Bracketing Belief: Giyyur for the Godless

Bracketing Belief: Giyyur for the Godless

SHAI CHERRY

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God forbid, the Talmud tells us, that we should mouth platitudesabout God that are contrary to our understanding. Since God’s sealis truth, and we are created in the divine image, we must remain

true to our own experience.1 And that experience, for a significant percent-age of American Jews, is that God is absent.2 According to the 2013 Pewsurvey, of those who identified as Jewish, only a third (34%) claim “abso-lute certainty” in their belief in God or a universal spirit.3 Nearly a quarter(23%) do not believe in God or a universal spirit.4

Statistics are slippery things.5 The discussion in this paper assumes thatmore than one quarter of the Americans who identify in some way as Jew-

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1B. Yoma 69b.2Even within the Orthodox world there is such a sentiment. See the conclusion ofHaym Soloveitchik, “Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of Contem-porary Orthodoxy,” in Tradition 28:4 (1994), pp. 64–130.3Steven M. Cohen and Lauren Blitzer, “Belonging without Believing: Jews andTheir Distinctive Patterns of Religiosity—and Secularity,” in Selected Results fromthe 2008 Pew Forum U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (Florence G. Heller—JCCAssociation Research Center), p. 11.4Pew Research Center, “A Portrait of Jewish Americans,” November, 2013, p. 74.5Steven M. Cohen’s most recent research, focusing on the idiosyncratic communitiesof New York City, suggests that the 37% figure is too high. See Chapter Four, page120ff. of the “Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011” sponsored by theUJA-Federation of New York.

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ish are either agnostics or atheists. Since most of my discussion concernspolicy rather than philosophy, I’ll be grouping the agnostics and atheiststogether under the label of “the godless.” It is also my assumption that such“godless” Jews suffer no discrimination or sanctions from the various bod-ies within the Jewish community.6 The question of this paper, then, con-cerns the propriety and wisdom of reaching out to the non-Jewish godlesspopulation to invite them under the wings of the Shekhinah.

The question itself can so easily be reduced to the absurd.7 How couldand why would the godless convert to any religion? Where is the motiva-tion or authenticity in such a decision? The problem in asking that questionin regard to Judaism is precisely that Judaism is not reducible to its reli-gious beliefs. What we must avoid reducing then is not the question of god-less conversion, but the very understanding of Jewishness itself.

As of 2012, roughly 1/3 of Americans under 30 years old do not identifywith a religion. Although these “nones” claim no religious affiliation, themajority still considers themselves religious or spiritual!8 Some of those

6The Conservative Movement has approved a t’shuvah that prevents an outspokenatheist from serving as sh’lia˙ tzibbur. In that responsum, Rabbi David H. Lincolnrequires that the congregational rabbi verify that the person is truly an atheist andnot simply rejecting “a particular belief which he assumes to be normative”; see “May an Avowed Atheist Serve as a Shaliach Tzibbur?” in Responsa:1980–1990, The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the ConservativeMovement, ed. David J. Fine (The Rabbinical Assembly: New York, 2005), pp.40–42, and available online at the website of the rabbinical assembly athttps://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19861990/lincoln_atheist.pdf.7Some have questioned that Conservative rabbis would reject a candidate for con-version based on their godlessness. I have not taken a scientific survey, but anecdo-tal evidence suggests that there are such rabbis. See also the explicit claim by JeremyKalmonofsky, “Spiritual Citizenship: Reflections on Hilkhot Giyyur,” in Conserva-tive Judaism 60:1–2 (Fall/Winter 2007–2008), pp. 26–61, esp. p. 48. Note also thatthe Conservative Rabbi’s Manual, Moreh Derekh, offers only one declaration for anew Jew, which explicitly invokes a “commitment to the God of Israel” (NewYork: The Rabbinical Assembly, 1998), vol. 2, p. J14.8Pew Research Center, “‘Nones’ on the Rise,” October, 2012, pp. 10 and 43f.

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young people are marrying Jews, who may themselves identify as godlessJews, thus vitiating the religious distance between the two partners. When agodless Jew marries a godless gentile, is that an intermarriage? It may beintercultural, but it is not exactly interfaith. Rabbi Harold M. Schulweisscalls these unions interfaithless!9

Another assumption: most Americans place Judaism in the same catego-ry as Christianity, and Christianity is a religion. Since neither the the god-less nor the “nones” are in the market for religion, Judaism is not likely tobe a live option.10 Thus, if the Conservative Movement is amenable to con-verting the godless, the onus is on us to invite the godless to consider seri-ously the process of giyyur (conversion). In many cases, godless gentiles willbe introduced into the Jewish world through a romantic relationship with aJew. I will argue that it is in the best interest of this couple, their future chil-dren, the Jewish people, and the whole world (!) to actively engage the god-less in giyyur.

Although I will be citing many rabbis in this paper, I am contextualizingtheir words in a novel way, and in many cases I suspect these rabbis woulddisagree with my conclusion. Yet, the process of recontextualization isquintessentially Jewish; it is the process of midrash.11 I, like my rabbinicancestors, am placing their words into my context. This exercise in midrashhalakhah will be successful to the degree that it allows others to hear howour tradition might respond to the unprecedented challenges before us.

Classical Jewishness

Shaye Cohen, in his book The Beginnings of Jewishness, contends thatJudaism becomes something more akin to what we call a religion only in

9For Those Who Cannot Believe: Overcoming the Obstacles to Faith (New York:Harper Perennial, 1994), p. 5. I recognize that atheism is an expression of faith.10According to “‘Nones’ on the Rise,” 88% of the religiously unaffiliated are notlooking for a religion, p. 10.11See my book, Torah through Time: Understanding Bible Commentary from theRabbinic Period to Modern Times (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society ofAmerica, 2007), esp. pp. 32–34 and 189–191.

