BAGI DISCOURSE AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES OF SELF ANDIDENTITY; IMPLICATIONS UPON THEORIZING ETHNICITY

(A Paper Read in “Theorizing Ethnicity: A RoundtableDiscussion,” CSC Conference Room, UP College Baguio, May 24-

25, 2002)

-Narcisa Paredes-Canilao, Ph.D.-

Introduction

The term ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language andculture in the construction of SUBJECTIVITY and IDENTITY, as well as thefact that all discourse is placed, positioned, situated, and all knowledgeis contextual.

-Stuart Hall, 1992-

Since identity is not stabilized by nature or some other essentialguarantee, then it follows that it is constructed historically, culturallyand politically: the concept which refers to this is ethnicity.

-Andermahr, et al., 1997-

Ethnicity has been defined as a socio-political conceptreferring to group identity based on shared cultural,religious, or linguistic heritage (Andermahr, 1997:68).Because the concept connotes the particularity andbelongingness which many people value, it has served tofoster the cause of communities or groups endangered bymarginalization, or, at worst, extinction, in a globalizedworld.

Largely due to theorizing in critical theory, ethnicityhas resulted from the effort to rethink race and soethnicity which is an “unstable complex of social meanings,constantly being transformed by political struggle,” (Dinesand Humez, 1995: 573), has been contrasted to the more“essentialist” concept, race, which is based on skin coloror physical features. Thus, if the markers of race arebiology and physiognomy, those of ethnicity can be language,territorial right or culture.

Main Argument of the Paper

In this paper I will argue that concepts of self andidentity are integral components of ethnicity. Butethnicity, in contrast to race is anti-essentialist,acknowledging how selves and identities are constructedhistorically, culturally, politically, and lately, thanks topoststructuralism, discursively. This acknowledgementnecessitates ethnicity’s reliance on social constructionism,specifically deconstructionism, which are methodologies forrigorous analysis of the ways and processes by whichidentities are so constructed.

However, social constructionism and deconstruction canbe pushed too far to the point of paralyzing politicalpractice. Especially in the case of deconstruction, I citethree innate problems for political practice. First, owingto its preoccupation with textuality, the uncovering ofhierarchical oppositions in texts, and the indeterminacy oftextual meaning, analysis has led to paralysis. This is theclassic case of the centipede suddenly finding out it couldnot walk when it bothered to know how many feet it had.Second, very threatening to political efforts is thedeconstructive decentering of identity and the subjectleaving all forms of identity politics bereft of groupidentification essential to organizing and mobilization.

A third problem of deconstruction for politics, andwhich takes the greater bulk of the paper, has something todo with its very narrow conception of self and identity.The postmodern subject is a specific reaction to thehumanist or the enlightenment self – the free, autonomous,rational and self-contained, soliloquizing individual –idealized in Western philosophy culminating in the Cartesianself (Derrida, Levinas, Taylor, Sandywell). But this is notthe only way to conceive of the self. Likewise not allprocesses of self and identity construction follow the samepath of separation and Oedipal conflict. Other and lessproblematic self-conceptions are available not only innonwestern thought systems but also in Western philosophy

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itself. An illustrative case of the latter is found inGilbert Ryle’s critique of the Cartesian official doctrineof the self (Ryle, 1949). Illustrative cases of the formerare found in the major Asian mystical systems of Hinduism(the self identified with the Brahman), Buddhism (the selfblown out in nibbana) and Taoism (the self in unity with theTao). Similar alternative notions of the non-self may alsobe found in less centralized cultural systems in Asia, asshown in sporadic researches on Austronesian, Malayo-Polynesian, Maori, and other more minoritized cultures andthought systems. Evidence of alternative constructions ofself and identity are enshrined in non-western discourses.

Relying on the discursive and cultural approaches, thispaper explores one more alternative notion of the self inthe Ilokano cultural system, as manifested on the manifolddiscourses by which Ilokanos refer to, or talk about theself. However, in Ilokano there is no special term for theself. The self is referred to as the body (bagi), thus thispaper explores the Ilokano concept of self implicit inIloko bagi language.

Ethnicity, Anti-Essentialism and Social Constructionism

Underlying discourses on ethnicity is the anti-essentialist theme or the distrust of, or the scorn foressentialism. Essentialism and anti-essentialism can beunderstood better by tracing their origins and specificelaborations in philosophy. In fact philosophy hastraditionally been identified with the search for essences.Essentialism in philosophy is the view, often in the fieldof metaphysics (in philosophy, metaphysics is theinvestigation of the true or underlying nature of things),that the true and the fundamental nature and purpose (in thesense of end or telos) of anything is revealed through itsessence.1 Essence, in turn, is the totality of attributes,elements, etc., without which a thing would not be what itis. Essence in philosophy has been traditionally contrastedwith “accidents” those that a thing may or may not have, or

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those without which something still retains its substantiveidentity.

