Basil of Caesarea versus Eunomius of Cyzicus on the Nature of Time: A Patristic Reception of the...

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VigiliaeChristianae

Basil of Caesarea versus Eunomius of Cyzicus on the Nature of Time: A Patristic Reception of the Critique of Plato

Mark DelCoglianoUniversity of St. ThomasMail JRC 153, 2115 Summit AvenueSt. Paul, Minnesota 55105

[email protected]

Abstract

This paper investigates rival views about the nature of time that were articulated in the fourth-century controversies over the Trinity. In his Contra Eunomium Basil of Caesarea refuted the definition of time put forward by his opponent, Eunomius of Cyzicus, and presented his own views on its nature. This study seeks to contextual-ize the views of both contestants polemically, theologically, and philosophically. It is argued that Eunomius’s definition of time has a Platonic pedigree. In addition, it is demonstrated that, in both his critique of Eunomius’s definition and the positive pre-sentation of his own views on time, Basil draws upon his familiarity with the philo-sophical critique of Plato’s views, as found in Aristotle, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and the Middle Platonists (and perhaps even Galen). Basil’s own views on time have been most immediately influenced by Middle Platonist, Peripatetic, and Stoic concerns.

Keywords

Basil of Caesarea – Eunomius of Cyzicus – ancient Christian views of Time – fourth-century Trinitarian controversy

It is said that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology. This is certainly true for Basil of Caesarea.1 But Basil could also use philosophy as a weapon

1 For recent studies of Basil’s engagement with late antique philosophy, see Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity

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against his opponent. This is what he does in Contra Eunomium 1.21, where he expounds his view of the nature of time in reaction to that advanced by Eunomius of Cyzicus in Apologia 10.2 It is the purpose of this study to situate Contra Eunomium 1.21 in its polemical, theological, and philosophical context. While Eunomius’s definition of time is essential to his theological argument, I suggest that Basil’s view of time is not and was presented only to expose the philosophical ignorance of his opponent. I argue that Eunomius’s own view of time has a Platonic pedigree and Basil’s position is rooted in the philosophical tradition that critiqued and modified the Platonic notion of time. A proper understanding of Basil’s view of time requires a survey of the preceding philo-sophical tradition, though one that is necessarily limited to discussing Plato, the critique of Plato, and the appropriation of this critique. In particular, this study examines how Aristotle and other Peripatetics reacted against the Platonic notion of time, and how both Middle Platonists and Stoics appropriated the earlier Platonic and Aristotelian views. Only after this survey is completed can Basil’s own view of time be properly appreciated. I argue, in contrast to some recent scholarly assessments, that it is best understood in a Middle Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic context.3 Furthermore, I demonstrate that Basil draws upon his knowledge of the philosophical critique of Plato’s understanding of time in the Timaeus in order to undermine Eunomius’s Platonic viewpoint. Thus Basil reveals himself not only conversant with Middle Platonist and Stoic theories of time, as well as debates over time in the early centuries CE, but also

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), and Mark DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomium Theory of Names: Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Vigiliae Christianae Supplements 103 (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

2 Editions: Bernard Sesboüé, et al., Basil de Césarée. Contre Eunome. 2 vols. Sources Chrétiennes 299 & 305 (Paris: Cerf, 1982), and R.P. Vaggione, Eunomius: The Extant Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 34-159. Vaggione’s edition includes an English translation of the Apologia [=Apol.]. For an English translation of Contra Eunomium [=Eun.], see Mark DelCogliano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz: Basil of Caesarea: Against Eunomius, The Fathers of the Church 122 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011).

3 In the interests of space and in view of lack of evidence, I omit a specific discussion of Plotinus’s view of time in En. 3.7 [45] as a possible background for Basil, as well as other Neoplatonist discussions of time. On this treatise, see J.E. McGuire and Steven K. Strange, “Annotated Translation of Plotinus Ennead iii 7: On Eternity and Time,” Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 251-271; and Steven K. Strange, “Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time,” in Lawrence Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in Late Antiquity (Catholic University of America Press, 1994), 22-53. I refer to Plotinus’s treatise on eternity and time only insofar as it records previ-ous philosophical views and arguments. On the issue of Basil’s indebtedness to Neoplatonism, see John Rist, “Basil’s Neoplatonism,” in Paul J. Fedwick, ed., Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteenth-Hundredth Anniversary Symposium. 2 vols. (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), 137-220.

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able to deploy this knowledge in a polemical and theological context, develop-ing a peculiarly synthetic view of the nature of time.4

The Theological and Polemical Context

Much of the theological debate of the fourth century concerned itself with providing a satisfactory account of how the Son could be God while being born (or begotten) from God the Father, which implied the Son’s posterior-ity to the Father. Eunomius rejected the view that the Father’s priority to the Son was maintained if the Father and the Son were thought to share a com-mon substance (the viewpoint encapsulated in the Nicene homoousios), on the grounds that a single shared substance could not contain the essential distinctions necessary to establish the Father’s priority over the Son. Hence, the intent of Eunomius’s theology was to demonstrate that the Father and the Son did not share a common substance, as a way of insuring and safeguard-ing God the Father’s uniqueness. To advance his views, Eunomius argued that the substance of God was unbegottenness (ἀγεννησία). If this is the sub-stance of God, then only the Father is truly God. For then the Son of God, as the Only-Begotten, is by definition unable to share in this substance. Hence the Son is the begotten God, and his substance, which is defined as begotten-ness, is unlike the Father’s. Thus the Father is prior to and greater than the Son qua substance. They are different in substance.5

4 Previous studies have not focused sufficiently on Basil’s view of time. Brooks Otis, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Conception of Time,” Studia Patristica 14 (1976): 327-57, con-siders Nyssa’s view of time as the “Cappadocian” one and hardly touches upon Basil; John F. Callahan, “Basil of Caesarea: A New Source for St. Augustine’s Theory of Time,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958): 437-454, is devoted to proving Augustine’s use of Eun. 1.21, not so much to explicating Basil’s view itself; and David Bradshaw, “Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers,” The Thomist 70 (2006): 311-366, deals with Basil and the other Cappadocians, though the focus in this wide-ranging survey is more on eternity than time. Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 87-8, helpfully notes a few of the Aristotelian and Chrysippean features of Basil’s view of time.

5 On Eunomius and Heteroousian theology, see Elena Cavalcanti, Studi Eunomiani, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 202 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1976); Thomas A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism, Patristic Monograph Series, No. 8 (Cambridge: The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, Ltd., 1979); Richard Paul Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michel R. Barnes, The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology (Washington, D.C.:



One of Eunomius’s arguments for his position is that, if the Father and Son share a common substance, the Son’s posteriority to the Father would have to be a consequence of an imposed ordering or time, both of which are impossible. And so, they cannot share a common substance. Here is what Eunomius says:

Now they would certainly not say the following: that while the substance is common to both, it is due to order and to superiorities based on time that the one is a first and the other a second. This is because the cause of pre-eminence must be present in that which is pre-eminent, but neither time nor age nor order has been joined with the substance of God. For order is secondary to the orderer, but nothing which belongs to God has been ordered by another. Time is a certain kind of motion of the stars, but the stars came into being not only later than the substance of the unbe-gotten and all the intelligibles, but also later than the primary bodies. Do we even need to speak about ages? For scripture clearly declares: Before the ages God exists [Ps 54:20] and the common thoughts confirm them.6

Hence, so as to prove that a common substance of God cannot contain distinc-tions based on order or time, Eunomius here advances two arguments based on the assumption that the cause is present in the effect. First, if order within the substance of God implies a pre-existent orderer but there is nothing prior to God, then nothing could have introduced an ordering into the substance of God. Second, if the priority of the Father to the Son is understood in terms comparable to human fathers and son, wherein the father first exists alone and then produces a son later in time, and if time is a certain kind of motion of the stars, then the creation of the stars later than the unbegotten substance of God precludes the presence of temporality in that substance. Accordingly, neither order nor time could be present within a shared common substance of the

The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 173-219; Radde-Gallwitz, Divine Simplicity, 87-112; and DelCogliano, Theory of Names, 1-134.

6 Eunomius, Apol. 10, 1-10 (Vaggione, Extant Works, 44): Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴποιεν, ὡς κοινὴ μὲν ἀμφοῖν ἡ οὐσία, τάξει δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ χρόνου πρεσβείοις ὁ μέν ἐστι πρῶτος, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ προσεῖναι πάντως τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι τὸ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς αἴτιον. οὐ συνέζευκται δὲ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐ χρόνος, οὐκ αἰών, οὐ τάξις. ἥ τε γὰρ τάξις δευτέρα τοῦ τάττοντος, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου τέτακται. ὅ τε χρόνος ἀστέρων ποιά τίς ἐστι κίνησις, ἀστέρες δὲ οὐ τῆς ἀγεννήτου μόνον οὐσίας καὶ νοητῶν ἁπάντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων γεγόνασιν ὕστεροι. περὶ γὰρ αἰώνων τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν, σαφῶς τῆς γρα-φῆς διαγορευούσης πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ὑπάρχειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν λογισμῶν ἐπιμαρτυρούντων;

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Father and Son to insure their personal distinction, and this leads to the con-clusion that Eunomius wants, that the Son must not share a divine substance in common with the Father. The Father’s priority and the Son’s posteriority must be in terms of substance. Note that Eunomius’s elimination of the pos-sibility of temporality within the divine substance is dependent upon his par-ticular definition of time: if time is the motion of the stars, then it cannot have existed, before God created the stars, in the divine substance. Thus Eunomius’s particular definition of time is essential to his argument.

One of Basil’s main concerns in Contra Eunomium is to refute Eunomius’s claim that the Son’s substance is unlike the Father’s.7 Accordingly, in his refu-tation of this specific argument of Eunomius, he will argue for the priority of the Father to the Son while asserting a shared common substance by arguing that an order in the shared common substance is possible but that the Father’s priority cannot be understood in temporal terms. Basil refutes Eunomius’s claim that order necessarily precedes that which is ordered by distinguishing between a natural order and an order by deliberation.8 Basil concedes that an order imposed by deliberation necessarily precedes that which is ordered. But in a natural order, such as exists between correlatives (like fire and light), the cause is simultaneous and inseparable from the effect, even if a prior and posterior can be distinguished in thought. For Basil a natural order is present within the common divine substance; the Father is prior to the Son in terms of cause, though as correlatives the Father and Son are simultaneous and thus co-eternal.9 Hence, there is no temporal gap between them that establishes the Father’s temporal priority; they are completely non-temporal, existing outside of time in eternity.

It is the context of making this argument that Basil offers an alternative view of time. It does not seem that Basil needed to propound his own view of time to refute Eunomius’s overall argument and secure his own theologi-cal account because he insists that the Father and Son are non-temporal.

7 On Basil’s theology, see Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism, 361-440; Volker Henning Drecoll, Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea: Sein Weg vom Homöusianer zum Neonizäner, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 66 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996); Bernard Sesboüé, Saint Basile et la Trinité: Un acte théologique au IVe siècle. Le rôle de Basile de Césarée dans l’élaboration de la doctrine et du langage trinitaire (Paris: Descleé, 1998); Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea: A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007); Radde-Gallwitz, Divine Simplicity, 113-174; and DelCogliano, Theory of Names, 135-260.

