Bensayah Belkacem Current/True NameandAliases

SECRET // 20330428

STATESCOMMAND

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEADQUARTERS , JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMOU.S. NAVAL STATION , GUANTANAMO BAY , CUBA

APOAE09360

JTF- GTMO- CDR 28 April 2008

MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates SouthernCommand, 3511NW 91st Avenue,

Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG- 010001DP (S)

JTF- GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) PersonalInformation:

JDIMS/NDRC ReferenceName: Bensayah Belkacem

Current/ True Name andAliases: Abu Shiema, Abu al-Majid ,Abdulkarim al-Sabahi, AbdelKarim el-Sabahi,Mezd,Belkacem Ahmed, AbdulMedzid, Mesa, Zerar, Jamal

Place of Birth: Warqala, Algeria (AG )Date of Birth: 10 September 1962

Citizenship: AlgeriaInternment Serial Number (ISN) : -010001DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U ) JTF-GTMOAssessment:

a. (S) Recommendation : JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention

Under DoD Control (CD) . JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for ContinuedDetention Under Control (CD on 26 October 2007 .

b . (S ) Executive Summary Detainee is a member ofan Algerian Armed Islamic( GIA) cell involved inan al- Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo ,

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BK) was the Bosnia contact for senior al-Qaida

1

Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism ( CT) Priority 3

target . Priority 3 targets are defined as issues , opportunities , or threat other senior policymakers and IC managersbelieve must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include

terrorist / extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack

CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES

REASON : E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED , SECTION 1.4 ( CDECLASSIFY ON: 20330428

SECRET NOFORN 20330428


JTF- GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee , ISN US4AG- 010001DP (S)

facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah ), ISN010016DP (GZ-10016). Detainee is identified as a financier and facilitator who coordinatedpre-travel arrangements for extremists en route to Afghanistan (AF ). Detainee receivedadvanced training at an al-Qaida associated training camp and an extremist camp in Bosnia.Detainee is linkedto al- Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN) , including those tiedto the MillenniumPlot and other terrorist support non-governmentalorganizations (NGO) .[ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE INANSCI SUPPLEMENT. GTMO determined this detainee to be:

A HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and alliesA LOW threat froma detentionperspectiveOfHIGHintelligencevalue

c. (S NF) Summary of Changes The following outlines changes to detainee'sassessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be

annotated by next to the footnote.)

Added a significant amount of documents to detainee's supplement

Included an additional report identifying detainee as a high level extremist facilitatorAdded additional informationon communications between detainee and GZ- 10016

Includedreportsidentifyingdetainee's trainingat an advancedtrainingcamp inAfghanistanand attendinga trainingcamp inBosnia

Includedreports indicating detainee fought in Tajikistan and Bosnia

Added a reportdescribingdetaineeas an associate ofanAlgerianextremistcell inZenica, BK

Added informationpertaining to detainee's roommate in Zenica

Included detainee’s admissions of being a director ofan NGO while inBosnia

4. ( U ) Detainee’s Account of Events :

2

U.S. personsand interests, but are believedto posesomewhatless threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/ extremist

groups that havedemonstratedintentionto attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to developoracquire WMDcapability.

AnalystNote: The GJSNis a NIPFPriority1 CT target. Priority1 targets are definedas issues, opportunities, orthreatsthat riseto or are expectedto riseto , the levelofinterestofthe President, VicePresident, DNI, and

NSC /HSCPrincipalsandDeputies. This includesterroristgroups, countriesthat sponsorterrorism, or countriesthathavestateorganizationsinvolvedinterrorismthat pose a clearand immediatedangerto USpersonsor interests.

This includesthosepreparingto employWMD.

2

SECRET 20330428


JTF- GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee , ISN US4AG - 010001DP (S)

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account .

These statements are included without consideration of veracity , accuracy , or reliability .

a. ( S //NF) Prior History: Detainee completed conventional schooling through the sixth

grade . He then attended a religious institute until 1980 when he left before earning a

diploma . Detainee then worked as a civil registry clerk at the local municipality, preparingbirth and death certificates. From 1982 through 1984, detainee satisfied his compulsory

military service in the Algerian Army. Detainee returned to work as a civil registry clerkuntil 1986, when his father died. Detainee quit hisjob and moved back in with his mother.

Unable to obtain employment, detainee sold a piece of land and set up a small grocery store

out ofhis parent’s house which he operated for two to three years . In 1989, he became

serious about Islam. In June 1990, detainee left Algeria to participate inthe hajj (pilgrimage)

and traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) , via Tunisia (TS) and Jeddah, SA. While inMecca, detainee frequented various mosques where shaykhs gave religious lessons. Detainee

remained in Mecca due to these teachings and stayed at the Noble Sanctuary until early 1995.

