assess levels of party institutionalization and organizational cohesion. Itargues that it is the nature of intra-party organizational cohesion that bestexplains the rise and fall of religious parties. I categorize political parties broadlyinto two categories: well-institutionalized and clientelistic. Well-institutionalizedparties are rule-bound, merit-based and disciplined, usually with well-definedclear divisions of duties and responsibilities. Clientelistic/patrimonial parties, onthe other hand, are permeated by reward- and patronage-based clientelistic rela-tions based on personal loyalty and/or ascriptive norms and practices.

The comparative case study below suggests that well-institutionalized partiesare more competitive politically than clientelistic parties in the medium to longterm. Moreover, it also shows that the timing of institutional formation is crucialfor the survival of political parties in light of Indonesia's weak state institutionsand entrenched tradition of patronage-based party mobilization. When party

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 121

elites have developed a disciplined well-institutionalized party organizationbefore they have extensive access to state power and patronage, they tend to beless susceptible to money politics, political corruption and opportunistic behav-iors that could be a cause of organizational fragmentation. On the other hand,less institutionalized c1ientelistic parties are more susceptible to money politics,corruption and opportunistic behaviors as they gain greater access to state powerand resources, thereby resulting in further erosion of party cohesion and, ulti-mately, political competitiveness. This chapter examines three religious partiesthat have exhibited diverging outcomes to explore the utility of the analyticalperspectives introduced above: two post-transition parties, the Prosperous JusticeParty (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and the National Awakening Party(Partai Kebangkitan Bangs a, PKB), and a party already established during theprevious New Order regime, the United Development Party (Partai PersatuanPembangunan, PPP).

3

Political parties and electoral politics in Indonesia'democracy

The democratic ~ansition and the in~roduction of ~on:r~ 'J/e election.s in post-Suharto Indonesia have generated lively deb a umd,ew scholarship amongobservers of Indonesian politics. With regar tfie.iSfudy of parties and partysystems in particular, broadly three analy . ectives have emanated fromthe debate about political parties . thoritarian Indonesia. First,

"approaches based on a/iran or s",cio-cu . "'~ 'cleavage/identity, second, studiesthat stress personalism or ,h "e scholar "call the 'presidentialization' ofparties and, third, works focusi money politics and political corruption. 1

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The cleavage m2ael

One of the nJ~tpromi .t ~nalytical approaches that scholars of Indonesianpolitics have ¥l!lopt ccassessparty alignment and party formation is the cleav-age model or what ubbed the aliran (socio-cultural stream) model in theIndonesian context. This perspective is especially prominent in analyses of reli-gious parties since the concept of aliran first gained scholarly currency toexamine political identification of religious-based communal categories (Geertz1960). Although the a!iran and cleavage models may not be exactly the same(see Ufen in this volume), both commonly treat deeply-rooted socio-cultural cat-egories, shared identities and values and/or organizational attachment as thebasic foundation of political party alignment and member affi Iiation. Moreover,such socio-cultural cleavages are translated into more explicitly political cleav-ages or categories within party systems only when political agents use themactively to mobilize popular allegiance to win votes (King 2003; Ufen 2008:5-6; Woodward 2001: 30-1).

According to this model, Indonesian parties, either in the first democraticperiod of the 1950s or in the post-Suharto period, are organized along

32~~JJ

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socio-cultural identities. The parties use these identity categories and socio-cultural and communal institutions based on these identities to mobilize the elec-torates. They are also considered the representatives of the social and economicinterests of these cultural communities. Moreover, democracy and electoralpolitics would offer 'a venue for power struggles among the leadership ofthese community groups' based on these identities (Woodward 200l: 30).Accordingly, the rise of PKB, for example, sponsored by the most prestigiousIndonesian religious mass organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), is explained bythe political aspirations of the 'traditionalist' Muslim community (Turmudi2004).2

Personalistic parties

Other scholars, on the other hand, find that the utility of the cleavage model hassomewhat declined due to the growing prominence of ke new trends in the2000s. One of the other approaches that have challeng e cleavage modelemphasizes the mobilizing and organizing power o~..tpe~ Iities and leaders(Liddle and Mujani 2007; Mietzner 2009a). Accordit\~",to"'t9is approach, partiesare formed for, and/or organized along, prom! 'charismatic personalitiesrather than social cleavages/interests mediate.g iv" class or identity. Thesepersonalities then seek to dominate and us'¥' Yrrty' nizations.as their electoralvehicles to gain power (Ufen 2008: 2.:.Ok.. -...2..~.j.J... . se their political survival is ulti-mately dependent on the popularity q.{~~a{or resources possessed by prominentfigures, personalistic parties tend to be o~igaftizationally weak (Mujani and Liddle2010; Pepinsky 2009). SOl -eq~~holarsadJpt'this approach to account for the rise(and potential fall) of n ties, suer as the Democratic Party (PartaiDemokrat, PD), thety~fa Movement (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Ger-indra) and the PeaR !nce Party (Hanura), all led by former militaryofficers.' Ie""

tiP" and money politics'"

The third analytical approach that has gained wide currency in analyses of Indo-nesian party politics emphasizes the role of money politics and political corrup-tion." According to some scholars, money politics and rampant corruption arecritical and concomitant features of personalistic parties as a result of increas-ingly costly elections. In the last few years money politics and political corrup-tion have grown ever-more conspicuous because of a number of electoralchanges such as the introduction of direct elections for heads of local govern-ments (pilkada) in 2005 and a fully open party list system in the legislative elec-tions (Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009). In the case of legislative elections, forexample, individual candidates now need to spend a disproportional sum ofmoney to run for office, let alone win elections. Under the old closed-list systemused in 1999, candidates needed to pay primarily to secure a higher position in aparty list. Under the new system, on the other hand, candidates have to finance

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 123

their own campaigns (and to spend more) to win actual votes because theycompete with numerous other rivals not only from other parties but also fromtheir own parties.'

