Bioeconomic management of invasive vector-borne diseases
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Transcript of Bioeconomic management of invasive vector-borne diseases
ORIGINAL PAPER
Bioeconomic management of invasive vector-borne diseases
Eli P. Fenichel • Richard D. Horan •
Graham J. Hickling
Received: 27 January 2009 / Accepted: 13 August 2009
� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract Invasive insects, arthropods, and other
invertebrates are of concern due to the role some play
in introducing and transmitting pathogens via a
pathogen–vector relationship. Indeed, vector-borne
diseases represent a significant portion of emerging
diseases. We compare and contrast three strategic
approaches to managing a vector-borne pathogen:
conventional strategies based on disease ecology
without regard to economic tradeoffs and cost-effec-
tive strategies based on a bioeconomic framework.
Conventional strategies entail managing the vector
population below a threshold value based on R0—the
basic reproductive ratio of the pathogen, which
measures a pathogen’s ability to invade uninfected
systems. This does not account for post-infection
dynamics, nor does it balance ecological and economic
tradeoffs. Thresholds take on a more profound role
under a bioeconomic paradigm: rather than unilaterally
determining vector control choices, thresholds inform
control choices and are influenced by them. Simulation
results show cost-effective strategies can lower overall
program costs and may be less sensitive to parameter
estimation.
Keywords Bioeconomics � Decision theory �Disease ecology � Host-density thresholds �Vector-borne pathogen system,
Introduction
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), whereby patho-
gens are newly evolved or are introduced into new
regions or species, are an increasingly important form
of species invasion that adversely affects the health of
people, plants, and wild and domestic animals. EIDs
can have substantial economic consequences (Daszak
et al. 2000). Vector-borne diseases in particular are
responsible for nearly a quarter of all EID events
(Jones et al. 2008). This fraction could increase due
to the globalizing effects of trade and travel that
inadvertently move insects and other vectors across
the globe, and due to climate change and other
processes that expand vector habitats both geograph-
ically and temporally (Dobson 2004).
E. P. Fenichel (&)
School of Life Science and ecoSERVICES group,
Arizona State University, Box 874501, Tempe,
AZ 85287-4501, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
R. D. Horan
Department of Agricultural, Food,
and Resource Economics, Agriculture Hall, Michigan
State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1039, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
G. J. Hickling
The Center for Wildlife Health/NIMBioS, The National
Institute For Mathematical and Biological Synthesis,
University of Tennessee, 1534 White Ave., Knoxville,
TN 37996-1527, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
123
Biol Invasions
DOI 10.1007/s10530-010-9734-7
A vector-borne disease invasion process involves
the establishment of a pathogen–vector relationship
by one of three pathways (Juliano and Lounibos
2005; Lounibos 2002). First, the pathogens and
vectors may be introduced together or in close
sequence. This has been the case with malaria in
many places around the world (Tatem et al. 2006).
Second, an introduced ‘bridge’ vector may acquire a
native pathogen that previously had cycled only
among wild hosts, but which henceforth begins to
infect humans and domestic animals. For example,
the introduced Asian tiger mosquito Aedes albopictus
has carried the viruses causing dengue into urban
areas of Rio de Janeiro (Lourenco-de-Oliveira et al.
2004). Finally, the introduction of novel pathogens
may convert previously benign insects or other
animals into vectors of harmful disease. Purse et al.
(2008) propose this third pathway has contributed to
the expansion of bluetongue into northern Europe.
Ecological models have been developed to help
understand vector-borne disease systems, and these
models are crucial inputs into decision models for
pathogen management. These disease ecology mod-
els are often extended beyond their initial purpose of
understanding the system, so that the analysts may
offer management recommendations. However, gen-
erally such recommendations are not grounded in
decision theory. We refer to management based
solely on disease ecology as the ‘‘conventional’’
approach to disease management.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we show
conventional models of vector-borne pathogens are
limited in their ability to inform management of
already-infected systems (i.e., a system perturbed from
its pre-infection or disease-free equilibrium, as will be
the case with a typical emerging disease scenario).1
Second, we show how bioeconomic analysis that
integrates economic and vector-borne disease models
can be used to improve disease management recom-
mendations. Specifically, we compare and contrast
conventional and bioeconomic approaches for devis-
ing management strategies for vector-borne animal
diseases. Bioeconomic models have recently been
applied to directly-transmitted animal disease man-
agement problems (e.g., Bicknell et al. 1999; Horan
and Wolf 2005; Fenichel and Horan 2007a, b; Asano
et al. 2008) as well as human disease (Barrett and Hoel
2007) and plant disease (Gaff et al. 2007) problems.
Gersovitz and Hammer (2004, 2005) investigate
management of vector-borne human diseases and in
doing so they motivate the use of bioeconomic
analysis to guide management. However, none of
these articles compare bioeconomic and conventional
strategies. We fill a gap in the literature by explicitly
comparing conventional and bioeconomic approaches
to systems involving vectors and animal hosts.
We begin by describing some of the main elements
of conventional and bioeconomic models that influ-
ence our analysis and results. We then formally
review conventional vector-borne disease ecology
models, illustrate the role of human choices in these
models, and highlight the difference between host-
based and vector-based management. This discussion
also highlights the limitations of conventional
approaches and motivates bioeconomic analysis.
Finally, we introduce the bioeconomic model and
analytically and numerically compare the two
approaches. We find significant differences between
the approaches, both in terms of the recommended
strategies and the associated costs.
Background
Conventional strategies based on population- and
community-level disease management recommenda-
tions stem from disease ecology, which primarily
focuses on a pathogen’s ability to invade naıve (i.e.,
pre-disease) systems. Invasibility is typically quanti-
fied by calculating the basic reproductive ratio of the
pathogen (R0), i.e., the expected number of secondary
infections generated from a single infected individual
within an otherwise healthy but susceptible host
population. R0 is defined at the disease-free equilib-
rium (Diekmann et al. 1990), and so the pathogen
invades when R0 [ 1, and fails to invade when
R0 \ 1, implying a threshold effect (Roberts and
Heesterbeek 2003; Dobson 2004; Heffernan et al.
2005).
R0 is considered ‘‘the most pervasive and useful
concept in the mathematical epidemiology of
1 A reviewer points out that some may regard management of
a post-infected scenario as pest management, but the process of
biological invasion involves more than species introduction
(Williamson and Fitter 1996). Focusing on post-introduction
processes (i.e., establishment and spread) can help to prevent or
slow further invasion into surrounding areas.
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
infectious diseases’’ due to its perceived role in
guiding disease management (Roberts and Heester-
beek 2003), with ‘‘threshold behavior [being] the
most important and useful aspect of the R0 concept’’
(Heffernan et al. 2005). Using R0 (or variations
thereof; see Heesterbeek and Roberts 1995), manag-
ers have estimated the minimum constant level of
harvesting, vaccination, or other efforts required to
prevent a disease outbreak or to eradicate a previ-
ously-established disease. The conventional manage-
ment approach is to eradicate a disease by engaging
in management efforts (e.g., vector control or vacci-
nation) to satisfy a threshold criterion based on R0. In
the case of vector-borne pathogens, R0 has been used
to compute thresholds for malaria control (Hagmann
et al. 2003) and other vector-borne pathogen control
programs (e.g., Lord et al. 1996).
