Bernd F. Schulte 

Beware of the Wolves. 

The Riezler Diary and a Historians “Fraternity”. Preamble. The controversy surrounding German war aims in the First WorldWar, lastly centred on Germany’s share in the responsibilityfor the outbreak of war, is closely connected with the lateHamburg professor of history, Fritz Fischer. Between 1959 and1968 this discussion was dominated by a primarily oldergeneration of scientists, the memories of which reached backinto the monarchy. Fischer succeeded in gaining influence atuniversities, radio- and television channels as well as byfurther publishing. He did furthermore influence researchventures in the fields of social and economic history. In 1978at the “Historian´s Day” in Hamburg, Fischer began – visible toall – with his public speech on the “alliance of the elites” -his retreat from the – even in his view - distastefulcontroversy. He interrupted this path in 1983, only on a short-term level, through his sudden emergence in a long-overduediscussion on the authenticity of the Riezler-Diaries. In thecourse of this last chapter of the discussion, the foundationsof the historical view of his opponents in the Third Reichstarted to sound. Historical science overrated Kurt Riezler as a witness of theevents in the German leading circle prior to 1914. Whether ornot the highly educated Bavarian uttered an active influence onthe politics of the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, maybe a matter of discussion1. Whether Kiderlen, Bethmann Hollweg,and (or) even Riezler, initiated the Morocco policy, in order toweaken the entente, appears to be immaterial in the end2. At allevents, this Foreign-Office-Assistant was deeply involved withthe characteristics of the political climate before 1914 andhad already foreseen the war in his conditions3. The Germanleaders before 1914 were evidently closely engaged in the“localising” of conflicts, i.e. attempts were made to controland direct conflicts in a diplomatic fashion4. Riezlerrepresented those aims which were also followed by both, Bülow

and afterwards Bethmann Hollweg since 19085, and which becamethe breviary of German leadership6. Although he did not belongto the innermost circle of decision-making, Riezler declaredthat Great Britain would lose its status as world power7. Thiswas just the aim of Moltke and the Great General Staff byplanning the German Army’s advance on the Channel. The aim ofdividing the entente was not achieved. Great Britain failed tosuccumb to the “joint venture” of a formal neutrality allianceand military pressure8.- The question remains as to what Germanhistorians did after the First World War in order to concealthese associations9. 1 cf. Wayne C. Thompson: In the Eye of the Storm. Kurt Riezler and the Crises ofmodern Germany, Iowa City 1980, p. 39 (quoted as: Thompson, Eye).2 See ibid., 403 See ibid.,43 and following pages. All denial is to no effect.4 See ibid., 47, Riezler: Finances and Monopolies.5 Ibid., 49.6 Ibid., 50.7 Ibid., 54.8 See ibidem 55.9 BA-K. NL Rothfels. NL Rothfels to R. Stolt, 26.07.1963: “[concerning Rudolf Steiner]From the examples shown I have not gained the impression that would encourage me toembrace your wish to publish an article here. This applies in particular to the factsalready known relationship of the younger v. Moltke where one could set quitedifferent accents in the interpretation”.  Riezler Diaries and “Fischer-Controversy”. The Diary becomes a matter of discussion1. It has recently been claimed that the diaries of Kurt Riezlerare “a later forgery” and now, eighteen years later, withlittle innovation, the theory has been aired that Carl Erdmannintended with his publication of the Riezler diaries to providehimself with “a sharpened sword” against Fritz Fischer2. Theneo-conservative German historians would dearly love to put anend to the continuing debate over the outbreak of the FirstWorld War. For it is as ever the national-historical backgroundof the sixties to which Fischer’s opponents formulated theirattacks. This event is particularly today of greatsignificance, since once again powers are at work in favour ofa new German national history. Kurt Riezler did reveal in the1920ties, in view of the defeat of 1918, at FrankfurtUniversity, details on the outbreak of war in 1914, on theverdict of Bethmann Hollweg, on Emperor William II, themilitary, the party leaders and professors. However, in no way

was there a fundamental breach with the aims and methods of thecommanding elite of imperialist Germany to be expected. Not tomention an accusation. Witnesses of the time described Riezler´s criticism of Tirpitz, the military and of otherpersonalities3. Incited by the outbreak of war in September of1939, Riezler again revealed information, describing theImperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg as “war-hungry” inexpectation of the great war with Russia. Thereupon, theKönigsberg historian Hans Rothfels, who also had emigrated toUSA, gave his colleague the advice to refrain from apublication of his material4. In September 1939 Riezler gave a critical judgement of thedevelopment in the “old world”5. His attitude towards the formerjournalist Paul Scheffer (“Berliner Tageblatt”), who tried towin him for a memorial collection, remained unremitting6.Scheffer had been thinking of an “addenda”. It should have been“a discursive, non-chronological…consolidation of memories”7.Riezler affirmed his interest in the subject in 1954, howeverin the form of but a “long hours” of narrative8. Thus it was, inno means, a priori refusal9. In early July, Riezler wrote that hehad found a small apartment in Rome in which the well-knownconversation with Kurt Rheindorf should take place, in thecourse of which the initial results of his work on theremembrance project were mentioned10. “The Riezler matter”,noted Scheffer in 1956, had become a “tiresome subject” sincethe inconvenient aspects of Riezler´s legacy were subjected to“a concealment”. Scheffer confirmed that his friend Kurt hadhad contact to Rothfels. This had formed the starting-point forRiezler´s plan to “keep these memories forever secret”. Up tothis time, “the manuscript” had not been destroyed by himselfin person. Apparently however Walter Riezler was the first -for whatever reason - to speak of an order by his brother todestroy “the manuscript”. Paul Scheffer stressed that: “According to my informant, the decisive point for Kurt and Mr. Rothfelswas the fact that Bethmann Hollweg had made bellicose remarks to him in1914. This obviously is a serious reason for a non-publication. And thereis more of a similar strain, although of lesser significance” (My emphasis,B.S.). The intensity of the exchange of ideas, even between Schefferand Rothfels, is confirmed by Hans von Saucken, the owner of

the Scheffer legacy in a letter to the Tübingen historian inmid-October 196312. 1 BA-Koblenz. N 1354/31. Heritage Hans Herzfeld. G.Ritter to H. Herzfeld, 5.4.1962:“The experts are of course Mr. Fischer and his school”.2 According to Bernd Sösemann in early 2001 in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”.Eighteen years later, he assumes in late recognition: Bernd F. Schulte, The forgedRiezler Diaries. A Contribution to the Scientific History of the 50’s and 60’s,Frankfurt-Bern-New York 1985 (quoted as: Schulte, Riezler). Schulte, Riezler, 165-180(Documents Nos. 2-10).3 Schulte, Riezler, 169. [Conversation Rheindorf-Riezler, 5./6.8.1930] „Later hevoiced strong criticism to the factual content of the memories of ‘the world warleaders’”. Ibid., A. 67: ”Riezler stood in contact with the historian [KarlFriedrich] Nov[w]ak. See K.F.Nowak, The third German Imperial State, Berlin 1929/31.See also appearing soon: B.F.Schulte: Politics and the Military in Imperial Germany,1890-1914.4 Schulte, Riezler, 234, [Rheindorf to Erdmann, 27.12.1965]. Rothfels’ difficultieswith the system in money matters are documented in the latter’s legacy. See BA-K,Heritage Rothfels. N 1213/35, H. Rothfels to the Imperial Minister of Finance,9.3.1939. The historian then left Germany. See ibid., D.C.Thomson (Society for theProtection of Science and Learning/London) to H.Rothfels, 25.1., 26.1. and 14.2.1939.5 BA-K. N. 1422/98, Heritage F.Fischer. K.Riezler to P.Scheffer, 13.9.1952. See asfollows Schulte, Riezler with detailed exposition on the Riezler brothers in the50’s. My investigations in 1983/84 were largely met with silence by friends andstudents (Marx, Helbig, Lowe) to the Riezler prior to 1914. See Diary Schulte, 1984.6 Ibid., N 1422/98. K.Riezler to P.Scheffer, 5.12.[1953]. Schulte, Riezler, 7:K.Riezler: The Historian and the Truth, in: The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLV, No.14 (July 1, 1948) 381. Margret Boveri’s letters from Rothfels’ legacy giveinformation on Paul Scheffer’s contribution to the discussion on 20 July 1944. Heremention is made of Eugen Gerstenmeier’s “theory” that “the legend of 20 July” may notbe disturbed. See BA-K, N 1213. Heritage Rothfels, N 1213/1, M.Boveri to H.Rothfels,25.11.1958. Ibid. N 1213/32-2, M.Boveri to H.Rothfels, 5.3.1963.7 Ibid., P.Scheffer to K.Riezler, 7.2.1954. See Schulte, Riezler, 59. For contactbetween Scheffer and Rothfels, see BA-K. Heritage Rothfels. N 1213/1, P.Scheffer toH.Rothfels, 25.11.1953 and ibid., 5.1.1954.8 Ibid. K.Riezler to P.Scheffer, 27.12.1954.9 Ibid. K.Riezler to P.Scheffer, 19.2.1954. See Schulte, Riezler, 71-78 (A.68-87).10 Ibid. K.Riezler to P.Scheffer, 1.7.1954. See Schulte, Riezler, 158 and following.11 BA-K. Heritage F. Fischer, N 1422/98, transcript: P.Scheffer to H.Helbig,27.7.1956. See Schulte, Riezler, 158 and following. Regarding the “run” on thediaries, see Schulte, Riezler, 85 and following. Moritz Schlesinger was put underpressure. The German Foreign Office had threatened to cancel his pension, should hecontinue to support Fischer, Fischer claimed while we were working on the “polemic”in 1982. In 1963, H.Rothfels showed interest in the heritage of P.Scheffer. See ibid.Heritage Rothfels. N 1213/48, H.Rothfels to H.v.Saucken, 31.10.1963. H.v.Saucken hadinformed et al. that he owned the heritage of P.Scheffer. See ibid., H.v.Saucken toH.Rothfels, 26.10.1963.12 See ibid., H.v.Saucken to H.Rothfels, 17.10.1963.