8 See Eun. 1.20.9 See Eun. 1.25-27.



In other words, a particular understanding of time is not essential to Basil’s theology. Rather, it appears as if Basil attacks Eunomius’s notion of time and puts forward his own understanding in order to undermine Eunomius’s cred-ibility as a theological expert.10 In fact, Basil’s deconstruction of Eunomius’s definition of time seethes with sarcasm, lending weight to this interpretation. Nonetheless, despite the polemics, Basil’s discussion of time carefully engages with the previous philosophical traditions, as we shall see, even as he under-cuts Eunomius’s theological authority.

Eunomius’s Notion of Time

But we must first situate Eunomius’s view of time within its philosophical con-text. Sesboüé claims that his definition is Aristotelian, albeit a simplified one.11 But he is mistaken. Aristotle thinks of time as something which belongs to movement: τῆς κινήσεως τι (Phys. 4.11, 219a9-10) or πάθος τι κινήσεως (Phys. 8.1, 251b28). Eunomius on the contrary identifies time with a certain kind of move-ment, something which Aristotle explicitly denies in Phys. 4.11: “Hence time is either movement or something that belongs to movement. Since then it is not a movement, it must be something that belongs to movement” (219a8-10). Therefore, the philosophical pedigree of Eunomius’s definition of time must be sought elsewhere.

Eunomius’s definition of time bears a striking resemblance to that of a mid-fourth century Christian commentator on the biblical book of Job known as Julian the Arian.12 Julian wrote this work, which reflects the Heteroousian theology of Eunomius, in the years 357-365, making its author an exact

10 Vaggione stresses how Eunomius and the Heteroousians understood themselves to be theological experts who unlike their opponents subscribed to unwavering precision or accuracy (akribeia) in doctrinal expression; see his Eunomius of Cyzicus, 45-6 and passim. Therefore, in his polemics against Eunomius, Basil rarely skips an opportunity to show his readers his opponent’s lack of philosophical and theological expertize.

11 Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 86-7. 12 Dieter Hagedorn, ed., Der Hiobkommentar des Arianers Julian. Patristische Texte und

Studien 14 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973). Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 278 n. 106 and 319 n. 44, plausibly suggests that “Julian the Arian” may in fact be Julian of Cilicia, a known follower of Aetius and Eunomius (Philostorgius, Historia ecclesiastica 8.2). Hagedorn (p. lvii) does not accept this identity due to insufficient evidence. In any case, the appellation “the Arian” is inaccurate, as both Julian the commenter on Job and Julian of Cilicia were adherents of the non-Nicene heteroousian theology championed by Eunomius.

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contemporary of Eunomius.13 In commenting on the biblical verse Job 38:7 (lxx), “when the stars came to be,” Julian seeks to disabuse his audience of the notion that the stars are the cause of evils, and concludes his discussion thus:

Therefore, the stars have been appointed for the seasons and not so that they effect evils, and for the years and not for acts of coming-to-be and deeds. For it is up to human beings to live well or badly, and it is not up to the stars. For they do not hold the reins of the wills of human beings, but they traverse the circuits of the times. For time [happens] through them, as Plato says: “For time is a certain kind of movement of the stars which go along with the sun and the moon.” Therefore, if they are entrusted with doing these things, they are unable to compel someone either toward vir-tue or toward vice. For they have not been assigned [to do this].14

The definitions of time offered by Eunomius and Julian are nearly the same, but Julian explicitly attributes it to Plato. Julian’s intent here is to show that the stars cause time, that is, the seasons and the years, by their movement and as such are not responsible for human actions. Time is identified with a certain kind of movement of the stars moving along with the sun and moon. Setting aside the unanswerable question of whether either Eunomius or Julian is dependent on the other, it suffices to say that this definition of time appears to have circulated among adherents of non-Nicene Heteroousian theology and was thought to derive from Plato. But such a word-for-word definition of time is not found in Plato, nor any other ancient philosopher.

Plato on Time

Accordingly, this Platonic definition must represent a summary or an interpre-tation of Plato’s notion of time in Tim. 37c-39e. There are two components to this interpretation: first, that time is identified with the movement of the stars,

13 Hagedorn, Der Hiobkommentar, lvi.14 Julian, Comm. Job 38.7 (Hagedorn, Der Hiobkommentar, 254, 1-7): οὐκοῦν εἰς καιροὺς

ἐτάχθησαν οἱ ἀστέρες ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἵνα ἐνεργῶσι τὰ κακά, καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτούς, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰς γενέσεις καὶ πράξεις· ἐπ’ ἀνθρώποις γὰρ τὸ βιοῦν εὖ ἢ κακῶς ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄστροις· οὐ γάρ εἰσι τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γνώμας ἡνιοχοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν χρόνων περιόδους διιππεύοντες. χρόνος γὰρ δι’ αὐτῶν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησί· χρόνος γάρ ἐστιν ἀστέρων ποιά τις κίνησις συμπαρομαρτούντων ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα ἐνεχειρίσθησαν δρᾶν, οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς κακίαν βιάσασθαί τινα οἷοί τέ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπετράπησαν.



and, second, that time is caused by the movement of the stars. Now Plato’s view of time in the Timaeus is notoriously difficult and resolving the issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I merely want to demonstrate two points about the interpretation of Plato represented by Eunomius and Julian: first, that the text of Tim. 37c-39e itself is open to such an interpretation, and, sec-ond, that there is evidence for this interpretation in antiquity.

Sorabji discusses the three main interpretations of the Timaeus in antiq-uity, their adherents, and their basis in the text of the Timaeus itself.15 First, time begins with the formation of the world, before which there was no time; second, regular time begins with the formation of the world, before which there was irregular time; and third, the metaphorical reading (which I will not consider here as it is not pertinent). The Platonic interpretation repre-sented by Eunomius and Julian corresponds to Sorabji’s first interpretation.16 Accordingly, I would like to review the evidence for the first in Plato himself.

Plato holds that the existence of time is coterminous with the existence of the heavens: “For there were no days or nights or months or years before the heaven came to be. [The demiurge] devised their coming to be at the same time as he formed the heaven” (Tim. 37e1-3),17 and again: “Time, then, came to be along with the heaven with the result that, just as they are begotten together, so too they are destroyed together, if some destruction of them should ever hap-pen” (Tim. 38b6-7).18 While in these passages Plato does not make the causal connection between the stars and time explicit, he does so when he says: “Such was the reason, then, such the god’s design for the coming to be of time, that he brought into being the sun, the moon and five other stars for the begetting of time. These are called ‘wanderers’, and they came to be in order to set lim-its to and stand guard over the numbers of time” (Tim. 38c3-6).19 Accordingly, the seven stars “cooperate in producing time” (Tim. 38e4-5).20 In Tim. 39b2-5 Plato describes how the period of the sun’s movement in the second circle is

15 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum (London: Duckworth, 1983), 268-276.16 As Christians they would have, of course, endorsed the view that the world was created,

not eternal.17 Gk. ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα

ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.18 Gk. Χρόνος δ’ οὖν μετ’ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις

αὐτῶν γίγνηται.19 Gk. ἐξ οὖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας θεοῦ τοιαύτης πρὸς χρόνου γένεσιν, ἵνα γεννηθῇ χρόνος, ἥλιος καὶ

σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἄστρα, ἐπίκλην ἔχοντα πλανητά, εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γέγονεν. Translation by Donald J. Zeyl in John M. Cooper, ed., Plato. Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).

20 Gk. συναπεργάζεσθαι χρόνον. Trans. Zeyl.

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the year, the period of the moon’s movement in the first circle is the month, and the period of the sun’s movement around the circle of the Same is night-and-day (i.e. 24 hours). The periods of the other five stars do not have names, as they are largely uninvestigated, but they are also parts of time. For “time is really the wanderings of these bodies, bewilderingly numerous as they are and astonishingly variegated” (Tim. 39d1-2).21

Plato therefore did not identify time with the movement of a particular star but with the movement of all seven “wandering” stars (Tim. 38c3-6; 38e4-5). Time began when the heavens, i.e. the seven stars, were formed and thus the existence of time was coterminous with the existence of the heavens (Tim. 37e1-3; 38b6-7). The movement of each star constitutes a specific mea-sure of time: the sun, the year; the moon, the month, and so forth (Tim. 39b2-5; 39d1-2). The periods traced by the movement of each of these stars are numer-able and measurable amounts, and all seven together are thought to constitute the parts of time (Tim. 37e3). It is in this sense, then, that the movements of the stars cause time. Therefore, on this first interpretation time is both identified with and caused by the movement of all seven stars.

But note that Julian’s Platonic definition does not connect time directly with the movement of all seven stars as Plato did, but with “a certain kind of movement” of the stars. Hence Eunomius’s and Julian’s Platonic definition of time may be a later Platonic formulation,22 or it may be a Hellenistic or post-Hellenistic interpretation of Plato which identifies time with another sort of motion or quasi-motion of which the stars and planets are the primary subjects. Nonetheless their definition remains squarely Platonic (on the first interpretation of the Timaeus) because of its identification of time with the movement of the stars.

The problem with this first interpretation, as Sorabji notes, is that in Tim. 37c-39e Plato also speaks of time before the coming to be of the heavens.23 Hence a second interpretation of Plato developed as a criticism of the first, in which irregular time was thought to pre-exist the formation of the cos-mos and regular time was thought to have come to be simultaneously with the formation of the cosmos. As we shall see below, further evidence for the first interpretation comes from the Peripatetic refutation of it by pointing out the possibility of the second interpretation. It is to this Peripatetic response to Plato that we now turn. In this next section I want to demonstrate that both

21 Gr. χρόνον ὄντα τὰς τούτων πλάνας, πλήθει μὲν ἀμηχάνῳ χρωμένας, πεποικιλμένας δὲ θαυμαστῶς. Trans. Zeyl.

22 On this, see below p. 510.23 See Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 278-9.



Aristotle and subsequent Peripatetics recognized the first interpretation of Plato (later adopted by Eunomius and Julian), even if they sought to refute it.

The First Interpretation of Plato in Aristotle and the Peripatetics

At the beginning of his discussion of time in Physics 4.10 Aristotle reviews two opinions regarding the nature of time: “Some say that it is the movement of the whole (τήν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν), others that it is the sphere itself” (218a33-b1).24 We learn from the sixth-century Neoplatonist commentator Simplicius that Eudemus of Rhodes (a pupil of Aristotle), Theophrastus (Aristotle’s successor at the Lyceum), and Alexander of Aphrodisias attributed the former opinion to Plato: “It is uncertain, then, what time is, if some say that time is the move-ment of the whole (τήν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν) and circular motion (περιφοράν), [a view] which Eudemus, Theophrastus, and Alexander recognize as Plato’s.”25 Hence Aristotle begins his discussion of the nature of time by briefly point-ing out two difficulties with Plato’s opinion.26 First, if a part of the circular motion (περιφορά) of the universe is also a time, it is inconsistent to identify time with the circular motion of the universe. This criticism appears to inter-pret Plato as saying that time is identical with a complete revolution of the circular motion of the universe, and, as such, cannot account for also calling “times” the circular motions that fall short of complete revolutions.27 Second,

24 Gr. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν σφαῖραν αὐτήν.25 Eudemus, Fr. 82a (F. Wehrli, Eudemos von Rhodos, Die Schule des Aristoteles, vol. 8, 2nd ed.