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the Hasmonean/Hellenistic period.12 Prior to that time, religious elementsof Jewishness were inextricably bound with other elements of Israelite, andthen Judean, culture. When one discusses conversion, it is significant tonote that there is no evidence of such a thing prior to the Hasmonean con-quest of the Idumeans in 128 b.c.e.13 Moreover, the process of conversion,as attested to at that time, did not explicitly involve a change in belief.14 Aswe will see, becoming a Jew was far more about joining the Jewish peoplethan about any cognitive shift or spiritual realignment toward the God ofIsrael. Tellingly, “God” is altogether absent from the first description of theprocess.

The text below is from the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Yevamot 47a. Itis our earliest description of giyyur, and likely dates to the second or thirdcentury of the common era.15

A convert who comes at this time to be converted, they say tohim: “What have you seen that makes you approach to be con-verted? Don’t you know that Israel these days is pained,oppressed, harassed, torn, and that afflictions come uponthem?” If he says: “I know and I’m unworthy,” accept himimmediately.

For my purposes there are several details here worthy of emphasis. Firstand foremost, this person is immediately referred to as a ger, a convert.16

There is already a quality about this person that separates him from othergentiles. She clearly is not yet a convert, although she has taken the firststeps in that direction. She comes to us. At this time, any American gentilewho has renounced the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth has taken the first steptoward us.

12Shaye J. D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncer-tainties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 133.13Ibid., p. 110.14Ibid., p. 238.15Ibid., p. 210.16The feminine form of the word is giyoret, the plural is gerim.


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The vast majority of American gentiles were born and raised within aChristian framework. Christian culture remains the default culture ofAmerica. Christianity is predicated upon the belief that Jesus was the incar-nation of God and is, himself, a part of the triune Godhead. By definition,agnostics and atheists do not believe that. The gentile godless haverenounced, either implicitly or explicitly, a central dogma of the Christianfaith. That renunciation of the custom of their ancestors should not beunderestimated. That renunciation is the first step toward becoming a Jew.The Talmud, in its day, acknowledged this: “Anyone who rejects idolatry iscalled a Jew” (B. Megillah 13a).17

In our talmudic text above, the potential candidate for gerut (the processof conversion) is deflected before being able to answer the question aboutmotivation by a staccato series of misfortunes. The desired rhetorical effectis one of near despair. In a bizarre riposte, remarkable for its extremehumility, the potential candidate stands his ground in seeking gerut. Thisidealized dialogue reveals to us that from the point of view of the authorsor editors of this text, the first thing a potential convert should know con-cerns the status of the people. Such an opening salvo is then followed by thefinancial obligations deriving from the principle that all of Israel is respon-sible for another:18

And they inform him of a few of the light commandments anda few of the severe commandments. And they inform him of thesin of gleanings, the forgotten sheaf, the corner of the field, andthe poor tithe.

The Talmud leaves unspecified what these “few” commandments are tobe. In another text dealing with converts, Hillel famously exhorts: “Do not

17Although the Sephardic tradition considers Christianity idolatrous, Rabbenu Tam(1100–1171) and Mena˙em Meiri (c. 1249–1310) counsel softening our posturetoward Christians, since they are bound by a system of ethics. I concur. See MosheHalbertal, “‘One Possessed of Religion’: Religious Tolerance in the Teachings ofthe Meiri,” in Edah Journal 1:1 (2000), pp. 1–24.18This principle is found in B. Shevuot 39a.

do anything to another that you, yourself, find odious.”19 Our list in Yeva-mot does have a few specifics, and they all concern the obligations oflandowners to the poor. In other words, given the plight of the Jews men-tioned immediately before, if you are among the fortunate few to own land,your entry into the Jewish people will saddle you with economic liabilities.In the ensuing talmudic discussion as to why these particular command-ments are emphasized, Rabbi Óiyya bar Abba suggested that it is anotheropportunity to dissuade a potential convert, since non-Jews “would ratherbe killed” than spend a penny unnecessarily! Dualing/dueling stereotypesaside, the emphasis here is clearly on the communal as opposed to the theo-logical aspects of Jewishness. The text continues:

And they inform him of the punishment for the command-ments. They say to him: “Up until now, if you had eaten for-bidden fat you would not have been punishable with karet, ifyou had profaned the Sabbath you would not have been pun-ishable with stoning; but now, were you to eat forbidden fatyou would be punished with karet; were you to profane theSabbath, you would be punished with stoning.”

Here’s what a Jew is/does: she keeps kosher and observes Shabbat! Thereare a few other unspecified commandments, to be sure, but what the rabbisemphasized in their first articulation of a conversion ceremony is communalresponsibility, dietary consciousness, and the calendar. Everything else iscommentary—now, go and study!

Our passage continues with a brief explanation of the deferred rewardsof being a righteous Jew, the requirement of circumcision for a male, andimmersion for all. That’s it. That’s the sum total of giyyur. There are othertexts in the rabbinic corpus dealing with giyyur, and they have been ana-lyzed extensively by many of the scholars I cite herein. But, my brief for thegodless does not require me to deal with all texts and interpretations, onlyto draw a line, even a dotted line, from and through our sources to our-

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19B. Shabbat 31a.

selves. Not coincidentally, the later talmudic rabbis did exactly that in thetext we just examined. In parsing the ceremony, they reached back intotheir biblical past and portrayed Ruth the Moabitess, the ancestor of KingDavid and the Messiah, as the paradigmatic convert. In other words, theyrecontextualized Ruth into their rabbinic culture.