The conventional approach described above is
based on the pre-determined, fixed performance
objective of disease eradication, and also on a fixed
performance criterion. Thresholds based on R0 depend
on exogenously-fixed ecological parameters in a pre-
disease equilibrium. Such strategies limit the ability of
managers to consider economic and epidemiological
tradeoffs when choosing the level of disease control
(i.e., eradication or not) or the level of control effort.
Indeed, Heffernan et al. (2005) note that economic
tradeoffs are often ignored. Such an approach leaves
managers with little flexibility to actively manage
disease risks and relegates the role of ‘‘economics’’ to
an accounting exercise. Specifically, costs are com-
puted only after disease control strategies have
already been devised from R0-based analyses, and
the lowest-cost approach is then selected from this
small group of strategies (e.g., Wilkinson et al. 2004;
Smith et al. 2007; Baly et al. 2007). We demonstrate
below that strategies chosen in this manner are
unlikely to be least cost over all possible strategies.
Truly cost-effective management involves choos-
ing the strategy that is least cost overall (or,
equivalently, yields maximum net benefits overall).
This means economic costs and epidemiological
impacts must be evaluated simultaneously, which
requires the application of economics in its most
fundamental role as a decision science to evaluate
economic and epidemiological tradeoffs (e.g., the
marginal benefit of an intervention in terms of
reduced disease prevalence versus the marginal cost
of the intervention).
Bioeconomic models (Clark 2005) incorporate
information on epidemiological processes, and how
these are influenced by human actions, into an
economic decision framework (e.g., Bicknell et al.
1999; Gersovitz and Hammer 2004; Fenichel and
Horan 2007a). No exogenous performance metrics
are imposed in this framework. Rather, the system
dynamics are determined endogenously by selecting a
management strategy to minimize the costs of the
disease and its control. A bioeconomic approach
recognizes that the economic and epidemiological
systems are jointly-determined (i.e., that human
choices affect disease outcomes, which in turn
influence human choices), and that there are eco-
nomic and epidemiological tradeoffs that require
quantification. Knowledge of these joint interactions
and tradeoffs is then used to make cost-effective
disease management decisions.
Epidemiological model
Vector-transmitted diseases represent a special case
of multiple-host disease and involve complex species
and pathogen interactions. We make no attempt to
analyze the most general of all epidemiological
models that captures every conceivable interaction
or management response. Adding more interactions
and management options would significantly increase
the complexity of the analysis while not affecting our
primary conclusion that there are some fundamental
differences between conventional and bioeconomic
management strategies. We illustrate these differ-
ences with the simplest model possible—a model that
involves a small number of interactions and only a
few management opportunities.
Consider a pathogen that is transmitted only
between the host and a vector—and not horizontally
between conspecifics. Specifically, consider an inter-
acting insect vector population and an animal (e.g.,
wildlife or livestock) host population on a fixed area,
in which individuals of each population are either
susceptible, S, or infected, I, and there is no recovery
from disease—a simple SI model.2 The vector
2 Implicitly, we have assumed vaccination is not an option,
which is often the case for emerging diseases. While the SIframework is a special case of more complex models involving
recovered, immune, or exposed population compartments (e.g.,
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
population is indexed by i, so that the density of the
susceptible vector population is Si, the density of the
infected vector population is Ii, and the aggregate
density of vectors is Ni = Si ? Ii. Analogously, the
host population is indexed by w. We also define
hj = Ij/Nj to be the prevalence of infection in
population j = {i, w}.
Insect vector populations generally have short
generational times relative to vertebrate hosts.
Following the convention set forth in models of
vector populations, we model a disease outbreak
within the time span of the vector population so that
the aggregate host population is only affected by
disease mortality and any host population manage-
ment made in response to the disease outbreak (e.g.,
Lord et al. 1996; Wonham et al. 2004; Gersovitz and
Hammer 2005).3 Host reproduction and natural
mortality are not modeled, as these are assumed to
occur on a longer time span. Sub-populations fluctu-
ate due to feedbacks related to disease mortality and
pathogen transmission. Given these assumptions, the
system dynamics are
_Sw ¼ �biwIiSw=Nw � hwSw ð1Þ_Iw ¼ biwIiSw=Nw � awIw � hwIw ð2Þ_Si ¼ ðri � DiNiÞNi � bwiSiIw=Nw � diSi � hiSi ð3Þ_Ii ¼ bwiSiIw=Nw � diIi � hiIi ð4Þ
Here, bjk is the horizontal transmission rate at which
population j infects population k. We follow convention and
model transmission to be frequency-dependent, since
insect and other common vectors often make a finite
number of contacts (bites) during their lifetime (Dob-
son 2004). The disease-induced mortality rate for
animal hosts is aw, whereas the vector is only a carrier
and does not experience disease-related mortality. The
vector population’s recruitment rate is ri, Di is the
density-dependent reduction in the net recruitment
rate, and di is the natural mortality rate. Finally,
hj [ [0,1] is the harvest rate of population j. In the case
of an insect vector, harvests can be thought of as
mortality due to insecticide application, or vector
control. It is generally not possible to distinguish
between infected and susceptible individuals when
implementing harvest efforts. Therefore, we follow
convention (e.g., Heesterbeek and Roberts 1995) and
model effort as non-differentially applied to suscepti-
ble and infected individuals (i.e, non-selective har-
vesting). We focus on harvests as the primary control to
reduce population densities and therefore to limit the
number of infectious contacts. A more general model
might also include treatment and vaccination as
options (at least for valued livestock or wildlife,
though infected livestock and wildlife are often culled
instead of treated). In conventional analysis the harvest
rate hj is generally fixed. In contrast, in bioeconomic
analyses hj generally varies over time to address
changing ecological and economic conditions.
Our analysis of the dynamic system (1)–(4)
proceeds based on the assumption that disease control
efforts are implemented after the pathogen has been
introduced and detected. Thus, the vector and host
populations initially exhibit some level of infection
(i.e., Ij(0) [ 0 for j = w, i), and hosts have experi-
enced some level of disease-induced mortality so that
Nw(0) is less than the disease-free host population
equilibrium, denoted Kw. Management in this setting
is an intervention during the invasion and establish-
ment process. We allow for the possibility that the
pathogen is eradicated, in which case management
prevents the pathogen from establishing.
The conventional threshold-based approach
Roberts and Heesterbeek (2003) analyze threshold-
based management in the context of vector-borne
diseases, with the objective being to determine how
much control effort is required to eradicate the
pathogen from an infected system—or, alternatively,
to prevent the pathogen from entering in the first
place. Specifically, the level of control they advocate
is based on a metric related to R0, called the type
reproduction number. The type reproduction number,
denoted T, represents the expected number of infec-
tions caused (directly or by a chain of infections
Footnote 2 continued
SIS, SIR or SEIR models), the basic insights developed for our
SI model—that the current state of infection matters and
focusing on tradeoffs as opposed to eradication leads to qual-
itatively different results—are generally applicable to these
more complex models. Also note that the vector may also
transmit pathogen to sink hosts, causing damages, but these do
not affect the basic disease dynamics between the vector and
host populations that we model here (Chaves and Hernandez
2004).3 See Song et al. (2002) for an approach to combining
infection dynamics on multiple time scales.