In April or May 1995, detainee conducted another hajj Detainee then decided to travel to

Bosnia to teach children the basics ofpracticing Islam

b . (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel : In June 1995, detainee, using his Algerian passport,departed Saudi Arabia and traveled to Sanaa, Yemen (YM), where he stayed for two

months . obtained a false Yemeni passport from an unidentified individual.

Detainee stated his Algerian passport had expired and he was afraid to go to the Embassy torenew it because he might be accused of beinga terrorist . August of 1995, detainee used

his Algerian passport to exit Yemen and his false Yemeni passport to enter Syria (SY).

Detainee left his Algerian passport in Damascus , SY with a religious person whom he met atthe Amawi Mosque and traveled to Istanbul, Turkey (TU) , where he waited for a Croatian

(HR) visa. He departed Turkey and traveled to Zenica, via Split, HR and Slovenia (SI) .Detainee arrived in Zenica on 11 November 1995 and was directed to the Balkans NGO.

3 034 0198 02, IIR6 034 0198 02(b ), AnalystNote: Detainee'sclaim of livingin the NobleSanctuary for five

years is assessedto be a fabrication, as are many ofhis claims. The NobleSanctuary is the area ofthe KabawhereMuslimspray five times daily . It is extremely unlikely that the Saudi Government would allow anyone to remainwithin the Sanctuary for any period greater than one day due to the need to ensure the Kaba was equally accessibleby all4

5

AnalystNote: Detaineereportedthat he used his Algerianpassportbecausehe did not think his accentwould

supporthis claimofbeing Yemeni. Detaineeclaimed that the officialsdidnot noticethat his Algerianpassporthadexpired.AnalystNote: InTD -314/40549-02, senioral-QaidalieutenantGZ- 10016stated he metdetaineeinAfghanistanin

1993, the perioddetaineereportedhewas in Saudi Arabia. GZ- 10016hashistoricallybeenmoretruthful thandetainee.

034 0198 02(b) , IIR6 034 0198 02(c) ; AnalystNote: Detaineereportedthat travelthroughYemen, Syria,

and Turkeyto Bosniawas normal.

3

SECRET 20330428


JTF- GTMO-CDR



c. (S ) Training and Activities: Detainee worked for the Balkans NGO until August

, distributing food in exchange for room and board. During this time , he obtained his

Bosnian citizenship using the name on his false Yemeni passport .' Detainee became aclothing trader and made numerous trips to Turkey . The first trip was to Istanbul for three tofour months at the end of 1996. Detainee returned to Zenica via Sarajevo in December 1996.

In 1997, detainee met and married a Bosnian woman and lived with her parents inZenica .Detainee did not work during the first two and a halfyears of marriage and lived off savings

and the profits ofa month long trip to Istanbul every six months selling clothes. DuringRamadan in 1998, detainee rented an apartment in Zenica where he and his wife stayed for

approximately eight months, then moved to another apartment. Detainee’s additional income

was derived from money from Arabs going to the United Kingdom (UK) for political

asylum , which he received through express mail or Western Union. In late 1997 or early

1998, detainee went to the local police department to change his name back to his “ real”name. He was then able to receive a Bosnian passport in his real name. Detainee traveled to

the United Arab Emirates (AE) Red Crescent office in Sarajevo seeking charity assistance for

his family. There, Lakhdar Boumediene, ISN -010005DP (AG- 10005), provideddetainee with groceries .

5. ( U Capture Information :

a. ( S //NF) Inlate October 2001, the BosnianFederal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP)arrested detainee and several other Algerians collectively known as the “ Algerian Six ” ) whowere suspected ofbeing involvedin a terrorist plot against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Inaddition to detainee, Bosnian authorities arrested Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar, ISNUS4AG010002DP (AG- 10002) ; Muhammad Nechla, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG- 10003) ; MustafaAit Idir, ISN -010004DP (AG- 10004) ; AG- 10005; andAl- Omar Boudellaa, ISNUS4AG-010006 (AG- 10006). After being exonerated by a Bosnianpolice criminalinvestigation and following the Algerian Government's refusal to take custody, Bosnian

authorities transferred the detainees to US custody on 18 January 2002.10

7

8

? AnalystNote: Detaineereportedthe BosnianGovernmentdissolvedthe Balkans” charity organizationat the end

of 1996due to a shootoutbetweenanEgyptianand anotherArab. Attainingcitizenshipabroadprovidesa meansofobtainingadditionalpassports, a commonpracticeusedby extremists.

