Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia

Environment and Planning A 2015, volume 47, pages 138 – 155

doi:10.1068/a140054p

Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia

Andrew McGregorDepartment of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Herring Road, North Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia, and School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand; e-mail: [email protected] ChalliesInstitute for Environmental and Sustainability Communication, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Scharnhorstrasse 1, D-21335 Lüneburg, Germany; e-mail: [email protected] Howson, Rini Astuti, Rowan Dixon, Bethany HaalboomSchool of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand; e-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] GavinWarner College of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, 400 University Avenue, Fort Collins, CO 80523, USA; e-mail: [email protected] TacconiCrawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia; e-mail: [email protected] AfiffDepartment of Anthropology, Universitas Indonesia, UI Campus, Depok 16424, Indonesia; e-mail: [email protected] 29 January 2014; in revised form 7 August 2014

Abstract. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is an expanding global initiative oriented at slowing or reversing carbon emissions from forests in the Global South. The programme is based on the principle of payment for environmental services, where the carbon sequestration services of forests are seen to have a financial value which can be paid for through grant and market mechanisms. In this paper we explore how REDD+ is implemented, drawing upon the concept of governmentality. We focus on REDD+ practices in Indonesia, concluding with a case study focused on the Sungai Lamandau REDD+ project in Central Kalimantan. A cross-scalar approach is adopted that explores the different but overlapping strategies of actors congregating at international, national, and local scales. We detail the neoliberal strategies employed by international actors; the more disciplinary approaches evident within national planning processes; and local forms of engagement being practised by a forest community. Our findings reveal REDD+ to be comprised of a heterogeneous regime of disjointed practices that reflect the existing political ecologies and interests of differently located actors. Rather than consolidate these approaches we argue that the strength of the programme lies in its fluidity, which is creating new cross-scalar opportunities, and risks, for those pursuing forms of social and environmental justice.

Keywords: governmentality, environmentality, REDD+, forest governance, environmental justice, Indonesia

REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia 139

1 IntroductionThe planetary scale of many environmental problems encourages ‘global’ solutions involving new networks of public, private, and community actors. These initiatives tend to span multiple geographical scales, creating complex governance arrangements for the management of socioecological systems within and across jurisdictional and territorial boundaries. In this paper we explore how Foucault’s (2007) concept of governmentality can assist in understanding one such emergent form of environmental governance—the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) programme. Our aim is to identify the governmental strategies and practices that are emerging at different geographical scales as the programme is implemented in Indonesia. We focus on strategies emerging from international, national, and local actors, concluding with a case study of the proposed Sungai Lamandau REDD+ project in Central Kalimantan. In doing so we aim to provide insights into how global environmental initiatives are pursued and transformed through encounters with place, and the opportunities they provide for socially and environmentally just outcomes. While acknowledging the evolving and locally constituted nature of environmental justice (eg, Forsyth and Sikor, 2013; Schlosberg, 2013), we follow Sikor (2013a) in seeing just processes as those that benefit disadvantaged human (and nonhuman) groups in terms of participation in decision making, the distribution of costs and benefits, and recognition of alternative human–environmental interactions. Such outcomes necessitate changes to the existing political ecology of forest governance in Indonesia.

Deforestation and degradation of tropical forests have become objects of global environmental governance, together constituting one of the largest sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (van der Werf et al, 2009). REDD+, as a global response, focuses on economic incentives for forest protection, striving “to make forests more valuable standing than cut down” (Katerere, 2010, page 105). To do so, it values forests as carbon sinks and rewards forested countries of the Global South that have slowed or reversed forest carbon emissions with public grant-based and private market-based funding. While REDD+ has important antecedents (see Humphreys, 2008), the programme was only formally introduced at the 2007 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 13th Conference of the Parties in Bali. Since then REDD+ activities have proliferated. The United Nations Collaborative Programme on REDD+ (UN-REDD) lists forty-eight partner countries at various stages of preparedness. The World Bank, through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), along with private finance institutions, donors, multinational corporations, and big environmental NGOs, are other key actors involved in this concerted global effort to reinvent forest values and governance.

We see REDD+ as a new form of power and knowledge that constitutes a ‘regime of practices’ oriented at governing forest carbon. We thereby position REDD+ as amenable to governmentality research, and move away from more common debates over policy and best practice. Instead we focus on “the characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range of effects” (Dean, 2010, page 31). We are interested in the strategies and practices through which global climate debates filter into other scales and spaces, and the mechanisms oriented at shaping the conduct of populations. Focusing on REDD+ mechanisms at different spatial scales provides insights into how global environmental agendas are enacted, negotiated, and appropriated, revealing the “humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government” (Rose and Miller, 1992, page 183). Humble and mundane they may be, but potentially far reaching and powerful are their effects.

140 A McGregor, E Challies, P Howson, and coworkers

Our approach explores the relationships between actors working at and between different geographical scales. We outline the strategies of actors to infiltrate and influence institutional arrangements across scales in order to better position themselves in the governance of carbon, forests, and forest peoples. The research is informed by work on the political ecology of scale, recognising the contested and constructed nature of scale in environmental governance (see Neumann, 2009), something that is less evident in wider research on multilevel gover-nance. Rather than see REDD+ as a top-down process involving hierarchically nested governance arrangements, we see it as constituted by a complex interplay of actors and practices across scales. While REDD+ may provide opportunities for international actors to reshape forest governance, it also affords space for national and subnational actors to realise their own interests. A variety of strategies have emerged to frame and contest REDD+ (eg, den Besten et al, 2014; Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011, McGregor, 2010). Understanding how diverse strategies emerge and interact to produce new forms of place-based environmental governance is important if REDD+ is to evolve in socially and environmentally just ways. We explore this process by initially discussing the concept of environmentality, before analysing REDD+ strategies and practices at three scales of governance in Indonesia.