In the Scroll of Ruth, read liturgically on the holiday of Shavuot whenJews celebrate receiving the Torah at Mount Sinai, Naomi attempted to dis-suade her two widowed daughters-in-law from joining her on her return toBethlehem. The first, Orpah, concedes and remains in Moab. We then read,in Ruth 1:14–16: “But Ruth clung to her, so she said, ‘See, your sister-in-law has returned to her people and her gods. Go follow your sister-in-law.’But Ruth said, ‘Do not urge me to leave you, to turn back and not followyou. For wherever you go, I will go; wherever you lodge, I will lodge; yourpeople shall be my people and your God my God.’”

This elegant soliloquy, in the rabbinic imagination, becomes one side ofan extended thrust and parry:

“We are forbidden,” Naomi told Ruth, “to move on the Sab-bath beyond the Sabbath boundaries!”

“Wherever you go, I will go.” “We are forbidden a private meeting between man and

woman!”“Wherever you lodge, I will lodge.”“We have been commanded six hundred and thirteen com-

mandments!”“Your people shall be my people.”“We are forbidden idolatry!”“And your God my God.”20

The importance of Shabbat is, once again, emphasized. We are then intro-duced to the concept of sexual propriety. Naomi’s next argument against


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20B. Yevamot 47b.

Ruth converting involves the intimidating number of commandments thatobliges Jews, a point to which we will return. In something of a nonsequitur, Ruth responds with a declaration of identity with Naomi’s people.It seems that Ruth’s response recognizes the commandments as an exten-sion of peoplehood rather than religiosity. Naomi then raises the issue ofidolatry, to which Ruth responds that she will exchange her elohim forNaomi’s. Robert Goldenberg has pointed out that the word used here forGod, elohim, is the generic term for gods that Naomi herself uses in refer-ence to Moab. He writes: “There seems to be no hint in the text that eitherwoman has even associated Israel with monotheism. . . .”21 In other words,the biblical Ruth shifts national loyalties without any trace of what wewould call a religious conversion.22 And the rabbinic Ruth’s embrace ofNaomi’s God is expressed as a renunciation of idolatry! For the godlessgentile, I am similarly suggesting that conversion entail a shift in ethniccommunity without necessarily a change in spiritual orientation. WhenRuth declares that our God, the Jewish God, will be hers, and so many ofus Jews are godless, the abandonment of idolatry is all we can reasonablyexpect.

In the parallel text to ours in Ruth Rabbah (2:23), there is a somewhatdifferent conversation imagined between Ruth and Naomi. There, Ruth’sunderstanding of joining Naomi’s people is precisely that she will abandonidolatry. On the spiritual plane, the emphasis seems to be about renouncingidolatry rather than taking on a specific metaphysical belief.

Before we leave Ruth, let us examine one more expression that hasbecome strongly associated with conversion, namely: “to come under thewings of the Shekhinah.” Goldenberg identifies Ruth 2:11–12 as the likelysource for the rabbinic expression: “Boaz answered, ‘I have been told of allthat you did for your mother-in-law after the death of your husband, how

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21Robert Goldenberg, “How Did Ruth Become the Model Convert?” in Conserva-tive Judaism 61:3 (Spring 2009), p. 56.22Moses Maimonides describes the concession of animal sacrifices in similar terms,arguing that the Israelites simply changed the address of their pagan practices. SeeGuide of the Perplexed III: 32.

you left your father and mother and the land of your birth and came to apeople you had not known before. May Adonai reward your deeds. Mayyou have a full recompense from Adonai, the God of Israel, under whosewings you have sought refuge.’” Goldenberg glosses: “There is not a wordhere about YHWH: when Boaz goes on to say that Ruth has taken refugeunder YHWH’s wings, surely those wings have appeared in the form ofIsrael’s tradition of social justice and protection of the poor.”23 Indeed,Psalm 36:8 offers the following: “How precious is Your faithful care, OGod! Humanity finds refuge in the shadow of Your wings!” The image ofprotecting the vulnerable resonates with those commandments articulatedin the giyyur process itself. Thus, coming under the wings of the Shekhinahis a metaphor not for divine dependence but for communal interdepen-dence.

Although for the rabbis a rejection of idolatry seems to have been evenmore important than an embrace of monotheism, there is one biblical char-acter who the rabbis reimagine as an atheist. To be precise, Targum Neo-phyti imagines Cain responding to what he perceives as divine partiality byprotesting, “There is neither justice nor Judge!”24 The Targum, however,does not condemn Cain for his theological position. It explains what pre-cipitated the fratricide. In fact, one might also read the Targum as an expla-nation of the subsequent divine protection of Cain! Since it was, andremains, so difficult to sense the divine presence in a world where the effortto serve God is not met with recognition or reward, as was the case withCain, God mitigates Cain’s punishment by offering him a measure of divineprotection (Genesis 4:15). Why else would Cain deserve protection, if Goddidn’t feel somehow complicit in the murder?25 May our mercy also extendto those who do not sense the Divine.


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23Goldenberg, p. 60.24Targum Neophyti on Genesis 4:8. See, more generally, my treatment of thismidrash in Torah through Time, pp. 89ff.25P’sikta d’Rav Kahana, Shuvah 11, answers that question by assuming that Cainengaged in t’shuvah. See Cherry, Torah through Time, pp. 94f.