What is the significance of philosophizing on essence?First, metaphysically, a thing’s true nature or trueidentity is tied up with its essence. Its essence is itstrue nature and identity. The essence is permanentunchanging and eternal, while accidents are transitory andimpermanent. Secondly, epistemologically, true knowledge ofanything is attained only by knowing the essence of thatthing.

But why is essentialism objectionable? Because nomethod is full-proof and guaranteed to discover the truth orthe real. Oftentimes desire and power has been passed offas the truth with disastrous effects on the powerless.Essentialism also discourages dynamism and freedom.

Indeed, less powerful or less-privileged groups such aswomen and ethnic communities, have very good reasons forthis mistrust. So many times, imagined or attributedqualities “essentially” found in women and minorities, suchas weakness, laziness, or lack of initiative, have beenexplained in terms of biology and conveniently employed as aweapon in the armory of discriminatory and unequaltreatment.

The attempt to trace back essential qualities of aperson or a group of persons to biology, known as biologicaldeterminism has been the strongest and most viciousconstraint to feminism and other liberatory movements.Biological determinism is the belief that “the biologicalsubstrate determines or limits individual behavior” (Birke,1986:37.) Biological determinists advocate that “biology isdestiny.” Oftentimes, biology has also encompassedenvironmental factors in the way some personal or groupcharacteristics have been explained in terms of climate,natural resources, and geographical location.

“Nature” or “natural” has also been employed, side byside with biology, to justify discrimination or inequality.Thus it has been argued that since women are by natureweaker than men, or that since certain races are naturallyless intelligent, they therefore deserve discriminatory

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treatment. It is in this sense that of late we talk of the“naturalization” of what are actually socially andculturally constructed attributes, or of how these have been“naturalized”.

Another term equated with anti-essentialism is socialconstructionism, the view, mainly from sociology, thatsocial reality is constructed in history and culture andopen to change through political intervention.. Socialconstructionism as originally espoused by Marx and laterappropriated by critical theorists, and first and secondwave feminists was a potent weapon for political change.The main idea then was, inequality among men and women donot have a natural or biological basis but are the artifactsof social and cultural practices motivated by relations ofpower. Simone de Beauvoir’s “One is not born but becomes awoman,” (1953: 249) succinctly captures this view. The goodnews of social constructionism then is since existingconditions of injustice are not permanent or eternal, changeis possible by political intervention thru reforms or thrumore revolutionary means, so that a more just society isachieved. Long years of advocacy and struggle inspired bythe theory of social constructionism resulted in legislativereforms, institutional changes, empowerment of the lessprivileged and general social change. It was an era whenthere was a working relationship between academics andpractical politics. But enter poststructuralist and postmodern theorizing,2

and under them social constructionism is radicalized asdiscursive constructionism. Guided by the Derridean dictum:

1Endnotes

? Kyriakos Kontopoulos provides an exhaustive definition ofessentialism as follows: It is “a deep-seated disposition tofind the “essence” of things; the belief that such a projectis possible; a quest for origins; any form of metaphysicalrealism or foundationalism; any theory or philosophyreferring to constant (Plato) or unfolding (Hegel)universals (The Logics of Social Structure, 1993, p. 380.)

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“Il n’y a pas de hors texte” (There is nothing outside the text),language and representation mediate and construct our accessto social reality. Thus the important task at hand isdeconstruction or the location of phenomena withinhierarchical oppositions which structure them. As this isdone, reversal and displacement of the oppositions follow.These are the twofold steps of deconstruction as elaboratedby Derrida. 3

The Limits of Deconstruction for Political Practice

1. Paralysis and QuietismBecause of the centrality of textuality in

deconstruction, an overwhelming failure to act or pervasivequietism has infected most academics and this infection hasspread to activism and advocacy. Martha C. Nussbaum, acontemporary English philosopher decries this sad state inan article singling out the postmodern feminist JudithButler as an ‘American feminist” who “has shaped thesedevelopments more than any other.” In her article entitled“The Professor of Parody: The hip defeatism of JudithButler,” Nussbaum complains how feminist theory, especiallyin America, has condescended to the “extremely French idea2

? Strictly speaking it is wrong to conflatepoststructuralism and postmodernism together as they do nothave the same referent. Postmodernism has a broader scopethan poststructuralism. However, I follow the convention inless technical circles surprisingly in social science andeven philosophical literature of equating the two. It isthe same thing with the pair poststructuralism anddeconstruction. Deconstruction is a specificaaly Derrideaninvention, and poststructuralism is broader in scope thanDerridean thought, however most literature also tend toconflate the two. 3

? These ideas are developed in Grammatology by Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Spivak, trans. Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1976, 1982.