2 REDD+ environmentalitiesFoucault (2007) coined the term governmentality in his later lectures to refer to the emergence of new forms of government that seek to shape the everyday behaviours of populations. Government, in this sense, refers not to “imposing law on men, but [to] disposing things; that is to say … employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics—to arrange things in such a way, that through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved” (Foucault, 1991, page 95). In disposing people towards things in particular ways ‘free’ populations come to self-govern their conduct in ways that are recognised as ‘convenient’ for each of the things to be governed (Foucault, 1991). Governmentality research, then, is interested in laws, regulations, and other less apparent strategies as tactics, oriented towards particular ends, which produce particular ways of thinking and acting within targeted populations. These ‘governmental technologies’ or ‘technologies of government’ encompass not only management by the state, but also the wide array of actors and practices addressing “problems of self-control, guidance for the family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul, and other questions” (Lemke, 2010, page 33).

Although Foucault showed little interest in nature, his ideas have inspired research on the practices governing socioecological relationships (eg, Agrawal, 2005; Birkenholtz, 2009; Darier, 1999; Goldman, 2004; Haggerty, 2007; Malette, 2009; Rutherford, 2007). A key insight from this field has been to extend Foucault’s observations regarding the government of human society to the government of nonhuman processes through disciplines like ecology (Rutherford, 2007). In Agrawal’s (2005) longitudinal study of forests in northern India, for example, he uses the term ‘environmentality’ to refer to “the knowledges, politics, institutions, and subjectivities that come to be linked together with the emergence of the environment as a domain that requires regulation and protection” (Agrawal, 2005, page 226). Agrawal’s work directs attention to the means through which ecological systems become objects of government, and thereby governable, through the calculative practices associated with forestry science. These technologies allow the Forest Department to set targets and implement policies to produce particular responses within the ecological systems being managed. Such tactics enable certain forms of power and knowledge and disenable others, such as customary human–forest knowledges and interactions, which themselves become objects of government. Agrawal shows how the Forestry Department sought particular dispositions towards forests among forest users through strategies involving decentralisation; the formation of Forest Councils, and associated mechanisms of recording, reporting, and accountability; and the


creation of forms of ‘intimate government’ where villagers monitor their own and others’ behaviours in ways that are disposed to the forestry goals of the state.

Agrawal’s research explores ‘disciplinary environmentalities’—or, practices of govern-ment that seek to internalise particular pro-environment norms and values, according to which people would then self-govern. Fletcher (2010) argues that four other environmentalities are evident within forest conservation, and suggests these can be used to better understand competing interests in conservation debates. First, and most relevant for conceptualising REDD+, ‘neoliberal environmentality’ embraces market mechanisms as the primary means of managing populations. Technologies and rationales based on economic growth, cost–benefit analysis, and financial incentives are used to encourage and reward pro-conservation behaviours. As such, the mobilisation of market rationalities represents “an environmental [external] type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals characteristic of a disciplinary governmentality” (Foucault, cited in Fletcher, 2010, page 174). In contrast, ‘fortress conservation environmentalities’ rely on sovereign power, wherein conservation is pursued through “fences and fines” strategies (Fletcher, 2010, page 177) involving forest guards and other surveillance technologies. A further form of forest government emerges from ‘truth environmentalities’ based on claims about essential cultural and spiritual connections between humans and forests, particularly in reference to Indigenous groups. Local human–forest relations and claims to authority may be legitimised through reference to traditional knowledge and practices, and customary claims of forest users. Finally, Fletcher suggests the field of political ecology itself could be contributing to the emergence of a fifth ‘liberation environmentality’ that bears strong similarities to Southern environmental movements (Guha, 2000) as it is “more concerned with social and environmental justice than biodiversity preservation” (page 178). We see such social justice approaches as critical to the success and longevity of global environmental programmes.

We draw on Fletcher’s (2010) environmentalities to respond to the call by Okereke et al (2009, page 73) for more research on climate governance and the “ ‘mentalities’ of rule [that] render the issue of climate change ‘practical’ ”. Dean (2010, page 229) argues that governmentality studies can illuminate “the multiple and varied agencies acting in concert or in contest to constitute governable domains and spaces along various scales from the neighbourhood to the globe.” Climate change becomes governable as it is constituted as an object of governance through the production of particular ‘truths’ (Larner and Walters, 2004) about the nature of human–climate interactions, and the amenability of social and climatic systems to management, manipulation, and ‘government’. A dominant, though also contested, ‘truth’—or governing rationality—emerges around a privileged role for (Western) technoscience in the production of knowledge about climate change (Jasanoff, 2010; Oels, 2005), and the centrality of market mechanisms in addressing it. The pervasiveness of this market environmentalism, or neoliberal environmentality (Fletcher, 2010), as ‘common sense’ is evident in the design and rationale of REDD+ in international negotiations.

As emergent ‘regimes of practices’, REDD+ initiatives construct forests as carbon pools and providers of ecosystem services, governable through science and markets. This view, which predates REDD+, is promulgated internationally by various constellations of governing authorities, incorporating state-based actors (subnational, national, multilateral) and non-state actors (private and civic sector) in what have been termed ‘hybrid’, multistakeholder or networked governance arrangements (eg, Lövbrand et al, 2009; Pattberg, 2010). Such institutions seek to normalise REDD+ and govern human–forest interactions at national and subnational scales via specific programmes and institutional practices. In the case of Indonesia, these programmes have, much like the ‘governing projects’ described by Larner et al (2007), been marked by trial and error, contestation and controversy, temporal and spatial overlap, and both radical breaks and strong continuities with prior arrangements.