The burden of this brief is to convince those, who might otherwise dis-miss the notion of giyyur for the godless as a farce, that such a strategy isjust four cubits away from the ideal, and, therefore, within the boundariesof halakhic possibility. Within rabbinic culture, “matters of belief were notlegally actionable.”26 Menachem Kellner has shown that Jews, according tothe rabbis, did not need to affirm a particular dogma. Dogma emergedwithin rabbinic Judaism only in the tenth century, as it interacted withKaraism from within Judaism and Islam from outside.27 On the contrary,rabbinic literature provides multiple statements suggesting that while beliefin God is certainly the ideal, it is not a necessary element of Jewishness. Forexample:

• Anyone who rejects idolatry is called a Jew. (B. Megillah 13a)• Anyone who rejects idolatry is like one who accepts the whole Torah.

(B. Óullin 5a)• Rather than abandon Me and not observe My Torah, let them just

abandon Me but observe My Torah. For from engaging in the com-mandments, the light within them will return them to the good.(Lamentations Rabbah 2:1)

• For from doing something without the proper motivation, one willcome to attain the proper motivation. (B. Pesa˙im 50b)

Kellner explains that necessary beliefs entered into Judaism, not univer-sally but specifically among those most influenced by Greek thought,because of the assumption that God’s existence could be proven. Thus, themedieval intellectual milieu made the positive claim of God’s existence areasonable innovation. “Today, however,” as Kellner points out, “the situ-ation is very different. Contemporary science and philosophy cannot proveto the satisfaction of reasonable persons that God exists, is one, and isincorporeal.”28

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26Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? (2nd ed.; Oxford: LittmanLibrary of Jewish Civilization, 2007), p. 42.27Ibid., pp. 44–51.28Ibid., p. 79.

Maimonides did maintain that correct belief in God is a requirement fornative Jews and gerim alike.29 Although none of the later medieval codifiersinsisted on any particular cognitive content concerning God for nativeJews,30 Maimonides’ language concerning gerim was preserved. For exam-ple, Karo rules that converts were to be informed about the unity of God.31

Given the chasm between the medieval philosophers’ and mystics’ under-standings of God, including the unity of God (!), it is understandable thatthe legal codes eschewed dogma. Both in Maimonides’ own day, and subse-quently, there were those—like Rabbi Abraham ben David of Posquières (c.1125–1198) and Rabbi Shmuel David Luzatto (1800–1865)—who bitterlycriticized Maimonides for his unprecedented concern with belief. For exam-ple, Luzzatto wrote: “The Prophets, Tannaim, Amoraim and Geonim delin-eated no criteria of belief. They did not say that someone who believes suchand such or who does not believe such and such may or may not be aber-rant in Israel. They did not place the ideas of our rabbinic sages in chains,preventing people from making their own observations.”32

The real split amongst the medieval legists concerned the extent to whichthe convert was explicitly instructed about and accepted all the command-ments. This dispute is already evident in the passage from Yevamot. In theoriginal description of the conversion ceremony, it was explicit that not allthe commandments should even be mentioned. Yet, in the ensuing elabora-


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29Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah, ch. 1 and Hilkhot Issurei Biah 14:2.It is worth noting that at an earlier (and perhaps less philosophically insistent) timein his life, Rambam denied that belief was a mitzvah. See the second chapter of hisSh’monah P’rakim.30Dogma was, however, preserved in the philosophical literature. See MenachemKellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel(Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004); and J. David Bleich, WithPerfect Faith: The Foundations of Jewish Belief (New York: Ktav Publishing House,1983).31Shul˙an Arukh, Yoreh Deah 268:2.32Shmuel David Luzatto, Criticism of Maimonides, 1838. Translated by GershonGreenberg in his Modern Jewish Thinkers: From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig(Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2011), p. 414.

tion involving the dialogue between Naomi and Ruth, mention is made (byNaomi) that there are 613 commandments. In particular, there are discus-sions concerning a ger who does not accept part of the tradition. In the Tal-mud, this person is identified as an idolater—a designation that does notapply to the godless.33 Yet, great halakhists have found ways to qualify thisconcern. For example, Joseph Karo in his Beit Yosef acknowledges that thecourts retain discretion in such matters.34

Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar devote several chapters of their TransformingIdentity to analyses of the halakhah surrounding the issues of giyyur in theMiddle Ages. They note that not until the sixteenth century was there alegal scholar who insisted that without prior acceptance of the command-ments, immersion is worthless as an act effecting conversion.35 Ideally, aconvert commits herself to the whole package. But, there are few nativeJews who attain that level of piety. The Talmud itself discusses a ger whoconverted amongst gentiles and knows nothing about Shabbat—yetnowhere is the ger’s Jewishness challenged!36

My concern here is not the same as Sagi and Zohar’s—namely, the pos-sibility of retroactive annulments of conversions due to a lack of compre-hensive halakhic obedience. Hence, I do not feel the need to delve into thehalakhic niceties that exercise them. I accept as a given that AmericanConservative Jews will exercise their sovereign selfhood in a way that precludes the vast majority from punctilious observance of ritual com-mandments. Yet, as an American Conservative rabbi, I would be unwillingto participate in a giyoret’s conversion if she refused to accept the yoke of the commandments. I take my cue from the text in Yevamot: sensitivityto food restrictions, awareness of the Jewish calendar, a commitment

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33B. Bekhorot 30b.34Yoreh Deah 268.35Transforming Identity: The Ritual Transformation from Gentile to Jew—Structureand Meaning (London: Continuum, 2007), pp. 197f.36B. Shabbat 68b.

to social justice and sexual modesty, and a conscious renunciation of idol-atry in all its nefarious forms. The yoke can be lightened, but not thrownoff.37