A Diary as a Weapon. The contents of the original Riezler Diaries severed the Germanposition of July 1914 to such an extent that a publication

repeatedly was denied. For this reason, Riezler once againturned his attention to the texts and carefully copied sectionsof it in pencil onto 19 large sheets of paper. By chance ratherthan as the product of serious editing can be seen on page 2,top left, the phrase “casus foederis”. It seems nonsense, inview of the precise handwriting, that at the bottom of page 4the title “Hohenfinow 10.7.14” is deleted. The whole day isthus cancelled. Riezler departs on 11 July. Even the mistake inthe decisive sentence: “Should there not be war, the tsar doesnot wish have [deleted] or advises France to peace”, makes noless than an artificial impression. The same applies to page 6.The deletion on page 9: “Hohenfinow,20.7.”, demonstrates thatconcealment was planned: “Was once[deleted] again in Berlin”.The original diary starts with the number 548 under the diarynumber XXXI. The most important notebook XXX (July/August 1914)is missing. 546 entries are divided between the years, at themaximum from 23.8.1907 until 14.8.19141. Riezler was a member ofthe “Bethmann-Circle”, as were, besides Otto Hammann“Wahnschaffe, Heilbron, Helfferich and August Stein”. From thisside he got to know of developments newly found in the entrieswhich were used by him in the destroyed entries of the yearsprior to 1914. Thus for example the description of the chief ofthe Department of Public Relations of the German Foreign Office, Otto Hammann, regarding the relations in between KiderlenWaechter and Bethmann Hollweg. Hammann had already reported in1922 on the crisis on Morocco: “At the end of July, the chancellor invited himself for dinner atKiderlen´s in the hope of discovering the truth. The outcome for thechancellor was a sleepless night. He learned from Kiderlen thatCambon had shortly before on behalf of his government refused thedemand of French Congo and had offered an inadequate exchange ofterritory around Camerun. How far the offer went, Kiderlen does notsay, but instead shows a tendency to regard the Congo demands as amatter of prestige, since, after the Paris press bustle which set infollowing Lloyd George’s intervention, a compromise became difficultto meet and there was no remaining choice but a return to theAlgeciras Act, i.e. to demand the evacuation of the French militaryposts in Morocco. Thus Kiderlen-Wächter remarks inter pocula: ´Ourreputation has gone, at the worst we must go to fence´. Thechancellor’s horror at the suspicion aroused by these words thatKiderlen was planning war, turned out on the following day to befalse...” 2 (My emphasis, B.S.). 

These words were written by Hammann, following the defeat of1918; but how much more detailed than the Riezler’s entry inhis “Blockblätter”! And they naturally offered – analogous tothe forged entries on the July crisis – an interpretation ofthe events which matched the mood of the years following theFirst World War. Between 1955 and 1961 Riezler’s brother allowed well knownGerman politicians and historians like Theodor Heuß, WalterGötz, Hermann Heimpel3 and Peter Rassow4 access to the materialof July 1914. After Fischer’s essay on the war aims of ImperialGermany in the First World War (1959), which was well“understood” in the fraternity, the “Grasp to the World Power”(1960) and the first warnings of Paul Sethe5 towards GerhardRitter6, the events took a turn. Theodor Schieder – at this timealready on the scene - acknowledged Ritter’s deep insight intothe weaknesses of the Second German Empire. Ritter admittedthat “the cracks” in the facade of the state were “not deepenough to allow Imperial Germany to crumble. Without World WarOne, the whole thing could have stood for much longer”, was theopinion of the Freiburg historian. He disavowed Rothfels´Bismarck interpretation of the German task in the East.“Central Europe”, according to Ritter, meant simply “atypically professorial idea”7. In this situation, Schiederdeveloped the outlines of counter-attack on Fischer8. Last butnot least provoked by Hans Rothfels’ letter to Ritter, dated 21March 1962, the events escalated. Long kept secret, this letter has now at last been releasedfrom Erdmann’s literary remains. At the beginning of the month,Ritter signified to the Hamburg mediaeval historian, HermannAubin, that “the evaluation of Riezler’s diaries” had become“more urgent than ever before through “the appearance ofFischer’s book”. The Freiburg historian intended “via Riezler adeeper insight into“ Bethmann Hollweg’s “Intentions”9. Shortlyafter, he continued to Aubin, at that time President of theBavarian Historical Commission: “In my opinion this publication is of eminent significance followingthe appearance of Fritz Fischer’s book”. Thus Ritter increased the effect decisively. He calledFischer’s exposition “an ignominious accusation” and stressed

the central significance of “Bethmann Hollweg’s letter to hisrepresentative Clemens Delbrück dated 9.9.1914”. According toPeter Rassow, the Foreign Office’s head of press, Otto Hammann“had already in the twenties shown this letter of Bethmann” tohim and underlined its significance10. Hilde Rassow, the wife ofErdmann’s predecessor at the Historical Commission, informedRitter that Riezler planned to get the diaries published “yearsago in America”. However, Rothfels did “advise[d] him againstit”. In the meantime the Tübingen professor apparently “changedhis mind”. Also, “Heuss and Heimpel” had “held the diaries intheir hands”. “As to Fischer’s views”, her “husband had beenvery angry” according to Mrs. Rassow. She did receive fromSchieder a request for “material from the time during which myhusband was working for Bethmann” too11. Erdmann, who was alsoquestioned by Ritter, gave an indistinct reply, admittedhowever that “he was most interested in the papers regarding the review ofFischer’s book for the HZ (Historische Zeitschrift). The definiteview on Bethmann Hollweg“ were “indeed the cardinal point”, he said12. However, theharmony of the fraternity disintegrated with the reply ofRothfels´, Ritter’s innate rival. For the latter confirmed the“bellicosity” of the Imperial Chancellor: “17 years ago, Riezler gave me to read that part of his diaries whichcontained Hohenfinow in July [19]14 and asked for my advice. It isthe only part with which I am familiar. It contains rather strongarguments for Bethmann’s wish for the outbreak of war with Russia,which he considers to be unavoidable and which he welcomed both on aninterior- as well as a cultural-political level. This is myapproximate picture in memory. I did advise – in the situation of May[19]45 – R[iezler]. not to proceed with the publication, as the moodin the USA could lead to a very false interpretation” (My emphasis,B.S.). However, Rothfels agreed to Ritter’s suggestion to use the“material for a discussion of Fischer’s coarse treatment”13. TheTübingen historian realised only after Ritter’s reply of 26March that he had dropped a bomb. Ritter saw with “horror andanxiety” that his arguments had lost the ground they stoodupon. For 

“if Bethmann…had in July 1914 the ”desire” to bring about the warwith Russia, then he was either gambling a scrupulous game with thefate of the German people or was indulging in absolutely incredibleillusions about our military capacities” (My emphasis, B.S). Thereafter one referred to a “most uncanny state secret”, a“dark secret”. Finally the Riezler Diaries were thus to becomeunsuited for the inaugurated battle against Fischer since thelatter’s “so-called September Programme” – now supported by theoriginal Riezler Diary - then advanced into “a completelyaltered significance”14. Ritter’s letter to Erdmann on 30 March,enclosing Rothfels´ letters, gave rise to alarm. The latterswiftly, though not convincing, disqualified his firststatement for he claimed with little originality: “It was my impression - as I may have written - that under thecircumstances of that period – 1945 – misunderstandings would becomeinevitable in the sense of a “desire”. However I do not wish to bindmyself to this word. That from a tactical point of view, – ofinterior politics – B[ethmann]. desired the outbreak of war – if atall – on the Russian front – we were well aware of, and at least toothat he lived in the perspective of an inevitable combat in betweenthe Germanic and the Slavic race. My overall impression of hiscomments on Riezler was that the storm would sometime be underwayfrom Asia, and better now than later. But this would in my opinionnot permit to state that his efforts after 29 [7.1914] to avoid werenot truly obvious” (My emphasis, B.S.)15. Rothfels’ comments on this matter, voiced in 1955, expose thefact that he, by no means, didn´t lack plans of his own.Besides he disclosed that there had existed “a Riezler Diary onBethmann Hollweg”, the famous lost original diary about thecrisis of July 1914. The Tübingen Professor wrote: “The plan, to transcribe several main documents for Bethmann’s war-and special peace policy and to prepare them with a briefintroduction for publication, seems to me a good idea. We shallcertainly not stumble over the 1917 time barrier. I would thenpossibly attempt further to gain Riezler’s diary on Bethmann Hollwegat the outbreak of war in 1914…”(My emphasis, B.S.) Rothfels´ plan was: hold out at whatever the cost! But Ritterwas not yet convinced. He insisted on the certification of  

“whether all these considerations rested of a defensive manner or ifthey indicated a preventative war in the end or even plans ofconquest as in Fischer’s sense”17. However, and this was no coincidence, Mortiz Schlesinger’s andRothfels’ comments are identical – and this suffices. Thediscussion on “bellicosity”, “dark secrets” and a “statesecret”18 continued to throw circles. Possibly even to the pointof no return: to destroy the aggravating document of June/July1914.-  Ritter wrote to Herzfeld that “he had most exciting news aboutthis”19. Towards Fischer, Ritter held fast to his criticism ofan improper “interpretation of the source material”. MartinGöhring/Mainz also voiced criticism20. Schieder21, as editor ofthe “Historische Zeitschrift”, pulled the strings, and Erdmanntried to board the career catalyst “Fischer Controversy”bandwagon by presenting to Ritter and Schieder a plan to employthe Riezler Diary as a weapon bagainst the “Grasp for the WorldPower”. He stressed the significance of this document in thebattle against Fischer22. Shortly after, he went a considerablestep further and insisted on his belief by writing “that from this new and important source an own and substantial basistowards the outlook on Bethmann-Hollweg and his circle around him”23  could be won. It is of note that the Kiel historian, parallelto his work on the edition of the diary, tried to find out, ifknowledge on parts of the original diary of July 1914 - or it´s whereabouts or even the storage place – did remain24. On theoccasion of the 1962 “Historians’ Day”, Ernst Engelberg pointedto the tendency of West German historians to “retreat to their´ivory towers´”. Paul Sethe, the wholly conservativecorrespondent for the Hamburg newspaper “Welt”, in this casedid pose the question “why the congress failed to mention or discuss either thecontroversial book by the Hamburg professor Fritz Fischer on the‘Grasp for the World Power’, i.e. on the war plans of Germanimperialism before and after the First World War or the variousopinions on the role of German generals such as Manstein, Paulus,Schmidt and Seydlitz in the Second World War”. 