Larner (2000, page 16) has called for grounded and detailed analyses that “make visible the messy actualities of new forms of governance; the contradictions, complexities and inconsistencies that inevitably characterize neo-liberal political projects.” Emergent regimes of practices and governing programmes around REDD+ in Indonesia constitute a useful case for research in this vein, due to Indonesia’s high rate of deforestation and the corresponding rapid proliferation of experimental forest carbon initiatives. Here we explore how the neoliberal rationalities present in the design of REDD+ are being pursued and translated by a range of actors at different scales of governance in Indonesia for a variety of ends.

3 REDD+ environmentalities in IndonesiaOn 19 December 2013 the Indonesian government hosted a high-profile event that celebrated the achievements of the REDD+ Taskforce, the team charged with institutionalising REDD+ in Indonesia, and discussed pathways towards full implementation. Undoubtedly, much has been achieved at the national level, with a range of institutions developed, or under development, to govern forest carbon. Most significantly, a National Strategy that outlines the path forward and a REDD+ Agency to oversee REDD+ implementation, which reports directly to the president, have been created. In addition, there are at least twenty-nine pilot projects under development, the majority of which are oriented towards voluntary carbon markets. However, REDD+ has proved slow and difficult to implement. There are considerable political, bureaucratic, and financial hurdles to be overcome, as well as powerful interests in the palm oil and timber industries, the two key drivers of deforestation in Indonesia. Only one voluntary carbon project has managed to sell carbon credits, and long-term financing for REDD+ remains uncertain, with some important donors and investors having recently withdrawn their support. Most significant, perhaps, has been the Australian government’s decision, after six years of investment, to withdraw from the high-profile, but also highly criticised, US $43 million Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership project. Other important actors, such as Macquarie Bank and the Clinton Climate Initiative, have also reduced their involvement in the sector.

It is in this fragile and uncertain context that we explore REDD+ environmentalities in Indonesia. The technologies of government we outline are in no way complete; instead they can be seen as attempts to introduce new ways of valuing and interacting with forests. While securing long-term finance will be critical to the success of REDD+ internationally, the effectiveness of existing strategies to build support for the principles of REDD+ will influence the success of the programme domestically. The challenge for REDD+ proponents is to implement practices that dispose the diverse populations of forest stakeholders positively to the rationalities of forest carbon governance in just and sustainable ways. As observed in Agrawal’s (2005) case study of forest conservation in Kumaon, this involves the production of new knowledges, politics, institutions, and subjectivities. Given the diverse interests engaged in the current political ecology of deforestation, the challenge is considerable.

In what follows we trace how actors located at international, national, and local scales are engaging with REDD+. We organise our analysis into these conventional scalar categories, as these best reflect the ways REDD+ strategies and projects are organised. However, our work is informed by the politics of scale literature. We see scale as socially constructed and contested, relational, and operating not in terms of a vertical hierarchy, but in terms of horizontally, dialectically, and multidirectionally networked relations (Amin, 2002; Cox, 1998; Howitt, 1993; 2007; Swyngedouw, 1997). The scalar units we explore are seen as containing elements of other scales (Howitt, 1993), with analysis of a scalar unit or focus on a particular ‘place’ conceived as a node in a set of relations, and as a site where a multiplicity of politics (of scale) converge (Massey, 1994). As such we are interested in understanding the agency of state and nonstate actors, and how they transcend and insert themselves (and their


agendas and discourses) into different scales (Neumann, 2009). As Brown and Purcell (2005, page 611) state, “The analysis [of scale] should always see scales and scalar relationships as the outcome of particular political projects. It should therefore address which political interests pursue which scalar arrangements.”

In looking across geographical scales we are able to expose the diverse politics and strategies that constitute REDD+ in Indonesia. Most of these initiatives are being pursued concurrently, often with little coordination or oversight, creating a vibrant but messy landscape of competing REDD+ activities. Nevertheless, they are all connected in some way, with international initiatives shaping and being shaped by actions of state and local forest users. These cross-scalar linkages, which can be hidden from view in research focusing on any one particular scale, illuminate multiple opportunities for engaging with REDD+ for progressive and just outcomes. The work is based on an ongoing research project that has involved interviews, field observation, and ethnographies with REDD+ stakeholders in Indonesia over a twelve-month period beginning in late 2012. Interviewees have included international donors, auditors, and investors; national government, NGOs, and businesses; and local government, community groups, and NGOs linked to the proposed Sungai Lamandau REDD+ project in Central Kalimantan.

3.1 International practicesIn this section we focus on two main groups of activities involving international actors. The first explores donor activities oriented towards institutionalising REDD+ rationalities at the national scale. These consist primarily of capacity-building activities that normalise REDD+ among forest stakeholders and make forest carbon calculable and governable, thereby enabling it to be priced and sold under future funding mechanisms. The second refers to activities associated with the voluntary carbon market, which attempts to generate carbon offsets through accrediting subnational projects. The voluntary market relies on broader national and international frameworks but seeks to govern forest carbon at smaller project scales. Despite the analytical distinction between activities broadly oriented towards compliance markets and voluntary markets, empirically there is much interaction between the two regimes—not least because of common expectations that finance will be raised through offset market mechanisms.

3.1.1 Donor strategiesA variety of international initiatives intended to build ‘REDD+ readiness’ have afforded international actors considerable influence within national forest governance. UN-REDD and the World Bank’s FCPF have provided REDD+ readiness programmes with visibility and resources internationally. The FCPF has extended US $3.6 million in grants to Indonesia since early 2011 to support REDD+ readiness. The funds have augmented research by the Ministry of Forestry into future land-use demands, demographic developments, and revenue sharing structures for REDD+. The Indonesia–UN-REDD National Joint Programme deployed $5.6 million in grant funding for readiness, focused on stakeholder participation, technical methodological design, the establishment of measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) and payment mechanisms, and institutional capacity building for decentralised REDD+ implementation within Indonesia (UN-REDD, 2008). In addition, a $200 million World Bank Forest Investment Programme Climate Change Development Policy Loan offers up to $80 million in grants and concessional loans for REDD+ development pending preparation of a ‘Forest Investment Strategy’.