(Basel: Schwabe, 1969)) apud Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros 700, 16-19 (H. Diels, Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros octo commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 9 & 10 (Berlin: Reimer, 9:1882; 10:1895)): ἄδηλον οὖν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν (sc. ὁ χρόνος),εἴπερ οἱ μὲν τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν καὶ περιφορὰν τὸν χρόνον εἶναί φασιν, ὡς τὸν Πλάτωνα νομίζουσιν ὅ τε Εὔδημος καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος.

26 Simplicius attributes the second opinion, that time is the sphere itself, to the Pythagoreans at In Aristotelis physicorum libros 700, 19-20 (Diels). Aristotle dismisses it as naïve. Alexander echoes this contempt saying that the adherent of this view “deserves to be laughed at” (Alexander, On Time 2 (Robert W. Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” Phronesis 27 (1982): 58-81, at 60)). N.b. Since this treatise is preserved only in Arabic and Latin, I cannot provide the Greek original when citing Sharples’s English translation and it makes little sense here to cite the derivative versions. It takes Plotinus one sentence to refute this view at En. 3.7 [45].7, 20-22.

27 The thought here seems to be that, if the parts of time such as the year are considered units for counting movement, then it is impossible to count movements less than a com-plete revolution of the circular motion of any given star since it is less than the unit. Aristotle must be thinking here of something like the seasons: if the year is the time

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if there were multiple heavens, the movement of each of them would be time and thereby there would be multiple times. This second objection of Aristotle seems a bit disingenuous since he does not hold that there are more heavens than one, unless we take the word “heaven” in the second sense recognized by Aristotle as “the body continuous with the extreme circumference, which con-tains the moon, the sun, and some of the stars” (Cael. 1.9, 278b16-18).28 This cri-tique, then, appears to be aimed at Plato’s opinion that the movements of the seven “wandering” stars all contribute to a single thing called time, of which each individual movement is a part. So Aristotle points out that such a notion results in a multiplicity of times, not a single time. The problem of identifying time with particular movement is also noted by Eudemus:

When some say that the movement of the sun is time, what will they say concerning the other stars? For the same motion does not belong to all of them. If, then, all times are different, it is absurd, and there will be many times at once. But if the motions of the rest of them are not times, one must state the difference why time is the motion of the sun, but time is not the [motion] of the moon, nor, in fact, the [motions] of the other [stars]. This seems not easy [to do].29

Nowhere in the Timaeus did Plato identify time specifically with the movement of the sun, but this was the standard definition of time found in the Platonic Definitions 411b: “time is the movement of the sun, the measure of its motion”

produced by the complete revolution of the circular motion of the sun, what accounts for the four seasons of the year? So, the fact that movements less than the complete revolu-tion of the circular motion such as the seasons are considered times reveals the insuffi-ciency of the Platonic opinion. Cf. Alexander, On Time 3: the parts of time are time but the parts of a circular movement are not (a full) circular movement. Plotinus appears to make the same argument at En. 3.7 [45].8, 9-13.

28 Translation by J.L. Stocks from Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Alexander appears to have interpreted this passage in the same way in On Time 2, though he seems to connect this objection with the view that time is the sphere itself, saying that while there are many heavenly spheres, there are not many times.

29 Eudemus, Fr. 83 (Wehrli) apud Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros 702, 14-19 (Diels): οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου κίνησιν τὸν χρόνον πῶς ἐροῦσι περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων; οὐ γὰρ πάντων αἱ αὐταὶ φοραί. εἰ μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι χρόνοι ἕτεραι οὖσαι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, καὶ ἔσονται πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ χρόνοι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τῶν λοιπῶν φοραί, διαφορὰν λεκτέον, διὰ τί ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ χρόνος, ἡ δὲ τῆς σελήνης οὐ χρόνος, οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων. τοῦτο δὲ ἔοικεν οὐκ εὐμαρεῖ.



(χρόνος ἡλίου κίνησις, μέτρον φορᾶς). It seems likely, then, that Eudemus here is refuting Plato, or at least a Platonic position. He is also alluding to the diffi-culty of claiming that the movements of the seven “wandering” stars are times without this resulting in multiple times, a critique which also surely applies to Plato.

Accordingly, the concern that time be unitary is primary for Aristotle.30 In Physics 4.10 Aristotle also notes a third, more common opinion that “time is movement and a certain change” (218b9-10).31 He points out that time can-not be associated with a particular movement since “time is present equally everywhere and with all things” (218b13).32 Furthermore, movements have speeds, that is, they can be fast or slow, whereas time does not. In addition, fast and slow are defined by time, “but time is not defined by time, being neither a certain amount nor a certain kind of it (i.e. change or movement)” (218b17-18).33 Aristotle concludes his discussion of this third opinion regard-ing the nature of time by saying: “it is clear, then, that it is not a movement” (218b18).34 Employing Aristotle’s definition of time as the number of move-ment with respect to before and after, Eudemus echoes the same concern not to connect time with a particular movement:

Perhaps someone is at a loss concerning time, whether it is the number of a certain or of a kind of movement (τίνος ἢ ποίας κινήσεως ἀριθμός ἐστιν). Now it does not appear [to be the number] of some one [movement] but [the number] of every [movement] equally. For it is equally the number of everything in which [there is] a before and an after, and this is a com-mon [trait] of movement. Just as scientific knowledge of a mortal animal is not of a horse nor of a human being nor of another one of the species, but rather of the universal, so too is time not the number of some par-ticular movement, but of all equally.35

30 See Alexander, On Time 28 (Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 67).31 Gr. κίνησις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος. Cf. Alexander, On Time 4 (Sharples, “Alexander

of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 60).32 Gr. ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. Cf. Alexander, On Time 4 (Sharples,

“Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 60).33 Gr. ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. Cf. Alexander, On

Time 4 (Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 60).34 Gr. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις, φανερόν.35 Eudemus, Fr. 86 (Wehrli) apud Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros 717, 6-12 (Diels):

Ὁ μέντοι Εὔδημος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν τάδε γέγραφε· περὶ δὲ χρόνου τάχα ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε, τίνος ἢ ποίας κινήσεως ἀριθμός ἐστιν· οὐ δὴ φαίνεται μιᾶς τινος, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως πάσης· παντὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁμοίως ἀριθμός, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον· τοῦτο δὲ κοινὸν τῆς κινήσεως· ὥσπερ θνητοῦ

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In one way or another, then, in this review of the opinions regarding the nature of time in Physics 4.10 Aristotle rejects the notion that time can be in any way identified with movement, whether of the universe or of some particular movement within it. This same view is echoed by Eudemus36 and from him we learn the anti-Platonic context of Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of time. The only clue for this context that Aristotle himself supplies is his statement in Phys. 8.1: “Plato alone asserts the creation of time saying that is simultaneous with the world and that the world came into being” (251b17-19).37 Such a view is consistent with the interpretation of Plato that he identified time with the movement of the stars.

Before exploring in more detail how Aristotle’s own view of time is a reac-tion to Plato, it is worth pointing out that both Aristotle and Eudemus may also provide evidence for a Platonic background to the precise formulation of the Platonic definition of time cited by Eunomius and Julian, that it is a certain kind of movement of the stars (ἀστέρων ποιά τις κίνησις). As noted above, Aristotle taught that “time is not defined by time, being neither a cer-tain amount nor a certain kind of it (i.e. change or movement)” (οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός; 218b17-18).38 Could Aristotle be rejecting the claim of some Platonists who identified time with a certain amount or a certain kind of movement? Perhaps, since Eudemus, as mentioned above, dialectically raised the question whether time is “the number of a certain or of a kind of move-ment” (τίνος ἢ ποίας κινήσεως ἀριθμός ἐστιν).39 Accordingly, the Platonic defini-tion quoted by Eunomius and Julian may derive from these Platonist proposals formulated in the course of debate with Peripatetics, even if it does not exactly match the ideas recorded by Aristotle and Eudemus. In any event, as Aristotle and Eudemus show, such a definition still identifies time with movement and remains wholly Platonic.

ζῴου ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν ἵππου οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲ ἄλλου τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθόλου, οὕτως οὐδὲ χρόνος τῆσδέ τινος κινήσεως ἀριθμός, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως πάσης.

36 It should be noted that Alexander departs from Aristotle and Eudemus in defining time as “the number of the movement of the heavenly sphere”; see On Time 5-6, 8, 10, 15 and 19. I will discuss this below.

37 Trans. Hardie and Gaye.38 Gr. ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. Cf. Alexander, On

Time 4 (Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 60).39 See n. 35 above.



The Critique of Plato in Aristotle and the Peripatetics

I would like now to briefly summarize Aristotle’s view of the nature of time to show that it is a reaction to Plato. Basil’s own view of time has its origins in Aristotle’s critique of Plato in this regard. In his presentation of his view of time in Physics 4.11-14 Aristotle also avoids identifying time with movement while stressing their close connection. In Physics 4.11 Aristotle claims that, even if time is not to be identified with movement, time cannot exist without move-ment. He says that “time is neither movement nor independent of movement” (Phys. 4.11, 219a1-2),40 and that “time is either movement or something that belongs to movement. Since then it is not a movement, it must be something that belongs to movement” (Phys. 4.11, 219a9-10).41 Aristotle actually offers a number definitions of time. First, “time is not a movement but only a move-ment insofar as it admits of enumeration . . . Time then is a kind of number” (219b2-3).42 By “number” Aristotle means what is counted not that by which we count. Aristotle’s final definition of time in Physics 4.11 is: “time is num-ber of movement in respect of the before and after, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous” (220a24-26).43 In Physics 4.12 Aristotle calls time “a measure of movement and of what moves, and it measures the movement by determining a certain movement which will measure the whole movement” (220b32-221a2).44 In all these definitions Aristotle is careful not to identify time with movement in any way.45 Hence, we can say that one of the goals of Aristotle’s treatment of time is to deny that it can be identified with movement but that it is nevertheless not independent of movement.

Simplicius also records two fragments of Eudemus and Alexander which show that both criticized Plato’s identification of time with the movement of the heaven on the grounds that he also spoke of movement before the heaven’s

40 Gr. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε κίνησις οὔτ’ ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστί, φανερόν.41 Gr. ὥστε ἤτοι κίνησις ἢ τῆς κινήσεώς τί ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κίνησις, ἀνάγκη τῆς κινήσεώς

τι εἶναι αὐτόν.42 Gr. οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ’ ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις. σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον καὶ

ἔλαττον κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. Trans. Hardie and Gaye.

