APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGYAppl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (2008)Published online 13 April 2007 in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/acp.1356

*Q

C

Beliefs About the Meaning and Measurement ofIntelligence: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of American,

British and Malaysian Undergraduates

VIREN SWAMI1*, ADRIAN FURNHAM2, ISMAIL MAAKIP3,MOHD SHARANI AHMAD3, NURUL HUDANI MOHD NAWI3,

PETER S. K. VOO3, ANDREW N. CHRISTOPHER4

and JEANETTE GARWOOD5

1Division of Public Health, University of Liverpool, UK2Department of Psychology, University College London, UK

3School of Psychology and Social Work, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Malaysia4Department of Psychology, Albion College, USA

5School of Social Science, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK

SUMMARY

This study examined lay beliefs about intelligence cross-culturally using a questionnaire based on anexpert summary of what is known about intelligence. Two hundred and thirty five universityundergraduates in Malaysia, 347 undergraduates in Britain and 137 undergraduates in the US ratedfor agreement 30 items about the nature, measurement, between-group differences and practicalimportance of intelligence. An exploratory factor analysis revealed three factors: (1) stability,reliability and validity of intelligence tests; (2) practical importance of intelligence and (3) sourceand stability of within-group intelligence. While the overall factor structure did not vary a great dealbetween groups, there were significant cross-cultural differences on the mean scores for Factors 1–3.Explanations for cross-cultural differences in implicit theories of intelligences are considered, andlimitations of the study discussed. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Controversy over the definition and measurement of intelligence, and what this means for

society, has not abated since the first psychometric tests of IQ were proposed in the early

20th century (Eysenck, 1998). Debate has centred primarily around definitions of

intelligence, the heritability of intelligence (genetic and environmental contributions to

individual variation), the importance of intelligence in everyday life and more recently

group differences in average measured intelligence (see Gottfredson, 2005). Moreover,

these debates have been echoed in more popular form in books, newspaper articles and

television programmes aimed at the general public (Furnham, 2001).

One particular topic that appears to be gaining attention concerns how different cultures

attempt to understand and define intelligence (Earley & Ang, 2003; Sternberg &

Grigorenko, 2006), and how such beliefs differ from those of experts. In terms of the latter,

Correspondence to: Dr Viren Swami, Division of Public Health, University of Liverpool, Whelan Building,uadrangle, Brownlow Hill, Liverpool L69 3GB, UK. E-mail: virenswami@hotmail.com

opyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

236 V. Swami et al.

Sternberg (1982, 1990) proposed that people in the general population have a different

conception of intelligence than most experts. That is, ‘what psychologists study

corresponds to only part of what people mean by intelligence in our [Western] society,

which includes a lot more than IQ test measures’ (Sternberg, 1982: 35; italics added). In

particular, Sternberg (1990: 54) defined implicit theories of intelligence as ‘constructions

of people (psychologists or lay persons or others) that reside in the minds of these

individuals, whether as definition or otherwise’. Understanding such implicit theories is

important because it is these that drive the way most of the people evaluate their own and

others’ intelligence (e.g. Dweck, 1999; Faria & Fontaine, 1997; Flugel, 1947; Furnham,

2001; Shipstone & Burt, 1973; Sternberg, 1985).

At the same time, however, it is clear that people in different cultures behave and think

differently (cf. Greenfield, 1997; Nisbett, 2003), including the way they understand

concepts such as knowledge and intelligence (e.g. Ruisel, 1993, 1996; Wober, 1973).

Indeed, a growing body of work has examined cross-cultural differences in the way

intelligence is understood, and generally supports the notion that there are stable, if subtle,

disparities. At a very general level, for example, Yang and Sternberg (1997a) have pointed

out that Western notions of intelligence (e.g. speed of mental processing) are unlikely to be

shared by other cultures, giving cross-cultural investigations particular importance.