Bilateral donors, including Norway, Australia, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the USA, and South Korea, are also important provisioners of REDD+ finance. Norway is the most influential international actor. Through the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative, it has pledged $1 billion in performance-based payments to Indonesia.


The bilateral agreement, underpinned by a formal Letter of Intent (LoI) signed on 26 May 2010 (see Government of Norway and Government of Indonesia, 2010), is in the style of a contract, based on ‘contributions-for-deliverables’—effectively paying Indonesia to establish a REDD+ programme. Deliverables include the creation of institutions to govern forest carbon and human–forest interactions, such as a national REDD+ strategy, a special REDD+ agency reporting directly to the president, independent MRV systems, a funding instrument, a province-wide REDD+ pilot, and a two-year moratorium on the conversion of peat lands and natural forests (Edwards et al, 2012; see also Murdiyarso et al, 2011).

Such practices can be seen as examples of neoliberal environmentalities wherein financial payments for improved forest carbon management are used to infiltrate and influence national-scale and subnational-scale forest governance. While donors are drawn to REDD+ for a variety of reasons, a common rationale that legitimises investment in the programme derives from expectations that REDD+ will eventually be self-funding through the sale of carbon credits. The contracts are negotiated by the Indonesian government and donors in pursuit of their respective interests, and become governmental mechanisms that can shape environmental governance for years to come. They institutionalise forms of ecological knowledge that enable forest carbon to be calculated and governed. The proposed donor-funded MRV Institution, for example, will produce

“ [a]dequate information covering carbon stocks in all ecosystem components, whether above (trunks, branches, leaves) or below (roots) the surface of the earth, as well as in biomass that is defined as part and parcel of the whole (necromass, manure, peat) [… and] compile all GHG inventory for Indonesia’s forests and peatlands over all domains of REDD+ activities at the national level. The GHG inventory will cover all relevant emissions and removals from within the country boundary” (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012, pages 18–19).Accompanying expert ecological knowledge are concepts from environmental economics

that provide guidance for the design of benefit-sharing mechanisms based on payments for environmental services. These are oriented towards incentivising changes in the behaviours of forest populations. For example, the proposed REDD+ Funding Instrument being developed with donor input will “remunerate regional governments, NGOs, communities and other groups for their efforts and performance in developing conditions that enable emissions reduction in their areas through both strategic activities and/or the formulation of supportive policies” (page 16). In paying for the development of these initiatives, donors are seeking to institutionalise REDD+ rationalities in the forestry sector, and encourage forest practices and subjectivities oriented towards carbon conservation.

3.1.2 Market strategiesAlongside the national capacity-building activities of donors are at least twenty-nine subnational pilot projects being developed for the voluntary market. These activities are creating new forest governance institutions at a newly formed REDD+ project scale. Through pilot projects diverse coalitions of state and nonstate actors are seeking to reorient local forest governance towards carbon economies. Their success is dependent on REDD+ becoming the preferred land-use option in the project area, which requires shifts in forest attitudes and practices (eg, normalising REDD+ in national and local political arenas, at local or village level, among private sector actors with interests in forest conversion, or among consumers etc), and a raft of technical measures to enable commodification of forest carbon and handling of finances (eg, the creation of governance structures and agencies, monitoring and enforcement capacity, funds, registers and reporting procedures etc). Such measures are typically accounted for within a market logic through cost–benefit analyses that weigh transaction costs, opportunity costs, and implementation costs of REDD+ activities


against potential benefits, the majority of which are financial in nature (eg, Albani et al, 2012; Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). Establishing these costs and benefits is itself an important step in rendering REDD+ calculable. Standard methods for the estimation of opportunity costs have been developed internationally and applied to Indonesia by researchers commissioned by organisations like the UK Office of Climate Change (Grieg-Gran, 2008), the International Union for Conservation of Nature, and Rio Tinto (Olsen and Bishop, 2009). While the precision of opportunity cost estimates can be critiqued (see Pirard, 2008), the estimation of transaction and implementation costs of REDD+ activities is even more fraught, given uncertain institutional capacities for implementation, benefit distribution, and monitoring and reporting (eg, Cacho et al, 2013; Irawan et al, 2013). However, the prominence of neoliberal logics means decisions over competing forms of land use are calculated and normalised according to costs and benefits articulated by international markets. The calculations are intended to persuade forest populations to pursue carbon conservation when it is economically feasible.

A variety of standard-setting and certification bodies are involved in the production of REDD+ offsets and associated narratives. These organisations apply a range of social and environmental technologies oriented towards reshaping forest governance (Lovell and Liverman, 2010). Different standards have different foci, but all require time, resources, and expert knowledge to implement, and each involves distinct methodologies, and monitoring and verification procedures. The most advanced project in Indonesia, the Rimba Raya project in Central Kalimantan, has gained certification from the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards (CCBS). The VCS is overseen by a group of partners from business, government, and nonprofit sectors, and underpinned by scientific methodologies for the quantification of emission reductions and removals, including via avoided deforestation and forest degradation under REDD+ (see VCS, 2013). In contrast, the CCBS are overseen by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), a partnership of international NGOs including Conservation International, CARE, Rainforest Alliance, The Nature Conservancy, and the Wildlife Conservation Society. The CCBS deal specifically with verification of cobenefits from projects that explicitly support local communities and conserve biodiversity. The standards require that projects incorporate stakeholder participation, uphold customary and statutory rights, obtain ‘free, prior, and informed consent’ (FPIC) of forest communities, account for indirect costs and benefits, and bring net positive benefits for climate, communities, and biodiversity (see CCBA, 2008). Such requirements send strong signals about the qualities of forest governance expected by voluntary markets and consumers of REDD+ credits, even if they are not always achieved (see Sikor, 2013b). While standards themselves can be seen as technologies of neoliberal environmentality, as they use market mechanisms to shape forest governance, they create and respond to ethical markets. These markets are “having a material effect on the ways in which carbon offsets are produced” (Lovell et al, 2009, page 2376), in this case through the possible institutionalisation of socially progressive, if applied appropriately, governmental technologies like FPIC.