In the concluding speech, according to Engelberg, it had beenRothfels’ aim to “contribute towards a historical foundationfor the Bonn state reason”. This statement says it all25.Without consideration, moreover, the pertinently charged NaziErwin Hölzle was set up as Fischer’s opponent. Fritz Klein/EastBerlin spoke out, thereby discrediting the whole guild: “It is deeply shameful and unfortunately typical for the situation inthe Federal Republic that Hölzle, the Nazi lector and Rosenberg’ssupreme commander, has the opportunity in widely read and influentialnewspapers and journals to defame a man like the Hamburg professorFritz Fischer (Editor of the book “Grasp for the World Power”) onlybecause the latter possessed the courage to break decades of taboosin civil German history and to define German imperialism as what itwas…”26.  Instead of this, the shining lights of German historicalscience at the 1964 Berlin “Historians’ Day” were occupied withreviving Prussia’s lost glory. Thereby, from Rothfels’ point ofview, the “state idea was intended to form the backbone” of thediscussion27. Dietrich Mende, another of those “advocates”against Fischer, who had been hastily drummed together fromRitter as far as the Institute for Contemporary History,congratulated Rothfels on his critique of the “Grasp for theWorld Power”. Rothfels wrote on a surprisingly similar note tothat of Ritter: “I am greatly impressed by your critique [Europe Archives] ofFischer’s book and find it perfectly justified if perhaps too mild,since, quite apart from the basic questions he committed seriouserrors with regard to the usage of sources, as a glance at the Frenchsource publications, which have in the meantime been published, andthe material published by Zechlin will show. Herzfeld will, as youknow, also express his opinion in the Quarterly Bulletins”(Myemphasis, B.S.)28. The depth of Herzfeld’s involvement with the opposition againstFischer is well documented by the latter’s correspondence withthe Munich Institute for Contemporary History. In the end ofmarch 1963 – more than a year later than planned – Herzfeldsent the manuskript of his essay on Fischer´s “Grasp for theWorld Power” to Helmut Krausick. Herzfeld declared: “I am sorry overlooking the outcome to feel not quite happy – the potremained too long on the fire and became too many-layered than being

handled as fancyed once. And further on the relative length. But onmy side there doesn´t rest nothing but to throw response on you”.  Krausnick remarked alongside: “With pleasure, this steady but distinct critic was in necessary…”, and by this confessed his pressure on Herzfeld to finish thisessay29. According to this, Krausnick wrote to Rothfels, the“great man” in the background of the institute: “by the way, Herzfeld once again promised the Fischer review when Ispoke to him on the telephone concerning another matter. It is abouttime too. You are probably familiar with the interesting discussionby Klaus Epstein in the October issue of “World Politics”, whichapparently gave rise to an incensed letter from Ritter“(My emphasis,B.S.)30. All the same, this recit didn´t appear. How swiftly however the good will of the learned fraternitycould be shattered by “false” notes is to be seen in Rothfels’position on Epstein on the question of nominating the latterfor a professorship in Frankfurt. The positive review ofFischer’s controversial book alone endangered Epstein’sreputation31. Fischer, as a second step, was planning an essay “on Germanpolitics between 1908-14 and on the July-Crises”. Here hisintention was “to express his views on Ritter’s reproaches andideas”32. Schieder´s positive reply came with the next post andwas binding32. The envisaged date of publication: July 1964.However, the opposite side in the person of Zechlin was also tohave a say33. Schieder reacted with delaying tactics, based onthe alleged great length of the manuscript as well as delicateinterpretations and attempts to influence the meaning ofFischer’s writings34. Evidently it was intended to thwartFischer’s aim of publishing the essay in time for the 1964“Historians’ Day” in Berlin35. Thus Schieder waited for morethan a month before telling Fischer that the essay would haveto be divided, in order to be brought out at all36. Schieder´sobjective was to estrange the contribution to such an extentthat Fischer’s theses would no longer clearly stand out, and,should he nevertheless be agreed, to “strip” the publication so

that it could only be released after the “Historians’ Day”.Fischer, on the other hand, gambled with a special release forthe “Historians’ Day” which brought about Schieder’s immediatesubmission37. Several months later Herzfeld, having just returned from USA,reported on the dangerous spreading of Fischer’s theory there.The Berlin professor announced: “Momentarily I am being overshadowed by Fritz Fischer’s Grasp for theWorld Power which was a subject of constant discussion sinceChristmas over there – at least as far as historians areconcerned…”38. At the same time Ritter´s efforts, animating foreign historians toattack Fischer as well, broke down. Fritz T.Epstein, whom Fischercalled later on “a friend of mine”, Pierre Renouvin and HeinrichLutz did regard Bethmann Hollweg after Fischer quite different fromthe views of the Freiburg historian. Lutz wrote to Ritter: “I was concerned that the Imperial Chancellor may now be regarded asthe initiator of the Machtpolitik or World War I and thereforeresponsible for the flowering of the conquest policy under Hitler”. By this, the barrier against the promotion of Fischer´s idea inthe western states, had become part of the past. To the end ofRitter´s life, he even recognized crackles in his relations toconservative historians like for instance Zechlin. For thisreason, completely disappointed, he finally finished strugglingfor his view against Fischer39. All the same, across all the barriers in the traditionalistcamp, Fischer had a unifying influence as is seen in thecomplex case of Rothfels who praised Erdmann’s remarks at theend of the year. Rothfels wrote to Kiel: “Many thanks for the off-print which I read immediately, andthroughout with applause. Your exposition I find most convincing.The only fact that I may criticise, and in which I am unfortunatelyof one mind with Ritter, is that Fischer, in my regard, should beattacked for his irresponsible manner of using sources. In themeantime, however, the latest issue of the Historische Zeischrifthas appeared consisting of nothing but Fischer and Zechlin. Itcannot be helped, one must plough through it, as well as through the

off-print which Ritter had handed in to me in Berlin” (My emphasis,B.S.). Evidently, in the meantime Erdmann had sent a report on theprogress in the Riezler research. However, his letter ismissing in the legacy of Rothfels. Yet the Tübingen historianincluded in his reply details on the background to his opinionon the diary affair and seems, for this reason, of greatsignificance. Rothfels explained: “I naturally regret Mss. White’s view. I by myself am not personallyacquainted with her and do not know whether she is informed of thefact that her father and I shared a confidential relationship. Itherefore cannot expect anything from an intervention on my part,would however gladly submit my name to you in support of arecommendation. As far as Riezler’s opinion is concerned, I amconvinced that, as stated in the conclusion of the discussion, theRuedorffer book reveals in total clarity the optimistic belief in aconstellation of juxtaposition, as he frequently calls it, i.e. WorldPolitics without War (My emphasis, B.S.)40. This “desire to disguise or comfort” is to be found some weekslater also in a letter to Ritter. Rothfels built a bridge inthe matter in spite of all animosity on a personal level,towards the Freiburg professor. He wrote: “I can well understand that in your work on the Bethmann-Hollwegepoch, you are anew increasingly made aware of the total difficultyof the traditional structure [of Imperial Germany]. However, Ibelieve that every only really detailed study of the innerstatefunctions, even those of the present German Republic, not to mentionthe French, would, in spite of a seemingly greater logical structure,still leave the reader with similar anxieties and reflections” (Myemphasis, B.S.)41. This very Rothfels in 1956 had been receiving the followingwords from Walter Peter Fuchs in Tübingen: “The German historians have as a consequence of their behaviour inthe 3rd Reich lost all credit in the eyes of the world. All the morewe must be grateful to you, for taking it upon yourself years ago, toreturn to our midst”42. 1 BA-Koblenz. KleErw 584, Assets K.Riezler.2 Otto Hammann, Pictures from the last Imperial Era, Berlin 1922, 76, 87 andfollowing.

