Back to the Future: Asking About Mental Images to Discriminate Between True and False Intentions

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Back to the Future: AskingAbout Mental Images toDiscriminate Between True andFalse IntentionsMelanie Knieps a , Pär Anders Granhag a & Aldert Vrijb

a University of Gothenburgb University of PortsmouthPublished online: 20 Sep 2013.

To cite this article: Melanie Knieps , Pär Anders Granhag & Aldert Vrij (2013) Backto the Future: Asking About Mental Images to Discriminate Between True and FalseIntentions, The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 147:6, 619-640,DOI: 10.1080/00223980.2012.728542

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The Journal of Psychology, 2013, 147(6), 619–640Copyright C© 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Back to the Future: Asking About MentalImages to Discriminate Between True

and False Intentions

MELANIE KNIEPSPAR ANDERS GRANHAG

University of Gothenburg

ALDERT VRIJUniversity of Portsmouth

ABSTRACT. In this study we asked participants to mentally travel back to the future. Theparticipants were asked to remember and report on a mental image of the near future. Wepredicted that participants who, during an interview, told the truth about their intentionswould differ in their descriptions of their mental images compared to participants who liedabout their future intentions. We found partial support for this overarching assumption.More specifically, we found that more truth tellers than liars reported to have had a mentalimage activated during the planning of their intentions. We also showed that liars (vs. truthtellers) found the question on the mental image more difficult to answer. However, they didnot differ in other aspects (number of words and amount of details reported, and subjectiveperception of the mental image activated). The suspects were interviewed twice, with aninterval of one week, and in line with our prediction we found that liars’ (vs. truth tellers’)reports were less consistent over time. This study departures from episodic future thoughtand aims to contribute to the development of a scientifically based interview protocol fordiscriminating between true and false intentions.

Keywords: episodic future thought (EFT), mental images, repeated interviews, true andfalse intentions, unanticipated questions

IN LEGAL SETTINGS IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACCURATELY determine theveracity of statements provided by suspects, witnesses, and alleged victims. Hence,there is a large literature on deception detection (Vrij, 2008; Granhag & Stromwall,2004) but virtually all this research is on methods discriminating between truthfuland deceptive statements about past actions (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). This isremarkable considering the societal value of being able to discriminate between

Address correspondence to Melanie Knieps, P.O. Box 500, 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden;[email protected] (e-mail).

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620 The Journal of Psychology

individuals who lie about their intentions and individuals who tell the truth abouttheir intentions. Although this topic has been acknowledged in disciplines suchas economical modeling (Crawford, 2003), military studies (Donald & Herbig,1981), negotiation research (Lewicki & Stark, 1996), social cognition (Beck &Ajzen, 1991), and developmental psychology (Peterson, 1995), research on trueand false intentions has been virtually ignored within the field of legal psychology(Granhag, 2010). For the current line of research, we define intention as an agent’smental state preceding his or her corresponding action (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin,2001). Furthermore, an intention is typically directed at the intender’s own action,it often comes with a strong commitment, and many times the intention is basedon some amount of planning.

Recently research has focused on true and false intentions. One of the veryfirst studies was carried out at an international airport in the United Kingdom(Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011a). This study showed that passengers wholied about their intentions (what they were going to do arriving at their finaldestination) came up with statements that were less plausible than, but equallydetailed as, statements from passengers who told the truth. Furthermore, the studyshowed that the two interviewers who elicited the statements could discriminatebetween lies and truths with about 70% accuracy. In a second study the sameteam of researchers had serving military and police officers acting as undercoveragents, meeting both hostile and friendly agents (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag,2011). This set-up resulted in each participant lied to two agents (to one about pastactions, and to one about future actions) and told the truth to two other agents (toone about past actions, and to one about future actions). The study showed thatfalse intentions and lies about past actions were less plausible than their truthfulcounterparts. Again, there was no difference in terms of details comparing truthfuland deceptive intentions. In addition, observers reading the transcribed interviewswere reasonably accurate in discriminating between statements expressing trueand statements expressing false intentions (around 70% accuracy), whereas theaccuracy rates for discriminating between true and deceptive statements on pastactions was lower (around 55%). The studies by Vrij and his colleagues arepioneering, but were not driven by theoretically based predictions. Granhag (2010)argued that the emerging concept of episodic future thought (EFT) might beone way forward to meet the goal of theory driven research on true and falseintentions.

Episodic Future Thought (EFT)Episodic future thought (EFT) is assumed to play an important role when

individuals mentally simulate future scenarios (Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009;Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008). Furthermore, EFT relates closely to the con-cept of the prospective brain, which is the idea that a crucial function of the brainis to use stored information to simulate, imagine and predict possible future events(Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). In other words, EFT can be viewed as theability to “pre-experience” the future, whereas episodic memory can be seen as

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Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij 621

the ability to “re-experience” the past (Tulving, 1983). More specifically, episodicmemory provides the building blocks from which EFT is constructed, a claimsupported by both developmental (Atance & O’Neill, 2001) and neuroimagingstudies (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007).

A crucial observation from research is that episodic future thoughts oftenare accompanied with the formation of one (or several) concrete mental images,such as pre-experiencing the future event by an act of self-projection and/orscene construction (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,2004, 2006; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). For example, when thinking about anupcoming birthday party, colorful images may appear in the mind. These mentalimages often contain various details and actions. Hence, someone might “see”him/herself moving around in the room, picking up a glass, tasting the wine,interacting with people, and perhaps even feeling emotions.