Yet, with all the halakhic leniencies we can offer, can we really considerbracketing belief for giyyur? Aren’t the knowledge and love of God founda-tional beliefs that give coherence and intelligibility to all other command-ments? It is one thing for a potential ger to reject the mitzvah of shatnez—wearing a fabric that combines linen and wool. But, a rejection of God isaltogether different.38 The halakhic discussion concerning idolatry is rele-vant to our analysis. Here is Maimonides:

The oral tradition specifies that in order to be guilty of idolatryone cannot have committed idolatry while compelled, inadver-tently, or because of an error. If, concerning the worship offalse gods, which is the most serious [of transgressions], a per-son who is forced to worship is not liable for excision by God,nor, needless to say, execution by a human court, how muchmore [does this principle apply to] one concerning other com-mandments in the Torah?39

Let us take Maimonides at his word: idolatry is the most serious trans-gression. Godlessness is not as grievous as idolatry, and according to Mai-monides one is not guilty if one is compelled by dint of rational analysis orif one erred through lack of rational capacity or theological sensitivity.Maimonides here also seems to provide a pass for the merely lazy and self-indulgent (the inadvertent), who do not bother to engage in the arduousprocess of reflection. It is with full awareness of the irony of my claim, but I


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37Richard L. Claman, “Vinegar and Wine, Leniency and Piety: Justifying a BiasToward Lightening the Yoke,” in Conservative Judaism 56:3 (2004), pp. 63–80.38There is no unanimity in the sources about whether this is a discrete command-ment or simply a presupposition for others.39Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 5:4.

see Maimonides, here, as the champion of the godless.40 They are mistaken,but exempt from punishment.

The next obviously challenging mitzvah for the godless is: “You shalllove Adonai, your God” (Deuteronomy 6:5). The v’ahavta is not just anyold commandment, in part because of its place in the liturgy and in partbecause of the verse’s association with martyrdom, going back to RabbiAkiva.41 Yet in explicating this mitzvah, at least according to some of oursages, there was a prescient sensitivity to our very issue. How can you com-mand love of God to the godless, to those for whom God’s reality isobscured, perhaps through no fault of their own? The rabbis and Rashioffer this escape for the godless: “Do His words from love.”42 The com-mandment is still about an inner state or emotion, but the object has shiftedfrom God to God’s words. Embrace the life of commandments and com-mandedness. Such a life is a blessing to be appreciated. If a potential gercannot agree with that interpretation, then I see no reason for him to con-vert as a Conservative Jew. Yeshayahu Leibowitz offers a functional defini-tion of faith that eschews any cognitive component: “The unintelligibleverse ‘and you shall love Adonai your God’ is elucidated through its sequel:‘And these words which I command you this day should be in your heart.’The acceptance of the yoke of Torah and commandments is the love ofGod, and it is this that constitutes faith in God.”43 In contrast, Rabbi Abra-ham Joshua Heschel sees the commandments as a vehicle for faith: “Thegates of faith are not ajar, but the mitzvah is a key. By living as Jews we

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40Maimonides’ emphasis on negative theology (see, e.g., Guide I:59) is not altogeth-er out of place in this discussion, particularly in regard to agnostics. The limits ofhuman knowledge about God can shift into reservations about God’s existence,especially when the attributes of such a God are perceived as childishly simplistic.See Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi,ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” in Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed.Joseph A. Buijs (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 91–121.41B. Berakhot 61b.42Sifrei Devarim 32 and Rashi on Deuteronomy 6:5.43“The Reading of the Shema,” in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State,ed. Eliezer Goldman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 44.

may attain our faith as Jews. We do not have faith because of deeds; wemay attain faith through deeds.”44

Modern Jewishness

Modernity was double-barreled for the Jewish community: the Enlighten-ment came with scientific breakthroughs that challenged simple faith, andEmancipation allowed Jews an exit from the community with unprecedent-ed ease. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Rebbe Na˙man of Bratzlavacknowledged that science had now explained so much that it is forbiddento investigate its claims for fear of falling into heresy. “There is no answerto this heresy. It comes from the void, from which God, as it were, haswithdrawn himself.”45 As my teacher, Arthur Green, comments: “In theLurianic notion of the void, Na˙man found an answer to the most pressingtheological problem of his life; the seeming absence of God from theworld.”46

The very beginning of our passage from Yevamot specifies what we areto do with the ger who comes to us to convert at this time. There can be noclearer challenge to contemporary rabbis than to grapple with the appropri-ate changes for our time. Above, I cited Menachem Kellner about theinability of contemporary science and philosophy to prove the existence ofGod. It’s true, but Kellner has understated the problem. The case can bemade, as the recent spate of atheist screeds has, that atheism is the mostreasonable interpretation of the evidence before us. Neither science norrecent history sings of God’s handiwork—at least not in a melody thatmost of us recognize as divine. Nor, I suspect, is religion’s reputationenhanced by outspoken proponents who are embarrassingly benighted.When over 40% of Americans reject evolutionary theory and believe that


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44God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson,Inc., 1955), p. 282.45Likutei Mohoran 64.46Tormented Master: The Life and Spiritual Quest of Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav(University of Alabama Press, 1979; rpt. Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing,1992), p. 313 of Jewish Lights text.

the world is less than 10,000 years old, who can blame anyone for distanc-ing themselves from such self-willed silliness.47 It is no surprise that in2001, 23% of Americans with post-baccalaureate degrees described theiroutlook as secular or somewhat secular, compared to only 16% of the general population.48 By contrast, 44% of Jews—the most educated reli-gious group in America—identified their outlook as secular or somewhatsecular.49

At this point, I hope to have demonstrated two points: first, that belief inGod can be bracketed for native Jews without censure, and second, thattraditional conversion was far more concerned with abandoning idolatrythan with accepting monotheism. The question, then, is: should thehalakhah now accommodate the godless for giyyur? For Thales, a pre-Socratic thinker, the world was full of gods. No longer. The hiddenness ofGod, the eclipse of the Divine, should not be considered a “mere” aggadicconceit; it has halakhic implications. The biblical punishment for blasphe-my is stoning. In the Talmud’s discussion of this procedure, it teaches that“it is the court’s duty to save him” from this punishment.50 Our modernsages have heeded their words.