3.2 National practicesIn 2009 the Indonesian government pledged to voluntarily reduce carbon emissions by 26% by 2020 (or 41% with international support) (Luttrell et al, 2014). As REDD+ is a key component in its mitigation strategy the country has positioned itself as a globally important REDD+ actor, thereby leveraging considerable funding and attention from donors. In this section we focus on two governmental technologies—the REDD+ Taskforce and the one-map process—that have emerged as a result of this positioning, and consider the role of nonstate and subnational actors in contributing to them.


3.2.1 The REDD+ TaskforceThe national REDD+ Taskforce was formed in 2010 to accelerate national REDD+ readiness processes (Indrarto et al, 2012). Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, favoured by international donors due to his role in post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh, was entrusted with leading the taskforce. His appointment, however, produced awkward political tensions between the newly formed taskforce and the Ministry of Forestry (MoF), as the latter has long been the authoritative agency in forest governance and was instrumental in initiating REDD+ in Indonesia. While the decision to form a REDD+ Taskforce, and subsequently a REDD+ Agency, outside of the MoF, reflects, to some extent, internal politics and personal ambition, it can also be seen as an attempt to distance REDD+ from the ministry’s reputation for corruption and mismanagement of forests (Dermawan et al, 2011; Luttrell et al, 2014). It was influenced by the LoI between Norway and Indonesia, which repeatedly stresses the importance of “indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society” in “full and effective participation in REDD+ planning and implementation” (Government of Norway and Government of Indonesia, 2010, page 1). Given the adversarial relationships many Indigenous and civil society groups have historically had with the MoF, the independent REDD+ Taskforce facilitated participation of a wider array of civil society stakeholders.

A key mechanism in advancing REDD+ was the formation of working groups under the taskforce to prepare legal and institutional architecture to implement REDD+. The working groups incorporated representatives of related government ministries, NGOs, and academic institutions. High-profile members included WWF-Indonesia, and national environmental and Indigenous rights organisations such as Sawit Watch, ICEL, and HUMA. This ‘inclusive’ approach has two immediate governmental effects. First, it reduces opposition to the programme as working groups focus on how best to implement REDD+, rather than questioning its merits. Second, NGO involvement provides the programme with a degree of legitimacy, and is likely to make NGO constituencies more favourably disposed towards the programme. NGOs have long demanded that the government address latent problems such as land tenure, definition of forest borders, illegal and overlapping concessions, inadequate enforcement, corruption, and neglect of Indigenous rights. Such concerns, which have fuelled anti-REDD+ campaigning internationally, have heated political histories in Indonesia (FPP, 2008). Through the taskforce however, the Working Group on Funding Instruments, for example, seeks to develop REDD+ social and environmental safeguards as a means of reassuring critics and addressing their concerns. Other working groups, like those on REDD+ National Strategy and MRV Strategy, adopt a similarly inclusive multistakeholder approach that renders REDD+ more of a technical challenge than a political one.

Our interviews revealed that some forest activists consciously chose to engage with these national scale institutions in attempts to reform bureaucracies “from the inside”. While still being cautious of market and offsets mechanisms, for those who chose this strategy REDD+ was seen as a unique opportunity to pursue social and environmental justice through improved forest governance. Activists were less attentive to the financial rationalities informing international investment, instead referring to REDD+ as ‘beyond carbon, more than forest’ (a phrase now appearing in government documents) to signal their prioritisation of community and environmental benefits. Their strategy of engagement has provided an important conduit for local actors to find representation in national and international activities. However, it also shapes the types of politics that can be practised, as activists become stakeholders within the programme rather than observers from outside. Some of those who remained outside of the official process reported that they found it more difficult to critique REDD+ head-on, given their traditional environmental allies were participating. Hence the working groups can be seen as a governmental technology that has deterred the type of outright opposition expressed by some global civil society and Indigenous networks (den Besten et al, 2014;


Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011; McGregor, 2010); instead encouraging broader pro-REDD+ rationalities through civil society and Indigenous networks. However, our interviews revealed that the majority of NGOs were using working groups as a technology to pursue their own organisational agendas, often based on principles of social and environmental justice that have more in common with Fletcher’s (2010) liberation environmentalities, than with neoliberal ones. One of the NGO activists interviewed explained why he was participating in the REDD+ working groups as follows;

“Despite its [REDD+] controversial debates, I don’t see the point of rejecting it! The most important thing to do is to employ it [REDD+] as a means of struggle for forest governance reform … and what we need to do is to create space through the REDD+ Taskforce for creative struggles to happen … because I am inside [the system] I know the dynamics, I know the politics … . I can’t change a lot of things though, but at least by being inside they [the government] can’t lie to me” (interview, June 2013).