What is missing? Weak program, ideology and institution

Despite some disagreements and different analytical foci, these approaches seemto agree on a few common features that have become prominent in the processof democratic consolidation. First, ideological parties or programmatic partieshave largely failed to emerge and/or gain power in Indonesia's electoral demo-cracy (Fealy 2001: 100-4; Mujani and Liddle 2010; Pepinsky et al. 2009),6Second, all these approaches imply and/or complement a view that politicalparties have a very weak institutional foundation except a few parties,such asGolkar and PKS, For example, the strongest party in,c:;..parliament in the2009-2014 period, PD, has not invested in the developmenf solid organiza-tional base because it could rely almost entirely on othe s of electoralcapital to gain power, just like the personalistic party a ;;~£ diets. More-over, expansion of new campaign technologies such jh§u tancies, media,opinion polls and surveys has meant that political parr e-IPressed to employnew strategies to appeal to electorates and coml1.st~i.ti0ther parties, renderingtraditional means and networks such as door- ~':dobr:vlsits and traditional cul-tural leadership less effective (Mujani a 0I0: 41). Such new trendshave given greater leverage to rich busi'> ,celebrities, local nobles as wellas prominent politicians and \y"§J)-con71~te bureaucrats who have access towealthy business interests a estate app,:aratus, thereby contributing evenfurther to the dominance of ities in p'arty politics (Mietzner 2009a), Anoverall consequence q;fi(~~ptS'~{t general indifference among party elitestowards building efte~tiv:¢ili~rgaftl ations staffed by competent cadres to reach

~->-. "~lii'I .• ~·

out to electorat~:a't"the . . ots. The party-mass relations have become super-ficial and temper as a 11.

Religious parties nder electoral democracy

To what extent do these analytical perspectives help explain the political com-petitiveness of religious parties? Religious parties are broadly defined as polit-ical parties based on religious ideology, created and led by religious leaders and/or closely associated with religious organizations, They exhibit a considerablelevel of collective religious identity and/or resort to religious capital and symbolsto achieve political prominence collectively, According to this definition, theCrescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the National Awakening Party(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the National Mandate Party (Partai AmanatNasional, PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS),and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) aremajor parties included in this category, although the degree of religious identityand access to, and/or use of, religious resources among these parties has changed

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124 K. Hamayotsu

over time," Golkar and PDI-P are not considered religious parties because theseparties remain dominated by secular elites and their collective use of religiouscapital is minimal and, if at all, largely nominal."

As seen in Table 7.l below, religious parties exhibit intriguing patterns inelectoral competitiveness since the introduction of democratic elections in 1999.A relatively new puritanical Islamist party, PKS, has achieved steady growth tobecome the most competitive and prominent religious party. On the other hand,PKB, established to represent the interests of NU, has declined drastically overthe years. A similar pattern is seen with PPP, the oldest of the Islamic parties,which also has a close association with NU, as well as other religiousorganizations.

All three major theoretical paradigms discussed above are indeed helpful inidentifying overall patterns of political party mobilization and affiliation. Forexample, the cleavage model may still be relevant to understand why PDI-P sup-

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porters are not very likely to switch their allegiance to P or PPP. Moreover,these paradigms do not necessarily contradict one another example, politicalcorruption and money politics certainly could also be romiri tWinpersonalisticparties in attracting members and voters. The inade a~~{' these paradigms,however, is apparent if we try to account for div~tfg;'ns of political com-petitiveness among three major religious part' KB and PPP.

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)

PKS is a new party establis as th cal wing of a dakwah (missionary)movement, Tarbiyah. Ori known 'ply as the Justice Party (PartaiKeadilan, PK), it was initia c. minor paJY that won only 1.36 percent of thepopular vote and 7 V"i> iament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) in1999.9 Its popularif significantly over time, however, to gain thelargest number/of. v ..~ among religious parties and 57 seats in parliament in2009. By tile e o{{vrlfing it held three cabinet positions under the currentpresident, 'U011.o. The steady expansion of PKS appears to defy the majoranalytical perspecdxfes.

Table 7.1 Religious parties in the House of Representatives (DPR)

1999 2004 2009

Vote (%) Seat Vote (%) Seat Vote (%) Seat

PAN 7.12 34 6.44 53 6.01 43PBB 1.94 13 2.62 11 1.8 0PKB 12.61 51 10.57 52 4.94 27PKS 1.36 7 7.34 45 7.8 57PPP 10.7 58 8.15 58 5.3 39Total 33.73 163 35.12 219 25.85 ]66

Source: The General Elections Commission, Indonesia Mernilih.

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Rise and fall a/religious parries in indonesia 125

First, PKS does not have any particular charismatic leaders who could wieldoverwhelming popular appeals. Although key figures like KH Hilmi Aminuddin,the chairman of the highest decision-making body (Majelis Syura, ConsultativeCouncil), and his protege, secretary-general Anis Matta, exert exceptional influ-ence within the party, neither of them possesses the kind of popular appealtypical of other dominant leaders such as PDI-P's Megawati Sukamoputri orPD's Yudhoyono. Second, PKS is still committed to limiting political corruptionand money politics to minimal levels among its members, even though someprominent corruption cases and charges involving PKS elites in recent yearshave tarnished its otherwise clean image." Third, PKS does not entirely fit theestablished aliran model. Built on the campus-based dakwah movement, itdeveloped particularly strong roots in urban low- and middle-class constituen-cies, but it has also managed to mobilize Muslims from various other socio-cultural backgrounds and expanded its support base beyo.pd their traditionalnarrow constituencies including even the underprivileged l' unities in ruralJava more recently. I I

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The National Awakening Party (PKB)

PKB has proven to be another unexpected case ..!! largest religious partyin 1999, but gradually declined over time. Now:lils survival is questionable.PKB is a new political party intimately a ~jwith NU. It was founded bythe former chairman of NU, the late A an Wahid (popularly known asGus Dur), a number of NU ~JJi, (tradi religious leaders) and membersclosely associated with them;;'~t fi~t glanc PKB seems to fit the model of apersonalistic party, since' ontrolled t e party till he passed away (Ufen2008: 24). Moreover, be ., bused the party in order to advance his per-sonal interests and a t party is still widely dubbed 'a party of theformer president)itMllT11! m. Wahid', even after his demise." It is importantto realize, ho~e~e' that WE is different from other personalistic parties, mostnotably PD, ili\at I e essential respect. PKB relies not only on the personalclout ofWahid, but on organizational resources from NU, whereas PD doesnot rely on support from a particular mass organization.