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that the intellectual does politics by speakingseditiously,” and how for some feminists, this alreadysuffices as “a significant type of political action”(1999:38).4

It is sufficient to use words in a subversive way,because there is little room, in fact, no room at all, forlarge-scale social change, because we are already structuredby the structures of power, resisting them only succeeds inreinscribing them. The latter idea is of courseattributable to another reigning French Maitre a Penser,Michel Foucault, another “Great White Father” (Susan Bordo,1992:163) who has succeeded in seducing activists intoquietism. The other French fathers are Derrida, Barthes andLacan (Naomi Schor, 1987: 99).5 In addition, deconstruction is suspicious of grandnarratives as despotic and dictatorial. All political actsof change or reform, in so far as they hold a vision of abetter future are already preconditioned by the grandnarratives of the existing regime, and thus will onlysucceed in replicating the same oppressive regime though innew and insidious ways.

To top it all, further alienating postmodern theoriesfrom political activists, the academic publications of thesesymbolic thinkers have been characterized by “loftyobscurity” and “disdainful abstractness.” In the case of4

? Martha Nussbaum notes that American feminism today faces a“disquieting trend” far more serious than provincialism andshe writes: Something more insidious than provincialism has come toprominence in the American academy. It is the virtually complete turning fromthe material side of life, toward a type of verbal and symbolic politics that makesonly the flimsiest of connections with the real situation of real women. (p. 38)5 Derrida, for one, has declared that feminism as a form ofphallogocentrism that may be tactically necessary at acertain point, but ultimately to be deconstructed, and hewrites: So I would say that deconstruction is a deconstruction of feminism,from thje start, insofar as feminism is a form – no doubt necessary at acertainmoment – but a form of phallogocentrism among many others. Positions,Alan Bass, trans. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981.

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Judith Butler, Martha Nussbaum notes that she has joinedcertain quarters of “continental philosophy” that haspropagated the blatantly false idea that the philosopher issupposed to be a “star who fascinates and frequently byobscurity rather than as an arguer among equals.”6

2.Decentering of Self and IdentityMost threatening of course to political practice

especially identity politics7 is the second problem – the6

? Similarly, Susan Bordo also notes that Gender Trouble is“written in the dense, complexifying style of muchcontinental philosophy” (in92: 173). Unfortunately, in mostcases, this academic accessorizing, or thick jargon, hasbeen mistaken for philosophical profundity. However,Nussbaum asks if such prose really belongs to philosophyrather than to rhetorics and sophistry. Actually theabstruse verbosity is seen by her as a sleight-of-hand toexhaust the reader’s energies in deciphering the prose suchthat little energy is left for critical assessment of theclaims. Oftentimes too, the obscurity is a disguise foremptiness, for it “fills the void left by an absence of areal complexity of thought and argument.” Nussbaum reports,in addition, that Butler won first prize in the 1998 annualBad Writing Contest sponsored by the journal, Philosophy andLiterature for her impenetrable writing style (Nussbaum,1999: 39).

7Identity politics can be defined as “the practice of basingone’s politics on a sense of personal identity” (Andermahr,1999: 103) for example, woman, black woman, latino, gay,which became a dominant form of radical politicalorganization since the 1980s. To this definition, we mustadd the feature that such a personal identity is believed tobe shared by all the members of a group which is the groupidentity. Following this definition, feminism and ethnicityprojects therefore are very good examples of identitypolitics.

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postmodern idea that in an unequal world structured byhierarchical dualisms, the identity of the oppressed hasalready been constituted by the oppressor. Resistance basedon shared or group identity, or the assertion ofsubjectivity or agency based on such an identity, thereforeinsidiously reaffirms the identity on the basis of whichoppression was operating in the first place.

To demonstrate the real threat of deconstruction’srefusal of unitary self and identity, the history offeminism would be instructive. Second wave feminism,specifically radical and socialist feminism appropriated theMarxist idea that the oppressed and marginalized desire forchange because of their interest to be freed from a sharedand common experience of oppression. In the case of women,the basis of resistance and reform is their having beentreated as The Other, the second sex, the irrational, thelack, the body, etc., in diametrical and hierarchicalopposition to men as The One, the first sex, reason,presence, mind, etc. But in contrast to first wavefeminists (liberal and Marxist) who asserted that women toocan transcend their relegation to the other divide and crossover to the male turf, the second wave feminists assertedthat the very difference of women from men in thehierarchical dualism is precisely their strength. Thebattle cry thus shifted from “equality” to “difference”.

Now, third wave feminists of the postmodern camp aretaking issue with this move of identifying women thru theirdifference from men. They contend that it is preciselythese differences that were the basis of women’s oppressionin the past, and grounding resistance and identity in themis a tragically misguided enterprise because it will onlysucceed in serving the very powers that constituted thesedifferences to suit their purposes. Anne Snitow in heressay “Gender Diary” poses the problem in a nutshell in:“How are women to transform the idea of woman, which has forcenturies stood as the justification for their oppression,into a basis for political freedom and social and economicequality?” (in Hirsch and Keller, 1990: 9-43).