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
occurring through host and vector populations) when
one infected individual is introduced into a com-
pletely susceptible population, i.e., a pathogen-free
equilibrium.
A pathogen is prevented from invading a multiple-
host system through a particular host population (or
group of populations) when measures are taken to
reduce the type reproduction number, T, below one
(Roberts and Heesterbeek 2003). Roberts and Heest-
erbeek (2003) argue that such calculations can guide
the minimal effort levels needed to eradicate a
pathogen from an infected system. This approach
ignores the current state of infection and important
system dynamics, however, because the basis for
these calculations, T, is predicated on the assumption
of a pathogen-free equilibrium. Even so, such
recommendations are convention, and references to
R0 and T are ubiquitous in the disease management
literature (e.g., Roberts 1996; Wobeser 2002;
Hagmann et al. 2003). Below we show that such
recommendations are not cost-effective and are
potentially misleading.
Host management
Consider the possibility of managing the pathogen
problem by reducing the density of the animal host
population, Nw. From Eq. 2 note that the number of
new host infections depends on the ratio Sw=Nw.
Denote initial values of the host state variables by S0w,
I0w, and N0
w. After non-selective harvests are admin-
istered at the rate hw, the values of these state
variables are denoted by S0w ¼ ð1� hwÞS0w, I0w ¼
ð1� hwÞI0w, and N 0w ¼ ð1� hwÞN0
w. Host transmission
after population management therefore depends
on the ratio S0w=N 0w ¼ ð1� hwÞS0w= ð1� hwÞN0
w
� �¼
S0w=N0
w. Hence, management of the host animal
population has no effect on disease transmission (all
else being equal). Analogously, from Eq. 4, the
number of newly-infected insect vectors depends on
the ratio Iw=Nw, and this ratio is also unaffected by
harvests hw. Reducing an animal host population
imposes costs on society but has no effect on
pathogen transmission. Therefore, it is not econom-
ically optimal to invest resources in this method of
control.
If harvests of animal hosts were somewhat selec-
tive (i.e., harvesting was biased towards removing
infected animals), then it is likely that harvests of
host animals would reduce Nw proportionately more
than Sw. In that case, the ratio Sw/Nw increases and
there would be more new infections among host
animals. The reason is that infectious insects, which
make a fixed number of bites during their lifetime,
‘‘waste’’ fewer infectious bites when a larger propor-
tion of the total population is susceptible, so that the
probability of biting an already-infected host
declines. This is consistent with Wonham et al.’s
(2004) finding that killing hosts worsened a West
Nile Virus problem.
Vector management
Now consider management of the vector population.
The numbers of new animal and insect infections in
Eqs. 2 and 4 depend on the absolute number of
infected or susceptible insects, and not the propor-
tions. Hence, insect population controls can reduce
pathogen transmission.
Conventional analyses determine the required
level of control efforts by first calculating a threshold
value of Ni that prevents pathogen invasion. Specif-
ically, this vector-density threshold, which is derived
from R0 (or variants of R0 or T), is denoted NTi. NTi is
the largest value of Ni that prevents pathogen
invasion when a single infected vector is introduced
into an otherwise susceptible population in equilib-
rium (McCallum et al. 2001; Holt et al. 2003).
Threshold NTi is generally derived without consider-
ation of human-ecosystem interactions. NTi is defined
according to the relation
limSi!Ni;Nw!Kw;
hj!0 j¼i;w
_IijIi¼1;Iw¼I�w¼ bwiNiI
�w=Kw � di ¼ 0
! NTi ¼awdi
biwbwi
Kw ð5Þ
where I�w ¼ biw=aw is the solution to limSw!Nw
_Iw ¼ 0
when Ii ¼ 1. The disease-free equilibrium of the
animal host, Kw, is determined from biological
processes occurring outside the presently-modeled
time span, and would be larger than values of Nw
during an outbreak.
Conventional thresholds are fundamentally linked
to R0 : Ni \ NTi if and only if R0 \ 1 (Roberts and
Heesterbeek 2003; Heesterbeek and Roberts 2007).
The correct policy interpretation of NTi is that a
pathogen cannot invade an uninfected population
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
when the vector density is maintained below the
threshold (Gubbins et al. 2008). Yet this result is
often applied to infected populations as well, as it is
conventionally understood that maintaining vector
densities below NTi in already-infected populations
will reduce infections and ultimately eradicate the
pathogen. This is not necessarily true. Maintaining
Ni\NTi will be too weak a requirement for disease
reduction in some instances (and, once benefits and
costs are considered, will be overly strong in others).
The reason is that vector control is not explicitly
included in derivations of NTi, and that the current
infection levels matter. Observe that condition (4)
indicates _Ii\0 when
hi [bwihw
hi� ðbwihw þ diÞ ð6Þ
If we were to impose the requirement that hi \ 1,
then the following condition could be derived from
condition (6) (see ‘‘Appendix’’):
Si\ NTi þawKw
biwbwi
� �Ii
Iw
Nw
Kw
biw
awð7Þ
The right hand side (RHS) of (7) is less than NTi when
NTi\ð1=bwiÞðIi=IwÞNw
1� ðIi=IwÞðNw=KwÞðbiw=awÞand ðIi=IwÞðNw=KwÞðbiw=awÞ\1:
ð8Þ
When condition (8) is not satisfied, then Si\NTi
may not reduce Ii. In this case, the condition Ni\NTi
may not be sufficient to reduce Ii. When condition (8)
is satisfied, the condition Si\NTi ensures Ii is
reduced, but this may be stronger than necessary.
Because Ni C Si, it follows that Ni\NTi is more than
sufficient to reduce Ii when condition (8) is satisfied.
But if maintaining Ni\NTi is extremely costly
relative to the benefits, then society may do better
by investing in less control.
Threshold NTi is a special case of a more general
threshold, ~Ni, such that _Ii\0 when Ni\ ~Ni given
current infection levels and current harvest rates. As
with NTi, threshold ~Ni is derived by setting Eq. 4
equal to zero, but now the pre-infection steady state
assumptions are not imposed at the outset. Specifi-
cally, substitute the relations Si ¼ Ni � Ii and hw ¼Iw=Nw into Eq. 4 to yield _Ii ¼ bwi½Ni � Ii�hw�diIi � hiIi. Then set _Ii ¼ 0 and solve for the following
critical value of Ni:
~Niðhi; Ii; hwÞ ¼ðbwihw þ di þ hiÞIi
bwihwð9Þ
The critical value ~Ni is a vector-density threshold for
Ni, which is used to re-write Eq. 4
_Ii ¼ bwihw Ni � ~Ni hi;Ii; hw
� �� �ð40Þ
Eq. 40 indicates that infection will spread (i.e., _Ii [ 0)
when Ni [ ~Ni and it will decline (i.e., _Ii\0) when
Ni\ ~Ni.