Using EFT to Study True and False IntentionsGranhag and Knieps (2011) conducted the first EFT driven study on true and

false intentions. In their study one group of participants were asked to individuallyplan a mock criminal act (to place a memory stick containing illegal material ina shop in a mall). In addition, these participants were asked to plan a cover storyto be used if stopped and questioned. Another group of participants were asked toindividually plan for going to the same mall to shop a gift for a close friend (i.e.,to carry out a noncriminal act). Before leaving for the mall, all participants wereintercepted and interviewed about their intentions and their planning activities. Theparticipants who had planned a mock criminal act used their cover stories duringthe interview to try to mask their criminal intentions (liars). The participants whohad planned to buy a gift told the truth during the interview (truth tellers).

It was predicted and found that a significantly higher proportion of truthtelling (vs. lying) suspects agreed (during the investigative interview) that they hadevoked a mental image while planning their future actions. Of the lying (vs. truthtelling) suspects who claimed to have activated a mental image during the planningphase, it was found that they provided significantly poorer verbal descriptions oftheir most dominant mental image. With respect to more global ratings, tappingmemory of EFTs using a post interview questionnaire (where the role-playing onbehalf of the lying suspects no longer existed), revealed that innocent (vs. guilty)suspects remembered their planning as being characterized by the activation ofmental images to a higher extent. In addition, truth tellers reported their memoryof having pre-experienced their future actions as much clearer than did liars whowere asked about their memory of having pre-experienced their cover story. Last,it was predicted and found that liars perceived the question on the mental imageas significantly more difficult to answer than truth tellers.

The study by Granhag and Knieps (2011) provided strong support for theassumption that tapping essential EFT features, such as the mental image, can behelpful in understanding how statements on the forming of true and false intentionsmay differ. It was found that the processes relevant for constructing a cover story

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(which a guilty suspect needs to mask his/her criminal intentions) were much lesscharacterized by the typical EFT features (e.g., a vivid mental image).

Consistency Over Repeated InterviewsRepeated interviews are more a norm than an exception in real life investi-

gations. However, research on how truthful and deceptive statements change overrepeated interviews is still scarce. To address the development of true and falsestatements over repeated interviews, Granhag and Stromwall (1999) introducedthe so-called repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that de-ceptive statements will be characterized by a relative high degree of repetition,as liars will try hard to remember what they have said in previous interviews. Inaddition, the hypothesis assumes that liars will be careful not to introduce newinformation in later statements. In contrast, the hypothesis predicts that truthfulstatements will follow the basic principles of reconstructive memory (e.g., Badde-ley, 1990), and therefore show a natural variation over repeated interviews. Thatis, over repeated interviews, some details will be lost and other details will beadded. In essence, the “repeat” part of the hypothesis was assumed to hold true fordeceptive statements, whereas the “reconstruct” part was assumed to hold true fortruthful statements. There is empirical support for this hypothesis (e.g., Granhag &Stromwall, 2001; Granhag & Stromwall, 2002; Granhag, Stromwall, & Jonsson,2003).

During recent years researchers have begun to study the topic of repeatedinterviews (e.g. Vrij et al., 2009; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011). Thisnew wave of research shows that the repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis holds truewhen liars and truth tellers are asked questions that are anticipated and when liarshave planned their answers. However, when the interview includes unanticipatedelements the pattern of results is likely to change dramatically. These unanticipatedelements can come in at least two different forms; the question “as such” can beunanticipated (e.g., the suspect is asked for complications that occurred during thecritical event) or the “response format” can be unanticipated (e.g., the suspect maybe asked to sketch a drawing of a room instead of providing a verbal description).A recent study by Vrij and his colleagues (2009) examined this unanticipatedquestions technique. Pairs of liars and truth tellers were interviewed individuallyabout an alleged visit to a restaurant. The conventional opening questions (e.g.,“What did you do in the restaurant?”) were anticipated, whereas the request tosketch the layout of the restaurant was not. Based on the overlap in the two pairmembers’ drawings (consistency), 80% of the liars and truth tellers were classifiedcorrectly (the drawings were less alike for the pairs of liars than for the pairs oftruth tellers), whereas on the basis of the conventional questions the pairs werenot classified above chance level (for more on this, see Vrij, Granhag, & Porter,2010).

We argue that the present study belongs to the new line of research whichexamines the degree of consistency when introducing an unanticipated element.

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But the present study is also different than past research. Specifically, we intro-duced an unanticipated element in the first interview (questions about a mentalimage), and then, for the second interview following after one week, we repeatedthe questions on the participants’ mental images. In brief, we expect that the ques-tions on the mental images will be perceived as unanticipated when asked for thefirst time (in interview 1), but that the same set of questions will be perceivedas much more anticipated when asked for the second time (in interview 2). Aswill be outlined in the following section, we predict that liars will find it moredifficult than truth tellers to answer the unanticipated questions in the first inter-view. In turn, we argue that liars, when asked the same questions in the secondinterview, will try to compensate for their relative poor performance in the firstinterview. In brief, comparing the outcome of the second interview to the outcomeof the first interview, a so-called repairing effect may result in that liars will (a)repeat less information and (b) add more new information, compared to truthtellers.

Last, it should be noted that consistency is a composite measure. That is, toget a detailed understanding of the degree of consistency it is often necessaryto combine a number of different measures (e.g., Granhag et al., 2003). For thepresent study we will tap three such measures: repetitions (details mentionedin both interviews), commissions (details mentioned in the second, but not in thefirst, interview) and omissions (details mentioned in the first, but not in the second,interview).