The utility of the cleavage model in explaining the (declining) political com-petitiveness ofPKB is also debatable. Many scholars support the cleavage modelto suggest that PKB emerged from a particular socio-cultural milieu based on'traditionalist' Islamic beliefs associated with NU, an identity that some assumeis almost static (Baswedan 2004; King 2003; Turmudi 2004). If the cleavagemodel is right, however, PKB should have remained as competitive and promi-nent as before, unless coherence of the traditionalist NU community hasdeclined. In reality, as discussed below, a number of PKB loyalists from NUhave abandoned PKB to switch allegiance to other parties including secularparties such as Golkar and PDI-P.

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The United Development Party (PPP)

PPP, a party created during the Suharto regime, also exposes some notableweaknesses in the established paradigms. No single prominent figure, family ororganization dominates the party, although money politics and political corrup-tion are allegedly widespread. Nonetheless, PPP fared relatively well in the firstelections in 1999 to become the second-biggest Islamic party in the DPR afterPKB, despite earlier expectations that the party would not survive after theregime change. The reasonable success in that first post-Suharto election as wellas the subsequent gradual decline of PPP has yet to be adequately explained.Some argue that these patterns have to do with the fact that PPP is an old partythat lacks legitimacy and reformist credentials. However, this view does notexplain why PPP performed comparatively well in 1999 when numerous otherparties with better reformist credentials and fresh outlooks emerged to mobilizeelectorates. It is also worth remembering that Golkar, nother regime partycreated and personally controlled by Suharto under the r regime, not onlysurvived the regime transition but actually remains a JOL,.player both atnational and local levels." Neither the major appr· ".oL tHerefore, nor thereformist credentials factor seem adequate to give ense ofPPP.

Bringing clientelism and institutionsinstitutionalization

This chapter brings in concep,!l!~l tools phasize the quality of party organ-izations to better explain Y o.ljtical ris ti fall of religious parties so as to

/if''''\Wcomplement the domin roaches . troduced above. There is growingawareness among sa{. parative politics that organizational qualitiesof political parties, t "y party institutionalization, have an importanteffect on reg' nd consolidation. In the democratization literature,some scholle arty institutionalization an indispensable condition fordemocratic,d,1lpon (e.g., Huntington 1991; Mainwaring and Scully 1995;Randall and Svas$f8 2002). Despite such broad consensus, however, there ismuch less agreement and clarity as to how institutionalization should be concep-tualized (Randall and Svasand 2002). It is also debatable what conditions facili-tate or hinder party institutionalization.

Built on traditional 'institutionalization' literature such as Huntington (1968)and Panebianco (1988), Randall and Svasand offer one useful definition for partyinstitutionalization. According to them, party institutionalization should be under-stood as 'the process by which the party becomes established in terms both ofintegrated patterns of behavior and of attitudes, or culture' (Randall and Svasand2002: 12). More specifically, they focus not only on internal but also externaldimensions of party organization to evaluate four elements along these twodimensions: (1) systemness; (2) value infusion; (3) decisional autonomy; and (4)reification (Randall and Svasand 2002: 12-15). Overall, scholars regard organiza-tional cohesion as one of the most important features of party institutionalization.

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 127

However, this view does not necessarily inform us about the quality of partyorganizations. Shetter's (1994) approach to party building, on the other hand, ismore valuable in addressing the quality dimension of party institutionalization.He categorizes political parties broadly into two types. One is programmatic, dis-ciplined and well-organized whilst the other is patronage-based. The former tendsto distribute collective benefits or appeal to a collective interest in an effort toelicit contributions of money, labor or votes from its followers. The latter distrib-utes patronage of various sorts to the individuals who support the party and isbased on vertical personalistic relations and transactions (Shefter 1994: Chap. 2).

Moreover, Shefter's comparative study is valuable in another importantrespect for our discussion of party institutionalization. It tells us under what con-ditions parties are likely to pursue one or the other of the two approaches inorder to acquire a following. Shefter predicts that two factors condition the stra-tegic choice of party elites. The first factor is 'the circum tances of a party'sorigins - whether or not it enjoyed access to patronage at tl" e it first under-took to mobilize a popular base' (Shefter 1994: 27). This, hues, can have asignificant impact on the party's subsequent behavior in sled gf "bether it optsto build a well-organized mass-based party or patronage] arty.

Another crucial factor that influences party builc ording to Shefter,the relative timing of two pivotal events, party ~u,,' d access to patronage.He argues that if a party is not in a position tov~i e particularistic benefitsbefore coming to power, its leaders will h been compelled to rely upon ideo-logical.and solidary incentives or to est n~ork of mass organizations inorder to mobilize mass support:.;Mpreove arty will not rely on distributionof patronage to gain support . .the pa ites neither occupy public office. ""nor are allied with elites wh 01 some source of patronage or if (2) stateagencies are protecte ice statutes and other general laws thatspecify how public b urdens are to be distributed. Furthermore, aparty linked to a n{~ss ? I ency through such an organizational structure willnot, once it COlIeSo pow~, be compelled to raid the public treasury in order tomaintain its hBM 0 upporters, On the other hand, a party that undertakes towin popular support distributing particularistic benefits through local notablesor politicians will not have established such an organizational structure to bindvoters directly to the party, and consequently such a party will only be able tomaintain itself in office by heeding the demands of the patronage-seeking politi-cians who are affiliated with it (Shefter 1994: 27-9).

I gain analytical insights from Shefter's approach and utilize Max Weber'sfamiliar typologies, patrimonial and bureaucratic organizations, to roughly cate-gorize political parties into two prototypes along the institutional spectrum (Rothand Wittich 1978: Chaps 11-12). At the one end of the spectrum are clientelisticparties while at the other end are well-institutionalized parties. These are, ofcourse, ideal types. In reality, parties might sit somewhere between these twopoles and display characteristics of both.