43 Gr. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ συνεχής (συνεχοῦς γάρ), φανερόν. Trans. Hardie and Gaye.

44 Gr. ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, μετρεῖ δ’ οὗτος τὴν κίνησιν τῷ ὁρίσαι τινὰ κίνησιν ἣ καταμετρήσει τὴν ὅλην.

45 Cf. Alexander’s short treatise On Time is basically a defense of the Aristotelian view of time as the number of movement, not movement itself.

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coming to be. This is an example of evidence for the first interpretation of Plato through the critique of it by raising the possibility of the second interpretation:

Alexander, out of contentiousness showing that the opinion which says that time is the motion of the heaven belongs to Plato, first gives the tes-timony of Eudemus, who says: “And so, Plato has followed this opinion, and very absurdly. For he says that, before the heaven came to be, move-ment was irregular. He is not, after all, joining a thread to a thread [i.e. he does not know what he is doing], if indeed all movement is in time.” Next, he [Alexander] does not accept those who say that Plato, agreeing with Aristotle, says that time is the number of movement when he says that it is “an eternal image moving according to number” (Tim. 37d). “For he [Plato],” he [Alexander] says, “does not say that time is the number of movement, but movement according to number, that is, according to regularity.” Alexander [said] these things, but it is necessary for me to indicate, first, on what basis Eudemus supposed that Plato said that time is the circular motion of the heaven, and then, that it does not follow that it is absurd, as Alexander reckoned, for Plato [to say] that time is before time. “For if all movement,” he [Alexander] says, “is in time, it is clear that the faulty and irregular movement is also in time. If, then, such time was before the heaven came to be, it is clear that time was also before the circular motion of the heaven. If, then, this is time, there would be time before time.”46

We see in this passage the development of the Peripatetic refutation of Plato. Eudemus specifies that Plato is the source of the opinion that identified time with the movement of the heaven recorded Aristotle in Physics 4.10 and points

46 Eudemus, Fr. 82b (Wehrli) apud Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros 702, 24-703, 6 (Diels): ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος φιλονεικῶν δεῖξαι τοῦ Πλάτωνος οὖσαν δόξαν τὴν λέγουσαν χρόνον εἶναι τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν πρῶτον μὲν τὸν Εὔδημον μαρτύρεται λέγοντα ἠκολούθησε καὶ Πλάτων τῇ δόξῃ ταύτῃ καὶ μάλα ἀτόπως· πρὶν γὰρ οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, φησὶ κίνησιν εἶναι ἄτακτον. οὐ λίνον δὴ λίνῳ συνάπτει, εἴπερ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ. ἔπειτα οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τῶν λεγόντων, ὅτι καὶ ὁ Πλάτων συμφώνως τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμὸν λέγει κινήσεως εἰπὼν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸν κινήσεως, φησί, λέγει τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν κίνησιν ὅ ἐστι κατὰ τάξιν. ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος. Ἐμὲ δὲ ὑποδεῖξαι χρεών, πρῶτον μὲν πόθεν ὁ Εὔδημος ὑπενόησε χρόνον λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιφοράν, εἶτα ὅτι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἄτοπον τῷ Πλάτωνι, ὡς ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος συνελογίσατο, τὸ χρόνον εἶναι πρὸ χρόνου. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις, φησίν, ἐν χρόνῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ πλημμελὴς καὶ ἄτακτος κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ. εἰ οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις ἦν πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ χρόνος ἦν πρὸ τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιφορᾶς. εἰ οὖν αὕτη ὁ χρόνος, εἴη ἂν χρόνος πρὸ χρόνου.



out that is it incompatible for him to assert that all movement is in time if there was movement before the coming to be of the heavens—a critique not made by Aristotle himself. Alexander elaborates the point and makes the absurdity explicit in saying that Plato’s view posits a time before time.47

And so, the Peripatetic tradition concerned itself with refuting the Platonic identification of time with the movement of the heaven by pointing out the difficulties and absurdities that result from such a view. Aristotle’s own view of time, adopted by Eudemus and Alexander, sought to connect time and movement but without identifying them. By defining time as the number or the measure of movement with respect to before and after, Aristotle reveals his concern for providing a general account of the nature of time completely independent of particular movements. For Aristotle, time is a question of counting or measuring any and all movements. Time is what is countable with regard to movement in respect of earlier and later stages, i.e. it is the number of periods counted off during movement.48 Time is the measure of movement when counting is regular in such a way that the periods counted off may serve as units of measuring time.49 Hence I take this view of time as enumerating or measuring all movements and as causally independent of particular move-ments, especially of the heavenly bodies, as Aristotelian.

Therefore, from Plato and Aristotle emerged two different and opposed views of time. I have reviewed passages from Aristotle and other Peripatetics both to provide evidence for the first interpretation of Timaeus 37c-39e (which stands behind the definitions of Eunomius and Julian) and to show continued Peripatetic adherence to Aristotle’s view of time. As will be seen, Basil’s own view of time has its roots in the critique of Plato initiated by Aristotle and other Peripatetics, but as mediated through more proximate philosophical sources.

Middle Platonism and Stoicism on Time

The Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of time which influenced both Eunomius and Basil were mediated to them through Middle Platonism and

47 I have been helped in sorting out the speakers in this passage and its interpretation by Robert A. Sharples, “Eudemus’ Physics: Change, Place and Time,” in István Bodnár and William W. Fortenbaugh, eds., Eudemus of Rhodes, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities xi (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 107-26, at 114-16.

48 Cf. Alexander, On Time 9 (Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 61).49 Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 84-89, holds that Aristotle’s views of time as

number and measure are not the same.

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Stoicism, as well as other philosophical traditions represented by other figures of the early centuries CE. Accordingly, these traditions need to be examined. I would first like to demonstrate both the persistence and the modification of the first interpretation of Plato among Platonists in the early centuries CE. The first passage is from Diogenes Laertius, writing in the first half the third cen-tury CE, who must record a Platonic handbook-epitome of Plato’s view of time:

Time came to be as the image of the eternal. And while the latter always remains [as is], time is the motion of the heaven. For night and day and month and suchlike are all parts of time. For this reason there is not time independent of the nature of the cosmos. For as soon as existence is given to the cosmos, there is also time.50

We see here the identification of time with the motion of the heaven, the notion that the individual circular motions of the stars are responsible for the various parts of time, and the belief that time began with the formation of the cosmos. But we see a different presentation of Platonic views by the slightly earlier Alcinous from the second century CE, who is considered a Middle Platonist:

God also fashioned the planets . . . seven in number [which] serve for the coming to be of number and time . . . For he created time as the extension of the movement of the cosmos, as an image of eternity, which is the measure of the stability of the eternal cosmos. . . . The moon makes the measure of a month, by completing its own orbit and overtaking the sun in this space of time. The sun gives measure to the year; for in making the circuit of the zodiac it completes the seasons of the year. The other planets each have their own circular motions, which are not accessible to the casual observer, but only to the experts.51

50 Vitae philosophorum 3.73, 6-10 (H.S. Long, Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)): Χρόνον τε γενέσθαι εἰκόνα τοῦ ἀιδίου. κἀκεῖνον μὲν ἀεὶ μένειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν χρόνον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν καὶ μῆνα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα χρόνου μέρη εἶναι. διόπερ ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου φύσεως οὐκ εἶναι χρόνον· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ καὶ χρόνον εἶναι.

51 Alcinous, Didaskalikos 14.6, 1-14 (P. Louis, Albinos. Épitomé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945)): Ἐδημιούργησε δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀστέρας τε καὶ ἄστρα, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῆ, κόσμον οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ νυκτός, πάμπολλα ὄντα τῷ πλήθει, τὰ δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ καὶ χρόνου καὶ δεῖξιν τῶν ὄντων, ἑπτὰ ὄντα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον ἐποίησε τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα, ὡς ἂν εἰκόνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ὅς ἐστι μέτρον τοῦ αἰωνίου κόσμου τῆς μονῆς. Τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρων τῇ δυνάμει οὐχ ὅμοια. Ἥλιος μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονεύει πάντων, δεικνύς τε καὶ φαίνων τὰ σύμπαντα·



Once again, the circular motions of the seven “wandering” stars are held respon-sible for generating time. But what is different here is the non-identification of time with the movement of the heavens and its definition as “the exten-sion of the movement of the cosmos” (τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα).52 What is more remarkable is that this definition is identical with that ascribed to the Stoic Chrysippus.53 Dillon notes that this same Chrysippean formula is attributed to Plato in the doxographic tradition by Aëtius (active in the late first century CE).54 Hence in the Middle Platonic period it seems that some Platonists thought this Stoic definition an accurate formulation of what Plato had said in the Timaeus. Also remarkable is Alcinous’s definition of eternity (αἰών) as “the measure of the stability of the eternal cosmos” (μέτρον τοῦ αἰωνίου κόσμου τῆς μονῆς). Dillon notes that such a definition is found nowhere in the surviving tradition and that it may be an original contribution of Alcinous himself. Furthermore, the notion that αἰών was the measure of the intelligible world is found in Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus.55 I note this view of αἰών here because later I will discuss how Basil holds a similar idea.

The Middle Platonic co-opting of the Chrysippean definition of time neces-sitates a look at the Stoic view of time.56 Unfortunately, all we have on the subject is summary statements without supporting arguments. Both Zeno and Chrysippus appear to have been influenced by Aristotle in that they do not identify time with movement while making its existence depend on it as some aspect of it. It has been suggested that they were influenced by Speusippus’s view that time was the quantity proper to motion (τὸ ἐν κινήσει ποσόν).57 Zeno defined time as “the extension of all movement without qualification” (πάσης

σελήνη δὲ ἐν τάξει δευτέρᾳ θεωρεῖται ἕνεκα τῆς δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πλανῆται ἀναλόγως κατὰ μοῖραν ἕκαστος ἰδίαν. Καὶ σελήνη μὲν μηνὸς μέτρον ποιεῖ, ἐκπεριελθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς κύκλον καὶ καταλαβοῦσα τὸν ἥλιον ἐν τοσούτῳ· ἥλιος δὲ ἐνιαυτῷ· περιελθὼν γὰρ τὸν ζῳοφόρον κύκλον πληροῖ τὰς ὥρας τοῦ ἔτους· οἵ τε ἄλλοι καθ’ ἕνα ἕκαστον περιόδοις ἰδίαις κέχρηνται, αἵτινες θεωρηταὶ οὐ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις. Trans. [modified] by John Dillon, Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1993), 24.

52 Dillon (Alcinous, 128) notes that by “cosmos” (κόσμος) Alcinous refers not to the world as a whole but to the sphere of the fixed stars.

53 Apud Stobaeus 1.106, 5-23 = SVF 2.509 = LS 51B.54 Aëtius, Plac. 1.21.2 = 318.4-5 Diels DG. See Dillon, Alcinous, 129.55 Dillon, Alcinous, 129-30. He admits that it is hard to make sense of how there can be a

measure for something unextended and not subject to change of any kind.56 By “Stoic” here I basically mean “Chrysippean.”57 Apud Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. 1007b = Speusippus, fr. 54 Lang. On the possibility of

Speussipian influence on the Stoics, see Strange, “Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time,” 42.