The Present StudyThe main purpose of the present study was to test the assumption that the

processes relevant for constructing a cover story (which a guilty suspect needsto mask his/her criminal intentions) would contain fewer episodic future thought(EFT) features typically following the forming of true intentions (Granhag &Knieps, 2011). More specifically, we argue that examining typical EFT features,and particularly the reports about mental images, will be helpful to discrimi-nate between individuals who are lying and individuals who are telling the truthabout their intentions. Our first aim was to examine whether liars’ and truthtellers’ descriptions of their mental images differ in terms of consistency overrepeated interviews. To our knowledge, the current study is the first to examinethis question. Our second aim was to examine to what extent we could replicatethe promising findings reported by Granhag and Knieps (2011). The experimentalset-up used for the present study is similar to the one introduced by Granhag andKnieps. In brief, half of the participants—referred to as liars—planned a mockcriminal act (placing a memory stick containing illegal material on a particularshelf in a shop in a mall). In addition, these participants were asked to plan acover story (an alibi), to be used to mask their criminal intentions if stoppedand questioned. The remaining half of our participants—referred to as truth

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tellers—were asked to plan a noncriminal act (shopping for gifts in the samemall).

The mental image of the future (which is a central feature of EFT) was tappedin two different ways. First, all suspects were asked about their planned actionsduring the investigative interview. More specifically, they were asked about thedominant mental image activated during the formation of the stated intentions.Both groups were interviewed at two different occasions with one week (six toeight days) in between. Second, we used a post interview questionnaire to capturehow the suspects had perceived different dimensions of the mental image reported.

During the interview, all suspects were asked whether or not they have hada mental image activated when forming their stated intentions. For truth tellerssuch a mental image was related to the truthful intentions stated, and for liarsthis mental image was related to the false intentions stated. With reference to theEFT framework (e.g., Szpunar, 2010) and previous empirical results (Granhag &Knieps, 2011), we predict that more truth tellers than liars will report that they hadactivated a mental image when planning their stated future actions (Hypothesis1). We also predict that liars will perceive the main question on the mental imageas more difficult to answer compared to truth tellers (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore,we tapped participants’ subjective experiences of the mental image reported. Withrespect to the more global ratings we predict (a) that truth tellers will perceive theplanning of their future actions as being characterized by the activation of mentalimages to a higher extent than liars will perceive the planning of their coverstories, and (b) that truth tellers will pre-experience their future actions as cleareras compared to how liars will pre-experience their cover stories (Hypothesis 3a).With respect to the more specific ratings we predict that truth tellers’ (vs. liars’)perception of the dominant mental image will be clearer and richer in termsof perceptual details, such as temporal and spatial details (Hypothesis 3b). Inaddition, we tapped a number of objective trademarks of the reports on the mentalimages. We expect that the dominant mental image described by truth tellers (vs.liars) would be richer in terms of (a) the number of words (Hypothesis 4a), and(b) the amount of details (Hypothesis 4b). With respect to the consistency overtime, and with general reference to the new wave of studies on the differentialeffects of asking unanticipated questions - and specific reference to the so-calledrepairing effect for liars (introduced previously), we predict that liars’ descriptionswill show a lower degree of repetitions (Hypothesis 5a) and a higher degree ofcommissions (Hypothesis 5b), compared to truth tellers. We did not expect anydifference between liars and truth tellers in terms of omissions.

Method

DesignIn total, 84 subjects (62 women, 22 men) were recruited to participate in the

experiment. Their age ranged from 19 to 65 years (M = 28.43), and all were paid

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150 SEK for their participation (approximately 22 USD). The subjects were ran-domly assigned to either the truth teller or liar condition. A 2 (Veracity: Truthfulvs. deceptive) × 2 (Time: Interview 1 vs. Interview 2) mixed group design was em-ployed with half of the participants being instructed to plan a mock crime (N = 42),and half of the participants being instructed to plan a noncriminal event (N = 42).

ProcedurePlanning Phase

The participants in the liar condition planned to place a memory stick contain-ing “illegal” material on a particular shelf in a shop in a mall (the mock criminalevent). A second task for these participants was to plan a cover story with the maintheme “shopping two gifts for a close friend in the mall” to mask their criminalintentions. This story was to be used if they were intercepted, and to achievehigh comparability between the events that liars and truth tellers told about in theinvestigative interview. That is, we provided a frame for the cover story, but madeit clear that it was up to each participant to fill this frame in order to construct aconvincing cover story. By comparison, the participants in the truth teller conditionwere instructed to “shop two gifts for a close friend in the mall” (the non-criminalevent). All participants had eight minutes time to plan and were offered someextra time if needed (only four participants asked for this extra time). They wereinstructed to carefully plan their future actions and were given access to printedmaps and the internet (this particular mall has its own website, containing detailedinformation on all shops in the mall). In addition, the participants were furthermotivated by a number of explicit constraints; they were instructed that they hadone and only one opportunity to carry out the task, and that they had a limitedamount of time at their disposal. All in all, we used a set-up which encouragedthe participants to envisage themselves acting at a particular time and place in thenear future. After the planning phase, the experimenter returned and conducteda manipulation check to make sure that all participants did indeed believe thatthey next were to execute their planned actions. This was a crucial prerequisite ofthe current study to achieve ecological validity. The experimental set-up used isalmost identical to the set-up used by Granhag and Knieps (2011).

First InterviewImmediately after the planning phase, each participant was brought to a

nearby room where they expected to receive the tram tickets to go to the mall.However, immediately after entering this room they were intercepted. They werehanded a list of instructions asking them to imagine that they now had faceda security check at the entrance of the mall, and that when trying to pass thissecurity check, they had been selected for further questioning. Thereupon, theywere asked to imagine being brought into a nearby interview room where theywere asked to wait and that this interview room was exactly the one in which they

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were currently sitting. Before leaving the room, the experimenter made sure theparticipant understood the instructions and advised the liars to use their cover storyto avoid detection. Moreover, all participants were informed that the interviewerdid not know whether they were lying or telling the truth. The truth tellers whoplanned to shop in the mall were asked to tell the truth about their intentions. That is,both groups were asked to speak about their shopping trip but while this story wasmirroring the truth tellers’ actual intention (i.e., true intentions), speaking aboutthe shopping trip was just a cover story for the liars (i.e., false intentions) to hidetheir criminal intention. Furthermore, all participants were instructed to try to be asconvincing as possible. Also, all participants were individually interviewed witha structured interview protocol asking about their intentions, planning activitiesand the occurrence of a mental image during planning. After the first interview, allparticipants left the psychology department. They were instructed to come back aweek later but they did not get any further information about what would happenthen.