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128 K. Hamayotsu

Clientelistic parties

I define clientelistic parties broadly as political organizations permeated by per-sonalistic exchange-based relations and ascriptive norms and practices betweenleaders and subordinates. Scholars generally use 'political clientelism' to refer topolitical interactions and linkages based on 'the proffering of material goods inreturn for electoral/political support' (Stokes 2009: 60S). Patronage and votebuying are subclasses of clientelism (Stokes 2009) or, as Tomsa and Ufen put itthe introductory chapter in this volume, 'strategies that can, but do not neces-sarily have to be applied' in a c1ientelistic relationship. While many studies tendto focus on party-electorate linkages in reference to political c1ientelism, I adoptthe concept of political c1ientelism more flexibly to characterize not only party-mass relations but also intra-party relations between party elites and rank-and-file members, since the essence of these relations are similar and bothcharacteristics tend to co-exist and overlap. 14

In c1ientelistic parties, the recruitment, promotion and II political successof rank- and-file members are ultimately dependent on their. onal relations with,and loyalty to, party elites or patrons. They are reward / with p~ positions and!or access to state offices and resources in return for ,;t'sonal loyalty to par-ticular party elites. In such parties, rules, reg and norms may exist onpaper, but are readily ignored or skewed to p),l, "~onal ambitions and interestsof dominant figures in practice. Thus, c1ientelist~cparties tend to be rife with per-sonal conflicts and factionalism over di'frl'0. tio'W'~fresources, Moreover, already

"frail organizational cohesion could d te further as parties attain greateraccess to state offices and eg6urces be. intra-party competition over thosepublic resources grows inte 7:'a nasty. . e lack of organizational cohesion inc1ientelistic parties can be,,*amaJof:.•.cause of electoral loss and political decline ifvoters lose faith in t" 's abi11tYto deliver the expected goods.

Well-institutionalize parties are located at the opposite end of clientelistic partieson the institutional spectrum. They broadly approximate the familiar Weberianmodel of rule-bound, merit-based, professional and disciplined organizations. Insuch parties, recruitment, promotion and political success of rank-and-filemembers are generally determined by their qualifications, performances andservice according to rules and norms explicitly set by the party and broadlyshared by party members. Well-institutionalized parties are organizationally morecoherent and steady than clientelistic parties because they are equipped withmechanisms to resolve internal disputes and tensions and keep narrow personalinterests from overriding collective interests. Factionalism centered on personal-ities or personal rivalries may exist, but is kept relatively minimal. As we shallsee below, it is this organizational cohesion, derived from institutionalized intra-party relations, that facilitates political competitiveness of well-institutionalizedparties in the medium to long run.

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To sum up this part, when elite-member relations are primarily based oninformal clientelistic interactions and immediate personal material gains, I argue,parties tend to be frail and unstable in the long term. Political competitivenesswill decline and survival of parties is at risk as a result. On the other hand, whenelite-member relations are bound by institutionalized rules, regulations, normsand values, parties tend to be coherent and stable. It is this organizational cohe-sion that contributes to political competitiveness and the survival of well-institutionalized parties. An assessment of new religious parties formed after thedemocratic transition, PKS and PKB, helps to attest to these claims.

3

Explaining the rise and political survival of the ProsperousJustice Party (PKS)

PKS represents the best example of a well-institutionalized party. PKS's steadyexpansion and political competitiveness in electoral politics0>inye the end of theauthoritarian regime is often attributed to its ideological ':adhesion, its cleanimage and its solid programs such as anti-corruption ~·ti governance(Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Hasan 2009; Machmudi 2008 all these obser-vations are largely true, what makes PKS especial, ' It from many otherpolitical parties is its organizational cohesion. 0 the value of organiza-tional cohesion for political survival has inc further as the party hasgained greater access to state power and p

If Tslamist ideology, especialJy COl 0 enforcement of a Syariah-based system, was the key facll'>!i..for P '1:. , olitical competitiveness and sur-vival, the party could have lo.~~its cohesion 3:1l9tSupport as it pursued aggressiveideological reorientation, :s~~tcli:ted by ¥'some ~bservers (Hasan 200?).However, that has no." ~n.(the{ca-S'e.PKS has achieved electoral expansionacross class and re~io".,.;. ~,d~jes while other avowedly Islamist parties suchas PPP and PBBave los.tco,]jsiderable electoral support across the archipelago.In the 2009 L~g ive ~I~~trons, PKS has also gained more votes and parlia-mentary seatssin va and Central Java, traditional strongholds of otherparties such as PDT- d PKB (Hamayotsu 2011).

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Recruitment and promotion of party cadres and party cohesion

From the beginning, PKS has developed a clearly defined hierarchical partyorganization to recruit not only pious but also politically ambitious and skilledyoung Muslim men and women. PKS has inherited a puritanical Islamist ideologyand vision inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and a hierarchicallyorganized, cell (usrah)-based structure from the Tarbiyah movement from whichit emerged (Machmudi 2008: Chap. 6; Permata 2008: 98-103). All party membersare required to participate in regular religious meetings and trainings to be quali-fied for party ranks, regardless of their socio-economic and cultural backgrounds.These mandatory trainings certainly imbue a strong collective religious identityamong party members and sustain ideological coherence in the party. IS

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PKS's recent ideological moderation to expand its electoral support basebeyond its traditional constituencies in campuses and urban dakwah circles hasput such ideological cohesion of the party at risk. Indeed, at times these adjust-ments have caused tension and confusion among the party's rank and file."However, the party has managed to contain these tensions and disagreementsreasonably effectively without causing any serious crack, conflict or factional-ism, let alone breakup of the party. Perhaps equally important, the party's cohe-sion has also remained largely unaffected by its enhanced access to state powerand patronage. 17

Indeed, in order to understand the PKS's organizational cohesion and effect-ive moderation, it is imperative to look into its organizational structures thatwere put into practice before the party (and members) gained access to statepower." I emphasize at least three characteristics of the party that facilitate col-lective identity and commitment among members and organizational cohesion.First, recruitment and promotion of members is based on. merit and service inPKS. The party particularly emphasizes service (both in Fl:l;t~lityand quantityterms), qualification and grassroots support as import aIitj¢s' for promotion.Personal connection or nepotism, let alone money, primary source toattain a leadership position in the party. Thus p . nation of non-member