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ἁπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα),58 and we do not know much else about his views on time.59 This definition clearly influenced Chrysippus, a number of whose definitions of time are recorded, of which I will list the three main representa-tives: “the extension of the movement of the cosmos” (διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως),60 “the extension accompanying the movement of the cosmos” (τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου κινήσει),61 and “the extension of movement according to which one speaks of the measure of fastness and slow-ness” (κινήσεως διάστημα καθ’ ὅ ποτὲ λέγεται μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδυτῆτος).62 It is clear, then, that the Stoics thought of time primarily as the διάστημα of the movement of the cosmos, but it remains to determine precisely what this means.

Though the Stoics took Aristotle as their starting-point for their view of time, Long and Sedley claim that the Stoics took a “less subjectivist” view in speaking of time not as something countable or counted by a conscious coun-ter but as merely depending on the existence of movement.63 Hence, given the Stoic understanding of the cosmos as everlasting and always in motion, “in linking time with the world’s motion, Chrysippus tied the duration of time to the one thing whose existence is not subject to intermittent starts and stops.”64 Be that as it may, the question remains what sense of κόσμος Chrysippus meant in his definitions. Diogenes Laertius notes that the Stoics used the word κόσμος in three ways: (1) for the indestructible and ingenerate god itself who manufac-tured and consumed each individual world-order, (2) a single world-order, and (3) what is composed of both the god and the world-order.65 In other words

58 Apud Simplicius, in Ar. Cat. 350.14-16 = SVF 2.510 = LS 51A.59 John M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 274-6,

speculates about Zeno’s view of time.60 Apud Simplicius, in Ar. Cat. 350.14-16 = SVF 2.510 = LS 51A.61 Apud Stobaeus i.106, 5-23 = SVF 2.509 = LS 51B. The notion of time as the accompaniment

of movement (τὸ παρακολούθημα τῆς κινήσεως) is Epicurean (see Lucretius i.459-463 [LS 7A5], Epicurus, ep. Hdt. 72-73 [LS 7B6], Sext. Emp. M. 10.219-27 [LS 7C]). On this view, the existence of time is inseparable from the movement of which it is an accident. In En. 3.7 [45].10, Plotinus lumps Epicurus (correctly, I think) with Aristotle and Chrysippus, in that all three view time as something belonging to movement, not movement itself.

62 Apud Stobaeus i.106, 5-23 = SVF 2.509 = LS 51B. Cf. “the measure of fastness and slowness” (μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδυτῆτος) [apud Stobaeus i.105, 17-106, 4 = Posidonius fr. 98 = LS 51E].

63 A.A. Long, and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), vol. 1, 306-7.

64 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, 307.65 Diog. Laer. 7.137 = SVF 2.526 = LS 44F.



(and to simplify things a bit), κόσμος could refer to either an individual world-order or the ordered system of infinitely successive world-orders. If Chrysippus meant the latter sense, then time would extend far beyond the existence of a single world-order to encompass all states of the Stoic universe even during periods of conflagration when there is no particular world-order to speak of.66

Philo of Alexandria, active in the middle of the first century CE, records this view, but also a Platonizing interpretation of Chrysippus’s definition as mean-ing by κόσμος a single world-order. In Aet. mundi 52-54 Philo argues for the eter-nity of the single cosmos and turns to the subject of time, since if he can show that time is uncreated, it follows that the world must also be uncreated. He first refers to Plato who demonstrated that time cannot exist without the move-ment of the sun and the circular motion of the whole heaven (52).67 He next offers the Chrysippean definition of time as corroboration for this Platonic view since it shows that “the cosmos is of the same age as time and also its cause” (γίνεται ὁ κόσμος ἰσῆλιξ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ αἴτιος). Because his view of time as coextensive with the cosmos is part of his argument for the eternity of the world, Philo rejects the Stoic view that “time is explained as the extension of the cosmos, not only of the present world-order, but also the one supposed at the conflagration” (54)—the view mentioned above. Hence, on the Platonizing interpretation, the cosmos referred to in the Stoic definition of time is the pres-ent world-order.

Rist interprets the Chrysippean definition of time in the same way as refer-ring to a single world-order, though he does not recognize it as a Platonizing interpretation.68 He sees the view of time as the extension of the movement of present world-order as motivated by the need to have fixed points (i.e. a beginning and an end) for the measurement of time. Such a reconstruction of the Stoic view has much in common with Alexander’s definition of time which we mentioned above: “the number of the movement of the heavenly sphere.”69 Alexander appears to have based his definition on Aristotle’s state-ment in Physics 4.14 that time seems to be measured par excellence by the movement of the heavenly sphere since this movement (i.e. regular circular motion) is the best known and all other movements and time are measured

66 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, 310-11, claim that any Stoic who accepted Chrysippus’s definition of time would have to accept such a view.

67 Note that this appears a conflation of the views of time from Tim. and Def.68 Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 276-78, 281-2. He seems (p. 282) unaware that there is evidence for

the Stoic view that there is time during the conflagration (see LS 28O4, 46O, 52A2). 69 Alexander, On Time 5-6, 8, 10, 15 and 19. Plotinus appears to be refuting Alexander’s view

in En. 3.7 [45].7, 13-19.

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by it (223b18-24). Yet while Aristotle does not categorically state that that time is the number of the movement of the heavenly sphere, Alexander does.70 Alexander’s formulation here appears to be motivated by the need to provide for some standard by which to number time.71 There is no movement swifter than the movement of the heavenly sphere and hence all lesser movements can be measured with respect to it (i.e. as slower to some degree).72 This is similar to the Platonizing interpretation of Chrysippus, in that both recognize the need to provide for a frame of reference in which movement can be numbered so as to measure time. Hence, it can be said that in the centuries after Aristotle and Eudemus, among some of those who accepted his non- identification of time with movement, starting with Chrysippus, perhaps, it was felt that measuring time needed a stable standard, most likely in order to avoid the Aristotelian implication that time depended on the soul.73 Chrysippus deems this to be the continually moving cosmos (whether the system of successive world-orders or a single one) and Alexander the heavenly sphere whose movement is eternal, continuous, and swiftest.

Accordingly, in the early centuries CE the emphasis is no longer on identi-fying time as the movements of the stars, be it all or one of them, but as the extension, or duration, co-eval with the movement of the present cosmos. No doubt alluding to Genesis 1:14, Philo says that days and nights, months, and years show (ἔδειξαν) “the nature of the measurement of time.”74 Hence, he must not understand them as parts of time—indeed, he does not call them parts—but as measures in the sense that they measure a certain duration of the extension of the movement of the cosmos, which are not the constituents of time as Plato had said. Such a view seems consistent with Alcinous, who also calls the year and the month measures. Time is the duration of the estab-lishment of cosmos, and the durations established by the completed orbits of

70 See Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 69-70.71 Or possibly the idea is to provide a framework in which different motions can be

coordinated, as having occurred simultaneously, or earlier and later than one another.72 Alexander, On Time 10, 15 and 19 (Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 62).73 On the Aristotelian implication that time is dependent on soul, see Sorabji, The Philosophy

of the Commentators, 2.201-206. Alexander defends Aristotle on this point by appeal to Plato’s view of the soul as the source of change, saying that, if this is the case, there can be no change and thus no time without soul. Here I think Alexander is more engaging in damage-control than offering satisfying philosophical arguments. I hold that even though he makes this defense, he still realizes the need for providing an objective frame of reference in which to number movement outside of the human mind.

74 Aet. mundi 19. Plotinus repeats this idea in En. 3.7 [45].13, 1.



the sun and the moon and other planets constitute the measures of time, not its parts.

This same view which considers the motions of the various heavenly bod-ies as the measures of time and not its parts is also found in Galen. But in addition to this, Galen makes a very pointed critique of Aristotle’s not iden-tifying time with movement but making its existence depend on it as some aspect of it, a tactic which influenced Stoics and Middle Platonists. Galen not only critiqued Aristotle’s definition of time but also proposed that its existence was completely independent of motion. These views were expressed in his now-lost On Demonstration, though a handful of fragments from this work are extant in the Greek and Arabic traditions.75 Galen rejected Aristotle’s defini-tion of time because in defining time in terms of temporal priority and pos-terity, he claimed it was circular.76 This is coupled with Galen’s insistence in two testimonies that the existence of time was independent of motion. First, it is reported that Galen made the point that time exists when we think about unchanging things like the poles of the cosmos and the center of the earth.77 In other words, time still passes even for unmoving things.78 But a second tes-timony from Ibn Abī Saʿīd provides the clearest expression of Galen’s views in this regard:

Also, let me know whether you hold that time necessarily depends on motion, such that there can be no time except through motion, and the latter is the cause of the former’s existence. For Aristotle does hold this. Or, do you rather hold that time has an existent nature [of its own], and is a substance subsisting through itself ( jawhar qāʾim bi-nafsihi), which motion merely measures and determines, the way a surveyor measures the earth with a cubit? For according to the testimony of Alexander in his treatise refuting Galen on the subject of place and time, Galen held this opinion, but Alexander refuted him on this point. For Galen held that time is subsistent through itself and has no need for motion in its

75 These are nicely laid out and analyzed by Peter Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” in Rotraud Hansberger, M. Afifi al-Akiti, and Charles Burnett, eds., Medieval Arabic Thought: Essays in Honour of Fritz Zimmermann, Warburg Studies and Texts 4 (London: Warburg Institute, 2012), 1-14. Adamson suggests that Alexander’s On Time is defense of Aristotle against the criticisms of Galen (see pp. 6-7).

76 Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” 3.77 See texts T2 and T6 in Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” 3 and 5-6.78 This idea is refuted in Alexander, On Time 5 and 23, and is cited as proof that Alexander’s

target is Galen in Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” 7. See also the comments on p. 10.

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existence, and he said that Plato was of the same opinion on this topic, that is, that he held that time is a substance—by which he means ‘dura-tion (al-mudda)’—and motion merely measures and determines it. So Galen says that motion does not produce time for us, but rather produces only day, month and year for us. Time, though, is existent in itself, and is not an accident dependent upon [motion].79

Here Galen’s view is contrasted with the view ascribed to Aristotle, that time depends on motion for its existence. For Galen, time is self-subsistent and its existence does not depend on any motions, which instead produce the various measures of time by dividing it into specific durations. Interestingly, he appar-ently presents this a faithful interpretation of Plato, much as Middle Platonists did with their views even if they diverged from the Timaeus. The claim about motions measuring time reflects the Middle Platonist view that the vari-ous motions are not the parts of time but its measures, as seen also in Philo and Alcinous.80 But the claim about time’s independence from any motions appears to be a unique contribution of his, and one that had some influence in Arabic philosophy, particularly upon the late-ninth and early-tenth century Abū Bakr al-Rāzī.81

Therefore, the Middle Platonic tradition incorporated Stoic elements into the Platonic account of time, thereby introducing mediated Aristotelian elements as well. In so doing, it retained the Platonic notion that time was coterminous with the coming to be of the heaven and the idea that time was dependent upon the movement of the heaven, but, following Aristotle, it no longer identified time with the particular movements of the stars. What Plato had considered the parts of time—the year, the month, the day—the Middle Platonists thought of as the measures of time. In addition, philosophy of the Middle Platonic period, including the Peripatetic Alexander, felt the need to provide for an objective frame of reference in which to measure movement, all of which occurred in time. This led both Middle Platonists and Alexander to define time as some aspect of what they considered the most objective move-ment, though not identified with it in a Platonic way. Galen went one step fur-ther than this, claiming time’s existence to be independent of all movements.