Second InterviewAll participants returned to the department about one week after the first

interview (between six to eight days). They were asked to imagine that they hadleft the mall immediately after the first interview (one week before) and thatthey had never executed their plans (neither shopping nor the mock crime). Allparticipants were asked to imagine that the same persons (the security police) whohad interviewed them a week before, had called them in for another interview.Liars were instructed to again use their cover story and truth tellers were askedto again tell the truth about their planned shopping trip. It was stressed that allparticipants should try to be as convincing as possible. In addition, all participantswere interviewed by a new interviewer who asked them again about the event theyreported a week ago. Both the first and the second interview were audio taped andthe interviewers were blind to the participants’ truth status.

Post Interview QuestionnaireImmediately after the second interview, all participants were asked to com-

plete a post interview questionnaire. Importantly, the liars were explicitly in-structed to answer this questionnaire truthfully and to stop role-playing. It wasensured that this instruction was fully understood. First of all, a manipulationcheck was conducted with the aim of controlling for some basic elements. Tobegin with, the participants rated the degree of veracity of what s/he had statedduring the interview on a 7-point scale running from 1 (everything I told wastrue) to 7 (everything I told was untrue). In addition, all participants were askedto rate some basic features of the planning phase. They were asked to rate howdifficult they experienced the planning on a 7-point scale running from 1 (veryeasy) to 7 (very difficult); they were asked how sufficient they found the time

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allocated for the planning phase (which was 8 minutes, plus 4 more minutes ifneeded) on a scale running from 1 (not at all sufficient) to 7 (totally sufficient);and all participants rated (a) how satisfied they were with the planning and (b)how stimulating (interesting) they found the planning. For both these questions7-point scales were used running from 1 (not at all satisfied/stimulating) to 7 (verysatisfied/stimulating).

Before completing the next section of the post interview questionnaire theinnocent suspects were asked to “Think back about their planning,” whereas theliars were instructed to “Think back about their planning of their cover story.” Thissection consisted of 17 questions of which ten are relevant for the current study(i.e., they have immediate relevance for EFT). Participants rated these questionson 7-point scales ranging from 1 (to a very low extent) to 7 (to a very high extent).The first question was “To what extent did you form a mental image while planningyour errand [cover story]?” Next followed a set of questions based on the MemoryCharacteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) which, in turn, has been derived from thereality monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981). This questionnaire hadpreviously been applied to map the subjective perception during pre-experience ofthe future (e.g., see D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; Szpunar & McDermott,2009). In total, there were eight questions covering the participants’ subjectiveexperiences of the dominant mental image activated during the planning phase.Specifically, three questions covered sensorial details (the degree to which themental image was characterized by (i) visual information, (ii) auditory information,and (iii) smell/taste information); three questions covered spatial information (theextent to which the mental image was characterized by clarity with respect to (i)the spatial location per se, (ii) the spatial location of objects, and (iii) the spatiallocation of persons); and, two questions covered temporal information (the extentto which the mental image was characterized by clarity with respect to (i) the timeof the day and (ii) the temporal order of the event). All these eight questions wereanswered using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (to a very low extent) to 7 (to a veryhigh extent). It should again be stressed that liars were instructed to think aboutand rate the mental image they had activated when planning their cover story (notthe mental image they may have had activated when planning the criminal event).Furthermore, the participants answered the following question “To sum up, howclearly did you pre-experience the future event?” (truth tellers), and “To sum up,how clearly did you pre-experience your cover story?” (liars). The 7-point scaleused for answering this question ranged from 1 (to a very low degree/no strongfeeling of having pre-experienced) to 7 (to a very high degree/a very strong feelingof having pre-experienced).

In the final section, all participants were asked to rate to what extent theyanticipated the main EFT question asked during the interview (i.e., “Did you, atany point during your planning, evoke a mental image of the future event?”). The7-point scale used for answering this question ranged from 1 (very anticipated)to 7 (not at all anticipated). In addition, all participants were asked to rate how

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difficult they found answering this question on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (notat all difficult) to 7 (very difficult).

CodingAll interviews were transcribed verbatim, and in order to test Hypothesis

1 the answers given to the question “At any point during your planning, didyou evoke a mental image of the future event?” were coded (“Yes, a mentalimage was evoked” vs. “No, a mental image was not evoked”). Moreover, to testHypothesis 4a, a computer-based word count was conducted counting the numberof words participants used to describe their most dominant mental image (anynew details told in response to the follow-up question were added to the originalresponse). In order to test Hypothesis 4b, two independent coders evaluated theparticipants’ statements on the mental image based on a modified version ofhow to capture the details of a statement (e.g., Roos af Hjelmsater, Stromwall,& Granhag, 2012; Landstrom, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2005). For this method, thecoders first broke down the sentences into its main clauses and subordinate clausesfollowing the rules of the Swedish grammar. As a result, these clauses ranged fromrather long clauses such as “I saw myself in the shop with the red letters at theshelves nearby” to rather short clauses “I thought (that) . . . ”. Second, the raterswere instructed to identify the smaller information units within the clauses likesubjects, objects and other descriptive contextual details. In the aforementionedexample, these units are “myself,” “shop,” “red,” “letters,” “shelves,” and “nearby.”The third step was to delete (a) all repeated information units, (b) clauses thatdid not include any useful information (e.g., “I tried . . . ”), and (c) clauses thatreferred to other contents than the description of a mental image. For instance,statements expressing a participant’s cognitive processes (e.g., “I did not planto take this entrance because it is usually pretty crowded there”) were not takeninto account. Hence, the richness of detail was determined by the number ofdescriptive information units. Two independent coders scored the amount of detailsin the two interviews. One coder rated 100% and one coder rated 20% of thematerial providing a level of agreement between the coders of 76%. To testHypothesis 5a and 5b, two coders rated whether a particular detail of Interview1 was repeated, or added (a commission error) in Interview 2. One coder rated100% and one coder rated 20% of the material providing a level of agreementbetween the coders of 87%. No additional coding was needed for the post interviewratings.