AnalystNote: Detaineereportedhe madeapproximately$ 2,000 US duringeachofthesebi-yearly trips toIstanbul, TU. Detaineefurther claimedthat he neverheld a job inBosnia.

034 0198 02( ) AnalystNote: Detainee'sprocurementofmultiplepassportsis representativeofextremistprocurementoftraveldocuments. Detaineehad multiplepassports: an Algerianpassport (whichhe claimedto have

left inSyria, whichverified his nationalityandmarriageinBosnia) ; a falseYemenipassport(whichhe claimedheburned); a true-nameBosnianpassport; andlikelya Bosnianpassportsharingthe nameofhis falseYemenipassport.

Reportingstateddetaineehad 10 passportsshowingvariousnationalitiesandnames inhispossessionat the timeofhis arrest, althoughit is unknownifthey were for detainee'spersonaluse.

IIR 6 933 002102, IIR6 034 019802, TD-314/08126-05, TD - 314 /49994-02, TD- 314/39239-01, AMEMBASSY

SARJEVO29-DEC-2006; Analyst Note: In TD- 314/39634-01, the date ofcaptureis givenas 21 October2001.

10

4

SECRET 20330428


JTF - GTMO-CDR



b. ( S) Property Held:

Ring

Although not held at JTF -GTMO,the following items were reported in detainee'spossession atthe time of his capture:

10 passports showing various nationalities and names, three ofwhich were :

Algerianpassport, number 3510803

Yemenipassport, number3741913

Bosnianpassport number S/91060155063 Audio Cassettes and 2 VideotapesTelephone numbers and e-mail addresseswere found on detainee or inhis

apartmentby the BosnianMuslimGovernment Service

c. (S Transferredto JTF- GTMO: 20 January 2002

d (S ) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provideinformationon thefollowing

Terrorist operations against US personnel and facilities in Bosnia

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account : While detainee has acknowledged possessing

multiple passports, he has omitted key details such as the actual disposition of the passports, theirorigins, and intended use. As noted, detainee stated he left his Algerian passport in Syria but

also claimed he used it to validate his identity for marriage in Bosnia. Detainee is not

forthcoming during debriefings and routinely refuses to answer questions. Despite corroborated

intelligence reporting, detainee denies his identity activities , employment, and relationship toextremist members. Detainee stated to the Algerian delegation he “ has secrets that he cannot tell

the Americans.” Detainee stated he made an oath to Allah not to speak to interviewers.

7. ( U ) Detainee Threat :

The FMUPis also abbreviatedas MUP. IIR2 216 133102 stated detaineewas strippedofBosniancitizenshipon

29 November2001 andpledguiltyon 7 December2001to havingfalsifieddocuments, specificallyan Algerian

passport inthe name ofAbdulkarimal-Sabahi. The Bosnianinvestigationwas probablylimitedto the issue ofcitizenship

TD- 314/38324-01, IIR2 216 1276 02

010001302 04-NOV-2002, 010001302 29- -2002, 010001SIR 16 -MAR - 2006

11

12

5



JTF- GTMO-CDR



a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threatto the US, its interests, and allies.

b . (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention : Detainee is an assessed member of theGIA and was arrested, along with other assessed members of a terrorist group, in response to

terrorist threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee was the -based contactfor senior al-Qaida facilitator GZ- 10016 . Detainee is identified as a financier and facilitator

who coordinated pre -travel arrangements for extremists en route to Afghanistan to participate

in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is a veteran mujahid who receivedadvanced training at an al-Qaida associated training camp and an extremist camp in Bosnia.

Detainee is linked to other members of al-Qaida’s GJSN , including those tied to theMillennium Plot and to extremist NGOs .

14

( S //NF) Detainee is an assessed member of a GIA cell in Bosnia and an assessed

participant in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo.

( S //NF) In September 2001, detainee , Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (AbuMaali) , AG- 10003 , AG - 10005 , and AG- 10006 were included on an Algerian

Government list of Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of havingterrorist ties to the GIA and al-Qaida.

(S//NF) Detainee included on a Bosnian Government list of 86 ethnic

Arabs who made changes to their legal personal identification information .