In contrast to NTi, the threshold ~Ni depends on the
current disease prevalence level in the host and the
current density of infected insects. For instance, when
Ii [ 0 and in the limit as hw ! 0, then the threshold
approaches infinity: infection will never spread.
When hw [ 0 and Ii ¼ 0, then ~Ni ¼ 0 and infection
will always spread. Another difference from NTi is
that threshold ~Ni depends on vector controls, hi. Thus
the threshold is an ‘endogenous’ component of the
modeled system. This feature also highlights a
limitation of threshold-based management. Because
the threshold depends on human choices about vector
control, the policy interpretation of ~Niðhi; Ii; hwÞbecomes muddled: invasions are prevented when Ni
is reduced below ~Niðhi; Ii; hwÞ, but greater vector
control reduces the need to control vectors because
o ~Ni=ohi [ 0. This confusion is often sidestepped by
imposing additional constraints that are often ad hoc
(e.g., imposing time-invariant policies and pre-
disease equilibria; see Heesterbeek and Roberts
1995) and fails to address economic and ecological
tradeoffs. In what follows, we present an alternative
management approach that explicitly accounts for the
endogeneity of the thresholds and hence the system
dynamics.
A bioeconomic approach to management
The objective of a bioeconomic model is to choose
the management variables (vector control mortality
rates in the current case) to maximize some economic
criterion that a resource manager might care about,
such as social welfare. To do this, one considers how
the management choices affect disease dynamics, and
also how the intertemporal changes in the state
variables from the disease ecology model affect
economic welfare.
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
Suppose the economic criterion of social welfare is
defined as the present value of economic net benefits
that people derive from the host species and vector.
These net benefits are assumed to accrue over two
distinct ‘‘phases’’: an outbreak phase during a time
interval of t [ [0,s), and a post-outbreak phase begin-
ning at s. Specifically, suppose we are dealing with a
vector that flourishes during warm months, but dies out
naturally once the temperature cools (see Wonham
et al. 2004 for a similar set-up). Vector control costs
therefore only accrue during the outbreak phase.
Denote these control costs by cyi=Ni, where yi ¼hiNi is the total harvest mortality of vectors and c is a
cost parameter. A larger value of c indicates control
efforts are either more costly or less effective. The
management choice variable is yi, and Eqs. 3 and 4 can
be adjusted accordingly. This formulation is used to
highlight the fact that marginal vector control costs
become quite large as the overall vector population
falls. Because the outbreak time frame is short, we do
not discount costs. Assuming vector controls are the
only economic activity during the outbreak phase,
social welfare during the outbreak phase is
Zs
0
�cyi
Ni
� �dt: ð10Þ
All other economic activity, such as livestock sales
or recreational wildlife harvests, occurs during the
post-outbreak phase. Any infected hosts remaining at
time s are assumed to yield no direct economic value
(e.g., infected livestock are unproductive and not
marketable), and these animals do not contribute to
disease transmission once the vector dies out at time s(e.g., infected livestock are often culled to prevent
future spread, and other infected animals may
experience disease mortality). We assume that the
disease may re-emerge cyclically, but that this re-
emergence is strongly influenced by environmental
conditions and independent of the state of the world
at the time when the vector dies out. Given these
assumptions, social welfare after the outbreak phase
depends only on the number of healthy animals
remaining, Sw(s). Denote social welfare in the post-
outbreak phase by V[Sw(s)], which represents the
present value of future net benefits resulting from the
healthy animal stock. This present value may include
economic impacts from pathogen re-emergence in
future periods.
Given the formulation outlined above, total social
welfare over both phases is given by
W ¼Zs
0
�cyi
Ni
� �dt þ V Sw sð Þ½ � ð11Þ
The social welfare measure in (11) does not explicitly
incorporate any values associated with infected host
animals. However, there is an implicit opportunity
cost associated with infected animals: a larger
number of infected animals during the outbreak
phase implies a smaller value of Sw(s) and hence a
smaller present value V[Sw(s)]. This opportunity cost
is considered during the maximization of (11).
Indeed, this opportunity cost is the only reason to
invest in disease control in this model.
An economically efficient, or cost-effective, strat-
egy is one in which vector harvest levels are chosen
for each point in time during the outbreak phase in
order to maximize social welfare, W, subject to the
constraints implied by the dynamic Eqs. 1–3, 40, and
the initial conditions. There is no need to consider
vector control choices beyond time period s since any
future re-emergence of the disease is independent of
the state of the world at time s, and since the present
value function V accounts for the net benefits of
future management. Mathematically, this problem is
written as
MaxyiðtÞ
W s:t:ð1Þ � ð4Þ; and Sjð0Þ ¼ Sj0; Ijð0Þ ¼ Ij0
for j ¼ i;w ð12Þ
This bioeconomic problem can be solved as an
optimal control problem (Clark 2005). The solution
to problem (12) is characterized by a set of conditions
(see ‘‘Appendix’’) that require the manager to balance
economic and ecological tradeoffs. For instance, if V
is small, then disease-related opportunity costs will
be small and hence the incentives to reduce disease
prevalence will be small. Disease control incentives
will also be small when c is large, as the marginal
costs of disease control will be large in this case.
The solution to problem (12) is a path of vector
harvest levels, denoted y�i ðtÞ, that determines optimal
paths for the state variables, S�j ðtÞ and I�j ðtÞ (and
hence N�j ðtÞ, h�j ðtÞ, and h�i ðtÞ) for j = i,w, and also the
vector-density threshold, ~NiðtÞ. The vector-density
threshold is not an explicit element of the optimiza-
tion problem. Rather, it is implicit: the choices of
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
y�i ðtÞ drive changes in the state variables and hence~NiðtÞ. However, as ~Ni is an implicit component of
Eq. 40, the choices of y�i ðtÞ are optimally made to
account for the impacts on this ecological metric and
the feedbacks that they imply. Moreover, the choices
of y�i ðtÞ define the optimal time-varying vector-
density threshold as ~N�i ðtÞ ¼ ~Niðy�i ðtÞ; I�i ðtÞ; h�wðtÞÞ.
Human choices in each period cause the threshold to
change endogenously over time. The bioeconomic
model accounts for this, and consequently will result
in the overall least-cost strategy.
Illustrative example
We illustrate the conventional and bioeconomic
management approaches with a simple numerical
example that is representative of a range of impor-
tant vector-host diseases (see Wonham et al. 2004,
Lord et al. 1996, and Purse et al. 2008 for specific
examples). We consider one animal host population
and one vector population. The epidemiological
processes and economic relations are as described
above, with V[Sw(s)] = vSw(s), where v is a param-
eter. Parameter values for the simulation are shown
in Table 1. As indicated earlier, initial values of the
state variables are based on the assumption that
disease control efforts are implemented only after
the pathogen has already been introduced and
detected.