3 BA-Berlin. NS 15/1586. Cultural political Forum. Archives, 13.8.1941: “[lecturesof the Free German Academy]… A lecture is to be held by Prof.Dr. Heimpel, historianof Leipzig University (appointed to Strassburg) on the history of the Eastern andWestern Borders (unobjectionable according to the Board of the Academy)” (Myemphasis, B.S.). See Schulte, Riezler, 104, 107. Schulte-Diary, 2.1.1984: „17.30[hours]. Telephone conversation with Prof[essor] Heimpel[/]Göttingen[.] In 1957involved in the R[iezler].-D[iary]. Affair. At the request of Th[eodor]. Heuß madethe diaries known before the Historical Commission at Göttingen [Munich?].=Hadhowever never seen anything of the diaries.= See NL Heuß a[nd]. Prof[essor] Heimpelto Heuß…”. . –Afterwards, Heuß accorded his friend in Göttingen access to theRiezler diary. Heuss described the diary so that there can be no doubt that it wasthe Diary XXX of June/July/August 1914. This is certified by Rothfels’ variousremarks which are cited here, in part for the first time.4 BA-Berlin. Ibid.: “…Prof. Dr. Rassow was possibly proposed by Breslau Universityfor the same subject. (He stands somewhat under suspicion inasmuch as he is thenephew of Hans Delbrück and was once a democrat. (His bearing at the Academy is notconsidered to be desirable)” (My emphasis, B.S.). Berlin Federal Archives, 4901/R 21old (R 21/1), “Rassow,P. 23.11.1889 now of Breslau”. “Since 20.11.1933 member of SA(Res.I) and since approx. 1929 member of DDP. “I[ron] C[ross]. II in battle” entryin personal file.5 Schulte, Riezler, 220, Paul Sethe to Gerhard Ritter, 18.10.1961: “It is the mostdisturbing book that I have read in many years“. Sethe corresponded with both sidesas is revealed by Fischer’s legacy.6 BA-Koblenz. Legacy Hans Herzfeld. N 135/31, G.Ritter to H.Herzfeld, 13.2.1962: ”Bythe way, I find Fischer’s book particularly exciting because it also implicates theprevious history of the war in the theory of the ‘Grasp for the World Power’”. Ibid.G.Ritter to H.Herzfeld, 1.3.1962 (My emphasis, B.S.).7 Ibid., N 1188/506. G.Ritter to Th.Schieder, 19.1.1962. Ibid., Rothfels’ legacy. N1213/1, G.Ritter to H.Rothfels, 21.5.1953. Ritter and Rothfels were adversaries inscience. This is confirmed in the words of the Freiburg historian to his rival: “Iwish to disregard your journal [i.e. Quarterly Papers on Contemporary History] dueto the fact that this journal does not wish to be burdened with my name”. The matterin question regarded Schlieffen’s legacy and other military files in Washington.8 Ibid., N 1188/237. Th.Schieder to G.Ritter, 7.2.1962: “I very much hope that Mr.Erdmann will in the near future be able to complete his discussion of the remainingpart of Fischer’s book.” Erdmann’s review never appeared [sic!].9 Ibid., N 1393/106. Legacy of K.D.Erdmann, G.Ritter to H.Aubin, 2.3.1962.10 Ibid., G.Ritter to H.Aubin, 6.3.1962.11 Ibid., H. Rassow to G.Ritter, 9.3.1962.12 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to G.Ritter, 18.3.1962. Schulte, Riezler, 134 and folllowing.Mss. Blainsdorf maintained in 1984 in reply to my criticism that the letters sent byRitter to Erdmann too “were no longer existent in Erdmann’s correspondence”. Nowthey do emerge. – In Erdmann’s legacy!13 Ibid., H.Rothfels to G.Ritter, 21.3.1962. Erdmann had kept this “missing link”secret despite my informations up to the contrary. See ibid. G.Ritter toK.D.Erdmann, 30.3.1962, with the documents given to Erdmann. See F.Fischer toE.Zechlin, 9.10.1984 and the indication: “The only stimulating but also horrificfact in Mss. Bl[äns]dorf’s essay is her innocent notification on p.675, 16th lineand following, that ‘these two letters (from Rothfels dated 21. and 28.3.1962) arenowhere to be found”.14 Ibid., G.Ritter to H.Rothfels, 26.3.1962. Schulte, Riezler, 135: Rothfels wrote toS.A.Kaehler/Göttingen, that he had in 1945 “prevented Riezler from publishing hisHohenfinow-Diary dated July 1914 in which Bethmann’s hope for a war with Russiaseemed to me to be clearly proven considering the morale at this period” (Myemphasis, B.S.). This document was placed at my disposal by WalterBußmann/Karlsruhe. More on this topic in short in my investigation of Germanhistorians in the 70s and 80s.15 Ibid., H.Rothfels to G.Ritter, 28.3.1962.

16 Ibid., Legacy Rothfels. N 1213/1, H.Rothfels to v.Mackensen, 31.3.1955.17 See Schulte, Riezler, 134 and following. Rothfels’ letter to Ritter is publishedhere f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e .18 Schulte, Riezler, 141 and following, G.Ritter to F.Fischer, 26.4.1962.19 BA-Berlin. Ibid. R 21/1 10006. Martin Göhring, 21.11.1903. Studied history asprincipal subject at Kiel University. Between 1933 and 1937, scientific research,mainly in France. On 19.1.1938, Dr.habil. at Kiel University. He confirmed in hisfile: “I was the political leader (cell worker)”. Ibid., NS 15/20: “The H.W. raisesno objection to the planned nomination of the lecturer Göhring of the University ofHalle/Wittenberg [-] as professor.” Ibid. files of REM, RFR, German Academy.“Göhring, Martin, G 426, Pers[onal] File”. BA-Koblenz. N 1178/25, LegacyH.Aubin[after 1945], “Assessment… Göhring is not afraid to make his position known,but he successfully aspires to show in scientific objectivity even the heart-touching events (Bismarck’s successors 1890-1945: Germany’s path from William II toAdolf Hitler)”. Likewise Kiel: the STASI of the GDR discovered in 1966 that “vonRauch, the director of the Seminar for East European History” had joined the NSDAPin 1928 and was actively engaged in the “5th column” of the “fascist movement inEstonia”. “Von Rauch was also one of the most energetic members of the ´North andEast German Research Society’ which had stood under the direct leadership of OfficeVII of the Reich Security Office since 1943.20 BA-Berlin. ZB II 4529 A 5. Schieder [Dr.] Theodor, Dr.phil. Born on 11.4.1908.NSDAP-No.: 5284680. Admission: 1.5.1957. Schulte, Riezler, 220, TH.Schieder toG.Ritter, 28.12.1961: “Concerning the discussion of Fischer’s book in theH[istorische]Z[eitschrift], may one count upon receiving from you a discussion ofthe first part?…Mr. Erdmann has already declared himself willing to investigate theremaining parts. I believe that the HZ´s reaction is correct”.21 BA-K. N 1188/219, K.D.Erdmann to Th.Schieder, 23.9.1961. Erdmann had in September1961 debated his plans with Schieder. Herzfeld wrote to Erdmann on 27.11.1964: “Withbest regards and a slight sigh of envy that you are able to carry out your greatventure with a closed cohort led by yourself.”22 See Schulte, Riezler, 159-164.23 BA-K. N 1188/240, F.Fischer to Th. Schieder, 17.5.1963.24 Ibid., Th. Schieder to F.Fischer, 21.5.1963.25 See ibid., Rothfels’ legacy. N 1213/32-1, H.Rothfels to K.D.Erdmann, 5.9.1963;H.Rothfels to W.Conze, 12.11.1963; W.Conze to H.Rothfels, 29.11.1963; H.U.Wehler toH.Rothfels, 5.2.1964; H.Rothfels to K.D.Erdmann, 11.2.1964; W.Hubatsch toH.Rothfels, 16.10.1964; K.E.Born, Prussia in the era of William [II].26 Ibid., N 1213/32-2, E.Engelberg, Bonn’s historians between illusion and reality,in: Neues Deutschland, No. 334, 5.12.1962.27 Ibid., Excerpt from: F.Klein, Prof. Hölzle ‘Rosenberg’s superior officer in:Dresdener Zeitung, No. 258, 19.9.1962. Hölzle’s personal files were in the archivesof the Humboldt-University in Berlin. 28 Ibid., H.Rothfels to D.Mende, 10.6.1963.29 Archiv Institut für Zeitgeschichte. ID 103, Korrespondenz Krausnick, H.Herzfeldto W.Krausnick, 25.3.1963. 30 BA-K, Rothfels’ legacy. N 1213/48, H.Krausnick to H.Rothfels, 28.1.1963. Ibid.,N1213/32-2, H.Rothfels to H.Herzfeld, 20.4.1963: “I was pleased to hear that youressay on Fischer has arrived in Munich. I asked to point out to you the recentlyissued French publication (a somewhat unfair matter) of files on Germany’s war aims.I accidentally noticed that our Mr. Fischer simply omits what does not suit him,e.g. Bethmann’s reply to Falkenhayn regarding the annexation of the Baltic. He oughtnot to miss such a fact.”31 Ibid., N 1213/32-2, H.Rothfels to the Dekan of the Phil.Fak. University ofFrankfurt, 7.2.1963.32 Ibid., Th.Schieder to F.Fischer, 23.9.1963.33 Ibid., Th.Schieder to F.Fischer, 11.11.1963.34 Ibid., F.Fischer to Th.Schieder, 14.2.1964.35 Ibid., Th.Schieder to F.Fischer, 25.3.1964.

36 Ibid., F.Fischer to Th.Schieder, 29.8.1964.37 Ibid., Th.Schieder [via telegraph] to F.Fischer, Sept[ember]1964 [post-dated byunknown, B.S.].38 Ibid., Rothfels’ legacy. N 1213/36, H.Herzfeld to H.Rothfels, 15.7.1964.39 Schulte, Riezler, 130. See ibid., 110 and H.Böhme, ´Primat´ und ´Paradigmata´.Zur Entwicklung einer bundesdeutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung am Beispiel desErsten Weltkrieges, in: H.Lehmann, Historikerkontroversen, Göttingen 2000, 92, 103,108, 116. 40 BA-K, Rothfels´ legacy. N 1213/36, H.Rothfels to K.D.Erdmann, 17.12.1964.41 Ibid., Rothfels’ legacy. N 1213/1, H.Rothfels to G.Ritter, 22.6.1955.42 Ibid., N 1213/1, W.P.Fuchs to H.Rothfels, 14.5.1956.

Diversion and Concealment. In late 1961, Fischer sought to persuade the Kiel politicalscientist Michael Freund to have a review of his “Grasp for theWorld Power” published in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”.Thereby he commented on Sethe’s discussion in the weeklynewspaper “Die Zeit”, which he blamed for causing a false tonein the discussion by naming in the title Germany’s “SoleGuilt”. Freund was to understand that Fischer’s main aim was toprevent the “discussion of the book from concentrating on the´War Guilt Question´ of July 1914 alone”. Instead of this,Fischer was interested in the  “dynamic forces which determined German politics before and during thewar”1.  In December the national liberal journal “Der Spiegel” hadhonoured Fischer’s book with the headline “William theConqueror”. This in Fischer’s opinion “somewhat exalteddiscussion” was to be balanced by Freund. The Hamburg historiandeveloped his own thoughts on the matter with rareauthenticity: “Therefore I will be set upon from this side – as in the question of the July 1914 taboo – for destroyingthe nice building of the Viennese unsocial that seduced the good German nation and for setting thepre-conditions deeper, not with Luther and German Romanticism, nor according to Dehio at the timeof Frederick the Great, but with the clearly defined historical point of the German Reich in the 20 th century and its ideal and material motivation, institutions and personalities, but above all thewretched isolation into which it had brought itself2 (My emphasis in all and detail, B.S.). The Hamburg historian also voiced the hope  “that further discussion would break free from the question of the Julycrisis and turn to the book as a whole”.  