Detainee is listed as changing his name to Abdulkerim al- Sabahi on 12 October1997. (Analyst Note: Changing his name in the Bosnian Government

bureaucracy would possibly enable detainee to obtain another passport inthatname, therefore allowing extremist groups to obtain authentic travel documents . )(S/NF) On 8 October 2001, FMUP, incooperation with US forces in Bosnia,

apprehended detainee a suspected al-Qaida facilitator, after an investigation intothreats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed the

investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee, who were suspected

of involvement in the threats. This led to their subsequent apprehension .(S //NF) Over the next two weeks AG-10002, AG- 10003, AG- 10004, AG

10005, and AG- 10006 were arrested for false attestation of information andsuspected involvementin the threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.16

13

14

TD -314 /39634-01, TD -314 /42368-01; Analyst Note: It is assessed that Abdelmadjid Benaissa is a variant of

detainee's name and his alias . A variant of Bensayah is Benaissa and a variant of Abdul Medzid is Abdelmadjid .TD- 314/32951-04 ParagraphR ; AnalystNote: A variant Abdulkerimis Abdul Karim.IIR 6 933 002102

IIR 6 933 002102

15

16

6



JTF- GTMO-CDR



18

20

( S //NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic

Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur , aka ( AbuNasar) , a suspected facilitator for the GSPC .

( S //NF) The Bosnian Federation SupremeCourt stated this group attemptedtoattack the facility and the employees ofthe US Embassy in Sarajevo. BosnianGovernment documents identified the arrested individuals as an organizedterroristgroup, whose activities constitutedan act of international terrorism . The group wassuspected of conducting surveillance of the Embassyand its personnel, andcoordinating with senior UBL lieutenantGZ- 10016 . (Analyst Note: According to2004 open source reporting, Bosnian prosecutors andpolice formally exonerated thesix Algeriansof any criminal charges. No terrorism charges were levied against themin theBosnian court.)

( S //NF) Detaineepossessedthe phone number of a Bosnianlocksmith

employedat the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigationby Embassyauthorities revealedthe individualwas AG- 10002's father- in -law . The employeewas detained and subsequently faileda polygraphtest givenby US authorities.(Analyst Note: This individualcouldhave providedphysicalaccess to theEmbassy for the purpose of the attack .)

//NF) Despite claims they were not associated with each other ,

communications between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six ”

demonstrated a close association between them. All six individuals are Algerian

nationals who came to Bosnia during the 1992-95 war . They are linked to theAlgerian terrorist organization GIA .

( S //NF) AG- mobilephone numberandhis landlinenumber are listed

amongdetainee's contacts.

( S //NF) AG - 10002 remarked he met detainee once or twice during AG10002's employment with the Saudi High Commission for Relief (SHCR) inZenica . AG-10002 further remarked detainee was a poor, uneducatedindividual who could barely afford to feed his family .( S //NF) A report listing phone numbers of detainee's contacts included AG

10005's phone number cell phone number was identified as

21

22

23

17

18

19

TD- 314/ 11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001TD - 314 /02606-02, BIHCourt Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB

2004Washington Post ForeignService 21 August 2006

IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1A, 010001 Profile23 -AUG-2002AMEMBASSY -SARAJEVO -29 - DEC -2006

010001SFORPOCKETLITTER01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 002102; AnalystNote: AG- 10002'sphonenumberisreportedas 033-535-026

TD- 314/ 09118-02

010001 SFOR POCKETLITTER01-OCT-2001

20

21

22

23

24

7

SECRET 20330428


JTF - GTMO-CDR



28

0038766157269 in the report. (Analyst Note: AG- 10005 reported during an

interview his home telephone number was 543234 and his cell phone number was66157269. )25

( S //NF) AG- 10005 admitted knowing, providing aid to , and obtaining alawyer for detainee . AG - 10005 claimed he hired a lawyer without knowing

the charges against detainee.

( S //NF) Detainee identified AG - 10005 asAhmed from the United ArabEmiratesRed Crescent office in Sarajevo.

//NF) AG- 10003 stated AG- 10005 assisted detainee and AG- 10002with theirrespectivecharity work.

( S //NF) Detainee's pocket litter included AG-10006's phone number. AG10006's cell phone number was provided as 00387-66160112 and his home phonenumber was 00387-33522085.“ Analyst Note: During an interview ,AG -10006confirmed his cell number as 66160112 his home number 33522085.30 AG10006 was an al-Qaida instructor and an assessed GIA

(U ) Other reportingprovided additional links between the “Algerian Six”Bosnia

( S //REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) AG-10004 claimed he was goodfriends withAG- 10005 and they worked together one or two days per week .AG- 10004 further remarked he and AG-10005 taught Karate to orphanssponsoredby the Red Crescent. They also played soccer on Saturdays withother Arabs who worked with other NGOs and embassies. AG-10004 furtherreported AG- 10005 and AG-10003 were friends.