Results

Manipulation ChecksVeracity

The post interview questionnaire showed that liars (M = 5.31, SD = 1.47)rated the degree of lying significantly higher than truth tellers (M = 1.55,

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SD = 0.83), t(65) = 14.41, p < .001, d = 3.15. Hence, the participants com-plied with the instruction to lie or to tell the truth.

Experience of the Planning PhaseTo test if liars and truth tellers differed in how they experienced the planning

phase, we asked the suspects to rate (a) the satisfaction with the allocated timefor planning, (b) degree of stimulation (degree of interest), (c) satisfaction withthe planning, and (d) degree of difficulty. Liars (M = 6.29, SD = 1.22) weresignificantly more satisfied with the time allocated to plan their future actionscompared to truth tellers (M = 4.74, SD = 1.91), t(70) = 4.42, p < .001, d =0.97. However, one should note that both liars and truth tellers found that theyhad sufficient time to plan as the means for both groups were at the upper end ofthe scale. Liars (M = 4.21, SD = 1.51) and truth tellers (M = 4.64, SD = 1.51)perceived the planning as equally stimulating, t(82) = –1.3, p = .20, d = –0.28.Furthermore, liars (M = 4.90, SD = 1.46) were significantly less satisfied withtheir planning than truth tellers (M = 5.93, SD = .92, t(69) = –3.84, p < .001, d =–0.84), but no difference emerged between liars (M = 2.90, SD = 1.45) and truthtellers (M = 3.02, SD = 1.51) with respect to the perceived degree of difficultyof the planning, t(82) = –0,37, p = .71, d = –0.08). These ratings were on thelower range of the scale, indicating that both liars and truth tellers experienced theplanning as rather easy.

Reporting a Mental Image During the Interview (Hypothesis 1)As there were two different interview occasions, and the participants were

asked about their mental images at both these occasions, there are several waysto compare the liars’ and truth tellers’ responses. When examining how manyparticipants reported at both interviews to have had a mental image activatedwhen forming the intention, it was found that more truth tellers (N = 39, 92.9%)than liars (N = 30, 71.4%) reported to have done this, χ2 (N = 84) = 6.574, p =.01. As expected, examining the result for the two interview occasions separately,the same pattern of results emerged. For Interview 1, the difference between thenumber of truth tellers (N = 39, 92.9%) and liars (N = 33, 78.6%) that reportedto have had a mental image activated when forming the intention was borderingon significance, χ2 (N = 84) = 3.5, p = .061, and for Interview 2 the differencewas significant (N = 39, 92.9% vs. N = 32, 76.2%), χ2 (N = 84) = 4.46, p = .04.In all, the combined evidence supported Hypothesis 1.

Results from the post interview questionnaire showed that all 39 truth tellerswho in both interviews reported to have had a mental image activated during theplanning phase were telling the truth about this. Of the 30 liars who reported inboth interviews to have had a mental image activated during the planning phase, 7lied during the interview. That is, for the investigative interview these 7 individualsreported to have had a mental image activated during the planning phase, but in

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the post interview questionnaire (which was filled out after the role play had beencalled off), they admitted that they had lied about this during the interview.

Perceived Anticipation and Difficulty (Hypothesis 2)Both liars and truth tellers were asked to rate the extent to which they had

anticipated being asked about the mental image that they had activated during theplanning phase. The self-ratings indicated that both groups found this questionequally unanticipated; liars (M = 5.79, SD = 1.26) and truth tellers (M = 5.4,SD = 1.52), t(82) = 1.25, p > .05, d = 0.28. Importantly, the absolute valuesshowed that both groups found this question highly unanticipated (both meanswere at the upper end of the scale). Furthermore, when asked to rate how difficultthey perceived the main question on the mental image, it emerged that liars (M =3.6, SD = 1.82) perceived this question as significantly more difficult to answerthan truth tellers (M = 2.62, SD = 1.61); t(82) = 2.6, p < .05, d = 0.57, supportingHypothesis 2.

Subjective Measures on the Mental Image (Hypothesis 3a and 3b)Global Ratings

In order to address Hypothesis 3a we looked at the outcome of the first andthe last question asked in the post interview questionnaire on the participants’subjective perception of the planning phase with respect to mental images (forMeans and SD’s, see Table 1). The result of the first of these more global ratingsshowed that truth tellers’ planning of their future actions (M = 5.19), and liars’planning of their cover stories (M = 5.17), did not differ in terms of the extentto which it had been characterized by the activation of mental images (t(82) =–.055, p = .956). The outcome of the second global rating showed that the truthtellers’ perceived degree of clarity in terms of pre-experiencing their future actions(M = 5.49) was not different from liars’ perceived degree of clarity in terms ofpre-experiencing their cover stories (M = 5.14), (t(81) = 0.903, p = .369). Hence,we did not find support for Hypothesis 3a.