79 Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, The Philosophical Treatises, ed. S. Khalifat (Amman, 1988), pp. 318, l. 6-319, l. 3. Translation taken from Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” 5 (his text T4).

80 See also Galen’s paraphrase of the Timaeus, preserved only in Arabic, which is translated at Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” 6 (his text T7).

81 Adamson, “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time,” 8-11, analyzes the accuracy of the various reports about Galen’s view of time, and on pp. 11-14 assesses Galen’s influence on al-Rāzī.



Basil on Time

At this point the philosophical context has been sufficiently explained to discuss Basil’s own view of time in detail. I will proceed by citing it section-by-section and commenting upon it. Basil’s refutation has four major parts: (1) how Eunomius’s definition of time is inconsistent with scripture; (2) how Eunomius’s definition of time in itself is problematic; (3) Basil’s own account of time; and (4) Basil’s reduction of Eunomius’s definition to absurdity.

In this first section Basil simply quotes Eunomius’s definition and raises his first objection to it:

Since this man who is wise in everything has proceeded to give us a defi-nition of the nature of time, let’s investigate whether his thinking on the matter is solid and circumspect. He says that “time is a certain kind of (ποίαν τινα) motion of the stars,” clearly meaning the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars in which there is the power to move by themselves. What, then, will this expert in astronomical phenomena declare is the interval (διάστημα) from the coming-to-be of heaven and earth until the making of the stars? For the one who in the power of the Spirit recorded the cosmogony clearly said that the great lights and the rest of the stars came to be on the fourth day.82 Therefore, it seems as if there was no time during the preceding days. The stars, you see, were not moving yet. For how could they, when they had not come to be at the beginning? And again, when Joshua the son of Nun was waging war against the Gibeonites, and the sun, constrained by a command, remained unmoved and the moon stood still,83 was there not time in these circumstances?84

82 See Genesis 1:14-19.83 See Joshua 10:12-13.84 Basil, Eun. 1.21, 1-16 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol.1, 246-248): Ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἀφορίσασθαι ἡμῖν

τοῦ χρόνου τὴν φύσιν ὁ σοφὸς τὰ πάντα προήχθη, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν αὐτοῦ τὸ βέβαιον καὶ περιεσκεμμένον τῆς διανοίας ἴδωμεν. Χρόνον τοίνυν εἶναί φησι ποιάν τινα κίνησιν ἀστέρων· ἡλίου δηλονότι καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ὅσοις καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς κινεῖσθαι δύναμίς ἐστι. Τὸ τοίνυν ἀπὸ γενέσεως οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς μέχρι τῆς ποιήσεως τῶν ἀστέρων διάστημα τί ποτε ἄρα εἶναι ὁ δεινὸς τὰ μετέωρα οὗτος ἀποφανεῖται; Σαφῶς γὰρ ὁ τὴν κοσμογονίαν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀναγράψας τῇ τετάρτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τοὺς μεγάλους φωστῆρας καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀστέρας γεγενῆσθαί φησι. Χρόνος οὖν οὐκ ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ταῖς κατόπιν ἡμέραις· οὐ γὰρ ἐκινοῦντό πω οἱ ἀστέρες. Πῶς γὰρ, οἵ γε μηδ’ ἐγεγόνεισαν τὴν ἀρχήν· Καὶ πάλιν,ὅτε ἐπολέμει τοῖς Γαβαωνίταις ὁ τοῦ Ναυῆ Ἰησοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἀκίνητος ὁ ἥλιος ἔμεινε τῷ προστάγματι πεδηθεὶς, καὶ ἡ σελήνη κατὰ χώραν εἱστήκει, χρόνος οὐκ ἦν τηνικαῦτα; Translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 121-2.

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To begin, Basil’s debate with Eunomius on time focuses on the nature (φύσις) of time, not other aspects of time such as its existence. I have demonstrated above how Eunomius’s definition is ultimately of Platonic origin, and hence Basil objects to the Platonic understanding of time. On the one hand, as Aristotle and Eudemus before him, Basil sees the problem of identifying time with the particular movements of heavenly bodies. Yet Basil’s first objections are not based on those of Aristotle and Eudemus, nor are they even, strictly speaking, philosophical. Rather, Basil appeals to scripture, citing two exam-ples of the existence of time without the movement of the stars. This argu-ment, however, is similar to that of Eudemus and Alexander (cited above)85 in which they say that Plato’s speaking of time before the coming to be of the heaven is inconsistent with his identification of time with its movement.86 It is an exegetical argument just like Basil’s. Eudemus, Alexander, and Basil all appeal to an authoritative text (i.e. Plato or scripture) to discredit the view that time can be identified with the movement of the heaven for much the same reason, insofar as in both texts the existence of time is implied before the coming to be of the movement which is supposed to account for time. On the other hand, Basil’s argument here is reminiscent of Galen’s, in that both point to the passing of time when movement in specific bodies is lacking. But there is a difference. For Basil there is still time even when the heavenly bod-ies which supposedly cause time stop moving, whereas for Galen time is still perceived even in places where motion is absent. Accordingly, Basil makes a broadly Aristotelian and Peripatetic critique of Eunomius’s view of time, even if he does not employ their specific philosophical arguments, a critique that was foundational for Stoic and Middle Platonist views of time as well. For Basil, scripture shows that time exists independently of the particular movements of any heavenly bodies.

Basil next turns to the question of how one might measure or call those durations for which Eunomius’s Platonic definition cannot account:

What, then, should we call the interval (διάστημα) of that day? What des-ignation have you dreamt up for it? If the nature of time has failed, clearly an age (αἰών) takes its place. But if you designate a small part (μέρος) of the day as an age, is there any excess of folly left to surpass?87

85 See pp. 511-513 above.86 On this, see Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 30-1 and 72.87 Basil, Eun. 1.21, 17-21 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 248): Τί οὖν ἐκεῖνο τὸ διάστημα τῆς

ἡμέρας εἴπωμεν; τίνα προσηγορίαν ἐπινοήσεις; Εἰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου φύσις ἐπιλελοίπει, αἰὼν



Basil’s concern with measuring extension reveals the Stoic and Middle Platonic context of his views. He sees Eunomius’s view as resulting in the absurdity that without the movement of the stars, there is nothing with which to measure temporal extension. Therefore, on Eunomius’s view, since the events recorded in the scriptural testimonia mentioned are altogether not in time, they would have had to occur in an age (αἰών). For Basil, an age has extension: “Common usage classifies every interval under time or age, for that which is time among the sensory realities corresponds the nature of age among the supercosmic realities.”88 Such an understanding is reminiscent of Alcinous’s definition of an αἰών as “the measure of the stability of the eternal cosmos” (μέτρον τοῦ αἰωνίου κόσμου τῆς μονῆς).89 While Alcinous speaks of αἰών as the measure of the intelligible realm, Basil sees αἰών as the extension (without claiming it is measurable) that is proper to the unchanging intelligible realm.90 Whatever

ἀντεισῆλθε δηλονότι. Αἰῶνα δὲ μικρὸν ἡμέρας μέρος προσαγορεύειν τίνα τῆς ἀνοίας ὑπερβολὴν ἀπολείπει; Translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 122.

88 Basil, Eun. 2.13, 19-22 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 2, 48): ἡ μὲν γὰρ κοινὴ συνήθεια ἢ χρονοις ἢ αἰῶσιν ἅπαν διάστημα ὑποβάλλει· ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὑπερκοσνίοις ἡ τοῦ αἰῶνος φύσις ἐστίν. Translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 147.

89 Alcinous, Didaskalikos 14.6, 6. See p. 515 above.90 Basil’s close friend Gregory of Nazianzus had a similar view: “For an age is neither time

nor some part of time. For it is not measurable. But that which is time for us is measured by the motion of the sun, this is an age for the everlasting realities, coextensive with the real beings, a quasi-temporal movement and extension” (Αἰὼν γὰρ, οὔτε χρόνος, οὔτε χρόνου τι μέρος· οὐδὲ γὰρ μετρητόν· ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἡμῖν ὁ χρόνος, ἡλίου φορᾷ μετρούμενος, τοῦτο τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, αἰὼν, τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τοῖς οὖσιν,οἷόν τι χρονικὸν κίνημα, καὶ διάστημα); see Oratio 38.8 in theophania (PG 36.320, 14-18) and Oratio 45.4 in sanctum pascha (PG 36.628, 30-34). As mentioned above, Dillon noted that such a concept of eternity is hard to fathom. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 142-3, speculates that on this view αἰών signaled “a less determinate but still boundaried kind of time” which preceded or lay outside of χρόνος. Because it “was boundaried it was not outside time, and yet because it was not measured, to speak of ‘before’ or ‘after’ made no sense.” Hence non-Nicenes such as Arius and Eunomius who wished to avoid saying that the Son was begotten in χρόνος (something no Christian would want to say as obviously heretical) could say that he was begotten πρὸ αἰώνων (which most Christians would accept as accurate, if somewhat vague) and still maintain that the Son was in some sense created. Proclus, Elem. Theo. 53-54 speaks of the αἰών as the principle of eternities and their measurer by the whole, in contrast to time, the principle of times which measures them part by part. David Bradshaw, “Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers,” 335-42, sees the Cappadocians as anticipating the medieval theory of the aevum in which αἰὼν characterizes “the eternity of creatures such as the angels, who are not subject to the temporal order of the physical cosmos,” but not the eternity characteristic of the divine nature (pp. 336-7).

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this means, Basil is simply indicating the absurdities to which Eunomius’s view of time leads. If there is no time, it follows that there must be an age. But to call that small part of the day in which Joshua fought without the move-ment of the sun or moon an age is utter nonsense. However one tries to har-monize the scriptural testimonia cited by Basil and Eunomius’s definition, absurdity results.

Having demonstrated this inconsistency, Basil next turns to a critique of the implications of Eunomius’s definition itself:

It seems that because of his great sagacity he thinks that day and night happen by a certain kind of motion of the stars, but that these are parts of time. For this reason he declared that “time is a certain kind of motion of the stars,” not realizing what he said. It was more appropriate to say, not “a certain kind of” (ποίαν) motion, but rather (if I may) “a certain amount of” (ποσήν) motion. But who is so completely childlike in his thinking so as not to know that days and months and seasons and years are measures of time, not parts?91

Basil draws the inference that Eunomius’s definition of time implies that day and night only happen by the movement of the stars and that they are parts of time. That Eunomius nowhere makes such a statement indicates that Basil himself infers this conclusion, and it would seem that he could infer such a conclusion only if he knew something about the Platonic notion of time. As I demonstrated above, Plato (on the first interpretation of the Timaeus) saw the year, the month, and the night-and-day as the parts of time caused by particu-lar movements of the stars, which co-operated to produce time. Accordingly, Basil supposes that this sort of Platonic understanding of day and night under-lies Eunomius’s definition, indicating that Basil knew the Platonic view of time. Basil adds, moreover, that Eunomius formulated his definition without really thinking about what he was saying, noting his use of the incorrect indefi-nite adjective. For Basil correctly sees that Eunomius thinks of time (such as a night or a day) as a measurable amount of movement, not a kind of movement.