Conventional management
First, consider management based on the threshold
NTi = 364, derived using Eq. 5. Specifically, we
examine implementing vector controls so as to hold
the vector population at a constant level NiðtÞ ¼�Ni\NTi for all t \ s. We find the social welfare
associated with such a strategy is greatest when �Ni is
just less than NTi, i.e., �Ni ¼ 363. Social welfare will be
lower if the vector population is held constant at any
lower level, as the added costs of vector control exceed
the additional benefits that would follow from having
fewer infected hosts and a larger value of Sw(s). Social
welfare will actually achieve its maximum value,
under a constant-vector policy, at a value of �Ni ¼ 421.
We refer to this as the optimal constant vector (OCV)
strategy, but such a strategy violates the conventional
management requirement that the vector population be
maintained below the threshold NTi.
These results are illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows
the social welfare values associated with different
values of �Ni. The social welfare associated with
maintaining �Ni ¼ 363 is negative, yielding W =
-$3,233. Social welfare is negative because the
control costs incurred during the infection period
exceed the present value of the remaining hosts.
Managing further below �Ni ¼ 363 only leads to
greater economic loses, as described above. Social
welfare associated with the OCV strategy of �Ni ¼421 is also negative, yielding W = -$2,498. We
Table 1 Parameters and
values used in the model
All rates are days-1. Other
units are as documented
Parameter Interpretation Value
biw Transmission rate from vectors to hosts 0.0144
aw Disease induced mortality rate of hosts 0.0143
bwi Transmission rate from hosts to vectors 0.0792
ri Maximal vector recruitment rate 0.0075
di Vector mortality rate 0.029
Di Density-dependence term for vector growth, N�1i
� �0
v Constant marginal value of a uninfected host at time T ($) 30
c The cost of vector control ($) 10,000
Nw(0) Host population when pathogen is detected (after some
disease induced mortality has occurred)
988
hw(0) Host prevalence when pathogen is detected 0.1
Ni(0) Vector population when pathogen is detected 1,419
hi(0) Vector prevalence when pathogen is detected 0.1
Kw Equilibrium host population density prior to disease 1,000
s Time horizon (days) 100
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
show below that social welfare is non-negative under
a cost-effective strategy, highlighting the inefficien-
cies of a constant �Ni strategy.
Figure 2a indicates infections in the animal host
initially increase when maintaining �Ni ¼ 363, but then
begin to diminish. The initial increase in infections
indicates that the pre-disease vector-density threshold
is not stringent enough given the state of the world
when management is initiated. Holding the vector
population further below the threshold NTi will yield a
more rapid decline in host prevalence, but at rapidly
increasing cost (Fig. 1). Vector control would have to
be extreme to lead to eradication within the time
horizon of the problem (s = 100 days).
Bioeconomic management
We now develop an alternative management strategy
based on the bioeconomic model presented in (12).
As described above, and in contrast to the conven-
tional management results, the optimal vector
controls, state variables, and vector-density threshold
are each allowed to vary over time in the bioeconomic
model. In particular, the optimality conditions (see
‘‘Appendix’’) suggest, and we verify numerically, that
the optimal course of action when 0 \ s � ? is to
exert vector control effort such that 0 \ yi(0)
\ Ni(0) and yi(t) = 0, for all t [ (0, s].4 Specifically,
conditional on the parameter values in Table 1,
y�i ð0Þ ¼ 1; 163, so as to kill 82% of the initial vector
population. Following this initial pulse of vector
control, no vector control should take place. This
management strategy yields W = $6,519 (Fig. 3
s = 100). Any other initial pulse of vector control
would result in lower economic returns (Fig. 3).
Social welfare would also be reduced by applying
additional vector controls after the initial period. This is
because future costs are not discounted, and marginal
harvesting costs (c/Ni) will rise as the vector population
is reduced.5 It is therefore optimal to apply significant
controls only in the initial period to reduce the vector
population and hence prevalence in all future periods.
This result illustrates the simplest time-varying control
Fig. 1 Net benefits from maintaining a given density of vector
population, �Ni for three different terminal time periods,
s = {50, 100, 250} days. The horizontal dotted line is zero
net benefits. The vertical dashed line is the conventional
recommendation where R0 ? e = 1, and e is small
Fig. 2 Host prevalence (a) and population density (b) over a
100 day infectious period for a conventional pre-disease
equilibrium threshold management that maintains Ni ¼ �Ni ¼363, and for cost-effective management
4 If there are capacity constraints that only permit a
yi(0) \ yi*(0), then subsequent vector control pulses may be
optimal within the interval t [ (0, s]. We also note that for this
Footnote 4 continued
problem if s is large enough, then it is not optimal to engage in
any management resulting in W = 0.5 Rising marginal costs are also a factor in determining the
initial pulse harvest. The costs associated with a pulse harvest
are cln(Ni/[Ni - yi]) (see Clark 2005). This implies that costs
increase as a larger proportion of the vector population is
initially harvested.
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
strategy. It is possible that vector control efforts would
optimally be spread out over additional periods in
models where vector control costs are nonlinear in yi,
the future is discounted, or when the system dynamics
involve more complex relations. But the most basic
result—that control efforts should optimally vary over
time in response to the state of the world—will be
unaffected.
The $6,519 in net benefits under the cost-effective
strategy is $9,017 greater than the best constant vector
density management program, and $9,752 greater than
the conventional management program described
above (Table 2). The differences in net benefits arise
because the cost-effective plan yields significantly
lower control costs during the outbreak phase, and
greater benefits during the post-outbreak phase. Con-
sider the outbreak phase. The cost-effective plan
initially reduces the vector population density to 256,
well below the conventional management threshold
NiT . This initial reduction is chosen because of the
dynamic effects it has on the endogenously determined
threshold (Eq. 5). At the instant of control, ~NiðtÞ rises
to 83,765 vectors, but then immediately falls to 542
vectors (Eq. 5). This new threshold is much larger than
the conventional threshold NiT , and it is more than
twice the vector population that remains after the
initial cull. Management has shifted the threshold to
ensure that the infected vector population will con-
tinue to decline even if no further controls are
implemented. In contrast, under conventional man-
agement, the vector population is maintained only
slightly below its threshold value. In that case, controls
must continue to be implemented to keep the infected
vector population in check. Moreover, these controls
are implemented at higher costs after the initial period
due to the larger marginal control costs (i.e., c/Ni)
associated with maintaining a reduced vector popula-
tion in each period.
The value of V also is also larger under cost-
effective and smaller under the conventional man-
agement. This is because the large initial cull in the
cost-effective scenario yields a smaller number of
infected vectors and infected hosts in almost every
subsequent period (Fig. 2a). With less disease
pressure over the most of the management interval,
the total density of surviving hosts is greater. The
result is a greater density of susceptible hosts at time
s and a larger V, under bioeconomic management
(Fig. 2b).
Sensitivity analysis
We explore the sensitivity of the model in two steps.
First, we consider the influence of the length of the
time horizon s, and then we consider other parameters
in the model. The value of s is particularly important,
as it may vary by location for climatic reasons, and
over time as influenced by climate change (Purse et al.
2008). These analyses can be viewed as alternative
climate scenarios. The time horizon does not influence
conventional management recommendations (noted
by the vertical dashed line in Fig. 1), though a shorter
time span s does result in larger net benefits. The time
horizon does influence the OCV strategy (i.e., the
vector density associated with the maximum on each
curve in Fig. 1) and the net benefits under this strategy.