Specific RatingsClosing in on the participants’ perception of the main mental image that

they had activated it was found that truth tellers (M = 5.69) perceived the spa-tial information with respect to the spatial location as clearer compared to liars(M = 5.02). This difference was bordering on significance, t(82) = –1.92, p =.059. Furthermore, unexpectedly, liars (M = 3.98) rated the temporal informa-tion with respect to the time of the day as significantly clearer than truth tellers(M = 2.85, t(77) = 2.65, p = .01). Furthermore, both groups rated the spatial in-formation with respect to the spatial location of objects and the spatial location ofsubjects present in the mental image and the temporal information with respect to

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TABLE 1. Liars’ and Truth Tellers’ Subjective Ratings of the Mental ImageDerived from the Post Interview Questionnaire

Liars Truth tellers

Subjective ratings M SD M SD d

GlobalExtent, mental image 5.17 2.02 5.19 .94 –0.01Clarity, pre-experience 5.14 1.84 5.49 1.63 –0.20

Specific 5.36 1.75 5.62 1.64 –0.15Visual 2.17 1.40 1.71 1.26 0.35Auditory 1.71 1.37 1.69 1.47 0.01Smell/taste 5.02 1.63 5.69 1.55 0.42Spatial location 5.07 1.81 5.00 1.74 0.04Spatial location of

objects3.17 1.94 3.10 1.82 0.04

Spatial location ofpersons

3.98∗ 2.16 2.85 1.68 0.58

Time of dayTemporal order

4.62 1.71 4.71 1.97 –0.05

Note. All ratings for the liars pertain to how they perceived their cover story. ∗p < .05.

the temporal order as equally clear. In addition, we found no differences betweenliars’ and truth tellers’ ratings for sensorial information (i.e., visual, auditory, andsmell/taste). Hence, we found weak support of Hypothesis 3b.

Objective Measures on the Mental Image (Hypothesis 4a and 4b)Number of Words

A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. deceptive) × 2 (Time: Interview 1 vs. Interview 2)mixed group ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for the within subjectsfactor Time. That is, Interview 1 and Interview 2 did not significantly differ interms of the number of words used to describe the mental image (Interview 1:M = 164.46, SD = 104.92; Interview 2: M = 155.75, SD = 91.06, F(1, 67) =.310, p = .58, η2 = .005. In addition, no significant main effect was found forthe between subjects factor Veracity. Hence, liars (M = 152.52, SD = 88.28) andtruth tellers (M = 165.95, SD = 79.02) did not differ with respect to the numberof words used to describe the main mental image, F(1, 67) = .442, p = .51, d =–0.16. Moreover, the interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 67) = .87, p =.35, η2 = .01. Hence, Hypothesis 4a was not supported.

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TABLE 2. Liars’ and Truth Tellers’ Statement-Consistency (Repetitions, Omis-sions and Commissions) Between Interview 1 and Interview 2

Liars Truth tellers

Absolute Proportions Absolute Proportions

Repetitions 3.97∗ 35.14% 5.64 43.42%Omissions 8.40 63.34% 8.85 57.15%Commissions 8.57 60.38% 9.03 60.18%

∗p < .05 (comparing liars and truth tellers).

Amount of DetailsA 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. Deceptive) × 2 (Time: Interview 1 vs. Interview

2) mixed group ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for the within subjectfactor Time (Interview 1: M = 13.55, SD = 8.8; Interview 2: M = 14.1, SD = 7.84;F(1, 67) = .272, p = .60, η2 = .004). In addition, no main effect was found for thebetween subject factor Veracity, F(1, 67) = 1.74, p = .19, d = –0.33. Furthermore,the data revealed no significant interaction effect, F(1, 67) = .005, p = .95, η2 <

.001. In sum, the results did not lend support for Hypothesis 4b.

Objective Measures of Consistency (Hypothesis 5a and 5b)To compare truthful and deceptive statements in terms of consistency over

the two interviews, we separately examined repeated details, commissions, andomissions. We calculated the absolute numbers as well as the proportions (seeTable 2).

Repeated DetailsOf all details reported in Interview 1, truth tellers (M = 5.64; SD = 3.45)

repeated significantly more of these details in Interview 2 than did liars (M =3.97; SD = 2.75), t(67) = –2.18, p = .03, d = 0.54. Hence, we found supportfor Hypothesis 5a. Turning to proportions, during Interview 2 the truth tellersrepeated 43.42% of the details that they had reported in Interview 1, whereas theliars (during Interview 2) repeated 35.14% of the details that they had reportedin Interview 1. This difference was not significant, t(67) = –1.73, p = .09, d =–0.42.

CommissionsIn terms of the absolute numbers, there was no difference between truth

tellers (M = 9.03 SD = 4.84) and liars (M = 8.57; SD = 7.08) with respect to the

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number of commissions made in Interview 2, t(67) = –.32, p = .75, d = 0.08. Theproportion analysis showed that liars (60.38%) and truth tellers (60.18%) added asimilar amount of new information in Interview 2, t(48) = .04, p = .97, d = 0.01.Hence, we did not find support for Hypothesis 5b.

OmissionsWith respect to absolute numbers, of all details mentioned in Interview 1,

truth tellers (M = 8.85; SD = 6.64) and liars (M = 8.4; SD = 6.14) omitted anequal amount of details in Interview 2, t(67) = –.29, p = .78, d = 0.07. Notsurprisingly, the results for the proportions followed the same pattern. That is,truth tellers (57.15%) and liars (63.34%) omitted about the same proportion ofinformation in Interview 2, t(67) = 1.25, p = .22, d = 0.31.