Studies in Africa, for instance, provide an interesting example of such cross-cultural

differences (e.g. Irvine, 1966, 1969; Serpell, 1976; Wober, 1972, 1973). According to

Ruzgis and Grigorenko (1994), conceptions of intelligence in Africa centre mainly around

practical skills that facilitate and maintain inter- or intra-group relations. In a more recent

study in rural Kenya, Grigorenko et al. (2001) documented four distinct terms that

constitute conceptions of intelligence: rieko (knowledge and skills), luoro (respect), winjo

(comprehension of how to handle life problems) and paro (initiative). Only one of these

(rieko) refers directly to knowledge-based skills, which appears to be emphasised in

Western conceptions of intelligence (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981).

The emphasis on the social aspects of intelligence are also important in East Asian

cultures, particularly those that prioritise humility and intergroup relations (cf. Fiske,

Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b). Thus, a number

of studies have found that Asian cultures tend to place less importance on IQ-based

intelligence, while emphasising social aspects (e.g. Azuma & Kashiwagi, 1987; Gill &

Keats, 1980; Lutz, 1985; Nevo & Khader, 1995; Poole, 1985; White, 1985). Specifically,

Yang and Sternberg (1997b) found, that to be considered intelligent in Taiwan, an

individual needs to be flexible with regard to knowing when to use different kinds of

abilities, particularly, inter- and intrapersonal intelligence and self-effacement.

When taken together, these studies give some indication of the time- and

culture-specificity of lay beliefs about intelligence. On one hand, these studies suggest

that lay conceptions are broader than most of the academic theories of intelligence, while

on the other hand, they suggest cross-cultural differences in how intelligence is understood.

Within the literature, however, different techniques have been used to study cross-cultural

differences in concepts of intelligence. The most widely used involves having participants

in different cultural settings generate relevant descriptors of intelligence, and having

independent samples rate those descriptors (e.g. Chan, 1991; Grigorenko et al., 2001).

By contrast, some studies have asked participants in different cultural settings to rate the

same series of items for agreement or frequency of use (e.g. Goodnow, 1976). The basic

assumption of this approach is that, by using factor-analytic techniques, it is possible to

examine the structure of intelligence beliefs in different cultures. This is because the

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (2008)

DOI: 10.1002/acp

Beliefs about intelligence 237

development of specific beliefs will likely be shaped by different cultural environments (cf.

Greenfield, 1997; Nisbett, 2003), and hence those beliefs will cluster differently in the

factorial structure of the intelligence concept held by different groups.

In the present study, we utilised the latter method, developing a novel questionnaire to

examine lay theories of intelligence (Furnham, 2003). The items in this questionnaire were

based on a scientific statements about intelligence by experts in the field (see Gottfredson,

1997), and referred to beliefs about the meaning and measurement of intelligence, group

differences and practical importance of intelligence (see below). Furthermore, to examine

cross-cultural differences using this questionnaire, we sampled participants in twoWestern

settings (the US and Britain) and one Eastern setting (Malaysia).

To our knowledge, the only previous study to have examined lay beliefs of intelligence in

Malaysia was conducted by Gill and Keats (1980), in whichMalay students strongly valued

practical skills, speed and creativity (as compared with Australian undergraduates, who

valued academic skills). However, our personal observations suggest that participants in

Malaysia, in the present study, will likely have a similar factorial understanding of

intelligence to their counterparts in Britain and the US, given that all the three samples are

undergraduates who likely be familiar with debates around intelligence. Still, based on

the cross-cultural studies reviewed here, we predicted that Malaysian undergraduates

would be more likely to endorse items referring to intelligence as a general trait as well as

the practical importance of intelligence in everyday life.

METHOD

Participants

The participants in this study were recruited from three countries, namelyMalaysia, Britain

and the US. The first group consisted of 235Malaysian undergraduates at a large university

in Malaysian Borneo. There were 154 women and 81 men in this sample, with a mean age

of 21.66 years (SD¼ 0.99). A number of different ethnic groups and university disciplines

were represented, although all the participants will have been exposed to debates around

intelligence through a first-year introductory course on psychology. All the participants in

this sample were born and raised in Malaysia, and were fluent or native speakers of Bahasa

Melayu (Malay).