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A solution, or a better word would be a ploy ofresistance, suggested by postmodern feminists is to emptythe category, and the identity, woman. Women should vacatethe only speaking position available to them, the feminine,and subvert the notion of a monolithic or eternal woman byproliferating a multiplicity of identities.

Another strategy of resistance is to poke fun at theruling paradigm. From the available space assigned to themby Patriarchy, women can enact their constructed roles underthe ruling discourse, but with parody and mimicry. As weact and speak as gendered subjects we actively constitute,replicate and reinforce the system, however if we do it withparody and mimicry, we are contributing to its unmasking andunmaking.8

This political strategy on the symbolic realm is atbest frigid, and at its worst it immobilizes politicalaction. And since feminism has been originally conceived asa political movement, some feminists have concluded thatpostmodernism and feminism are more opposed rather thancompatible bedfellows.9

Whether or not identities are discursively constructedby hierarchical dualisms, a common identity is necessary forgroup consciousness, and it is only when there is groupconsciousness that organizing for mobilization becomespossible. This is the reason why some activists, especiallyrelatively small and less powerful ones, for the sake ofpolitical efficacy and as a matter of survival, have8Judith Butler’s notion of “gender as performance” and Luce Irigaray’s notion of parody and mimicry are examples of these resisting gestures. Although in the case of Irigaray,she has used essentialism tactically theorizing that the feminine speaking position must be asserted for the rectification of the dominance of the masculine. Further, for Irigaray, feminine writing and textual projects are onlypart of a more general feminist project of change and reform. See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and London, Routledge, 1990 andLuce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One. Catherine Porter, trans.Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

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embraced a form of essentialism in a move called “strategicessentialism.” Proponents argue that extreme or puristsocial constructionism – the summary dismissal of all kindsof essentialism, simply reinscribes an inescapableessentialist logic. Instead, it must be reflected where andhow essentialism is necessary for political efficacy.10 Herecommon pre-existing personal identities or experiences arebuilt upon as organizing tools to build cohesive and potentpolitical communities. This project, however, has met9

? Nancy Hartsock, a radical-socialist feminist contends in“Epistemology and Politics,” that the decenteringmethodologies of postmodernism hinder rather than help inthe accomplishment of feminist goals. Postmodern theoriesreject the scholar’s dream of understanding the worldsystematically in order to change it. And thus they merelyrecapitulate the ill effects of enlightenment theories onthe marginalized by denying them the right to participate inmainstream interaction (in Harding, 1991: 182)

Christine di Stefano an Italian feminist has four mainobjections against postmodernism expressed in her essay,“Dilemmas of Difference”. First, the postmodernists who aremostly white privileged men of the industrialized West cannow afford to subject the enlightenment to critical scrutinybecause they already had their light of day. Second,postmodern critique has really been directed to preciselythese same philosophers and will be incongruous whendirected at other projects. Third, mainstream postmodernisttheory has itself been gender-blind, insensitive to the manyways that its own rereading of history, politics, andculture are likewise politicized. Fourth, postmodernismmakes feminist politics impossible due to the postmodernistprohibition against subject-centered inquiry (in Harding,1991:182-183). Other feminists encourage a dialogue between the two. Twoproponents of socialist feminism, Nancy Fraser and LindaNicholson, strongly argue that while feminism andpostmodernism are two of the most important political-cultural currents in recent theorizing that have gone deep

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serious objections due to the temptation of reifying anunreflective identity that is closed to criticism andanalysis.

3. Too Narrow Conception of Self and Identity: MalestreamPsychoanalysis and the Cartesian Cogito

The concept of self and identity presupposed bydeconstruction is itself in need of deconstruction. For notall selves are constituted in the same way as the humanistself or the self idealized in the enlightenment – the free,autonomous, rational and self-contained person. It is thisself, by the way, otherwise known as the bourgeois self,which is being subverted by the postmodern, decenteredsubject.

and wide in critiquing Western institutions and modes ofdiscourse, the two have proceeded from opposite directions.While postmodernism subordinated practical political andsocial issues to philosophy, feminism subordinatedphilosophy to the interests of social criticism. Whilepostmoderns offer persuasive criticism of foundationalismand essentialism, their conception of social criticism isanemic. On the other hand, feminists are powerful socialcritics however they tend to lapse into foundationalism andessentialism. Fraser and Nicholson propose a meeting ofthe strengths of both and an elimination of their weaknesses– something like – social criticism without philosophy(Fraser and Nicholson, 1989: 283).10

? Diana Fuss is an example of a feminist who has embracedstrategic essentialism. See her Essentially Speaking: Feminism,Nature and Difference. New York and London: Routledge, 1989.Other strategic essentialists are the Italian Feminists whowere influenced by the difference feminism of Luce Irigaray.I discussed at length the difference feminism of LuceIrigaray in three researches: “Knowledges of Women: FeministEpistemologies from Liberal to Postmodern Feminism” (1994),“Philosophical Analysis of Gender Language” (1998), and“Exposing the Sex of Knowledge: Simone de Beauvoir and LuceIrigaray” (1999).