Discussion

Our overarching goal was to test the assumption that the tapping of episodicfuture thought (EFT), and more specifically, reports about mental images, is away forward in discriminating between individuals stating false intentions andindividuals stating true intentions. We had two specific aims. The first aim wasto examine to what extent liars’ and truth tellers’ descriptions of their mentalimages differ in terms of consistency over repeated interviews. To our knowledge,this particular question has not been examined in previous research. The secondaim was to examine to what extent the promising findings reported by Granhagand Knieps (2011) could be replicated. To address these questions we used anexperimental set-up introduced by Granhag and Knieps (2011). Importantly, thisset-up accommodates the main characteristics of intention (e.g., the participantshad to carefully plan their own future actions) and it allows for episodic futurethought (e.g., the participants were encouraged to envisage themselves acting at aparticular time and place in the near future).

Main FindingsPlanning

Analyzing the self-reports made in the post interview questionnaire on basicfeatures of the planning phase, we found that liars were significantly more satisfiedwith the time allocated for the planning phase than were truth tellers. However,and importantly, the means showed that both groups of suspects found the timeallocated for the planning phase sufficient. Second, we found that liars weresignificantly less satisfied with their planning than truth tellers, a finding to whichwe will return below. Last, we found that liars and truth tellers did not differ withrespect to (a) how stimulating and (b) how difficult they found the planning to be.In fact, both groups indicated that they experienced the planning as a rather easy,but still stimulating, task.

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Reports of a Mental Image (Hypothesis 1)Turning to the responses given during the interview, we found that truth telling

(innocent) suspects, more frequently than lying (guilty) suspects, reported that theyhad evoked a mental image while planning their future actions. In fact, almost all ofthe innocent suspects (93%) claimed in both interviews to have activated a mentalimage during the planning phase, whereas significantly fewer guilty suspects(71%) made the same claim. This finding supported our hypothesis and we wereable to replicate the findings by Granhag and Knieps (2011). Importantly, thisresult adds to previous EFT research suggesting that there is a strong link betweenthe forming of an intention and the activation of a mental image (e.g., Schacteret al., 2008).

Perceived Anticipation and Difficulty (Hypothesis 2)Liars and truth tellers did not differ in how anticipated they perceived the

question on the mental image to be. Importantly, both groups perceived this ques-tion as highly unanticipated, which was in line with our expectation. Furthermore,we found that liars (vs. truth tellers) perceived the question on the mental imageas significantly more difficult to answer. Hence, we found support for our predic-tion and were again able to replicate the findings by Granhag and Knieps (2011).This result adds to the emerging line of research showing that lying during aninterview is often more cognitively demanding than telling the truth (e.g., Vrij,Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006). This particular finding may also help explain whyliars were less satisfied than truth tellers with their planning. It is reasonable toargue that someone’s satisfaction with a plan is assessed in light of the outcomeof the event planned for (in our case, the performance during the investigativeinterview). Furthermore, there is recent empirical data suggesting that liars’ mainstrategy during the planning before an upcoming interview is to come up with acover story that will help them to answer questions on their intentions (Clemens,Granhag, & Stromwall, 2011). Therefore, it is only logical that the liars in ourstudy were surprised when asked about the planning phase, including their mentalimages of the future. These unanticipated questions put them in trouble, evidencedby the fact that they found the question on the mental image as more difficult toanswer compared to truth tellers. In short, their planning did not prepare themvery well for some elements of the interview. Hence, perceiving the interview asdifficult may result in a low level of satisfaction with respect to one’s performanceduring the planning phase.

Subjective Measures on the Mental Image (Hypothesis 3a and 3b)We found that truth tellers’ planning of their future actions and liars’ planning

of their cover stories did not differ with respect to the activation of mental im-ages. Similarly, truth tellers did not pre-experience their future actions as clearercompared to how liars pre-experienced their cover stories. Hence, we did not find

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support for Hypothesis 3a, and we were not able to replicate the findings reportedby Granhag and Knieps (2011).

Furthermore, and again in contrast to the findings reported by Granhag andKnieps (2011), we did not find any clear differences between liars’ and truthtellers’ perception on their mental images. We examined several different dimen-sions, and for most of these we did not detect any differences between liars andtruth tellers (e.g., the temporal order of events and the spatial location of objects).The only difference that emerged was related to the suspects’ perception of thespatial information regarding the location in the mental image. That is, the truthtellers perceived this particular aspect of the spatial information as clearer com-pared to the liars. This difference was bordering on significance. Our analysis alsorevealed an unexpected difference, in that liars perceived the temporal informa-tion with respect to the time of the day in the mental image as significantly clearerthan truth tellers. Our data do not allow us to fully explain this finding, but wespeculate that two factors may have contributed to this result. First, the time of theday was the only aspect that the liars were not forced to lie about in the interview(in order to mask their illegal intentions). Second, the time of day was the onlydimension that overlapped perfectly between the mental image that liars may hadactivated of their illegal intentions and the mental image that they evoked for thecover story. These two factors combined might explain why the temporal infor-mation in the mental image came out as particular strong for the liars during theinterview.

All in all, in terms of the suspects’ subjective perception we were not able toreplicate the findings by Granhag and Knieps (2011), and we attribute this to acrucial difference between the two studies. For the present study the participantswere asked about their perception of the mental images that they had activated oneweek ago (during the planning phase). In contrast, the participants in the studyby Granhag and Knieps were asked a few minutes after that the mental imageshad been activated. One might speculate that the one week interval for the currentstudy reduced the differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ perception of theirmental images (see e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).

Objective Measures on the Mental Image (Hypothesis 4a and 4b)Our analysis showed no differences between liars and truth tellers in terms

of the number of words used to describe the mental image, nor did we find anydifferences in terms of the amount of details in the reports. Therefore we were notable to replicate the findings by Granhag and Knieps (2011), who found that truthtellers’ (vs. liars’) reports on their mental images were richer in terms of words.This discrepancy cannot be explained by any difference in terms of set-up betweenthe two studies. That is, for both studies the mental image was described in aninterview that followed shortly after that the participants had been intercepted. Atthis point we have no explanation for why we failed to replicate this particular

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finding, other than speculating that the number of words might be a too crudemeasure to tap differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ mental images.