However, the fact that this encouraged the political scientistfrom Kiel to compare Bethmann Hollweg with Hitler meant thatonce again oil was poured on to burning waters. In March 1965the German diplomat Moritz Schlesinger, Paul Scheffer’s mentorin the fifties, informed Fischer of his suspicion that theImperial Chancellor, according to the Hamburg historian´sdescription in his controversial book, was to be understood asvery much more decisive and courageous than Fischer’s nationalconservative opponents wished to see him. Schlesinger suggested “to find proof of the fact that Bethmann Hollweg was bellicose and hadassumed the risk of a war in the interests of saving the Reich” (Myempasis, B.S.).  He stressed that the Hamburg historian should “not be ashamed”to “summon his opponents to limit the discussion to” his own“theory and to give up the attempt to divert public opinion to´peace politics´”3. Fischer described the relations, throughoutthe years unaltered until today with such “saints” in theGerman press as e.g. the late Countess Marion Döhnhöff: “Just a week ago, Paul Sethe had refused one of my articles – after aneditorial conference under presidency of Countess Döhnhoff [a Rothfelsstudent]a, which was a comment on his article on “collective guilt” and hisdiscussion of Ger[hard] Ritter’s third volume of Militarism… this occurredwith the explanation that the journal could not enter into endlesspolemics. This is of course a political act and a wholly biased attitude;for this practically prevents me from using the “Zeit” as a mouthpiece. Atleast he agreed, in order not to be completely biased (which by theacceptance of the article above was increased), to print a whole page outof my book with a prelude that may enter into his discussions (and thus inaddition the Zechlin article)4. Fischer was opposed, Stoltenberg “made” minister, as Rothfelsstrongly confirmed to Waldemar Besson5. Rothfels’ stipulatedfrontal position in relation to Fischer after the “Grasp forthe World Power” appears paradox if also stringent, especiallywith regard to Otto Hintze’s view, in which the Tübingenprofessor praised the crucial question of the national state,the latter’s critical perspective. Rothfels wrote in July 1965: “even in a most critical controversy with the traditions from which hecame, with the scepticism of the politics of power in the mass age, withthe reshuffling between state and society, with Europe’s altered role andof course the role of Prussian Germany in a world, torn between the

perspective of a Pax Anglosaxonica and the perspective of a worldrevolution”6. a Fischer in manuscript 1983: “See 1983 (22 years later). Ibid. in the case ofErdmann versus Sösemann”.b Fischer in 1983: “i.e. my article. Did this happen?!” Two central documents –Scheffer’s letter from Hot Springs and Riezler’s reply – are today still missingfrom his legacy and were - by mistake of Mr.B.-J.Wendt, Fischer´s assistant in thosedays - flying about Europe during February 19655.  1 BA-K. N 1394/9. Legacy of M.Freund, F.Fischer to M.Freund, 17.11.1961. P.Sethewrote to the “Political Editorial” of the ZEIT on 16.11.1961: “I myself did not usethe expression”.2 Ibid. F.Fischer to M.Freund, 2.12.1961.3 BA-K. N 1422/98, legacy of F.Fischer. M.Schlesinger to F.Fischer, 10.3.1965. Inthe course working through his legacy in the 80s, Fischer signified his book “War ofIllusions” as the reply demanded by Schlesinger. However, this apparently wereoverlooked in the light of the “theoretical dispute” in the late 60s.4 Ibid. F.Fischer (Princeton) to M.Schlesinger, 28.3.1965. Ibid. Rothfels’ legacy. N1213/1, H.Rothfels to H.Helbig, 31.3.1955: “I am pleasantly surprised that part ofthe material has been preserved and that verbal explanations received fromRie[t]zler and Paul Scheffer are now being demonstrated.” This means that Rothfelswas in close verbal contact with Riezler and Scheffer. It rests the question: What”part of the material” had been secured in fact? Rothfels maintained a livelycontact to Countess Döhnhoff too. See ibid. N 1213/32-2, H.Rothfels to M.v.Döhnhoff,5.4.1963.5 Ibid. M.Schlesinger to F.Fischer, 1.2.1965.6 Ibid. N 1213/36. H.Rothfels’ legacy, H.Rothfels to W.Besson, 16.12.1965. Thetraditional powers also maintained close connections with the German Federal Army.See ibid. Head of the Research Office for Military History (von Grote) toH.Rothfels, 15.2.1965. Ibid., N 1213/32-2, Meier-Welcker to H.Rothfels, 29.11.1963.7 Ibid. H.Rothfels, Recollections of Otto Hintze, July 1965. For or against?– Sösemann. It was not long until doubts about the authenticity of thediary edition of Erdmann were voiced. Fritz Fellner and BerndSösemann considered the questions of textual concordance. InMay 1975, Erdmann wrote to Schieder, they would both not know“the proportion of the disasters” which awaited them1. Foryears, Erdmann blocked the original diary from publication forinternational science. Today’s version was published by Rudolf Augstein for theSPIEGEL in 1964. The national-liberal ZEIT then offered Erdmannthe possibility of passing judgement. The Kiel historian had inan overnight action selected parts of the Riezler diary on theJuly Crisis and published them in order - as benefits to a trueconservative - to weaken the discussion of Fischer’s “Grasp forthe World Power”.

 By a counter-attack, Erdmann accuses Fischer and his school ofcalling Bethmann Hollweg: “Hitler’s predecessor”. It isprecisely “Bethmann Hollweg’s struggle for world power” thatErdmann analyses and concludes: “Whenever World Dominion and the German World Kingdom is mentioned in thediary, it is plainly always a question of Germany’s share of the WorldPower alongside other world powers; this means definitely: Germany soughtto gain a political, military and economic glacis in East and West of thekingdom in order finally to dispense with the pressure on two fronts andthus to win a secure basis for a colonial and economic policy overseas. Butthis same idea, which meant so much to Germany’s conservative and liberalimperialists was not a subject of interest for Bethmann Hollweg. This isplainly exposed by Riezler, who also offers the explanation why: it isbecause Germany would have suffered an intellectual decrease were she tohave adopted such a form of rule” (My emphasis, B.S.). Already at this time Erdmann quotes from some pieces ofdocuments, dating from 1915 and 1916, which, as the Kielhistorian intends, hardly describe the Imperial Chancellor aspower-hungry. On the other hand, there was “the new insightinto the German chancellor’s risk sensibility during the Julycrisis”, as Erdmann describes it. The Kiel historian admits: “From the very beginning Bethmann Hollweg knew that possibly the world warwas in the blank cheque including the involvement of England” (My emphasis,B.S.). But what does this mean? Fritz Stern of New York broughtErdmann into considerable difficulties when he pointed out thisfact. In any case, the latter referred to his conversation withthe colleague from Kiel in 1965 in Vienna, in which he shouldhave asked him, “whether there were two different diaries, i.e. whether the pre-war sectionexisted separate from the other part” (My emphasis, B.S.). Erdmann had, according to Stern, without giving him “a directanswer”, asked him why he (Stern) “was interested to knowthis”. To his amazement, Erdmann went on, “is there anythingnew to be said about Bethmann?” Fritz Stern did in 1967 alreadyupset the typical Bethmann image when he, in contrast to thetraditional German historical slant, stressed that the Germanchancellor’s “sense of responsibility and his hesitancy” had

“not paralysed his ability to react”(My emphasis, B.S.). Sternnoted that: “Rather they will have lent him the psychological security to take action.He hesitated before the leap, but he nevertheless leapt.”  The American historian pointed out explicitly that the Riezler Diarycontained  “not a single indication that Bethmann had attempted to stop the crisis, toretain peace”.  Stern went so far as to compare the chancellor’s fears overGermany’s future to a psychosis, which could have been partlycaused by the death of Bethmann’s wife in May 1914. A factor,which today seems nearly irrelevant. Especially because theredo exist other components which might have been of much moreserious effect. The fact that the perceptions in Riezler’srecollections after 1914, and even since 1917/19, became mixedtogether, was not yet noticed by Stern. Thus he was under theinfluence of German historical literature when he described thechancellor’s distress between Kaiser, the latter’s entourageand the military. After all, Bethmann Hollweg’s statements andhis omissions did influence historical tradition since 19201.For Erdmann this sufficed to attack once more the theory that“the Riezler Diaries” did  “not suffice to attribute to Bethmann Hollweg, as motive for the risk ofwar, which he had taken in July 1914, expansionist aims” (My emphasis,B.S.).  Erdmann quickly arrived at his goal, which was again to confirm “that the recently revived theory of Germany’s Sole Guilt could as well beconsidered as a legend“  as “the earlier story of Germany’s innocence”. In this“respect”, the “interpretation of the Riezler Diaries, as…givenby him in 1964, could be confirmed.” However, and this is worthnoting, Erdmann mentioned here that in 1962 h e h a d n o treceived until “later…several additional entries from theearlier time [before 1914] and from the wartime”. Here the Kielhistorian alludes to a subject, which was not to be dealt within depth until 1982/833. 