11figures for high-ranking state office has becometc." ~,ersial especially becausesome of them do not have clean records aninv61Yed in corruption. Muham-mad Misbakhun, a DPR member from va'who was arrested for corruptionin 2010, offers a prominent example portant to note, however, that non-members are not qualified f~!J~p'artyIe ip/executive positions even if theywin and hold state office s' by PK

Second, the party emp s collective interests over personal interests.Unlike many other IuS,iQrWsi arties, PKS has made a conscious effort toprevent a single ch~ris'\h~c-tlg re from emerging and controlling the party topursue his/he rson~""'i :"'erests and ambitions. Its highest decision-makingbody, Maj'J({,ra, ~f~ptesented by executive members and regional heads,serves as a hart' to ensure that the party formulates policies that representthe collective inte ts of members. A few top leaders, most notably the chair-man of Majelis Syura, Hilmi Aminuddin, and the secretary-general, Anis Matta,exert exceptional influence in the party to potentially challenge these principles.Indeed, it is suspected that they have built c1ientelistic relations in the patty andcould interfere in, and control, decision-making and personnel appointment at alllevels." However, these leaders still depend on a well-institutionalized party fortheir own political survival and do not run the party in the same way as leadersof more personalistic parties such as Yudhoyono or Megawati.

Third, there is regular succession and regeneration of leadership at almost alllevels despite, again, a few prominent exceptions at the highest echelon of theleadership. Party leaders and executive boards at national and local levelsare elected by members. Incumbent leaders are expected to step down fromoffice after fulfilling a given tenn to make room for new leaders and toencourage regeneration." The most notable example is the party president. All

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 131

the presidents have stepped down after serving one term (five years) to focus ontheir official duties in government."

Despite the prominence of merit-based rational-legal characteristics, there isno doubt that contradicting patrimonial (to stick with the Weberian theme) fea-tures also exist in PKS, for example the secretive decision-making processwithin the Majelis Syura or the overwhelming influence of a few individualssuch as Aminuddin and Matta over personnel appointments at the highest levelof leadership. At this stage, these features appear to be limited to a few excep-tions, but precisely because PKS's political survival depends so much on itsorganizational coherence such patrimonial tendencies may actually endanger theparty's survival in the future.

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Party cohesion, political competitiveness and party survival

The organizational cohesion ofPKS has important effects r litical competit-iveness. Staffed with disciplined and well organized cad KS could, forexample, run election campaigns effectively and efficie~tt. ~ jte the relativelack of financial and socio-cultural resources compared ~itli'Qther major partiessuch as Golkar and PKB. It is the disciplined and ()" ""ttetl"young cadres thatfill these gaps. PKS deploys its cadres to build ~~ nections with elector-ates at the grass roots not only during electio~s ~b'u at other times. Withoutthe network of cadres committed to servi interests of electorates, PKScould never have been able to gain the d ;., prominence that it has now.

Organizational cohesion is al§Q crucia aintaining ideological cohesion.It allows the party leaders to rifake"qecessa deological adjustments relativelyflexible to accommodate new enous changes and electoral challenges. After1999, for instance, PK d its electoral support base beyond its tradi-tional Tarbiyah const e such ideological adjustment is the decisionto stop pursuing f4611na entation of Syariah (Islamic law). Another one isa more recellt;ll~' ion unced at the 2010 National Congress to open upparty membersh! on-Muslims and allow them more formal and activeinvolvement in the anagement of the party." Despite some confusion andanxiety, especially among a small group of hard-core members who still wish topursue Islamist goals, party elites at least in Java are in general well aware of thedevelopments and seem to understand why these changes are necessary for theirlong-term struggles, not only politically but also religiously."

Moreover, party cohesion gives the party comparatively strong political lev-erage to negotiate with other parties for cabinet posts after elections. Indeed, asPKS has won more seats in parliament and cabinet positions, the party hasgained better access to state patronage. It is important to remember, however,that it is their organizational capital, most importantly highly disciplined andwell trained party cadres that give them better bargaining power with the presid-ent and the ruling party so as to secure access to state patronage and privilegessuch as cabinet positions. Before the 2009 elections, PKS not only quicklyendorsed Yudhoyono as the presidential candidate against the wishes of many

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PKS members, but also promised deployment of party cadres to monitor andguard the polling stations across the archipelago at the presidential election." Inreturn, PKS seemed four cabinet posts (reduced to three after a cabinet reshufflein October 2011), which is more than Golkar, the second largest party in theruling coalition. Representation in government has enabled PKS to expand itspatronage and support base and advance their conservative religious views."

Seen against the backdrop of a weak state apparatus and rampant politicalcorruption in Indonesia, this expanded access to state power and resources bearsthe risk of causing significant damage to the organization. So far, however, PKShas been able to avert such damage due to its organizational cohesion. Thus, aspredicted by Shefter, organizational structures and discipline that had been inplace before gaining state powers and access to state patronage is the key inunderstanding political competitiveness and survival of well-institutionalizedparties such as PKS.

23

Clientelistic parties and political decline: the Na .Awakening Party (PKB)

ample of a clientelis-inance of personalities in

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Among Indonesia's parties, PKB offers perhaps ltic party, especially when we take into account

pIdecision-making and survival of the party'.~ r, PKB diverges from anideal-typical clientelistic party on at le~,s.t",QPe'l«FUcialpoint: its support and sur-vival is not only based on personali(es"'~q\the relations built around them, butalso on support from a mass ~~igious or " ation, NU.

In PKB, clientelistic re " uilt ar 'party patrons like the founder andchief patron of the party, t Abdurrahinan Wahid, penetrate the party fromthe center to the gr QQis f importantly, recruitment and promotion ofparty members to ~~lt-l. ns are primarily based on their personal loyaltyto the party p rons. ,'. thl conflict and factionalism among party elites havegrown ramB nd na'§'::::::::dueto a lack of adequate rules and regularities as wellas the domll\ "ersonalistic interests in decision making and distribution ofpolitical and econ ic resources. These internal conflicts finally resulted in asplit ofthe party into two camps in 2008, thereby deteriorating its already declin-ing political competitiveness even further.