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Western traditional psychoanalysis otherwise known infeminist circles as malestream psychoanalysis accounts selfand identity constitution thru Freudian drive theory andOedipal conflict.11 According to this account, self andidentity construction develop by means of the realization ofotherness or separation of the individual from environmentand relationships. Identity henceforth is reinforced bygradual and continuing assertion of independence and self-sufficiency which is further determined by the desire toseparate from mother and enter the Law of the Father. Tothis narrow and obviously male-centered account of identityconstruction, the psychoanalytic feminist Nanacy Chodorow12

uses object relations theory which posits that self andidentity construction need not be a separative process, butrather that of relation and connection. Likewise the desireof the growing child to separate from mother and enter theLaw of the Father may be true for some males only and maynot be the operative in the identity formation of girls andother boys.

Alternative Ways of Constituting Self and IdentityThat oppressed persons too find agency in history

despite the postmodern objection that subjectivity andselfhood are not exempt from social and discursiveconstruction, and are “mere records of the needs and desiresof the powerful carved in the bodies and souls of history’smultiple others,” is the point of Laura Lee Downs’ s essayentitled “If ‘Woman” is Just an Empty Category, Then Why AmI Afraid to Walk Alone in the Dark? Identity Politics Meetsthe Postmodern Subject,” (1992) Speaking of how thepostmodern decentering of the subject and identity has11

?Psychoanalytic accounts of self and identity constructionare highly complex, but due to time and space limitation Ican only treat it briefly. But I discussed this morelengthily in my dissertation entitled “Knowledges ofWomen. . .” (1994). 12 See Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering.Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978.

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debilitating effects on identity politics as a whole, LauraLee Downs has taken issue, this time with a feministpostmodern historian, Joan Scott in the book, Gender and thePolitics of History (1988). To Downs this book serves as apowerful and convincing introduction of historians topostructuralism, and it has made Joan Scott the veritablespokesperson for gender history.

Downs argues that the marginalized and the oppressed,because of given conditions can become “differentlyconstituted beings.” Downs mentions two works13 which showthat knowledge, subjectivity and agency can still bepossible for “differently constituted beings,” such asworking class children. But identity formation in suchcases follows a path different from accounts of traditionalmalestream psychoanalysis which have invariably invoked thetwin principles of separation or otherness, and Oedipaldesire as integral to identity formation.

We can also cite empirical evidence on the availabilityof spaces for differently constituted identities in thePhilippine context. Further research can be undertaken todiscover the underlying conceptions of self and identity inour local practices and beliefs and changing conditions inour families. But these are implied or explicitated so far,in the researches of Filipino social scientists (Jocano,Mercado, Bulatao, Enriquez), as well as those working on theCordillera, (Brett, Bacdayan, de Raedt). In the case of theCordillera, I mention these observations in three studiestwo of which were also based on empirical research, (seeParedes-Canilao 1989, 1990, and 1998). l. The practice commonly found in traditional Cordilleracommunities of rearing children and socializing them notthru the individual families but through the community maybe conducive to a relational rather than separativeidentity. Elders and younger siblings take care of thechildren, socialization happened in the ulog, and the ator.

13

? Jessica Benjamin’s The Bonds of Love, and Carolyn Steedman’s Landscape for a Good Woman.

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2. The belief that certain personal crimes are crimesagainst the community is also productive of a morerelational and communitarian, rather than separative andindividualistic self-concept.3. The Filipino extended family might also be productive ofrelational and kin-based rather than separative identityformation.4.Strict taboos in the Cordillera against incest may weakenif not reject the role of Oedipal conflict in identityformation.5.Likewise the traditional image of women as strong andcapable of men’s work upset the Oedipal narrative, wherefathers only are supposed to be strong and mothers weak butnurturant.6. In more recent times, mothers going out of the country asOCWs and fathers remaining to do housework and look afterthe children, has eroded the patriarchal family system andlikewise tips the Oedipal narrative off-balance. 7. Changes in the nuclear family, and the growth ofvariously styled families, e.g., single-headed households,single mothers, women family heads, gay-lesbianpartnerships, also weaken or render the Oedipal accountinoperative.