Specifically, a larger vector population is allowed
under shorter time spans in the OCV strategy, as this
reduces control costs and also the vectors have less
time to infect the host population when s is small. The
sensitivity analysis associated with the OCV strategy
clearly shows how conventional threshold-based man-
agement may be too stringent in some cases (i.e.,
s = 50, as the maximum lies to the right of the vertical
dashed line) and not stringent enough in others (i.e.,
s = 250, as the maximum lies to the left of the vertical
dashed line).
The magnitude of s also influences the optimal
bioeconomic strategy. Figure 3 illustrates the net
benefits accruing from the optimally chosen yi(0)
conditional on three different values of s. On the one
Fig. 3 Social welfare arising under cost-effective manage-
ment for different initial pulses (with zero harvests afterward),
for three different terminal time periods, s = {50, 100, 250}.
The x-axis differs from that in Fig. 1. Zero social welfare is
indicated with a dotted line
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
Ta
ble
2S
ensi
tiv
ity
anal
ysi
so
fp
aram
eter
su
sed
inth
em
od
el(s
=1
00
)fo
rth
eco
st-e
ffec
tiv
eb
ioec
on
om
icst
rate
gy
,th
eco
nv
enti
on
al(R
0b
ased
)st
rate
gy
,an
dth
eo
pti
mal
con
stan
tv
ecto
r(O
CV
)st
rate
gy
Man
agem
ent
scen
ario
Per
form
ance
mea
sure
Bas
elin
em
od
el
par
amet
ers
Res
ult
sw
hen
the
ind
icat
edp
aram
eter
isin
crea
sed
by
5%
rela
tiv
eto
its
bas
elin
ele
vel
,an
dal
lo
ther
par
amet
ers
are
hel
dat
bas
elin
ele
vel
s
cv
b wi
d ir i
biw
a w
Bio
eco
no
mic
stra
teg
y
So
cial
wel
fare
(W)
$6
,51
9$
5,6
66
(-2
.87
)$
7,7
04
(3.4
2)
$6
,51
9(0
.00
)$
6,5
19
(0.0
0)
$6
,19
1(-
1.0
6)
$6
,41
9(-
0.3
2)
$6
,58
4(0
.20
)
Op
tim
al
init
ial
cull
1,1
63
1,1
60
(-0
.05
)1
,16
6(0
.05
)1
,16
3(0
.00
)1
,16
3(0
.00
)1
,18
6(0
.40
)1
,15
1(-
0.2
1)
1,1
64
(0.0
2)
Co
nv
enti
on
al
stra
teg
y
So
cial
wel
fare
(W)
-$
3,2
33
-$
4,5
59
(-6
.98
)-
$2
,06
8(9
.01
)-
$3
,70
7(-
2.8
0)
-$
2,8
54
(2.5
5)
-$
3,8
42
(-3
.53
)-
$3
,66
4(-
2.5
6)
-$
2,8
20
(2.8
0)
Nu
mb
ero
f
vec
tors
36
33
63
(0.0
0)
36
3(0
.00
)3
46
(-0
.98
)3
81
(0.9
9)
36
3(0
.00
)3
46
(-0
.98
)3
81
(0.9
9)
OC
Vst
rate
gy
So
cial
wel
fare
(W)
-$
2,4
98
-$
3,6
86
(-7
.88
)-
$1
,42
5(1
1.2
1)
-$
2,4
98
(0.0
0)
-$
2,4
98
(0.0
0)
-$
3,1
00
(-4
.41
)-
$2
,69
6(-
1.5
7)
-$
2,4
36
(0.5
1)
Nu
mb
ero
f
vec
tors
42
14
26
(0.2
4)
41
7(0
.20
)4
21
(0.0
0)
42
1(0
.00
)4
21
(0.0
0)
41
1(-
0.4
9)
42
2(0
.05
)
All
par
amet
ers
wer
ein
crea
sed
by
5%
.V
alu
esin
par
enth
eses
are
arc
elas
tici
ties
,w
hic
har
ed
efin
edas
the
%ch
ang
ein
the
resp
on
sev
aria
ble
div
ided
by
the
%ch
ang
ein
the
par
amet
er.
Fo
rth
eO
CV
and
cost
-eff
ecti
ve
bio
eco
no
mic
stra
teg
ies,
the
lack
of
chan
ges
incu
llra
tes
and
inso
cial
wel
fare
(W)
inre
spo
nse
toch
ang
esin
b wian
dd i
isan
arti
fact
of
rou
nd
ing
,as
the
resu
lts
are
extr
emel
yin
sen
siti
ve
tosm
all
chan
ges
isth
ese
par
amet
ers
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
hand, longer infectious periods imply larger damage
costs (i.e., reduced V) since there is greater time for
infection to spread. This feature increases the net
benefits of vector controls. On the other hand, longer
infectious periods imply the pathogen has more time
to rebound, within both the vector and host popula-
tions, after the initial cull. This feature reduces the
incentives to invest in vector control. The net effect
depends on the initial value of s and the magnitude of
the change in s. When s is small (e.g., s = 50), the
optimal response to a small-to-moderate increase in s(say, to s = 100) is a larger initial pulse, i.e., a larger
value of y�i ð0Þ (Fig. 3). The net economic effect of
increasing s from 50 to 100 is a reduction in social
welfare, as control costs increase and V is diminished.
However, if s is increased by a large value (e.g.,
s = 250), then it may be optimal to not control the
vector and forgo animal-related benefits (note: the
global maximum of the s = 250 curve is at
y�i ð0Þ ¼ 0).6 It is not optimal to wait to initiate vector
controls because this delay results in more infected
hosts, reducing Sw(s) and hence V. Overall, our
results suggests that if an exogenous force such as
climate change increased s, then this too could
impose costs on society by reducing W, though it is
possible to adapt the management response to offset
larger potential losses.
We also perform sensitivity analysis for other
relevant epidemiological and economic parameters
for the case of s = 100 (Table 2). The results for
changes in the economic parameters are intuitive:
smaller control costs or larger economic benefits of
preserving healthy animals encourage a larger initial
vector harvest, under both the bioeconomic and OCV
strategies. In contrast, the conventional strategy does
not change in response to changes in economic
parameters, as these parameters are not considered in
calculating the R0-based threshold. In all cases, social
welfare is increased when control costs are reduced or
the benefits of Sw are increased. These sensitivity
results illustrate one of the short-comings of conven-
tional management. A move towards the OCV
strategy is an improvement from the conventional
approach, but does not take full advantage of
economics as decision science. The bioeconomic
management strategy is relatively insensitive to
changes in economic parameters (as measured by
the elasticity of the optimal initial cull with respect to
the parameter in question; Table 2). Therefore,
precise estimation of these parameters may not be
essential to develop a near-optimal bioeconomic
strategy.
Now consider the sensitivity results for changes in
the ecological parameters. Changes in the parameters
bwi and dwi have virtually no impact on management or
welfare in either the bioeconomic or OCV scenarios.