The British sample consisted of 347 students from different university disciplines, all

taking introductory open courses in psychology at three universities. This sample consisted

of 266 women and 81men, with a mean age of 19.89 (SD¼ 3.49). The final group consisted

of 137 (94 women and 43 men) undergraduates from the US, with a mean age of 18.22

(SD¼ 1.09). Participants in both the British and American groups were native or fluent

speakers of English. There was a significant difference in the mean ages of the three groups

[F(2, 718)¼ 83.06, p< 0.05; h2p ¼ 0.19], and a post hoc Tukey HSD test showed each

group to be significantly different from each other.

Measures

All the participants completed the Meaning and Measurement of Intelligence

Questionnaire (Furnham, 2003). This is a 30-item scale derived from a summary of

psychological research on intelligence signed by 50 (Western) experts in intelligence and

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (2008)

DOI: 10.1002/acp

238 V. Swami et al.

allied fields (reprinted in Gottfredson, 1997). The summary was a response to the

controversy caused by the publication of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) and

was also published in the Wall Street Journal (15 December 1994). The original summary

outlined conclusions regarded as ‘mainstream’ among researchers on intelligence, in

particular on the nature, origins and practical consequences of individual and group

differences in intelligence (see Table 1).1

The questionnaire derived from this work consists of 30 statements about what

intelligence is, the source and stability of between group differences in intelligence, and the

practical relevance as well as social implications of intelligence. Most of them were

derived directly from Gottfredson (1997), but others were deleted or added in a pilot study

(n¼ 30) conducted in Britain. The pilot study also indicated that British undergraduates

had no difficulty understanding any of the items, and we had no reason to believe that US or

Malaysian participants would fail to likewise understand the items. Participants in all the

three settings indicated their agreement on an 8-point Likert scale, where 1 represented

disagreement with the statement and 8 represented agreement. The measure showed good

internal consistency (Cronbach’s a¼ 0.81).

Procedure

All the participants were tested in large lecture theatres in the presence of examiners who

ensured the test was appropriately completed. For the Malaysian sample, the questionnaire

was translated into Malay by the first author. A back-translation by an independent

translator certified its validity. The questionnaire was presented in English for the British

and American groups. All the participants were asked to be as honest as possible in their

responses.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics

The mean scores on the 8-point scale of all the 30 questionnaire items are given in Table 1.

There was some evidence of both ceiling and floor effects, indicating that participants

agreed with some statements fairly strongly and disagreed about others. Overall for the

Malaysian sample, the highest scores were given for item 1, 15 and 2; for the British

sample, for items 23, 1 and 2 and for the American undergraduates, for items 10, 1 and 2. In

general, participants in all the three countries agreed strongly with general statements

about intelligence being a broad and deep mental capability (e.g. items 1 and 2). For the

Malaysian sample, the lowest scores were given for items 12, 6 and 11; for the British

participants, for items 8, 7 and 4 and for the US participants, for items 6, 4 and 14. In

general, participants in the three samples appeared to disagree most strongly with items

that suggested between-group differences in intelligence (e.g. items 11 and 12) and those

that suggested that intelligence tests were valid and reliable (e.g. items 4 and 6).