91 Basil, Eun. 1.21, 21-28 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 248): Ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ἐκ πολλῆς ἀγχινοίας ἡμέραν μὲν καὶ νύκτα ἐν τῇ ποιᾷ τῶν ἀστέρων κινήσει νομίζειν γίνεσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου μέρη· ὅθεν τὸν χρόνον ποιάν τινα κίνησιν ἀστέρων ἀπεφήνατο, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συνεὶς ὅ τι λέγει. Οὐ γὰρ ποιὰν, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἄρα, ποσὴν, μᾶλλον ἦν εἰπεῖν οἰκειότερον. Ἀλλὰ τίς οὕτω παῖς παντελῶς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι ἡμέραι μὲν, καὶ ὧραι, καὶ μῆνες, καὶ ἐνιαυτοὶ, μέτρα τοῦ χρόνου εἰσὶν, οὐχὶ μέρη; Translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 122.



As we will see, Basil himself thinks of time as a measurable amount as well, which perhaps influenced his reading of Eunomius’s definition. Finally, Basil echoes the Middle Platonic tradition in seeing days and months and seasons and years as measures of time, not parts of time. Therefore, in this critique of Eunomius’s definition, Basil reveals his knowledge of the Platonic view of time and his adherence to the Middle Platonic view of days and such as time’s measures, not its parts.

After this two-step critique of Eunomius’s view of time, Basil then gives his own definition:

Rather, time is the extension coextensive with the existence of the cos-mos (συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τῇ συστάσει τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα). All motion is measured by time, whether of the stars, of living creatures, or of anything else that moves. On the basis of time we say that one thing is quicker or slower than another. The quicker is what traverses a longer interval (διάστημα) in less time; the slower is what moves a shorter interval in more time.92

Basil’s indebtedness to the Chrysippean and Middle Platonic view of time is obvious in his identification of time with extension.93 But at the same time there is in his definition no causal connection at all made between time and movement. Basil only says that all movement is measured by time. This sug-gests that for Basil there is no movement without time. All movement takes place in time. But time does not depend on movement for its existence (as his examples above show). There was an interval—i.e. a period of time—from the generation of heaven and earth to the creation of stars, as well as when the sun and moon stood still. And so, when Basil says that all motion is measured by time, he must mean that time is only indicated and measured by movement, but not produced by it. Hence Basil preserves the key Aristotelian insight, taken up by the Stoics and Middle Platonists in turn, that time cannot be iden-tified with any movement, but Basil seems to go beyond them, completely

92 Basil, Eun. 1.21, 28-34 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 248-250): Χρόνος δέ ἐστι τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τῇ συστάσει τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα· ᾧ πᾶσα παραμετρεῖται κίνησις, εἴτε ἀστέρων, εἴτε ζώων, εἴτε οὑτινοσοῦν τῶν κινουμένων, καθὸ λέγομεν ταχύτερον ἢ βραδύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου· ταχύτερον μὲν τὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ πλεῖον διάστημα μεταβαῖνον, βραδύτερον δὲ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ κινούμενον. Translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 122.

93 The Chrysippean inspiration of this formulation is noted by Callahan, “Basil of Caesarea: A New Source for St. Augustine’s Theory of Time,” 442.

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disassociating the production of time from movement in the manner of Galen. In addition, like the Stoics and Middle Platonists, Basil views time as cotermi-nous with the coming to be of the cosmos. In his formulation Basil also shows his concern to provide a secure frame of reference for measuring movement, just as the Stoics and Alexander. For Basil, then, this sure frame is the existence of the cosmos, which for him is a singular event. In the beginning, God created the cosmos and time. Since it is God who sets the boundaries of the existence of the cosmos, it is therefore also God who establishes time itself. For Basil, time is not dependent on any of the things that God has made, but rather on God himself.94

Yet even with these Middle Platonic and Stoic precedents, Basil’s unique definition of time needs further explicating. The very wording of Basil’s defini-tion of time warrants comment: “the extension coextensive with the existence of the cosmos” (συμπαρεκτιενόμενον τῇ συστάσει τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα).95 In a comment on Paul’s letter to the Ephesians, Origen records more or less the same definition, not for time, but for the ὁ αἰών τοῦ κόσμου:

What does it mean to live according to the αἰών of this cosmos (κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου) [Eph 2:2], and not according to the αἰών of the better cosmos toward which the saints hasten? Someone has rather simply thought that the αἰών of this cosmos is the time coextensive with the con-stitution of this cosmos from its beginning to its end (συμπαρεκτεινόμενον χρόνον τῇ τούτου τοῦ κόσμου ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μεχρὶ τέλους κατασκευῇ).96

Unfortunately Origen does not record whose view this was, and nothing like it survives from before his period. It is likely that Origen is reporting a Stoicizing but Platonist interpretation of the Timaeus’ conception of time. It seems

94 Cf. Basil, Homiliae in Hexaemeron 2.8, 45-47 (S. Giet, Basile de Césarée. Homélies sur l’hexaéméron, 2nd ed., Sources chrétiennes 26 bis (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1968)): “Having established the nature of time, God set as measures and signs for it the intervals of the days” (ὁ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου φύσιν κατασκευάσας Θεὸς, μέτρα αὐτῷ καὶ σημεῖα τὰ τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐπέβαλε διαστήματα).

95 For this meaning of σύστασις, see G.W.H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), s.v. ii, b.2.

96 Origen, Fragmenta ex commentariis in epistulam ad Ephesios 9, 168-71 (J.A.F. Gregg, “Documents: the Commentary of Origen upon the Epistle to the Ephesians,” Journal of Theological Studies 3 (1902): 234-244, 398-420, 554-576): τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου περιπατεῖν, καὶ οὐχὶ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κρείττονος κόσμου ἐφ’ ὃν οἱ ἅγιοι σπεύδουσιν; ὁ μὲν οὖν τις ἁπλούστερον αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἡγήσεται τὸν συμπαρεκτεινόμενον χρόνον τῇ τούτου τοῦ κόσμου ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μεχρὶ τέλους κατασκευῇ.



that αἰών in the recorded view is not “eternity” but simply “age.” The τούτου in the definition may be taken from the scriptural verse and serves to compare the present world with a future eschatological world to come in which God’s reign will be realized. Nonetheless, the definition of the age of this cosmos given here seems intended as summarizing Stoic teaching, in that this present world-order is spoken of as opposed to other previous or subsequent ones. And so, even if the definition is taken from an originally Stoic context about the cosmic cycles, it still fits what Origen wants to the say about the biblical verse, in which the contrast is between this cosmos and the Christian next world, not the next cosmic cycle. At any rate, we know that Basil read Origen and he may have appropriated this definition of the age of the present cosmos for his own definition of time.97 Another definition of αἰών even more similar to Basil’s definition of time is found in a scholion on the biblical book of Proverbs, attributed in some sources to Origen, but now generally seen to belong to the late-fourth century Evagrius of Pontus.98 He writes:

The righteous man will not surrender throughout his age [Proverbs 10:30]. “Age” is put in place of “duration of life.” And Paul said: I will not eat meat throughout my age lest I scandalize my brother [1 Corinthians 8:13], calling the “age” the extension coextensive with the existence of his life (αἰῶνα τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τῇ συστάσει τῆς ζωῆς αὐτοῦ διάστημα).99

97 On Basil’s definition of time, P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), writes: “There is no term or expression in this definition of Basil’s which had not already been enunciated by Origen” (p. 227). He also says: “The Cappadocians, particularly Basil, said about time nothing more than Origen did” (p. 368). Tzamalikos credits Origen with defining time as a διάστημα that is συμπαρεκτιενόμενον (see in particular pp. 179-271) and judges Origen’s definition as having pre-eminent influence among subsequent Christians, including the Cappadocians (pp. 260-8). However, the single text in which Origen himself joins these two key terms together is the comment on Ephesians. And in his comment Origen offers a definition of ὁ αἰών τοῦ κόσμου, not time, and furthermore makes it clear that he is reporting another’s definition. And so, it seems more likely that Origen and Basil formulated their definitions of time in similar philosophical milieux rather than that Basil simply copied from Origen, as his other engagements with the philosophical tradition about time demonstrate. Indeed, David Bradshaw, “Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers,” 332 n. 55, notes “Tzamalikos considerably exaggerates Origen’s originality.”

98 Evagrius was intimate with both Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus: Basil ordained him lector and Gregory as deacon. Evagrius was Gregory’s theological advisor at the Council of Constantinople in 381.

99 Gr. Δίκαιος τὸν αἰῶνα οὐκ ἐνδώσει: Τὸν αἰῶνα ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ βίου. καὶ ὁ Παῦλος· «Οὐ μὴ φάγω, φησίν, κρέα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἵνα μὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν μου σκανδαλίσω», αἰῶνα τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον

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Accordingly, based on these two texts, it might seem that Basil thinks of time merely as the age of the world, that is, as the measurable extension from its creation to its end. But speaking of time as the extension coextensive with movement is found in Themistius.100 He says:

Since movement is in time insofar as it is measured, its essence is depen-dent on time. For the essence of movement is no different than the com-ing to be with which time is coextensive and which measures it. It is clear that even for other things being in time means their being measured dependently on time. For being in time has a double meaning. First it means being when time exists. We state the second meaning like the first, that it is being in number.101

τῇ συστάσει τῆς ζωῆς αὐτοῦ διάστημα ὀνομάζων. In some manuscripts these scholia on Proverbs have been transmitted under the name of Origen; for this comment in an edi-tion of Origen’s works, see PG 17.189. The same scholia, or at least some of them, have been reassigned to Evagrius. See C. Tischendorf, Notitia editionis codicis bibliorum Sinaitici (Leipzig, 1860), 91, 14-16; and Paul Gehin, Évagre le pontique: Scholies aux Proverbes, Sources chrétiennes 340 (Paris: Cerf, 1987), 220-223. Gehin notes (p. 223) that for Evagrius the phrase συμπαρεκτεινόμενος τῇ συστάσει indicates the total coincidence of two objects. For the purposes of this study, resolving the issue of authorship is not essential, though Evagrian authorship seems the better case. It should be noted, however, that P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, places much weight on this scholion as evidence for Origen’s view of time, and its Evagrian provenance considerably weakens that case (see n. 97 above).