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Interests behind the birth of PKB

PKB was founded by Wahid in response to pressures from prominent NU-linkedreligious leaders to create a party that would represent the interests of the NUcommunity in the aftermath of the regime change in 1998 (Bush 2009: 118-23;Jung 2009: Chap. 6). From the beginning, however, PKB exhibited key charac-teristics of clientelistic organizations. First, the party quickly became a politicalvehicle to serve the personal interests and ambitions of Wahid and his loyalallies rather than the collective interests of the party or the sponsoring religiousorganization, NU. Despite mounting aspirations of NU elites to gain political

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 133

prominence, it was not clear, even during the very formative phase, whether theparty was in fact to serve the collective interests of the NU community. Theparty was formed at Wahid's residence and he appointed people personally loyalto him to the top echelons of the party leadership (Bush 2009: 122). PKB dupli-cated the organizational structures of NU to have a religious advisory board,Dewan Syura (staffed by NU kyai), which exercised supreme authority over thepolitical leadership of the party, so as to protect the interests of NU in electoralpolitics (Mietzner 2009b: 255). However, personal abuse of the party by Wahidand a few party elites connected to him and prominent NU families soon gotworse, and internal conflict derived from this abuse has grown bitter and uglyover time. This has severely hurt the long-term and collective interests of NUconstituencies as a result."

Second, there is no clear rule or procedure respected by party members inregard to succession and promotion of party leadership in PKB. Almost allimportant personnel decisions are made by a few top party ea ers, according totheir personal situations, favors and interests. For exam arly on Wahidappointed Matori Abdul Djalil, a relatively unknown fJ, /out adequatereligious credentials or a large mass base, as the party an despite fierceopposition by senior religious elites. This appoin rimarily based onMatori's loyalty to Wahid (Bush 2009: 122; Miettuer .'9b: 255). Later, Wahiddismissed Matori from the party, once Mato~lir~v1;d-.t6be disloyal to him, likemany other party leaders that followed (Bus.,g2·QO : 141). The tight control oftop leaders (specifically Wahid) over pe . appointments and distribution ofpatronage in the party has faci!itt'ted a c, of clientelism that helps partyelites to cultivate their supp.· ase within party and keep their followersloyal. Ordinary party member ' - , e other hand, depend on the favor of theirpatrons for their fortuQe'survival.

These clientelistic r w even more prominent after Wahid waselected as presi nt::;;(l9 I) and gained access to massive state resourcesand privilege§/ ppor his men (such as Matori and Alwi Shihab) andfamily memb-';;~rs(.\lS his brother, Hasyim Wahid) to lucrative governmentpositions and approp~i~ied state funds to benefit himself, his allies, his personalconstituencies, NU-linked pesantren (traditional religious boarding school) andkyai. When he was eventually forced out of office in 2001, his opponents usedhis alleged abuse of state office and privileges for personal gains as main reasonsfor the impeachment."

Even after the devastating experiences in relation to his presidency andimpeachment, Wahid kept abusing the party for his personal ambitions and inter-ests, thereby exacerbating further severe internal confl ict and factionalism causedby his personalistic rule in the first place. His abrasive decision-making and arbi-trary personnel appointment finally resulted in a split of the party into twocamps, one led by Wahid and his daughter, Yenny Wahid, and the other by hisnephew, Muhaimin Iskandar.

The party split was caused by Wahid's dismissal ofMuhaimin as party chair-man in 2008. Wahid also dismissed Muhaimin loyalists altogether from the

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134 K. Hamayotsu

party's leadership positions." Muhaimin questioned the validity of the decisionmade by Wahid who, he claimed, ignored formal procedures as stipulated in theparty constitution." He then dismissed Yenny as the secretary-general, an actionwidely seen as retaliation against Wahid." Without a mechanism to resolve theconflict within the party, Muhaimin took the case to court to reclaim the party'schairmanship. Although the Wahid camp lost legal battles against Muhaimin,Wahid's camp has claimed legitimate ownership of the party ever since." As aresult of the court rulings, the General Election Commission recognizedMuhaimin's PKB to participate in the 2009 general elections. At the time ofwriting, reconciliation of the two camps had yet to be achieved, despite pres-sures from prominent party elites."

23

5

Clientelism, organizational fragility anti political survivaljt,

TIle prolonged and unresolved battle between the two ~camps not only offersevidence of organizational fragility derived from a lack ot~~~ and regularity inpersonnel appointment and leadership succession, bT~l~p ~i;l~monstrates howorganizational fragility of c1ientelistic parties affects t . '";,, iiical survival. As aresult of the prolonged infighting, party mernbej ed drastically," theparty's re~istration and preparation to conteltbtf~J:;...Y elections were delayed,and most Importantly, the party suffered a:asslw-electoral loss. In 1999, PKBhad won 12.61 percent of the popular, te and' 5 I seats in parliament Sincethen, however, popular support for p., eclined steadily from 10.57 percentin 2004 to 4.94 percent in 2QQ~. Furt cline is widely predicted unless thetwo camps achieve reconci . ndjoin es."

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"US parties: the United

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The instituti rs e may also help to gain a better understancting of the·:If,

political cOJn '< ,eq.essof other parties such as the more established Pl'P, Thisparty's decline has;j'taken a similar pattern as PKB's. In 1999, PPP received thesecond largest number of votes among religious parties after PKB to secure 58seats in DPR. This was a remarkable achievement given that the party, whichhad been the sole formal representative of Islamic political interests during theNew Order period, was facing unprecedented competition from new Islamicparties such as PKB and PAN. Since then, however, PPP's support base has kepteroding further and further, In 2009, the party had plunged to a mere half of thevotes it won a decade earlier (5.3 percent).