Some of the most stringent halakhic decisors of our day acknowledgedthat our modern religious and theological climate does dictate certainchanges in the halakhah. The Óazon Ish, Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz

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47I have written on a Modern Orthodox response to this phenomenon in my “CrisisManagement via Biblical Interpretation: Fundamentalism, Modern Orthodoxy, andGenesis,” in Jewish Tradition and the Challenge of Darwinism, ed. Geoffrey Cantorand Marc Swetlitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 166–187.48Barry A. Kosmin, “Religion and the Intelligentsia: Post-Graduate Educated Amer-icans, 1990–2008,” Trinity College, Hartford, CT, https://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/2011/02/14/religion_and_the_intelligentsia_post-graduate_educated_ameri-cans_1990-2008/.49American Jewish Identity Survey, 2001: An Exploration in the Demography andOutlook of a People (New York: Graduate Center of the City University of NewYork, 2001), pp. 35–38. I am not identifying those with a secular or somewhat sec-ular outlook as godless, although I do assume there is a significant overlap.50B. Sannhedrin 43a.

(1878–1953), is associated with the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox. In a responsumdealing with how to treat heretics, he overturns a talmudic law that waslater codified by Maimonides, who had written:

Whoever repudiates the Oral Torah . . . is a heretic who anyperson has a right to put to death. Once it is made clear that heindeed repudiates the Oral Torah, he is cast into a pit and notrescued from it. . . . Anyone who kills such a heretic has ful-filled a great mitzvah and removed a stumbling block.52

The Óazon Ish, in a recontextualization worthy of a talmudic sage andConservative rabbi, limits the applicability of this law to a period when“divine providence is transparent, miracles are evident, heavenly voices areheard, and the righteous of the generation enjoy obvious divine provi-dence.”52 If there were ever such moments in Jewish history, we are nolonger blessed with them. In such periods, the above law served a valuablepurpose, claims Karelitz. “But in this time of obscurity,” Karelitz writes,we live in a period when faith has been uprooted from the people and“God’s face is hidden.”53 In our time, applying this law would be counter-productive and therefore it no longer applies.

The Office of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, too, recognized that in thistime of tremendous (gadol kol kakh) divine hiddenness, ritual transgres-sions are almost inadvertent and should, therefore, no longer serve to dis-qualify witnesses.54 These two rulings are noteworthy for two reasons: first,they both invoke the theological concept of divine hiddenness (hesteirpanim); and second, they argue that because of hesteir panim, there is per-mission to bracket a heretic’s beliefs and the neglect or rejection of the com-


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51Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim 3:1. See also Joseph Karo, Shul˙an Arukh,Yoreh Deah 158:2.52Óazon Ish, Yoreh Deah 2:16.53Ibid.54Piskei Din Rabbaniyyim, pp. 137f.

mandments that fall under the category of “between a person and God”(bein adam la-makom).

Rabbi Joseph Mesas (1892–1974) hones in on a different aspect ofmodernity that prompts him to shift halakhic standards concerning gerut:rampant intermarriage. He writes: “Because these are licentious times, and‘love is as strong as death,’ and they [Jews involved romantically with gen-tiles] are endangered [by assimilation and conversion], and ‘pressing condi-tions’—exacerbated by danger—enable the a-priori [l’khat·˙ilah] applica-tion of ex post facto rules [b’diavad], they are [to be accepted] as proselytes[even though they are converting only for marriage].”55 Rabbi Mesas isconcerned with the potential violation of a prohibition concerning conver-sion for romantic love.56 Rather than employing a strategy of interpreta-tion, Rabbi Mesas explains why the initial understanding of the law againstconversion for marriage would be dangerous to apply in today’s circum-stances—and he wrote in the 1960s!57 Thus he advocates for a retreat fromthe ideal to the practical, specifically on the issue of gerut.

Halakhic decisions approaching the lines we are suggesting have alreadybeen issued. Two early twentieth-century adjudicators, Rabbi ShlomoHirsch Schick (1841–1917) and Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner(1856–1924), used the following talmudic dictum to obviate the need for apositive faith commitment: “Anyone who denies idolatry is like one whoacknowledges the entire Torah.”58 Sagi and Zohar offer the following anal-ysis: “In rabbinic sources, the dictum always relates to a person who isalready an Israelite. The innovation introduced here by Glasner [andSchick] is to apply this statement to a non-Jewish candidate for giyyur.Accordingly, the requirement to internalize Jewish faith is transformed intoa requirement that the candidate truly internalize denial of any other

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55Otzar Ha-Mikhtavim (Jerusalem, 1968), #765. Cited in Sagi and Zohar, p. 46.56Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Gerim 1:7, B. Yevamot 24b, and Y. Kiddushin 4:1.57For other strategies, see chapters 2–4 of Sagi and Zohar.58B. Óullin 5a and Sagi and Zohar, pp. 90–98.