1It should be said that some of the statements in Gottfredson (1997) are contested by other researchers, and do notnecessarily reflect the consensus within academic circles. Nevertheless, they do provide an effective means ofsummarising expert thinking on intelligence. Our use of statements derived from Gottfredson (1997) does notimply our endorsement of any of these items, nor do they imply their acceptance and/or accuracy within thescientific literature.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (2008)

DOI: 10.1002/acp

Table

1.Questionnaire

item

sandmeanscoreswithstandardsdeviations

Item

a

OverallM

(SD)

MalaysiaM

(SD)

Britain

M(SD)

AmericaM

(SD)

F(n¼516)M

(n¼205)F(n

¼154)M

(n¼81)F(n

¼266)M

(n¼81)

F(n¼94)

M(n¼43)

1.Intelligence

isaverygeneral

mentalcapability

that

involves

theabilityto

reason,plan,solve

problems,thinkabstractly,comprehendcomplex

ideasandlearnquickly

from

experience

6.38(1.28)

6.29(1.40)

6.54(1.30)

6.20(1.49)

6.30(1.28)

6.54(1.31)6.33(1.26)5.98(1.34)

2.Intelligence

reflectsabroader

anddeeper

capabilityforcomprehendingoursurroundings—

‘catchingon’,‘m

akingsense’ofthingsor

‘figuringout’what

todo

6.36(1.24)

6.12(1.26)

6.42(1.37)

6.12(1.32)

6.33(1.14)

6.30(1.15)6.37(1.32)5.77(1.32)

3.Intelligence

canbemeasuredandintelligences

testsmeasure

itwell

3.82(1.74)

4.14(1.88)

4.72(1.85)

4.75(1.87)

3.39(1.50)

3.50(1.79)3.55(1.62)4.19(1.68)

4.Intelligence

testsaream

ongthemost

accurate

(intechnical

term

s,reliable

andvalid)ofallthe

psychological

testsandassessments

3.48(1.81)

3.96(1.96)

4.79(1.73)

4.86(1.88)

2.91(1.54)

3.10(1.69)2.91(1.52)3.84(1.86)

5.Intelligence

testsdonotmeasure

creativity,

characterorpersonalityorother

important

differencesam

ongindividuals,norarethey

intended

to

5.55(1.83)

5.35(1.98)

4.69(1.92)

4.41(2.05)

5.85(1.65)

6.04(1.76)6.14(1.69)5.84(1.50)

6.Whiletherearedifferenttypes

ofintelligence

tests,they

allmeasure

thesameintelligence

3.52(1.65)

3.49(1.80)

4.16(1.76)

4.38(1.63)

3.33(1.58)

2.77(1.76)3.00(1.35)3.14(1.47)

7.Intelligence

testsarenotculturallybiasedagainst

anygroup

3.72(2.21)

4.10(2.30)

5.64(1.91)

5.41(2.09)

2.56(1.64)

2.73(1.97)3.84(1.85)4.19(1.78)

8.IQ

scorespredictequally

accurately

forallthe

groupsregardless

ofrace

andsocial

class

3.69(2.18)

4.20(2.26)

5.57(1.85)

5.40(1.99)

2.50(1.57)

2.72(1.79)3.95(1.87)4.67(2.03)

9.Thebrain

processes

underlyingintelligence

are

stilllittle

understood

5.55(1.49)

5.54(1.55)

5.42(1.67)

5.43(1.68)

5.65(1.41)

5.83(1.44)5.51(1.40)5.23(1.45)

10.Mem

bersofalltheracial-ethnic

groupscanbe

foundat

everyIQ

level

5.69(1.92)

5.27(2.04)

4.75(1.67)

4.64(1.80)

5.92(1.90)

5.50(2.15)6.56(1.76)6.05(1.94)

(Continues)

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (20

DOI: 10.1002

Beliefs about intelligence 239

08)

/acp

Table

1.(Continued)

Item

a

OverallM

(SD)

MalaysiaM

(SD)

Britain

M(SD)

AmericaM

(SD)

F(n¼516)M

(n¼205)F(n

¼154)M

(n¼81)F(n¼266)M

(n¼81)

F(n

¼94)

M(n

¼43)

11.Somegroups(Jew

sandEastAsians)

score

somew

hat

higher

than

whites

ingeneral

4.35(1.82)

4.41(1.94)

4.30(1.92)

4.64(2.04)

4.42(1.81)

4.23(1.93)4.22(1.70)4.30(1.78)