The reason is that these parameters affect biological
processes that are of second-order importance to the
host population (i.e., they do not directly affect
transmission to the host) once an outbreak occurs.
These parameters do, however, significantly impact
management and welfare levels associated with the
conventional strategy. The reason is that these param-
eters affect the calculation of NTi (Eq. 5), on which
conventional management is based. This result high-
lights the importance of basing management strategies
on the dynamics associated with current infection
levels as opposed to the initial point of infection.
Increases in ri and biw result in ‘‘speeding up’’
those processes having direct and adverse effects on
the host population. Specifically, a larger ri results in
the vector population rebounding more quickly after
a cull, and a larger biw results in more transmission to
animal hosts. Speeding up these processes is akin to
having a slightly larger time horizon, s, as a larger
number of adverse pathogen interactions can occur
during the actual time horizon. It is therefore not
surprising that, for both the bioeconomic and OCV
strategies, increases in each of these variables has
qualitatively similar impacts as a slight increase in s.
The conventional vector control strategy is unaf-
fected by changes in ri (as this parameter does not
affect NTi), but it is affected by changes in biw, as this
parameter does affect NTi.
Finally, increases in aw results in fewer infected
hosts, which reduces both transmission of the patho-
gen back to the vector and also the number of
‘‘wasted’’ vector bites. The former is beneficial and
reduces the need for vector controls, though this effect
is of secondary importance relative to vector-to-host
transmission. The latter result indicates increased
vector-to-host transmission, which is costly and
6 For a sufficiently large s it will be important to incorporate
discounting and net natural growth within the host population,
neither of which are currently included in our model.
We hypothesize that including these factors will result in a
time-varying positive level of vector control.
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
increases the incentives for vector controls.7 We find
the latter effect dominates under the bioeconomic
strategy, so that a larger aw results in more vector
controls being economically optimal (though the
response is small). In contrast, the first effect dominates
for the OCV strategy. The reason is that an increase in
aw reduces host prevalence, hw, which in turn increases
the current vector-density threshold ~Ni defined in
expression (9). A larger threshold means the number
of infected vectors can be kept under control at higher
vector densities. Hence, control costs are reduced by
reducing vector controls. The net effect is a reduction
in social welfare as the second effect (i.e., reduced
wasted bites) reduces V, but investing in more vector
controls to prevent these losses would be even more
costly than easing up on controls and allowing some
losses to occur. Finally, vector controls are also eased
up under the conventional strategy, as increases in aw
increase the conventional vector density threshold NTi.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to aw indicates
another short-coming of basing management on the
point of invasion once the invasion has occurred.
Discussion
Programs to manage vector-borne pathogens will
likely expand in coming decades, motivated by the
link between wildlife, domestic animal, and human
health (Cleaveland et al. 2001) and global environ-
mental changes that lead to disease emergence (Daszak
et al. 2000; Jones et al. 2008). Historically a concern in
tropical climates (e.g., malaria), vector-borne patho-
gens are now of increasing concern in temperate
climates (e.g., West Nile virus in North America,
bluetongue in Europe)—either due to the increasing
number of biological invasions, often with human help,
or due to the potential effects of climate change (Purse
et al. 2008). It is imperative to prioritize management
actions within such programs to make the best use of
scarce resources. We have presented an approach that
bases disease management decisions on both biolog-
ical and economic decision science.
Prior bioeconomic models of vector-borne disease
management are limited and have not compared
bioeconomically-derived strategies to strategies
based only on disease ecology –conventional recom-
mendations. One goal of this manuscript has been to
compare and contrast conventional and bioeconomic
approaches to deriving vector-borne disease manage-
ment recommendations. Our results indicate there are
potentially large gains to be made from explicitly
considering economics at the outset of vector-borne
disease management planning.
An interesting feature of the problem is that the
bioeconomically optimal solution we present is less
complicated and less costly to implement than the
conventional approach. Moreover, the bioeconomic
management program is less sensitive to the estima-
tion of biological parameters. This means that bioeco-
nomic management may be more robust to ecological
and economic uncertainty than the conventional
approach. While this is not a global feature of
bioeconomic models, it illustrates the point that both
bioeconomic and conventional ecological approaches
can involve complicated analysis and complex and
costly implementation. Generally, analysis of natural
resource management problems is less costly than
implementation of the management programs. Finding
the best management program that accounts for
economic and ecological processes, transactions costs,
and institutional constraints requires interdisciplinary
teams willing to explore new approaches. Such novel
approaches will become increasingly common as
interdisciplinary teams complement each other’s
strengths and bring new and innovative tools to
ecological problems.
The use of ‘‘ecological’’ thresholds is increasing in
natural resources management (Martin et al. 2009).
Much of this work has come out of disease manage-
ment (e.g., R0 based thresholds) and invasive species
biology (invasion thresholds). A related literature
address pest control with accounting based thresholds
related to ‘‘economic’’ injury levels (Koonce et al.
1993). Though occasionally mentioned (Walker et al.
2004), the rapidly growing literature on thresholds
largely neglects the multi-dimensional nature of the
determinants of these thresholds and how management
actions shape both the system relative to the threshold
and the threshold itself. Bioeconomic management
provides a framework for jointly considering the effect
of management action relative to the threshold and the
7 Increases in aw effectively result in selective culling of
infected host animals. As indicated in footnote 4, selective
culling of infected hosts can in some circumstances be
detrimental because this increases the probability that an
infected vector randomly bites a susceptible (as opposed to
infected) host.
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
effects of management actions on the value of future
thresholds. State-dependent management that affects
the system relative to a threshold and the future value
of the threshold itself can lead to lower management
cost and more effective management. We have
illustrated this with a simple vector-borne pathogen
model.
Acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge
funding provided by the Economic Research Service-USDA
cooperative agreement number 58-7000-6-0084 through ERS’
Program of Research on the Economics of Invasive Species
Management (PREISM), and by NRI, USDA, CSREES,
grant #2006-55204-17459. This work was conducted as part of
the SPIDER working group at the National Institute for
Mathematical and Biological Synthesis (NIMBioS), sponsored
by the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture through NSF Award #EF-0932858, with additional
support from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The views
expressed here are the authors and should not be attributed to
ERS, USDA, or NIMBioS.
Appendix
(A) Derivation of condition (7)
Upon imposing the requirement that hi \ 1, condition
(6) indicates that
1 [ bwihw=hi � ðbwihw þ diÞ¼ bwihwð1=hi � 1Þ � di: ðA1Þ
Condition (A1) can be re-written as
di þ 1 [ bwihwð1=hi � 1Þ ¼ bwihwðNi=Ii � Ii=IiÞ¼ bwihwðSi=IiÞ: (A2)
Write hw ¼ Iw=Nw and solve for Si:
Si\ di þ 1½ � IiNw
bwiIw¼ di þ 1½ � awKw
biwbwi
Ii
Iw
Nw
Kw
biw
aw; ðA3Þ
where the last equality simply comes from multiply-
ing both the numerator and the denominator by
awKwbiw. Upon applying the distributive property,
condition (A3) becomes
Si\awdiKw
biwbwi
þ awKw
biwbwi
� �Ii
Iw
Nw
Kw
biw
aw
¼ NTi þawKw
biwbwi
� �Ii
Iw
Nw
Kw
biw
aw; ðA4Þ
which is condition (7).