//NF) AG-10003 stated he first met AG 10004 in Croatia and AG10004 assisted himwith the paperwork for his Bosniancitizenship. AG10003 stated he came to knowAG-10004 quite well when AG-10004transferredto Sarajevo in 1997.

32

33

25

IIR 6 034 0205 0226

IIR 6 0205 02( b )27

IIR 6 034 0198 02( ) , paragraph 2328

IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR4 201 2433 0629

TD- 314/38324-01, IIR 6 034 0201 02; Analyst Note: The IIRlists a phone number AG- 10006 provided as hisown. The TD provides a list ofdetainee’s contacts and notes the same phone number with the name Khallad. The

phone number is 066-160-112.IIR 6 034 0201 02

TD- 314/41818-01, 010006 SIR 01- DEC- 2005, IIR6 034 0205 02, TD -314/42368-01, TD -314 / 43043-07IIR 6 034 0727 02IIR4 201 2107 06

IIR 6 034 0208 02, 010003 FM4024 -MAR - 2002

30

31

32

33

34

8

SECRET 20330428


JTF - GTMO-CDR



35

37

( S //NF) An FMUP investigation found AG- 10003's and AG- 10005’s

phone numbers in items confiscated during AG- 10004’s arrest.( S //NF) AG- 10006's mobile phone number memory contained the phone

numbers of AG- 10003, AG- 10004, and AG- 10005.36REL TO USA, AUS, CAN , GBR) AG-10004 remarked that he met AG

10006 in June or July 1996. AG- 10006 was working for the Human AppealCharitable Organization. AG-10004 claimed his wife and AG-10006's wife werefriends. Detainee also admitted he helped AG-10006 download programs on hiscomputer.( S //NF ) Detainee had direct contact with senior al-Qaida facilitator GZ- 10016 in

Afghanistan and Bosnia . GZ - 10016 attempted to have detainee procure passports for himwhile detainee was in Bosnia .

( S //NF) Detainee called GZ- 10016 at least once on his mobile phone, and had

spoken in a way that indicated he was about to take part in a terrorist attack . The

most likely targets were “ Eagle , the main US base in , housing 3,000

personnel, and the US Embassy, which later closed temporarily in recognition of thethreat.

( S //NF) GZ- 10016 photo -identified detainee as Abu Majd, an Algerian national

who fought in Bosnia in the mid-to - late 1990s. GZ - 10016 did not recognize the name

Bensayah Belkacem . Ina separate debriefing, GZ - 10016 again photo- identifieddetainee as Abu al-Majid and also identified detainee by the alias Zerar.41

( S //NF) GZ- 10016 stated detainee was from Bosnia and first met him inAfghanistan in 1993 or 1994. Detaineehad been captured and spent some time in“ aCommunist prison ” in Kabul, AF . Sometime in 1994, detainee was released andvisited GZ- 10016 at his guesthouse in Peshawar, Pakistan (PK). Detainee told GZ10016 he was en route to Bosnia to fight in the jihad

//NF) When detainee returned to Afghanistan in 1997, GZ- 10016 saw detaineeagain. GZ- 10016 said detainee stayed in Afghanistan until 2000, when detaineereturned to Bosnia. GZ -10016 attempted to use detainee during this time as a contactto procure passports. GZ- 10016 said his last contact with detainee was shortly after

39

40

35

36

37

TD- 314/39904-01, Paragraph 2 FFFF and Paragraph 3C ; Analyst Note: AG- 10005's phone number is 090-157269, and AG-10003's phone number is 090-165-595 (see TD -314/ 41367-01) .

TD- 314/41367-01

IIR 4 2012107 0638 TD -314/43586-01

Janes Sentinel Security Assessment – Balkans 1-APR-2005 (See below regarding GZ- 10016'scommentspertainingto this phone call . )

TD- 314 / 18247-05

TD- 314/57979-05; Analyst Note: A variant of Abu Majd is Abu al-Majid. Detaineehasnot beenidentifiedinany other reportingas Zerar.

TD- 314/57979-05

39

40

41

42

9

SECRET 20330428


JTF - GTMO-CDR



43

44

45

11September2001by telephone. Duringthis phoneconversationGZ- 10016told

detaineehe would be able to find work in Afghanistansimilar to his work inBosnia

(S//NF) Analyst Note: GZ - 10016's comments conflict with detainee's claims

and place detainee in Afghanistan on multiple occasions. It is also assessed that

the phone call detainee made to GZ - 10016 is the same as mentioned previouslyregarding detainee and an imminent terrorist attack. It is assessed that detainee

was requesting safe -haven assistance from GZ- 10016 and continued employmentin terrorist operations inAfghanistan.