On 2 February 1968, Erdmann received from Riezler’s daughter,Ms Maria White, permission to publish the diaries. It remainsunclear whether this confirmation was in fact necessary, as anappropriate agreement had already been signed in the 1950’s4.Shortly afterwards, Erdmann went “to Bonn for a few weeks…, inorder to look for clues in the files of the Foreign Office asto Kurt Riezler’s official acitvities”5. At all events,Schieder now urged Erdmann to do “everything” to “bring about apublication as soon as possible”. The “press controversy withStern” was not to be continued5. When Sösemann presented hismanuscript to the “Historische Zeitschrift” for publication,Erdmann asked his colleague Schieder to let him “have a copy inadvance”. He would be “interested in the therein used criticalinvestigations of sources especially to the July 1914”6 (Myemphasis, B.S.). Evidently he was constantly aware of the problem of hisedition. In late 1981, Sösemann reported to Cologne that aftereight years’ effort, he had finally managed to look over KurtRiezler’s legacy in the Federal Archives at Koblenz. Sösemannemphasised his honourable intentions. Nevertheless Erdmann’seternal irritability was ever present7. Schieder turned toKarl-Georg Faber of Münster, in order to gain clarity withregard to the further procedure for Sösemann’s production. Hewrote that the manuscript dealt with “dynamite”. He was of theopinion that the “contents” were so “important that apublication” appeared “inevitable”. Schieder had already spokenwith Andreas Hillgruber of Cologne who “also looked into thearticle”. Erdmann, whom Schieder contacted by telephone on 18January, apparently knew “nothing about the whole matter”8. Asthe particular scientific situation, which dominated thediscussion of the outbreak of war in 1914, was mentioned, Hans–Georg Faber, questioned by Schieder, made reference to theproblem which was lurking under the surface:  “I agree that because of the continued latent front position in thejudgement of the July Crisis and the editor’s [i.e.Sösemann] criticism ofErdmann’s Riezler Edition, a publication, together with the possibility forthe editor[i.e.Erdmann] to prove his assumptions, is unavoidable. (Myemphasis, B.S.) Andreas Hillgruber/Colonge, in “Das historisch-politische Buch”,took a neighbouring position in an essay on my book, dealing withthe “Forgery of the Riezler Diary”. With this explanation, Faber

demonstrates that Erdmann could substantiate his decisionbetween various texts, namely between the “block pages” soincriminated by Sösemann, and other texts. The importance ofthe situation becomes apparent as Faber continues: “The most important conclusion for the significance of Riezler’s ´Diaries´as a source for the judgement on the July Crisis, i.e. the fact that thetexts were probably revised at a later date, is a challenge for the editorand for those who had not questioned the value of these parts of theedition as primary source and had therefore based their arguments uponthem” (My emphasis, B.S.) As one solution, Faber suggested the commentary of a “neutral”third party: for example “W[olfgang].J.Mommsen[!] or J[ames].Joll”9. In order to protect the subject from the SPIEGEL andthe probability of a “great public discussion”, Schiederdecided on the parallel publication of Sösemann and Erdmann10.Andreas Hillgruber/Colonge, in “Das historisch-politische Buch”(102/1986), took a neighbouring position to Faber, dealing with mybook on the “Forgery of the Riezler Diary”.  In early February 1982, evidently alarmed, the Kiel historianturned to Schieder again in order to discuss the possibility ofa reaction from Sösemann. He referred directly back to thecomplications of the matter, for he was aware that thismanuscript – however treating a subject of limited significance– was dynamite. Schieder advised his friend and colleague topublish the latter´s “commentary together with Sösemann’smanuscript”. Now he wrote: “The whole matter has consequences in directions of which the editor[i.e.Sösemann] is evidently not aware”11. In consequence, from “Cologne’s” point of view, this had becomethe question of “the tiresome Sösemann affair”, which thelatter would have “to publish in the December issue of theHistorische Zeitschrift”12. Schieder now considered delayingthe publication “until the 1983 February issue”13. The Kielhistorian claimed at this moment, from his somewhat elevatedposition that it is “not worthwhile writing an article whichonly” (my emphasis, B.S.) refers to the young man fromGöttingen. Sösemann’s criticism of Walter Riezler, Kurt Riezlerand the editor of the diaries [i.e. Erdmann] contained, in hisopinion, “too little substance”. On the contrary, he wasplanning a “far-reaching article”, more an “account” of the

“echo of Riezler Diaries, probably under the title ‘KurtRiezler and his critics’”(My emphasis, B.S.)14. However, Schieder himself was in considerable doubt as to whatErdmann was actually planning14. Erdmann’s reply to Sösemannwas sent to Cologne in December. The Kiel historian´s pooropinion of himself became clear. The Kiel professor commented,completely misunderstanding the situation:  “I hope I wasn’t too sharp – although I would have liked to have been evensharper. I assume that Mr. Sösemann will not see this text before it isprinted”15 (My emphasis, B.S.).  Then the bomb went off. At the “Historians’ Day” in Münster,the young man from Göttingen expressed his annoyance that hisessay had taken so long to be printed. Schieder who had beeninformed of this by Wolfgang Mommsen[sic!], went into attackand wrote to Sösemann. He stressed immediately that he  “had from the very beginning left no room for doubt…, that I am onlyprepared to publish your essay in conjunction with a commentary by Mr.Erdmann”16 (My emphasis, B.S.).  However, on the other hand the Cologne representative did notdare to risk a conflict. Evidently the matter was too delicate.Sösemann for his part took a step back. His “regret” appearedto have developed into more in the minds of those concerned.These alternate breezes all had the sole intention ofpreventing the break down of an important publication-projectfor the H[istorische]Z[eitschrift] on one hand, and on theother hand the loss of ten years’ work and effort17. Now Schieder arranged that Erdmann could “add another twopages” to “his essay”. Again the situation was aggravated bythe latter’s hesitation in exchanging the proofs. With thebackground of this continued concerted action between friends,Schieder now withdrew and referred Sösemann to Erdmann. For inCologne, suspicion was raised  “that at least part of his [i.e. Sösemann’s] nonsense had reached Fischer”. Schieder had in fact received wind of the latter’s polemic onthe Riezler Diary. In any case from Cologne was commented that“it is only good that we now have an answer at the ready”18. Atthe end of the year, Schieder warned his young colleague from

Göttingen that the latter might “not pass on the text of hisreply in whatever form”19. Thereupon Sösemann confirmed thetransaction: “early information” in exchange for the promisenot to correct anything20. But Erdmann put up a fierceresistance even against this extremely one-sided agreement21.The result was an unworthy dispute. Why should the man fromGöttingen present his paper verdicts to Erdmann? Erdmann beganto make a habit of bold distortions. This letter reachedSösemann on 24 January and went from there to Cologne. Thelatter by this attempted to calm Schieder22 and to keep hold ofhim by underlining his distance to Fischer which wasincorrect23. This was not completely successful, for the latterasked Erdmann at a later point: “Should he [i.e. Sösemann] really be the unsuspecting Parceval that heclaims to be?”24. Thus the contradictions, hitherto painstakingly glossed over,burst open nevertheless. Schieder could not be fair to both ofthem. Sösemann claimed, amongst other matters, that none otherthan Erdmann had failed to “keep to appointments”. Thus forexample the “viewing of the manuscript and/or proofs” and“preliminary information in the GWU”: He had assured Schiederand “Mr. Erdmann on 6.1.1983 that he would not undertake anychanges” which “were caused by his knowledge of Mr. Erdmann’sreply”. Sösemann’s “Anti-Criticism” against Erdmann, which isnot present in Schieder’s legacy, is ironically amongstFischer’s papers, declared as “CONFIDENTIAL” and dated“probably 1983”25.  For his part, Schieder opened at this time an additionalbattle-scene with Karl-Heinz Janßen of the Hamburg ZEIT. Hecriticised Janßen’s remark that he had referred to Fischer’s“Grasp for the World Power” as “a book that is a ‘nationalcatastrophe’”. The Cologne historian summoned the ZEITeditorial writer to tell him when and on what occasionhe[i.e.Schieder] was supposed to have made this “completelyunknown remark”26. Janßen replied briefly that he had drawnthis information from the “rororo aktuell book by Fritz Fischer(“July 1914: we did not slide into it”)27. Thereupon the latterturned to Fischer who informed him that this was a remark, madesome years ago by the head of the Foreign Office archives, Dr.Ullrich, which “had angered him [i.e. Fischer] greatly at thetime”. Ullrich had referred to a telephone conversation with

Schieder28. Schieder believed the battle won as hesarcastically wrote in the readers’ column of the ZEIT of12.8.1983 that  “it is perfectly paradoxical…had I made such a statement having beforehandpublished the first results of Fischer’s research (1959) in the HistoricalJournal”29.  On the other hand, his letter to Erdmann, dated December 1961,confirms Fischer’s 1982 notification in full. Schieder, 22years ago, had summed up: “In the meantime I have been reading in Fischer’s book and the lecturemakes me ill. But not me alone. The way in which the war development of1914 is here described is in contradiction to the entire research up tillnow. Unfortunately Sethe mentioned in the “Zeit” the word ´Germany’s SoleGuilt´ for the development of the Ist World War. In order to carry out thediscussion with Fischer, one would have to work through the entire Bonnfiles…Besides: is it really necessary to open up the whole War-Guilt-Debateof 1914? This is in my opinion most mourning, quite apart from thepolitical effects, which Fischer so to say does provoke by speaking of a´contribution to the problem of continuity in Germany’s history from the 1st

to the 2nd World War´” (My emphasis, B.S.)30. Evidently, Schieder in 1983 wasn´t aware of his parallel letterto Hermann Heimpel either. He wrote: “I also, as you are writing, felt physically ill for several days and oneis reluctant to start once again pushing the stone of Sisyphus back uphill,to where it had been brought by the combined efforts of the neo-historiansof the majority of teachers before 1933. However, it seems to be our fatethat the carpet is continually pulled from beneath our feet”31 (My emphasis,B.S.). Besides Schieder’s letter to Gerhard Ritter32 outlines in factthe continuity of his negative opinion of Fischer’s work inbetween 1959 and 1983. He noted on 6.12.1961 that: “Fischer’s book is much worse than I had expected a f t e r t h e e ss a y i n t h e H Z [i.e. 1959], especially the first paragraphs on theoutbreak of war. The unwitting reader is presented not only with a warpedview of the occurrences in July 1914, but also by the sudden transition tothe description of Bethmann’s apparent war aims in 1914, to him there issuggested that these war aims were the actual reason for the outbreak ofwar”33 (My emphasis, B.S.). This suffices to refute utterly Schieder’s answer in the“Zeit”. When the latter reported on 10.06./08.07.1983 on