faith.”59 According to Sagi and Zohar, Rabbi Schick understood the pro-cess of giyyur to have always been about changing one’s ethnic identity anda sincere desire to join the Jewish people.60

Rabbi Moshe HaCohen (1906–1966) wrote about conversion in Israelaround 1960. He recognized that in Tiberias, his home, Jews lived a non -observant lifestyle. He reasoned that converts would most likely do thesame in such an environment. “But they do consider themselves Jewish inthe same sense as do other Jews amongst whom they reside,” he noted.61

And that’s precisely what brings Rabbi HaCohen to endorse such conver-sions. Again, Sagi and Zohar: “According to Rabbi HaCohen, to behave asa Jew is not synonymous with behavior as a religiously observant Jew. It isfully possible to transgress many commandments, and at the same time tobehave as a Jew, because to behave as a Jew means to lead a lifestyle whichis similar to that of the real Jewish community at that time and place.”62

Given that in our time and place many Jews are godless, I apply the samelogic.63

Rabbi Zechariah HaCohen (1898–??), another Israeli rabbi, was explic-it: “We cannot demand that the proselyte observe all 613 precepts at a timewhen most of those who are resettling him [in Israel] are themselves farfrom this number or even part of it. . . . How can we demand of the prose-lyte to observe the Sabbath and the dietary laws, etc.? Such would be say-


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59Sagi and Zohar, p. 93.60Ibid., pp. 94f. Rabbi Jack J. Cohen suggests that the term “naturalization” ispreferable to conversion for just this reason. See his “Halakhah and Conversion,” inJudaism in a Post-Halakhic Age (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2010), p. 150.61M. HaCohen, Responsa Ve’heishiv Moshe (Jerusalem, 1968), Yoreh Deah, #51;cited in Sagi and Zohar, p. 96.62Sagi and Zohar, p. 97.63It may be objected that gerim living in the land of Israel are not to be compared tothose living outside of Israel. I acknowledge the distinction, and still believe that myargument is valid.

ing: do as I say, but not as I do!”64 For Rabbi HaCohen, it is a matter ofintellectual honesty and integrity that we not make hypocritical demands ofgerim, to which the majority of Israel does not conform. As the Talmudsays of native Jews: rabbis are forbidden from making a decree that themajority is unable to tolerate.65

Rabbi Benzion Uziel (1880–1953), the first Sephardic Chief Rabbi ofIsrael, makes the point that we are morally required to convert one who isinterested in converting only for marriage.66 It is likely that both the Jewishspouse and their children will be lost to the Jewish community if we turnthe potential ger away. Giyyur for the godless might provide an unalloyedJewish home. We need to draw in the Jews who float in the margins of ourcommunities. The responsum by the Óazon Ish cited previously concludesthat it is incumbent upon us to draw in heretics with bonds of love to theextent of our ability. This is all the more so true, I would argue, for thosemarginal Jews who still seek ties to the Jewish community.

Bringing the godless under the wings of the Shekhinah may be counterin-tuitive, but it is both practical and merciful. We have seen that belief wasnever a requirement to be Jewish because belief is not legally actionable:

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64Cited in Baruch Litvin, Jewish Identity (New York: Feldheim Publishers, 1965, p. 62 and in Marc D. Angel, “Conversion to Judaism: Halakha, Hashkafa, and His-toric Challenge,” in Hakira: The Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought 7(Winter 2009), pp. 25–49; quote is frtom p. 44. The 1982 responsum of Jacob B.Agus, “The Mitzvah of Keruv,” in Responsa: 1980–1990, pp. 660–666, also makesthis point.65B. Baba Batra 60b.66Mishpetei Uziel (Jerusalem, 1964), No. 18; cited in Marc D. Angel, “AnotherHalakhic Approach to Conversions,” in The Conversion Crisis: A Continuing Dis-cussion, ed. Emanuel Feldman and Joel B. Wolowelsky (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Pub-lishing House, 2011), pp. 41–45. A similar attitude is expressed by Rabbi ZviHirsch Kalischer (1795–1874). See David Ellenson and Daniel Gordis, Pledges ofAllegiance: Conversion, Law, and Policymaking in Nineteenth- and Twentieth- Century Orthodox Responsa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 49f.and 126–133.

d’varim she-balev, einam d’varim.67 To know what someone believesrequires d’rishah va-˙akirah, investigation and examination. Speaking formyself, there were so many traditional, popular God ideas that I rejected,that for many years I considered myself an atheist. My first academic paperat the Association of Jewish Studies in 1995 was a comparison of Mai-monides and Mordecai Kaplan, where I attempted to show that MordecaiKaplan, the trans-naturalist, was more traditionally pious than was Mai-monides. I was greeted afterwards by a Maimonides scholar who informedme that my thesis was a commonplace among her colleagues.68 After com-pleting a doctorate in Jewish Thought and Theology, I now know thatthere is an illustrious tradition of Jewish thinkers who similarly rejected thepopular pabulum I absorbed in my youth. Moreover, my own self-image isno longer that of an atheist or an agnostic, but that of a religious Jew. It isunreasonable to expect the self-identifying godless to undertake graduatework in theology to confirm or deny their godlessness! And while it isessential to expose all candidates for giyyur to a range of Jewish theologies,the impact of such study may take years to crystallize.