(B) Optimal vector management
Problem (12) can be formulated as a linear control
problem (i.e., the problem is linear in the control
variable yi). The Hamiltonian for the problem is:
H ¼ �cyi
Niþ kw
_Sw þ lw_Iw þ ki
_Si þ li_Ii; ðB1Þ
where kj is the co-state variable associated with the
susceptible stock of population j, and lj is the
co-state variable associated with the infected stock of
population j (j = w,i).The marginal value of yi on the
Hamiltonian is:
oH
oyi¼ � c
Ni� ki
Si
Ni� li
Ii
NiðB2Þ
The marginal value in (B2) vanishes along a singular
path. When the value is positive (negative), then hi
should be set at its maximum (minimum) value.
Generally, the system will not be on the singular path
initially, which means an extremal control must be
used to move the system as quickly as possible to the
singular path (if one exists) (Clark 2005). As there is
no upper bound on yi, harvests can only occur at a
maximum rate for an instant. Harvests can persist at
yi = 0 or at the singular level for a longer time.
Hence, except for an initial jump, we have
yi ¼ _yi ¼ 0; or oH=oyi ¼ 0: ðB3Þ
The remaining necessary conditions for problem (12)
are:
_kw ¼ �oH
oSwðB4Þ
_lw ¼ �oH
oIwðB5Þ
_ki ¼ �oH
oSiðB6Þ
_li ¼ �oH
oIiðB7Þ
The transversality conditions are:
kwðsÞ ¼oV
oSw[ 0 ðB8Þ
lwðsÞ ¼ 0 ðB9ÞkiðsÞ ¼ 0 ðB10Þ
E. P. Fenichel et al.
123
liðsÞ ¼ 0 ðB11Þ
Conditions (B10) and (B11), along with (B2), indi-
cates that hi(s) = 0. Taking the time derivative of the
Hamiltonian yields:
oH
ot¼ oH
oyi_yi þ
X
j¼w;i
oH
oSj
_Sj þoH
oIj
_Ij þoH
okj
_kj þoH
olj
_lj
" #
oH
ot¼ 0þ
X
j¼w;i
oH
oSj
_Sj þoH
oIj
_Ij þ _Sj_kj þ _Ij _lj
� �
oH
ot¼ 0þ
X
j¼w;i
�oH
oSj
_Sj þoH
oIj
_Ij þ _Sj �oH
oSj
� �
þ _Ij �oH
oIj
� ��¼ 0: (B12)
The second row of (B12) comes from condition (B3),
while the third row comes from conditions
(B4)–(B11). Hence, H is constant after possibly an
initial pulse harvest. Define this constant value of H
by v, i.e., H = v. Using the results H = v and
hi(s) = 0, along with the transversality conditions
(B8)–(B11), we have
HðsÞ ¼ 0þ kwðsÞ _SwðsÞ ¼ �oV
oSwðsÞbiwIiðsÞ
SwðsÞNwðsÞ
¼ v\0; ðB13Þ
which means H(t) \ 0 for all t [ [0, s).
As H is a measure of economic welfare, the result
H(s) \ 0 means that extending the time horizon to sreduces welfare. It would be optimal to diminish the
time horizon to some value s0\s, such that
Hðs0Þ ¼ 0, as setting Hðs0Þ ¼ 0 means there is no
value to extending the time horizon any further
(Clark 2005). However, this is not possible since s is
biologically-determined and is therefore exogenously
fixed. The implication is that it is optimal to take all
actions as soon as possible: an impulse control at time
t = 0. The intuition is as follows. First, there is no
incentive to delay management because problem (12)
is a linear control problem with no discounting. If
discounting occurred at a very high rate, then future
costs (and benefits) would be worth less and so one
would want to wait to invest in vector controls. With
no discounting, costs today and in the future are
valued equally, so there is no penalty from investing
early. But there is a penalty to investing later, as the
only stock of concern, Sw, can only decrease when the
disease problem gets worse. So it is optimal for all
vector reduction to take place immediately. The cost
associated with an impulse control used for the initial
cull is c ln½Ni0=ðNi0 � yið0ÞÞ� (Clark 2005).To deter-
mine the optimal initial harvest, rewrite the problem
as
Maxyið0Þ
�c ln Ni0
Ni0�yið0Þ
h iþ VðSwðsÞÞ ðB14Þ
subject to the equations of motion and the initial
conditions as before, except that now we have the
following initial conditions for the vector popula-
tions: Sið0þÞ ¼ Si0ð1� yið0Þ=Ni0Þ and Iið0þÞ ¼Ii0ð1� yið0Þ=Ni0Þ. The objective function in (B14)
now does not depend on time, and the equations of
motion no longer depend on human choices. We
solve the equations of motion (1)–(4) as functions of
the stock levels after the initial cull, and then rewrite
problem (B14) as
Maxyið0Þ�c ln
Ni0
Ni0 � yið0Þ
� �þ VðSwðs; Sw0; Iw0; Si0
½1� yið0Þ=Ni0�; Ii0½1� yið0Þ=Ni0�ÞÞ; ðB15Þ
or, more simply, as
Maxhið0Þ�c ln
1
ð1� hið0ÞÞ
� �þ VðSwðs; Sw0; Iw0; Si0
½1� hið0Þ�; Ii0½1� hið0Þ�ÞÞ ðB16Þ
The optimality condition for this problem is:
c
ð1� hið0ÞÞ¼ oV Sw sð Þð Þ
oSw� oSw
oSið0þÞSi0 �
oSw
oIið0þÞIi0
� �
ðB17Þ
The left hand side of (B17) is the marginal cost of
vector controls. Marginal costs approach infinity as
the harvest rate hið0Þ approaches unity; hence it is not
optimal to eradicate the vector population assuming
the marginal benefits of eradication are finite. The
right hand side is the marginal net benefit of vector
controls in time period 0. Society benefits from a
larger value of SwðsÞ. This value is increased at the
margin as Iið0þÞ is reduced (i.e., �oSw=oIið0þÞ[ 0),
and it may increase or decrease as Sið0þÞ is reduced
(i.e., �oSw=oSið0þÞ�\0).
It is worth noting that the impacts of the initial cull
will depend on the time horizon s. The smaller is s, the
larger the impact of a given initial cull on SwðsÞ, as the
vector population will have less time to rebound and
infect the host population. In contrast, a larger s gives
Bioeconomic management of vector-borne diseases
123
infected vectors more time to rebound and infect hosts
after the initial cull. Our numerical sensitivity analysis
indicates that the less control is required when s is
small, as having only few controls can yield effective
protection of the host population in this case while
keeping costs low. The optimal level of vector controls
is initially increasing in s, as vector control efforts are
initially substituted for reduced protection effective-
ness as s is increased. If s is too large, however, the
level of control is reduced in response to reduced
effectiveness; more hosts become infected while
society saves from reduced control costs.
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