12.Other

groups(BlacksandHispanics)

are

centred

somew

hat

lower

than

whites

3.93(1.82)

4.18(2.17)

3.98(1.88)

4.26(1.84)

4.05(1.81)

3.91(1.86)3.51(1.69)4.51(1.91)

13.IQ

isstrongly

related,probably

more

sothan

anyother

single

measurable

human

trait,to

many

importanteducational,occupational,economic

andsocial

outcomes

5.20(1.64)

5.21(1.77)

5.58(1.49)

5.53(1.43)

5.15(1.70)

5.18(1.92)4.71(1.58)4.67(1.94)

14.Whatever

IQtestsmeasure,IQ

isofgreat

practical

andsocial

importance

4.46(1.92)

4.45(2.07)

5.84(1.53)

5.69(1.38)

4.02(1.80)

3.65(2.07)3.46(1.60)3.60(2.04)

15.A

highIQ

isan

advantagein

life

because

virtually

alltheactivitiesrequiresomereasoning

anddecisionmaking

5.55(1.75)

5.52(1.74)

6.41(1.44)

6.20(1.43)

5.30(1.64)

5.06(1.80)4.86(1.97)5.12(1.78)

16.A

low

IQisoften

adisadvantage,

especially

indisorganised

environments

4.57(1.79)

4.62(1.89)

5.03(1.89)

5.11(1.91)

4.51(1.63)

4.58(1.68)3.99(1.88)3.79(1.95)

17.A

highIQ

nomore

guarantees

successthan

alow

IQguarantees

failure

inlife

5.64(1.98)

5.77(1.91)

5.92(1.94)

5.68(2.04)

5.59(1.96)

5.88(1.87)5.29(2.06)5.77(1.77)

18.Thepractical

advantages

ofhavingahigher

IQincrease

aslife

settingsbecomemore

complex

(novel,am

biguous,changing,unpredictable

or

multifaceted)

5.04(1.49)

5.09(1.48)

5.20(1.50)

5.21(1.39)

5.00(1.46)

4.87(1.50)4.87(1.54)5.26(1.58)

19.Differencesin

intelligence

certainly

arenotthe

only

factoraffectingperform

ance

ineducation,

trainingandhighly

complexjobs,butintelligence

isoften

themost

important

5.42(1.72)

5.38(1.48)

5.53(1.69)

5.43(1.44)

5.52(1.69)

5.25(1.56)4.97(1.79)5.53(1.39)

20.Certain

personalitytraits,specialtalents,

aptitudes

andphysicalcapabilities,experience

havenarrower

applicabilityortransferability

across

tasksandsettingscompared

withgeneral

intelligence

4.60(1.72)

4.87(1.57)

5.27(1.52)

5.20(1.57)

4.20(1.74)

4.55(1.54)4.61(1.61)4.86(1.55)

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (2

DOI: 10.1002

240 V. Swami et al.

(Continues)

008)

/acp

Table

1.(Continued)

Item

a

OverallM

(SD)

MalaysiaM

(SD)

Britain

M(SD)

AmericaM

(SD)

F(n¼516)M

(n¼205)F(n¼154)M

(n¼81)F(n¼266)M

(n¼81)

F(n

¼94)

M(n

¼43)

21.Individualsdifferin

intelligence

dueto

differencesin

both

theirenvironmentsandgenetic

heritage

6.24(1.48)

5.89(1.67)

6.16(1.63)

5.56(1.83)

6.46(1.29)

6.41(1.40)5.78(1.59)5.56(1.58)

22.Mem

bersofthesamefamilyalso

tendto

differ

substantially

inintelligence

forboth

genetic

and

environmentalreasons

5.60(1.64)

5.31(1.72)

5.82(1.64)

5.65(1.70)

5.69(1.58)

5.41(1.73)4.99(1.71)4.47(1.52)

23.That

IQmay

behighly

heritable

does

notmean

that

itis

notaffected

bytheenvironment

6.36(1.39)