Rabbi Bradley Shavit Artson, the Dean of the Ziegler School of RabbinicStudies, recently published God of Becoming and Relationship: TheDynamic Nature of Process Theology, in which he offered a presentation ofProcess Theology in a Jewish key. Rabbi Artson, who also holds a doctor-ate in Jewish Theology, rejects divine omnipotence, omniscience, and staticeternality.69 He, too, has found allies within our tradition for his contempo-rary theology. And he, too, once identified as an atheist. Were Rabbi Art-son to articulate his theology in many houses of worship, he would bebranded as godless, or, perhaps, just a blasphemer. That’s the reality of


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67B. Kiddushin 49b.68Elements of that paper appear in my “Three Twentieth-Century Jewish Responsesto Evolutionary Theory,” in Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism 3(2003), pp. 247–290.69The Rabbinical Assembly and Jewish Lights Publishing (Woodstock, VT: 2013).

contemporary America. The God most of us either do or do not believe inis the God of old-time religion.

Rabbi Uziel suggested that we have an obligation to Jews who mightintermarry. I maintain we have an obligation, as well, to godless gentiles. Inlosing their faith in Christ as a divine figure, they have also lost member-ship in a religious community. We have the ability, and therefore theresponsibility, to offer to return that lost object (Deuteronomy 22:3). Agodless ger can become a righteous Jew. The culminating mishnah in trac-tate Makkot records the words of Rabbi Óananiah ben Akashia: “Theblessed Holy One, desires to acquit Israel, as it is written, ‘God desires tojustify him by enlarging the Torah and glorifying it.’”70 In the g’mara onthis mishnah, Rabbi Simlai offers an extended homily on the core of thecommandments. Just as we stood at Sinai, Rabbi Simlai stands the 613commandments on fewer and fewer demands, until he arrives at the versefrom Habakkuk (2:4): “A righteous man will live through his faithfulness(emunah).” Although the New Testament takes emunah to mean faith inGod and Jesus, both Habakkuk and Rabbi Simlai understand emunah asfaithfulness. In the context of the sugya, righteousness reaches back to thepreceding mishnah, which links it to increasing Torah and mitzvot. Thus,Rabbi Simlai identifies righteousness as faithfulness to God’s teachings, notto faith in God.71 The righteous ger, once integrated within a Jewish com-munity, may well have a change of heart or self-perception and no longeridentify as godless. “The heart/mind is drawn after the deeds.”72 But, evenif the godless gentile remains a godless Jew, he can still find comfort andsupport in a community dedicated to righteous living. As Ronald Dworkinwrites: “What divides godly and godless religion . . . is not as important asthe faith in value that unites them.”73

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70M. Makkot 3:16 and B. Makkot 23b, quoting Isaiah 42:21.71See Devorah Steinmetz, “Justification by Deed: The Conclusion of Sanhedrin-Makkot and Paul’s Rejection of the Law,” in Hebrew Union College Annual 76(2005), pp. 133–187.72Sefer Ha-˙innukh, Mitzvah #16.73My emphasis. Religion without God (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,2013), p. 29.

We in the Conservative Movement recognize the power Judaism has tobe a force for goodness, and godliness, in the world. The commandmentsare, according to Rabbi Harold S. Kushner, opportunities to transform theordinary into the sacred in our life-long quest for holiness.74 And our sages,like Rabbi Óananiah, recognize the abundance of mitzvot as signs of divinelove, whose goal is to increase those opportunities. The Jewishness of thegodless may be impoverished, but we are obligated to provide for impover-ished gentiles just as we are to provide for impoverished Jews—for the sakeof peace and wholeness.75

A Postscript on Methodology

In 1973, my teacher, Elliot Dorff, published an article in this journal enti-tled: “Towards a Legal Theory of the Conservative Movement.”76 Formore than forty years (!), he has been applying and refining his theory. Hismost recent statement, unlike his first, offers a place for aggadah, non-legaltraditions from our past.77 Rabbi Gordon Tucker has articulated the needfor the incorporation of both aggadah and midrash when determining lawin “hard cases.” He contrasts his approach to the school of legal positivismwhich, in the Conservative Movement, is associated with the legal reason-ing of Rabbi Joel Roth.78 Although I have no reason to believe that RabbisDorff and Tucker would agree with my conclusion, I do believe they wouldrecognize the methods used in this paper. I believe that we can be faithful toour rabbinic ancestors not only through the application of their judgments


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74“Conservative Judaism in an Age of Democracy,” in Conservative Judaism 59:4(Summer 2009), pp. 3–13, 8f.75B. Gittin 61a.76Conservative Judaism 27:3 (1973), pp. 65–77.77Elliot N. Dorff, For the Love of God and People: A Philosophy of Jewish Law(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2007).78See my article in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Ethics and Morality, ed. ElliotN. Dorff and Jonathan K. Crane (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 2013), pp. 225–240.

to modern circumstances, but also through the rehabilitation of theirmethod of midrash and the utilization of aggadah. Rabbi Yehudah LeibAlter of Ger (1847–1905), the author of Sefat Emet, articulated this sensethrough a midrash of his own. The morning liturgy reads: “Happy is theone who listens to Your commandments.” The Sefat Emet rereads it as fol-lows: “Happy is the one who listens for Your commandments.”79

79Commentary to Devarim, Parashat Ekev, 656. The liturgical line is itself amidrash on Proverbs 8:34.

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Shai Cherry, Ph.D., was ordained by the Ziegler School in 2009 and founded ShaarHamayim: A Jewish Learning Center in 2011. Cherry is the author of Torahthrough Time: Understanding Bible Commentary from the Rabbinic Period to Mod-ern Times (JPS, 2007), the featured lecturer for The Great Courses’ “Introductionto Judaism,” and is currently writing a Jewish theology of creation that incorporatesa novel philosophy of halakhah.

Bracketing Belief: Giyyur for the Godless

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Transcript of Bracketing Belief: Giyyur for the Godless