100 There is evidence neither for direct contact between Basil and Themistius, nor for Basil’s familiarity with Themistius’s philosophical writings. Themistius may simply be nothing more than a contemporary of Basil living in the same geographical region. Hence I cite Themistius as a witness to contemporary ideas about time with which Basil may have been familiar. Nonetheless, Basil may have been a student in Constantinople in 348 or 349, when Themistius was already established there as a teacher. Basil was certainly in Constantinople in 360 to attend a church council. Basil was also within the social orbit of Themistius. Basil’s close friend Gregory of Nazianzus corresponded with Themistius. Hence it seems likely that Basil at least knew of Themistius, even if he had never met him personally, nor read his works. Note that P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, does not consider Themistius in his study. If Tzamalikos is correct about the originality of Origen’s definition, it remains unlikely that Themistius would have been influenced by him. The similarities shared by Themistius, Basil, and Origen is thus another indication that all three wrote in similar philosophical milieux.

101 Themistius, In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis 154, 8-13 (H. Schenkl, Themistii in Aristotelis physica paraphrasis, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 5.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1900)): Ἐπειδὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ τῷ καταμετρεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τὸ εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως (ἢ τὸ γίγνεσθαι ᾧ συμπαρεκτείνεται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὃ καταμετρεῖ),



He also says: “For the time of movement is coextensive with the extension over which that which continuously moves changes.”102 Themistius is concerned with stressing the dependence of the existence of movement upon time in such a way that all movement can only be in time. This is precisely the point Basil wants to make when he says that all movement is measured by time.

Accordingly, I think Basil is doing more than simplistically appropriat-ing Origen’s and Evagrius’s definitions of age to define time as the age of the cosmos. Rather, time, like movement and change, is one of the conditions of created existence which has its roots in the very creation of the cosmos by God.103 Basil’s notion of the “extension” of the existence of the cosmos is not the interval from its creation to the present moment, but from its creation to its end. In other words, it is not a subjective extension, but rather objective. It has fixed points, according to God. By providing an objective frame of refer-ence in which all movements can be measured Basil advances the concerns of Chrysippus and Alexander. All created existence is subject to time, while God is in eternity. This radical bifurcation of the divine and created orders of exis-tence is exactly the point Basil wants to assert against Eunomius who sought to blur the boundaries of the uncreated and the created. With Basil’s under-standing of time, it is impossible for Eunomius to make of the Son a quasi-god somewhere between fully divine and created.

The final point that Basil makes concerning time is that it is the basis for calling moving things quicker or slower: “On the basis of time we say that one thing is quicker or slower than another. The quicker is what traverses a longer interval (διάστημα) in less time; the slower is what moves a shorter [interval] in

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν τὸ καταμετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου. τὸ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ διττόν ἐστιν, ἓν μὲν τὸ εἶναι τότε, ὅτε ὁ χρόνος ἐστίν, ἕτερον δὲ ὥσπερ ἔνια λέγομεν, ὅτι ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἐστίν.

102 Themistius, In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis 186, 23-25 (Schenkl): συμπαρεκτείνεται γὰρ ὁ τῆς κινήσεως χρόνος τῷ διαστήματι, ἐφ’ οὗ τὸ συνεχῶς κινούμενον μεταβαίνει.

103 Cf. Basil, Homiliae in Hexaemeron 1.5, 20-28 (Giet): “So then, connatural with the cosmos, and to the animals and plants in it, the passage of time came to subsist, always pressing forward and slipping away, and nowhere resting from its course. Indeed, is this not time, whose past has disappeared, whose future is not yet here, whose present escapes perception before it is recognized? Such is the nature of produced things, either growing or decaying, without a clearly settled state and stability” (Συμφυὴς ἄρα τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, ἡ τοῦ χρόνου διέξοδος ὑπέστη, ἐπειγομένη ἀεὶ καὶ παραρρέουσα, καὶ μηδαμοῦ παυομένη τοῦ δρόμου. Ἢ οὐχὶ τοιοῦτος ὁ χρόνος, οὗ τὸ μὲν παρελθὸν ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ μέλλον οὔπω πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ παρὸν πρὶν γνωσθῆναι διαδιδράσκει τὴν αἴσθησιν; Τοιαύτη δέ τις καὶ τῶν γινομένων ἡ φύσις, ἢ αὐξανομένη πάντως, ἢ φθίνουσα, τὸ δὲ ἱδρυμένον καὶ στάσιμον οὐκ ἐπίδηλον ἔχουσα).

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more time.”104 The language here is reminiscent of Aristotle in Physics 4.10: “for the quick and the slow are defined by time: the quick is what moves much in a short time, the slow is what moves little in much time” (218b15-17). Yet we need not claim that Basil is copying Aristotle here, for such definitions of quickness and slowness are found throughout the commentary tradition, such as, for example, in Alexander and Plotinus.105 Hence it can be considered a common-place philosophical definition of quickness and slowness. Yet the point Basil is making here by using this common formulation is that time is not identified with movement but is rather its measure, and thus all movement is in time. Time is needed for measuring motions, and in order to say that motions are quick and slow. This reflects the similar concern of Galen and Themistius that time is necessary for measuring movement. And this corroborates what was said above: time makes movement possible rather than movement (or some specific movement) producing time.

After giving his own definition of time and affirming that all movement is in time, Basil shows how this reduces Eunomius’s definition to an absurdity, and then he offers his final sarcastic critique of it:

But since the stars move in time, he declares that they are the creators of time. Therefore, it follows from the reasoning of this wisest of men that, since dung-beetles also move in time, we should define time as a certain kind of movement of dung-beetles. For what he says is no different than this, except for the dignity of the names.106

104 Basil, Eun. 1.21, 31-34 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 248-250); translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 122. See n. 92 above.

105 Alexander, On Time 4: “But ‘swift’ and ‘slow’ are only determined in relation to time, since a swift movement is one which takes place in a small time, and a slow movement one which takes place over a great time” (Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time,” 60). Plotinus, En. 3.7 [45], “For it is clear that the quickest of all covers the greater, and in fact, the greatest distance in less time, but others are slower because they cover only part of the distance in more time.” Plotinus is here talking about the heavenly sphere as the quickest of all the spheres in refutation of Alexander’s claim that time is the number of the heavenly sphere.

106 Basil, Eun. 1.21, 33-40 (Sesboüé, Basil de Césarée, vol. 1, 250): Ὁ δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐν χρόνῳ οἱ ἀστέρες κινοῦνται, χρόνου αὐτοὺς εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἀποφαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν τοῦ σοφωτάτου λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ κάνθαροι ἐν χρόνῳ κινοῦνται, ὁρισώμεθα τὸν χρόνον εἶναι ποιάν τινα κανθάρων κίνησιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτου τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῦ λεχθὲν διαφέρει, πλὴν τῆς σεμνότητος τῶν ὀνομάτων. Translation from DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 122-3.



If all movement is in time, no movement can be said to cause time. Accordingly, since both the stars and dung-beetles move in time, Eunomius could have just as well said that dung-beetles cause time. Of course this criticism is unfair and aimed at scoring points in their debate. The points earned, Basil considers Eunomius’s definition of time refuted.

Conclusion

Asking whether a Christian theologian’s viewpoint follows either Plato or Aristotle, as some have done, is the wrong question. The ideas of these two philosophical giants were transmitted to subsequent generations of non- professionals like Basil mostly through the tradition of their appropriation. While Basil’s own view of time may have its ultimate origins in Aristotle’s cri-tique of Plato, this critique comes to him through the appropriations of Aristotle represented by the Stoic Chrysippus, Galen, the Peripatetic Alexander, and, fur-thermore, through Middle Platonists such as Philo and Alcinous, in whom we see a fusion of Stoic and Platonic views of time. Basil’s view of time as coexten-sive with the existence of the cosmos reflects the concerns of both Chrysippus (especially in the Platonizing interpretation of him) and Alexander (to a lesser but real extent) to provide an objective frame of reference with a beginning and an end in which movement could be measured. The Middle Platonic denial that years, months, and suchlike were parts of time—in direct contradiction to Plato himself—and rather measures of time is found also in Basil, and this as well shows the transformation of the Platonic tradition in reaction to Stoicism. The view of the dependence of movement upon time such that all movement is in time, which was emphasized by Middle Platonists and most forcibly by Basil’s contemporary Themistius, is one of key elements of Basil’s notion of time. In Basil, time becomes a condition of created existence, just like change. Accordingly, Basil’s indebtedness to the preceding philosophical tradition’s variegated views on time is clear, but he cannot be assigned to one particular branch or school. Nonetheless, the concerns and viewpoints about time on the part the Middle Platonists, Stoics, and Peripatetics such as Alexander in the early Christian centuries are best seen as the immediate context for Basil’s own views. This should really come as no surprise, and it shows that earlier scholars who attempted to identify Basil’s notion of time as either purely Aristotelian, Platonic, or Stoic were wrong.

Yet it must be admitted that Basil did not articulate his view of time because of his own intrinsic interest in the subject as a philosophical problem. Rather, it was uttered in the heat of a polemical debate with Eunomius, whose

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adherence to a purely Platonic notion of time is clear. Basil’s explication of his notion of time in refutation of Eunomius’s has the sole motive of undermining his opponent’s claims to expertize and supporting his own theological agenda against his opponent’s. Nonetheless, it is especially in this context that Basil reveals himself aware of recent philosophical debate concerning the nature of time. This makes sense because a polemical treatise, rather than another context like a sermon, provided Basil with the best opportunity to deploy his philosophical knowledge as a weapon against his opponent. In contrast to Basil, Eunomius seems to have adopted what must have been considered, even in his own lifetime, a very simple, inadequate, and antiquated view of time. It reads like something copied from a philosophical handbook, and not a very sophisticated one. Because of Basil’s familiarity with the preceding phil-osophical debate, he recognized the inadequacy of his opponent’s views on time and marshaled his knowledge to refute Eunomius. And so, at least con-cerning the nature of time, Basil seems more philosophically insightful than Eunomius. Basil appears to understand the implications of particular views of time, whereas Eunomius seems content to quote authorities more out of show rather than out of concern with their substance.

In conclusion, then, Basil’s objective in deploying various elements of the preceding philosophical tradition regarding the nature of time in order to bol-ster his own polemics resulted in a peculiar synthesis of those very elements as he articulated his own views on time. But it should be said that with regard to the nature of time Basil primarily witnesses to the preceding and contem-porary philosophical opinions and arguments of others and only minimally formulates these philosophical ideas in a way that is interesting on its own philosophical merits. Yet his views are not without theological interest, for in claiming that time is the extension coterminous with the existence of the cos-mos and that all movement is measured in time, he bases upon a creation-ist view of the cosmos an understanding of time’s utter independence of all things created by God. But Basil can avoid the vexed issue, which featured so prominently in Plato and Aristotle, and which generated much of the subse-quent philosophical debate, over what produces time, since for Basil time is caused by God, who provides the motions which measure it.107 Therefore, Basil is a fine example of how the Greek philosophical tradition was appropriated and re-expressed when employed in issues of specifically Christian interest.

107 See Basil, Homiliae in Hexaemeron 2.8, 45-47, cited above in n. 94.

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