PPP's decline has been blamed on its connection to the old regime and lackof reformist credentials, but a better explanation may be its lack of organiza-tional cohesion and rampant factionalism based on organizational affiliation andpersonal rivalries. Of course, PPP's weak organization has historical roots in theauthoritarian past. The party was created by the Suharto regime by a forcedfusion of various Islamic parties and organizations in 1973 to weaken political

34

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 135

23

opposition (Kompas 1999: 159-71). These organizations, including NU, PSII(Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia), Parti (Partai Islam Persatuan TarbiyahIslamiyahi. and Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia), sought to protect theirown narrow interests and supported party candidates strictly along factionallines. Moreover, organizational structures were not clearly defined. For example,the party had more than one executive board - a Central Board and presidencyas well as two Advisory Boards - all issuing conflicting orders. Nor was there aclear allocation of duties and responsibilities. As a result, factional rivalry andcompetition over party positions and resources were extremely tense, therebyhindering the central leadership, once selected, from exerting effective influenceover policy-making, as well as activities of regional boards and rank-and-filemembers (Platzdasch 2009: 48).

After the fall of the Suharto regime, PPP essentially retained these organiza-tional characteristics. It is heavily fragmented with various Islamic organizationsattempting to control the allocation of party positions '~lJ.d various otherresources, The party has retained vertical networks of patrons and clients based

'/'"~\..

on organizational affiliation both at national and region 1S;;'£nerebydeter-ring the party leadership from exerting effective contr uihority not onlywithin the party but also in relation to outsiders.

PPP has largely failed not only to build a well idisciplined organization, but also to recruit abuild and lead the party in a new democrat'on the clienteIistic networks of various"and mobilization of members supportline party leaders and memb tively.

Despite the party's loss 0 onfidence, PPP elites have been surprisinglysuccessful in securing,mil*tr . 65itions, in, the two Yu~oyono cabinets of2004 and 2009. As oJte.~ttl!e~lI1 beneficiaries of the president's tendency tobuild broad-baseLgJ&:inbO:i¥:~c~ll>inetsin order to co-opt rivaling parties," PPP hasgained remarls~b'@ cces~~'tt;:'§tatepatronage regardless of its deteriorating elect-oral perform:Rces, inst the backdrop of rampant opportunities for corruptionand money politics, anded access to state office easily allows opportunisticbehavior at all levels, especially because (-!-(thelack of organizational discipline,Corruption scandals involving PPP members are abundant both in the party andgovernment office, Party members pay bribes to win party positions," partynominations of candidates at elections are traded and sold to non-members," andPPP politicians, once elected, use state office and patronage to enrich themselvesand to stay in power."

These factors have discouraged the formation of a collective identity andcommitment among party members. Islamic ideology, values and ideals theparty officially has pledged to fight for have become hollow and do not serve tobind members together. Internal conflicts and senior members' obsession withpower and money had already alienated ambitious, talented and pious youngMuslim leaders even before the regime change in 1998 (platzdasch 2009: 49),But this trend seems to have deteriorated even further in the context of expanded

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nalized, coherent, andlented cadres that could

~~t. The party instead has relieded organizations for recruitment

ere is no mechanism to discip-

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136 K. Hamayotsu

political opportunities for young and ambitious Muslim leaders after the intro-duction of democratic elections. It is not surprising, then, that junior PPP leadersare particularly bitter about the relative success of PKS wherein young Muslimleaders have a fair chance of success." Since the working congress in 2007,PPP's central board has attempted to take various steps to revitalize the party.One of the major efforts includes kaderisasi - recruitment and training of tal-ented young Muslim leaders (DPP PPP 2007).40 However, given the party'sdismal organizational condition, it seems rather doubtful that these efforts willhelp reverse the decline and revitalize the party.

Conclusion

This chapter has brought in familiar concepts of clientelistic and well-institutionalized organizations to emphasize organizatiC>Jlal qualities in threeIslamic parties in Indonesia. It has argued that organizatis cohesion (or lackthereof) accounts for the political rise and fall of religiou ies in Indonesia'selectoral politics after the fall of the authoritarian S e. The rise ofPKS, for example, is explained by its organizational on. Since its incep-tion, PKS has developed a rule-bound and disci ;,7fwell-institutionalizedparty to recruit and promote a number of talent ambitious young Muslimleaders, regardless of their socio-economi al background. Moreover,the party is equipped with mechanism few charismatic figures fromcontrolling (and ruining) the party so ct the collective interests of partymembers. Party cohesion e apating ..~~ these mechanisms allows PKS toimbue a strong collective . 'ai~s identi'~Jlfnong party elites and members torun the party and election .' igns effec1ively, without destructive factional-ism and infighting, it$ er of controversial ideological and politicaladjustments. FUrthel dieted by Shefter, the party elites' effort to builda disciplined, J>v'e11-0 ized party before it gained state power and patronagewas anothef"a .al . or'that explains the political competitiveness and sur-vivalofpKl$.

PKB and PPP n the other hand, have largely failed to build a well-institutionalized party. Instead, these parties are permeated by clientelistic rela-tions and patronage- and reward-based interactions. The weak organizationalapparatuses have caused destructive internal fighting and factionalism amongpersonalities. It has also left the parties vulnerable to money politics and corrup-tive and opportunistic behaviors as their access to state power and resources hasgrown. As a result, both PKB and PPP have alienated a number of young, tal-ented Muslim leaders and have lost mass support over time. In Indonesia's pecu-liar presidential system, parties could gain access to cabinet positions and statepatronage regardless of their electoral performances in the legislative elections.However, the expanded access to state patronage has deteriorated intra-partyconflict and fragility of some parties such as PPP and PKB even further, pre-cisely due to the deeply-seated clientelistic features put in place before theygained access to state power."

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Rise andfall of religious parties in Indonesia 137

Emphasizing the type of party organization and the level of organizationalcohesion does not necessarily exclude the traits other major analyticalapproaches tolndonesian party politics have emphasized, such as supremacy ofpersonalities andlor money politics and political corruption in gaining power. Onthe contrary, these elements play an important role in any institutional analysisand they are certainly present in the types of parties I have introduced. What thischapter has sought to achieve, then, is to draw more attention to the quality ofparty organizations that condition the degree to which personalistic ambitionsand money politics could infiltrate parties, and ultimately affect their organiza-tional and ideological cohesion.

34

NotesThis chapter mainly focuses on the debate about political parti~~ and party formationrather than the party system as whole. For the party system mon brpadly, see JohnsonTan (2002, 2006) and Mietzner (2008a).