Consistency (Hypothesis 5)With reference to the new wave of studies on how truth tellers’ and liars’ level

of consistency is affected by asking unanticipated questions (e.g., Vrij et al., 2009;Leins et al., 2011), we predicted that liars’ answers would reach a relatively lowerdegree of consistency over time. We found support for our prediction that liars’(vs. truth tellers’) reports were characterized by a lower degree of repetitions.However, we failed to find support for our prediction that liars’ (vs. truth tellers’)reports would be characterized by more commissions. Hence, we found onlypartial support for our reasoning that liars’ responses during the second interviewwould be colored by a so-called repairing effect. The degree of consistency isoften tapped by a number of different measures, and for the present study we usedthree such measures (repetitions, omissions and commissions). For the future, itmight be of interest to use more fine grained measures to tap the developmentover time, for example, changes in the level of specificity of the informationreported.

LimitationsThis study comes with a number of limitations, and we will acknowledge four

of these. The first two pertain to the experimental set-up, and the latter two pertainto our analysis. First, mental images may come without forming an intention (e.g.,I can see myself falling from the roof of a building, without any intention eversetting my foot on the roof of that building), and an intention may come withoutany mental images (e.g., forming an intention of a script like routine activity likedoing the dishes may very well come without any mental images). However, theknowledge possibly emerging from studies like the current is mainly to be appliedin situations where the intender is likely to have planned his actions, and thereforealso having evoked mental images (e.g., buying a weapon, departure from anairport, signing up for specialist training). Second, and in a similar vein, manyintentions that we form are only loosely (if at all) tied to an exact time and place inthe future. For the present study both the legal and illegal intentions formed wereclearly positioned in terms of time and place. More specifically, the intentionsformed were all related to a single act, to be performed in the near future, andat a specific place. That is, the results of the current examination can only begeneralized to such situations. Third, we used a number of different measuresto map EFT (and specifically so the suspects’ mental images). However, onlywhat the suspects report during the actual investigative interview is of value in anapplied context. That is, the suspects’ perception of their mental images is of littleor no applied value. In fact, it would be rather naive to ask real-life suspects abouttheir subjective perception. The reasons for asking our participants about their

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subjective perception of their mental images was for us to learn more about thetrademarks of the mental images activated during the planning phase. We believethat future research may profit from gathering more detailed information aboutthe participants’ subjective experiences of their mental images. This may leadto an increased understanding of the processes behind the formation of mentalimages. Furthermore, we may obtain important additional knowledge by mappingindividual differences with respect to mental imagery capacity, and relate suchdifferences to the reports elicited during an investigative interview. Fourth, ouranalysis with respect to the content of the suspects’ mental images was ratherlimited in terms of depth. That is, we used only a few and rather crude quantitativemeasures, like the number of words and the amount of details and some basicmeasures for tapping consistency over time. Clearly, for future research it wouldbe important to conduct a more fine grained analysis of the content of the mentalimages reported (see e.g., D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; D’Argembeau, Ortoleva,Jumentier, & van der Linden, 2010).

Final ReflectionWe asked our suspects to go back in time to the mental images that they

have had of the future when they planned the intentions stated in an investigativeinterview. By doing so we were able to elicit a cue that, at least to some extent,discriminated between liars and truth tellers. That is, significantly more truthtellers than liars reported to have had such a mental image activated during theplanning phase. This cue cannot be used as a stop rule, as two thirds of all liarsalso claimed to have activated a mental image during the planning phase. In brief,reports of “not having had” a mental image activated during the planning phaseseem to be of more value than reports of having had a mental image activated. Thelie detection capacity of our approach is limited further by the fact that we foundonly few differences analyzing the content of the mental images reported on. Insum, paying attention to if a mental image is reported upon seems to be of higherdiscriminative value than paying attention to how the mental image is described.

Furthermore, we believe that the knowledge resulting from the present studymay have applied value. Many interviews that are conducted in intelligence andsecurity settings are focused on intentions (Granhag, 2010), and it is crucial thatinterrogators and analysts are able to determine whether the statements elicited aretruthful. We do not argue that asking about mental images of the future will detectevery single case of false intentions. However, as both theory (Schacter et al., 2008)and empirical data (the current study and Granhag & Knieps, 2011) support theassumption that the forming of true intentions are to a higher extent characterizedby central EFT features than false intentions, we believe that questions aboutmental images could be added to already existing interview protocols. Last, webelieve that the current study, on a more general level, adds to the growing literatureon asking strategic questions in order to elicit and enhance cues to deception andtruth (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011b).

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FUNDING

This research was supported by a grant from the Swedish Research Council(2009-1343) given to P. A. Granhag.

AUTHOR NOTES

Melanie Knieps is a PhD candidate at the University of Gothenburg. Her cur-rent research interests are deception detection, true and false intentions, episodicfuture thoughts, and mental images. Par Anders Granhag is Professor of Psy-chology at the University of Gothenburg. His current research interests concernvarious areas of psychology and law such as deception detection, investigativepsychology, investigative interviewing (including the Strategic Use of Evidence(SUE) technique), true and false intentions, eyewitness testimony and legal de-cision making. Aldert Vrij is Professor of Applied Social Psychology at theUniversity of Portsmouth. His current research interests concern various areas ofpsychology and law such as nonverbal and verbal cues to deception (i.e., how doliars behave and what do they say), lie detection, true and false intentions, and thecognitive approach to lie detection.

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Original manuscript received December 16, 2011Final version accepted September 5, 2012

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Back to the Future: Asking About Mental Images to Discriminate Between True and False Intentions

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