( S //NF) Detainee was identified as the primary al-Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.Detainee possessed numerous phone numbers linking him to operationalnetwork in Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network, including GZ

phone number which was found in his pocket litter.( S //NF) Detainee denied associations with GZ - 10016 and to using the alias Abu

Majd. Despite his denials , detainee’s wife also identified detainee as Abu Majd.

( S //NF) Detainee was identifiedas a financier and facilitatorarranging travel to

Afghanistan for the “ Algerian Six ” with the intentions to participate injihad againstUSand Coalition forces.

( S //NF) Detainee'sname was one of 25 names ona BosnianGovernment list ofAlgerians suspectedofinvolvementwith terroristorganizationsabroad, or involved

with humanitarianorganizationssuspectedofprovidinglogisticalsupport to terroristgroups.

S //NF) Detainee is identifiedas anextremist facilitator linked to cells inNorth

Africa( Tunisia , Morocco and Algeria) and extremists operating in Turkey , Germany(DE) France, Italy and England . (Additional information available in SCIsupplement )

S //NF) Open source reporting refers to bank accounts held by members of the“ Algerian Six ” . The document specifically mentions detainee as the key man in alQaida in the Balkans , and he had 3.5 million Bosnian Marks in bank in Bosniadeposited by the SHCR . Detainee denied ever having a bank account in Bosnia .49

46

43

44

45

TD- 314/57979-05 ; Analyst Note : In 010001 302 19 -NOV-2002, detainee denied ever traveling to Pakistan.TD- 314/14059-02, TD -314 /40549-02, IIR6 933 0021 02, DCS- G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB

2004 IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1IIR 6 034 0199 02, 010001 302 06-DEC- 2002

46 TD - /07726-02, Paragraph X> 002223 INTREP03- APR -2002

Figurecurrentlyequivalentto approximately$2.8 millionUS

EUP20030303000281, 010001SIR09-APR-2004; AnalystNote: The SHCRis a NIPF Priority4 TerroristSupportEntity(TSE) Priority4 TSEs are defined as havingthe availableresourcesandbeing in a positionto

providefinancialsupport to terroristorganizationswillingto attackUSpersonsor interests, or providewittingoperationalsupport to Priority4 terrorist groups.

47

48

49

10

SECRET 20330428

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoDControl (CD)

GuantanamoDetainee,ISNUS4AG-010001DP(S)

50TD-314/35452-01

51TD-314/57979-05

52TD-314/35452-01,IIR 6 933 002102; AnalystNote: The GSPCis an NIPFPriority1 CT target.

53TD-314/35452-01,IIR 6 933 002102,TD-314/14059-02

54TD-314/45985-02,001206FM4018-APR-2005

55TD-314/45985-02,001206FM4018-APR-2005,TD-314/30111-02

56TD-314/20986-02

(S//NF) A source reported detainee led a group of naturalized former Bosnian

mujahid of Algerian descent in Bosnia. Detainee was identified as an al-Qaida

member with no viable means of financial support but was somehow able tosupport himself and several other former mujahideen families in the Zenica and

Sarajevo areas of Bosnia. Some financial support was provided by Shaykh Nasar

al-Said, the former director of the SHCR, as well as from Rashid al-Sudairi, a

former mujahid with connections in Afghanistan.50 Possibly corroborating this

statement, GZ-10016 stated detainee worked for the mujahideen in Bosnia,providing them with daily supplies.51

(S//NF) Detainee encouraged his Algerian associates, GTMO detainees AG’s

10002-10006; Khaled al-Arbed (See information available in SCI supplement)

and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu Nasar), a native Algerian and a former Bosnian and

Afghan mujahid to participate in jihad in Afghanistan against US and Coalitionforces. 52 Detainee applied for an Iranian visa on 1 October 2001 in Sarajevo

intending to travel to Afghanistan through Iran and then assist the other Algerians

jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the US campaign following the

11September 2001 attacks. Detainee received financial support for this travel

from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the former director of the SHCR.53

• (S//NF) Detainee is a veteran mujahid who received advanced training at an al-Qaida

associated training camp and an extremist camp in Bosnia. (Additional information

available in SCI supplement)