Sösemann’s doubts, regarding the Riezler Diary Edition,television caught wind of the matter and the Bavarian Radioprojected a discussion between Sösemann and Erdmann which I,while working with the NDR got to know, and thereupon broughtFischer into the game. As a result of Erdmann’s superior“direction”, the discussion remained limited on the technicalquestions of the edition.- Namely to make “a legible book” asErdmann gave to know.  In the course of this development, Fischer established contactto Fritz Fellner/Innsbruck. He encouraged the Austriancolleague to help the researcher from Göttingen with a reader’sletter34. Fellner replied to Erdmann’s divided role that thelatter had “with his letter at the time pushed his scruplesaside”. Sösemann, so he went on, were not contradicted in theHistorische Zeitschrift, but, on the contrary, the existingdoubts were “fully justified”. It were a question of  “hand-written notes by Riezler, which had been composed at another point oftime”.  Fellner argued, the form and transmission of the “block pages” madeit impossible “to draw these as sources for the events, acts anddecisions of the summer of 1914”35. Early in 1982, Fischer had intimated confidential facts drawnfrom the Ritter legacy to Karl-Heinz Janßen. Fischer cut therelevant part out and sent it to the “Zeit”. “This document isto show you”, he wrote, “why the ‘hunt’ as it is called in the‘guild’ for the Riezler Diaries began”. –He, Janßen, ought to“write a long book out of this correspondence, i.e. what wasleft of it”, about “the way the fraternity dealt withhistorical truths when they believed these to be demanded bythe ‘state principle’”. Finally the Hamburg professor unveiledhis secret36. “This dark secret” was the description named inthe editor´s column of the “Zeit”, made by the now fearlessJanßen and modelled around Ritter´s letter to Rothfels of March1962. My reader’s letter in this column apparently revealed theorigin of this knowledge. The man from the “Zeit”, who had beenpursuing all this with somewhat too much optimism, wrote toFischer: “It seems that the discussion is only justbeginning”37. The Hamburg professor, in his customarilygenerous manner, spread the cloak of oblivion over it all38. Hegave me for 19 July a report by telephone of the events,

concerning Janßen and Sösemann, possibly summing up his recentconversation with the latter in Blankenese. Ms. Döhnhoff hadremarked again that “for a review on the subject in the ZEIT 3-4 pages would suffice.”39. Walter Peter Fuchs/Erlangen urged Schieder to hold an event atthe Historical Commission in Munich as a public stance againstthe attacks on the Erdmann edition. The complexity of Erdmann’ssituation is demonstrated by Fuchs’ statement. The latter wroteto Schieder: “After the absorbing lecture which Mr. Erdmann improvised at the latestannual meeting of the Historical Commission, I, and with me probably theother members of the commission, pursued with great interest thepublication about the alleged forgery of the Riezler Diaries in the HZ, inthe “Zeit” – the letters to the editor included” – and Bavarian television(15 August 1983) and also held a number of telephone conversations with Mr.Erdmann”40. However Schieder refused. He was  “somewhat sceptical, whether this was in the interest of the matter. Theproblem is that nobody had seen the Riezler Diaries and the discussionalmost inevitably circled towards the question of the war guilt of 1914.The ´Zeit´ does this quite consciously as you can see from the issue inwhich only letters to the editor are published and then almost exclusivelythose of Fischer’s scholars” (My emphasis, B.S.)41.  The fact that the “victory” was for the other side seemed to befinally clear to Schieder42. This did not alter the fact thatJohn Röhl began putting out a feeler towards the conservativecamp. Röhl wrote: “It was inevitable that the controversy surrounding the Riezler Diarieswould flame up again. Although the polemic tone which has now entered thediscussion is by no means necessary and certainly not beneficial!” (Myemphasis, B.S.)43. Röhl intervened in favour of Sösemann whom he knew from hisvisits of the Merseburg archive collections. 1 BA-K, Legacy of Th. Schieder. N 1188/292, K.D.Erdmann to Th. Schieder, 9.5.1975F.Fellner and B.Sösemann had uttered first critics on Erdman´s edition in 1974.2 Something new about Bethmann, in: Die Zeit, 26.1.1968. See F.Stern, The Art ofDoing Evil, in: Die Zeit, No. 52, 29.12.1967, 26 and K.D.Erdmann, Coveted Diary. Wasthe Truth about July 1914 concealed? In: Die Zeit, No.52, 29.12.1967, p.26.3 K.D.Erdmann, Coveted Diary. Was the Truth about July 1914 concealed? In: Die Zeit,No.52, 12.1.1968, 7.

4 BA-K. N 1188/12, K.D.Erdmann to Th.Schieder, 8.2.1968.5 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to M.White, 8.2.1968.6 Ibid., N 1188/277. K.D.Erdmann to Th.Schieder, 10.2.1982.7 Ibid., N 1188/102. Th.Schieder to K.-G.Faber, 19.1.1982.8 Ibid., K.-G.Faber to Th.Schieder, 31.1.1982.9 Ibid., Th.Schieder to K.-G.Faber, 15.2.1982.10 Ibid., N 1188/284. B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 21.12.1981. “Enclosure: manuscript‘The Diaries of Kurt Riezler’ 5 photographic copies on block paper, 1 graphic”.11 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to Th.Schieder, 8.2.1982. In this Erdmann was undoubtedly rightfor it was not until much later that Sösemann showed a sense of reality in hisattempts to contact Fritz Fischer.12 Ibid., B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 2.6.1982.13 Ibid., Th.Schieder to K.D.Erdmann, 18.6.1982.14 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to Th.Schieder, 6.8.1982.15 See ibid., Th.Schieder to K.D.Erdmann, 6.9.1982.16 Ibid., N 1188/284. Th.Schieder to B.Sösemann, 13.10.1982.17 Ibid., B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 20.10.1982. That Schieder was closer to thetruth is revealed to me by Fischer’s repeatedly mentioned language agreement, whichwas reported to Schieder.18 Ibid., B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 15.11.1982.19 Ibid., Th.Schieder to B.Sösemann, 21.12.1982. 20 Ibid., B.Sösemann to K.D.Erdmann, 6.1.1983.21 Ibid., B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 6.1.1983.22 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to B.Sösemann, 21.1.1983.23 Ibid., Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 26.1.198324 Ibid., Th.Schieder to B.Sösemann, 31.1.1983. Ibid., Th. Schieder to K.D.Erdmann,11.1.1983. This corresponds to the facts. Although I am reluctant to confirm it,Fischer did receive Sösemann on a July weekend in Blankenese. Both were somewhatafraid of burning their fingers on the matter. That was my impression as I wasworking on the same subject just a few kilometres away.25 Ibid., Th.Schieder to K.D.Erdmann, 31.1.1983. These doubts were also shared by me.26 Ibid., B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 2.2.1983. Schulte Diary, 1983. On 26 AprilFischer rang me on the telephone and mentioned Sösemann’s essay which appeared inthe Historical Journal. Schulte Diary, 1983. On 7. May Fischer was in Bonn.27 Ibid., B.Sösemann to F.Fischer, 31.5.1983.28 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to Th.Schieder, 27.5.1983. See ibid. B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder,3.6.1983. Ibid., Th.Schieder to B.Sösemann, 7.6.1983. Ibid., B.Sösemann toR.Oldenbourg publishers 7.6.1983. Ibid., B.Sösemann to Th.Schieder, 10.6.1983.Ibid., legacy of F.Fischer, N 1422/97. B.Sösemann, Riezler Diaries. Erdmann, Anti-Criticism, [Note in Fischer’s handwriting: „probably 1983“]. This is not present inSchieder’s legacy. Is however found in Fischer’s papers, declared as “CONFIDENTIAL”and dated by Fischer as „probably 1983“.29 Ibid. Th.Schieder to K.-H.Janßen, 10.6.1983.33 Ibid. K.-H.Janßen to Th.Schieder, 13.6.1983.31 Ibid. F.Fischer to Th.Schieder, 2.7.1983. Ibid., N 1188/235, Th. Schieder toH.Herzfeld, 1.2.1960: “I am writing to you in great haste that I am most impressedby your discussion with Fischer and Müller. I believe that you have voiced allnecessary basic criticism and thus any false impression created by Fischer’s essayis corrected.”32 Ibid., Th.Schieder to Die Zeit, 12.8.1983.33 Ibid., N 1188/234. Th.Schieder to K.D.Erdmann, 4.12.1961.34 Ibid., Th.Schieder to H.Heimpel, 4.12.1961.35 Ibid., N 1188/237. Th.Scheider to G.Ritter, 6.12.1961. 1985 published after theRitter legacy in Schulte, Riezler, 124 and following.36 Ibid., See Schulte, Riezler, 122 and 124 and following.37 Ibid., N 1422/26. F.Fischer to F.Fellner, 5.6.1983.38 Ibid., F.Fellner to F.Fischer, 9.7.1983.

39 Ibid., F.Fischer to K.-H.Janßen, 7.1.1982. Fischer eventually disclosed to me thatmy co-authorship of the rororo volume was “ignored”. However, he informs outsidersof our mutual visit to the Federal Archives (insight into Ritter’s legacy) and handsover the fruits of my investigation, for instance that the archives had quashedparts of the Rassow legacy which contained copies of the Riezler Diaries. See ibid.F.Fischer to K.-H.Janßen, 1.6.1983. Fischer also maintained a close intercourse, aswell by letter as in person.40 Ibid., K.-H.Janßen to F.Fischer, 1983. The kind of political influence CountessDöhnhoff was pursuing by the weekly newspaper “Die Zeit” becomes unveiled by theRothfels legacy. See Federal Archive Koblenz, N 1213. Legacy H.Rothfels, M.CountessDöhnhoff/G.Bucerius to H.Rothfels, 16.3.1967.41 See ibid., N 1422/26. Legacy F.Fischer, F.Fischer to K.-H.Janßen, 21.8.1983 andB.F.Schulte to Die Zeit, 12.8.1983, Die Zeit, No. 33.42 Schulte, Diary, 4.9.1983.43 Federal Archive Koblenz. N 1188/12, Legacy Th.Schieder, Th.Schieder to W.P.Fuchs,20.9.1983.44 See ibid., Th.Schieder to K.D.Erdmann, 25.10.1983.45 Ibid., N 1188/283. J.Röhl to Th.Schieder, 16.2.1983. Th.Schieder to J.Röhl,23.2.1983. Schieder answered sift, that he had “been unable to postpone furthermorethis publication”; “for in between the Streitschrift of Fritz Fischer has beenpublished” . This book went back on more than my initiative. Our work on this bookfounded on the letters of G.Ritter, I did upheave in the Federal Archive at Koblenzin between 1977 and 1978.    Erdmann: “Wicked Rumours”. In January 1984 a conversation took place in Kiel with Erdmannwhich caused the Kiel professor and his lady assistant someproblems. My questions which resulted from the Ritter legacy,by the two could not be adequately answered. Laying down noteswith blushing ears, they admitted that it would be necessary toinvestigate the matter once again. In the end Erdmann did notfail to dismiss me with the stern warning not to write anythingsimply for the sake of it.  There are some indications that show us: Erdmann and Blänsdorf,from this onwards, and with high probability were working onthe Riezler Diaries again with indirect help of the GermanChancellor Helmuth Kohl who, in 1984, spent some DM 500.000,-on Erdmann, in order to set him into the state to complete hisstudies on Riezler´s legacy. This fact I got to know byFischer. The background gets clarified by Blänsdorf who didanswer me in 2000:  “I suggest that your question alludes to the project of Professor Erdmann´s on acomparison of the post war development of the two German States and of Austria. Thepicture planned didn´t reach it´s completion because of his death”1. 