3.2.2 One-mapA second mechanism to emerge from the Indonesia–Norway agreement was the two-year forest moratorium announced in 2011, and extended in 2013. The moratorium targets the private sector (logging, palm oil, and mining industries) by limiting the issuance of new forest concessions in hutan alam primer (‘primary natural forest’) and peatland areas (Murdiyarso et al, 2011). However, its implementation has been hampered by the existing political ecology of forest governance in Indonesia, with different maps used by different government agencies and NGOs leading to overlapping claims and conflicts. Many maps are out of date, creating uncertainty about exactly where hutan alam primer or peat-land is located. Further, the definition of hutan alam primer is unclear, causing concern among environmental groups that secondary and disturbed forests would be excluded. To address some of these problems, a nationwide initiative, known as the one-map policy, was started on the president’s order to develop a common map as the authoritative source of spatial information. While the one-map policy encompasses more than just REDD+, it has gained funding and momentum from REDD+ actors. The REDD+ Taskforce, for example, is heavily involved in the development of the Integrated Cadastral Mapping and Survey system and in the provision of base maps from six REDD+ pilot provinces. These, and other related activities, were funded through REDD+ grants associated with the LoI between Indonesia and Norway. Further activities involve input from a range of government ministries, large environmental NGOs, and some community representatives.

The one-map policy has ramifications for provincial authorities, governance of extractive industries, and forest communities—particularly around issues of security of land tenure. Secure tenure for forest communities is considered vital for sustainable forest management, and for the success of REDD+ (Stern, 2008; Sunderlin et al, 2008). It is assumed to broaden communities’ engagement in REDD+ projects and increase their leverage in decision-making processes (Blom et al, 2010; Boyd et al, 2007). By overlaying maps of forest cover with maps of plantation, logging, and mining areas, the process seeks to identify spaces where secure tenure might be established, as well as points of contestation. Unified forest cover data are expected to provide clarity in subnational spaces where forest and concession boundaries have intentionally been blurred by competing interests (Murdiyarso et al, 2011). Indigenous and environmental NGOs, bolstered by a recent Constitutional Court decision that recognises Indigenous claims to forest ownership (Roewiastuti, 2013), are working with forest communities in mapping customary land to provide material for the one-map process. Rather than being ‘countermaps’ that contest state knowledge (Peluso, 1995), mapping customary land is being used as a tool to make local dynamics ‘legible to the outsider’ (Majid-Cooke, 2003), in order to clarify tenure and enable REDD+ investment. As such, long


histories of land struggle are being rendered technical as customary land claims, concessions, and other land-use data are classified, stored, mapped, and become the subject of what Li (2007) calls experts’ technical diagnosis. The resultant maps are displayed in a geoportal, created for the purposes of transparency, public participation, and cross-sector coordination.

The one-map policy can be seen as a cross-scalar strategy for breaking down the silos of ministries, state agencies, and district governments that fragment forest governance. National authorities are attempting to fix spatial truths about land use, and thereby shape how forests are governed and valued by local and international actors. In classifying land as primary, production, or community forests, for example, particular forms of forest use and relations of authority are legitimised, shaping the use of the forest and its value to various groups. In this sense, the one-map policy is a governmental technology that responds to the neoliberal environmentalities of international actors, by increasing investor confidence and reducing risk and uncertainty around REDD+ projects. For some national and subnational actors, however, the one-map policy is a site of struggle that can have progressive or regressive outcomes, depending on how central government defines and monitors forested land, and decides what activities are permissible where. It is a high-stakes process that, where successful, should lead to more just forms of forest governance, as previously marginalised forest communities will have improved access to decision-making processes, benefit distribution, and recognition. Equally, however, forest communities may be rendered invisible if their claims are not recognised, and some traditional activities are unlikely to fit within clear spatial boundaries (Forsyth and Siko, 2013; Peluso, 1995). Ultimately the one-map policy seeks to establish locations where REDD+ activities can and cannot take place, thereby disciplining how forest stakeholders should legally interact with and value forests in those spaces.

3.3 Local practicesIn this section we consider how a local forest-dependent community is engaging with the Sungai Lamandau REDD+ project planned for a buffer zone forest bordering the Lamandau River Wildlife Reserve in Central Kalimantan (see figure 1). Rather than tracing the governmental technologies deployed by the programme at the local level—such as the FPIC processes emerging in various international standards and national safeguards—we focus on community agency. We are interested in how communities, like international and national actors, are choosing to engage with REDD+ based on their own interests in human–forest relations. The case study focuses on Sei Gandis, a rubber tappers’ (Pemantung) collective, and explores how they are actively shaping the project at the local scale and how this affects their relations to the forest area. As the Sungai Lamandau REDD+ demonstration activity is the only REDD+ project in Indonesia officially proposed by a community group, it is a good case through which to explore community strategies. However, like all REDD+ projects, it is a cross-scalar effort influenced by a diverse array of actors and institutions, including the Clinton Climate Initiative, the World Agroforestry Centre, RARE, the Orangutan Foundation UK, Yayasan Orangutan Indonesia, as well as the community originators.

The Sungai Lamandau project is envisioned as a community-forestry empowerment project with a potential REDD+ ‘bonus’—generally a direct financial payment to local stakeholders. Our interviews to date suggest that, as observed with other community-based conservation initiatives (Berkes, 2013), the financial payment is not the main attraction for the Sei Gandis community. Instead, they are engaging in REDD+ as a strategy for protecting their livelihoods from external land-use threats, reflecting the particular historical political ecology of the group. Sei Gandis is a forest users’ collective of twenty households, who tap the Jelutung (Dyera costulata) tree in the region directly surrounding the reserve. They are predominantly Kubu villagers who live in work huts scattered along the Sungai Keranji tributary to the Lamandau River. The group shares a sense of historical injustice, having


been forced north from Kubu, after what one group member called the ‘militarisation’ of the Tanjung Puting National Park, where the group had tapped Jelutung for generations. Many in the community felt they were excluded from the park with little notice or compensation, reflecting practices of fortress conservation. There is a strong feeling that conservation values and the interests of societal elites (Fletcher, 2010; Igoe, 2004) were pursued at the expense of Sei Gandis livelihoods.