6.20(1.47)

6.23(1.46)

6.16(1.33)

6.65(1.26)

6.62(1.48)5.78(1.44)5.49(1.47)

24.IQ

sdogradually

stabiliseduringchildhoodand

generally

changelittle

thereafter

4.63(1.74)

4.83(1.71)

5.04(1.75)

5.35(1.67)

4.53(1.76)

4.53(1.76)4.22(1.57)4.42(1.47)

25.Althoughtheenvironmentisim

portantin

creatingIQ

differences,wedonotyet

know

how

tomanipulate

itto

raiselow

IQspermanently

5.43(1.46)

5.29(1.57)

5.83(1.38)

5.81(1.36)

5.33(1.47)

4.97(1.74)5.05(1.42)4.91(1.38)

26.Racial-ethnic

differencesin

IQareessentially

thesamewhen

youngstersleavehighschoolas

when

they

enterfirstgradeat

school

3.99(1.61)

4.23(1.78)

4.84(1.60)

5.05(1.61)

3.68(1.43)

3.55(1.71)3.48(1.58)3.93(1.58)

27.Because

brightyoungsterslearnfaster

than

slow

learners,IQ

differenceslead

togrowingdisparities

inam

ountlearned

asyoungstersprogress

through

school

4.93(1.55)

5.11(1.50)

5.64(1.56)

5.27(1.62)

4.70(1.45)

4.99(1.46)4.41(1.43)5.05(1.31)

28.Thereisnodefinitiveansw

erto

whyIQ

scores

differacross

racial-ethnic

groups

5.17(1.86)

4.64(1.84)

5.72(1.64)

5.36(1.60)

4.86(1.91)

4.16(1.83)5.16(1.83)4.16(1.86)

29.Racial-ethnic

differencesaresomew

hat

smaller

butstillsubstantial

forindividualsforthesame

socio-economic

backgrounds

4.88(1.39)

4.60(1.67)

5.40(1.44)

5.22(1.51)

4.76(1.36)

4.43(1.54)4.39(1.14)3.77(1.78)

30.Individualsarenotborn

withfixed,unchangeable

levelsofintelligence

5.99(1.75)

5.73(1.96)

5.56(1.95)

5.70(1.89)

6.21(1.47)

6.07(1.91)6.04(1.99)5.14(2.07)

aScale:8¼Agree,

1¼Disagree.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 22: 235–246 (2008)

DOI: 10.1002/acp

Beliefs about intelligence 241

242 V. Swami et al.

Factor analysis

A principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation (Varimax) was performed to

examine the underlying structure of beliefs about intelligence. In order to achieve reliable

factor scores, the data from the three groups were initially combined before carrying out the

factor analysis (further factor analyses for each group was conducted post hoc; see below).

All the original items were part of the pooled factor analysis, and those that had the

strongest loadings (greater than 0.4) were retained for further analysis. A second run using

an oblique (Direct Oblimin) rotation yielded similar results, and are therefore not reported

here.

From the scree test, we identified three stable factors, accounting for 25.99% of the

variance (see Table 2). Each factor was given a label based on the content of the items

loading upon it and on the a priori categorisation found in Gottfredson (1997). The first

factor to emerge from the analysis had an eigenvalue of 3.26 and accounted for 10.85% of

the variance (a¼ 0.85). Items loading onto this factor referred to the stability, validity and

reliability of intelligence tests, and generally scored very low (suggesting disagreement

with the items). The second factor, which accounted for 9.15% of the variance and had an

eigenvalue of 2.75 (a¼ 0.76), dealt with the practical importance of intelligence. Finally,

the third factor had an eigenvalue of 1.80 and accounted for 5.99% of the variance

(a¼ 0.61). This factor concerned the source and stability of within-group differences in

intelligence. The mean values of items in this factor were generally very high, indicating

strong agreement with the items.