In July 1983 I did resume in the “Lübecker Nachrichten” theopinion that I had only just advocated on the NDR televisionchannel, namely that Erdmann, as part of the historian´sfraternity, had intended to use the Riezler Diary as a “weaponagainst Fischer”2. Strangely enough, exactly these researchresults are currently being adapted – eighteen years later – bySösemann; but now with Erdmann as the single object of attack. Erdmann, much angered by this, in 1983 effected through his CDUpolitical party colleague, “N[ord]D[eutscher]R[undfunk]”principal Wilhelm Räuker, as well as the “Zeit” editors. And atelevision report, as well as an essay in the “Zeit” wereproduced (Erdmann: “I am not a Forger”). But Erdmann,completely agitated set forth attacking and sent angry lettersto Ralf Reck, the author at the NDR. He denied outright myresearch results which were based on the Kiel professor´s owncomments on Ritter: He stressed that:  “Riezler’s diaries spoke against Fritz Fischer’s well-known theory that theGerman Imperial Government had planned the general European war long inadvance”3.  Before this, Schieder too, as “President of the HistoricalCommission at the Bavarian Academy of Science”, had alreadysent a letter of protest to Räuker. In a rather far-fetchedcomparison, Schieder asserted that the edition of the RiezlerDiaries had already been passed on to the “Bavarian Academy ofScience” in 1957, “i.e. long before the appearance of FritzFischer’s well-known book ´Grasp for the World Power´”. Greatlydisturbed, the former Cologne professor cited my remarks in aNDR television report on my reasearch that Erdmann “had been in the obligation to reply to a book by his famous Hamburgcolleague Fritz Fischer and thus with a reply to join the front line of theGerman conservative historian´s fraternity. He had practically the task ofopposing Fischer in the name of these German conservative Historians forclaiming that Germany had, to a large extent, co-unleashed the 1st WorldWara. The Riezler diaries were the historians’ fraternity’s weapon againstFischer and it was motivated and thought by this historian´s fraternity todisarm Fischer by a source which seemed to portray a key document. ThusGerman War Guilt was to become practically anihilated. [This is the servicewhich Mr. Erdmann believed that he owed to German history and the Germanimage of history”, [omitted by Schieder, sic!]4 (My emphasis, B.S.). ______

 

a Here my spoken text was manipulated by the author (Günter Specovius). The tape wascut and individual words put together in this form. The irregular phonetic height ofthe words in accentuation causes the text to jump at this point. Beyond Schieder’s “competence” things were in reality evenclearer, for it was Schieder who had developed and from thebeginning co-ordinated the fraternity’s strategy againstFischer, partly based on the Riezler Diary5. His aim was toimpress the NDR principal from a position of power; based onhis position as President of the Bavarian Academiy6.Consequently Ralf Reck received the order to produce areparation report exclusively about Erdmann7. But the lattercontinued to exert pressure on the NDR. He claimed that thefilm could not be a report on research findings since my book8

were not yet available. The author should have conspired withme. By means of the Bavarian Historical Commission, Erdmannsought to attain such importance as he deemed necessary to hisdefence. His position was shaky. Only his colleague and friendSchieder continued to support him. Erdmann declared that he wasthe object of  “the unspeakable reproach of a deliberate purposeful manipulation of theedition”.  The Kiel professor had misused the Historical Commission as a“lightning conductor”. Erdmann refused to give any statement inan interview “on the scientific questions, raised by theRiezler Diary” and forced the NDR - under the threat ofjudicial proceedings – to issue an explanation which could bethe prerequisite of an adjustment report. This report was shownon television9. All this went on behind closed doors. I learnedof Schieder’s protest nearly twenty years later from hislegacy. My investigations on the “forgery of Riezler’s diaries”which appeared in 1985 was harshly criticised in the“Süddeutsche Zeitung” by Volker Ullrich (currently at “DieZeit”). Klaus Hildebrand mentions this article nevertheless inhis handbook on German foreign policy 1871-191810. Erdmann died in 1990. As I did prove in 1985, he in the 1930’swas a member of the NS Teachers’ Association. The Kröger/Thimmebook on “Carl-Dietrich Erdmann’s historical images” documentsclearly and sharply pointedly Erdmann’s historical work for theNS-State. Werner Conze, the Erdmann scholar EberhardJäckel/Stuttgart and others, sought in obituaries to render

Erdmann’s role as harmless. The Erdmann of the 30’s and the40’s, one of the later central figures in the camp of Fischeropponents, draws the glance to their role during the 3rd Reich.Thus the motives become transparent from which the scientificdiscussion since the 60’s had to be held in such an intenseform and severity. 1 A.Blänsdorf an B.F.Schulte, 30.1.2000. Between 1983 and 1990, Erdmann was engagedin a project on the relationship of the two German states towards Austria. His chiefassistant hereby was again Agnes Blänsdorf (Blänsdorf’s information). It is obvious,as confirmed and announced from various directions, that in fact alterations werecarried out on the Riezler Diaries subsequently. See Schulte, Riezler, 28. I toldErdmann and Blänsdorf in the discussion at Kiel-University that in Koblenz FederalArchive there existed a legacy of Kurt Rheindorf. Both, Erdmann and Blänsdorf,were interested a good deal, what became apparent by them taking detailed notes. Onthe 25.3.1984 the son of Walter Goetz/DHI Rome, wrote to me, he did “allowProf.Erdmann and a lady assistant of his…, in his demand, to take a look into thelegacy” of his father. From Munich as well there were news, containing Mr. Erdmannwould send a lady assistant even to the Akademy of Beau Arts, in order to selectthe legacy of Walter Riezler a second time. Erdmann did work there already in 1968for but one day; in those times there did exist three letters of Kurt Riezlerwhich disappeared up to 1983. Fritz Fischer informed me in 1983 that Helmuth Kohlhad placed DM 500.000,- at Erdmann’s disposal for a German History (See BA-K. N1422, B.F.Schulte to F.Fischer on this). See B.F.Schulte, The Wall of Trust: TheLeuna Case or how Governments are run, in: Ders., Recollections and Redirections.Contributions to the German Question, 1850-1989, Hamburg 2000, 223. See also: TheState Secret: A civilian Crime Story in eight Acts with an Act of Strength, in:“konkret”, 2nd Issue, February 1984 (“konkret” Extra), 50-63. Diary Schulte,5.12.1983: “Gremliza Konkret. Manuscript on report of Konkret re-edited and appearsas report on my book on the same conditions”. 2 Bernd F. Schulte, Another Forged Diary? Kurt Riezler’s Reports on the ImperialChancellor Bethmann Hollweg in the Debate of the Historians, in: LübeckerNachrichten, 17.7.1983. “Following the appearance of the “Grasp for the World Power” however, this document was re-functioned to become ´chief witness´of the historian- defendants of Imperial Germany against Fischer…This is theportrait of a decisive epoch in our history which may not be concealed through thehistorians’ monopoly on information.” See B.F. Schulte: The „Black Hole“. A Forgeryof a Diary und the Motives Beyond, in: “Extra-Blatt”, 30.8.2001 (Teil I: „Not to beused as a Source to Facts, Actions and Decision-Making in Summer 1914“; Part II:„Historians in the Shade”).3 BA-K, NL Th.Schieder. N 1188/284, K.D.Erdmann to R.Reck, 26.6.1984.4 Ibid., Th.Schieder to F.W.Räuker, 18.5.1984.5 See Schulte, Riezler, 130-140, 222 (Doc.77), 225f. (Doc.83).6 Ibid., Th.Schieder to F.W.Räuker, 18.5.1984.7 Ibid., R.Reck to K.D.Erdmann, 19.6.1984.8 Bernd F. Schulte, The Falsification of the Riezler Diaries. A Contribution to thescientific History of the 1950’s and 1960’s, Frankfurt-Berne 1985 (cited as:Schulte, Riezler). This book, was to appear in Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s “NeueGesellschaft”. But when Wehler spoke on the telephone of his colleague, “Wolfgang”[i.e. Mommsen/Düsseldorf], I realised that this subject could not be allowed toreach the “New Society”. Schulte, Diary, 10.9.1983.9 Ibid., K.D.Erdmann to R.Reck, 26.6.1984.10 Volker Ullrich: What is false with the Riezler Diaries? A Spot-light on theHistory of the German Historians’ Guild, in: “Süddeutsche Zeitung, No. 208,10.9.1985, 10. See my review in: “The Black Hole”, in: special edition,

www.forumfilm.de , 1/2001. See K.Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy 1871-1918. Munich1989, 88. See Schulte, Diary, 28.2.1984. Dr. Real/Federal Archives, phoned asking meto write some explanatory text to enable him in order to extinguish the flamesfanned by Frido Ritter (brother of G.Ritter), Schieder and Erdmann in the FederalArchives against me using the Ritter legacy. Professor Booms, the President at thosetimes - and pupil of Schieder´s, then gave instructions to have my completecorrespondence run via his desk. This amounted de facto to a prohibition of my work.11 Between 1983 and 1990, Erdmann was engaged in a project on the relationship of thetwo German states towards Austria (see note 1).