(S//NF) GZ-10016 indicated he first met detainee in approximately 1993, whenal-Majd came to Afghanistan from the war in Tajikistan. Former al-Qaida operations

director in Southeast Asia and Bagram escapee, Mahmud Ahmad Muhammad al-

Rashid, ISN US9KU-001206DP (KU-1206, deceased) corroborated GZ-10016’s

account by stating he believed detainee had traveled to Tajikistan based on

conversations he had with detainee.54(S//NF) Multiple reports identify detainee as having received training and serving

in the Bosnian jihad in the early to mid 1990s.55

(S//NF) Detainee is reported being an associate of a group of former Bosnian

mujahideen from Algeria which established an extremist cell wanted by the

Algerian Government as of 2002.56(S//NF) KU-1206 reported he saw detainee (al-Majd) at the Derunta Training

Camp for approximately one week. Additionally, after detainee’s training at Duranta,

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

11

for

JTF-GTMO-CDR



57001206FM4018-APR-2005,TD-314/30111-02

58001206 FM4018-APR-2005

59EUCOMAtmani14 Feb2006,TD-314/32974-05,TD-314/38324-01,Paragraph4A

60TD-314/14059-02,IIR 6 034 0199 02,010001302 29-AUG-2002

61IIR6 034 0199 02; AnalystNote: A variant of Benallaoa Nabilis NabilBenalloua.

62TD-314/30473-04,TD-314/18847-04

63TD-314/38324-01,AnalystNote: Variantsof Dozana may include Dojano,Janana,and Dujana.

detainee told KU-1206 about his training and how compounds and explosives were

created at the Duranta Training Camp.57

(S//NF) KU-1206 also reported that detainee attended an unidentified militanttraining camp in Zenica during 1993.58

• (S//NF) Detainee is linked to other members of al-Qaida’s GJSN, including those

tied to the Millennium Plot and to extremist NGOs.

(S//NF) Detainee’s pocket litter contained the same phone number provided byHocine Benaoui to Fatah Kamel in order to contact Said Atmani. Kamel is suspected,

along with Ahmed Ressam, of involvement in the Millennium Plot, a planned

bombing attack against the Los Angeles Airport (LAX). Atmani was convicted in

French courts as a terrorist facilitator and deported to Morocco by the Bosnian

Government.59(S//NF) Detainee met Ahmad Marwan in 1998 at the al-Ansar Mosque in Bosnia.

Detainee called Marwan to request assistance in locating a place to stay when he

traveled to Turkey, allegedly to buy and sell clothing. Marwan is an ethnic Turk with

ties to mujahideen efforts in Turkey and is affiliated with several known terrorists.60

(S//NF) Detainee received money from members of al-Qaida’s GJSN. Asrecently as two weeks prior to his arrest, detainee received a wire transfer in the

amount of $750 US from Benallaoa Nabil in Frankfurt, DE. Detainee stated Abu Ali

in London, UK arranged the transfer.61

(S//NF) Algerian national Benallaoa Nabil is a lieutenant of Ibrahim Buisir

trained in Kosovo. Ibrahim Buisir, aka (Ibrahim Abd al-Salam MuhammadBusayr), is an Ireland (IE) based terrorist facilitator and holds a leadership

position in the al-Qaida European cell.62

(S//NF) The phone number 441214495950 associated with the name Dozana

and Dojano, was found in detainee’s effects by the Bosnian Government service.

The same phone number was listed for Abud Janana al-Jazari in the telephonediary of al-Qaida facilitator Ahmed Hassan Jamil Suleyman, ISN US9JO-

000662DP (JO-662, transferred).63 (Analyst Note: Dozana’s phone number has a

United Kingdom country code and it is possible he is associated with Abu Ali.

There is no other known connection between detainee and JO-662.)

(S//NF) Detainee’s roommate at 184 Gorazdanska, Zenica was an Egyptiannamed al-Sheriff Hassan Mahmoud Saad, aka (Sakhr) who was arrested

S E C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20330428

12

for

JTF-GTMO-CDR



64EUP2001092200089

65TD-314/04678-03;Analyst Note: Detainee’sphone number is listedin paragraphC as 38732420737.

66TD-314/52648-03,IIR 7 739 3117 03

67AT Force Protection06-FEB-2002;Analyst Note: Al-Furqan is a NIPFPriority4 TSE.

68IIR7 1310030 02; AnalystNote: Al-Haramainis NIPFPriority2 TSE. Priority 2 TSEs have demonstrated

sustained and active financial support for terroristorganizationswilling to attack US persons or interests,or provide

witting operationalsupport to Priority2 terroristgroups.69

010001SIR 29-JUN-200570

TD-314/50199-05,ParagraphO71

TD-314/50199-0572

IIR7 114 0256 04; AnalystNote: AIO is an NIPFPriority1 TSE. Priority 1 TSE’sare identifiedas providingwitting operationalsupport to Priority1 terroristgroups.