Additional factor analyses were run for each national group separately. For the

Malaysian sample, the factor structure was consistent with the overall model described

above, with the exception that item 17 loaded onto Factor 1. For the British sample, the

only factor-loading deviations from the overall model were that Factor 1 contained items

referring to the practical importance of intelligence, whereas Factor 2 contained items

referring to the stability, validity and reliability of intelligence tests. For the US sample, the

Table 2. Principal components and loadings for the pooled sample

Component

1 2 3

Stability, validity and reliability of intelligence tests (10.85% of variance)Item 8 0.82 0.08 �0.05Item 4 0.78 0.14 0.03Item 7 0.77 0.10 �0.03Item 3 0.73 0.18 �0.02

Practical importance of intelligence (9.15% of variance)Item 15 0.18 0.79 0.07Item 16 0.06 0.69 �0.03Item 14 0.41 0.67 0.08Item 18 �0.01 0.64 �0.01Item 13 0.22 0.45 0.26

Source and stability of within-group differences (5.99% of variance)Item 22 0.08 �0.01 0.79Item 21 �0.08 0.08 0.78Item 23 �0.13 0.22 0.47

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Beliefs about intelligence 243

factor structure was also consistent with the overall model. The only factor-loading

deviations were that item 13 loaded onto Factor 1, and item 10 loaded onto Factor 3.

Cross-cultural and gender comparison on factor scores

Three-factor scores were computed for each participant by taking an average of responses

to scale items associated with the factor. Using these factor scores, we then conducted a

multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), with participants’ Sex and Nationality

as the classification factors. Because of the significant difference in the mean age between

groups, we include participant age as a covariate. The results showed a significant effect of

Nationality [F(6, 1414)¼ 59.3, p< 0.001; h2p ¼ 0.20], and an examination of the ANOVA

results showed significant differences on Factor 1 [F(2, 714)¼ 148.78, p< 0.001;

h2p ¼ 0.30], Factor 2 [F(2, 714)¼ 43.01, p< 0.001; h2p ¼ 0.11] and Factor 3 [F(2,

714)¼ 28.44, p< 0.001; h2p ¼ 0.07]. Tests of simple effects showed that for Factors 1 and 2,

the Malaysian participants gave significantly higher ratings than either the British or US

participants, who were not significantly different from each other. For Factor 3, the

Malaysian and British participants, who were not significantly different from each other,

gave higher ratings than the US participants.

The results also showed a significant Sex difference [F(3, 706)¼ 3.80, p< 0.05;

h2p ¼ 0.02], although the effect size was small. An examination of the ANOVAs showed a

significant Sex difference on Factor 3 [F(1, 714)¼ 6.58, p< 0.05; h2p ¼ 0.01]. The

MANCOVA results showed no significant Sex�Nationality interaction [F(6,

1414)¼ 1.41, p> 0.05], nor a significant effect of participants’ age [F(3, 706)¼ 2.53,

p> 0.05].

DISCUSSION

This study set out to examine implicit beliefs about the measurement and meaning of

intelligence in three countries. The results showed that, insofar as there was compatibility

in the factor structures across groups, the perceived meaning of intelligence and its

measurement was similar across the cultures sampled. That is, based on the 30 items used

in the present questionnaire, there appeared to be little difference in the factor structures of

the different groups. Assuming that these structures are accurate indicators of beliefs

shaped by cultural environments, they provide evidence of cross-cultural similarity (at least

in Malaysia, Britain and the US) in concepts about intelligence (Chen, 1994).

The most likely reason for this is that, although the participants could meaningfully be

said to inhabit different cultural settings, they nevertheless represent a particularly selective

sample of their respective cultures. More precisely, they were university undergraduates

who would have received some training in the psychological sciences. To the extent that

core psychological curriculums in the three countries are similar, particularly as they

pertain to the teaching of concepts relating to intelligence (and our personal observations

suggest that they are similar), cross-cultural similarities are perhaps to be expected.