The Ghost in the Machine: An Essentialist Doctrine of Selfand Identity

One of the disastrous products of essentialist thinkingin Western philosophy is the Cartesian account of self andidentity which has been for a long time the officialdoctrine in western philosophy, religion, psychology, andthe sciences, including the social sciences. As elaboratedin Descartes’s Meditations on the First Philosophy14, a humanperson is composed of two distinct entities – mind and body,because we observe that we have mental activities as well as14 In Rene Descartes, A Discourse on Method, Mediations on the FirstPhilosophy, and Principles of Philosophy, John Veitch, trans. London,Melbourne and Toronto, Everyman’s Library, 1912, 1981, pp.63-143.

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bodily activities. Bodily activities are executed by thebody, so mental activities must also be executed by themind. The mind cannot be seen, however, for Descartes, it ismore easily known than the body, and its existence is moresecure than that of the body. This is because it is reasonrather than the senses that should be employed in knowledge.As a consequence, the mind is also superior to the body, itis the essential quality of an individual and it should takecontrol of the body.

The Cartesian concept of self and identity is expressedin his by now classical dictum: Cogito ergo sum (I thinktherefore I am). From this it is evident that a person’sidentity is that he is a thinking being, a thinking self.While one can doubt everything, the existence of the selfcannot be doubted, because it is the very precondition ofdoubting and thinking. It is noteworthy that the self forDescartes is the individual self, and as far as anindividual is thinking he is absolutely certain that heexists, but only as an individual. He cannot be certain asto the existence of others.

Gilbert Ryle15 an Oxford philosopher critiqued thisdoctrine and identified three fallacies, “the ghost in themachine,” “category mistake,” and “intellectualist fallacy.”First, Cartesian mind-body dualism propagates a conceptionof man that is questionable for it considers the body to belike a machine being commandeered by a ghost, and yet thisis not the case in real life. Second, positing theexistence of two entities the body and the mind just becausethere are two types of human activities, bodily and mental,suffers from a category mistake. It is a mistake committedwhen for instance one mistakenly thinks that aside from theindividual parts of a university, e.g., classrooms, library,canteen, there is a separate university. Third, not allmeaningful human activities are thought out by the mind or

15

? Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind. New York, University Paperbacks, 1949.

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by the intellect first and then later on executed by thebody.

In the meantime, the Cartesian solipsistic notion ofthe self has been the object of much criticism because itconfines the self to a limbo where only he is certain ofhimself, and he can only be certain of himself. Thenarrowness of the concept of self in methodologicalindividualistic theories such as rational choice theory,behaviourism, Hobbesian atomism and social Darwinism, hasbeen explained in terms of their having been influenced bythe Cartesian concept of self.

Iloko Bagi Language: An Alternative Anti-essentialistConception of Self and Identity

My initial investigations in Ilokano body language,which was originally the topic I wanted to pursue in thisroundtable discussion, has brought me unexpectedly into anexciting area of research that straddles the fields ofphilosophy of language, epistemology and philosophy of man.I conveniently call this new area of research, “Iloko BagiLanguage.” As I will show later, bagi language is moreencompassing than body language, for it also covers languageabout the mind, self and identity, all crucial concepts intheorizing ethnicity.16

1. Manifold Meanings of Bagi The Ilokano term bagi has manifold meanings. First,

bagi means the human torso. Thus bagi is contrasted to ulo(ulo), saka (paa) ima (kamay), etc. Second, bagi means thebody in mind-body, as in Saan nga kabaelan ti bagik timabannog ken mabisin unay (Hindi matiis ng aking katawan angsobrang pagod at gutom).. Third, bagi means self as inInlisi na ti bagina iti dakes (Iniligtas niya ang kanyangsarili sa kasamaan). Fourth, bagi, this time with the16 Of course the problem, Is Ilokano ethnic? Should be a morebasic question. However, to appreciate the alternativity ofself and identity found in bagi language, one need notassume that indeed Ilokano qualifies as ethnic.

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accent on the first syllable means ownership or pagmamay-ari, as in Bagi na diay daga, bagi met ni baketna diay balay(Sa kanya ang lupa, sa asawa niya ang bahay).

Bagi also serves as the root of several Ilokano termssuch as ibagi (represent) or pannakabagi (representative),kabagian (relative), mabagbagi (innards, or sex organs).

2.Bagi (body)17

Based on my investigations of Iloko body language, itappears that Ilokanos traditionally have a very robust senseof their body, they are not ashamed of their body, and theygive due importance to it. However there have been changesin the way the body is regarded largely due to modernizationand the entry of foreign culture.