2 For further discussion of the utility of this approach in th ',. n context, seeUferr's chapter in this volume.

3 PO, which was created by/for current president Susilo Bthe best example (Mietzner 2009a).

4 It should be noted though that this approach an,<1,themutually exclusive (for examples see Mietzner ;!{)"07,~O ).

5 For some key electoral changes, see Sherlock] ,- .2009).6 See also Tornsa's chapter on Southeast A .A . . pes in this volume.7 For example, PAN may no longer be zed as a 'religious party' in many

respects especially since it has AS! close ion with Muhammadiyah after 2005.In the formative period, PA relied 0 urces and facilities of Muhammai-dyah although it ideologic ed a plu list position and eschewed religioussymbols and idioms ..~~"~"S~~aI2~06; Chap. 6): ...

8 It may be worth not . lat other major non-religious/secular-nationalist parties suchas Golkar and POl-Pc alsp begun using religious symbols and resources to appealto religious se 'm'ents'k .the electorates, thereby complicating further categorizationof political, ,:f How~ver, such initiatives among these parties are still marginal orpersonal. The es~entiallv secular natures of these parties remain the same. ForGolkar's recent ir~ij~ti~~ to promote religious programs, see 'Golkar KumpulkanDana Melalui Zakat", Kompas, 21 August 2010.

9 PK changed the name to PKS to reregister to participate in the next elections.10 For the increasing trend of corruption, scandals and opportunistic and pragmatic

behaviors involving PKS politicians, see Tomsa (2010; 151-3) or Mietzner (2009a;14).

II For example, PKS gained four additional seats in East Java and Central Java, strong-holds of PKB and POI-P, respectively, in the 2009 legislati ve elections.

12 For example, 'PKB Chairman Moves to Sack 'Inactive' NO.2', Jakarta Globe, 3November 2010.

13 'Dernokrat dan Golkar Berpotensi', Kompas, 15 October 2010. For the institutionaldevelopment of Golkar and the importance of institutionalization for political sur-vival, see Harjanto (2010) and Tomsa (2008).

14 In both cases, material rewards are awarded to subordinates in return for the latter'spersonal allegiance to their superiors (i.e., patrons), although [ acknowledge that pat-rimonialism generally refers to intra-elite relations based on the distribution of publicresources while c1ientelism focuses more on elite-mass relations.

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138 K. Hamayotsu

15 Interviews with PKS cadres, 2008-20 10. See also Machrnudi (2008).16 Interviews with party elites; e.g., Cholid Mahmud, former head of PKS Yogyakarta

and currently member of the OPO (Regional Representative Council), Yogyakarta, 5July 2010.

17 The membership has grown more than ten-fold between 1999 and 2009. According tothe party, approximately 700,000 members are officially registered.

18 PKS' access to state office expanded dramatically after 2004. PKS gained more than1000 legislators across the archipelago (Mietzner 2009a: 14).

19 Confidential interview with a party leader, Jakarta, 18 July 2010.20 The new party president, Luthfi Hasan Tshaaq, reiterated this point at his inauguration

at the National Congress in Jakarta (Kompas, 19 June 20 I0).21 For example, former president Tifatul Sembiring relinquished his post after he was

appointed Communications and Information Technology Minister in 2009.22 'Islamist PKS faces daunting bid to embrace pluralism', Jakarta Post, 19 June 20 10;

'Terbuka Setengah Hati', Tempo, 4 July 20 IO.23 Interviews with party leaders at the regional levels in Yogyakarta, Sernarang, Sura-

baya and Jombang after the National Congress in June-July 20.10.24 Jakarta Post, 26 April 2010. Iappreciate a few PKS leaders, cially ursanita Nas-

uti on, for insightful information about the important role of cg monitors (saksi) atelections. The operation is not only expensive but m Qi1~ntly requires theparty's capacity to train and discipline party cadres t uf'the duty properly,since otherwise they could be susceptible to corruption negligence.

25 Communication and Information Minister Se .1;,£,' caused controversy byattempting to introduce conservative measures ontrol of web content. See,for example, "Tifatul threatens to ban BIac e over pornographic content',Jakarta Post, 1 September 20 I O.

26 Interview with Solahuddin Wahid, J01}1an ly 2010.27 Wahid was removed from office due to ~ rruption scandals, the so-called 'Bulog-

gate' and 'Bruneigate' affai ,S:~for a seri episodes related to Wahid's presidencyand dismissal, see, for e. sh (200 . ap. 4) and Mietzner (2009b: 260-70).

28 'Muammir Disebut Sebs anti Muhaimin', Kompas, 4 April 2008.29 'Muhaimin Iskand . y~I'Ie ap:J\!etua Umum ', Kompas, 6 April 2008.30 'Yenny Wahid Di >_ 'nl'tan~Jr( Sekjen PKB', Kompas, J 5 April 2008.31 'Gus Our loses-two 1 files', Jakarta Post, 13 June 2008.32 'PKB harus,g~r~ Mtt~anj)ir 2010', Kompas, 15 October 2010.33 'PKB i ov'6rt~ecuring seats in 2014', Jakarta Post, 21 July 2010. It is note-

worthy, t PKB does not even keep an account of their membership.34 Jakarta Post, 21 li.l 2010; 'PKB Harus Gelar Muktamar 2010', Kompas, 15 October

2010. if

35 Slater (2004) uses the term 'party cartel' to describe this structure. See Slater 2004.36 Interview with Abdul Rasyid, deputy secretary of PPP East Java Province Executive

Board; 29 July 2010.37 'Jual Beli Nomor Caleg, PPP Akan Panggil Bahrudin Dahlan ', detikNews, 9 overn-

ber 2008; 'KIPP: Praktik Jual Beli Nomor Urut Caleg Bukan Hal Baru', detikNews,14 July 2010.

38 'Ex-minister detained for graft', Jakarta Post, 6 August 2010.39 Interviews with junior PPP leaders; e.g, Abdul Rasyid, deputy secretary of PPP East

Java Province Executive Board, Surabaya, 29 July 2010.40 Interview with Chozin Chumaidy, deputy chairman of the PPP central executive

board, Jakarta, 22 July 20 I O.41 See also Tan's contribution on anti-party sentiment in Chapter 5 of this volume.

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I2

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