The strategy of some groups to pursue REDD+ as a means to conserve the forest, rather than promote its use as a more economically productive plantation or production forest (both would offer some immediate, ‘secure’ employment), or simply as a source of valuable timber (bringing short-term revenue), is partly a reflection of how forests are entwined with community livelihoods and identities (Agrawal, 2005; Singh, 2013). Local livelihoods in the river’s northern reaches are intimately linked to tree sap patterns, with Sei Gandis members heavily reliant on Jelutung in the buffer zone to meet their basic needs. Furthermore, almost all fish, fruit and vegetables, and firewood consumed by the group are harvested directly from the buffer zone and its waterways, and some river and forest products are sold at market in Kubu. Sei Gandis members display a strong and intimate connection to their environment, clearly evident over several visits to Sungai Keranji. For example, one local informant stated: “The Jelutung is a very large but delicate tree. If the Pemantung cuts too deeply, the tree becomes sick for a year or more.” Another stated: “We are all passionately fond of the Jelutung. We cut our tree with a truly pure heart so it will never die.” While recognising that Jelutung obviously provides an income for the Sei Gandis community, the intimate

Figure 1. Map showing the REDD+ project area in Sungai Lamandau, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.


connections reflect the importance of customary practices and knowledges in guiding local human–forest interactions.

The area of forest used by Sei Gandis is a small stretch of production-forest peat-land swamp, situated on an expired logging concession. The concession, now dormant for over fifteen years, has become heavily degraded. Evidence of ‘illegal’ logging is observable within the buffer zone, and frequent dry peat-land forest fires have caused further degradation to the Jelutung stock. While the actors involved in illegal degradation are unclear, several new timber and oil palm conversion permits have been issued for the area by the Bupati’s office (Head of District Government). However, these permits were later recalled following successful appeals from Sei Gandis members, who have resisted the proposals. Challenges to the Bupati are ongoing, with a community member describing a protest taking place in February 2013:

“We [the group members] took photocopies of the land-use planning amendment papers to the Bupati’s residence telling him to just give the land up. But they’d locked the gates and said the Bupati was away in Jakarta … . We’ll go again soon.”

These political protests are potentially strengthened by REDD+ as the previously obscured actions of the Bupati may become subject to the attentions of government, private sector, and civil society actors at different scales. The neoliberal discourses built into REDD+ also provide alternative economic rationales for income generation that may appeal to district authorities.

Due to the relatively long maturation period of Jelutung, the effort of rehabilitating Jelutung forests becomes a feasible alternative to more destructive livelihood practices (eg, oil palm or Sengon timber plantations) only once the threat from concessionaires is removed and communities are able to manage the land autonomously with multistakeholder support. The Sei Gandis community has chosen to work with BKSDA (Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam: the Indonesian Nature Conservation Agency ) and the Forest Police to apprehend and prosecute casual loggers within the REDD+ project site; working with a form of sovereign power they once opposed. Without the group’s participation, effective forest protection over what is a very large area becomes less feasible. The incentive to protect Jelutung was made clear by Anjang, a group member living permanently on the Sungai Keranji: “If we lost the Jelutung to loggers or if we don’t respect the Jelutung, automatically our whole livelihood is lost.” Anjung and other Sei Gandis members protect the project site from casual illegal loggers through practices that involve monitoring access to the forest via the Lamandau River. At night, the group’s boats flash torches towards the work huts to indicate their affiliation with the group. Through these everyday actions, Anjang has clearly developed affective ties with the forest wherein his capacity to conserve and restore is articulated and strengthened. Not all forested areas of Sungai Lamandau are protected in this way, nor is the community homogeneous in its views. A concessioned area much larger than the buffer zone, behind the river’s east bank, is consistently targeted by casual loggers. Many Sei Gandis members, despite their proximity, admitted they offered no protection. However, since 2010 the proposed REDD+ forests of the buffer zone have attracted the group’s special interest and hope for some stake in a viable, productive forest landscape. Rather than seeing REDD+ as a threat to these livelihoods, as feared by some anti-REDD+ activists, the Sei Gandis community is engaging with REDD+ as part of a tactical strategy to retain control of land and resources, as a step towards dignified and secure livelihoods.

For the Sei Gandis group, engagement with the regulatory practices of monitoring and enforcement is positively connected with the existence of environmental orientations and with livelihood gains. To some extent they have appropriated opportunities provided by global climate regimes to empower local environmental imaginaries and livelihoods in ways


that are far removed from atmospheric or market-based concerns. While the project is still in its infancy, the production of particular carbon-oriented REDD+ subjectivities in this case is largely absent. Instead, some individuals are strategically engaging with REDD+ to produce favourable governance outcomes—such as tenure claims and enhanced policing and protection of their lands. This may change in the future because, as Agrawal (2005) suggests, participation in certain forms of environmental regulation and enforcement generates new conceptions of what constitutes participants’ interests. However, REDD+ may also provide a vehicle through which the environmental imaginaries of Sei Gandis members are communicated and respected by more distant stakeholders. So the interplay of global programmes with local encounters shapes how REDD+ is articulated and practised by group members. These currently counter the common conceptualisations of REDD+ as purely a carbon finance tool, evident within international communities, recognising how the programme has been reappropriated—in this case to fit local resource struggles.