Ilokano abounds with terms referring to activities anddifferent movements of the body, creative use of thedifferent parts of the body, and terms pertaining to body-knowing or body knowledge. Ilokano likewise teems withsensual words, which in this sense means words pertaining tothe different senses. Interestingly, I discovered thatcompared to terms pertaining to the sense of sight which are

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? I have already presented at length Iloko body language(language referring to the body and language of the body) inmy research entitled “Language, Culture and IndigenousKnowledge: Reflections on Ilokano” (2001). For this presentpaper I have a preliminary list of words referring to bodilyactivities. I also wanted to include Ilokano terms forthe different parts of the body, something like an Ilokanoaccount of human anatomy, but due to lack of time, I wasunable to do so. But based on my current investigations ofIloko body language, it appears that Ilokanos traditionallyhave a very robust sense of their body, they are not ashamedof their body, and they give due importance to it. Howeverthere have been changes in the way the body is regardedlargely due to modernization and the entry of foreignculture. I also discussed these at length in myaforementioned research.

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relatively few, words pertaining to the other senses,specifically sense of smell and sense of hearing, I seethis as a sign that Ilokano is a resource against thedominance and violence of sight in traditional westernmetaphysics complained about in contemporary philosophy.It is the rich corpus of body language in this sense, whichleads to the observation that Ilokano indicates a knowledgesystem that is concrete, empiricist, yet holistic.18

18 My aforementioned research contains examples of Ilokobody language. See “Language, Culture and IndigenousKnowledge: Reflections on Ilokano,” in TowardsUnderstanding Peoples in the Cordillera, Vol. 2, Baguio,Cordillera Studies Center, 2001, pp. 186-197.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andermahr, Sonya et al., A Concise Glossary of Feminist Theory.London: Arnold, 1997.

Birke, Linda. Women, Feminism and Biology: The Feminist Challenge.Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, Ltd., 1986.

Bordo, Susan, “Postmodern Subjects, Postmodern Bodies,” inFeminist Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1. Spring 1992, pp. 159-175.

De Lauretis, Teresa. Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema.Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Derrida, Jacques. Positions. Alan Bass, trans. Chivago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1981.

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Gayatri Spivak, trans.Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins UniversityPress, 1976, 1982.

Descartes, Rene. Meditations on the First Philosophy in A Discourse onMethod, Meditations on the First Philosophy, and Principles ofPhilosophy, John Veitch, trans. London, Melbourne andToronto, Everyman’s Library, 1912, 1981, pp. 63-143.

Dines, Gail and Jean M. Humez, eds. Gender, Race and Class inMedia: A Text Reader. London: Sage Publications, 1955.

Di Stefano, Christine, “Masculine Marx,” in Shanley andPateman, eds., Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory.Oxford: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 146-163.

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Just to get a glimpse of what I mean, consider thispreliminary list of what different parts of the body and what thebody itself does.Ginagawa ng mukhaagmisootagmirugrugkumusilapag-dilat/agguyabagkiremagkidday

Ginagawa ng katawan:payapayanagkinni-kinniagdeppaagitudokalbitenkidagen

Ginagawa ng bunganga:agsakuntipagpaggaakagtanabutobagtanamitim

Downs, Laura Lee, “If ‘Woman” is Just an Empty Category,Then Why Am I Afraid to Walk Alone at Night? IdentityPolitics Meets the postmodern Subject,” in ComparativeStudies in Society and History: An International Quarterly, Vol. 35,No. 2. Cambridge University Press, April, 1993, pp.414-437.

Fraser, Nancy and Linda Nicholson, “ Social CriticismWithout Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism andPostmodernism,” in Cohen and Dascal, eds., The Institutionof Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? Illinois: Open Court,1989, pp. 232-252.

Fuss, Diana. Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference. NewYork and London: Routledge, 1989.

Hall, Stuart. “New Ethnicities,” in Donald, J., andRattansi, A., eds., Race, Culture and Difference. London:Sage, 1992.

Harding, Sandra. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking FromWomen’s Lives. New York: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Hennessey, Rosemary. Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse.New York and London: Routledge, 1993.

Irigaray, Luce. This Sex Which is Not One, Trans. CatherinePorter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Nussbaum, Martha C. “The Professor of Parody: The hipdefeatism of Judith Butler,” in The New Republic,February 22, 1999, pp. 37-45.

Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: UniversityPaperbacks, 1949.

Schor, Naomi, “Dreaming Dyssymmetry: Barthes, Foucault, andSexual Difference,” in Jardine, Alice and Paul Smith,eds., Men in Feminism. New York: Mathuen, 1987, pp. 97-

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perrengen

3. Bagi ken Panunot (body-mind)But what is the Ilokano term for mind? Do we find body-

mind dualism in Ilokano? Mind is panunot. But panunot isused more to refer to thoughts, to the products of the mindrather than to mind per se. The language game of bagi-panunot is that bagi is solid, it is observable, butpanunot is not. Bagi is an entity, but panunot is not.And in the Ilokano cultural context, the language game ofbagi-panunut is not the same as that governing body-minddiscourse. Panunut is not an entirely different entity, infact it is wrong to think of it as an entity, from bagi.This is evident if we look into mental activities which donot imply or entail the existence of a mind over and abovethese activities, e.g., nagbiddut, agduadua. We do not sayNapanunotna nga siguro nagbiddut isuna (Hindi niya naisip nasiguro nagkamali siya), or we do not say Simrek iti panunotna nga agduadua isuna (Hindi pumasok sa isip niya na siya aynagdududa.) These sentences would appear awkward in ordinarylanguage. Rather, we say, Nagbiddut isuna (Siya aynagkamali) or Agduadua isuna (Siya ay nagdududa.)