This does not rule out the possibility that cultural differences in concepts about

intelligence do differ inMalaysia, the US and Britain. It would be fruitful, in this regard, for

future research to examine (for instance) beliefs about intelligence among non-university

samples, particularly among rural groups in Malaysia (cf. Grigorenko et al., 2001). In this

sense, the sampling of participants in the present study represents a key limitation, which

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244 V. Swami et al.

limits the generalisability of our findings. An additional limitation was that the items in the

questionnaire perhaps represented the views of a particular group of researchers in the

West, which further limits the design. Rather than ascertaining a person’s beliefs about

intelligence with surface ratings, future studies could look at differences in the way

intelligence is understood locally, which would extend the present research.

These limitations not withstanding, the present results also suggested that there were

cross-cultural differences in the strength of agreement with the identified factors.

Specifically, Malaysian participants were more likely than participants in Britain or the US

to endorse intelligence tests as valid and reliable measures of intelligence and to view

intelligence as having high practical value in everyday, applied settings. On the other hand,

US participants were significantly less likely than either Britons or Malaysians to agree

with items suggesting that intelligence is the result of both environmental and genetic

factors (although this difference also had a relatively small effect size).

The most likely explanation for these significant differences (particularly on Factors 1

and 2) stems from the suggestion that, in many non-Western cultures, intelligence is more

strongly associated with practical and social aspects (e.g. Grigorenko et al., 2001;

Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2006). To the extent, therefore, that Malaysians inhabit a culture

that is similar to other East Asian and Southeast Asian national settings, it seems likely that

they emphasise social competence and the practical aspects of intelligence because it is

congruent with cultural approval.

In this sense, our findings support the argument of Sternberg and Grigorenko (2006), that

intelligence cannot be understood without reference to the cultural context in which it is

enacted. Sternberg (1997) proposed a theory of ‘successful intelligence’ to account for

differences in implicit theories of intelligence across cultures (see also Earley & Ang,

2003, who proposed a similar notion of ‘cultural intelligence’). Successful intelligence

refers to the ability to achieve one’s goals in life ‘through a combination of adapting to,

shaping and selecting environments, by a mix of analytical, creative and practical abilities’

(Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2006). As will be clear, the means of doing so will vary in

different cultural environments, and hence what is intelligent in one culture may not be

intelligent in another (Berry, 1974).

Of course, there are likely specific differences between Malaysia, Britain and the US,

which further explain the differences we found in the present study. For example, our

personal observations suggest that criticisms of psychometric testing is much less

developed in Malaysia than it is in the West, which may explain why Malaysian

undergraduates were more likely to endorse intelligences tests as valid and reliable.

Similarly, the relative youth of psychology as a science in Asia generally, and Malaysia

specifically (see Asian Association of Social Psychology, 2005), may buffer it against

broad-level criticisms in the region. This, in turn, may promote beliefs that prioritise

psychologically relevant traits (including, but not limited to, intelligence) in practical

settings, including education and work.

For the moment, however, these remain speculative conclusions requiring further

research, as does the finding that Britons and Malaysians were not significantly different in

their agreement with items suggesting combined environmental and genetic influences on

intelligence. The available evidence would seem to suggest that Malaysians should have

been more likely to endorse such views in comparison with their Western counterparts,

who tend to emphasise biological factors in explanations for various psychological traits

(e.g. Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2005; Read, Mosher, & Bentall, 2004). Of course, the

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Beliefs about intelligence 245

effect size of the difference on this factor was relatively small, and would benefit from

further investigation.

In conclusion, the present study suggests that, based on statements about intelligence

approved by a number of experts in the West, there are both similarities and differences in

concepts about intelligence in Malaysia, Britain and the US. Clearly, there is value in

conducting studies of this kind in multiple settings, especially as it may highlight important

ways in which cultural factors influence how people think and act in different

environments. It may also have important implications for both social and educational

practitioners, making it imperative to have a well-informed and critical public when it

comes to the concept and measurement of intelligence.

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