4 ConclusionsIn this paper we have used a governmentality framework to interpret REDD+ as a new form of power and knowledge that has the potential to reshape forest governance in Indonesia. A complex regime of practices is emerging and engaging with existing political ecologies to take particular forms in different places. This has distanced us somewhat from more abstract REDD+ debates about the effectiveness of different types of interventions; instead, these are recast as comprising evolving bodies of expert knowledges that are themselves potentially valid objects of research. Similarly, we have sought to broaden REDD+ research beyond local case-study approaches by emphasising the cross-scalar practices that constitute the programme. We do not see the local as nested within national and international spheres of influence, but rather we see stakeholders as engaging in forms of politics, seeking to influence others—with varying degrees of success—through governmental technologies that cross and construct scales and spaces. While here we have provided only a brief snapshot of some of the diverse governmental technologies that constitute REDD+, we see this as a rich and underexplored research area that can provide insight into how strategies of global environmental governance are pursued and reshaped through the ‘friction’ of local encounters (Tsing, 2005).

Our findings suggest that REDD+ is a fragile and heterogeneous experimental programme. It means different things to different stakeholders and comprises a disjointed regime of practices. Actors seek to benefit from the programme and are using it to reshape or legitimise socioecological processes in line with their own worldviews. For donors and investors REDD+ offers opportunities to establish economies to offset polluting industries; for the Indonesian government and national NGOs it is an opportunity to finance and improve forest governance; while for the Sei Gandis community it provides possibilities to protect its land and livelihoods. Reflecting these different interests were different environmentalities implicated in the implementation of the programme. At the international scale neoliberal environmentalities were prominent whereby donors and markets would pay for the production of institutions to calculate and govern forest carbon; at the national scale the Indonesian government engaged in disciplinary environmentalities to encourage pro-REDD+ subjectivities and delineate spaces for particular human–forest interactions; national NGOs became involved in the programme in pursuit of social justice through liberation environmentalities; while local communities claimed intrinsic connections to forests, echoing Fletcher’s (2010) ‘truth’ environmentalities. Hence, while the programme is providing a vehicle to introduce neoliberal carbon conservation rationalities and institutions to forest governance, it was also being used by forest communities and NGOs to enhance their calls for social and environmental justice.


We found this regime of practices fluid and uncertain, with knowledge and power being established through messy attempts at implementation. We see this uncertainty as hopeful and believe that engaging this complexity is important if we are to avoid the “tendency [within governmentality research] to see programmes as though they are written by one hand, rather than multivocal, internally contested and thus, in a sense, always in change and often internally contradictory” (O’Malley et al, 1997, page 513). The internal struggles and strategies that constitute REDD+ in Indonesia are generative of new socioecological opportunities. Some benefits we observed include the potential for enhanced political voice and opportunities to resist land incursions enabled through Sei Gandis involvement in international REDD+ networks; the engagement of community and Indigenous representatives in previously closed processes of national forest governance; and the institutionalisation of FPIC and other social and environmental requirements written into national safeguards as well as international standards such as the CCBS. We are also aware of new risks, such as the changing roles of NGOs, at they become crucial cross-scalar actors involved in the design, implementation, and outcomes of REDD+. While some NGOs remain distant and opposed to REDD+, others are becoming, at least partially, financially dependent. In addition, risks are associated with the evolution of standards and safeguards as there is no guarantee they will be sufficient in protecting livelihoods if they conflict with the goals of conservation capital (Sikor, 2013b). Finally, there are broader climate justice concerns regarding the merits of offsets (Lohmann, 2008). We also emphasise that this paper represents only one of many possible case studies, and different political ecologies will shape REDD+ in different ways. Nevertheless, by exploring the ‘mundane’ governmental technologies and strategies deployed in this case we have sought to improve how REDD+ is understood and might be approached for progressive outcomes.

We conclude by suggesting that the ultimate success of REDD+ may lie in its hetero geneity. The diverse environmentalities evident at different scales of governance provide the glue for an unstable but potentially beneficial alliance of diverse actors. If a single environmentality were to become prominent across all scales, then some stakeholders would be ostracised and would likely remove themselves from the project. For example, it has proved difficult for Indonesian NGOs to attract international finance for programmes based purely on improving social and environmental conditions; it is similarly unlikely that those same NGOs would engage in a conservation programme that was purely about carbon offsets. In maintaining the current loose interpretations of REDD+, a wide diversity of actors are able to engage and potentially confront the entrenched political ecology of deforestation in creative ways. Critical scholars can contribute by monitoring the emerging technologies of forest governance and examining how claims about justice and effective forms of environmental governance are made and implemented. In observing how truth and power are negotiated through ‘global’ environmental programmes, and interrogating the strategies, meanings, and subjectivities emerging at and between scales, the strengths and weaknesses of different practices can be critically assessed. In this vein, perhaps more just outcomes, which result in improved opportunities for marginalised human and nonhuman actors to access benefits, participate in decision making, and receive recognition, can be secured by engaging with and enlarging the space of progressive practices, while critiquing oppressive ones. While some critics have dismissed REDD+ as an oppressive form of neoliberal environmental governance (eg, Cabello and Gilbertson, 2010)—which it may be in some spaces and scales—our research suggests it is more hopeful than this. Political ecologists can choose to critique the strategies and practices that produce harmful forms of market environmentalism while simultaneously co-opting and building on the progressive possibilities they may provide (see Ferguson, 2010; McGregor, 2014). REDD+ is constituted by a disjointed regime of practices in Indonesia; we believe engaging with and shaping these heterogeneous ‘games of truth’ to realise their potential is a socially and environmentally appropriate response.


Acknowledgements. The authors would like to acknowledge the generous funding of the Royal Society of New Zealand who supported this research through the Marsden Fund. We also thank our many research participants for their time and insights, and the anonymous referees for their insightful comments.

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Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia

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