Note that also, Ilokano does not have a term for “tobe”, unlike in Filipino which has “ay”, and when we areforced to translate the “ay” we use “ket” as in Isuna ketnagbiddut or Isuna ket agduadua. This is the reason why inIlokano it does not happen that there is on one hand an

110.Snitow, Anne, “Gender Diary,” in Hirsch and Keller, eds.,

Conflicts in Feminism. New York and London: Routledge, 1990,pp. 9-43.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” inNelson and Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation ofCulture. Urbana and Chicago: University of IllinoisPress, 1988, pp. 271-316.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. GEM Anscombeand Rush Rhees, eds., GEM Anscombe, trans. Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1953.

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observing or commandeering mind, and an execution of theactivity on the other. Note further that if in English itmakes sense to say He is, or She is, or I am, etc., inFilipino Siya ay, Sila ay, Ako ay. are as nonsense as Isunaket, Isuda ket, Siak ket. Can you imagine what would be theFilipino and Ilokano translation of Cogito ergo sum? Thisis in contrast to the Cartesian rule that the mind’sexistence is more certain than that of the body. Of coursethe epistemological context of Descartes and Ilokanos aredifferent. As I mentioned earlier, Ilokano indicates anempiricist while Descartes adheres to a rationalistepistemology.

The ilokano term for soul, kararua, is already in thelanguage game of Catholicism and Christianity. More oflocal color are the terms karkarma, which is connected tothe language game of nakabatbati. Note that in rituals torecover what is left in nakabatbati, it does not make sense,unless one is a Martian, to ask Anya ti nabatina? It isimplicit that it is the karkarma which has been left behind.Al-alia, is not a clear counterpart of soul however it canserve for spirit, but only the dead have in this sense aspirit. “Spirit” for the living is an-aningaas, which takesthe form of sounds from a person who has been to a place, ahouse and even when he has left leave traces of herselfbehind.

4. Bagi (Self)Self or sarili in Ilokano is also bagi, as in Diay

bagina laeng ti ammona (Siya ay makasarili). But bagi as self is not very much on currency in ordinary language. Thepronouns siak (ako) is more in currency, although it seldom stands alone as in Filipino, for it is awkward as in Siak ket mapanak idiay Manila, we say instead, Mapanak idiay Manila. Similarly, Nagdigosak, naglampasoak.

And so we can observe that in Ilokano, the self is notessentialized, nor is it reified, as in Western philosophy,due to the absence of words for the self that stand alone.In fact, note that there are no reflexive pronouns likemyself, himself. He slapped himself would be Tinungpa na

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diay rupana and not tinungpa na diay bagina as this would beawkward. He is talking to himself would be Kasasaona orkapatpatangna diay bagina but this is not “normal” and soothers would say Ay ket agbagtit ngaruden ah kaka.

Bagi as self, however, does not indicate that theIlokano self-concept is physical reductionist, that is selfis simply the body. Speakers of the language game of bagias self know that bagi as self does not mean only the body,but something else beyond the physical, only it is notsomething that stands alone by itself. The fallacy of unumnomen, unum nominatum (one name, therefore one thing named),fortunately, is not committed.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Ilokano bagi language indicates analternative conception of self and identity that isdifferent from that enshrined in Cartesian essentialistbody-mind doctrine, and so would be exempt from the axe ofdeconstruction. Based on the foregoing presentation whichis still only preliminary and in need of furtherelaboration, the Ilokano concept of self is non-essentialist – there is no language pertaining to the mindas the essence, or the self being essentially this or that,it is non-foundationalist – there is no language pertainingto the self alone but it is diminished into a suffix “ak”,and so it is the activity that is given importance, not thedoer. It makes sense to answer Siak, when asked thequestion Sinno ti agsangsangit. However, it is nonsensicalto ask Sinno ti agsangsangit after I have already said,agsangsangitak.

Of course, for Ilokanos already infected by philosophy,or for those already Christianized, or converted intodualistic psychology, their subtext is already different.

In conclusion, for ethnicity, deconstruction can beemployed as a tool for rigorous analysis but we must be waryof its limitations. Theorizing on ethnicity provides anopportunity for us to rethink the adequacy of western

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theories and methodologies and unearth our own localresources.

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