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention

perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force

and staff. He currently has 21Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the

most recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he failed to follow guard instructions on

returning an electric razor when his time was up. He has one Report of DisciplinaryInfraction for assault occurring on 17 November 2003, when he threw water on the guards.

Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass

approximately three months prior to detainee’s arrest. Sakhr was also suspected of

being a member of the GJSN operating in Bosnia.64

(S//NF) Detainee’s Bosnian phone number was found on Libyan extremist anddocument forger Ibrahim Muhammad Mustafa, aka (Mustafa al-Ibrahim), aka (Abu

Hafs), when Mustafa was detained in Ireland.65

(S//NF) Documents recovered from UBL’s residence in Kandahar, AF and from

raids of suspected al-Qaida facilities in Northern Afghanistan listed detainee’s phone

number.66(S//NF) Detainee has been identified as a former director of the al-Furqan

Association, and linked to several other NGOs in Bosnia including the SHCR through

Shaykh Nasar al-Said. SHCR provided funding to other Islamic NGOs in Bosnia,

including al-Furqan, al-Haramayn, and the Active Islamic of Youth Organizations

(AIO).67(S//NF) Reporting indicates detainee was once employed by the al-Haramayn

Charitable NGO.68 Corroborating these reports, detainee admitted being the director

of an unspecified NGO in Bosnia.69

(S//NF) The Bosnian-based NGO Pomoc provided detainee’s wife and the wives

of the other “Algerian Six” members a monthly stipend throughout 2004.70 (AnalystNote: Pomoc also provided a stipend to the wife of convicted terrorist Said Atmani,

who was associated with convicted Millennium Plot conspirator Ahmed Ressam.71

The Pomoc NGO is suspected of having ties to the Active Islamic Youth

Organization (AIO).)72

S E C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20330428

13

for

JTF-GTMO-CDR



8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

disturbances,failure to follow guard instructions/camprules,unauthorizedcommunications,

assaults,provokingwords and gestures,and possessionof food and non-weapontype

contraband. In2007,he had a total of seven Reportsof DisciplinaryInfractionand one so farin 2008.

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee’s

most recent interrogation session occurred on 7 March 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was identified as working with GZ-10016

and linked to the procurement and use of forged documents. Detainee spent ten years

traveling around Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and West Asian regions. Detaineereportedly lived in Saudi Arabia for five years. He is affiliated with various NGOs and is

assessed as an extremist with militant experience in Bosnia and in Afghanistan. Detainee’s

phone directory ties him to al-Qaida operatives in Europe and the Middle East.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is assessed as an extremist with militantexperience dating back to the early 1990’s. Detainee can provide information on terrorists

with whom he affiliated during that time, such as GZ-10016, as well as new associations and

provide details of the evolution of militant recruitment and facilitation. Detainee can detail

the al-Qaida network regarding forgery and finance support in Bosnia and can provide

information on terrorist links in Europe. Detainee can detail the surveillance of andpreparations for attacks against the US Embassy in Bosnia, as well as identify participants

who may still be at large.

d. (S//NF) Areas of PotentialExploitation:

• Al-Qaida terrorist operations and methodology

Foiled USEmbassy attack in Sarajevo

• Al-Qaida and international network leadership and facilitators

GZ-10016 (Worldwide)Ibrahim Buisir (Ireland/Europe)

Ibrahim Muhammad Mustafa (Ireland)

Nabil Benalloua (Germany)

Abu Ali (United Kingdom)

GIA in BosniaAl-Qaida activity in Bosnia

• Terrorist and foreign fighters operatives, recruiters, financiers, and facilitators

• False, stolen, and forged travel documentation

S E C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN/ / 20330428

14

for

SECRET 20330428

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee , ISN US4AG-010001DP (S)

Terrorists and foreign fighters targets, activities, training, motivation, movement,

logistics, leadership, and networksPlot against US Embassy in Sarajevo

GIA operationsand personnelin Bosnia, includingthe “ AlgerianSix”membersTies to terrorism

NGOsand links to extremism includingpersonnel, facilities, financing, links

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatantstatus was reassessedon 1 October2004, and

heremains an enemy combatant.

MARK H. BUZBY

Rear Admiral, US NavyCommanding

Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence CollegeOctober 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology .

15


Bensayah Belkacem Current/True NameandAliases

Documents

Transcript of Bensayah Belkacem Current/True NameandAliases